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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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FOREIGN RADIODROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL
IN EAST GERMANY

CIA/RR FR-54

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FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL
IN EAST GERMANY*

Summary and Conclusion

From the available evidence, it is clear that East Germany continues to be a fertile target, especially from the proximity of West Berlin and West Germany, for exploitation by foreign radiobroadcasting directed into that domain. This conclusion is supported by the following:

1. The availability of large numbers of suitable receivers in the hands of the populace.
2. The propensity of the average East German to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially RIAS. (Radio in the American Sector, Berlin), produced by a combination of native curiosity, pan-Germanism, known welfare inadequacies, and, in marked contrast, the better economic status of West Germans.
3. The failure of jamming to blot out completely foreign broadcast reception.
4. The failure or unwillingness of the Russians or the East German SED hierarchy to solve the problem of foreign broadcast listening by imposing drastic prohibitive measures, such as confiscation of all radiobroadcast receivers capable of such reception.
5. The absence of any other rapid media of mass communication to replace the present basic radiobroadcasting system in use in East Germany today.
6. Possible undermining, by persons within East German radio officialdom potentially susceptible to disloyalties, of Kremlin-inspired East German Government efforts to solve the foreign broadcast menace and domestic broadcast ineffectualities.

East Germany, since the end of World War II, has become the target of an increasing volume of foreign broadcast transmissions. The program content of these transmissions ranges from pro-Western to "objective" to pro-Soviet.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 January 1954. However, some material of a later date has been included.

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Historically, Germany has been among the leading nations of the World in the development and use of radio as a medium of mass communication. It was one of the earliest nations to recognize and use radio broadcasts as a propaganda weapon. At the end of World War II, its radiobroadcasting facilities were partly destroyed, damaged, sold, or confiscated. East Germany's radiobroadcasting service got off to a slow and unsure start under Soviet control and restraint. It lacked key trained personnel and effective organization and management. Domestic production of broadcast equipment and receivers for home consumption was almost at a standstill. Even after substantial production was revived, the Russians did not permit retention of a significant amount of newly produced East German broadcast equipment for home use until 1952. Also in that year, the Russians began to return German professionals to their homes in East Germany. Technical radio management was completely reorganized and integrated. Radiobroadcasting organization and management was completely revamped and put on a centralized basis for better control of facilities and program content and of the security level of its personnel.

Great progress has been made since 1952, but there are indications that neither the Russians nor the SED Party Hierarchy in East Germany are yet satisfied. A plan to reorganize the present State Radio (Broadcasting) Committee, reported to have been drawn up in March 1953, has not been implemented, however, even after the provocation, if it were needed, brought home by the effectiveness of broadcasts from West Germany which helped to spread the East German riots in June 1953.

The Nazi broadcasting system transmission base remained virtually at a constant dimension during the decade ending in 1941. Some facilities were damaged, destroyed, or confiscated in consequence of World War II and Soviet occupation. The East German transmission base, however, had been nearly restored to its prewar condition within 5 years of the end of hostilities. Possibly influenced by the Soviet philosophy of dependence on very high power transmitters, the East Germans have almost tripled their total transmitter power during the last 3 years. This increase in transmission should make it much more difficult to penetrate the area with Western broadcasts effectively and should provide much better coverage of Western Europe by East German stations.

Although the number of broadcast receivers in service had fallen to a relatively low point by the end of World War II, a steady growth has brought the number up to an estimated 3.7 to 4 million today. These figures include a few very high frequency and television receivers. The geographical distribution of radio receivers follows generally the same pattern as the distribution of the population. By far the great bulk

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of receivers in operation are relatively insensitive, many with only one tube, and in general of a poor quality, reflecting shortages of material and poor workmanship. These receivers are hardly capable of satisfactory reception of high-frequency transmission from foreign countries. There is some development of wire-diffusion systems in public places, factories, and newly constructed apartment houses, and a few, apparently, in private homes. Much of the East German production of electrical equipment has gone for reparations and export. The prohibitively high prices charged for receivers and the conditions surrounding their purchase tend to make it hard for the average citizen to acquire them.

There are no formal laws, decrees, or statutes specifically forbidding listening to foreign radiobroadcasts. There has been, however, a steady increase in the harassing measures adopted by the East German regime to restrict this practice. These measures involve both legal and political restrictions (surveillance, intimidation, insinuation) and technical interference with reception through jamming operations. There are definite restrictions on the viewing of television programs and permits to own a set are held to a minimum.

The present jamming facilities in East Germany are capable of reducing seriously the potential East German audience for Western broadcasts. This is done by the use of both high-power and medium-power transmitters strategically located and of low-power local jammers which distribute their signals over electric power lines.

In spite of countermeasures, Western broadcasts have been effective in East Germany. A large audience listens regularly to Western programs. The effect upon East German listeners has had widespread political and economic reverberations. Among Western stations, RIAS (Radio in the American Sector, Berlin) has been in the forefront of popularity among East German listeners. RIAS broadcasts reportedly were effective in spreading news of the 17 June 1953 riots throughout East Germany. News and political programs are the most popular programs broadcast by Western stations.

The radio audience in East Germany has become an increasingly attractive target for Western exploitation. This exploitation is welcomed by a large part of the audience. Accordingly, foreign broadcast transmission into East Germany has increased over-all since the end of World War II. To counter this, the East German radiobroadcast service has moved toward centralized control, integration, and improvement in the effectiveness of its radiobroadcasting propaganda weapon at home and abroad, particularly in West Germany. Incompetence, subversion, and

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security vulnerabilities of personnel associated with the East German radio-broadcast service have forced the authorities to improve the screening and training of employees and applicants. Organizationally, 1952 was the critical and dynamic year, but some evidence shows that the many cure-all actions taken that year have not yet solved East Germany's radiobroadcasting problems.

Trends point toward increasing foreign exploitation of East German listeners. Managerially and organizationally, East Germany, probably under Soviet insistence and direction, has been moving dynamically on all fronts since early 1952 toward greatly improving the effectiveness of the broadcasting resource in its East German and West German political and other missions. Although the trend is upward on availability of East German receivers, it is levelling off or receding on the number capable of foreign reception. The East German transmission base trend has been upward in terms of total power being used, clearly for purposes of "capturing" both the East German and West German audience. The jamming trend and its degree of effectiveness have been rising and will probably continue in that direction. A slight trend is perceived in the direction of possible alternative systems, such as frequency modulation (FM) and TV, wire diffusion, and group listening, possibly designed to yield ultimately a "captive" audience, at least insofar as foreign broadcasting is concerned.

I. Transmission Facilities of Foreign Broadcasters to East Germany (Aural).

Seven Communist countries, 7 Western countries (excluding West Germany), and 4 organizations operating in West Germany beam a weekly total of 248.5 hours of original programs into East Germany, exclusive of entertainment. Although a considerable portion of this broadcast time is designed for both West German and East German listeners, all of it has potential reception in East Germany and is therefore significant to this study.

Table 1* shows the breakdown, by country, of foreign broadcasts to East Germany. It will be noted that programs by local West German stations are not included in this table, for reasons discussed in I, G, below.

* Table 1 follows on p. 5.

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Table 1

Reported Foreign Radiobroadcasts to East Germany (Aural)
 Weekly Program Hours (Non-Entertainment)
 and Number of Frequencies Used, by Type 1/*
 January 1954

	Original Weekly Program Hours	Number of Frequencies			
		Very High a/**	High b/	Medium c/	Low d/
<u>Communist Countries</u>					
USSR	35	0	13	2	0
Poland	23.5	0	8	1	1
Czechoslovakia	9	0	0	1	0
Rumania	12.5	0	4	0	0
Yugoslavia	9	0	2	1	0
Hungary	7	0	2	1	0
Bulgaria	5	0	2	0	0
Total	<u>101</u>				
<u>Western Countries (Except West Germany)</u>					
Switzerland	32	0	2	0	0
UK	21	0	2	1	1
France	6.5	0	1	1	0
Italy	5	0	3	0	0
Vatican City	5	0	5	0	1
Spain	2	0	2	0	0
Turkey	2	0	1	0	0
VOA	6.5	0	15	0	0
Total	<u>80</u>				

* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in Appendix 1.
 ** Footnotes for Table 1 follow on p. 6.

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Table 1

Reported Foreign Radiobroadcasts to East Germany (Aural)
 Weekly Program Hours (Non-Entertainment)
 and Number of Frequencies Used, by Type 1/
 January 1954
 (Continued)

	Original Weekly Program Hours	Number of Frequencies			
		Very High ^{a/}	High ^{b/}	Medium ^{c/}	Low ^{d/}
<u>West Germany</u>					
RIAS	46	1	1	3	0
RFR (Radio Free Russia)	18	0	2	0	0
Radio Liberation	3.5	0	1	0	0
Total	<u>67.5</u>				
Grand Total	<u>248.5</u>				

- a. Very high frequencies (VHF) extend from 30 to 300 megacycles (mc) and are often referred to as "very short waves."
 b. High frequencies extend from 3,000 to 30,000 kilocycles (kc) and are often referred to as "short waves."
 c. Medium frequencies extend from 300 to 3,000 kilocycles and are often referred to as "medium waves."
 d. Low frequencies extend from 30 to 300 kilocycles and are often referred to as "long waves."

Actual reception potential is much greater than this table would indicate, since many of the Western broadcasts are repeated at later hours. None of the broadcasts from Communist countries are repeated, although most of them are transmitted on several frequencies simultaneously.

Of the 248.5 hours of original programs, 101 originate in Communist countries (including Yugoslavia), 80 in non-German Western countries, and 67.5 are beamed from West Germany. It should be pointed out that a majority

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of the 67.5 hours beamed from West Germany are carried by stations which are owned or controlled by US interest, either officially or by citizens' committees.

The outstanding broadcaster to East Germany is the organization known as RIAS, or Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin). It operates around the clock and carries programs that are of interest to both East and West Germans.

This report is based upon the latest available information, but it must be realized that frequencies and programing may change from day to day and certainly from month to month. It is felt, however, that the over-all picture remains relatively constant and that the composite study presented will remain reasonably accurate until major changes in broadcast policy are effected.

A. RIAS -- Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor -- Berlin (Radio in the American Sector).

RIAS has transmitters at Britz, in the US Sector of Berlin, and at Hof, in the US Sector of West Germany near the Czechoslovak and East German borders. At Britz there are 4 transmitters, 2 of them on medium frequency, 1 on high frequency, and 1 on a very high frequency unit employing frequency modulation (FM) type of emission. The 40-kilowatt (kw) transmitter at Hof operates on medium frequency. 2/

RIAS has maintained continuous broadcasting since early 1952. 3/ At least one frequency in each category, -- medium, high, and very high-- is in operation from 0500 to 0305 (GMT). The gap from 0305 to 0500 (GMT) is filled by a second medium frequency unit which operates from 1500 to 0500 (GMT); a third medium frequency transmitter is in operation from 0700 to 1800 (GMT). 4/

Most of the material prepared for East German listeners by the Voice of America (VOA) in Munich and New York is relayed by RIAS, but this represents a very small fraction of the total RIAS transmissions. 5/

RIAS, though controlled by the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), is essentially a German station for the German people. 6/ Originally designed to reach the people of West Berlin, it operated only as a wire-diffusion unit, by interconnection with the Berlin telephone system, for the first 6 months after its inception in early 1946. 7/ As the capacity and facilities of RIAS expanded, it gained recognition throughout Germany. Although many other transmitters are beamed toward East Germany, RIAS has by far the strongest and most extensive voice. 8/

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Approximately one-third of RIAS programs (52 hours a week) are of an informative nature. Of this, 24 hours a week are devoted to news coverage or comments on the news. 9/ The remainder consists of music, plays, and the like.

B. Voice of America (VOA).

The Voice of America spends comparatively little time or money in trying to reach the ears of East Germans, 10/ probably because it is felt that RIAS is doing a good job. VOA, New York, prepares and transmits 1 hour of material daily except Sunday for East German consumption, employing from 3 to 8 high frequencies. 11/ This material is also relayed by Tangier, Africa. RIAS picks up 3 of the 15 minute programs for relay and repeat broadcasts, and several local West German stations handle the fourth program. 12/ These four programs consist mostly of news, press comments, interviews, topical reports, and spotlights on US life. A special Thursday program features "USA -- Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." In addition, there is a one-half hour Sunday program "Answers to Listeners' Letters and Stamp Corner," which is also transmitted by RIAS, from preshipped tape. No VOA transmitters in West Germany are employed to beam German-language material to the East German people. 13/

Probably the most significant function of VOA, as far as East German listeners is concerned, is the Russian-language programming designed for Soviet occupation troops stationed in the Satellite countries. 14/ These programs are broadcast over numerous medium- and high-frequency channels, and most of them could be picked up by the troops in East Germany, whether or not specifically beamed toward them. Such programs are not, however, represented in Table 1, because they are not specifically designed for or beamed to the territory of East Germany.

C. Radio Free Europe (RFE).

Although there are about 600 Germans on the Munich staff of RFE, 15/ there is no more than a token appeal to East Germany and it is not included in Table 1. Primary target areas of RFE are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. 16/

D. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

BBC beams 21 hours of original programs weekly to Germany, using 1 low, 1 medium, and 2 high frequencies. 17/ Some of the BBC programming has in the past been especially designed for East German listeners, but for the most part it is of a general nature for German-speaking peoples of

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varying political inclinations. 18/ A one-half hour program is relayed from Montreal once a week. 19/ All of these transmissions are carried on the medium frequency and at least 1 of the high frequencies, but only 1 hour a day is transmitted on low frequency. 20/

BBC concentrates on objective coverage of the news, but includes fill-in music and feature programs that depict daily life of the Western World as well as programs which point up British appreciation for problems of European peoples. 21/

E. Radio Liberation.

Radio Liberation, sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., went on the air 1 March 1953 with a 10-kw high-frequency transmitter located at Munich. 22/ Broadcasts are beamed to East Germany in the Russian language and are apparently designed to appeal to the elite of the Soviet occupation forces, since the operation is supported by the Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, also located in Munich. 23/

Radio Liberation begins the broadcast day with a one-half hour program of news and features, carried on 3 high frequencies; 1 is beamed to East Germany, 1 to Austria, and the third to the USSR. From 0330 to 2300 (GMT), this program is repeated continuously on the East German frequency. 24/ Thus the Radio Liberation effort shows as only 3.5 hours a week of original programs, although the total weekly broadcasts, as far as reception potential is concerned, amounts to 140 hours.

F. Radio Free Russia (RFR).

Radio Free Russia (RFR) is a mobile, clandestine unit operating on high frequency, controlled by the Natsionalno Trudovey Soyuz (National Worker's Union -- NTS). 25/ Programs are in Russian with no rebroadcast in the German language, as was the practice in 1951. 26/ RFR is the only known non-Communist radio station operated by Russians and has as its objective an internal resistance to Communist pressure by the formation of underground cells, each with 2 or 3 members, that would listen to RFR broadcasts for guidance in their activities. 27/ In addition to special broadcasts designed for the common soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces, 28/ RFR periodically sends "operational messages," 29/ and comments on matters of international interest and Soviet internal affairs. 30/

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NFR is on the air 18 hours a week. 31/ Its transmitter (or transmitters) operate with low power, but a study [redacted] shows that its signal is receivable about 75 percent of the time, probably in part due to frequent changes in transmitting frequency over a rather wide range, which helps to reduce the effect of Soviet jamming.

