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DISSENT IN RUSSIA

CPYRGHT

By Abraham Brumberg

THE first chapter in the history of open political dissent in post-Khrushchev (or for that matter in post-Stalin) Russia may be said to have begun in October 1967. At that time the young physicist and grandson of the late Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Pavel Litvinov (now in the United States) threw down the gauntlet to the Soviet authorities by openly distributing the final statement made at his closed trial three months earlier by Vladimir Bukovsky, a young dissident arrested and sentenced to three years in a forced labor camp. Bukovsky had organized a demonstration, in January of that year, against the arrest of a number of dissidents who had helped yet another young dissident, Alexander Ginzburg, compile a White Book on the February 1966 trial of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, sentenced respectively to seven and five years hard labor for having published their works abroad. The ineluctable pattern—arrest-protest-arrest—had thus come into being two years earlier. What distinguished Litvinov's action from the others was that his protest was set down on paper, signed, and distributed to Soviet and foreign newsmen alike. Perhaps, then, Litvinov may also be credited with initiating a new genre of *samizdat*, all previous such unofficial "self-publications" having been circulated only sub rosa.

In January 1968, Alexander Ginzburg (who had himself been arrested in February 1967), and three of his associates, were sentenced to long prison and labor camp terms, after a four-day bogus trial replete with bogus evidence and bogus witnesses—two of them clearly *agents provocateurs*. The public reaction was instantaneous and extraordinary. Emboldened perhaps by the examples of Litvinov and Piotr Grigorenko—a Soviet Major General with a long record of civil disobedience—as well as by official Soviet propaganda extolling the benefits of "socialist legality," hundreds of Soviet citizens flooded their own and foreign newspaper offices, and also the headquarters of various foreign Communist parties, with letters protesting the latest perversion of justice in their country, and voicing alarm about the specter of Stalinist—or quasi-Stalinist—terror in general.

For the next year or so, open protests against specific judicial malpractices—letters, petitions, statements—became the principal instrument of what has come to be known as the Russian "Democratic Movement," a loose conglomeration of perhaps 2,000 people or so, most of them members of the intelligentsia, and most of them concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad. It was a heady period. As one of the "Movement's" most active participants, now in the United States, recalls: "the pure idealism, the totally selfless attitudes and hopes, the previously nonexistent hopes . . . it was the time of the Prague spring, the best days of our lives." It was a period that saw the birth of the bimonthly *Chronicle of Current Events*, an anonymously edited news bulle-

tin containing scrupulously accurate information on the burgeoning struggle for human rights in the U.S.S.R., as well as on the authorities' efforts to combat it. Other hallmarks of this period: the furious battle waged by Alexander Solzhenitsyn—with the support of some of his fellow-writers—against the suppression of his works and the institution of censorship in general; the formation of the so-called "Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.," consisting of about 15 members and 60 active sympathizers; the emergence into the open of various forms of national and religious dissent, both of which provided the "Democratic Movement" with at least a potential base for mass support; and the astonishing growth and transformation of *samizdat* from occasional items of unorthodox fiction and poetry to something resembling an opposition press.

The first chapter—or period—came to a halt roughly by the middle of 1969. So did a measure of the early zeal and enthusiasm. The government, while obviously not viewing the dissidents' activities as a serious threat, nevertheless took forceful measures to suppress them: arrests, trials (formally "open" but in fact closed, unpublicized, and rigged), house-searches, interrogations, dismissals from jobs and from the Party, and finally that most odious of all forms of political persecution—confinement to mental hospitals.¹ Yet, contrary to what might have been expected, the initial enthusiasm did not yield to despair: many of the dissidents defiantly invited arrest, in the hope that their sacrifice would serve as an example to others, as well as a challenge to the world not to remain passive. With this came a realization that the early methods did not work, and that new forms of opposition would have to be devised. Not that the practice of sending signed letters of protest ceased; it exists to this day. But as the repressions continued, some dissenters concluded that anonymous, and in some cases even illegal and conspiratorial methods (such as underground political organizations) might be preferable. Paradoxically, too, the reprisals stimulated many dissidents toward greater introspection and reflection, to a look into the country's past, a more conscious stock-taking, and a search for ideological and practical solutions to Russia's many and enduring problems.

II

During the following three years, Soviet dissent took on many new and fascinating forms. One was the gradual process of differentiation among those who had earlier been united not only in their ultimate and vaguely defined goals (which might perhaps be best described as the elimination of the Stalinist heritage of lies and illegality), but also in their methods. Now differences began to arise. Some dissidents, known as "legalists," carefully eschewed any explicit strictures against Soviet political institutions as such, confining themselves to forceful yet reasoned criticism of "socialist legality." Their most distinguished representative has no doubt been Academician Andrei Sakharov, who in 1970, together with two other physicists, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Valery Chalidze, founded the Committee for Human Rights,

whose aim is to struggle for the observance of Soviet law, and to do so strictly "in accordance with the laws of the land." Others, while similarly determined to act entirely within legal confines, have laid the stress on gradual economic, social and political reforms. Many of the latter—most prominently the historian Roy Medvedev and his twin brother, Zhores (like Chalidze, now an involuntary exile in the West)—consider themselves loyal Marxist-Leninists. While the bulk of what might be called the "Democratic Opposition" has evidently become thoroughly disillusioned with Marxism of any variety, the *Chronicle of Current Events* (our most valuable source of information on that period) occasionally reported on the existence—and liquidation—of small illegal revolutionary groups, with programs that blend a curious social utopianism with elements of militant Trotskyism.

More interesting and significant has been the emergence of what might be called a "right wing" within the dissident camp—significant, because it corresponds to the rise of similar tendencies on the "official" level. In particular there has been a revival of "Slavophilism," that nineteenth-century philosophical school that looked for Russia's salvation in the country's unique historical and religious traditions, disdainfully rejecting what it considered the corrupting influence of the West. The All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical Monuments, founded with official blessings in June 1966, and journals such as *Molodaya Gvardiya* (*Young Guard*), the monthly organ of the Young Communist League, and *Nash Sovremennik* (*Our Contemporary*), have all been expressions of the new Russian patriotism, often laced with thinly disguised anti-Semitic and generally xenophobic views. However, since Slavophilism is, at least in theory, fundamentally at odds with the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, its true believers have "gone below," expressing their ideas in such *samizdat* publications as *Veche* (the word for town assemblies in medieval Russia), of which eight bulky issues have appeared thus far, and in occasional essays and articles. In 1971, a brochure called *A Word to the Nation: A Manifesto of Russian Patriots* made its appearance in *samizdat*. Unabashedly advocating racist, anti-Semitic, totalitarian, and theocratic ideas, it may be the product of one man's demented labors, or that of a group—it is hard to tell. But it may well reflect a larger body of opinion than is commonly assumed—the widespread anti-Jewish sentiments, abetted and encouraged by official "anti-Zionist" propaganda of the most primitive and repulsive kind, indirectly testify to this.

As in the case of the Slavophiles, so have other tendencies, political or otherwise, found a home in *samizdat*. Indeed, from 1969 to 1972 *samizdat* had gradually become a vehicle for a discussion of a wide range of views, thus appealing intellectually to thousands of readers who otherwise had no interest in political dissent per se. Separate journals and documents sprang up to deal with legal matters, to spell out Stalinist crimes and their suppression, to advocate the formation of underground political organizations, to urge genuine federalism coupled with parliamentary democracy, and to discuss the theoretical and practical

problems facing the "Democratic Movement"—while, of course, there continued to be publication of works of fiction, both Russian and foreign, proscribed by Soviet censorship. Mention might also be made of *The Ukrainian Herald*, a journal published by Ukrainian dissidents, which was modeled after the *Chronicle of Current Events*, and which was recently suppressed; and the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, expressing the views of Catholics in a country where opposition to Soviet domination has both a national and religious character.

