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April 1972

POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"In the fall of 1971 and at the beginning of this year, workers of the Interior Ministry arrested certain disseminators and producers of anti-state leaflets and other materials of the same nature....The seized documents indicate that these Czechoslovak citizens strove in the period of 1970 and 1971 to create illegal anti-state groups....They organized these activities in combination with emigres and foreign enemy centers....Subjects of foreign states also participated in this criminal activity....."

Prague Television, 11 January 1972

Although rumors of detentions and police interrogations of certain individuals in Czechoslovakia filtered to the West during the last months of 1971, this was the first official admission by the Prague regime that a new wave of arrests was under way.

The harsh facts of these arrests, which took place in late 1971 and in January 1972, are well known by now and are receiving considerable publicity in Western Europe. About 200 individuals, most of whom held positions of some influence during the liberalization process of 1968, are involved. The highest ranking of these are Milan Huebl, former Rector of the Higher Party College and co-author of Alexander Dubcek's Action Program of April 1968, and Jaroslav Sabata, former Secretary of the Party organization in Brno. Both were elected members of the Central Committee at the "clandestine" Party Congress convoked 48 hours after the Soviet invasion. According to press reports, Huebl is accused of involvement in the distribution of samizdat materials in Prague and Czech Lands, while Sabata is said to have mobilized his entire family (two sons, a daughter and other relatives) to conduct a wide-spread campaign throughout the province of Moravia against the national elections of last November.

International flavor was added to the affair through regime charges of foreign involvement, and the arrest on 5 January of one Italian newsman, Valerio Ochetto, and the summary expulsion of two others. This resulted in a surprisingly strong and indignant protest action in Italy, which included critical editorials in the principal organs of the Italian Communist Party. Possibly under the influence of this pressure, the Czechoslovak Press Agency officially announced on 17 February that Ochetto had been expelled from Czechoslovakia. The decision to resolve the

irksome Ochetto case through mere expulsion suggests that the Husak regime is still sensitive -- at least to some degree -- to criticism from abroad, especially when levied by a "fraternal" party.

It remains to be seen how the regime will react to the growing storm of protest its actions have evoked elsewhere in Europe, notably among the French left, particularly on the part of prominent, former French Communists. Some of the public statements made by the French left on the political arrests are contained in the attachments. Most prominent is the half-page protest printed in Le Monde of 5-6 March, signed by 144 leftist intellectuals, mostly French, including socialists and dissident and orthodox Communists. Among the more prominent signatories are philosopher and writer Jean Paul Sartre, former Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister and author of the book The Confession Arthur London, former French Communist Party (PCF) Politburo member and theoretician Roger Garaudy, author Simone de Beauvoir, and the Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis. Additional signatures are coming in despite the PCF's demand that its members disavow their signatures. Roger Garaudy,* writing in the large circulation, independent daily France Soir, exposes the absurdity of the Czech regime's claim that there are no political trials going on in Czechoslovakia. Another PCF expellee, Paul Noirot, expressed his views in his own Communist dissident weekly, Politique Hebdo. At the same time, he published excerpts from a letter written by the above-mentioned Milan Huebl to his former comrade-in-arms, Gustav Husak, warning about the incalculable consequences of starting political trials. Huebl wrote the letter last October and sent a copy abroad to be published in the event of his arrest. (Attached is a translation of the whole letter, which was published in the Italian newspaper L'Espresso.)

On the French left only the PCF sees nothing wrong in Czechoslovakia. The French Socialist Party has urged the PCF to join it in a common protest against the political repressions but with no success. In fact, a delegation sent to Czechoslovakia by the PCF to seek assurances from Husak that political trials would not be held, returned to Paris with the expected whitewash and denials of political repression, but the exchange between socialists and Communists is continuing.

The question arises as to why the Prague regime, having repeatedly proclaimed the completion of consolidation and defeat of the right wing, embarked at this particular point in time on

*Garaudy was expelled from the Party in 1970 for his persistent criticism of the Soviet system of Socialism.

large-scale arrests and trials of known and generally respected supporters of Dubcek.

Soviet and Czechoslovak paranoid concern with criticism at home and abroad is well known and amply documented. The year 1968 taught Prague and the Kremlin a lesson they are unlikely to treat lightly again. Husak knows and has admitted publicly that "despite the election results, it must not be assumed that 99% of the people are with us." Probably more than some of his colleagues, Husak is aware of public sentiment and of the fact that he is presiding over a brooding and even hostile nation. Being unwilling or unable to initiate meaningful steps toward national reconciliation, Husak can only silence potential opposition leaders and thus intimidate and neutralize large numbers of less determined individuals who might be willing to follow someone else's lead but are not themselves strong enough to take the initiative. Given this national impasse, the price of adverse publicity abroad and more intense hostility at home must be paid as the lesser of two evils. Husak has no other alternatives given the inexorable reality within most ruling Communist Parties that those who have been publicly accused of serious transgressions against existing Party statutes must be punished, lest Party discipline among the rank-and-file suffer.

Since ridiculing the opposition one day and charging it with heinous plotting the next is obviously not impressing the skeptical and politically mature Czech and Slovak man in the street, the regime must - as in the past - manufacture intricate and ominous ties between the domestic opposition and "powerful international enemy centers abroad." Consequently, visits to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and since then by Western journalists, academic personalities, etc., have been and continue to be presented as "espionage trips" and subversion. The press, radio and television tediously repeat fantastic tales of "an invasion by the Green Berets," the presence in 1968 of "American tanks" (which incidentally were rented in Austria for a film dealing with WW II), attack purely scholarly meetings in the West, such as the Reading Seminar in England, and put the imperialist brand on even such apolitical organizations as the PEN Club and Amnesty International by calling them tools of Western espionage. Needless to say, activities of Czechoslovak emigres -- old and new -- are magnified out of all proportion and every activist among them is accused of working for at least one Western intelligence service.

As ludicrous as this may seem to the average Westerner, to Prague -- as apparently to Moscow -- it is a deadly serious matter, and Prague's exaggerated concern throws some light on that government's defensive and nervous posture. Apart from the above, the

decision to crack down on Czechoslovak dissidents may well be a logical consequence of the recent Soviet wave of arrests of dissidents in Moscow and the Ukraine. Given Czechoslovakia's semi-colonial status since 1968, it is unlikely that Husak would take any major step without full coordination with Moscow. Finally, this may all be part of an overall Soviet Bloc tightening of security at home which, as many analysts have predicted, would accompany the Soviet detente campaign vis-a-vis the West.

LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 March 1972

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CPYRGHT

**LES SIGNATAIRES DE L'APPEL ONT SOUSCRIT ENSEMBLE LE PRIX DE CETTE
ANNONCE QUE LE MONDE A BIEN VOULU LEUR ACCORDER AU TARIF PUBLICITAIRE**

APPEL

POUR LES VICTIMES DE LA RÉPRESSION EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE

La fidélité révolutionnaire et la fierté nationale vont-elles être à nouveau —
omme au temps de « l'Aveu » — réputées criminelles de Prague à Bratislava ?

Des hommes et des femmes sont suspectés, surveillés, poursuivis, emprisonnés, jetés au secret des prisons d'État parce qu'ils symbolisent l'espoir d'un peuple qui, malgré les rigueurs de l'occupation et de la police, ne consent pas à les renier.

Quelques-uns parmi nous ont rencontré certains de ces hommes et de ces femmes, et les connaissent bien.

Nous les admirons d'avoir décidé, il y a trois ans, de continuer au coude à coude avec leur peuple le combat pour le socialisme et préféré ce risque aux aléas de l'exil.

Si vous nous y aidez, nous ne les laisserons ni salir ni briser.

Pour soustraire leur honneur et leur vie aux persécutions qui les menacent et les frappent, nous refusons de les laisser prendre au piège du silence.

Faudrait-il — sous prétexte de n'alimenter aucune campagne — accepter de se taire ? Certains le penseront sans doute. Mais beaucoup d'autres diront avec nous que leur liberté et, pour une part, leur idéal dépendent de notre solidarité ouvertement exprimée.

Nous qui par milliers signons et signerons cet Appel et contribuerons à interdire le silence sur le sort des victimes de la répression, notamment par la voie de tels communiqués, les placerons sous la seule sauvegarde qui leur reste : la nôtre.

LES PREMIERS SIGNATAIRES

Maurice AGULHON
Pierre ALEKAN
François ALQUIER
Daniel ANSELME
Claude AVELINE
Yves BAREL
Simone de BEAUVOIR
Loleh BELON
Jean BENARD
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Jean-Marie VINCENT
Olga WORMSER-MIGOT
Boris YANKEL
Vladimir YANKELEVITCH
Alain ZARUDIANSKY

Celles et ceux qui veulent se solidariser moralement et matériellement avec cette initiative doivent écrire à :

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Mme Geneviève DERON, 7, rue Victor-Hugo (92) Colombes

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(Advertisement)

LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 March 1972

CPYRGHT

The signers of this appeal have together paid for this announcement, for which Le Monde granted them the commercial rate.

A P P E A L

For the Victims of Repression in Czechoslovakia

Will revolutionary fidelity and national pride be again -- as in the days of "The Confession" -- reputed as being criminal in Prague and Bratislava?

Men and women are being suspected, kept under surveillance, prosecuted, jailed, thrown into the depths of state prisons, because they symbolize the hope of a people which, despite the rigors of occupation and police, does not consent to disavow them.

Some of us have met these men and these women and know them well.

We admire them for having decided, three years ago, to continue, shoulder-to-shoulder with their people, the struggle for socialism, and to prefer this risk to the solitudes of exile.

If you help us, we shall not let them be either sullied or broken.

We refuse to let them be trapped into silence, our silence, to save their honour and their life from the persecutions that are threatening them and are striking them.

Is it necessary to accept silence -- under the pretext of not contributing to some campaign? Some, no doubt, think so. But many others will say with us that their own freedom and, for many among them, their ideals, depend on our solidarity openly expressed.

We, who by the thousands sign and will sign this appeal and contribute to banning silence about the fate of the victims of repression, place them under the only safeguard that still remains to them: ours.

The First Signatures

[Signatures]

Those who wish to express their moral and material solidarity with this initiative should write to:

Mme Genevieve DEROIN, 7, rue Victor-Hugo (92) Colombes

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PARIS-MATCH, Paris
26 February 1972

COMMUNISTS AGAIN TORN BY EVENTS IN PRAGUE

Since the start of the year, a new wave of arrests has been building up in Czechoslovakia, despite solemn commitments made by its rulers to brother communist parties. Raymond Tournoux tells us about the hidden crisis precipitated by these arrests within the French CP and throughout the political left.

The communist party brandishes the tax returns of its elected office-holders. Through Mr Jacques Duclos, it is calling for publication of "cabinet members' fortunes." The offensive falls well within the boundaries of the standard rules of political warfare. And yet, even while this is going on, the CP is covering up the inner tragedy, the secret tragedy that deeply troubles many of its members and a number of its leaders. Toward the outside world, its law of silence is still ironclad. In all the shouting of the headlines, the tragedy has got lost. Let us have a look at some of its important acts.

At the beginning of this month of February, a new wave of arrests swept over Czechoslovakia. It came in the wake of pressure applied to intellectuals who, in the view of the present authorities, were a bit too much in evidence during the "Prague Springtime." Among the people recently jailed were a philosopher, a historian, a scientist, and a journalist. A month earlier the police had picked up, among others, Mr Milan Huebl, former rector of the Czech CP's Ecole Superieure, Mr Ludeck Pachman, former chess champion, Karel Kyncl, journalist, Jan Sling, son of Otto Sling, a party dignitary who was executed in 1952 at the same time as Rudolf Slansky, the secretary-general, and ten other leading party lights. What is it they are supposed to have done? What are the trumped-up charges against them? They allegedly formed small groups working "against the state" with the help of emigre associations and "hostile foreign organizations." Some of these men, but only a few, have apparently been freed since their arrest.

Events follow one another relentlessly. On 2 February, Mr Jiri Lederer, who had been arrested in the pre-dawn hours of 31 January, without his family's being able to find out the reason for his arrest, was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Why? Because in May 1968, he had written an article for Literarny Listy -- then the organ of the Czech Writers' Union -- critical of Mr Gomulka. The court called it "defamation of an allied state."

Suddenly -- quite by chance, his friends said at first -- Mr Roland Leroy, member of the Chamber of Deputies, secretary of the Central Committee of the French CP, set off for Prague. With him went Mr Paul Courtieu, a member of the CC. In 1968 an emissary from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had come to Paris to pledge his party's solemn word that no prosecutions would be opened against those who had taken part in the "Prague Springtime." What has become of those promises, once so freely and prodigally given?