G. Other Western Broadcasters.

Six other non-Communist countries transmit 52 hours of program time a week in the German language for Germany, using 1 low, 1 medium, and 14 high frequencies. 32/ News and comments on the news are featured in these broadcasts.

Except for Vatican City, which employs 1 low and 5 high frequencies, and France, which uses 1 medium and 1 high frequency, all of these transmissions are carried by high frequency. 33/

Switzerland is high in this category, with 32 hours of broadcast time in the German language. The other countries are France -- 6.5 hours, Italy and Vatican City -- 5 hours each, and Spain and Turkey -- 2 hours each.

It will be noted that programs carried by local West German stations are not included, although in many cases they are received by East German residents and come under the general category of "foreign stations" as far as East Germany is concerned. The reason such programs are not included is that there is no reasonable place to draw the line: that is, it would be obviously inaccurate to list all transmissions by local West German stations. It would be less inaccurate, but would nevertheless present a confusing picture, to include only the NWDR (Nordwest Deutsche Rundfunk) network. Therefore the dichotomy has been on the basis of whether or not the stations operating in West Berlin and West Germany have intentionally beamed their programs to East German residents. Since NWDR is just getting into this field, it is not included, although any future study of this nature would have to take its facilities into consideration.

H. Foreign Communist Broadcasters.

Communist countries, exclusive of East Germany, transmit 101 program hours in the German language to East Germany, using 1 low, 6 medium, and 31 high frequencies. The USSR leads this group with 35 hours, followed by Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in that order. Most of these programs are devoted to the news, or are related to news items.

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All of the programs broadcast by the USSR to East Germany are carried on at least 4 frequencies, and 1 of the half-hour programs is carried on 2 medium and 8 high frequencies. 34/

Of the 13 high frequencies used by the USSR in these broadcasts, 12 emanate from Moscow, the other from Leningrad. One of the Soviet medium-frequency transmitters is in Kaunas, Lithuania. 35/ The other, a 100-kw medium-frequency unit, operates in Leipzig, East Germany, but is under Soviet control. It is used to relay some of the programs originated by Radio Moscow. 36/

II. East Germany Broadcasting System.

A. Early History.

1. German Leadership in the Field of Radio.

Historically, at least until the end of World War II, Germany was among the leading nations of the world in the development and use of radio as a medium of communication. It kept pace with other technologically modern countries of the period. In many instances it outran them. By the beginning of World War II, Germany had built up a huge radio research and development capacity. It had prolific radio equipment productive facilities. While consuming large quantities of its own production to build up its own operational communication resources, it was able to export large quantities of radio equipment. During the period, Germany had evolved mass technological and organizational "know-how" and the necessary trained manpower pool.

Germany's radio history dates from 1897 at least. In that year radiotelegraph communication over a short distance took place in that country. Radiobroadcasting, as a voice medium of rapid mass communication, was initiated in 1923 with the establishment of a transmitting station in Berlin. It was about this time that the practical applications of the vacuum tube, both for transmission and reception, began to be heavily exploited. High-frequency radiobroadcasting was commenced there in 1929. In 1930, television picture transmission was conducted and very-high-frequency radio was employed on German railroads. In the same year, public address and wire diffusion facilities became associated with radiobroadcasting. As early as 1936, FM techniques were conceived and tested. 37/

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2. German Broadcasting as a Political Weapon.

The first use of radio to further a nation's political objectives took place in Germany in 1915. Isolated by war blockade, Germany took to radio to establish a Morse-code telegraph news service to neutral countries. This German novelty perhaps gave a cue to Lenin. On the very first day of the proletarian revolution in Russia, on 7 November 1917, he had the Russian Cruiser *Auroka* announce to the "world" by radio-telegraphy that they had overthrown the provisional government. Daily accounts of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk followed with presentations of the revolutionary views for reception by the outside world. 38/

It was during the 1914-18 period that the popular discovery of propaganda and its power was made. 39/ "In the immediate post -- 1917 period, the Soviet leaders had found that, deprived as they were at the start of all other means of power, they had in propaganda a cheap effective weapon of their own. By its use, they broke the spirit of the German armies in Russia, and its application on the international scale materially assisted them in putting an end to the intervention policies of Russia's former allies...." 40/ In effect, the Russians are doing the same thing today on German soil.

3. German Management Organization.

Consistent with early post-World War I efforts to democratize Germany, radiobroadcasting service was provided by private companies. Ten such companies were in business when, sometime before Hitler came to power, they were merged into the Reich Rundfunk Gesellschaft (State Radiobroadcasting Company). 41/ With this move, private broadcasting enterprise seems to have died in Germany. It was consonant with the then current trends toward statism.

When Hitler came to power in 1933, sweeping organizational and managerial changes were made in German radiobroadcasting. It is highly probable that German experience over the years in the field of propaganda and the potentialities of radio as a medium for its dissemination, coupled with Hitler's intentions, gave great impetus to the development and use of radiobroadcasting as an instrument of State following Hitler's political victory.

Hitler moved dynamically. One of the initial acts of his new government was the organization early in March 1933 of a Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment. It was headed up by the infamous Goebbels. It absorbed the State Radiobroadcasting Company. The purpose

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of the new Ministry was to coordinate the national and international propaganda efforts of Hitler's National Socialist (Nazi) Party, a synonym for the German Government. 42/

Fully sensing the potential of radio as a medium of propaganda as did the Russians, Goebbels organized his Ministry into five departments, giving recognition to radio along with other media of mass communication. These were propaganda, radio, press, cinema, and theater. Goebbels, who enjoyed cabinet rank and stood near the top of the Nazi hierarchy, gave national dictatorial powers to these departments. Upon activating the new Ministry, Hitler took over all propaganda channels and facilities, including the German radiobroadcasting network. Their operation was then coordinated with the experienced propaganda department of the Nazi Party. 43/ It is likely that German jamming of Soviet foreign-language propaganda broadcasts, begun about 1935, was also a responsibility of this new ministry. 44/

Sometime prior to 1942 the Nazis took direct action in improving and expanding the propaganda benefits of radiobroadcasting. The Nazi Party had a radio section. The section had regional and branch offices in all provinces and districts. Heads of these offices, acting as political and radio propagandists, set up reception facilities to close any communication gaps between the Government, the Party, and the masses. To achieve this end, the radio-manufacturing industry, at the request of the Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, manufactured large numbers of cheap "people's" radio receivers. 45/

From the foregoing it can be seen that Germany had gone a long way in the development and exploitation of radiobroadcasting as a medium of rapid mass communication even before World War II. It had all the human and physical resources for the undertaking. The fact that Germany lost the war can not be attributed to a failure of mass communication, or specifically radiobroadcasting, to do an effective job. It is probably more nearly correct to conclude that mass communication including radiobroadcasting contributed greatly to the solidification of German thinking and to rallying the populace to build up its war efforts to the tremendous peak achieved in 1943.

It is with this background that post-World War II East German capabilities in the field of radiobroadcasting must be viewed, conditioned, however, by Kremlin dictates, Pan-Germanism, and subversion by East Germans themselves.

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B. Post-World War II History.

1. Emergence.

Emerging from World War II, East Germany, under Soviet possession and control, was in chaos. Goebbels and his Ministry were gone. Radiobroadcasting transmitting and reception facilities were partly destroyed, damaged, sold, or confiscated. So were the general telecommunications facilities, including wireline plants used for broadcast network operations. Experienced key personnel, engineers, and technicians were in short supply. Some fled to the West, others died in the war or were otherwise liquidated, or were probably considered poor security risks. Still others, including thorough-going scientists and research engineers, were deported to the USSR for terms of 5 years and in some cases remained for a second 5-year term.

2. Early Management Organization.

In July 1945 the Soviet Military Administration created in East Germany a Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications for the administration and operation of information communication services in general. ^{46/} In these early days, such radiobroadcasting as could be provided came under the Ministry of Popular Education. It is not clear what the division of responsibilities was between these two mechanisms in the field of radiobroadcasting. It is likely that the Ministry was essentially responsible for programing, program content, and program control, whereas the Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications installed, operated, and maintained the physical facilities.

Several changes took place in organization between 1948 and 1952. In the spring of 1948 the Central Administration for Post and Telecommunications was redesignated the Main Administration for Posts and Telecommunications and was placed under the newly created German Economic Commission. This Main Administration became the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in October 1949. ^{47/} As of 1951, while administrative control was ostensibly in the hands of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Soviet Control Commission through its Telecommunications Department was exercising at least strict supervision over the more vital aspects of Ministry functions. ^{48/}

Soon after, in early 1950, the radiobroadcasting administration was reorganized and placed in "a position of dependence directly under the Minister-President of the German Democratic Republic" (GDR). ^{49/} There are other indications that at the same time the Ministry of Information may

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operated and controlled the radiobroadcasting service, perhaps in behalf of the Minister-President, as the General Directorate /or General Management of the Soviet Zone Radio Broadcasting System/. Appendix A is a reported organization chart of this directorate, at least as it stood during the period from December 1950 to 31 August 1952. Although the chart gives a somewhat detailed depiction of activities, it appears to distort the line and staff functions and overemphasize by relative detail the importance of the technical functions. Program management is considered to be a line function, not a staff function as shown. Some of the technical functions shown as line functions are believed to be staff functions. This directorate was decentralized in form and operation. Apparently each of the radiobroadcast stations and studios had its own technical, editorial, and operations staffs.

Perhaps significantly, there was a reported shortage of trained and loyal (to Communism and East Germany) personnel for staffing the new General Directorate organization. In particular there was a shortage of editors, reporters, and commentators. Accordingly, at the end of 1950 a central radio school was established and two courses were organized. One was a 6-month political course and the other was a 5-month professional radio course. There were only 19 pupils in the first course, 36 in the second, and 90 in the third. In the latter 40 percent were women. As will be noted in later subsections, this school did not solve either competence or loyalty problems once and for all. 50/ It may well be that this dual problem, now as then, may be one of the most vulnerable internal spots in the whole East German radiobroadcasting complex.

Prior to 1952, according to the evidence, the administration of the radio medium as a natural resource was not centered in one organization in East Germany. Organizational decentralization or division of research, development, and technology in the field of radio was also a condition of the period. At least by Western standards these situations would not generally lead to the effective and efficient use of the radio resource for legitimate purposes nor for the development and use of that resource as an electromagnetic warfare weapon, a subject of considerable concern to the US today. 51/*

* For an estimate on this general subject see CIA/SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare, 24 Apr 1953. S.

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It is strongly conjectured from subsequent evidence that during the winter of 1951-52 the USSR and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Germans realized that radiobroadcasting in East Germany was losing ground to West Berlin and West Germany and that this tool of the State was not making its full contribution to fashioning East Germany -- and for that matter West Germany -- as a solid Communist satellite of the USSR.

3. The Critical Year 1952.

Evidence clearly shows that the year 1952 was critical to radiobroadcasting in East Germany. By this time, Soviet and East German SED officials were unhappy with the development and effectiveness of that resource both at home and abroad. Neither was it standing up to the input of foreign broadcasts, particularly from West Germany. In consequence, a number of far-reaching actions were initiated to correct the unsatisfactory conditions. Among these were reorganization of radio administration, reorganization of radio technological activities, reorganization of radiobroadcasting administration and operations, sanitization of personnel, ambitious replanning for the rapid expansion of facilities, and a revamped approach to radiobroadcast program content and slant.

a. Technical Radio Management.

Over the years the Kremlin has asserted the organizational concept that the administration of radio as a medium should be centralized for control and administrative purposes.* It is so organized in the USSR. Apparently it had been somewhat decentralized in East Germany as late as 1952. Entering 1952 there was a Main Department for Communications under the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. It was in some way related to a Central Office for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques. The latter had among its duties the technical and organizational supervision of all radio transmitting and receiving stations. However, broadcasting equipment used by the General Directorate /or General Management of the Soviet Zone Radio Broadcasting System/was not included. The Central Office was the procuring and purchasing office for all radio stations with regard to equipment. It was also responsible for rendering expert opinion on receivers and for checking of all electrical apparatus in the interest of interference suppression. A branch of the Central Office was concerned with radio security. 52/ Reportedly, in April 1952, "the Soviet Control Council ordered that the organizational set-up of the Ministerium

* This concept has significance for jamming operations in which the avoidance of self-jamming is an important consideration.

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fuer Post-Fernmelde-technisches Zentralamt (Central Office for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques) be altered to conform to Soviet patterns. The Russians demanded that all radio communications be controlled by a special Main Administration." 53/ This demand may have been in some way related to means for coordinating planned expansion of jamming. By June 1952 there was in fact established, presumably pursuant to the above demand, a Main Radio Administration under the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Though some parts of the Central Office were retained, the essential radio functions and duties were apparently assumed by the new Main Radio Administration. 54/

It seems likely that it was the Main Radio Administration which carried the burden in preparing two regulations on radio adopted as decrees by the GDR in August 1952. These were the "Decree on Radio-Frequency Installation" and the "First Provision for Execution of the Decree on Radio-Frequency Installations." These decrees by definition and explanation cover all uses of radio in the radio spectrum range from 10 kilocycles to 3 million megacycles. Oddly enough, introduction to the basic decree itself would seem to limit the benefits which it seeks to achieve by the phrase "In order to protect the interference-free reception of broadcast transmissions and of radio news transmissions." 55/

Several other organizational shifts were conceived during 1952 and put into effect on 1 January 1953, which directly affected the exploitation of radio in East Germany in general and, pertinently here, radiobroadcasting. As directed by the Council of Ministers of East Germany, a Central Institute for Radio Techniques was established on 1 January 1953, for "purposes of coordination and guidance in the field of radio engineering, and in order to promote a research and technical development in this field." It was made part of the Main Radio Administration of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

At the same time (1 January 1953) the Radio Department of the Central Office for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques was shifted to the new Central Institute for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques. In the shift it took with it all installations, equipment, and instruments which could be used for research and development in the field of radio technology. Further to bring together in one place creative talent in the field of radio and the necessary research and development tools and equipment, "personnel and equipment useful for radio development work" were transferred from the 4-month old State Radio /Broadcasting/ Committee, successor to the General Directorate previously mentioned, to the new Central Institute. The Committee, however, was to retain "equipment and personnel essential to the radio and television studio industry."

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To oversee the new Central Institute, the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications was to appoint a board of trustees (kuratorium), subject to the approval of the Director of the Central Office for Research and Technology. An unconfirmed report relates that the board was to include representation from the Academy of Sciences, the Technical University of Dresden, the Ministry of Traffic [apparently transport], the Office of Economic Questions, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the industries engaged in producing radio equipment and related products.

Also effective 1 January 1953, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications created and placed under his Main Radio Administration a People's-Owned Radio Installations Planning and Assembling Enterprise for Radio Transmitting and Receiving Installations. It is physically located on the grounds of the Funkwerk in Koepenick, Berlin, where one or more powerful radiobroadcasting and/or jamming transmitters are located. In the production and erection of radio installations, the Enterprise has the duty of preparing projects with cost estimates, technological projects for radio installations with cost plans setting up uniform drafting norms, and performing technical evaluations upon request. It may perform designing and assembly work and construction management. It has the right to inspect radio installations being produced by other enterprises. It was to be the only agency authorized to give final approval for the transfer of completed installations. 56/

It seems amply clear that this sequence of shifts in technical radio organization and management reflects a clear pattern for improving coordination, integrating research and development effort, gearing the latter to operational needs, proliferating creative production, enhancing top level control, and generally accelerating the exploitation of the radio medium, probably for both East German and Soviet benefit. The two or more thousand German returnees with competence in science, technology, and engineering who remained in East Germany after their return undoubtedly are contributing greatly to a revived East German technological competence, particularly those who had or acquired Communistic sentiments.

b. Creation of the State Radio Committee.

