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OFFICE OF POLICY AND STRATEGIES  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WORKING PAPER

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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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
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Union of South Africa

9. Government to discuss minority problem with India and Pakistan

The preliminary India-Pakistan-South Africa conference next month in Durban on the treatment of South Africa's Indian minority reflects primarily the Union's desire to build public favor abroad by observing the UNGA recommendation for such a conference. But because the Union Government has no real intention of affording its Indian-Pakistani minority better treatment except by repatriation, it is doubtful that the conferees will agree upon any constructive approach to the problem upon which to base a subsequent formal meeting. There has been some speculation that Pakistan and perhaps India may lift their boycott of South Africa prior to the conference as the Union has suggested, chiefly to obtain the commercial advantage of again exporting jute bags to South Africa, but this possibility has been publicly denied, according to a Reuters report, by a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman.

IRELAND

10. Costello Government faces difficult tests in new Dail session

Although there is a possibility of its breaking up on some controversial issue, particularly social welfare, Prime Minister Costello's "inter-party Government" will probably survive the crucial Parliamentary session commencing 26 October. A return of De Valera would not be as significant for domestic affairs as for foreign affairs, where Ireland could then be expected to be more isolationist and neutrality-minded. However, as the five parties and the independent deputies supporting the Government were brought together not by common policies and objectives but by common opposition to De Valera, it is in controversial domestic issues that the greatest dangers for the Government lie. The next Dail session will probably be dominated by such issues, which are appropriate for the Opposition's favorite tactic of attempting to exploit the divergences that have inevitably developed within the paradoxical coalition of Right and Left.

The most dangerous issue from the Government's point of view is social welfare. The Labor Party is demanding, and

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has been promised, a codification and expansion of social welfare legislation, but the conservative Minister for Finance is resisting. In a background of an expected rise in the cost of living and renewed demands for wage increases, the drive for an expanded social security program has an especial urgency. A failure to develop an acceptable program would split the coalition, and the Government cannot much longer postpone making its proposals. The odds are that it will somehow manage to agree on a program acceptable to all of its present supporters.

SCANDINAVIAN BRANCH

NORWAY

1. Mixed reaction to absence of Communists in Storting

The elimination of Communists from the Storting is considered unfortunate by the Norwegian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who believe that the absence of this safety valve may drive the Communists underground. The Secretary General of the Labor Party, however, welcomes the election results on the grounds that they may hasten a schism because each faction will blame the other for the poor showing.

The Communists have addressed a memorandum to the Storting Presidential Committee (composed of present and past presidents of the Storting) charging them with the responsibility for assuring representation of the approximately 100,000 voters who supported the Communist candidates. Justification for this demand is based on the Agrarian representation of twelve seats for roughly the same total vote as received by the Communists.

There is certain to be increased pressure for revision of the electoral law which created such disproportionate representation and obviously favors the larger parties, but the Communists as well as the other small parties cannot benefit before the next election, in all probability four years hence.

OSLO

2. Who will bell the cat?

The minority Social Democratic Government averted an immediate parliamentary crisis by attaining, after prolonged

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debate, a vote of confidence. The solution is only temporary, and general elections may yet be held, for the Government's continuance in office rests solely on the fact that the majority of the Moderate Liberal Party, the strongest opposition party, abstained from voting. The combined votes of the other opposition parties (Conservative, Justice, and Communist) were insufficient to unseat the government.

Although clearly unwilling at this moment to unseat the Government and thus provoke a general election, the Moderate Liberals can not afford to reverse their present position by giving full support to the Government.\* Their position is delicate since for the time being, at least, they must continue to attack the Government but not so strongly as to precipitate elections. Abstention from the vote of confidence was a strategic retreat from a politically untenable position.

The Social Democratic Government, although it could face an election with reasonable confidence that it would be returned to office, does not at present wish to bear the responsibility for precipitating an election knowing that it would then be exposed to the opposition's charges that it had refused to wait until debates on specific legislative proposals had demonstrated whether a basis for continued cooperation existed.

To date, only the position of the Communists in the Rigsdag appears to be clarified. Until early 1949 the Communists supported the Government on most domestic issues, and the Government depended on Communist votes, as well as on those of the Radical Liberal Party, to assure its Rigsdag majority. Early in 1949, however, the Communists voted against a Government finance measure and since that time there has been some speculation as to their future course of action. Their vote against the Government in this instance seems to indicate that in the future the Communists will obstruct rather than support the Social Democratic Government.

\* See NB Weekly No 85, 10 October

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