On the left, Mr Francois Mitterand takes pen in hand in the first issue of L'Unite, the infant socialist party weekly. He writes about the repression that scourges those Czechoslovak communists "guilty of thinking differently from Mr Gustav Husak, secretary general of the CP." He writes:

"Here we are back in Prague again, and in its springtime that knew no summer. What to do? Each of us has the inner fortitude to bear another's sufferings. Are we to leave them utterly defenseless, these muzzled men guilty of having dreamed of a socialism out of joint with the times in their own country?"

The fact is that another very grave matter, born of events in Czechoslovakia, is smouldering inside the French CP. On 12 February, the communist party felt called upon to restate its position in an absolutely extraordinary statement which appeared on page 3 of Humanite. It does its best to start its own diversionary maneuver:

"Trying to cope with the grave difficulties which the crisis in French society has created for it, a crisis for which it must bear the whole responsibility, the big bourgeoisie now seeks to launch a new anti-communist campaign..."

The CP makes two points:

1. It states that it stands by its 19th Congress position, namely "its disagreement with the military intervention in Czechoslovakia [which occurred on] 21 August 1968."
2. It expresses satisfaction "with the statements of the secretary general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the effect that there will be no prefabricated political trials."

Yet at the very same time, Rinascita, the official weekly of the Italian Communist Party, deploras such subterfuge. It goes a great deal further under the headline "Grave news from Prague." It cites the several phases of a kind of liquidation still going on, the elimination of leaders, purges in the party, in the labor unions, in the professional organizations, at the university, among intellectuals, and in the press. And it wonders aloud whether the arrests made over these past few weeks are not actually tantamount to abandonment of a solemn commitment not to engage in repression and not to mount [show] trials.

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Touching Italian Appeal

It concludes in moving terms:

"The news reaching us from Prague is grave. We cry out to the Czechoslovak communists, to the international worker movement, to all who aspire to the free, just world of socialism. We speak as communists, as internationalists, as revolutionaries, as those who are most deeply wounded by what is happening in Prague."

Several Italian newsmen have been arrested and expelled from Czechoslovakia, among them Ferdinando Zidar of Unita, Italy's equivalent of Humanite.

On 18 February another communique from the French CP's political bureau: 1. It admits that Roland Leroy went on a mission to Prague; 2. It officially notes the assurances from Ian Husak that there would be "no prosecutions, no arrests for political acts dating back to 1968."

So? Still according to the political bureau, Husak said:

"A preliminary investigation was recently begun into the constitution of an illegal conspiracy network.... Most of the persons arrested for questioning have been released." In other words, they are arresting people in Prague.

And so in Paris the CP suffers through its hidden tragedy, whose origins date back to 26 August 1968. That was the day Waldeck Rochet took to radio and TV to make his historic statement to Robert Boulay:

"We were painfully surprised to learn, on the night of 21 August, of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. I shall not hide the fact that there is some bitterness and even anguish in our realization that there is grave disagreement between us and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the matter of this military intervention in Czechoslovakia...."

Waldeck-Rochet was just back from a flying trip to Russia. He had failed in his efforts at the Kremlin to prevent the order to move against Czechoslovakia from being given to the Russian troops. His pleading as a child of the people, like his ideological arguments, were swept away before the icy determination of the general staff and by the steel-clad arguments of strategy.

Today, somewhere in a villa outside Paris, Waldeck Rochet, secretary general of the communist party, comrade of Maurice Thorez, scales the tragic hill of an endless Calvary. He has become invisible in an inaccessible hideaway. For 3 years this deeply sincere party man has failed to recover, intellectually or physically, from the blow of Prague. He is still too deep in soul-shock, this man who had tried to lead the CP out of the ghetto and into what he hoped would be the irreversible way of leftist unity, this man who had committed his word and his honor

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in the debate over the peaceful paths to socialism, on respect for personal sovereignty and independence by brother parties. He wanders in a world of ghosts and nightmares. He is lost in a Kafka universe. His soul runs in search of a lost dream, still seeking a Church that is gone forever.

PARIS-MATCH, Paris
26 February 1972

CPYRGHT

Les communistes de nouveau déchirés par Prague

Depuis le début de l'année, une nouvelle vague d'arrestations sévit en Tchécoslovaquie, au mépris des engagements pris par les gouvernants à l'égard des P.c. frères.

Raymond Tournoux nous raconte la crise cachée provoquée par ces arrestations au sein du P.c. français et de toute la gauche.

Le parti communiste agite les feuilles d'impôt de ses élus. Par la bouche de M. Jacques Duclos, il réclame la publication de « la fortune des ministres ». L'offensive entre dans les règles classiques de la guerre politique... Pourtant, dans le même temps, le P.c. dissimule le drame intime, le drame secret qui angoisse beaucoup de ses militants et nombre de ses dirigeants. A l'égard de l'extérieur, sa loi du silence reste implacable. Dans le feu de l'actualité, le drame est passé inaperçu. Il convient d'en reconstituer les actes principaux.

Au début de ce mois de février, une nouvelle vague d'arrestations est opérée en Tchécoslovaquie. Elle survient après la mise sous les verroux d'intellectuels qui, au gré des autorités en place, s'étaient trop manifestés lors du « printemps de Prague ». Parmi les personnes récemment incarcérées, figurent notamment un

philosophe, un historien, un scientifique, un journaliste. Un mois auparavant, avaient déjà été arrêtés, entre autres, MM. Milan Huebl, ancien recteur de l'Ecole supérieure du P.c. tchèque, Ludek Pachman, ancien champion d'échecs, Karel Kyncl, journaliste, Jan Sling, fils d'Otto Sling, dignitaire du parti qui, en 1952, fut exécuté en même temps que Rudolf Slansky, secrétaire général, et dix autres personnalités. Quels reproches ou quelles charges fallacieuses les accablent donc ? Avoir voulu constituer « contre l'Etat » avec l'aide d'associations d'émigrés et « d'organisations étrangères hostiles ». Quelques-uns de ces hommes — mais quelques-uns seulement — paraissent avoir été remis en liberté.