To overcome organizational and administrative defects the East Germany Council of Ministers adopted a far-reaching decree on 14 August 1952. At that time, President Grotewohl explained "that the new great tasks in creating the foundations of Socialism in the GDR enhanced the importance of the democratic radio. The previous system of the democratic radio is no longer up to these tasks and cannot satisfy the growing requirements of the working population. In the future the entire work of

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the radio will be centralized in Berlin and will be subject to uniform direction." 57/ The decree, so revealing as to East German, and probably Kremlin, intentions and plans, follows 58/:

"Decree of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
Concerning the Setting up of a State Radio Committee
as from August 14, 1952

(IIIb) The new and great task of the building of the foundations of socialism in the German Democratic Republic, demanding the raising of the political and cultural level of our population. It is a question of developing the socialist formation of the workers, of propagating among the inhabitants and of instilling into them deeply, the idea of the defence of peace and our country, hatred of the imperialist warmongers, militarists and traitors to their country; of intensifying the struggle for the unity of Germany for the rapid conclusion of a peace pact. For the solution of these problems, the radio of the German Democratic Republic is developing increasingly important activity. The system of the radio of the German Democratic Republic, which existed hitherto, no longer suffices for present day tasks, nor does it meet the overgrowing demands of the workers.

The new tasks demand that the people of the German Democratic Republic and of western Germany should have the possibility of receiving three different programmes carefully co-ordinated, and of high quality, broadcast throughout the day by the radio of the German Democratic Republic. That is why radiophonic activity must be centralized in the German Democratic Republic in Berlin, and subordinated to a single directorate which will be responsible for the structure of all three programmes. That is why the Council of Ministers has decided to promulgate the following decree.

1. With the aim of improving radio activity in the German Democratic Republic, a state radio committee has been set up attached to the Council of Ministers.

2. The administration of the State Radio Committee comes within the competence of the president, the vice-president and 11 members.

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3. (a) The chairman of the State Radio Committee is nominated and recalled by the chairman of the council on the proposal of the Council of Ministers.

(b) The vice-chairman and the members are nominated by the premier, on the proposal of the president.

4. The administration of the Radio Committee is charged particularly with the following tasks:

(a) The planning and structure of the programmes of the broadcasts of the German Democratic Radio.

(b) Continual use of the experience of the Radios of the Soviet Union and the countries of People's Democracy.

(c) The working out, on scientific bases, of activities concerning programmes.

(d) The direction of radio studios in the regions of the German Democratic Republic.

(e) The direction of the television centre in Berlin and the development of television in the German Democratic Republic.

(f) The direction of the radiophonic school, as a professional institution for the preparation of cadres.

(g) The publication of a weekly paper on radio programmes.

(h) Co-operation with the competent ministries and secretariats of the state, to ensure technically the transmission of programmes of the German Democratic Radio.

(i) The conclusion of agreements with friendly radio organizations in the framework of cultural agreements of the German Democratic Republic.

(j) The observation of obligations resulting from its membership in the International Broadcasting Organization (OIR).

5. (a) The decision will be carried out on the directives of the president.

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(b) The chairman of the Radio Committee will issue, within his field of competence, directives and instructions based on and in execution of the laws which are in force, and the decrees of the Council of Ministers, and will control their carrying out.

6. The budget of the Radio Committee will be established separately within the framework of the state budgetary plan of the German Democratic Republic.

7. The Radio Committee attached to the Council of Ministers is the responsible body in the field of planning and investments for everything concerning radio in the German Democratic Republic.

8. The studios in the various regions of the German Democratic Republic are directly responsible to the Radio Committee.

9. Directives are given by the Radio Committee.

10. The present decree comes into force on the 1st of September, 1952."

An analysis of this decree reveals basic changes in Government policy. The reorganization shows a shift from decentralization to centralization for control, coordination, and economy reasons. The new Committee is attached directly to the Council of Ministers affording close liaison with top Government leaders. Top level officials of the Committee are subject to appointment and removal by top level officials of the Government and probably the Party (SED). The decree not only directs what to do, but also, in some matters, how to do it. The Committee is responsible for certain policy formulation, for program planning and content, as well as for broadcast service operations. It is reported that the Committee is empowered to coordinate all technical offices of the GDR for the purposes of insuring faultless technical transmissions of its broadcasting programs over the networks. 59/ (See II, D, 3, a, above, on Technical Radio Management).

A presumed organizational structure of the new State Radio Committee (SRC) appears in the accompanying chart.* The Committee members appear to have specific responsibilities beside those of the Committee as a whole. The assigned specific responsibilities probably reflect the importance attached by the government and the Party to those matters. It is significant that most of the Committee members are concerned with program content. This seems to mean that efforts to capture and retain an audience (pan-German)

* Following p. 22.

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were to be the crucial task of the new Committee. The chart attempts to depict the functions of the Committee and to identify line and staff relationships as well as principal lines of coordination with external mechanisms. The Television Center segment of the SRC is apparently operational and developmental. As of 1 January 1953, when there was a Central Office for Television, the dominant function was probably development. According to one comprehensive report it was an organization of considerable size. Apparently, however, when radio technical management was reshuffled, the new Television Center segment of SRC lost much of its developmental functions. 60/

Within about 2 weeks of the adoption of the decree, on 1 September 1952, the SRC was in business. By 16 September 1952, three phases of the reorientation were implemented. These were centralization of program production in Berlin, large-scale release of employees, and the use of the new Koeppenick transmitter, possibly as a jammer. 61/ On 14 September 1952, Berlin initiated 3 directed programs over the 3 newly constituted networks. One of these was directed chiefly to West German patriots to encourage resistance to the West German Government, the second contained cultural and scientific matters, and the third was addressed to the masses. 62/

There are three other aspects of organization and management which are highly germane to an understanding of East German and Soviet intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. They are personnel, equipment availability, and relations with other Soviet Bloc countries. These deserve separate treatment.

4. Personnel Problems.


The loyalty and performance of personnel associated with East German radiobroadcasting seems to have been continuing problem at least since 1951. It is conceivably a soft, vulnerable spot in the East German structure.

In November 1951, Friedrich Trede, business manager of the Communist-run Berlin radio station was dismissed without notice by SED authorities, reportedly because he refused to join the Party. He was to be succeeded by SED activist Vogel. The same report states that about 900 employees of Berlin Radio who resided in West Germany were dismissed in 1951. All staff members who still resided in West Germany were directed to move to East Berlin by the end of 1951. This directive applied as well to SED members who by special permission had been permitted to retain permanent residence in West Berlin. 63/

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PRESUMED ORGANIZATION OF THE
EAST GERMANY STATE RADIO COMMITTEE (SRC)^a

SECRET



^aReconstructed from material from various sources up to 30 November 1953.

^bIt is not clear how these functions are tied together organizationally to effect control of program content.

^cSome of these sections may have been combined sometime between March and November 1953.

SECRET

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One reliable report of 16 September 1952 states that widespread personnel changes were taking place, no doubt in connection with the staffing of the new SRC. About 3,000 employees including technicians, were to be released from the Leipzig, Dresden, Potsdam, Halle, Weimar, and Schwerin stations. On the other hand, some 400 selected competent radio people were to be employed to help staff the new operational headquarters in Berlin. 64/

Another report reveals that at the beginning of January 1953, 76 young reporters and editors who had been recruited from among the workers and peasants, went to work on the staff of the SRC. They were given basic theoretical and practical training in a 1-year course at the SRC radio school. They reportedly have the necessary qualifications to afford them an opportunity to become qualified reporters and editors in a short time. 65/ This action is considered consistent with the reconstruction and reorientation of the administration of broadcasting under the SRC.

In spite of a "clean" slate of personnel selected to staff the new SRC in September 1952, by November 1953, East Germany was again having loyalty problems in its radiobroadcasting structure. One report of 23 November 1953 relates that the Investigation Committee of Free Jurists reported that several hundred employees of the GDR SRC, among them GDR Television Director Hermann Zilles, a member of the SED, had been "released for political reasons." 66/ Another report which may relate to this item dated 18 December 1953 states that a "large number of employees of the Soviet Zone radiobroadcasting system have been dismissed without notice for political reasons," 67/ and still another report, dated 16 December 1953, states that "all East Zone press and radio editors will be thoroughly screened by the State security service during the next two months. Special attention is to be given to their attitude during the June 17 uprising and their reports on the rebellion." 68/

One highly illuminating report from reliable sources in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, if true, gives an indication of the potential security-risk vulnerability, questionable competence, or political unreliability on numerous personalities in the SRC. Some of the characterizations on the more important personalities are quoted below from that report 69/:

Kurt Heiss, Chairman SRC: "Spent much time in the Soviet Union and often visits there now. Unpopular. Central Committee warned him against drinking on duty. Referred to RIAS as 'station we will soon kill off.'"

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Hermann Zilles, SRC Committee Member and Chief of the television station at Adlershof: "Has been disciplined several times by the SED because of immorality and incompetence. Good connections with West Germany. An intriguer." Note: The report avers that he had been released for political reasons."

Zahnke, SRC Committee Member: "When drinking, complains about the GDR government."

Eduard v. Schnitzler, Senior Commentator: "Intellectually able but amoral. Is criticized at every party meeting as not being sufficiently attached to the Party. In an employees' meeting he claimed that Radio Berlin could learn something from RIAS."

Erich Selbmann: "Son of a Cabinet Minister. Belongs to the Party leadership within the station [East Berlin?] but is in conflict with it. Is having divorce trouble."

Appendix B contains a consolidated listing of reported biographical sketches on personnel of the SRC -- 1953.

From all the available evidence it is difficult to conceive how the SRC can function as an efficient, effective, dynamic organism. Neither esprit-de-corps nor morale seem to be of the highest order. Wide variations in political orientation appear rampant. Reported incompetence is scattered over the structure. Solidarity in sense of mission, devotion to duty, and loyalty to a cause seem wanting. Subversion might well flourish in such a human environment.

5. Equipment Considerations.

About 1950-51, Soviet economic policy, probably motivated by political considerations, toward East Germany underwent change. Prior to this time, at least in the field of telecommunications, the USSR and certain of the satellites as directed by the Kremlin, were absorbing practically all of East Germany's production of telecommunications equipment including radio equipment. Little if any was left in East Germany with which to rebuild its telecommunications operational resources. Soviet policy clearly called for acceleration in the build-up of East Germany's

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telecommunications equipment production capacity in 1951-52. It also called for an increase in the amount of East German production which could be retained there for use. This shift in policy may well have been occasioned by Soviet recognition that the depleted telecommunications resource of East Germany was retarding the over-all economic contribution which East Germany could make to the USSR. The Russians may have also reasoned that the effectiveness of East Germany as a strategic area could be enhanced as a first line of defense by enlarging its resources. The build-up in East German radiobroadcasting facilities commenced about this time, and undoubtedly stems from that change in Soviet policy. The details of equipment and facilities build-up appear in other sections of this Report.

6. Intra-Soviet Bloc Arrangements.

In the field of intra-Soviet Bloc relations the SRC has been carrying out the terms of the decree, previously quoted, which set it up. Mentioned specifically is the International Broadcasting Organization (OIR). Originally this mechanism could make some claim of being a truly international mechanism for dealing with international broadcasting. However, in 1949, virtually all Western country members gave up membership. This left actual control in Communist, if not Kremlin, hands. Yugoslavia and Syria were expelled in 1951. In 1951, Communist China and in 1952 East Germany became adherents. Finland, the only remaining non-Communist member, has not been active. From 1952 on, OIR has become essentially a Soviet Bloc organization with administrative and technical headquarters at Prague. It is considered to be an important mechanism for coordinating the Soviet Bloc radiobroadcasting operation. (O/)

Possible in consequence of East Germany's adherence to the OIR, the SRC of the GDR has concluded several agreements with other Soviet Bloc countries. An agreement was signed in Moscow on 13 February 1953 between the SRC and the Radio Information Committee attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In submitting to his government, the Chairman of the SRC characterized the agreement as a further step towards the strengthening and development of cultural relations between the two entities, as well as cooperation between them in the field of broadcasting and probably jamming. 71/ On 15 May 1953 a similar agreement was signed between the GDR and Bulgaria. Under the agreement, radiobroadcasts were to be exchanged and each country was to send experts to the other to familiarize themselves with developments in the radio field. 72/ In late December 1953, another similar agreement was signed in Berlin between the GDR SRC and the Radio Committee of the Rumanian Council of Ministers. Under the agreement the two countries "will regularly exchange their best

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programs" and will otherwise cooperate in the field of broadcasting. 73/ It is probable that similar agreements with other Bloc countries have been concluded, are in the making, or are under revision.

It seems reasonably clear that the Kremlin, through the medium of the OIR, is laying down fundamental policies and directions in the field of radiobroadcasting to be implemented through bilateral and multilateral operational agreements between the Soviet Bloc countries. It is a logical mechanism for coordinating and integrating the whole Bloc radiobroadcasting complex as well as jamming activities directed against foreign broadcasts.

7. Reported Plans to Reorganize the State Radio Committee.

A single report, upon which no confirmatory information is available, states that in February or March 1953 the SRC visited the Soviet Union. Following the visit, recommendations were reportedly made for the reorganization of Radio Berlin (East Zone) along Radio Moscow lines. The recommendations envisaged a mechanism of five main departments: political agitation, music, literature and drama, science and education, and administration. Allegedly, considerable economies would result from this change. 74/

An intelligence comment on the above report states in part: "The reorganization of East German information media which has been taking place since last September suggests considerable dissatisfaction with their effectiveness. Last fall ... the functions of the entire Office of Information were transferred to the Press Office of Minister-President Grotewohl. It is expected that the SRC, whose functions are political and administrative rather than technical, will ultimately be consolidated with the old Office of Information in some new general propaganda agency under Grotewohl." 75/ While this report may be true and the intelligence comment valid in so far as plans or intentions are concerned, it is very doubtful that the structure of the SRC, at least, has been so altered. If in fact it has not been so altered, it would seem that the influence of RIAS in spreading the riots in East Germany in June 1953 provided a suitable occasion, were one needed, to revamp SRC better to cope with such foreign influences.

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C. Transmitting Facilities.*

1. Pre-World War II.

At the beginning of the 10-year period 1934-44, the area presently defined as East Germany was served by one low-frequency transmitter (known as the Deutschlandsender), located at Zeesen, near Berlin, 2 relatively high-power, medium-frequency transmitters at Berlin and Leipzig, and 2 medium-power, medium-frequency transmitters at Dresden and Magdeburg.

During this 10-year period, the low-frequency transmitter was increased in power from 60 kw to 150 kw and, finally, to 200 kw and the transmitter site was changed from Zeesen to Herzberg. The power of the transmitter at Dresden was increased from 0.25 kw to 5 kw and one new 5-kw, medium-frequency station was added at Reichenbach.

