

OER/ST/PC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A0012001


~~Removed Copy~~

~~SECRET~~
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Nº 46

PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE REDEFLECTION-REPATRIATION CAMPAIGN
OF THE SOVIET BLOC
1955-57



CIA/RR PR-162
28 June 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C) 1989
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE REDEFLECTION-REPATRIATION CAMPAIGN
OF THE SOVIET BLOC
1955-57

CIA/RR PR-162

(ORR Project 45.1596)

NOTICE

The data and conclusions contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Comments and data which may be available to the user are solicited.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary and Conclusions	1
I. Introduction	2
II. Selected World War II and Postwar Movements	3
A. Movements into Germany	3
B. Overseas Movement	3
C. Escapee Arrivals, 1955-56	5
D. Post-Revolutionary Movement of Hungarians	5
1. Movement to Austria	5
2. Movement to Yugoslavia	7
III. Redefection to the Soviet Bloc	8
A. Soviet and Satellite Amnesties	8
B. Evaluation of Soviet Bloc Returnee Data	9
1. USSR	9
a. Returnees from South America	9
b. Returnees from Europe and the US	9
2. European Satellites	10
a. Number of Repatriates	10
b. Repatriation from the USSR	13
c. Return of German Ethnics	15
d. Reception Given to Redefectors	17
e. East Germany	18
C. US Escapee Program Statistics	19
D. Comparison Between Soviet Bloc and US Statistics	21
IV. Conclusions	22

~~SECRET~~

S-E-C-R-E-T

Page

Appendixes

Appendix A. Gaps in Intelligence	23
Appendix B. Source References	25

Tables

1. Emigration from the USSR and the European Satellites, 1946-52	4
2. New Arrivals from the Soviet Bloc Registered Under the US Escapee Program, 1955 - November 1956, and Regis- tered Escapees, 1 November 1956	6
3. Number of Repatriates Announced by Selected European Satellite Countries, 1955-57	12
4. Recorded Number of Redefectors to the Soviet Bloc, 1955 - September 1956	20

- iv -

S-E-C-R-E-T

CIA/RR PR-162
(ORR Project 45.1596)

S-E-C-R-E-T

THE REDEFLECTION-REPATRIATION CAMPAIGN
OF THE SOVIET BLOC
1955-57*

Summary and Conclusions

The response of former Soviet Bloc nationals to the 1955-57 redeflection-repatriation campaign of the Soviet Bloc has been comparatively negligible. Although more than 11 million persons residing in West Germany in mid-1956 were wartime and postwar residents of areas now included in the Soviet Bloc and although 1.2 million additional previous residents in the same area have moved overseas, it is improbable that more than 6,000 persons have redeflected to Bloc countries. This figure does not include East and West German nationals who move fairly freely over the border seeking employment and also excludes the 3,300 Russian returnees from Argentina who were prewar migrants rather than postwar refugees or defectors.

The total of 61,000 persons listed as returnees by Soviet Bloc countries apparently includes a large number of intra-Bloc repatriates from the USSR to Poland, Rumania, and Hungary. Official Polish announcements verify this assumption by indicating that 31,000 repatriates from the USSR returned to Poland in 1956 and that only 2,000 came from all other countries.

Of the 170,000 Hungarians who escaped into Austria and the 18,400 Hungarians who entered Yugoslavia following the October revolution in Hungary, only 3,700 voluntarily had returned to Hungary from Austria and only 1,400 had returned from Yugoslavia by March 1957. The number of extralegal returnees is believed to have been small. A minimum of 16,000 Hungarians -- primarily young adults -- were deported to the USSR, however, as a reprisal for the uprising in Hungary. Few are believed to have escaped or to have been returned to Hungary by the USSR.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 15 March 1957.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

The return of German ethnics on even a limited scale to the European Satellites suggests a change in attitude toward the German minorities. But even in this instance the flow westward far exceeded that to the east. By 1 February 1957, more than 23,000 German ethnics had left Poland for West Germany.

The impact of redefectors from the West upon the Soviet Bloc labor force is of little significance even if all the redefectors are skilled workers. Despite the unimpressive results achieved in quantitative terms, however, there are indications that the Soviet Bloc redefection-repatriation campaign will be continued for at least 1 or 2 more years.

I. Introduction.

The redefection-repatriation campaign,* begun in the Soviet Bloc during 1955, is designed (1) to mollify Bloc nationals, (2) to reverse the westward flow of defectors, (3) to utilize the skills of the redefectors in order to realize planned economic goals, (4) to discredit the emigre groups, and (5) to convince the Free World that Communism is worthy of adoption.

This report analyzes available statistical data to determine the degree of success of the redefection-repatriation campaign by making comparisons of the return movement into Soviet Bloc countries with the major movements westward in the postwar period.

* The term redefection includes the return of refugees who chose not to return to their homelands immediately after World War II as well as defectors or escapees who fled after the Soviet takeover and subsequently returned. Wherever possible, the distinction will be made between these categories and those comprising (1) returning prewar migrants from the Free World and (2) recent repatriates from the USSR to the European Satellites. Satellite regimes tend to use the term repatriation because it covers the return of nationals arranged by governmental action as well as by individual initiative from all other countries of the world, including prisoners of war and other detainees in the USSR.