Les faits se succèdent, impitoyables. Le 2 février, M. Jiri Lederer, arrêté l'avant-veille au petit matin sans que sa famille ait pu apprendre les motifs de l'interpellation, s'entend condamner à deux ans de prison. Pourquoi ? Parce que, en mai 1968, dans Literarni Listy — alors organe de l'Union des écrivains —, il avait critiqué M. Gomulka. Le tribunal le

sanctionne : « Diffamation d'un Etat allié. »

LES HOMMES BAILLONNES

Soudain — un hasard, affirment tout d'abord ses amis — M. Roland Leroy, député, secrétaire du comité central du parti communiste français, part pour Prague, accompagné de M. Paul Courtieu, membre du comité central. En 1968, un émissaire du parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie était venu, à Paris, donner l'assurance solennelle qu'aucun procès ne serait ouvert contre les participants au « printemps de Prague ». Qu'en est-il donc des promesses prodiguées naguère ?

A gauche, M. François Mitterrand prend la plume dans le premier numéro de « l'Unité », hebdomadaire du parti socialiste. Il évoque la répression qui s'abat sur les communistes tchécoslovaques, « coupables de penser autrement que M. Gustav Husak, secrétaire général du P.c. ». Il écrit : « Nous voilà ramenés à Prague, et à son printemps sans été. Que faire ? Nous avons

tout assez de force pour supporter les maux d'autrui. Laisseront-ils sans défense ces hommes bâillonnés, coupables d'avoir rêvé à un socialisme inactuel par les temps qui courent dans ce pays qui est le leur ?

En réalité, une nouvelle et sérieuse affaire, née des événements de Tchécoslovaquie, couve à l'intérieur du P.c. Le 12 février, le parti communiste estime nécessaire de rappeler, sa position par une déclaration tout à fait inhabituelle; que l'on trouve en troisième page de « l'Humanité ». Il s'efforce, à son tour, de provoquer une manœuvre de diversion :

« Aux prises avec les graves difficultés que lui crée la crise de la société française, crise dont elle porte l'entière responsabilité, la grande bourgeoisie cherche à relancer la campagne anticommuniste... »

Le P.c. précise deux points : 1° Il affirme s'en tenir à sa position du XIX^e Congrès, à savoir « son désaccord avec l'intervention militaire du 21 août 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie ».

2° Il se félicite « des déclarations du secrétaire général du parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie, selon lesquelles il n'y aurait pas de procès politiques préfabriqués ».

Dans le même moment cependant, « Rinascita », l'hebdomadaire officiel du parti communiste Italien, regrette les faux-fuyants. Il va beaucoup plus loin, sous le titre : « De graves nouvelles de Prague ». Il mentionne, pour sa part, les différentes phases d'une sorte de liquidation en cours, l'élimination des responsables, les purges dans le parti, les syndicats, les organisations professionnelles, l'Université, les intellectuels, la presse. Et il se demande sans ambages si les arrestations effectuées durant ces dernières semaines ne sont pas, en effet, l'abandon d'un engagement : celui de ne pas se livrer à la répression et de ne pas ouvrir des procès.

APPEL PATHETIQUE DES ITALIENS

Il conclut en termes pathétiques : « Les nouvelles qui nous parviennent de Prague sont graves. Nous nous adressons aux communistes tchécoslovaques, au mouvement ouvrier international, à tous ceux qui aspirent au monde libre et juste du socialisme. Nous parlons en communistes, en internationalistes, en révolutionnaires, les premiers qui sont blessés par ce qui se passe à Prague. »

Des journalistes italiens sont arrêtés ou expulsés, dont Ferdinando Zidar, de « l'Unità », l'équivalent de « l'Humanité ». Le 18 février, nouveau communiqué du bureau politique du parti communiste français : 1) il reconnaît que Roland Leroy s'est rendu en mission à Prague ; 2) il prend acte des assurances données par Jan Husak : « aucun procès, aucune arrestation pour des faits politiques remontant à 1968 ». Alors ? Toujours selon le bureau politique, Husak a déclaré : « ... une instruction a été récemment ouverte sur la constitution d'un réseau illégal de conspiration... le plus grand nombre des personnes interpellées et interrogées ont été relâchées ». Autrement dit, on arrête à Prague.

Ainsi à Paris, le P.c. vit son drame caché dont l'origine remonte au 26 août 1968. Ce jour-là, devant le micro de R.t.l., Waldeck Rochet faisait à Robert Boulay une déclaration historique :

« Nous avons été douloureusement surpris en apprenant, dans la nuit du 21 au 22 août, l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie. Je ne cacherai pas que ce n'est pas sans amertume et un certain déchirement que nous constatons notre grave désaccord avec le parti communiste de l'Union soviétique au sujet de l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslo-

CPYRGHT
vaquie... »

Waldeck Rochet revenait d'un voyage-éclair à Moscou. Il avait échoué dans sa tentative en vue d'empêcher, au Kremlin, que soit donné l'ordre de marche des forces russes. Ses adjurations de fils du peuple, ses arguments idéologiques avaient été balayés par la froide détermination des états-majors, par les arguments sans appel de la stratégie. Aujourd'hui, quelque part dans une villa de la région parisienne. Waldeck Rochet, secrétaire général du parti communiste, compagnon de Maurice Thorez, gravit les tragiques étapes d'un calvaire jamais terminé. Il est devenu invisible dans une retraite inaccessible. Depuis trois ans, ce militant sincère ne se remet, ni intellectuellement ni physiquement, du coup de Prague. Il demeure trop intérieurement choqué, lui qui avait voulu sortir le P.c. du ghetto, pour l'entraîner dans la voie, espérée irréversible, de l'unité de la gauche ; lui qui avait engagé sa parole et son honneur dans le débat sur les voies pacifiques du socialisme, sur le respect de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance nationale par les partis frères. Il erre dans un monde de fantômes et de cauchemars. Il évolue dans un univers kafkaïen. Son esprit court en quête d'un rêve perdu, à la recherche d'une Eglise dis-

parus. RAYMOND TOURNOUX

FRANCE-SOIR, Paris
25 February 1972

CPYRGHT

Roger Garaudy

FROM BURGOS TO PRAGUE, THERE ARE NO POLITICAL TRIALS

In late January the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published two resolutions on the "ideological struggle." This is the usual means of indicating that the policy of the leaders is encountering difficulties and of announcing new measures of repression-- the only method known to these leaders for overcoming difficulties.

And here are the chain reactions:

First, in the Soviet Union where men who advance the slightest criticism are sent either to insane asylums or prison: Bukovski after Grigorenko and hundreds of others.