The complete geographic coverage of the area was further ensured by the installation of low-power, booster transmitters in areas where signal strength for reception by weak receivers proved to be too low. The number or locations of such booster stations is not available. 76/

By 1940, radiobroadcasting on very high frequencies had been introduced, with two stations in operation, -- in Berlin and on the Brockenburg in the Harz Mountains -- and a second station for Berlin was under construction. 77/

Germany was a pioneer in the then infant art of television. Scheduled entertainment programs had been transmitted for a few months prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. Two of the three television stations were located in the area presently designated East Germany -- in Berlin and Witzleben Brocken in Harz. 78/ The war put an end to this, although the Germans did a great deal of research on military applications of television. With the surrender of Germany in 1945 and the Soviet occupation of the East Zone, the research ended. German scientists, and their television equipment, were taken to the USSR where it was reported that the television equipments were modified by the Germans for use in Soviet television broadcasting facilities.

In 1934, all German international broadcasting was conducted from Zeesen, employing 6 high frequencies with power of 5 kw. During the Nazi regime this service was increased markedly, in terms of numbers of frequencies employed and the power of transmitters. By 1937, the number

* This subsection was prepared by OSI.

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of high frequencies had been increased to 12, with 50 kw power on 2, and 5 kw on the remainder. By 1940, 33 high frequencies were employed -- 6 with power of 12 kw, 3 with power of 20 kw, and 24 with power of 50 kw. ^{79/} No information is available as to the hours of programing which were originated, the transmission schedules or the world areas to which such programs were addressed.

2. World War II and the Immediate Post-War Years.

Notwithstanding the ravages of World War II the East German radiobroadcasting facilities apparently were restored to their prewar activity fairly rapidly. By 1947 not only had prewar service been restored, but there had been additions. One low-frequency, 2 medium-frequency, and 2 high-frequency transmitters had been added. There were a few shifts of transmitter locations, but coverage does not seem to have changed materially. By 1950, 2 more low-frequency and 3 more medium-frequency transmitters had been added.

Television and very-high-frequency (VHF) services do not appear to have been restored during this 5-year period.


3. Recent Growth.

From 1950 to the present there has been considerable growth in the broadcasting facilities in East Germany. It is believed that 1951-52 was the important period in this change. Plans were made then for the development and construction of high-power transmitters. The fruition of these plans was the installation of several high-power, medium-frequency transmitters in East German towns. These transmitters were based on a design which had the cover name "Zwilling" (twin) or Z-3. As the name implies high power was achieved by installing two identical halves (halbzuege) and operating both simultaneously. There are indications that half sections of these transmitters were installed initially and operated alone on an interim basis while their twins were being completed in the East German factory at Koepenick.

4. Present Facilities.*

The present day radio and television transmitting facilities of East Germany are believed to include approximately 4 low-frequency transmitters with powers up to 100 kw, 15 medium-frequency transmitters with estimated powers up to 440 kw, 3 high-frequency transmitters with estimated powers up to 10 kw, 6 very-high-frequency transmitters employing frequency modulation (FM) type of emission, and 3 television transmitters. There are no reports of plans to restore the high-frequency international broadcast facilities of prewar Germany.

* See map following p. 28.



Radiobroadcasting Transmitting Facilities in East Germany

(includes power increases scheduled for 1954)

Frequency	0-50 kw	51-250 kw	over 250 kw
Very high 30-300 mc	■	—	—
High 3000-30,000 kc	▣	—	—
Medium 300-3000 kc	▢	▣	■
Low 30-300 kc	□	—	□

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The increase in power of the low- and the medium-frequency transmitters from 1934 to 1954 (selected years) is set out in Table 2.

Table 2

Growth in Power of Radiobroadcast Transmitters in East Germany
Selected Years, 1934-54

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Power (kw)</u>	<u>Average Power (kw)</u>
<u>Low-Frequency Transmitters</u>			
1934	1	60	60
1937	1	60	60
1940	1	150	150
1947	2	120	60
1949	1	100	100
1950	4	105	26
1953	3	140	47
1954	4	1,040	260
<u>Medium-Frequency Transmitters</u>			
1934	4	220	55
1937	4	280	70
1940	5	230	46
1947	7	290	41
1949	8	297	37
1950	11	362	33
1953	15	1,872	124
1954	16	2,452	153

The reported total transmitter output power in the medium-frequency broadcast band in East Germany is now nearing 2 million watts, giving this area, roughly the size of Ohio, almost 6 times the total power it had in the same band in 1950.

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High frequencies were not employed for domestic broadcasting in Germany prior to World War II. Information on high-frequency transmitters employed since 1945 is inadequate to warrant tabular presentation.

a. Low-Frequency Broadcast Transmitters.

The low frequencies used in some European broadcasting services have the capability of giving good coverage day and night in their primary service area. When high-power transmitters are employed, their primary service area is obviously rather large. Before World War II, therefore, people in all parts of Germany were able to receive consistently good signals from the low-frequency, 200 kw Nazi Deutschlandsender located at Zeesen, later at Herzberg. It is believed that the Russians dismantle this installation during the early days of their occupation of East Germany at the close of World War II. A substitute was installed at Koenigs Wusterhausen, a Berlin suburb, by East German authorities. This substitute transmitter was built around an old German Army transmitter and was rated at 20 kw. By 1949, this substitute installation had been replaced by a 100-kw transmitter, and it is probable that this power will be increased to 500 kw in the near future.

A second high-power installation for operation in the range 150-300 kc is variously reported as under development or under construction for installation in Zehlendorf, Koepenick, Ludwigslust, or Burg near Magdeburg. Known as the SL-II, it is to have a power output of between 750 and 900 kw. It is scheduled for completion in 1954. 80/

b. Medium-Frequency Broadcast Transmitters.

In the first half of 1950 the Ministerium fuer Post und Fernmeldewesen (Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications) asked the Zentral-amt fuer Forschung und Technik (Central Bureau of Planning and Engineering) of the Staatlichen Plankommission (State Planning Commission) to develop a 250-kw medium-frequency broadcast transmitter for production purposes. Apparently within the following 2 years this program was modified by the Z-3 or Zwilling program which envisaged the operation of these transmitters in pairs to produce about 500 kw. In the original plans only Berlin-Koepenick was scheduled to get a twin installation initially. The other East German locations were to get only a half (halbzug) for interim operation at a power of 250 kw until the second half could be delivered. 81/ Production schedules identified these transmitters as the SM (Sender, Mittelwellen -- Transmitter, Medium Wave) series with the numbers I, II, III, and IV assigned to the individual installations.

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Operation of the twins (440 kw) at Berlin-Koepenick and Schwerin began in October 1953. The reported power of transmitters put into operation in October 1953 at Burg (near Magdeburg) and Dresden-Wilsdruf is 300 kw. This may be an exaggeration of an actual power of 220 kw (the reported power of a half), or operation of 2 halves at reduced power pending delivery of some parts, or operation of a half at well over its rated capacity.

Among the reported features of all these transmitters are quick tuning to any point in the broadcast band and directional antenna systems at the installations. The transmitters may be completely retuned in 40 minutes and the two-tower antennas provide for a degree of directivity. Provisions are reportedly being made for varying the direction of maximum signal radiated by these antennas. They are so oriented that it is possible to concentrate the signal in the direction of Western Europe. The exception to this is the Dresden-Wilsdruf installation about which there is not sufficient information.

Erfurt is scheduled to get a 440-kw installation in 1954, but it is not known when the power of the Burg and Dresden-Wilsdruf installations will be raised to that figure. At one time, Leipzig was reported to be scheduled to get a 440-kw installation, but in view of the fact that it presently has two 100-kw transmitters broadcasting separate programs it may be assumed that its priority was not as high as that of cities having lower power transmitters in operation, or as those nearer the Western border. ^{82/} The locations of these transmitters near the border and the flexibility of operation afforded by quick tuning and antennas of variable directivity provide bases for conjecture about possible methods of operation, such as redirecting the program to a part of East Germany other than the normal service area, jamming of Western broadcasts, or beaming of Eastern propaganda broadcasts toward Western Europe.

For a tabulation of 1949 and 1954 transmitting facilities, see Appendixes C and D.

c. Mobile Transmitters.

A new factor in medium-frequency broadcasting in East Germany was introduced during 1952-53 by the production of mobile 5-kw and 20-kw transmitters. These transmitters were reported to have been designed for mounting in trailers for transportation from one site to another by highway. Both RFT's (Radiofunktechnik), Funkwerk, Koepenick and C. Lorenz, Leipzig, are reported to be participating in the construction of these units. It is possible that some of these units will

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operate on 575, 611, 728, 800, 820, and 920 kc inasmuch as crystals for these frequencies are reported to have been ordered.

It is probable that some of these units are intended to be used to jam Western broadcasts. Another possible use for these transmitters would be to give better signal strengths to weaken signal area of East Germany until permanent transmitter installations may be accomplished. This would tend to discourage listening by the East Germans to Western broadcasts, particularly if the East German transmitter were operating on the same frequency as that of the Western stations.

One 20-kw transmitter appears to have been in operation in 1953. It is reported variously as having been used for jamming and as having a steady test tone as modulation. Two additional transmitters are expected to be completed in 1954 which, when combined with the first, will be known as SM-VII. It is reported to be destined for installation at Potsdam-Golm. It is reported five 5-kw transmitters were to be completed in 1953. 83/

d. VHF FM Broadcasting Facilities.

There is an increasing interest in the use of VHF FM broadcasting in East Germany, as there is in much of Western Europe. The main reason for this popularity is the crowded medium-frequency broadcast band. Since VHF signals do not travel materially beyond the horizon, mountain top transmitters can provide excellent service for a restricted area without interfering with another FM transmitter on the same frequency operating in a remote part of the country.

The first post-World War II FM broadcast transmitter in East Germany was installed in Berlin in the fall of 1950, with one in the Harz Mountains, near Brocken, following shortly thereafter. As of October 1953, transmitters are reported to be operating in Leipzig, Schwerin, Berlin-Friedrichstadt, carrying the Berlin III program; in Inselsberg (Thuringia), Brocken (Harz Mountains), and another is projected for Berlin to carry the Berlin I program. In view of the report of 30 additional VHF transmitters (10 each with powers of 0.25 kw, 1 kw, and 10 kw, respectively) having been completed in late 1953 it is possible that there will be considerable expansion of the VHF FM facilities in 1954.

In addition to providing interference-free reception a group of FM stations operating on different frequencies in an area can provide a convenient program distribution network. Ballempfang is the

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designation for the method of receiving and rebroadcasting programs over an FM network. There are also reported provisions for supplying medium-frequency AM (amplitude modulation) broadcast transmitters with programs from these networks in East Germany. Other nations have found this a successful system for program distribution.

In addition to the above advantages of FM, it is relatively impervious to jamming since the jamming transmitter must be located virtually within sight of the target station to be effective. 84/

e. Program Distribution.

When the East German broadcasting facilities had achieved a fair state of repair following World War II, listeners had a choice of three programs in addition to those of local origination. Network operations were provided by wire-line interconnections under the administration of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Berlin I, Berlin II, and Berlin III programs were intended to attract all listeners by the variety of their offerings. They were supplemented by approximately 1-hour of programs originating locally.

"Berlin I is an 'all-German fighting program'; it is not only a program for East German audiences, but the main vehicle of Communist radio propaganda for West Germany." During a recent reorganization Berlin II was reported to have been discontinued, having been replaced by "Deutschlandsender" propaganda broadcasts aimed at West Germany. It had carried "many of the programs of Berlin I, but its particular emphasis" was "on the exposition of Communist theory of science, society and art." Berlin III "is characterized by less ideological intensity and more non-political broadcasts than Berlin I."

In the main it is believed that wireline facilities distribute these programs. As the VHF FM transmitter program goes forward distribution will probably shift to these transmitters. There have already been reports of a device (Dallempfaenger) for receiving a program from an FM transmitter and feeding it to a medium-frequency transmitter. (See section on FM Broadcasting). Similar techniques have been used in the US and other countries with success for several years. 85/

f. Directional Antennas.

The use of a directional antenna installation at a radio transmitter provides for reinforced signals in some directions at the expense of signal strengths in other directions. The East Germans

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are reported to be installing directional antenna systems at the sites of some of the high power transmitters. These systems are so arranged that signals may be beamed to the West, or to the East. With some adjustments the antennas will radiate equally in all directions. The significance of this, when coupled with the reported high powers of the transmitters, is that the East Germans will be in a position to beam extremely powerful signals to a large part of Western Europe from these installations, many of which are relatively close to the border between East and West Germany.

There are reports that high-power, medium-frequency transmitter installations at Berlin-Koepenick, Burg (near Magdeburg), Dresden, Erfurt, and Schwerin were to include two-tower directional antenna systems. They were said to be aimed toward the West, with the exception of the Dresden installation, the direction of which is unknown. 86/ It should be noted that Schwerin, Burg, and Erfurt are relatively close to the border. The medium-power (20 kw) transmitter at Potsdam-Golm is also reported to have a directional antenna system. 87/ The high-power, low-frequency installation supposedly under construction at Zehlendorf is also to have a directional antenna. 88/

g. Television.

Because of the lack of trained manpower in East Germany and its economic condition, there was no post-war television in the country until 1952, when an installation at Berlin-Adlershof began a 2-hour daily test transmission. This operation was begun despite such handicaps as lack of proper raw materials from which to manufacture the delicate and complex components of the transmitting and receiving equipment, fires in the studios, and accusations of sabotage. These latter were levelled against East German technicians by German and Soviet administrative personnel.

Original demonstrations of television were apparently "closed-circuit" operations. That is, the transmitting and receiving equipments were connected by cable, rather than by a radio link as is customary in the US. Difficulties in finishing the transmitter were finally overcome in 1952 so that broadcasts in the true sense of the word were sent out at a frequency of approximately 99 mc with a low-power (100 watts) transmitter. 89/

Now there are indications that the transmitter situation has improved and in addition to a more powerful transmitter in Berlin, one has been put into operation at Leipzig. Two hours of daily programs are scheduled. There are reported plans for six transmitters to be located on the Brocken (in the Harz Mountains), in Dresden, Erfurt, Salswedel, Stralsund, and on the Fichtelberg (in the Erz Mountains). 90/

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Studio facilities in Berlin are reported as being elaborate. It is reported that these facilities are intended to supply programs for the entire East Zone. At the moment, still and moving picture films provide a considerable part of the programming in East Berlin. A shortage of camera pick-up tubes is said to be a major factor in limiting the programming facilities. 91/

h. Miscellaneous Transmitters.

Soviet occupation forces in East Germany are provided with program service by transmitters in Berlin-Koenigs Wusterhausen and Leipzig. Neither of these transmitters is under the control of the East German authorities. Operating on a frequency of 263 kc with an estimated power of 20 kw, "Radio Volga" has been located at Koenigs Wusterhausen by direction-finding equipment. Studios are believed to be in Potsdam. Some programs are believed to originate in these studios, but most of the time is devoted to relaying programs from Radio Moscow and from Berlin III. This station, started in 1946, has never used a call letter identification, nor has it announced its location. 92/

The high-frequency transmitter in Leipzig, not under the control of the East German government, relays the German-language programs of Radio Moscow's European service.

III. Receiving Equipment in East Germany.

Introduction.

Prior to World War II, Germany ranked first of all European countries in the field of telecommunications research, production, and utilization. In 1935, more than 7 million broadcast receivers were in use in Germany. 93/ A large proportion of those receivers were of high quality and covered the low-, medium-, and high-frequency broadcast bands.