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

II. Selected World War II and Postwar Movements.

Discussion in this report is limited to the major postwar movements into Germany and to overseas destinations.

A. Movements into Germany.

An indication of the wartime and postwar westward movements of population from Eastern Europe and the USSR is that, as of mid-1956 more than 11 million persons, or 21.8 percent of the total population of West Germany, had previously (1 September 1939) resided in Berlin, the European Satellites, or the USSR. 1/*

The campaign to reunite German families by repatriating members of families living in Poland began in 1952 for East Germany but not until December 1955 for West Germany. Under an agreement concluded between the Polish and West German Red Cross organizations in December 1956 the principle of the permanent reunification of families was liberalized to permit the repatriation of even distant relatives. 2/

By 1 February 1957, more than 23,000 persons of German nationality had left Poland (particularly the administered territories) for West Germany, and more than 18,000 had departed for East Germany. 3/ It was anticipated that 15,000 additional persons would be leaving Poland for the two Germanies. 4/ West German data are generally consistent with the above Polish figure on movement. 5/ Also during 1956, about 1,300 Germans returned from captivity in the USSR, and a few hundred prisoners and children returned from Yugoslavia. 6/

B. Overseas Movement.

Table 1** shows that over 1 million emigrants (net) from the USSR and the European Satellites (other than East Germany) moved to overseas destinations between 1946 and 1952. About 292,000 additional persons emigrated from Germany as a whole, but the number originating in East Germany is not known. In 1953-55 the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration moved overseas 108,000 additional "refugees of all categories." 7/

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

** Table 1 follows on p. 4.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 1

Emigration from the USSR and the European Satellites a/
1946-52

Country of Immigration	Country of Emigration b/						Thousand
	USSR	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Total
North America							
Canada	31	1	10	9	77	6	134
US	120	1	28	22	169	14	354
Latin America	15	Negligible	3	8	23	2	51 e/
Israel	9	38	22	18	121	134	342
Australia and New Zealand	56	1	11	13	72	3	156 d/
Total	<u>231</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>462</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>1,037</u>

a. 8/

b. Identifiable migrants have been traced with a reasonable degree of certainty based primarily on "country of birth" statistics of the receiving countries supplemented with those of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and its successor, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

c. Primarily to Argentina (24,000), Venezuela (10,000), and Brazil (9,000).

d. Virtually all to Australia.

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. Escapee Arrivals, 1955-56.

The Office for Field Coordination of the US Department of State Escapee Program (USEP)* in West Germany has collated in a master index file on a monthly basis the number of escapees in Western Europe together with the number of new arrivals from the USSR and the European Satellites exclusive of East Germany. 9/ It is probable, of course, that an unknown number of persons moving in either direction go unreported.

Table 2** gives the registered new escapee arrivals by nationality for 1955 and the first 10 months of 1956 together with the number of escapees already registered at the beginning of November 1956. This date is a convenient demarcation point because it marks the eve of the large-scale movement of Hungarian refugees to Austria. The order of magnitude of these figures on escapees is minute compared with the number of Soviet and Satellite nationals who actually moved overseas from Europe in the postwar years 1946-52 (see Table 1). Table 2 shows that a small but continuing flow of defectors, averaging 133 per month, escaped from the Satellites before the Hungarian uprising despite the existence of rigid legal and physical barriers.

Even before the uprising, Hungarians comprised more than 40 percent of the 2,900 new escapees registered. Albanians, Bulgarians, and Czechoslovaks were the other nationality groups represented. On the other hand, over half of the total number of registered persons at the present time consists of Russians, including a number of "hard core" refugees, or pre-1945 Russian refugees difficult to resettle. Czechoslovaks and Hungarians together account for one-fourth of the escapees.

D. Post-Revolutionary Movement of Hungarians.

1. Movement to Austria.

In the 22 months preceding the Hungarian uprising of 23 October 1956, an average of only 56 Hungarians per month registered as

* With the demise of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the US escapee program was established in 1952 to provide a channel for movement to the West of persons able to flee from the Soviet Bloc. USEP sections of American embassies located on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc screen defectors, maintain a surveillance of redefectors, and submit statistical data to the Office for Field Coordination in Frankfurt-am-Main.