The remarkable diversity of *samizdat* literature should not, of course, be confused with numerical strength. A "party" may well consist of a mere handful of individuals; a ringing "manifesto" is likely to be the work of a single man; factional wrangling among political oppositionists is as rife in Russia today as it was at the turn of the century. Nor is the intellectual level of some of these documents necessarily impressive. Indeed, some are painfully naïve, simplistic, utopian, or abstruse. Programmatic writings in particular are notoriously given more to vague generalizations than to rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, they all testified, at the very least, to a certain process of political maturation, to the efforts of *some* individuals not to rest content with the slogans that animated the protest movement when it first burst into the open.

Finally, the period 1969–1972 (and to a considerable extent the present, too) has been characterized by a remarkable increase in links between the Soviet dissenters and the outside world. Suddenly, Soviet political opposition ceased to be only an internal concern, and its vicissitudes and fortunes engaged the sympathetic interest of a sizeable segment of world public opinion. This is probably attributable, in part, to the successes scored by the Jewish "exodus movement." The once cowed and timid Jewish community—or at any rate those of its members eager to leave the U.S.S.R. for Israel—"caught up with and surpassed," to use a favorite Soviet phrase, all other groups of dissidents within the country, in the determination with which they pursued their aims, as well as, eventually, in their attainments. The piecemeal emigration of Soviet Jews would have been impossible without the energetic aid of Jewish communities throughout the world, in the first place Israel and the United States, and so appeals for outside support became a norm to be emulated increasingly by other dissidents as well.

Glasnost (publicity) has been, of course, a principal aim of the dissident movement ever since its inception; but it was not until 1970–71 that this aim was achieved. The dismal trials of Soviet dissenters made headlines in American and European newspapers. Western correspondents filed numerous stories and frequently acted as conduits for *samizdat* material. Various Western organizations, such as Amnesty International, began to concern themselves with the fate of individual dissenters. The International League for the Rights of Man in New York established a formal organizational bond with Sakharov's Human Rights Committee; professional organizations of psychiatrists, notoriously reluctant to delve into the murky waters of politics, began to evince inter-

est in and a sense of outrage at the barbaric use of their profession in Russia; and religious groups (e.g., the Baptists) published the appeals of their persecuted co-religionists in the U.S.S.R. In time, the telephone became one of the most effective instruments of *glasnost*—so much so that some of the protests were actually phoned to journalists in Great Britain and the United States, thus reaching the Western public before the limited number of poorly reproduced copies could reach Soviet readers. Broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Union by Western radio stations did the rest. It was a bizarre spectacle, a unique product of our technological age, a source of succor to the embattled Soviet dissidents—but also yet another factor that persuaded the Soviet authorities that the situation could no longer be tolerated.

III

Although the KGB had persistently hounded the Soviet dissenters and had never been known for excessive charity in coping with any manifestations of opposition to the regime, it seemed strangely reluctant to employ all the weapons in its arsenal against what must surely have been one of its most formidable irritants—the *Chronicle of Current Events*. The reasons for this apparent timidity had been a subject of endless speculations by Soviet specialists in the West. The most plausible explanations offered were: (a) that the Soviet security police could eradicate the *Chronicle* (and the group of people behind it) only by undertaking a series of massive arrests, thus antagonizing the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole as well as public opinion abroad—all of which it was unwilling to do; (b) that the KGB knew precisely who was connected with the *Chronicle*, but preferred to keep them under surveillance, so as eventually to net as many as possible. In retrospect, the second hypothesis seems closer to the truth than the first.

Toward the end of 1971, the Soviet authorities had apparently decided that the situation was getting out of hand, and that the "Democratic Movement" must sustain a decisive defeat. According to information that has subsequently reached the West, the Politburo itself resolved to liquidate the *Chronicle*, and instructed the KGB to do so.

But the KGB today is no longer what it was in the days of Stalin. Though some of its present methods are palpably similar to those employed in the past, on the whole they are not predominantly those of terror and brutality, but rather a more subtle mixture of threats, intimidation, promises—and coercion. In what was to become known as "Case No. 24," therefore, the KGB at first moved relatively slowly. A number of arrests were made in the Ukraine, where national restiveness among intellectuals had of late become particularly strong. In Moscow and Leningrad prominent dissenters were "invited" to appear at the headquarters of the security police for interrogation. Homes were searched, and "incriminating" *samizdat* material (some of it of a perfectly innocuous nature) was confiscated. This was followed by arrests, culminating, on June 21, 1972, in the detention of Piotr Yakir. To the dissident community, this latest step was

indeed the writing on the wall.

Piotr Yakir is the son of a much decorated Civil War hero, who along with other top officers was shot in June 1937 on fabricated charges of spying. Shortly thereafter, Piotr himself, then 14 years old, was seized by the police and spent the next 15 years of his life in various prisons and concentration camps. His father, as well as the other officers, was "rehabilitated" in the 1950s, and Piotr was taken under Khrushchev's personal wing and allowed to lecture and write about his father. This, of course, was during the heyday of the "de-Stalinization drive."

With Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, "de-Stalinization" too came to a halt, and Piotr Yakir, alarmed by what he perceived to be not merely a silence on Stalinism but organized efforts to revive it, became increasingly—and overtly—involved in the protest movement. In 1968–69, he emerged as one of its most active leaders, author and co-signer of numerous "open letters" and petitions. The KGB was obviously aware of his activities (he made no attempt to hide them), but it was generally assumed that Yakir would be left alone, no matter what, since his arrest could only be interpreted—in the words of one of his close personal friends, now in the West—"as a final symbol of the actual restoration of Stalinism in our country."

Yakir's arrest in June 1972, therefore, produced a shattering effect on the Soviet dissident community. The atmosphere of despondency and gloom intensified when it was learned, after several months, that Yakir had decided to cooperate with his jailors, to divulge all he knew and to implicate (as it eventually turned out) more than a hundred of his friends and associates. (Yakir's propensity for alcohol was well known, and it seemed reasonable to assume that it was this particular weakness that the KGB exploited in order to break him.)

More arrests and interrogations followed, and in September 1972 Victor Krasin, another prominent civil rights activist with an impressive record of protest and imprisonment, was put in jail. He, too, it was soon learned, had been "persuaded" to cooperate with the authorities. After a while, it became evident that the KGB was grooming both Krasin and Yakir for an elaborate "show trial," which would serve as a warning to their friends to desist from any further activities against the regime. While the KGB was thus showing its teeth—as well as its reliance upon some of the most discredited Stalinist methods—it also engaged in a new and considerably more refined strategy, i.e., allowing and even encouraging various known oppositionists to leave the country (in effect expelling them) as part of the "Jewish exodus" to Israel, which was gathering momentum at that time. (Some of the dissidents who have left since 1972 have indeed been Jewish or part-Jewish, or married to Jews, but others, as the authorities were fully aware, had no connection at all, familial or ideological, with the Jewish movement.)

Issue No. 27 of the *Chronicle* appeared in October 1972. Since no other issues were forthcoming for 18 months, it seemed clear that the journal would no longer see the light of day—at least not under the (unknown) auspices under which it had been

appearing regularly since April 1968. By 1973, the "Democratic Movement" (though not necessarily all other dissident groups) was in a state of disarray. "Moscow," a recently arrived young Russian told this author, "was the scene of heartrending scenes: dozens of dissidents returned from camps, prisons and exile to which they had been banished in 1968-69—or earlier—only to find their former comrades talking about nothing else except leaving the country." In March 1972 Academician Sakharov received a letter from Yakir, written in jail, in which its author admitted to having engaged in "anti-Soviet activities," and implored the scientist to "understand [him] correctly" and to avoid similar "mistakes and delusions." At the end of August 1973, Yakir and Krasin were put on trial. Foreign correspondents were refused entry, but they might as well have been there: both defendants fully admitted their "guilt" (e.g., passing "anti-Soviet material" to the West and collaborating with the NTS, a right-wing Russian emigré organization with headquarters in Germany, which had for years published many *samizdat* documents, including all the issues—in Russian—of the *Chronicle of Current Events*). In a macabre "press conference" staged a few days later, Krasin and Yakir repeated their confessions, and named some Western correspondents as their contacts. The tragicomedy was played out to the end.