Then, in the Czechoslovak protectorate, where Husak is again repeating that there are no "political trials" when, among hundreds of other arrests, Bzoch has been imprisoned in Brno for carrying in his briefcase the Smrkovsky interview published by an Italian communist newspaper. He was also proclaiming that there were no "political trials" when the first wave of repression swept General Prchlik into prison for having carried out the orders of the Dubcek government in 1968. There are no "political trials" because the slightest divergence is qualified as a "violation of the law." According to this terminology, there were never any "political trials" under Stalin. The unfortunate thing is precisely that political opposition under such a regime is a violation of the law.

The political opposition is by definition an "enemy of the people" as in all police states, from the Spain of Franco to the Greece of the colonels. Thus from Burgos to Prague, there are never "political trials."

An Italian journalist is gathering information on the opposition; he is arrested for conspiracy. There are no "political trials," at least not for all those who accept, in France or elsewhere, the normalization and its vocabulary.

Bilak, the man who was preparing himself as early as 20 August 1968 for a position as jack-of-all-trades for the occupiers of Prague, is charged with seeing that the orders of his masters are obeyed by those who do not accept the normalization and its vocabulary.

He condemns the Romanian desire for independence. The Romanian Bilak, General Ion Serb, was removed from office and arrested (if not executed) as a Soviet agent.

He castigates Yugoslavia, which he says is abandoning "the principles of Marxism-Leninism" in its attempts to allow the workers self-management of their factories and the possibility of criticizing the policy of their government.

CPYRGHT He accuses Hungary of following the path of Czechoslovakia when trying to regain its independence.

He reproaches Gierek for having restored the workers' councils in Poland at the very moment that Mravec and Lederer are being arrested in Czechoslovakia for having criticized Gomulka.

There is a link among all these facts: the will of the Soviet leaders to impose their law in all socialist countries. In so doing they are the best suppliers of anti-communist propaganda--periodically proving that they are prepared to intervene by any means they consider necessary in their "fraternal" countries and parties.

But where is the socialism in all that?

Who strikes? And who is struck?

Those who strike are those who continue the political and ideological illusionism of Stalin. At the 18th Party Congress in 1937, Stalin presented the new Soviet constitution as a "consistent and fully developed democracy." He was completely right. One has only to read the text to recognize that it was the most democratic of constitutions up to that time. It was, nonetheless, in the name of this constitution, and without the slightest violation of it, that one of the bloodiest dictatorships the world has ever known was established.

The key to the enigma is found in the postulates of identification and substitution. If we translate each reference in the text to the worker class or the citizens as the party that represents them and is identified with them, and if we recognize that the leadership represents the party and is identified with it, everything becomes clear. This sort of democracy led 200 million Soviets, acting in good faith, to "participate" in the crime against Czechoslovakia in August 1968 because they had no reason to doubt the official lies: "We have been called by the Czechoslovak people, and our troops are welcomed with enthusiasm."

Who is struck? Those who combat the postulates of substitution and identification and who tried, in Yugoslavia in 1948 in the first resistance against Stalinism and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, to construct socialism by the people--giving the workers themselves the control and self-management of their enterprises.

This is why the Soviet problem and the Czechoslovak problem are French problems. At stake in these instances of intervention and repression is the future of socialism in our country. As long as the Soviet model with its substitutions and identifications that are a hideous caricature of socialism is not repudiated, as long as these interventions are not denounced, as long as the lie that "there are no political trials" (because the political opposition is an "enemy of the people") is accepted--and by this acceptance, one becomes an accomplice--socialism is dishonored and French prospects are blocked.

The struggle for socialism will never be credible until it is clearly

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FRANCE-SOIR, Paris
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ROGER GARAUDY

FACE A L'OPINION.

De Burgos à Prague, il n'y a jamais de procès politique

A la fin du mois de janvier le Comité Central du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique publie deux résolutions sur la « lutte idéologique ». C'est la formule habituelle pour dire que la politique des dirigeants se heurte à des difficultés et pour annoncer les répressions, seule méthode que ce genre de dirigeants connaisse pour les surmonter.

Et voici les réactions en chaîne.

D'abord en Union Soviétique, où les hommes qui avancent la moindre critique sont ventillés entre les hôpitaux psychiatriques et les prisons : Boukowski après Grigorenko et des centaines d'autres.

Puis dans le protectorat tchécoslovaque où Husak répète une fois de plus qu'il n'est pas question de « procès politiques » lorsque, parmi des centaines d'autres arrestations, Bzoch est emprisonné à Brno pour avoir dans sa serviette l'interview de Smrkowsky publiée par un journal communiste italien. Il proclame également : il n'y a pas de « procès politiques » lorsque la première vague de répression conduisit en prison le général Pechlik pour avoir exécuté, en 1968, les ordres du gouvernement Dubcek. Il n'y a pas de « procès politiques » puisque la moindre divergence est qualifiée de « violation de la loi ». Selon ce vocabulaire il n'y a jamais eu de « procès politiques » sous Staline. La malheur c'est précisément que l'opposition politique dans un tel régime soit une violation de la loi.

L'opposant politique est, par définition, un « ennemi du peuple », comme dans tous les régimes policiers, de l'Espagne de Franco à la Grèce des colonels. Ainsi, de Burgos à Prague, il n'y a jamais de « procès politiques ».

Un journaliste italien s'informe sur l'opposition ; il est arrêté pour complot. Il n'y a pas de « procès politiques » du moins pour tous ceux qui acceptent, en France ou ailleurs, la normalisation et son vocabulaire.

**

POUR ceux qui ne l'acceptent pas, Bilak, celui qui s'apprêtait, dès le 20 août 1968, à être l'homme à tout faire de

l'occupant à Prague, est chargé de répécuter les consignes de ses maîtres.

Il blâme la volonté d'indépendance de la Roumanie, où le Bilak roumain, le général Ion Serb, a été destitué et arrêté (si non exécuté) comme agent soviétique.

Il semonce la Yougoslavie qui, en s'efforçant de donner aux travailleurs l'autogestion de leurs usines et la possibilité de critiquer la politique de leur gouvernement, abandonne, selon lui, « les principes du marxisme léninisme ».

Il accuse la Hongrie de prendre le chemin de la Tchécoslovaquie au temps où elle tentait de recouvrer son indépendance.

Il reproche à Gierok d'avoir restauré en Pologne les conseils ouvriers, au moment même où en Tchécoslovaquie Mravec et Lederer sont arrêtés pour avoir critiqué Gomulka.

Il y a un lien entre tous ces faits : la volonté des dirigeants soviétiques d'imposer leur loi dans tout pays socialiste. C'est par là qu'ils sont les meilleurs fournisseurs de la propagande anticommuniste, en faisant périodiquement la preuve qu'ils sont prêts à intervenir par tous les moyens dans les pays et les partis qu'ils appellent des pays et des partis frères.