** Table 2 follows on p. 6.

- 5 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 2

New Arrivals from the Soviet Bloc
Registered Under the US Escapee Program, 1955 - November 1956,
and Registered Escapees, 1 November 1956 a/

Nationality	New Arrivals Registered 1955 to November 1956		Escapees Registered as of 1 November 1956	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Albanian	626	21.5	1,124	7.1
Bulgarian	605	20.7	996	6.3
Czechoslovak	294	10.1	2,141	13.4
Hungarian	1,217	41.7	1,893	11.9
Polish	90	3.1	847	5.3
Rumanian	53	1.8	300	1.9
Russian	33	1.1	8,610 <u>b/</u>	54.1
Total	<u>2,918</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>15,911</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a. 10/

b. Includes 7,564 pre-1945 Russian and 7 Baltic refugees.

new arrivals with USEP. From that date through the end of 1956, as many as 156,000 refugees 11/ -- or an average of 94 per hour -- fled to Austria. More than half of these (88,000) had been transported to countries of asylum in Europe and overseas including 15,000 to the US. The number of admissions to Austria reached nearly 170,000 by the end of January 1957 12/ but through mid-March had increased by only about 1,000 refugees. 13/ On the other hand, the number moved out of Austria had risen to 119,000 including more than 26,000 to the US. 14/

Of 9,253 Hungarian refugees processed for admission to the US, 47.6 percent were males 15 to 40 years of age, 15/ although this age group comprised only 36.4 percent of the total population of Hungary. Correspondingly, children of both sexes under age 15 were fewer among the refugee group than among the total population -- 17.7 and 25.4 percent, respectively -- but were proportionately higher than is generally found among migrant groups.

- 6 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Among the Hungarian refugees have been a number of university students and technical and professional personnel. The Budapest radio has announced that an estimated 8 percent of university students left the country. 16/ A refugee engineer has expressed the belief that 3,000 engineers left their homeland 17/; physicians apparently comprised the next largest professional group. Of the previously mentioned 9,253 refugees bound for the US, 1,963 were classified occupationally on the basis of personal statements as "craftsmen"; 1,538 as "operatives"; 1,060 as "professional, technical, and kindred workers"; and 602 as students. Relatively few classified themselves as farmers, laborers, or service workers. 18/

2. Movement to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was definitely a second choice as a country of immediate asylum for Hungarian refugees. By the end of 1956, only 2,200 of these had entered Yugoslavia. 19/ The official position toward Hungarian refugees has been that they would be granted complete freedom of choice as to remaining in Yugoslavia, repatriating to Hungary, or moving to another country of asylum. 20/ In January, movement from Hungary to Yugoslavia accelerated as flight to Austria became increasingly difficult. By 4 February, there were 16,500 refugees in Yugoslavia. 21/ Almost 2,000 persons attempting to cross the border had been arrested in January. 22/ By order of the Hungarian Minister of the Armed Forces, the southern frontier zone was re-established effective 2 February. Hungarians in the area who lack police permission obtained in advance will be subject to arrest. 23/ Enforcement of this measure slowed the flow of refugees, whose number totaled 18,400 by 6 March. 24/ Contrary to the Austrian experience, only 260 of these Hungarian refugees have been moved to the West. 25/

By comparison with the exodus from Hungary, movement from the other European Satellites has been insignificant despite the ferment in Eastern Europe. At least before the Hungarian uprising, there were considerable numbers of persons who might conceivably have been pressed into returning to their homelands. A series of Soviet Bloc amnesties has provided the legal instrument for permitting the return of these defectors.

- 7 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

III. Redefection to the Soviet Bloc.

A. Soviet and Satellite Amnesties.

Soviet Bloc repatriation campaigns extend back to the period immediately following World War II when the appeal was made for Polish troops to return home from the UK and elsewhere and attempts were made to return Polish nationals from the disrupted economy of West Germany.

Before 1953 the Bulgarian penal code provided the death penalty for those who deserted the homeland. 26/ The amnesty originally extended to returnees on 13 February 1953 for 6 months was renewed in November 1953 for 1 year and again to November 1955. Following an unofficial extension, a new amnesty with no terminal date was proclaimed on 7 April 1956. 27/

Amnesties as the legal basis of the redefection campaign did not come into general usage until 1955. From April through June 1955, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania amnestied almost all of their citizens who had fled the country. The USSR followed suit in September, as did Albania in January 1956. In Poland, Boleslaw Bierut, then President of the National Front, stated in July 1955 that "any one who sincerely loves his country and wants to return there can do so without fear and can work for the development of Poland." 28/ It was not until late in April 1956, however, that the Sejm passed the measure forgiving Polish citizens and former Polish citizens living abroad for all crimes except genocide during the Nazi occupation. 29/

The current amnesty measures have the following expiration dates: Hungary, 31 March 1957; Poland, 22 July 1957; Albania, end of 1957; and Rumania, end of 1958. The Hungarian amnesty decree promulgated on 29 November 1956 included those refugees who crossed the frontiers between 23 October and that date. 30/ Bulgaria and the USSR have not stipulated any terminal date.

On 30 November 1956, President Zapotocky of Czechoslovakia stated that all amnesty cases had been practically solved and that future cases would be handled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the valid legal regulations. He thereby canceled the amnesty instituted on 9 May 1955. The Committee for

- 8 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Refugees terminated its activities with a self-congratulatory meeting in Prague on 29 January 1957. The failure of the committee to present a statistical summary, however, indicates that the Czechoslovak redefection campaign had not been successful. 31/

B. Evaluation of Soviet Bloc Returnee Data.

1. USSR.


a. Returnees from South America.