Following the trial, Zhores Medvedev, by then in exile in London, revealed that by 1970 his fellow-dissidents had decided that Yakir could no longer be trusted. Roy Medvedev, in a long essay, "The Problem of Democratization and the Problem of Détente," circulated in *samizdat* in October,² explicitly accused both Yakir and Krasin of "provocational activity." Whatever the truth of these allegations, it is clear that the KGB had largely succeeded in accomplishing its mission, and that the small group of civil rights activists who had been in the forefront of the dissent movement in 1968-69 had been decimated.

IV

Yet if the Politburo and the Soviet security police could congratulate themselves on a job well done, they clearly miscalculated in their apparent belief that "Case No. 24" would decisively eradicate all remaining expressions of political resistance in their country. For as the drive against the dissidents gathered force, two men stepped into the fray, challenging the authorities in terms far more radical and far more intransigent than they had ever done in the past. More importantly, the issues they raised—and the spirited debate that subsequently ensued—no longer touched upon problems of concern primarily to Soviet citizens, but involved the general attitude of the West to the U.S.S.R. and indeed some very concrete policy issues facing Western governments, in the first place the United States. Whereas in 1969-1972 Soviet dissenters were principally interested in attaining *glasnost* abroad as a means of insurance against government reprisals and as a source of moral and political support, the West was now being drawn intimately into a dialogue whose premises and perimeters were laid down by domestic

critics of the Soviet regime. The issues were East-West relations, the Jackson Amendment, détente, and the future of Russia; and the two men were, of course, Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Sakharov had long been profoundly concerned with East-West relations, as his three famous memoranda, published respectively in 1968, 1970 and 1971, demonstrated. Yet while in the past Sakharov seemed to believe that his efforts to "speak sense" to the Soviet leaders (to whom his memoranda had been addressed) would produce a useful dialogue between the regime and its "loyal opposition," and while in the past he clung to a belief in a socialism reformed through a gradual "convergence between the capitalist and socialist systems, accompanied by demilitarization, a strengthening of the social protection of the rights of working people, and the creation of an economy of a mixed type,"⁸ by 1973 he had obviously changed his mind. As a result of the grim anti-dissent campaign and the failure of his efforts, Sakharov came to two momentous conclusions: first, that the Soviet system bore no relation whatever to what he had earlier believed to be certain endemic features of a socialist society; second, that necessary fundamental reforms in Soviet life could only come as a result of specific policies of the West.

On July 10, 1973, Sakharov gave an interview to the Swedish Radio and Television, in which he expressed his profound disillusionment with the Soviet system:

It is simply capitalism developed to its extremes, the sort of capitalism you have in the United States . . . but with extreme monopolization. We ought not to be surprised, then, that we have the same problems, qualitatively speaking, the same criminality, the same alienation of the individual, as in the capitalist world. With the difference that our society is an extreme instance, as it were, extremely unfree, extremely constrained ideologically . . . [also] probably the most pretentious society; it's not the best society but it claims to be far better than all the others.⁴

The interview, as could have been expected, elicited a furious storm of attacks and calumnies in the Soviet media. Sakharov was accused of "grovelling before the capitalist system," and—ominously—"slandering the Soviet Union." A few weeks later he was summoned to an interview with the First Deputy Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., Mikhail Malyarov, who warned Sakharov to refrain from any further "anti-Soviet activities." Instead of heeding Malyarov's advice, Sakharov a week later called ten Western correspondents to his house, handed them the text of his interview with the Soviet official and answered questions on a wide range of problems. In this interview, Sakharov succinctly formulated his views on détente:

We are facing very concrete problems, of whether in the process of rapprochement there will be a democratization of Soviet society or not. . . . Détente without democratization, a rapprochement when the West in fact accepts our rules of the game . . . would be very dangerous and wouldn't solve any of the world's problems . . . It would be the cultivation and encouragement of closed countries where everything that happens goes unseen by foreign eyes. No one should dream of having such a neighbor, especially if that neighbor is armed to the teeth.⁵

These views logically led Sakharov to an explicit endorsement

of the Jackson Amendment, which would deny long-term credits and most-favored-nation tariff status to any "non-market economy" nation that denies its citizens the right to emigrate. And so in an "Open Letter to the Congress of the United States," dated September 14, 1973, Sakharov forcefully appealed "to the Congress of the United States to give its support to the Jackson Amendment, which represents in my view and in the view of its sponsors an attempt to protect the right of emigration of citizens in countries that are entering into new and friendlier relations with the United States."

The Jackson Amendment is, of course, aimed first and foremost at the Soviet Union, and affects, at least at this time, the Jews more than any other ethnic group in the U.S.S.R. Even granting that Sakharov is firmly committed to the notion that the West, in establishing closer coöperative links with the Soviet Union, must, as much as a matter of principle as that of practicality, demand certain concessions from the U.S.S.R. in return for economic and technological help, it might still be wondered why he chose the issue of emigration above all others. Yet in his letter to the U.S. Congress, as well as in a number of other statements that Sakharov has issued within the past half year or so, he has made his reasons crystal clear: First, the Jackson Amendment serves as a symbol of the kind of policy Sakharov believes that the West must follow in its relations with the Soviet Union. Second, emigration is a universal human right, embodied in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Moscow has ratified. Third, to cite his letter to the U.S. Congress, "the abandonment of a policy of principle would be a betrayal of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camps and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin Wall." Fourth, the unframed right to emigrate would eventually force the Soviet Union to adopt measures that would discourage the desire of Soviet citizens to leave their country—that is, to reform the system in the direction of greater freedom and material welfare. Western failure to press this demand upon the Soviet regime would, indeed, "lead to stronger repressions on ideological grounds," to disastrous consequences for "international confidence, détente, and the entire future of mankind."

While Sakharov was issuing these statements, amidst a hysterical campaign in the Soviet press ("spontaneous" meetings of protest by "indignant" Soviet workers, and so on), Alexander Solzhenitsyn, too, decided to have his say. Unlike Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn had until then limited himself—with several notable exceptions, such as an acid statement on the use of psychiatric hospitals, which he compared, *mutatis mutandis*, to the extermination policies of Nazi Germany—to a vigorous defense of freedom of speech and religion in the U.S.S.R. On August 28, however, exactly one week after Sakharov's first press conference, Solzhenitsyn invited two Western correspondents to a news conference of his own. Much of what he said⁶ was a repetition of his past statements, especially as it related to the campaign of slander that the Soviet press had waged against him for several years.

However, for the first time he identified himself forcefully with

other Soviet dissidents, specifically singling out numerous individuals—such as General Grigorenko and Vladimir Bukovsky⁷—to praise their “indomitable” courage and their inhuman suffering, while also castigating the West for failing to do whatever possible to secure their release. While agreeing with Sakharov on the need for outside pressure, he implicitly disagreed with the physicist by demanding that the West refuse to compromise with the Soviet regime on any matter of principle whatsoever—an attitude which needless to say, holds out little promise for any meaningful détente.