**

MAIS où est le socialisme en tout cela ? Qui frappe ? Et qui est frappé ?

Ceux qui frappent ce sont les continuateurs de l'illusionnisme politique et idéologique de Staline. Au XVIII^e Congrès de son Parti, en 1937, Staline présentait la nouvelle Constitution soviétique comme « une démocratie conséquente et développée jusqu'au bout ». Il avait parfaitement raison ; il suffit d'en lire le texte pour reconnaître qu'elle est la plus démocratique des constitutions ayant existé jusque-là. C'est pourtant au nom de cette Constitution, et sans la violer le moins du monde, qu'a pu s'instituer l'une des plus sanglantes dictatures que l'histoire ait connues.

La clé de cette énigme ce sont les postulats d'identification

de substitution ; si chaque fois qu'il s'agit, dans le texte, de la classe ouvrière ou des citoyens, nous traduisons par « le parti qui les représente et s'identifie à eux, et si nous admettons que la direction représente ce parti et s'identifie à lui, tout devient clair. Une démocratie de ce genre a fait « participer » de bonne foi deux cents millions de Soviétiques, en août 1968, au crime contre la Tchécoslovaquie parce qu'ils n'avaient aucun moyen de mettre en doute les mensonges officiels ; « Nous sommes appelés par le peuple tchécoslovaque et nos troupes sont accueillies avec enthousiasme. »

Qui est frappé ? Ceux qui combattent les postulats de substitution et d'identification et qui ont tenté, en Yougoslavie en 1948, dans la première résistance au stalinisme, comme en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968, de construire le socialisme par le peuple, en donnant aux travailleurs eux-mêmes la parole et l'autogestion de leurs entreprises.

C'est pourquoi le problème soviétique et le problème tchécoslovaque sont des problèmes français. L'enjeu de ces interventions et de ces répressions, c'est l'avenir du socialisme dans notre pays. Tant que l'on ne répudiera pas le modèle soviétique avec ses substitutions et ses identifications qui sont une caricature hideuse du socialisme, tant que l'on ne dénoncera pas ces interventions, tant que l'on acceptera, en s'en faisant ainsi complice, le mensonge selon lequel « il n'y a pas de procès politiques » parce qu'on a baptisé l'opposant politique « ennemi du peuple », on laisse déshonorer le socialisme et l'on bouche la perspective française.

La lutte pour le socialisme ne sera crédible que lorsqu'on dira clairement : le socialisme, ce n'est pas cela !

Prochain « FACE A L'OPINION » :

JEAN CHARBONNEL

(député UDR, président de la

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POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
10 February 1972

CPYRGHT

THE HOUR OF THE TRIALS

How Far Will They Go?

From his free tribune, Le Monde, Vercors cries, "Now it is starting all over again," in reference to the wave of arrests that is now sweeping so many comrades into Husak's prisons. The author of "Silence de la Mer" refers with moving sadness to the responsibility of the French Communist Party.

It must, in fact, be denounced, again and always. For, objectively speaking, it has aided the normalization -- by its lies, its half-lies, its silence. Objectively speaking, it bears and will bear the cross of the coming trials in Prague -- the beginning of which is marked by the sentencing of Jiri Lederer, for having uttered criticism of Gomulka in 1968 a thousand times milder than what Gierak is saying about him now.

"We support Husak completely when he says that there will be no trials. We are absolutely opposed to political trials," Georges Marchais affirmed to television and to Europe I in July 1970 (L'Humanite, 22 July 1970). Husak lied; he could do nothing but lie. Today is the proof.

Georges Marchais is silent; L'Humanite is silent. Roland Leroy, secretary of the French Communist Party and the party "liberal," reiterates to all who will listen his dismay at the return of Stalinism; Roland Leroy is in Prague, while they are arresting my comrades, who were also his comrades.

Powerless. Doubtless so. But an accomplice like so many others because he is silent.

It is beginning all over again. How far will you go this time?

The witch hunt has begun in Czechoslovakia. Heavier and heavier repression strikes the friends of Dubcek and those behind the "Springtime of Prague" who remained in their country, occupied by the Red Army, to wage a combat becoming more and more difficult with resources becoming more and more limited.

After those of December and January (1), the third wave of arrests in early February claimed figures who, by virtue of their reputations, had heretofore been spared. Thus, the historian Karel Bartosek and Karel Kaplan, the former secretary of the Prague Committee of the Communist Party, Jiri Litera, well known in scientific circles, Jiri Hochman, former editor-in-chief of the Reporter, (the organ of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, prohibited in 1969 by order of the Soviet authorities) and another journalist, Vladimir Nepras were arrested.

The police arrested, then released, but kept under surveillance the philosophers Karel Kosik and Sochor, the jurist Frantisek Chamalik, and Richard Slansky. Slansky is the son of the former secretary general of the Communist Party who was arrested in 1952 with 10 other leaders of the Communist Party, sentenced, and executed after a rigged trial, replete with confessions, the sinister machinery of which Arthur London unveils in his resounding book.

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is the era of the "great trials" against the opposition beginning all over again? Already the journalist Jiri Lederer has been sentenced to two years in prison by a Prague court for having "defamed the representatives of an allied country." In truth, Lederer, in April and May 1968 made the same criticism of Gomulka in several articles in the newspaper of the Union of Writers, Literarni Listy, that are made officially today in Warsaw.

It is possible that the intellectuals and militants arrested recently or in early January -- like the former rector of the Advanced Political School of the Communist Party, Martin Huebl -- will be brought to trial on charges of having printed and disseminated not only "subversive tracts," but also a clandestine opposition newspaper circulating secretly in Czechoslovakia.

Jiri Hochman

Hochman, 44 years old, a former deportee, was, in the early years after the liberation in 1945, a carpenter. After obtaining his baccalaureate at the School of Economics, he began working as a journalist for Obrana Lidu, the organ of the army, as director of the foreign politics section. In the late fifties, he began work for Rude Pravo, the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as foreign politics editor. In 1967 he took a job with the weekly of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, Reporter. It was there, as editor-in-chief, that he waged the fiercest battle for the "Springtime of Prague." Expelled from the party in 1969, he was, although gravely ill with tuberculosis, forced to find employment as an ironworker in a small town. His wife, a teacher, became an agricultural worker. Jiri Hochman is the author of a satirical novel, Jeleni Brod, which has just been published in Czechoslovakia by Index Publishers of West Germany.