The 3,300 Ukrainians and Byelorussians 32/ who were recently induced to return to the USSR from Argentina and Uruguay were pre-World War II migrants rather than postwar defectors and are consequently excluded from the total number of postwar redefectors.

Between 150,000 and 250,000 immigrants from the USSR settled in Argentina before World War II, and 6,000 Soviet citizens emigrated to Argentina in the postwar years 1946-52. 33/ The Russians in Argentina have generally been economically successful, but many of the first generation have not adapted their Russian Orthodox background to the Latin-Catholic culture. The Soviet government therefore considered the redefection campaign a suitable instrument for persuading members of this colony to return to the USSR.

b. Returnees from Europe and the US.

25X6



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Soviet agents were employed to obtain names and addresses of refugees from the present territory of the USSR in order to bring pressure upon them to redefect. 37/ Nevertheless, the Committee for the Return to the Homeland headed by General Mikhaylov in Berlin stated that the Soviet citizens repatriated through that city by March 1956 numbered about 500 38/ -- not a very impressive showing for the effort expended.

A group of about 60 persons composed of 20 from Berlin and the remainder from East Germany was scheduled to leave for Uzbekistan in the USSR in September 1955. Following an initial grant of 3,000 rubles (\$750 at the official rate) for each household head and 600 rubles (\$150) for each additional member of the family, the sovkhos commission in Brest was to extend credits of 15,000 rubles (\$3,750) for housing, purchase of livestock, and the like. 39/

In the former US Zone of Western Austria the escorted Soviet Repatriation Mission met with minimal success. Of 6 individuals who agreed to an interview, only 2 requested repatriation. 40/

Occasionally there have been instances of redefection from other countries to the USSR. Nine Soviet seamen came to the US after their tanker was captured by the Chinese Nationalists in 1954. In a celebrated case investigated by the US Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 5 of the 9 redefected to the USSR. [REDACTED] one who did not redefect, indicated that Soviet agents had employed every subtle means including letters and photographs purportedly from relatives and friends to encourage redefection. He felt that two of those who returned did so under duress. 41/

25X1C

2. European Satellites.

a. Number of Repatriates.

Satellite regimes for the most part have stressed the return of "large numbers" of their citizens and former citizens from areas outside the Soviet Bloc -- Western Europe (Austria, West Germany, Sweden, Italy, France, Belgium, and the UK); North America (Canada and the US); South America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela); the Middle East (Israel); and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand.) They have been reluctant, however, to publish the actual number of cases involved. These statements have been described as follows:

- 10 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

"The impression is given that the return is on a fairly considerable scale, although only three or four names are published at a time; and the harrowing experiences stated to have been undergone by these persons during their period of exile ... are emphasized as an incentive to those at home to be satisfied with their lot in a people's democracy." 42/

The total number of returnees announced by the Satellites since the inauguration of the redefection campaigns amounts to about 61,000, as shown in Table 3.* Poland and Rumania had the largest contingents, but each of these groups included large numbers of detainees released by the USSR. Bulgaria and Hungary have failed to specify actual numbers. East Germany is discussed in e, below.

The numerical results have not been impressive, although examples of the redefection of emigre notables such as Hugon Hanke to Poland have offered propaganda opportunities.

Dr. Lev Sychrava is another example of a high-level redefector coveted and widely publicized by the Satellite governments. A founder of the Czechoslovak republic in 1918, assistant to Masaryk, and a journalist, Sychrava played an active role in emigre circles following his defection in 1948. Returning in December 1955, he was the first emigre of note to redefect since the alleged return of Bohumull Lausman in December 1953. 43/

The head of the Hungarian Repatriation Commission in Austria stated that, as of mid-January 1957, more than 16,000 had returned from Austria to Hungary. 44/ The Budapest radio cited the much lower number of "more than 7,000 Hungarians who have returned." 45/ The American Legation in Budapest gives credence to the reports that Hungarians apprehended in the border area while attempting to escape are returned to their homes but are considered as redefecting refugees. 46/

All told, non-Bloc sources account for only 5,500 returnees to Hungary. Official Austrian data indicate that only 3,730 repatriated from Austria to Hungary as of 13 March. Only 2 refugees in 4 camps canvassed expressed any interest in talking with members of the Hungarian Repatriation Commission. 47/ The Hungarian government has gained little ground in its contention that refugee children under 18 years of age should be returned inasmuch as they are considered minors in Hungarian law. 48/

* Table 3 follows on p. 12.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 3

Number of Repatriates Announced
by Selected European Satellite Countries
1955-57

Country	Repatriates <u>a/</u>
Albania	200 <u>b/</u>
Czechoslovakia	385 <u>c/</u>
Poland	55,800 <u>d/</u>
Rumania	5,000 <u>e/</u>
Total	<u>61,385</u>

a. Persons returning to the homeland from any source.

b. 49/. Persons living abroad who had returned or been permitted to return as of April 1956. Examination of a subsequent list of 85 persons revealed that all were pre-World War II emigrants rather than political refugees.

c. 50/. About 330 of these had returned by the end of November 1955; the remainder, in June 1956. Unspecified numbers redefected in the intervening and subsequent months. At least 92 of the redefectors left directly from US Army Labor Service units in West Germany.

d. 51/. Total number repatriated from all countries from July 1955 through February 1957. During 1956, as many as 31,000 were repatriated from the USSR compared with only 2,000 from all other countries.

e. 52/. Number announced by the Committee for Repatriation as repatriated by 1 December 1956. This number includes 1,900 ethnic Germans returned from West Germany to Rumania between December 1955 and 19 June 1956.