After the coming-to-power of the Nazi hierarchy, radiobroadcasting was exploited as a prime propaganda tool. Concomitant to the supplemental coverage of the country by a network of small transmitting stations for synchronized transmission of a single program was the wide-spread distribution of inexpensive, 2-tube, relatively insensitive broadcast receivers, designed for local reception. Loudspeakers attached to wire-diffusion systems, employing existing telephone wire lines as the medium of transmission, also were employed to some extent. These relatively insensitive receivers and the wire-diffusion loudspeakers served the dual purpose of making broadcast reception economically available to practically the entire

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development and future of broadcasting by means of wire-diffusion. Because of the lack of data pointing out the directions and extents of these influencing factors, an annual growth of 200,000 receivers for East Germany and 10,000 for East Berlin has been assumed for a lower limit, and 400,000 and 20,000 receivers for East Germany and East Berlin respectively, for an upper limit. It is felt that figures between these limits will probably be realized.

From the figures in Table 3 it is estimated that in 1952 there were about 18 receivers per 100 population in East Germany and 28 in East Berlin, while the figure for the combined area amounted to an average of 19 receivers. By way of comparison with pre-war conditions, as of 31 March 1939, there were an estimated 20.3 receivers per 100 population in the territory now known as East Germany, 27.25 in Berlin (not East Berlin), and the combined figure for East Germany and all of Berlin was 22.1 receivers per 100 population. 103/

As of late 1952 and early 1953, there were in West Berlin and West Germany an estimated 22 broadcast receivers per 100 population. 104/ The same source gives the number of listeners per set as 2.53 for West Germany, 3 listeners per set for West Berlin, and 4 listeners for East Germany and East Berlin combined.

The number of loudspeakers connected to the wire-diffusion networks of East Germany is not known and no estimate of the number is attempted for this report. This system is discussed in III, A, 4, below, where it is stated that the system has been expanded since World War II.

The number of receivers operating in East Germany for reception of very-high-frequency (FM) broadcasts is not known. It is presumed, however, to be a very small number. In the first place, it is thought that there are not many receivers with the very-high-frequency component available for such reception, and although there are adapters produced which will allow this reception when used in conjunction with the usual type of broadcast receiver intended for lower frequency bands, it is not believed that many of these are in use. Furthermore, this type of broadcast is not developed to any extent at the present time. As development of this transmission takes place, receivers will undoubtedly be made available and an increasing number will be in operation.

b. Television.

The number of television receivers in East Germany is apparently very small. This is indicated by an estimate in one report of 50 receivers in operation in East Berlin at the end of September 1952, while

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a second report gives an estimate of 800 receivers in East Germany in December 1952. 105/ Estimates of the number for later dates are not available. A substantial number of Leningrad T-2 receivers produced as reparations for the Russians were reportedly returned to East Germany as being faulty. This has been reported as 10,000 and again as 40,000 receivers. 106/ At most it can be said that at the present time there is a very small reception base for television, but it can be expected to grow with improvement in design, lowering of prices, and lessening of production demands for reparations. The rate of growth will depend upon Soviet wishes.

2. Characteristics.

a. Aural.

Notwithstanding the German tradition of production of high-quality telecommunications equipment of top efficiency, it appears that a large part of the broadcast receivers in use in Germany at the close of World War II were by intent relatively insensitive and were capable of local reception only.

In mid-1945 the Russians reportedly ordered that all broadcast receivers be reduced to three tubes. Since about 85 percent of all receivers at the time had 3 tubes or less the order was applicable to only 15 percent of receivers. It is not known to what extent this order was carried out, except that in Leipzig it was not enforced, and only a few apparently obeyed the order. It is not known at what date the order was rescinded, but production of receivers with more than three tubes for sale in East Germany was resumed in early 1947: 107/ so it would appear that the order did not have much effect upon the listening capabilities of the receivers or habits of the listeners.

Numerous reports indicate that many high-quality German broadcast receivers found their way to the USSR with returning Soviet military forces. It seems logical that most of these broadcast receivers would have been of high quality. Although the pre-war distribution of high quality receivers is believed to have been fairly uniform throughout Germany and the current incidence of broadcast receivers in East Germany is almost as high as in West Germany, it is doubtful that the proportion of these receivers which are of high quality is as great.

The quality and workmanship of recently produced broadcast receivers for purchase by the East German public appears to have deteriorated markedly by comparison with pre-war produced receivers. One reason for this deterioration appears to be the absence of thorough

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testing of new models, which are put into production as soon as pilot models are completed. Improvements and adjustments are made later, based on complaints of purchasers. 108/ An unconfirmed report by a former employee of a plant producing one of the cheap one-tube receivers stated that it was being discontinued because the set had proved to be unsatisfactory. 109/

The probable causes of this deterioration in the quality of broadcast receivers are the Soviet influence on design and workmanship, shortages of materials with concomitant substitutions, and lack of purchasing power of the people to obtain higher quality receivers. The production of the higher quality receivers probably is intended for reparations to the USSR, the export trade, and the use of the hierarchy of East German officialdom.

The list of broadcast receivers produced in East Germany, as given in Appendix E, indicates that a large majority of these models are equipped for high-frequency reception. Even the one-tube set, Type 1-U-11, is capable of receiving high frequency transmissions, although limited in range from 5.9 mc to 9.8 mc.* Nevertheless, a one-tube receiver is relatively insensitive and it is highly speculative that it can be used satisfactorily for reception of transmissions originating at distant locations.

Even though most of the types of broadcast receivers produced in East Germany appear to have high-frequency reception capabilities, the distribution of broadcast receivers would not necessarily follow production, since many factors affect the availability of these receivers to the general public.

The use of receivers capable of reception of very high frequencies is relatively new. The behavior of radio waves in the very-high-frequency band is such as to limit reception generally to "line-of-sight" distance from the transmitter, which automatically precludes reception of programs from distant stations.

There is no known production of receivers designed exclusively for very-high-frequency reception in East Germany, although 6 models, 3 of medium quality and 3 of high quality, contain FM reception components in addition to the low, medium, and high frequency components.

* This range covers the portion of the high-frequency broadcasting bands employed for high-frequency broadcasting by East German stations. See Appendix D.

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FM adapters are available for two other models. It is not known how many FM receivers are operating in East Germany, but presumably they are few in number. The characteristics of these receivers are not known.

b. Television.

The Leningrad T-2 television receiver has a very small screen, 13 by 18 centimeters (about 6 by 7 inches) with a 625-line picture, 50 frames per second, the same as the West German picture delineation. It is said to be the oldest of the Soviet models, and is presumably the type used in East Germany. Aside from performance standards, this size picture is outmoded and far from satisfactory to the viewer. An improved model with a larger screen and better performance is reportedly under development and production. 110/

3. Distribution.

a. Aural.

Table 4 shows the estimated number of broadcast receivers by postal districts as of November 1950, and affords a representation of the geographic distribution throughout East Germany.

Table 4

Estimated Number of Broadcast Receivers and Percentage Distribution
by East German Postal Districts
November 1950 111/

<u>Postal District</u>	<u>Broadcast Receivers</u>	<u>Percentage Distribution</u>
Berlin	324,000	9.4
Dresden	435,000	12.6
Erfurt	490,000	14.2
Halle	773,000	22.4
Leipzig	773,000	22.4
Potsdam	422,000	12.4
Schwerin	218,000	6.8
Total	<u>3,453,000</u>	<u>100.0</u>

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In general, the incidence tends to follow the population pattern, with a somewhat heavier concentration in the cities where there is a concentration of state, military, and Party personnel, since these are the ones most able to purchase receivers and are particularly favored in other respects.

It is apparent that the people as a whole have receivers capable of short-distance reception, although the majority of types of receivers produced in East Germany have greater capabilities. The estimates of receivers with high-frequency capability vary from 40 to 90 percent, from which it can be deduced that a large percentage of them is capable of such reception, at least theoretically.

Many defector reports relating to reception of broadcasts on the part of farmers indicate that receivers are operating in the rural as well as the urban areas. The following excerpts are of interest with respect to distribution: "... in Coswig most homes have radios"; "Most of the farmers have old sets The reception ... is limited only to a few stations ..."; "Most people in Cottbus own radio sets ..."; "... many families (Anneberg-Duchholz) own their own radios ..."; "The number of privately-owned radio receivers owned by the population of Muecheln is estimated at 1,500." 112/

While certain types of receivers can be adapted to FM reception by means of a special unit, and a few types of receivers are initially equipped for this reception, it is not known where the few FM receivers are located. Presumably they are owned by state, industrial, and Party personnel in the upper brackets in East Berlin and the cities having VHF transmitters.

b. Television.

So far the distribution of television receivers has been limited to peoples'-owned plants, schools, universities, state-owned clubs and hotels, and important State and Party officials. 113/ Presumably they are confined to East Berlin and its immediate environs. It is conjectured that distribution will necessarily be very slow, primarily because of the prohibitively high cost of the receivers. Geographically they will be concentrated around the cities in which television transmitters will be operated.

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4. Wire-Diffusion.

The wire-diffusion network, begun under the Nazi regime, was used to connect loudspeakers in public places and in private homes. Its use was far less extensive than the use of individual receivers, especially in private homes. The telephone cables were employed to transmit programs direct to the listening points. The system permitted a choice on the part of the listener among several programs. The subscriber might possess either a simple loudspeaker or a tube broadcast receiver. In the case of a tube receiver, the subscriber could either connect the loudspeaker of the receiver to the wire-diffusion network, or employ the receiver for direct radio reception. The principal advantage of wire-diffusion reception was freedom from atmospheric and industrial interference and from jamming. Wire-diffusion systems were found chiefly in large cities. 114/ In 1942, 170,000 loudspeakers were in use throughout Germany. 115/

The wire-diffusion system in East Germany has been expanded since the end of World War II. Mainly, installations have been placed in the major squares and streets of towns and cities, in factories, recreation centers, barracks, premises of mass organizations, collective farms, and in newly-constructed apartment houses. 116/

These systems appear to range in size from a single loudspeaker in a village square for limited use in making occasional announcements, to the elaborate center of the Eisenhuettenkombinat Ost in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which is claimed by the Berlin Radio to be the "largest and most modern factory radio installation in the German Democratic Republic." The studio is said to be able to transmit 5 different programs simultaneously and the installation to have 40 relay points to which hundreds of loudspeakers can be connected. 117

Wire-diffusion loudspeakers in newly-constructed apartment houses appear to be the only installations in private dwellings. The high incidence of independent receivers in private dwellings probably accounts for this situation.

No information is available as to numbers of loudspeakers in service today or as to geographical distribution.

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E. Availability and Costs of Radio Receivers.

1. Production and Imports.

a. Aural.

Assuming availability of raw materials, East German telecommunication production facilities are capable of manufacturing practically all types of telecommunications equipment, including broadcast receivers of all ranges of capability from simple one-tube low-cost table models to 9-tube deluxe console models with automatic record players and tape recorders. A very high percentage of all these models are capable of reception of low, medium, and high frequencies. Some models also have very-high-frequency reception capability.

The East Germany Five Year Plan (1951-55) contemplated standardizing of broadcast receivers by the production of only 4 basic types, with average retail prices of 95 DME, 250 DME, 350 DME, and 700 DME (East German Marks). Emphasis was to be placed on increased production of the cheapest models. 118/ From the number of models listed in Appendix E, it is seen that there is a wide variety of radio receivers. It is likely that these are numerous variations of a few basic types, as improvements and advancements in the art have been incorporated into production, and as variations are introduced to satisfy differences in performance demands.

Production of radio receivers, tubes, and component parts has been carried throughout East Germany and in East Berlin in many plants. The majority are being produced at the VEB plant, i.e., plants of the People's Owned Enterprises, with a small number produced by private plants and the Soviet-owned SAG plants (Staatlicher Aktien Gesellschaften). This is borne out by the proposed 1954 production plans of the State Planning Commission. This plan itemizes 160,000 radio receivers to be produced by SAG plants; 607,000 by plants of the VEB; and only 46,000 by private plants, totalling 813,000 sets. 119/ It is not stated that these sets are radiobroadcast receivers and it is presumed that other types of an unknown quantity are included. All production, of course, is planned by and under the supervision of the Russians.

Radiobroadcast receivers produced in East Germany have been shipped to the USSR as reparations, exported to Soviet Bloc countries, to non-Bloc countries, and some have been used for home consumption (some as replacements for retirements). While data are not available as to proportions of the above, it is known that less emphasis has been placed on reparations since 1950-51. For these reasons, production figures do not

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reflect accurately the growth of the reception base in East Germany. Table 5 shows the estimated production of civilian radiobroadcast receiver sets for the years 1946-51.

Table 5

Estimated Production of Civilian Radiobroadcast Receivers
in East Germany 120/
1946-51

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1946	60,000
1947	100,000
1948	150,000
1949	220,000
1950	275,000
1951	321,000

While shortages of certain materials and components are reported to have caused slow-downs in production of some types of electronics equipment, these shortages apparently have not prevented a fairly steady increase in production of broadcast receivers year by year.

In Appendix E under the description of the characteristics of radiobroadcast receivers produced in East Germany it will be noticed that there are none listed as being intended for very-high-frequency (FM) reception exclusively. There are 6 models, 3 of medium quality and 3 of high quality, with FM reception components in addition to the usual low-, medium-, and high-frequency components. Seventy thousand Stern broadcast receivers are reported to have been produced in 1953, 45,000 of which contained very-high-frequency components. The 1954 quota of production of Stern broadcast receivers is said to be 84,000 units, of which 70,000 units will contain VHF components. 121/ From the description of the models listed in Appendix E, it appears that the majority of such receivers are of Stern manufacture. For two other models, FM adapters are available. A separate one-tube super-regenerative converter unit (not indicated in the table) is also reported available to enable FM reception on AM broadcast receivers at a cost of 80 DEM. 122/

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Imports related to production of radiobroadcast receivers and imports of radiobroadcast receivers into East Germany have been minor. As already stated East Germany produces radio receivers not only for its own use and for reparations but for export.

b. Television.

There are varying reports on the production of television receiving units. Production started in East Germany in 1951 as reparations to the USSR. One report gives the planned production for 1951 as 40,000 sets and 60,000 sets for 1952, with only 17,626 receivers delivered and accepted as of 27 October 1952. ^{123/} A production figure for 1951 of 29,000 Leningrad T-2 receivers is reported. ^{124/} There are other indications that anticipated production plans were not fully realized. A production goal of 200,000 receivers in 3½ years, possibly from mid-1952 through 1955, has been reported, but there is some doubt apparently as to the possibility of realizing this rate, which averages some 57,000 receivers per year. ^{125/} Production of Leningrad T-2 receivers apparently was discontinued in late 1952 and a newer, improved model was scheduled to begin production in East Germany in late 1953 or early 1954. It is not known whether this model would be for export or for domestic use or both. ^{126/}

2. Availability and Prices of Radio Receivers.

a. Aural.