Two weeks later, Solzhenitsyn addressed a long letter to the Nobel Committee in Oslo, nominating Andrei Sakharov for the Nobel Peace Prize. Reaffirming his deep concern for Soviet dissidents, Solzhenitsyn—true to his calling of writer/philosopher rather than politician—avoided the practical questions regarding East-West relations raised by Sakharov, referred to détente (obliquely) as being dominated by “the spirit of Munich—the spirit of concessions and compromise,” and called upon the world to renounce violence, both internal and external, both in relations between states and in the relations between the governments and their people, as the only means of securing a lasting peace.

The practical suggestions made by Sakharov were, however, taken up by Roy Medvedev, in the essay on détente and democratization referred to above. Disagreeing with his friend and colleague on his call for outside pressure as the only means of achieving a democratization of Soviet society, Medvedev said:

It would be a gross oversimplification . . . to presume that only with the help of outside pressure—and pressure, moreover, involving inter-state relations or trade—is it possible to achieve some substantive concessions from a country such as the Soviet Union in the conduct of our domestic policy. Outside pressure can play a negative as well as a positive role; it can deter our organs of power from certain actions in some cases, and in other cases, on the contrary, it can provoke those or other undesirable actions and in that way only impede the process of democratization of Soviet society.

Support for the Jackson Amendment, Medvedev felt, belonged in this last category. As a confirmed “Marxist-Leninist,” he argued, moreover, that appeals for support must be directed not at groups or governments that utilize the pressure for their own selfish reasons (i.e., profits), who are not at all interested in the process of internal democratization and who are in fact deeply opposed to any kind of socialism whatsoever, but to those “leftist social organizations which are most interested in the evolution of genuine socialist democracy in our country.” Reliance on specifically *anti-Soviet* organizations would only be grist for KGB mills—a sentiment echoed by Roy’s brother in London shortly thereafter.

Whatever the flaws or outright errors in Medvedev’s argument (e.g., he criticized Solzhenitsyn for comparing the South African treatment of blacks with the Soviet treatment of dissidents, whereas Solzhenitsyn had in fact only deplored the lack of response by the world to the latter as compared with the former), his essay represented a closely reasoned argument in which he

tried to formulate his agreements and disagreements with Sakharov's position. Yet so high run the passions within the Soviet dissident community that Medvedev found himself immediately under attack by numerous of his colleagues, some of whom levelled rather absurd charges against him (e.g., "raising [his] hands against two boundlessly courageous men of our time, the moral pride of Russia, Academician Sakharov, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn").⁹

These criticisms impelled Medvedev to issue yet another essay on this subject in April of this year ("Once More About Democratization and Détente"), in which he answered some of the criticisms, and attempted to formulate as concisely as possible the relationship between pressure from the outside (in which he fully believes) and the changes that can come only from within, as well as the prospects for changes instituted "from above" (in his earlier essay the only true means of effecting any meaningful reforms) and for those that can be generated "from below."

In March of this year Solzhenitsyn—already abroad by this time—published his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which raised yet another flurry of criticism and counter-criticism. Without attempting to do full justice either to Solzhenitsyn or to his critics—in the first place Sakharov, a subject this author has treated extensively elsewhere¹⁰—suffice it to say that Solzhenitsyn, in a manner singularly reminiscent of the ideas of the Slavophiles of the early nineteenth century, proposed essentially that Russia turn her energies inward, renounce Marxism-Leninism, which he holds responsible for all the ills that have befallen Soviet society, and also renounce unlimited technological and economic growth as "not only unnecessary but ruinous." In his reply, Sakharov affirmed his belief in international coöperation, technology and détente as the only guarantees for democracy and progress, rejecting Solzhenitsyn's views on ideology as "schematic" and unperceptive of its real role in the Soviet Union (that is, as "a convenient façade" and justification for the Party's retention of power). He also criticized his friend's "way of thinking" as a species of "religious-patriarchal romanticism."

At the same time, Sakharov welcomed the "Letter" as an important contribution to the continuing discussion of major issues affecting the future of Russia and the West, and paid tribute to the writer as "a giant in the struggle for human decency in our tragic contemporary world." Roy Medvedev, too, reacted to Solzhenitsyn's letter, criticizing him, though far less exhaustively, in terms similar to Sakharov's. In the meantime, Sakharov had also issued a reply to both Medvedev brothers, while other *samizdat* writers in the Soviet Union have published various statements directed at all four—the Medvedev brothers, Solzhenitsyn, and Sakharov. And so the debate goes on.

V

What, in the light of the foregoing, are some of the conclusions that may be drawn regarding the current and future state of dissent in the U.S.S.R., as well as some of the lessons for the West?

Perhaps the most important conclusion is that perorations

on the future of political opposition—and public opinion—in the Soviet Union are much too premature. There is little doubt that the KGB drive against the dissidents has yielded some results. The small group of intrepid men and women that had led the struggle for human rights in the years 1967–69 has been fairly effectively shattered, as much by sundry repressive measures as by the fact that so many of them have been allowed to leave their country. If the Soviet authorities could succeed in getting rid of all the present and potential “trouble-makers,” it would eventually make the country both “Juden-” and “intelligentsia-rein,” at the mercy of unscrupulous careerists, reactionary pseudo-intellectuals, and a cowed, unhappy and dispirited populace.

There seems little danger of that. The very elimination of terror—so that the penalty for political nonconformity, however odious, is no longer as awe-inspiring as it was in the days of Stalin—plus the fact that popular discontent, if not open, is nevertheless deep and pervasive, encourages the growth of unorthodox ideas and may very well lead, in turn, to more defiant and even organized forms of opposition to the regime. Détente, too, with all its pitfalls and shortcomings, encourages dissent (even though it is in the interest of the Soviet leaders to suppress dissent while improving relations with the West), if only because détente without world public opinion is impossible; and world public opinion is surely on the side of the victims of the KGB, and not vice versa.

The very existence of the debate described above shows that the spirit of free thought in Russia has not been extinguished, a conclusion underscored, as this article was in press, by the reappearance of the *Chronicle of Current Events*. In the future, the search for solutions to Russia's problems will probably not be carried on solely within the confines of the Soviet Union, but jointly with both Western thinkers and the steadily growing community of Russians in exile. The Soviet authorities, of course, count on the eventual disappearance from the public eye of men who had been considered martyrs when in the U.S.S.R. and material for sensational news stories when they arrived in the West. No doubt they will have proved correct in their calculations—to some extent. Yet Solzhenitsyn, Medvedev, Chalidze, Litvinov, and all the others will probably continue to exert considerable influence on their colleagues whom they have left behind. The exposure to their ideas (by means of radio and possibly expanding tourism) may well bring new forces to the fore, just as resolute—and indeed perhaps even more resolute—than those who have spoken up and acted upon their convictions in the past.

It would be presumptuous to predict either the nature of the debate or its results, but perhaps a few thoughts on the subject should be ventured:

(1) Within the “Democratic Opposition,” individual differences will probably revolve largely around problems of strategy and tactics, and are not likely to lead to fundamental schisms among the various protagonists. In this connection, it should be stressed that while the divergencies between the outlooks of men

like Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and the Medvedev brothers are formidable, they are not as great or abrasive as frequently assumed. Medvedev may fondly cling to his faith in Marxism, yet in his *A Book on Socialist Democracy* (shortly to appear in English) he sharply depicts the totalitarian nature of Soviet society, his practical proposals stopping just short of a defense of a multi-party system in the U.S.S.R. Solzhenitsyn idealizes pre-Petrine Russia (hardly a model of progress and democracy), yet his uncompromising stand on intellectual freedom constitutes a powerful indictment against the Soviet system *in toto*. Moreover, whatever their differences, all these men invariably close ranks when one of them is attacked by the regime—an almost automatic (and deeply moving) reflex that is not likely to disappear.

