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14 April 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Basic and Geographic Intelligence FROM: Chief, Map Library Division, BGI

SUBJECT: Map Procurement Consequences of Curtailment

25X1C 1. During recent years, through BALPA, OPRED, and other fiscal and personnel reduction programs applied to our Foreign Service, 25X1C and the map acquisition and reporting program which it sym-25X1C bolizes has taken a considerable buffeting. In the midst of such activities of defense of program, meetings and memoranda, at some point it should be pointed out simply and clearly that full and complete acquisition of up-to-25X1C date, foreign intelligence maps in an absolute "must" 25X1C and is basic to many intelligence, research 25X1C and operational activities. This was true in times past, as expressed by in his writings, and it is true today. The current existence 25X1A and use of sophisticated photography does not obviate the requirement for foreign intelligence maps, but rather intensifies the requirement. The successful use of photography, on a continuing basis, requires the enabling, locational and identification data frequently available only through the cartographic medium. 25X1C 25X1C In order to meet that situation, the Map 25X1C Library implements a continuing procurement program, which blends some priority procurement with a routine exploitation of foreign sources. The 25X1C result is that all countries of the world are covered on a continuing basis. A full, up-to-date, reference map collection is maintained as insurance against political, military and intelligence problems that may pop up at any time and in any country or area of the world. he associated world-wide map procurement 25X1C program, insure that those requirements may be met to the fullest extent possible. If this program is abolished or greatly reduced it will severely 3. 25X1C affect important intelligence programs w and within the Department of Defense mapping and interrigence agence These agencies MUST have accurate and current maps to accomplish priority and important programs and if the present program is not continued they will have to develop alternate methods of map procurement. It is extremely doubtful if this can be accomplished as effectively or efficiently and at



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the present low cost to the U. S. Government; there will be duplication of effort and duplication of results. Maps cannot be produced instantaneously upon demand; they must be systematically produced in accordance with stated and anticipated requirements.

4. The following are several specific examples of intelligence and mapping programs that would have been impossible, greatly reduced, or far less accurate and timely if the regular flow of new and revised maps had been cut or restricted:

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b. The White House Situation Room relies on the CIA Map Library to provide current maps to brief the President and his staff on CRISIS situations (Cuba, Congo, Nigeria, Cambodia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Middle East).

c. The emergency printing of large scale maps (1961-67) of the Dacca and Chittagong areas in East Pakistan by the Army Topographic Command to be used by contingency forces should the evacuation or protection of Americans be necessary.

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e. CIA map compilation and production by the OBGI Cartographic Division for the National Intelligence Survey, illustration of intelligence studies and support of covert operations rely almost exclusively on maps

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f. The latest foreign authoritative source (maps) providing geographic detail, relative and geographic locations and native language place names is essential to the special activities of the National Security Agency.

g. The unique and special needs for maps by the Deputy Director for Plans to support paramilitary operations, agent contacts, cashing, (i) surveillance, escape and penetration operations, etc. are apparent. In some cases original copies of foreign produced maps are essential for the success of an operation.