According to the Yugoslav Foreign Office, 1,400 Hungarians had repatriated by 5 March. 53/ The Austrian Minister of the Interior has stated that, by 5 February, 326 refugees had repatriated to Hungary from countries of second asylum. 54/

- 12 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

A Rumanian English-language publication 55/ recently carried an article containing stories and photographs of returnees. The cases cited included an engineer from Brazil, a war-stranded sailor, a farmer-mechanic who had been abducted by the Nazis, and a lieutenant colonel who had spent time in refugee camps in Germany and in the French Foreign Legion.

b. Repatriation from the USSR.

A large proportion of persons returning to Satellite countries apparently have been repatriated from the USSR rather than redefectors from outside the Bloc. Information regarding repatriation to Poland, Rumania, and Hungary follows. All three countries have had large numbers of their nationals detained in the USSR.

(1) Poland.

From the beginning of the repatriation campaign through February 1957, about 55,800 Polish nationals were returned from abroad, according to official claims. Of this number, all but a few thousand came from the USSR. 56/ Before the accession to power of Gomulka, the Polish government noted the return of Poles from the USSR but failed to indicate the numerical superiority of this group over the group returning from the West.

Of the 1.5 million Poles deported to the USSR in 1940-41, the departure of Anders' army (118,000) therefrom and the repatriation of 264,000 to Poland from 1945 to 1949 still left more than 1.1 million Poles unaccounted for. 57/

In the initial stages of the Bloc-wide repatriation campaign the Soviet government must have released Poles primarily to increase the total number of returnees to Poland and only secondarily to assuage the Polish citizenry. In recent months the USSR has freed a greater number of Poles as a concession to the Gomulka regime to keep Poland within the Bloc. 58/

The Soviet and Polish governments have established machinery to facilitate repatriation and have simplified the formalities involved. The Moscow office of the Polish Government Plenipotentiary for Repatriation and the Polish Consulate in Kiev provide financial and other assistance. The state pays all traveling expenses within Poland and at the place of permanent residence makes lump sum grants --

S-E-C-R-E-T

depending upon material circumstances -- of up to 3,000 zlotys for the family head and 1,000 zlotys for each of the other members of the family. 59/

The movement of Polish nationals from the USSR averaged only 1,000 to 2,000 each year from 1947 through 1953. The flow increased in 1954, but the first large-scale repatriation occurred in 1955. 60/ Similarly, American Embassy and defector reports suggest that most of the 10,300 repatriates claimed by the Sejm in April 1956 had come from the USSR. 61/

The average number entering Poland from the USSR each month from July through October 1956 was greater than the total of 2,700 for the first 6 months of 1956. 62/ As the situation between the Satellites and the USSR became strained, much larger numbers were permitted to return to Poland -- 6,100 in November and 9,800 in December. For all of 1956, as many as 31,000 Poles were repatriated from the USSR compared with 2,000 from all other areas of the world. 63/ In addition, 8,000 Poles returned from the USSR in January and 7,500 in February 1957. 64/ Of the total of 55,800 Poles repatriated since the inception of the repatriation campaign, probably 52,000 returned to Poland from the USSR.

Returnees from the USSR included: (a) many former Polish Home Army officers and men; (b) families of the old Polish Communist leaders who sought refuge in the USSR after the Polish-Russian war of 1920; (c) members of the aristocracy; (d) a group of engineers, physicians, technicians, and qualified workers; (e) collective farmers; and (f) prisoners. 65/ The Polish press reported that "the majority of the 3,468/ repatriates who returned to Poland in October 1956/ were persons who were in places of detention in the Soviet Union." 66/ Repatriates for the most part were returned to their families in various parts of Poland. Many of them were sent to the Western territories to aid the lagging resettlement of those former German areas.

(2) Rumania.

The lack of official Rumanian statistical data specifying the number of returnees by country implies that the USSR may have released hundreds of Rumanians to swell the total of "repatriates." In February 1951, 14,000 prisoners of war reportedly were repatriated to Rumania, 67/ thus indicating that well over 100,000 were unaccounted for at the time.

- 14 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Early in December 1955 a trainload of 800 prisoners arrived in Rumania from a camp in Mordovskaya ASSR in Siberia. About half were released soon thereafter, and the remainder were imprisoned in Rumania. 68/

(3) Hungary.

In late 1955 and early 1956, about 1,300 ex-prisoners of war, Nazi collaborators, and deported persons were repatriated from the USSR to Hungary. 69/

Following the Hungarian uprising in October 1956, the direction of flow of Hungarians between Hungary and the USSR was reversed. As a punitive measure against the civilian population, Soviet troops in Budapest (and apparently in Debrecen and elsewhere as well) rounded up men, women, and children at random; 70/ drove them in trucks to secluded points on the railroads; and loaded them into boxcars destined for the USSR.