(2) As a whole, the views of the “Democrats” are probably going to become increasingly radical even as their number decreases—or remains constant. The examples of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn are instructive. Over the past few years, the first has turned from a mild to an astringent critic of the regime, while the second has escalated his demands and placed himself squarely within the dissident camp—something he had refused to do in the past. Also, in his earlier works (e.g., *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward*) Solzhenitsyn’s exclusive subject was Stalinist Russia. In his extraordinary *Gulag Archipelago*, however, published in January of this year, he ascribes the ideological and actual origins of Soviet terror to the hitherto sacrosanct Lenin. The trend toward seeing Stalinism not as an aberration but as an endemic part of a system fashioned by the Bolsheviki had already emerged in the writings of other *samizdat* authors. As this trend continues, so will the belief that the Soviet system cannot be changed either by partial reforms or strict observance of “Socialist legality,” but only by a complete rejection of the ideological, economic and political bases upon which it rests.

(3) The deepening political debate may also be expected to turn on issues that transcend the primary concerns of the intelligentsia. Thus far the dissidents have not aimed their appeals at the population at large, paying little attention to such deep-seated grievances as social inequality, the rank exploitation of the peasantry, economic privations, housing conditions, and so on. But there have been signs of a growing awareness that dissent, if it is ever to assume broader proportions, must address itself to these issues, too.

(4) Finally, the persistence of nationalist discontent may also prove a fertile soil for the spread of political dissidence in general. As mentioned earlier, the animosities of various ethnic groups provided the “Democrats” with at least a potential base for mass support. There is no evidence that nationalist sentiments are on the wane; quite to the contrary, they are growing. In their search for viable strategies and tactics, the political dissidents may well choose to link their demands with those of the *democratic* nationalists of, say, the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, or even Central Asia, and perhaps enter into more intimate organizational contacts as well.

All this, of course, is *Zukunftsmusik*, and it would be sheer folly to sound confident about the trends within the dissident community, and even more so to ignore the ability of the Soviet authorities to cope with them if they ever reach serious proportions. Still, for the time being it would seem as if the political ferment and the debate are destined to go on, and that nothing but a complete breakdown in the East-West relationship could terminate them, thus setting the wheel of history backwards.

Which, of course, brings us back to the issue of détente—the principal subject of the current debate, and the principal guarantee of its existence. Its benefits seem fairly obvious to us but the fundamental and deeply disturbing question still remains: At what price? What about the issues raised by Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, the Medvedevs and others? None of them has the monopoly on truth, none of them should be regarded as a prophet. But surely they and countless others like them better represent Russia's conscience and wisdom than the officials or official representatives with whom the West is perforce in contact. Perhaps the words of Samuel Pisar, whose seminal work has provided some of the basic ideas that led the West to enter into a new relationship with the U.S.S.R., are worth quoting in this instance—even though they refer only to Sakharov:

What we are asking Sakharov is to tell us, whatever our nationality may be, the conditions under which he thinks we can agree to move forward along the path of détente, particularly between America and Russia. We urgently need to know precisely what he thinks about precisely that question. If we do not find that out, the new political efforts will simply be sacrificed by default and discouragement upon the altar of a moral purity it is not within our power to achieve.¹¹

¹ General Grigorenko, for example, has been confined to a psychiatric hospital since 1969, despite numerous efforts—including a finding by Soviet doctors—to release him as perfectly sane and healthy.

² It also appeared in the *Die Zeit* (Hamburg) and, severely truncated, in *The New York Times*.

³ See *Index* (London), Winter 1973, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-45.

⁷ In 1972, as punishment for Bukovsky's continuing activities—principally for having made available to the West an enormous amount of material bearing on the use of psychiatry for political means—he was sentenced to a total of 12 years of imprisonment, camp and exile.

⁸ Letter by the writer V. Maximov, *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.* (New York), No. 5-6, p. 8. Maximov is a gifted novelist who has recently been permitted to leave the Soviet Union.

¹⁰ *The New Leader*, May 27, 1974.

¹¹ *Le Monde*, September 16-17, 1973.

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Cover: Photograph by Ken Bell of Jordanian silver good luck charms. In the Middle East countries "lucky hand" traditionally offers protection against the evil eye.

MOSCOW

Notes on a Scientific Conference

On Saturday, December 15, 1973, in Moscow, officers of the KGB interrogated four Russian scientists, Mark Azbel, Victor Brailovsky, Alexander Lunts, and Alexander Voronel, about violations of Regulation 209-1 of the Russian Criminal Code, outlawing parasitism. A "parasite" is defined as an "able-bodied person stubbornly refusing to engage in honest work and leading an antisocial parasitic way of life." It is the crime for which others have been convicted recently. That Azbel, Brailovsky, Lunts, Voronel, and another scientist, Moshe Gitterman, had been fired from their jobs or forced to resign when they applied for emigration visas to Israel is not thought to be relevant by the Soviet authorities in considering their "parasitism."

Each of the scientists is Jewish; each is an active critic of the Soviet regime. Voronel spent one year in jail in the 1950s—for writing a high school class essay on civil liberties. But whatever the charges, the real crimes of Voronel and the others are these: they have applied to emigrate, and they have publicly defended nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, next to Alexander Solzhenitsyn the most outspoken and insistent Soviet dissident. And foreign physicists mounted an unprecedented demonstration on their behalf at the International Conference on Magnetism in Moscow, in August, 1973.

An international physicists' conference on magnetism is held every three years. Recent conferences were in England, the United States, and France. In 1973 it was the turn of the Soviet Union. The bulletin announcing it read:

The International Conference on Magnetism will be held in Moscow, 22-28 August 1973 . . . The scientific program will include papers on basic theoretical and experimental investigations of magnetism, on magnetic materials and their properties and on important new applications of magnetism. According to tradition there will be two types of

papers at the Conference: papers invited by the Program Committee (invited papers), and papers contributed by authors (contributed papers). . . .

The sponsors of the conference were the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP), and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Following custom, a Program International Advisory Committee was appointed. The planners mailed announcements, invitations, and solicitations of ten-minute contributed talks to interested scientists around the world. For Soviet scientists the procedure was different. A Conference Committee, and each laboratory, decided which employees would be allowed to attend, and these persons were given application forms by their supervisors.

Unpersons

Mark Azbel, Moshe Gitterman, and Alexander Voronel are physicists; Alexander Lunts and Victor Brailovsky are mathematicians and electrical engineers. (Moshe Gitterman was released from the Soviet Union a month after the conference, most probably because of appeals on his behalf by Senator Edward Kennedy.) Mark Azbel was once a professor at Moscow State University, a group leader of the prestigious Landau Institute of Theoretical Physics, the author of a textbook and of many research papers. Today he is no longer a professor nor a group leader nor even an employee. His books have been removed from the libraries and from the schools. His published papers are not referenced, and his research is not published. When Azbel applied for an exit visa in January, 1973, to join his twelve-year-old son in Israel, he lost his job; he has been without work for the past year. Although Azbel is internationally renowned, in the Soviet Union he is an unperson, as are the others. Fellow scientists and all cautious persons shun them. The extent of their isolation is emphasized by the minutiae of recognition in which they take comfort. A few months ago Voronel was crossing a Moscow street, jaywalked, and was charged and fined. A local newspaper in-

cluded Voronel's name in a list of those convicted of traffic crimes. Voronel and the others were ecstatic as they recounted this story to me. They relished the imagined surprise of their former friends, the pique of the editor, the anger of the KGB that an unperson had been named.