Milan Huebl

Huebl, 45, is a specialist in contemporary history -- particularly that of the socialist states. In this scientific work, he devoted several studies to the problem of the DAV, a group of Slovak progressive intellectuals. In the late fifties and early sixties, he brought attention to himself by demanding the release of the leaders of the Slovak Communist Party who had been arrested and sentenced in 1952 for "bourgeois nationalism" -- among them was Gustav Husak.

A professor at the Advanced School of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, he became its rector in 1967. He was one of Alexander Dubcek's closest associates.

Karel Bartosek

Bartosek, 41, is a historian. He is the son of a working-class family of Skutec (Moravia), a working-class city near Gottwaldow.

In 1948, the son of a militant (his mother was a member of the Communist Party as early as before the war), he entered the university. He then went on to the Institute of Contemporary History, where he specialized in the study of the Second World War. He published his first book in 1959, The Slovak Insurrection.

In the sixties, he worked with Karel Kaplan, director of the Institute, on an analysis of the crimes of the Stalinist period.

He wrote for Literarni Listy and participated from its beginnings in 1963 in the movement of intellectuals against the obscurantism of Novotny. In 1968 he was one of the active members of "Springtime" and wrote for the Reporter. At the time of the invasion, he and others were maintaining the free Czechoslovak

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radio -- thus contributing to resistance against the occupiers. Having resigned from the Czech Communist Party in 1969, he has been without work since June 1970: the Institute of Contemporary History was purely and simply closed.

A Fifty-Year Old Student

At the last meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students, held in Warsaw from 26 to 29 January, the representative of the Czech students was --- 50 years old. This old official of the Stalinist machine was one of the principal figures behind a coup that permitted the Soviet delegation and other delegations closest to the Russians to exclude two students of the National Union of French Students (UNEF) from the IUS congress and to expel them from Poland. These two students, Pierre Nesterenko and Jean-Claude Boksebaum, had recalled the position that their organization took "against intervention by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia" and against governmental repression by Husak for the Brezhnev government.

The Socialism that Husak Condemns

"We are going to begin a new struggle. And your task, my comrades in France and in Europe, is to understand . . . It marks the beginning of a new period of our political history: the struggle of all those exploited by 'socialism' against their exploiters. . .

"Against the bureaucrats who have taken over the national state and its possessions. On the threshold of this new class struggle, we must choose our position carefully.

"We are those who tomorrow will struggle for the power of the workers in the factories, in the cities, and in the country, at all levels of social activity, and thereby for the destruction of the state of the privileged persons who speak of socialism.

"For the moment, we are weak. The best among us are falling without glory today. But there will be revenge!"

K.B. Self-criticism in the blood of
a few comrades. 25 August 1969

"We must unite so that the fifties will not be repeated. The abuse of power and the contempt for the law knows no limits -- reaching the highest officials as well as ordinary citizens, those who are politically committed as well as those who are not.

"We must then build a bulwark against the illegality that has resulted in the political trials."

Karel Kaplan "Machinery for a Trial"
translated in "Politique Aujourd' hui"
September 10 and 12 1970.

"It is very important to begin a new and exhaustive investigation, and in particular, a review of the fundamental conditions for socialism. It seems to me, in fact, that the notorious consequences such as disrespect for the individual, destruction of liberty, consumption of the individual by the masses, the concentration camps, etc., are only just that -- consequences. We will all remain prisoners of the secondary and the superficial as long as we do not

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socialism, that they arise from different concepts of history, of man, of truth. We can summarize all that in these terms: the Czechoslovak experience brings socialism before critical thought and before philosophical reflection on the primordial and the essential."

Karel Kosik
Conversation with Antonin Liehm in
"Three Generations"

"The revolutionary political union of workers and intellectuals must take as its point of departure the fact that this union is based on mutual and bilateral action, on a dialogue. The natural attribute of one and the other, as modern social classes, is the capability for an overall view that goes beyond the partial or the biased. It is, furthermore, a critical spirit that spares nothing, not even itself. One must consider as symptomatic of abnormal circumstances that the intelligensia is forced to convince others of its own importance -- being unable, furthermore, to exercise its normal critical role with society and with itself. The revolutionary ties of workers and intellectuals arise from the fact that the two classes have both brain and hands; that they both work and think: the meaning of their union is to bring innovations to the political level. This undefined political innovation is effected precisely in this association and results from the dialogue, the contact, and the reciprocal influence. The union does not mean then that one class falls in line with another, or that one takes everything from the other. In that case, there would be no union, simply destruction."

Karel Kosik (Ibid.)

The Union of Writers Protests and Calls for Protests

Czechoslovakia has lived for three years under a regime of military occupation.

We all have reason to fear that its leaders, after having so long affirmed their hostility to political trials, are now engaged in a process of repression as brutal as it is cunning, aimed at depriving all intellectuals of their means of subsistence, when it does not deprive them of their liberty.

That is why the Union of Writers, meeting in general assembly, appeals to all democrats to protest vigorously these methods, which are incompatible with true socialism.

7 February 1972

Address signatures to the headquarters of the Union of Writers, 23, rue Gazan, Paris, 14.

POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
10 February 1972

CPYRG

TCHÉCO
SLOVAQUIE

l'heure
des procès

JUSQU'OU

FRONT-ILS ?

« Voici que ça recommence », crie Vercors dans sa Tribune libre du « Monde », devant la vague d'arrestations qui emporte en ce moment dans les prisons de Husak tant de camarades. Et l'auteur du « Silence de la Mer » évoque avec une émouvante tristesse la responsabilité du P.C.F.

On la doit dénoncer, en effet, encore et toujours. Car, objectivement, il a aidé à la normalisation, par ses mensonges, ses demi-mensonges, ses silences. Objectivement il porte et portera la croix des procès qui s'annoncent à Prague et dont la condamnation de Jiri Lederer pour avoir, en 1968, dit de Gomulka mille fois moins que ce qu'en a dit aujourd'hui Gierak, sonne l'ouverture.


« Nous appuyons tout à fait Husak quand il dit qu'il n'y aura pas de procès. Nous sommes résolument opposés aux procès politiques », affirmait Georges Marchais à la télévision et à Europe I en juillet 1970 (l'Humanité 22-7-1970). Husak mentait, il ne pouvait que mentir. La preuve en est aujourd'hui apportée.