Under a state-controlled economy, the availability of broadcast receivers can be very closely regulated by controlling their cost to the people. As can be expected, therefore, the high prices prevailing for receivers precludes the purchase of all but the cheapest and least effective, except by high officials. The simple one-tube receiver thus popularized in East Germany sells for about 96 DME. According to a publication of the Free German Trade Union, 17,000 of these receivers were to have been distributed in Berlin and 33,000 in the Soviet Zone by early 1952. ^{127/} Whether this was actually accomplished is not known, but it emphasizes the plans of the State to popularize a set which would be satisfactory for nothing but local reception. A two-tube receiver sold for 120 DME prior to July 1952, in Cottbus, where most households reportedly owned radio receivers. ^{128/} Other types of receivers were reported as selling at 420 DME for one of the best all-wave receivers; 500 DME for a medium-size receiver made in East Germany; and 900 DME for the most expensive "Blaupunkt" receiver in a State store catering exclusively to Soviet Army officers. ^{129/}

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A purchaser is required to present his credentials and to make a formal application for purchase of a new receiver. Periodically, all broadcast receivers must be registered. 130/ These measures tend to control the availability of receivers, both old and new. Reportedly the Central Committee of the Soviet Zone SED Party in October 1952 prepared a legislative bill for the "seizure with receipt" of all private radio receivers, and their replacement in enterprises and homes with a single type receiver, and in shops and apartments with loudspeakers. 131/ This points to the possibility that, at some future date, only cheap, insensitive broadcast receivers and loudspeakers will be at the disposal of the people. It is therefore evident that while the majority of the people now have access to some sort of broadcast receiver, even though it is apt to be a one-tube set, the Russians are concerned over the number of higher quality receivers still in the hands of the general public and are prepared to take drastic measures if and when they consider recovery of these receivers expedient.

It is not known to what extent broadcast receivers capable of very-high-frequency reception are available. There are several models produced in East Germany that have VHF components in addition to the usual low-, medium-, and high-frequency components. VHF adapters are available for several models, and a separate super-regenerative converter-unit to enable VHF reception on AM broadcast receivers is available at a cost of 80 DME. 132/

b. Television.

The limited number of the Leningrad T-2 television receivers which were available in East Germany in 1952-53 retailed for 3,500 DME in the State shops. A newer model, reportedly to be ready in 1954, is expected to sell for 1400 to 1500 DME. Payment by installments is not allowed. Price, alone, would preclude purchase by the general public. The usual approval to purchase a receiver is necessary, but permits are understood to be limited to trusted Communists, supposedly to prevent reception of "capitalist" programs from the West. Ownership, thus far, has been limited to top Party and government officials, schools, factories, clubs, and Communist Party organizations. 133/

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IV. Regulations and Conditions of Listening.

A. Aural.

1. Regulations.

During World War II the National Socialist authorities promulgated a law which forbade all listening to foreign programs, under threat of severe penalties, including death. 134/ These restrictions were abolished after World War II, and according to present information there are no laws, decrees, or statutes forbidding listening to foreign broadcasts by the East German population, although it has been reported at various times that legal measures were being contemplated. 135/

Despite the lack of formal regulations forbidding listening to foreign broadcasts there are a number of measures to open to GDR authorities as a means of inhibiting this practice. These include intimidation and insinuation, including loss of jobs. The names of regular listeners to RIAS broadcasts have occasionally been published in the press, and these listeners have been cautioned against the dangers inherent in this practice. 136/ German youth leaders were ordered by East Zone authorities to inform on persons listening to Western radio broadcasts. 137/ In February 1953, Volkspolizei questioned students of a school in Eberswalde regarding the radio stations to which their parents listened. 138/ In July 1953 a campaign was begun against RIAS in which employees of the county administration offices in Lucken, Brandenburg, were informed that listening to RIAS was forbidden and would be punished by immediate dismissal. 139/ In October 1953, probably as a result of the East Zone riots in June and the part played in them by RIAS broadcasts, a special RIAS-listener file was set up which contained the names of employees of the Buna and Leuna works. 140/

Although there are no formal restrictions against listening to Western broadcasts, listeners have been warned that they were violating the Law for the Protection of the Peace, passed by the Satellites in 1950-51. This law forbids the spreading of false rumors, and has been applied by the Communists to information contained in Western broadcasts.

Other measures taken by the authorities to limit the audience include orders to hold power distribution to a minimum during news broadcasts of RIAS and NWDR. 141/ This rationing of electric power greatly hampers the ability of radio set owners to tune in Western stations. No information is available on radio receiver license fees, if there are any such fees.

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There are, therefore, numerous techniques available to the authorities to restrict listening to Western broadcasting. Why the authorities have not instituted stricter measures, such as the confiscation of radio receivers or the passage of legislation specifically forbidding listening to foreign programs, is not clear. The regulations and conditions concerning broadcast receivers and reception in East Germany are comparable to such regulations and conditions prevailing in most countries of the Soviet Bloc. In the absence of an extensive wire-diffusion network, the confiscation of independent broadcast receivers, which would be an effective measure to prohibit East German listening to Western broadcasts, would also remove a prime propaganda tool from use by the authorities. Further, such confiscation apparently would be contrary to Soviet policy in regard to the claimed "freedom of the people" under Communism. Moreover the mass reaction, active or passive, of the East Germans might well be inimical to the Russians' best interests in East Germany.

2. Conditions of Listening.

The advanced state of technology in East Germany, which is considerably in advance of that of the majority of the Satellites, has provided a production base which has resulted in the availability of a relatively large number of radio receivers for the East German population. Most of these receivers have some capability for reception of low, medium and high frequencies, but are not of sufficiently high sensitivity to receive signals emanating from distant points, that is, weak signals.

Preclusive control of reception by means of the wire-diffusion technique appears to have limited use in East Germany. Probably because the Russians recognize the difficulties involved, there appears to have been no effort to extend this controlled listening technique into private homes. However, the present program of wire-diffusion, with its installations in factories and public places, seem to assure that the German public will be exposed to Party doctrine at least some of the time.

Although there has always been a certain amount of interference with reception due to the jamming of Western broadcasts, the events of 17 June 1953 have evidently caused the Russians to take strong measures to blot out reception of these programs. This subject is discussed at greater length in IV, C, below.

According to reports certain measures have been taken by some East German listeners to overcome the effects of the jamming operations. One source reports that the magnetic Ferrite antenna used

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in good quality West German receivers were obtained and installed on radio receivers in East Germany. These antennas supposedly have sharp directional characteristics which permit the separation of the RIAS transmissions from those of East German jammers. 142/ It has also been reported that VHF attachments for radio receivers are available to those people who wish to receive the VHF transmissions of nearby Western stations, which are relatively free from interference.

B. Visual.

The viewing of television programs is rigidly controlled by the regime. Official sanction is necessary even to watch a set, and permits to own one are limited to trusted Communists. 143/ The Communists seem to have in mind, at least for the present, some such system for television as that used throughout the Satellites to control radio listening, i.e., the wire-diffusion network. Plans are reported to call for the installation of a network of television sets in public places, such as theaters and meeting halls, thus placing viewing more strictly under the control of the State.

Both the East and West German television systems use the 625-line viewing screen. At present, however, the number of television receivers available in East Germany is very limited. Reports in early 1953 indicate that only a few hundred sets had been supplied, with most of these going to state-owned enterprises and Communist Party centers. 144/

C. Jamming.*

1. Introduction.

East German jamming of Western broadcasts may date back to 1947 when Soviet Zone listeners to RIAS reported, in letters to the station, that there was interference with RIAS signals reminiscent of the jamming activities of World War II. 145/ The congestion of the European broadcast band in recent years could have inspired mistaken reports of jamming. It appears well-established, however, that by 1951 the East Germans were engaging in deliberate jamming activities. An instance of this was reported in which a transmitter in Erfurt operated on a frequency so close to that of a West German transmitter at Munich that serious interference resulted in Bavaria as well as in East Germany. 146/

* This subsection prepared by OSI.

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Performance of jammers in East Germany indicates that, as a result of an expansion of facilities beginning in 1952, the East Germans now have all the important elements of an effective jamming system. 147/ These include high-power transmitters, directional antenna arrays for these transmitters, a monitoring system to determine which programs shall be jammed, a control network over which to send jamming instructions to the various jamming stations, and a staff of trained personnel.

While there have been reports of jamming of Western low-frequency 148/ and high-frequency 149/ transmissions, East German activities are devoted mainly to the medium-frequency band. This is to be expected because a large proportion of the Western radiobroadcasts to East Germany are in this band. Because most of the East German jamming of the medium-frequency band consists of broadcasting their own programs on both high- and low-power transmitters operating on or very close to the frequencies of Western transmitters, it might be well to review briefly the history of the most recent allocation of European low and medium frequencies.

a. The Copenhagen Frequency Plan.

In the summer of 1948 a European broadcasting conference was held in Copenhagen to help resolve the problems brought about by the crowded condition in the low- and medium-frequency broadcast bands. The results of this conference were put into effect in March 1950. The US, not being a European nation, was not a signatory power. However, the USSR refused to be bound by the convention if it were not observed by Spain (which did not attend the conference), by Luxemburg (which announced that it would not sign) and by the powers occupying Germany, including the US.* The USSR reserved to itself the right "to take the necessary technical measures to eliminate interference in the work of its stations" if all the signatory powers did not abide by the convention. 150/ This reservation has provided the Soviet Bloc with an excuse for operating transmitters at powers much higher than those of the Plan and on frequencies other than those assigned.

* Under the terms of the Copenhagen Frequency Plan, the US Armed Forces Network was assigned one frequency. All other US broadcast operations in West Germany do not conform to this plan, to which the US was not a party.

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2. Jamming Techniques.

a. The High-Power Jammer.

The jamming pattern in East Germany is similar to that of other Satellite nations in that a number of high- and low-power transmitters are used, under the direction of an effective monitoring and control network. Noise-modulation jammers are used against low-frequency and high-frequency transmissions, while, in general, programs modulate the medium-frequency jammers. ^{151/} Program modulation serves to propagandize Soviet Bloc populations as well as to reduce reception of Western programs. One difference, however, between East Germany and the rest of the Soviet Bloc is the apparent lack of use in other Bloc nations of the power-line jammer (to be described below) which appears to be used in East Germany.

The institution in 1952 of the program of high-power broadcast transmitter construction presaged more and better facilities for jamming. It is reported that the high-power (220-440 kw) medium-frequency broadcast transmitters now being put into service in East Germany are designed for frequency change to any point in the broadcast band (525 to 1605 kc) in 40 minutes. ^{152/} In view of this, and the fact that reported locations of jammer stations generally coincide with the sites of known broadcasting stations, it is probable that the East Germans are depending on the use of these broadcast transmitters not only to put strong propaganda signals into Western Europe, but to effect a marked reduction in reception of Western broadcasts in East Germany. A list of the broadcast transmitters probably used in this service, together with their locations, frequencies, and powers, is to be found in Appendix D. Those operating on the same frequency as Western transmitters are so marked.

b. The Power-Line Jammer.

In addition to the use of the high-power transmitters for jamming, the East Germans appear to have developed a jamming apparatus which distributes its signal over electric power lines in a town. The device is reported to be located at a central point in a town, often the post office or the Volkspolizei (People's Police) installation. Known as "the set for improving radio reception in poorly served localities" (note discussion of Soviet attitude toward Copenhagen Plan, above), it apparently receives the radio program of an East German transmitter and retransmits it over the power lines on the frequency of the Western signal which is to be jammed. Reported as having an output power of 50 watts,

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it is said to be effective within a radius of about 12 kilometers (7.5 miles). This jamming signal, however, will not be transmitted by power transformer which may be installed in the electric power distribution system. This jammer, known as either the "Transponierungsempfaenge" (frequency changing receiver) or as the MF 2962 apparatus, is variously reported as using 5 or 8 tubes. One report indicates that provision may be made for sending a noise instead of a program by means of this equipment. There are indications that from 300 to 600 of these devices were ordered and that 65 were delivered in 1953. There is little information as yet on the distribution of these equipments. 153/

V. Effectiveness of Western Propaganda Broadcasts.

A. Size of the Audience.

Estimates as to the size of the audience listening to Western broadcasts in East Germany are difficult to express statistically. However, one of the most recent estimates places the number of radio listeners in East Germany at 12 million plus. 154/ When this is compared with the total population of East Germany, which stands at about 18 million inhabitants, 156/ some idea of the very large audience can be obtained.

The attention paid by the Communist authorities to the effects of Western broadcasts upon the East German population is an indication that the audience is considered to have reached sufficiently high proportions to be of concern.

As has been previously stated, a large percentage of the radio receivers are in private homes in East Germany. RIAS transmitters, located in Berlin and at Hof, West Germany, enjoys the geographical status of "local" stations. Reports of reception of RIAS broadcasts have been received from all parts of East Germany, even those parts now under Polish control. 156/ A survey conducted in early 1953 indicated that RIAS outranks all other Western stations in popularity among Germans, with 8 out of 10 adult East Zone refugees reporting that they listened more often to RIAS than to any other station. NWDR broadcasts are generally considered as supplementary to RIAS, but it does not enjoy anywhere near as large an audience.* 157/

* See II concerning the impact of Western broadcasts, particularly RIAS, upon the East German SEC policy and the reactions of some of its officials

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B. Nature of the Audience.

The audience for foreign broadcasts in East Germany appears to be drawn from all sections of the population, and includes Soviet personnel as well as native inhabitants. It is reported that enlisted personnel of Soviet Army units in Germany are not allowed to have radio receivers in military barracks; thus officers are the only military personnel who have the opportunity to listen to foreign broadcasts. 158/ There are numerous reports that Soviet officers do listen to foreign broadcasts, with reception of BBC, VOA, RIAS, RFE, Radio Liberation, Radio Free Russia, and Yugoslav broadcasts in Russian being reported. 159/

During the Berlin Youth Festival in 1951, a study was made by RIAS personnel in West Berlin of the reaction of East Zone Youth to foreign broadcasts. The results of this study showed that 88 percent of those interviewed reported listening to the radio, and of this total 83 percent stated that they listened to Western broadcasts. 160/ More than 15,000 members of the Free German Youth movement in the Soviet Zone are reported to have visited RIAS studios during the Festival. 161/

The US High Commission, in a report of February 1953 on its Berlin operations, listed the following priority target groups within East Germany: (1) public opinion leaders (e.g., the press, political figures, educators, clergy, etc.), (2) visiting Soviet Zone residents, (3) youth, (4) students, (5) unemployed and refugees, (6) labor, and (7) women. 162/

Questioning by HICOG personnel of some 500 East German farmers who visited Berlin during January-February 1952 as to their listening habits indicated that 82 percent were regular radio listeners. Of these, nine-tenths listened to RIAS's farm broadcasts, three-tenths to those of NWDR, and one-fifth to Soviet Zone stations. 163/ It is interesting to note that among the farmers thus questioned, by far the great majority expressed a preference for farm programs or political broadcasts, while such programs as radio plays, music, and comedy drew only a small percentage of listeners.

C. Popular Stations, Times, and Frequencies for Listening.

1. Aural -- Low, Medium, and High Frequency.

According to numerous surveys, by far the most popular station among East Germans is RIAS. This is probably due to a variety of reasons. RFE, for example, does not consider East Germany as a target area, and its

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broadcasts are beamed almost exclusively to the other Satellite countries. BBC is reported to be popular among certain of the more educated elements of the population, and its news is valued for its objectivity, but reception of BBC broadcasts is reportedly poor. 164/ NWDR is considered mostly as supplementary to RIAS broadcasts. It should be remembered also that RIAS's position in the center of East Germany is unique, and affords an opportunity not accorded to any other stations.