Since Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel work in magnetism, they wished to attend the conference. In principle, there should have been no bar to their admission, under the rules of the sponsoring organization, IUPAP. Like the physicists of IUPAP, chemists, biologists, and astronomers also have international organizations, which are in turn members of a parent organization, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The rules of ICSU are the rules of all its unions, and are recommended to all its national members—including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences:

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS: AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTES

The Extraordinary General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions, immediately preceding the XIV General Assembly at Helsinki, Finland, September 1972, amended the Statutes of the Council. The following new provision concerning the non-discriminatory philosophy of ICSU was incorporated into the Statutes:

5. In pursuing these objectives the Council shall observe the basic policy of non-discrimination and affirm the rights of scientists throughout the world to adhere to or to associate with international scientific activity without regard to race, religion, political philosophy, ethnic origin, citizenship, language or sex. The Council shall recognize and respect the independence of the internal scientific planning of its National Members.

RESOLUTION ON THE FREE CIRCULATION OF SCIENTISTS

The XIV General Assembly
A. Recapitulates that the declaration of "political non-discrimination" is reaffirmed, and moreover . . . the Council shall take all measures within its power to ensure the

fundamental right of participation, without any political discrimination.

—this policy be adopted also by the Unions adhering to ICSU for all their activities;

—the ICSU National Members be invited to follow this policy.

American and Soviet delegations at the 1972 assembly supported the resolution, which "observes with regret that scientists are still today sometimes not allowed freely to attend . . . scientific meetings . . . either abroad or in their home countries. . . ." This was a reaffirmation of a ten-year-old policy, but one which has been violated time and again by the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc nations, particularly with respect to granting of visas. No Israelis were issued visas to attend an IUPAP-sponsored conference in Moscow in 1968. In Warsaw in 1972, again at an IUPAP-sponsored conference, the Israelis had great difficulty in obtaining visas, and most were unable to attend. And in August, 1972, the Hungarian government refused to issue visas to South African scientists wishing to attend an IUPAP-sponsored conference on nuclear structure.

An IUPAP regulation states that "IUPAP will not sponsor a conference if visas are refused for travel to it purely on grounds of nationality or citizenship." Since the Soviet Union has no diplomatic relations with Israel, the Israelis applied for visas through the Soviet Consulate in Vienna. Though applicants everywhere received their visas months in advance, those for the Israelis were not issued until Monday, August 20, two days before the conference, and in one instance, only two hours before the flight to Moscow. Of the twelve Israelis who had arranged to attend, only six had risked going to Vienna without visas. But in the end the Soviet Union complied with the regulations. All twelve visas were issued on the afternoon of the twentieth.

How to go?

Back in November, 1972, anticipating that they would have trouble getting into the coming Moscow meeting, Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel wrote to friends in the

United States. At an American conference on magnetism held in Denver in 1972, a few of those of us in attendance posted notices of a special session to discuss the problems raised by the forthcoming Moscow conference. Although the officers of the conference were opposed to discussion of social issues the session was held anyway. There the American representative on (and chairman of) the IUPAP Commission on Magnetism told us that IUPAP was being firm with the Soviet Union, and that visas would be issued to Israeli scientists. The question of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel was raised but not answered, though we were told that IUPAP was doing everything in its power to see that they would be permitted to attend the conference.

In June, 1973, while Leonid Brezhnev visited Richard Nixon in Washington to speak of détente, seven Russian scientists, Azbel, Voronel, and Gitterman among them, went on a hunger strike in Moscow. They wanted to emigrate to Israel, and they wanted the United States to support their right to do so. Voronel's skin became purple and his body shook from cold. Azbel was close to death. The world noted, and after two weeks the seven gave up. They began to eat again, at first sparingly. They convalesced together, discussing science to fill the time in preparation for the magnetism conference two months away. By then they would be well enough to attend, and would wish to present papers.

The three knew that the Soviet Union would not permit them to go to the conference as Soviet citizens. They had applied for exit visas to Israel. They had been granted Israeli citizenship. They had been appointed to faculty positions at Israeli universities. So they decided that they would attend the conference as Israelis. There is no IUPAP or conference rule which restricts membership of a delegation to residents. They arranged to be appointed members of the Israeli delegation, and Israel deposited their registration fees. Abstracts of their talks were phoned from Moscow to Israel, to a member of the Program International Advisory Committee, and mailed from Israel back to the Conference Committee.

In July, one month before the conference, Voronel visited Soviet physicist A. S. Borovik-Romanov, a fair, humane person, and chairman of the Program Committee, to learn if his abstract and those of Azbel and Gitterman had been received and if they might attend. Borovik-Romanov responded that they had missed the deadline for submission of papers. As for attendance, that was not within his authority to grant. Academician S. V. Vonsovsky, a physicist influential in the domestic and international politics of science, was chairman of the conference. He and the organizing committee must decide on attendance. Borovik-Romanov said that he expected that they would not be permitted to come as members of the Israeli delegation, but he would take up their request with Vonsovsky and the organizing committee.

A few days after Voronel's visit, Gitterman called Borovik-Romanov. He pleaded that few Soviet physicists would risk speaking to them and they no longer were allowed to attend research seminars at the institutes or to use the research facilities. They had to attend the conference. Had Borovik-Romanov heard anything from Academician Vonsovsky? No. Borovik-Romanov had not heard anything yet. There was nothing more they could do. They would be informed of any decision.

A few weeks later the three scientists tried again. They wrote to Academician Vonsovsky:

Being members of the Israeli delegation to the International Conference on Magnetism, from Tel Aviv University, but living presently in Moscow while awaiting permission of the Soviet authorities to emigrate to Israel, we ask the Organizing Committee to send our registration forms not to Israel but to our Moscow addresses below.

They pointed out that their registration fees had been deposited by the Israeli government at the Foreign Trade Bank, in hard foreign currency, as required. No answer was ever received.

That month a petition addressed to physicists throughout the world went out from the New York-based Committee of Concerned Scientists, and an offshoot of it, an ad hoc Magnetism Committee on Human Rights:

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Dear Friend:

As you know, Mark Azbel, M. Gitterman, and A. Voronel, along with many others, have lost their jobs in the Soviet Union because they dared apply for emigration visas. Recently they went without food, drinking nothing but water for 14 days, in an attempt to publicize their plight. All three physicists have written abstracts of talks (enclosed) for the Magnetism Conference in Moscow. Whether they will be permitted to register and attend the Conference is problematical.

We cannot invoke their names for fear of possible consequences to them, but perhaps the enclosed petition, signed by large numbers of scientists, will aid Azbel, Gitterman, Voronel and others in gaining entry to the Conference. . . .

Four hundred and seventy-two scientists from many nations signed the petition, and it was sent to the chairman of the IUPAP Magnetism Commission.

Doing something

Wednesday, August 22, was the first day of the International Conference on Magnetism. Fifteen hundred conferees gathered at the Hotel Russiya, where they were to eat and sleep for the next week. (Excluding food, Westerners had to pay eighteen rubles a day, or about twenty-seven dollars at the conference exchange rate, for a room for which Soviet scientists paid three rubles.) The conference sessions were held at Moscow State University. There the conferees passed between uniformed police carrying rifles, guarding the entrance. Each registrant was issued a large blue lapel badge. The guards would be at the door each day but the last; only those wearing badges would be admitted.

That first night a few of us visited Azbel, Gitterman, Voronel, and the others, in Voronel's apartment. They knew nothing of the meeting on their behalf in Denver, had heard nothing from IUPAP, or ICSU, nothing of the petition. We wished to protest, but we feared that our actions would bring retribution not on ourselves—we were protected by foreign passports—but on Azbel and the others. The Soviet scientists conferred, and Azbel told us: "You may do whatever you consider proper on our behalf. Do not fear

for us. There is nothing you can do that can hurt us. Anything the authorities wish to do to us they can do to us now. There is only one thing you can do that will hurt us, and that is to do nothing." None of us knew what we could do, but each swore to himself to do something.

Thursday, August 23. Delegates wearing blue badges walked past the armed guards and entered the meeting, eight sessions running at once, twenty sessions in all, one hundred and thirty-six speakers. The delegates had earphones to follow simultaneous translation into Russian and English.