The first reported instance of this deportation occurred on 8 November 1956. 71/ Within a week the American Legation expressed the belief that deportations from Budapest alone numbered a minimum of 16,000 persons. 72/ Some 10,000 Hungarians reportedly were sent to a camp near Kiev for internment. 73/

Evidence suggests that relatively few deportees actually returned -- a small number of girls under 18 years of age were sent back from imprisonment to Hungary by Soviet authorities, and about 50 Hungarians succeeded in escaping from the Carpatho-Ukraine. 74/ Doubtless the Soviet government will use the remaining deportees as pawns in negotiating a political settlement with the Hungarian government that emerges from the uprising.

c. Return of German Ethnic.

The centuries-old colonies of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe were substantially diminished as the result of Germany's loss of World War II. The continuation of a German cultural milieu in the Satellites, however, is an incentive for expelled Germans to return -- provided, of course, Satellite regimes are amenable.

- 15 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

In the past few years there has been some amelioration of conditions affecting the German minority. For internal reasons coupled with the desire to increase the number of redefectors, Czechoslovakia and Rumania have both offered inducements to former German residents to return.

(1) Czechoslovakia.

As a result of the expulsion of 2.7 million Germans in 1945-46, 75/ by 1955 only 200,000 remained in Czechoslovakia, chiefly in the Sudeten area.

Although these Sudeten areas were opened for resettlement by Czechoslovak citizens, the government experienced difficulties in finding settlers despite offers of land and livestock grants and long-term loans for buildings and agricultural machinery. 76/ The government resettled in the first 10 months of 1955 less than 5,800 agricultural workers, or only two-thirds of the annual plan. 77/ In some of the border districts a fourth of the houses repaired were still unoccupied as of September 1955. 78/

With the reversal of the policy toward minorities in 1952-53, German classes and publications were again permitted. 79/ The regime in 1956 encouraged the return of the Sudeten Germans for work in mines and foundries as well as in agriculture by promising them the restitution of their former property or freedom to select their place of residence. 80/ Accordingly, it is not surprising that 200 or 300 Germans accepted the offer and redefected.

(2) Rumania.

About 300 ethnic Germans were among the 1,000 persons who returned to Rumania in the 6 months following the amnesty of June 1955. 81/ This number probably includes the 84 ethnic Germans living in Austria who returned in December. 82/ The Rumanian government has rescinded its decree confiscating the property of ethnic Germans 83/ and has dispatched agents to Munich, Freiburg, and other West German cities to persuade Germans to return. 84/ In the postwar period, Rumania has generally treated the German minority better than have the other European Satellites. It has expelled relatively few Germans from Siebenbuerger in the Province of Transylvania. 85/

S-E-C-R-E-T

d. Reception Given to Redefectors.

In emphasizing rapid industrialization the economic plans of the European Satellites have increased the demand for trained technicians and skilled laborers. The redefection campaign has been regarded as one means of obtaining personnel to meet planned economic goals. Returnees to Poland have been settled in both industrial centers and farming areas. By February 1956, some 90 families were resettled in the steel city of Nowa Huta in Cracow Voivodship. Regarding the Administered Territory in western Poland, the majority of the 900 returnees to Zielona Gora Voivodship were assigned to state and cooperative farms, 86/ and 130 families were placed on land in Szczecin Voivodship. 87/

In Czechoslovakia, sources are critical of the reception accorded redefectors. A Czechoslovak redefector wrote that the job given him was satisfactory but that the people were suspicious. 88/

A defector from Bulgaria in 1955 indicated that the few who had redefected were being used as mouthpieces for propaganda. Questioning of a small group who had returned to help "build Socialism in the Fatherland" disclosed that they had been deported from Argentina for leftist tendencies. 89/

Although the Polish population has been sympathetic toward the repatriation of Poles from the USSR, it has resented the preferential treatment accorded redefectors from the West, has regarded them as failures, and has discussed their status in strong language. 90/

In view of the comparatively small number of redefectors from the West, the Polish attitude toward emigres as expressed by press and radio has recently undergone a radical change. Rather than seek the return of emigres who have generally improved their lot, emigres are now to be used as a bridge to the West.

One type of action sought of the emigres, according to Tygodnik (published in London), was the establishment of Polish trade enterprises specializing in imports from Poland and the undertaking of a campaign to increase trade with the West considerably. 91/

Some Rumanians who heeded the invitation to return deeply regretted their decision. Among these were a small group of Swabian repatriates from Austria and Germany employed on collective

- 17 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

farms in the Timisoara area of Western Rumania. They were not free to choose their work or place of work, and some were arrested. 92/ One defector states that the Rumanians hate the returnees, regardless of the circumstances of the original departure. The government generally provides quarters and jobs for returnees, but soon they lose their jobs and are left to their own devices. Housing in all the large cities is overcrowded. 93/

e. East Germany.