Reports indicate that the best times for broadcasting vary with the type of audience, that is, whether the broadcasts are intended for the East German population or for Soviet personnel stationed there. One report, for example, indicates that the best time for VOA Russian-language broadcasts to East Germany would be 2030-2200 GMT, which is off-duty time for Soviet troops. 165/ This is borne out by another report, which gives the period 1900-2200 GMT as the time best suited for listening to foreign broadcasts. 166/ This latter report also points out the difficulties encountered by Soviet enlisted personnel in attempting to listen to foreign broadcasts, since there are few individuals who have access to tunable broadcast receivers.

VOA at present carries Russian-language broadcasts to Germany at 1900-1930 and 2215-2245 GMT, both times mentioned as having good reception on high frequency. Other VOA and BBC Russian language high-frequency broadcasts mentioned as having good reception are those in the 9-mc band in the daytime, and in the 14- and 12-mc bands in the evening. 167/ Radio Liberation is reportedly very effective in its broadcasts in the 6-mc band from 1500 to 1530 GMT. 168/

As has been previously shown, RIAS outranks by far all other stations in its popularity among East German listeners. In 1951, a sampling of opinion among East Zone residents indicated that more than 80 percent of those who listened to the radio regularly depended mainly upon RIAS broadcasts. 169/ Among those stations heard, the relative popularity rating showed RIAS first with 66 percent, NWDR second with 12 percent, Radio Leipzig and Radio Berlin (both Communist) with 3 and 2 percent respectively, and BBC with 1 percent. A more recent survey, made in November 1953 by WICOG, indicated that RIAS had lost approximately one-quarter of its audience since mid-1951, 170/ but remained by far the most popular station. The loss of listeners was attributed mainly to poor reception owing to jamming operations, rather than to a drop in the quality of its programs.

The most popular programs among East Germans appear to be news and political broadcasts. This is true of all sections of the population -- professional people, workers, farmers, and students. 171/ These broadcasts are carried by RIAS on both medium and high frequencies.

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Some programs, with their broadcast times, which have a certain popularity among East German listeners are listed below: 172/

<u>Program</u>	<u>Time (GMT)</u>	<u>Frequencies</u> <u>173/</u>	
		<u>Medium</u>	<u>High</u>
"Berlin Speaks to the Zone"	0620-0630	x	x
	1240-1250	x	x
"The Week in Eonn"	0930-1000	x	x
Farm Broadcasts	1120-1130	x	x
RIAS Locator Service	1145	x	x
A.V. Boerner's Commentary	1901-1906	x	x

Other popular programs are "Pinsel and Schnorchel," "The Islanders," "Kit Parade," and "The Berlin Atmosphere." 174/

2. Aural -- Very High Frequency.

Most of the specific programs listed in Section IV, C, 1 are also carried by RIAS on VHF simultaneously with the medium- and high-frequency transmissions. There is no information available as to program preferences for VHF reception.

3. Television.

The present situation as regards the reception of television broadcasts from the West is unclear. There is little or no information which would indicate the size or nature of the audience, and the present base for reception of telecasts is still in a very elementary stage. It is, therefore, impossible to make any appraisal of the conditions which might govern reception of television in East Germany.

D. Some Economic Effects of Western Broadcasts.

All evidence points to the fact that Western radiobroadcasts have had a considerable economic effect in East Germany. It is estimated, for example, that at present there are 60 or more transmitters of various power ratings used at least part time in East Germany in the jamming of Western broadcasts. This operation involves the employment of skilled technicians and a large amount of expensive equipment, all of which are a drain upon the East German economy rather than a positive contribution.

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Broadcasts by RIAS have often had the effect of causing panic buying by reporting the existence of shortages in East Germany. In one such instance a RIAS report of a shortage of meat in Brandenburg was carried at 0640 hours. By 0800 the county offices had been mobilized to see to it that the report would be proved false, and meat taken from that usually reserved for Soviet troops was put on the market. 175/

In another case it was reported that a collective wage contract for the Brandenburg Steel Works was concluded only after great difficulty with the workers. These difficulties were attributed to RIAS broadcasts. 176/

The most dramatic evidence of the effect of Western broadcasts upon the East German economy occurred during the riots which took place in Berlin and the Soviet Zone in June 1953. Numerous reports testify to the effect of RIAS broadcasts in spreading the news of the riots throughout East Germany. 177/ It is perhaps too strong a statement to attribute the "new course" announced by the East German regime to this development, but it is certain that considerable damage was done to the economy during the period of the riots. Looting and property damage were reportedly widespread. In addition, there was the expense involved in moving People's Police and Soviet military units to Berlin to quell workers' resistance. Any effect upon the riots that may have been attributed indirectly to the RIAS broadcasts would seem to have been well worth the effort in terms of the disruption, even though temporary, of the functioning of the economy in East Germany.

The broad malignant impact of Western broadcasts upon the propensity of the East German worker to work heartily, though not measurable quantitatively, is estimated to be appreciable.

E. East German Press and Radio Reaction to Western Broadcasts.

There is abundant evidence of the reactions of the East German press and radio to Western broadcasts. Some instances of this have been reviewed in IV, A. Articles have appeared in the official press listing the names of persons known to be regular RIAS listeners. 178/ The party organ, Neues Deutschland, has often carried articles inveighing against those East Germans who listen to the "anti-democratic (Western) radio." 179/ Listeners to RIAS and NWDR were warned that they were violating the Law for the Protection of the Peace, 180/ which was passed by all the Satellite countries in the latter part of 1950. In April 1952 the magazine of the People's Police carried an article which stated that "RIAS listeners have lost the right to do duty in the People's Police." 181/

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Perhaps the finest tribute to the effectiveness of Western broadcasts is contained in an article which appeared in Neues Deutschland. This article carried a statement to the effect that it was not safe even for true Communists to listen to Western news on an academic basis, since this made them a party -- wittingly or unwittingly -- to the campaigns of the "warmongers and foes of democracy." 182/

VI. Trends.

The end of World War II left East Germany in political, economic, and social chaos. Its radiobroadcasting resources were depleted. Their reconstruction proceeded slowly and unsurely under Soviet controls and restraints. The winter of 1951-52 became critical and dynamic. Technical radio management, radiobroadcasting management, and production of radio equipment all went under review or reorientation to overcome deficiencies and to cope with the influence of foreign broadcasts, particularly those from Western Germany. Most major changes were completed by January 1953. Personnel problems, principally concerning competence and loyalty, have persistently plagued the effectiveness of East German radiobroadcasting and its administration. To cure all ills, the State Radio Committee was set up in September 1952. One unconfirmed but reliable report indicates that plans were laid in March 1953 to reorganize radiobroadcasting again. There is no evidence to show that this planned reorganization has since taken place, notwithstanding the recognized success which West Germany's broadcasting had in causing the spread of East German rioting in June 1953. In spite of serious problems, the trend since 1952 has been toward more effective and efficient organization and management of East German radiobroadcasting resources.

The trend in the East German normal broadcasting transmission base appears to be to saturate not only East Germany with medium-frequency signals, but to beam them toward much of Western Europe for propaganda purposes. In addition, it appears that from the current modest beginning the East Germans will make increasing use of very-high-frequency (FM) and television broadcasting with expanding coverage of the country.

The trend in the number of available broadcast receivers for use in East Germany for the usual types of broadcasting is steadily upward and it is expected to continue in this direction, with possible larger increases in FM and television receivers than in the past, since indications point toward development of these types of broadcasting. This upward trend should be helped by the present attitude of the Russians which contemplates a larger portion of East German production going toward home consumption. It is not expected that the percentage of receivers capable of satisfactory high-frequency reception from foreign countries

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will improve materially. While production embraces many high-quality models with several tubes and incorporation of all wave bands, it is probable that these will not find their way into the hands of the average citizen, who can afford to buy only the cheapest receiver. The latter is a relatively insensitive receiver capable of local reception only. The better, more expensive, receivers will continue to be held by the higher-ups in the government, military, industrial, Party, and Soviet circles. There should be an increased reception base for FM and television as these two types of transmission are expanded. Their distribution will naturally follow the installation of the transmitters since both are virtually of a line-of-sight nature. The development of wire-diffusion networks and loudspeaker connections will probably continue to follow the pattern of the past, with limited use in private homes unless Soviet policy changes radically toward this arrangement.

The trend in restrictions on listening to foreign broadcasts during the period 1946 to the present time has been toward an increase in such measures, but until now has not reached the point where listening to such programs is legally prohibited or where the regime has taken steps to confiscate sets.

As regards the conditions for listening, the general trend here has been toward an increase in the measures taken by GDR authorities to build up a "captive" audience which will be forced to listen to the Communist programs, accompanied by a decrease in the reception of Western broadcasts as a result of jamming interference.

It is estimated that the current strong propensity on the part of the average East German to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially those from West Berlin and West Germany, will increase with increasing efforts to prevent it.

If present plans for expansion of both strategically located medium- and high-power transmitters, and low-power local jammers distributing signals over electric power lines are carried out, the potential East German audience for Western broadcasts will be reduced. The apparent goal of this program is to make reception of Western broadcasts in East Germany impossible. The complete achievement of this goal will require jamming facilities considerably in excess of those presently in use of believed to be projected.

There has been a recent trend toward a decrease in the size of the East German audience for foreign broadcasts, but this is attributed to interference resulting from jamming rather than to any drop in the quality

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of programs. Increased difficulty in getting through the jamming curtain with presently available transmitting equipment can probably be expected in the future, because the Communists are constantly stepping up their efforts in this respect.


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APPENDIX A

REPORTED ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF RADIOBROADCASTING, EAST GERMANY
December 1950 - August 1952



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APPENDIX B

REPORTED PERSONNEL OF THE STATE RADIO COMMITTEE,
EAST GERMANY - 1953 183/

HEISS Chairman of the Commission is Kurt Heiss, a professional Journalist, who was formerly director of the Soviet Zone Radiobroadcasting System and editor of Deutschlandsender. His wife is Russian.

Born in 1909 in Mannheim, Heiss became a Communist Party member when he fled from Germany in 1933 to escape arrest by the Gestapo. After World War II, he served for a time as chief editor of Radio Leipzig, until assuming the position of Director of Radio Berlin on 26 October 1949. In December 1951 he left Radio Berlin to become Director of the East Zone Radiobroadcasting System, succeeding Hans Mahle. In August 1952 he was appointed to his present position.

Heiss attended the Antifa (Anti-Fascist) School in Moscow. He was in Warsaw with a delegation from the Central Radio Office from 20 June to 6 July 1950, where he signed a protocol on behalf of the GDR providing for cooperation and exchange of knowledge between the two countries.

KLEINERT Wolfgang Kleinert, who also received training at the Antifa School, is Deputy Chairman of the Commission. He headed a Commission delegation to Sofia on 28 April 1953 to conclude an agreement on cooperation in the field of broadcasting with the Radio Committee of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. He is a member of the SED.

PERK W. Perk, of Deutschlandsender, is responsible for the broadcast "All-German Questions." He has visited the Soviet Union. He deals with Radio Berlin's West German reporters, who are equipped with miniature recorders for work in the GDR. Perk speaks and writes German poorly, and his own commentaries must be extensively edited.

PFEUCHNER (possibly Pischner) Professor Pfeuchner is in charge of the Main Music Department. He believes that Radio Berlin, in line with the "new course," should imitate RIAS: first hot music, then political reports." (COMMENT: This is not, of course, the RIAS method.) He sends people to West Berlin to buy Western records and to engage Western artists -- money no object. Party affiliation not available. Pischner has been reported to be an SED member.

FUETZNER R. Fuetzner is responsible for literary and cultural-political broadcasts. He has visited the Soviet Union. His job is to demonstrate the "impossibility" of Western culture. Party affiliation not available.

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ELLRODT Kaete Ellrodt is in charge of entertainment and public performances. She plants off-color jokes about the Americans and the West. Party affiliation not available. A K. Ellrodt, perhaps the same person, has been reported as Chief Editor of Berlin III and a member of SED.

PRISKY Hanna Prisky is in charge of "Youth and Pedagogics." She maintains close liaison with Komsomols, and believes that "you can't do anything with the grown-ups, anyway." She is often in the Soviet Union and Satellite states. Party affiliation not available.

ADAMEK Heinz Adamek, director of the Main Personnel Department, is responsible for personnel policy. He has close connections with the State Security Service. He is a member of the SED, and regards political attitude as a decisive factor in the employment of personnel.

PROPST W. Propst, director of the Main Technical Department, is supposedly a technician, but was removed from his post at Radio Berlin for incompetence. Heiss took over his functions. Propst explains technical faults at Radio Berlin as being the result of poor quality of technical personnel and equipment.* Propst is a member of the SED.

ZAHNKE Zahnke is the supervisor of employees' work conduct. When drinking, he complains about the GDR government. Party affiliation is not available.

MENDELSON Kieter Mendelsohn, a member of Free German Youth, was installed in the commission to keep von Schnitzler and Gessner under observation. He is a young man, in his early 20's. Von Schnitzler was formerly in charge. Party affiliation not available.

GESSNER Herbert Gessner, a well-known commentator, was removed from Radio Munich in 1947. His wife was employed in the cultural section, but was removed for conduct injurious to the SED. Party affiliation not available.

KUHFEYD Guenter Kuhfeld has had difficulties on the score of morals and professional qualifications. Party affiliation not available.

SCHNEIDER Helmut Schneider was formerly chief of section. He was removed in a series of intrigues and is now a script writer for DEFA. He writes dramatized documentaries for Radio Berlin and did the Rosenberg shows. He is very able, though a heavy drinker. He is reported to have stated that "the party is the highest form of exploitation." Party affiliation not

* Technical facilities at Radio Berlin include 6 recording rooms, 14 cutting rooms, and 10 dubbing rooms; half of them are constantly out of service and all have acoustical faults.

available. An H. Schneider has been reported as an SED member, in the Entertainment Department.

RENNHAK Franz Rennhak is in charge of Berlin I. He is a heavy drinker and is professionally unqualified. His party affiliation is not known. It is reported that he was in "Western Emigration."