That day Mark Azbel remained in his apartment, a metro ride from Moscow State University, where he himself taught until two years ago, but which was now barred to him by armed guards. Although he couldn't be among his fellow scientists at the conference, he had learned from his visitors that his paper, having been carried out by a tourist, was being published in *Physical Review Letters*, the American journal of important new discoveries in physics. The paper, entitled "Random Two-Component One-Dimensional Ising Model for Heteropolymer Melting," was on the theory of the melting of nucleic acid mixtures, DNA, at elevated temperatures. Azbel had had to work out his calculations on biophysics in the isolation of his apartment. Although scientific papers usually credit the author and the laboratory or institute at which he works, the *Physical Review Letter* reads only: "M. Ya. Azbel, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Preoccupied with thoughts of Azbel, Voronel, and Gitterman, some of us questioned the conference chairman, Academician Vonsovsky, about them. Of course the Soviet Jews could not come as Israelis, he told us. They are Soviet citizens. Of course they cannot present papers. Their papers were submitted too late. This would be unfair to others whose papers were rejected because they were too late. And it is not because they are Jews. These persons are trouble-makers. There is no discrimination against Jews in the Soviet Union. He, Vonsovsky, is married to a Jew. Soviet law prohibits

discrimination against Jews. If only these people had come to him within the required time and asked to attend, it would have been arranged. But now unfortunately it was too late. Registration was closed, and it would be unfair to others who had not registered to allow these persons in late.

Though his wife and her children are Jews, there is much that Academician Vonsovsky prefers not to know about the life of Jews in the Soviet Union. Discrimination is endemic and pervasive. In the 1960s, at Moscow State University, the country's greatest, of those majoring in mathematics and mechanics about half were Jews. Last year, the entering class in these fields had about five hundred members as usual. Only three were Jews. All three are sons of prominent faculty at the university, persons with enough clout to gain special treatment for their sons.

The Soviet Union has made a decision: there are too many Jews in the professions. They want no more. Jews are hindered from entering college to train for the professions. A man need not be a practicing Jew. So long as his identification card reads "Jew," his child, however brilliant, will find it difficult to become a scientist, or a lawyer, or a doctor. Every Jew knows this and every official denies it.

Since religious discrimination is a violation of the Soviet Constitution, it is accomplished informally, or nominally on other grounds, such as ideology. For example, at Moscow State one of the admissions tests pertains to the subject of Communism. Jews know they will be failed on this test no matter how they answer. In one instance we learned of two brilliant Jewish boys, preparing for the tests, studied shorthand, as well as science and history. During the interrogation on Communist ideology, they recorded clandestinely the interrogator's questions and their responses. With a verbatim transcript of accurate answers, they are now appealing their failing grades to higher authorities, citing the laws against discrimination.

Friday, August 24. There was a disturbing incident at the conference. Over the public address system one of the American visitors

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denounced the exclusion of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel. The translator remained silent, and the Soviet conferees were spared hearing the insult through their earphones.

News

In Russia, it is safer not to speak of dangerous matters. When one must discuss them with trusted friends, one does not do so in public buildings, or hotels, or in the laboratories. Those may be bugged. One does not speak in restaurants or taxicabs. The waiters, the drivers may be spies. Since talk is inhibited and the press, the radio, and the books and magazines are controlled, the Russian people are ignorant of many things. Few ordinary persons have heard of the U.S.-Soviet grain deal. Each year the press reports new miracles of farming. Why should the Russians need to buy American wheat when their own crops have been so huge? Watergate is a puzzle. The word is known to them, but only those well up in the power structure know what it represents. The Russians want détente, and Nixon stands for détente; hence Nixon is favored and Watergate is not reported.

The Soviet press may not discuss the grain deal or Watergate, but it does give news, both foreign and domestic. The big foreign news that week in August was of a "bloody" strike at the Chrysler plant in Detroit. There was also news of the signing and ratification by the Soviet Union of two United Nations "international covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights and on civil and political rights." The covenants commit nations to respect each citizen's right to privacy, freedom of opinion, freedom to exchange books and newspapers "regardless of frontiers," freedom of religion, and the freedom "to leave any country, including his own." *New Times* proclaimed that the Soviet Union "has again emphasized that it is a consistent struggler for democratic rights and freedom, and for social progress," and pointed out that the United States had neither signed nor ratified the covenants. But no Soviet newspaper printed the text of the covenants, or described them fully. On the other hand, the press was careful to point

out that the covenant on civil and political rights can, according to its text, be suspended "for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals." In the Soviet Union national security and public order are well protected.

The domestic news was full of Andrei Sakharov: father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, winner of the Lenin prize, the Stalin prize, the State prize, three times "Hero of Socialist Work," full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Farmers, factory workers, housewives were seized with the desire to write letters denouncing him. Fellow scientists repudiated him. The satellites joined in—the Hungarian Communist Party accused him and author Alexander Solzhenitsyn of "irresponsible malice." A Kremlin functionary, the chief deputy prosecutor general, ordered Sakharov to cease all political activity, especially press conferences. He announced that Sakharov could be jailed for "clandestine meetings with foreigners."

We visited Sakharov. He was depressed and feared for his life and for those around him. He himself has been too important for the secret police to eliminate, so far, but they go after all who associate with him. His wife has been repeatedly interrogated by the KGB, his wife's daughter expelled from Moscow State University, her husband is without a job, their seventeen-year-old son barred from college. Sakharov told us of two friends, both now in prison, Yuri Shikanovich and Edward Kuznetsov.

Yuri Shikanovich, a mathematician, was fired from his job for signing a statement in defense of another dissident. For a while he was a construction worker, but on September 28, 1972, he was arrested and charged with crimes of subversion: possession and circulation of an underground newspaper, the *Chronicle of Current Events*. For eight months he was held incommunicado; then in May, 1973, he was declared insane. According to Soviet law, a party charged with insanity is entitled to a hearing, to defense counsel, and to examination by a psychiatrist of his own choosing. Yuri Shikanovich, at the time of our visit, had been imprisoned one year. He had not been seen by

family or friends and had not been allowed to speak to a lawyer, nor had he seen a psychiatrist.

Edward Shmuelevich Kuznetsov and his wife are in prison for protest activities, he for fifteen years (commuted from a death sentence), she for ten. Kuznetsov kept a secret diary, a daily account of his life in prison, which was smuggled out to the West by Mrs. Sakharov and published, and Kuznetsov is being punished. To ensure no one knows of the punishment, the authorities allow him no visitors. His wife is forbidden to see him because she too is imprisoned. Last year Mrs. Sakharov was permitted to see him only once. This year, while one of our group, Edward Stern, was visiting the Sakharovs, they received notification that "because of repairs to the prison," their visit must be cancelled. They are afraid that next year there will be no Edward Kuznetsov to visit.

Sakharov also spoke to us about Evgeny Levich, a son of Benjamin Levich, a theoretical physicist of some renown. Two years ago Benjamin Levich, his wife, his two sons, and their wives applied for exit visas for Israel. They were all fired from their jobs. Evgeny Levich has high blood pressure and a chronic stomach disorder. Last May he was seized on the street by the military police and disappeared. In time Evgeny wrote from a work camp in a forbidden area of the Arctic Sea near the North Pole, the Bay of Tiksi, Siberia. He had been examined in a military hospital, declared to be in fine health, and forcibly inducted into the army. His blood pressure has risen and his nose bleeds. He has bloody diarrhea. He is allowed no special diet and no reduction in work. He must break ice and carry heavy loads. At first the camp doctor exempted him from the heaviest jobs, but now the doctor avoids him. Sakharov feared that the Levich boy would not survive. In an open letter to the free world he called for an international campaign on Evgeny Levich's behalf. He denounced the abduction of Levich as "an action that is meant to frighten and to take revenge upon those who wish to exercise their right to emigrate from this country."