Owing to the continuing feeling of kinship with West Germany despite the political division of the country, the East German government has looked to West Germany for the return of its citizens and to the movement of West Germans rather than making any notable attempt to reclaim overseas defectors. There has been some dissatisfaction on the part of East Germans resettled in Canada and the US stemming from the language barrier and the necessity to start at or near the bottom of the economic scale. Nevertheless, very few persons have redefected from the Americas.

East Germans who went to West Germany to improve their economic circumstances in greater freedom continued to live in the same cultural area. If they became homesick or met with little success, they could slip back across the border to East Germany with little difficulty. West Germany has no regulations to prevent this flow. Nor does the movement from West to East Germany impose the degree of finality associated with redefection to the other Satellites farther east. A flow of migrants estimated at 279,000 from East to West Germany in 1956 94/ bears out this point. Indeed, the magnitude of the westward movement itself created personnel vacancies which the East German government was anxious to fill and which in the short run at least would benefit returning East Germans -- and even West Germans, for that matter. Instances have been reported of West Germans accepting temporary positions in East Germany to gain valuable experience for higher level positions in West Germany.

It is estimated that for every 5 persons who went from East to West Germany, 1 person went from West to East. 95/ From the beginning of 1951 to mid-1955, 1.5 million persons migrated from East to West, and roughly 300,000 persons migrated from West to East.*

* These data are based on official West German sources and are accepted pending clarification of the migration picture between the two Germanies anticipated in the East German Yearbook for 1956 likely to be published

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

A report purporting to emanate from the East German State Secretariat for Domestic Affairs states that of 32,563 persons migrating from West to East Germany in the first half of 1955, 56 percent were returnees and the remaining 44 percent were inhabitants of West Germany. Males aged 16 to 25, moving in anticipation of economic and educational opportunities, accounted for 22 percent of the total. 97/ This proportion suggests that the drive in all East German production ministries in the spring of 1955 to provide jobs -- particularly apprenticeships for youths -- and housing for returnees and West Germans has borne fruit. 98/

C. US Escapee Program Statistics.

The Office for Field Coordination (OFC) of USEP has compiled and maintained a master index file on the identifiable number of re-defectors to the Soviet Bloc as well as escapees from the Bloc. USEP officials have collated their data with information independently obtained by the West German government.

The number of redefectors returning to the Soviet Bloc who have been identified by at least a name check is shown in Table 4.* The number of redefectors (3,592, based on OFC statistics supplemented by NATO and embassy data) is in line with the number of registered new arrivals under USEP (2,918) during 1955-56 and is far less than the number

in 1957. The official Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik for 1955 shows a population decline of 556,000 for the period from the census of August 1950 to the beginning of 1956. The total loss through migration, taking into account a natural increase of 454,000, was therefore 1,010,000 persons. This lower East German figure probably reflects the fact that East Germans going to West Germany for a short time to explore job opportunities tend to register with the police upon arrival but fail to have their names stricken from the register when they return to East Germany. The unofficial West German Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung has stated that "the number of refugees returning to East Germany and the normal number emigrating to the Soviet Zone and East Berlin from the Federal Republic, West Berlin, and other countries may be estimated at about 200,000 for the period from 31 August 1950 to 31 December 1955." 96/ The actual number of returnees to East Germany for this period, therefore, may be about 250,000.

* Table 4 follows on p. 20.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 4

Recorded Number of Redefectors to the Soviet Bloc
1955 - September 1956 a/

Area of Redefection	Nationality							Total <u>d/</u>
	Albanian	Bulgarian	Czechoslovak	Hungarian	Polish <u>b/</u>	Rumanian	Russian <u>c/</u>	
Austria	0	10	55	153	3	398	36	655
West Germany	0	2	338	36	47	21	154	603
Greece	1	55	1	0	0	24	15	96
Italy, including Trieste	18	28	12	30	9	4	11	113
Turkey	0	10	0	0	2	0	0	12
Western Europe	0	3	71	89	71	43	122	401 <u>e/</u>
Total for Europe	<u>19</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>477</u>	<u>308</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>338</u>	<u>1,880</u>
North America and Australia	0	1	31	3	14	0	37	86 <u>f/</u>
South America	0	10	64	3	11	6	5	94
Other areas	0	0	26	7	0	7	13	53
Last address unknown	4	2	37	25	12	26	41	153
Total	<u>23</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>635</u>	<u>346</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>529</u>	<u>429</u>	<u>2,266</u>

a. 99/. Analysis by the Office for Field Coordination of the US Escapee Program was subsequently diverted to the Hungarian refugee problem.

b. Excludes Polish nationals from France because it is not known how many of those returning to Poland temporarily to visit relatives may have remained. Polish sources 100/ indicate that the 150 defectors from France to Poland during 1955 included farmers who had migrated before World War II.

c. Excludes 3,313 Russians who migrated in the prewar period. 101/

d. Includes 14 persons of unknown nationality.

e. Incomplete according to data submitted to NATO 102/ by member countries. The total number repatriated to the Soviet Bloc from the UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands through June 1956 was 792. The movement from the UK comprised 207 Poles, 70 Russians, 13 Czechoslovaks, 14 Rumanians, and 1 Hungarian; that from Belgium, 59 Poles, 259 Russians, 5 Czechoslovaks, and 8 Hungarians.

f. Incomplete according to NATO and embassy reports, 103/ which indicate 1,021 repatriates from Canada, Australia, and the US through June 1956. The movement from Canada included 61 Poles, 408 Russians, 88 Czechoslovaks, 16 Rumanians, and 225 Hungarians; that from Australia 15 Poles, 38 Russians, and 29 Czechoslovaks.