MOERICKE Hanz Moericke is in charge of Berlin III. His father is a personal friend of Wilhelm Pieck. When drinking, he makes critical remarks about the Communist system. He receives financial support from his father-in-law, who lives in West Berlin. Party affiliation not available.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Party</u>
Adolphs, Karl	Director, Leipzig Radio	N.A.
Alberty	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Bartels	Assigned Announcer	SED
Bauer	Youth Department	SED
Bexertt	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Boehm	Transmission - 3 Programs	SED
Bosse, Johann	News and Program Announcer	No Party
Brang	Director's Pool	SED
Braumann	News and Program Announcer	SED
Brenk	Assigned Announcer	SED
Burkhardt, H.	Chief Editor, Berlin II	SED
Buschmann	Chief Editor, Berlin I	SED
Busse, H.	Theater, Film and Music Department	SED
Classen, H.	West German Communist Party and Unions Department	SED
Crossman	Women's Department	SED
Demuth	Transmission - 3 Programs	SED
Doerge	Technician for 3 Programs	No Party
Dost, W.	Current Events Department	SED
Duchrow	SED Department	SED
Dunger, K.	Children's Department	SED
Ebel	Director of Main Administrative Department	SED
Edelhoff	Domestic Economy Department	SED
Edelmann	Country News Department	SED
Fehlig, Werner	Deputy Director, Leipzig Radio, or Director, Transmission	SED
Frenzel	Berlin Department	SED
Froehlich	Director's Pool	No Party
Gegget, H.	West Germany Department	SED
Glaetzner	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Grenzel	Berlin Section	SED
Gruenstein	Censoring Department	SED
Hacke, Rudi	Technical Director, Leipzig Radio	N.A.
Haendler	Truth About America Department	SED

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Name	Function	Party
Hartmann	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Hass	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Hauschild	News and Program Announcer	SED
Heilig, Johann	Personnel Referent	SED
Helzig	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Herr	Censoring Department	SED
Herwig	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Heydeck, H.	West Germany Department	SED
Hildebrandt	Director's Pool	No Party
Hilgert	Director's Pool	SED
Hoerne, Walter	Foreign Connections	N.A.
Horn	Technician for 3 Programs	N.A.
Imiela, M.	Technical Scheduling Office	SED
Kahlow	Dramatics Department	SED
Kaminski	Censoring Department	SED
Kasswan	Transmission - 3 Programs	SED
Kaul, Dr.	Director, Legal Department	SED
Kendt	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Kleehn	News and Program Announcer	SED
Lange, H. D.	News and Program Announcer	No Party
Mackat	Domestic Economy Department	SED
Miercke	Director's Pool	SED
Mika, V.	Traffic Office	No Party
Naltrudt	External Technical Service	SED
Nehmzow	Censoring Department	SED
Opitz	Finance Department	N.A.
Ortner, G.	Youth Department	SED
Paschke	SED Department	SED
Paul	Berlin Section	SED
Phuetzner, Rudolph	Director, Radio Berlin or <u>Deutschlandsender</u>	N.A.
Pietsch	News and Program Announcer	SED
Polensen	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Polland	Files and Archives (Sound Carrier)	SED
Porath	Director's Pool	No Party
Preusker	Chief, Production Department	No Party
Schnitzler, von	Commentary Department	SED
Schoellig	Production Director, Organization Office	SED
Schoenendorf, W.	Deputy Director, Production	SED
Schwendtner	Technical for 3 Programs	SED
Selbmann, E.	Science or Economic Department	SED
Soeldner	Women's Department	SED
Steinke	Director's Pool	SED
Stelzner, R.	Religious Department	SED
Stoll, B.	USSR and Satellite Departments	SED
Stuebe	Literature Department	SED

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Party</u>
Thierfelder	Censoring Department	SED
Thiess	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Toelg	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Wander	Assigned Announcer	No Party
Zilles, Hermann	Deputy Director, <u>Deutschlandsender</u> or Director, Television Branch	SED
Zimmering, G.	Political Culture Department	SED

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APPENDIX C

RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 184/
1949

Location	Frequency (kc)	Power (kw)	Program	Hours of Operation ^{a/}	Remarks
Berlin-Koenigswusterhausen	841	100	Berlin Home Service	Approximately 18.5 hours daily	
Berlin-Deutschlandsender	191	100	Deutschlandsender	Approximately 18.5 hours daily	
Berlin	6115 7113	5 to 10	Deutschlandsender	Irregular	Power estimated
Berlin	7610	5	"Radio Volga"	N.A.	Program for USSR occupation forces
Dresden	1465	10	Central German Radio and Saxony Regional Service	Approximately 17.5 hours daily	
Erfurt	1231	20	Central German Radio and Thuringian Regional Service	Approximately 17.5 hours daily	
Halle	1303	20	Central German Radio and Saxony Anhalt Regional Service	Approximately 17.5 hours daily	
Leipzig	785 9729	100 12	Central German Radio	Approximately 17.5 hours daily	Program for USSR occupation forces
Leipzig	722	7	"Radio Volga"	N.A.	
Potsdam	564	20	Berlin Home Service and Potsdam Regional Service	Approximately 18.5 hours daily	
Schwerin	1231	20	Berlin Home Service and Mecklenburg Regional Service	Approximately 18.5 hours daily	

a. Detailed program schedules not available.

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APPENDIX D

RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 185/

January 1954

Location Frequency Power Program Hours of Remarks

(kc) (kw) Operation (GMT)

Low, Medium and High Frequencies

Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	173 a/	N.A.	Berlin I	0330-0710) assumed 0900-0000)	Station not announced or listed; probably used to counter VOA on 173 kc. Power to be increased to 500 kw in the near future.
Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	185	100	Deutschlandsender	0330-0710, 0900-0000	
Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	263	20	"Radio Volga" to Soviet Occupation Forces	Daily: 1500-2200 Sunday: 1000-2200	Relays Moscow Main Program 5 hours daily, 8 hours Sunday; this station is not under GDR control. Probably mobile type transmitter.
Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	833	20	Berlin I	0330-0710, 0900-0000	
Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	6115) 7150)	5	Berlin I	0330-0710, 0900-0000	
Berlin-Koepenick	782	440	Night Program Deutschlandsender	0000-0330 (0330-0910 (1100-1300 (1500-0000	Transmitter is the Zwilling Z-3, recently installed.
Berlin-Koenigswusterhauser	782	70	do.	do.	Spare transmitter for Berlin-Koepenick above.
Berlin-Stadtsender	1570	20	Berlin III (which parallels Berlin I from 0330-0710)	0330-0710, 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000	

a. Underscoring indicates that this frequency is the same as that of a radiobroadcast station located in West Germany.

RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 185/

January 1954
(Continued)

Location	Frequency Power (kc)	(kw)	Program	Hours of Operations (GMT)	Remarks
Berlin			Probably Berlin I or Berlin III		Reported to be under construction. Frequency reported to be in the low- frequency range between 150 and 300 kc; power reported to be be- tween 500 kw and 1,000 kw. Location reported variously as Berlin-Zehlendorf, Berlin-Koepenick, Ludwigslust, or Burg (near Magdeburg)
Dresden I	910	20	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000 1700-1730	
Dresden II (Wiledruff)	1016	300	Saxony Regional Service Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850 1040-1700; 1730-0000, 1700-1730	New transmitter inaugurated 9 Oct 1952
			Saxony Regional Service (also short programs several times weekly from Goerlitz in Lusatian Serb)		

RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 185

January 1954
(Continued)

Location	Frequency (kc)	Power (kw)	Program	Hours of Operations (GMT)	Remarks
			<u>Low, Medium, and High Frequencies</u>		
Erfurt	800	20	Berlin I	0330-0710, 0900-1715, 1745-0000 1715-1945	Expected to be replaced in May 1954 by 440 kw transmitter.
Undetermined - thought to be Halle	<u>737</u>	N.A.	Undetermined - thought to be Berlin III	0330-1700) assumed 1730-0000)	Low power transmitter apparently used to jam the RIAS-Hof (West Germany) transmitter on the same frequency.
Halle-Bernburg	<u>1196</u>	20	Berlin I	0330-0710, 0900-1715, 1745-0000 1715-1745	
			Thuringian Regional Service		
Leipzig I	1043	170	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000	Actual power output believed to be 70 kw.
			Saxony Anhalt Regional Service		
Leipzig	9730	10	Night Program Deutschlandsender	0000-0330, 0330-0910, 1100-1300, 1500-0000	
Leipzig III	1079	20	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000	Mobile type transmitter; super-power transmitter scheduled for Leipzig in 1954.

RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 185/

January 1957
(Continued)

Location	Frequency (kc)	Power (kw)	Program	Hours of Operations ((GMT)	Remarks
<u>Low, Medium, and High Frequencies</u>					
Leipzig	1322	100	Leipzig Regional Service	1700-1730	
			Radio Moscow (re- lays German programs from Moscow European Service)	1600-2130	This station is not under GDR control.
Magdeburg (Burg)	575	300	Berlin I	0330-0710, 0900-1715, 1945-0000 1715-1945	
			Saxony Anhalt Regional Service		
Undetermined - though to be Plauen	890	2	Berlin I	0330-0710, assumed 0900-0000	Not announced or listed; formerly interfered with RIAS -Hof (West Germany).
Potsdam-Colm	611	20	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850; 1040-1700; 1730-0000	Probably mobile type transmitter.
			Brandenburg Regional Service	1700-1730	

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RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 185/

January 1954
(Continued)

Location	Frequency (kc)	Power (kw)	Program	Hours of Operations (GMT)	Remarks
				<u>Low, Medium, and High Frequencies</u>	
Schwerin	728	440	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000 1700-1730	440 kw power inaugurated 9 Oct 1953
			Mecklenburg Regional Service		
Unknown	683-Night 1385-Day	N.A.	Berlin I	0330-0710 (assumed) 0900-0000	
				<u>Very High Frequencies (FM)</u>	
Berlin-Friedrichstadt	92.5	0.25	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850 1040-1700 1730-0000	
Berlin-Friedrichstadt	94.9	0.25	Berlin I		Projected
Brocken (Harz Mountains)	94.6	0.25	Berlin I	0330-0710 0900-0000	
Geilsberg (Thuringia)	94.0	N.A.	Berlin I	0330-0710 0900-0000 0330-0710	
Leipzig	88.0	N.A.	Berlin I		
Schwerin	89.2	N.A.	Berlin III	0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I) 0710-0850 1040-1700	
			Mecklenburg Regional Service	1700-1730	

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APPENDIX E

CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIOBROADCAST RECEIVERS PRODUCED IN EAST GERMANY 186/

<u>Name or Type</u>	<u>No. of Tubes</u>	<u>Frequency Bands ^{a/}</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
RFT 1 U 11	1	L M H	HF Band, 5.9-9.8 kc. Probably most population set, lowest cost.
Stern 4 U 64	4	L M H	Superheterodyne, AC-DC, adapter for VHF available.
Stern 4 U 65	4	L M H VH	Superheterodyne.
Stern 5 U 61	5	L M H	Superheterodyne, AC-DC, adapter for VHF available.
RFT 5 E 61-D	4	L M H	Superheterodyne.
RFT 5 E 63	5	L M H VH	"Medium class" set, phonograph.
RFT Stern 5 U 53	5	L M H VH	Superheterodyne.
RFT 5 E 64	5	N.A.	Phonograph.
RFT 6 E 62	6	L M H	High-fidelity, record player and tape recorder.
6 D 71	5	M	Portable, AC-DC.
Stern 9 E 91	9	L M H VH	Superheterodyne.
Stern 9 E 92	9	L M H VH	Superheterodyne, record player and tape recorder.
9 E 61	N.A.	N.A.	Receiver for coaches (busses).
Belaphon 4251W	5	L M H	
"Sonneberg" 65/52 W	5	L M H	Superheterodyne.
"Olympia" 522 WM	5	L M H	Superheterodyne.
64/50 GHS	4	L M H	Superheterodyne.
RFT S 1049B	5	M H	Automobile set.
RFT AE 66	N.A.	M H	Automobile set, superheterodyne.
Skala	5	L M	
Stern 1 U 16 b/	1	L M	Low cost, said to have been discontinued in 1953.
Stern 7 E 86 b/	7	L M H VH	Superheterodyne, tone controlled.
Stern b/	2	M	Midget superheterodyne dispatch case.

- a. L - low frequency.
M - medium frequency.
H - high frequency.
VH - very high frequency.

b. These sets were reported scheduled to be placed on exhibition at the Leipzig Fair, 1952. They were new developments not then in production.

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APPENDIX F

METHODOLOGY

The totals of radiobroadcasting hours transmitted to East German audiences, both foreign and domestic, were obtained from overtly published material of the broadcasting agencies and from reports based on monitoring.

25X1X499

The estimates of the number of broadcast receivers (Table 4) for the years 1946 to 1951 were taken from CIA/RR IP-341, 25 August 1953, NIS (this was the only source of the geographical distribution), overt published material, [REDACTED] and a State Department despatch. For subsequent years estimates were predicated on a flat yearly increase, extending the estimates to 1957, which has been done in the S/COM contribution, dated 9 January 1954, to office-wide project, EIC-P-6. As a result of research for the current report, it was felt that the estimates for EIC-P-6 probably were high because of the uncertainties of the impact of certain economic factors. These include the development of very-high-frequency and television broadcasting, wire-diffusion expansion, and the "new course," which is intended to liberalize economic benefits to the masses. For this reason a more modest yearly growth increment was considered and adopted. Lower estimates then resulted and were combined with those for EIC-P-6 so that estimates for 1952 through 1957 are stated in the form of a range for each year rather than a definite figure.

Appendix E setting forth the characteristics of radiobroadcast receivers produced in East Germany was derived from material contained in catalogs of a German import-export organization, CIA/RR 11, 26 September 1952, and [REDACTED]

25X1A8a

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k. No information is at hand regarding plans beyond 1954 for radio broadcasting transmitting facilities.

1. There is little information regarding proposed power of new VHF (FM) and TV transmitters.

2. Filling Gaps.

Efforts to fill gaps have been proceeding on two broad fronts -- the general and the specific. As for the general, a Telecommunications Working Group of the EIC Subcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation has undertaken to develop a complete, new set of requirements manuals geared to the specific capabilities of the various collection agencies, along with the establishment of priorities according to subject matter and country. In consonance with this program, working groups of the EIC Subcommittee on Electronics and Telecommunications is now preparing a set of survey sheets on the Soviet Bloc countries which will measure the state of our intelligence in the field, the deficiencies, and the reasons for the deficiencies. This over-all program when put into effect, should greatly improve the quantity and quality of raw material and should help to fill in some of our more wide-open gaps.

As for specific efforts, advantage is taken of knowledgeable sources discovered in the daily reading process by the initiation of specific requirements geared to our known gaps and the competence of the source. [REDACTED] were also utilized to a limited extent in the preparation of this report. In addition, numerous requests for requirements have been responded to in this field and continue to help fill in gaps.

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
APPENDIX H

SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES

1. Evaluation of Sources.

a. Transmission Facilities of Foreign Broadcasters to East Germany (Aural).

25X9A2 The information on foreign broadcasting addressed to the East German audience was obtained chiefly from [REDACTED] based on monitoring and on overt publications. It is considered reliable. 25X1A8a



c. Receiving Equipment in East Germany.

This information on distribution of receivers came largely from NIS, NIE and CIA published documents, State Department despatches, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In general, this information was confirmatory.

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25X1X4000500

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The information on receiver production and characteristics was obtained from CIA published documents, and East German trade catalogs, [redacted] This information is taken as having fair reliability.

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d. Regulations and Conditions of Listening.

25X1A8a

Most of the material in this section is taken from [redacted] State Department and USIA despatches, [redacted] Since [redacted] reports were, in general, substantiated by the overt information, they are believed to be of good reliability.

25X1X4a

25X1X4gs

e. Effectiveness of Western Broadcasts.

The majority of the material on the effectiveness of Western broadcasts is taken from surveys made by HICOG or RIAS personnel. These surveys are considered to be of good validity. Information on popular programs, stations, and frequencies was obtained from HICOG reports, and confirmed as to time and frequencies by program schedules overtly published.

2. Sources.

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
A - Completely reliable	Doc. - Documentary
B - Usually reliable	1 - Confirmed by other sources
C - Fairly reliable	2 - Probably true
D - Not usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
E - Not reliable	4 - Doubtful
F - Cannot be judged	5 - Probably false
	6 - Cannot be judged

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which will carry the field evaluation "Documentary" instead of a numerical grade.

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document. Evaluations designated "SI" are by OSI.

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