"Have you heard?"

In Moscow the tourist guides explain to visitors that there is no religious discrimination in the Soviet Union. All are free to go to church or synagogue, as they see fit. If you ask where the synagogues are, the guides tell you that there are many, and they suggest you visit the one on Ulitsa Arkhipova, for example. In fact, the synagogue on Ulitsa Arkhipova is the only one in Moscow.

Each Saturday morning, pious Muscovites gather in the synagogue. Each Saturday those Jews who have applied to emigrate gather outside in the square. Who got a visa? Who has been denied? Who has been fired? Have you heard who the police took away? Is he in a mental hospital or a concentration camp? No doubt there are undercover agents among them, for across the street the KGB stand openly, eavesdropping, aiming directional microphones at turned-aside heads, photographing the crowd, photographing those who enter the synagogue. Perhaps there are KGB in the synagogue wearing yarmulkes.

Saturday, August 25. Several of us skipped the conference sessions to attend Sabbath services. The world youth games were going on in Moscow that week. The Soviet Union encourages such events, which bring foreign exchange, and last year more than two million visitors came to Moscow. From youngsters quartered in the Hotel Russiya we had learned that the Israeli contingent was being harassed. On the streets, at the games, they were greeted with "Zhid." Today, on the Sabbath, they planned to come together to synagogue, and we timed our visit to watch them march up, straight and proud and tall, in their bright blue uniforms. Outside in the square, young Israelis greeted prospective Israelis. "Shalom, shalom." "Next year in Israel." Then the youths spread through the synagogue. They mingled with the old men, praying. The cantor chanted on, but the bearded old ones looked up and smiled with a thrill of recognition and pride at the young athletes donning prayer shawls and yarmulkes and chanting among them.

The Russian worshippers could tell we were foreigners. Perhaps they all know each other, or maybe

it was our well-made clothes or something about our manner. They would glance over and nod or smile. In the lobby the old ones pressed up and shook our hands. An ancient woman held one of us, kissed his cheek, greeted him in Yiddish. "God bless you. You are our hope. Here Judaism is dying. Only the old come to synagogue. The young are atheists. Or they are afraid. In your country do the young Jews still go to synagogue? God bless you." She was crying and we struggled not to cry with her.

That Saturday afternoon was the meeting of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics Commission on Magnetism. There was a long agenda, and it went slowly. The last item was the question of the exclusion of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel. Several members objected that it was a political issue unsuitable for discussion at an international conference. Others argued that it was purely an internal affair of the Soviet Union. To discuss the matter would be a breach of the Helsinki Amendment, which says that the "Council shall recognize and respect the independence of the internal scientific planning of its National Members." Physicist George Rado, U.S. representative on the IUPAP Commission on Magnetism and then and now its chairman, gave a speech which ended the discussion.

As he wrote later: "Both before and during the Moscow conference I was put under considerable pressure to have IUPAP intervene. . . . However, as chairman of the IUPAP Commission on Magnetism, I must adhere to the policies of IUPAP, the international organization which elected me, even in cases where those policies are contrary to my personal feelings. To make sure that my actions . . . would be in accordance with IUPAP policy, I requested (well before the conference) the advice of . . . the Secretary-General of IUPAP and . . . the Secretary of the U.S. National Committee for IUPAP. They informed me that IUPAP cannot intervene, and has never intervened, when an individual scientist is prevented from proceeding from one part of his country to another. In view of this policy, I considered it inappropriate as chairman of the IUPAP

Magnetism Commission . . . to visit Azbel, Gitterman, or Voronel during the Moscow Conference. . . . In spite of the fact that officially I could not intervene for [them], I wanted to do whatever I could unofficially to help them. Therefore, I requested and obtained a private meeting with Academician S. V. Vonsovsky, the chairman of the Magnetism conference. . . . In a friendly and (hopefully) persuasive manner, I conveyed to Professor Vonsovsky the intense concern from many different countries. . . . I strongly sympathize with Drs. Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel and do hope that IUPAP's policy on the Free Circulation of Scientists will be improved. But until the governing bodies of IUPAP adopt a different policy, my continuing efforts to help . . . are limited by the clear obligation that I operate within the confines of the IUPAP policy which exists at present."

That ended the matter. There are fine distinctions here. On the one hand, the statutes prohibit exclusion of a scientist from an international conference on racial, religious, political, or citizenship grounds. On the other hand, the council recognizes the independence of the internal scientific planning of its national members. Objectivity is the scientist's profession. It can also be his occupational disease.

"Best sons"

Sunday, August 26. There were twenty more morning and afternoon sessions, eight sessions in parallel, one hundred and fifty-two lectures. Itinerant ferromagnets, bubbles, domain walls, spin densities and form factors, polarized neutrons, unpaired electrons, quasi-two-dimensional models, specific heats, magnetic moments, Knight shifts, Green functions, and Barkhausen noise.

Scientists are the monks of our time, illuminating their Physical Reviews. Outside in the world there is discord, but in the temple one hears only a muted orison: "praseodymium, gadolinium, neodymium, yttrium." It was Sunday, and fifteen hundred anchorites filed past the armed guards. Again there were disturbing incidents. Signs were posted and handwritten announcements were distributed in the lobbies. An

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announcement was broadcast from the rostrum: "This afternoon there will be a special seminar on Critical Phenomena and Related Topics in Magnetism. The seminar will be held in the apartment of Professor Voronel. Those wishing to attend will meet in the lobby of the Hotel Russiya at 1:30." Like the signs, the scheduling was spontaneous. Voronel and his colleagues had hoped for a few visitors; they were astonished when forty-one conferees turned up. Not many out of fifteen hundred, but still, in the Soviet Union, forty-one persons flouting authority is a large number. They went by subway to Professor Voronel's apartment and sat on the floor. Several Soviet scientists attended, and of course the KGB was there. But Mark Azbel, Moshe Gitterman, and Alexander Voronel finally got to give their talks.

Tuesday, August 28, was the last day of the conference. The guards were gone from the entrance to Moscow State University. Most of the delegates had already left. Those of us who still remained packed up our bags and invited our new Soviet friends to the Hotel Russiya to say good-bye: Azbel, Alexander Lunts, the Gittermans, Victor Brailovsky, the Voronels, husbands and wives, brave people.

Back home, we spoke to Mark Azbel by phone from Moscow. He said that though he and Voronel and Gitterman have applied to emigrate, they could never "remain indifferent to Russia. . . . If any enemy appeared who wanted to destroy everything beautiful in this

country, he would begin with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Any great country would be proud of these people, and only Russia carries on its old traditions of devouring its best sons."

In the United States, the National Academy of Sciences wrote to the Soviet Academy: "It was with consternation and a sense of shame that we learned of the expression of censure of Sakharov's contributions to the cause of continuing human progress that was signed by forty members of your academy. . . ."

In Budapest, Hungary, on September 29, 1973, officers of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics convened. The Soviet delegate, B. M. Vul, insisted that the Helsinki Resolution on the Free Circulation of Scientists was merely a floor resolution of the XIV General Assembly and had no legal weight. He further insisted that the statutory amendment on non-discrimination explicitly exempted internal actions by any national member. This was the same interpretation the Secretary of the U.S. National Committee for IUPAP and the Secretary-General of IUPAP had stated previously.

The U.S. representatives bowed to reality. The Soviet delegate suggested that if IUPAP pressed for a stronger interpretation of the Helsinki Amendment, or voted to censure the Soviet Union for the exclusion of the three scientists, the Soviet Union was prepared to abandon IUPAP. Faced with this threat, the Americans evaded the issue.

—EARL CALLEN