S-E-C-R-E-T

of Soviet Bloc nationals (15,911) currently registered (see Table 2*). The largest nationality groups represented among the redefectors were Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, and Hungarians. Over 40 percent of the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian redefections occurred from nearby countries of the Free World, particularly Austria and West Germany. Polish nationals returned largely from Western Europe; those from France were excluded from this tabulation because the number of them returning voluntarily or under compulsion is not known.

D. Comparison Between Soviet Bloc and US Statistics.

For Satellite countries which have indicated the number of returnees, the tabulation below recapitulates statistics on returnees from two different sources -- European Satellite and USEP announcements.

<u>European Satellite</u>	<u>Number of Returnees, 1955-57</u>	
	<u>European Satellite Data</u>	<u>USEP Data</u>
Albania	200	23
Czechoslovakia	385	635
Poland	52,700	169
Rumania	5,000	529

The number of returnees listed by USEP is larger than the number given for Czechoslovakia, and this discrepancy is due to the unavailability of quantitative Czechoslovak data for December 1955 and most of 1956.

It is probable that some Polish nationals and Rumanians returned from non-Bloc countries, especially France and Israel,** that were not identified in USEP statistics. But no more than 750 to Poland and 230 to Rumania can thus be accounted for. The bulk of the difference

* P. 6, above.

** Between the establishment in May 1948 of the state of Israel and the end of 1954, about 305,000 Jews migrated to Israel from the Soviet Bloc. Israeli statistics, cast in terms of "persons born any place and going to any country," suggest that 300 went to Poland, 104/ but if this number did actually return, there is no way of knowing how many went in response to the redefection-repatriation campaign. In August 1955 a group of predominantly elderly persons in Israel were awaiting transportation to Rumania because the Rumanian government had not released their families to join them in Israel. 105/

- 21 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

between the two series for Poland and Rumania has been composed of repatriates from the USSR as discussed in B, 2, b, above.

Excluding two categories of movement -- that from West to East Germany and the return of prewar Russian migrants from South America -- and making a generous allowance for unidentified persons, it appears probable that the number of redefectors in 1955 and 1956 from the West could not have been more than 6,000.

This number is insignificant compared with the minimum of 1.2 million Soviet Bloc nationals moved overseas since the end of World War II. It is even less significant when compared with the 290 million persons residing in the Soviet Bloc. Furthermore, even if there were as many as 6,000 redefectors and all of these were skilled workmen, they would have contributed little to the annual increment to the labor force of about 1.5 million.

IV. Conclusions.

Although unsuccessful in terms either of additions of personnel and skills to the labor force or of movements from the Bloc to the West, the Soviet Bloc redefection-repatriation campaign has produced such results in propaganda value alone that it is likely to be continued for at least 1 or 2 years. Sudden cessation of the campaign would be an admission that it has not been successful thus far.

Soviet Bloc countries have the facilities for continuing the campaign. The organizational structure extends from the Committee for the Return to the Homeland organized under General Mikhaylov in Berlin in April to local Repatriation Bureaus in Hungary and presumably elsewhere in the Bloc for the purpose of persuading relatives to bring pressure upon family members living overseas to return. Extensions of the government and party apparatus provide existing channels for persuading nationals and former nationals living abroad to redefect.

The Soviet Mission in Argentina has contracted with an Argentine shipping concern for transporting 30,000 Russians to Odessa within the next year or two. ^{106/} In view of the widely publicized Soviet suppression of Hungary's "October Revolution," however, it is improbable that many more Argentineans and other Latin Americans will elect to return to the USSR.

- 22 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX A

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

The two major sources of information for this report consist of compilations of identified redefectors and repatriates prepared by the Office for Field Coordination of USEP and the much higher claims of Soviet and Satellite governments publicized through press and radio.

The discrepancy between the two sets of data reflects the number of Satellite nationals repatriated from the USSR. Although defector reports mention the existence of repatriates in the USSR before departure and in the Satellites upon arrival, there is no precise means of pinpointing the magnitude of this repatriation for each of the Satellites. In addition, more information should be obtained for determining the extent of redefection from France to Poland.

- 23 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX B

SOURCE REFERENCES


Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
Doc. - Documentary	1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable	2 - Probably true
B - Usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable	4 - Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable	5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable	6 - Cannot be judged
F - Cannot be judged	

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation of the cited document.

25X1A



- 25 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1A

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001200110010-3

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001200110010-3

Approved For Release 199

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

093A001200110010-3

~~SECRET~~
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDP79-01093A001200110010-3