Georges Marchais se tait, l'Humanité fait silence. Roland Leroy, secrétaire du P.C.F., le « libéral » du Parti, celui qui répète à tous ceux qui veulent l'entendre sa souffrance devant le retour au stalinisme, Roland Leroy est à Prague, tandis qu'on arrête mes camarades qui furent les siens.

Impuissant ? Sans doute. Mais complice,
comme tant d'autres parce que muet.

Ça recommence : jusqu'où irez-vous cette
fois ? P. N.

CPYRGHT

 La chasse aux sorcières est ouverte en Tchécoslovaquie. Une répression de plus en plus lourde s'abat sur les amis de Dubcek et sur les artisans du « printemps de Prague » qui étaient demeurés dans leur pays occupé par l'Armée rouge pour y mener, avec des moyens de plus en plus faibles, un combat de plus en plus difficile.

Après celles de décembre et celle de janvier (1), la troisième vague d'arrestations, celle du début février, touche des personnalités qui, du fait de leur renom, avaient été jusqu'ici épargnées. C'est ainsi qu'ont été appréhendés les historiens Karel Bartosek et Karel Kaplan, l'ancien secrétaire du Comité du parti communiste de Prague, Jiri Littera, bien connu dans les milieux scientifiques, Jiri Hochman, ancien rédacteur en chef de « Reporter » (l'organe de l'« Union des journalistes tchécoslovaques », interdit en 1969 sur ordre des autorités soviétiques) et un autre journaliste, Wladimir Nepzas.

La police a arrêté, puis relâché, mais maintenu sous surveillance, les philosophes Karel Kosik et Sochar, le juriste Frantisek Chamalik et Richard Slansky. Celui-ci est le fils de l'ancien secrétaire général du P.C. qui fut arrêté en 1952 avec dix autres leaders du P.C., condamné à mort et exécuté après un procès entièrement truqué marqué par des « aveux » dont Arthur London a, dans un livre retentissant, démonté le sinistre mécanisme.

L'ère des « grands procès » contre les opposants va-t-elle s'ouvrir à nouveau ? Déjà le journaliste Jiri Lederer a été condamné par un tribunal de Prague à deux ans de prison pour avoir « diffamé les représentants d'un pays allié », en fait, pour avoir porté contre Gomulka, en avril et mai 1968, dans plusieurs articles du journal de l'Union des Ecrivains,

« Literarni Listy », des critiques qui sont celles que l'on peut entendre aujourd'hui officiellement à Varsovie.

Il n'est pas exclu que les intellectuels et les militants arrêtés récemment ou au début janvier, comme l'ancien recteur de la Haute Ecole Politique du P.C., Martin Huebl, comparaissent en justice sous l'accusation d'avoir rédigé et diffusé, non seulement des « tracts subversifs », mais un journal clandestin d'opposition circulant sous le manteau en Tchécoslovaquie.

Jiri Hochman

44 ans, ancien déporté, fut d'abord menuisier, après la libération en 1945. Ayant terminé l'école économique (niveau bac), il entra comme journaliste à « Obrana Lidu », organe de l'armée, dont il dirigea le service de politique étrangère. A la fin des années 50, il passe au « Rude Pravo », organe central du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, à la rédaction de politique étrangère, puis en 1967 à l'hebdomadaire de l'Union des journalistes tchécoslovaques Reporter. C'est là que, comme rédacteur en chef, il mènera le plus rigoureux des combats pour le Printemps de Prague. Exclu du Parti en 1969, il est, bien que gravement tuberculeux, obligé de travailler comme serrurier dans une petite ville. Sa femme, universitaire, gagne sa vie comme ouvrière agricole. Jiri Hochman est l'auteur d'un roman satirique, « Jeleni Brod », qui vient de sortir en tchèque aux éditions Index en Allemagne fédérale.

Milan Huebl

45 ans, historien, spécialiste de l'Histoire contemporaine, notamment de celle des Etats socialistes. Dans ce travail scientifique, il consacra plusieurs

études au problème du groupe des intellectuels progressistes slovaques DAV et, à la fin des années 50, au début des années 60, il se fit remarquer en réclamant la libération des dirigeants du parti communiste slovaque accusés et condamnés en 1952 pour « nationalisme bourgeois » (dont, notamment, Gustav Husak).

Professeur à l'école supérieure du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, il en devient recteur en 1967. Il fut l'un des très proches collaborateurs d'Alexandre Dubcek.

Karel Bartosek

41 ans. Historien. Fils d'une famille ouvrière de Skuteo (Moravie), cité ouvrière proche de Gottwaldow.

En 1948, comme fils de militant (sa mère était membre du P.C. dès avant la guerre), il entre à l'Université ; puis, à l'Institut d'Histoire contemporaine. Il se spécialise dans l'étude de la seconde guerre mondiale. A ce titre il publie en 1959 un premier livre sur « l'insurrection slovaque ».

Dans les années 1960, il participe avec Karel Kaplan, directeur de cet institut, à l'analyse des crimes de la période stalinienne.

Il collabore à « Literarni Listy » et participe, dès ses débuts, en 1963, au mouvement des intellectuels contre l'obscurantisme de Novotny. En 1968, il est un des membres actifs du « Printemps » et collabore notamment au « Reporter ». Au moment de l'invasion, il assure, avec d'autres, la survie de la radio libre tchécoslovaque, contribuant ainsi à la résistance aux occupants. Démissionnaire du P.C.T. dès 1969, il est sans travail depuis juin 1970 : l'Institut d'Histoire contemporaine a été purement et simplement fermé.

Un étudiant de 50 ans...

Lors de la dernière réunion du Comité Exécutif de l'Union Internationale des Etudiants, qui s'est tenue à Varsovie du 26 au 29 janvier, le représentant des étudiants tchécoslovaques était âgé... de cinquante ans. Ce vieux fonctionnaire de l'appareil stalinien a été l'un des principaux artisans du coup d'Etat qui a permis à la délégation soviéti-

que et aux délégations les plus proches des Russes de faire exclure, d'abord du Congrès de l'U.I.E., puis de faire expulser de Pologne les deux représentants de l'U.N.E.F., Pierre Nesterenko et J.-C. Boksebaum qui avaient rappelé la prise de position de leur organisation « contre l'intervention des armées du parti de Varsovie en Tchécoslovaquie » et contre la répression gouvernementale organisée par Husak pour le compte du gouvernement Brejnev ».

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

le socialisme que husak condamne

« Nous allons donc commencer une nouvelle lutte. Et votre tâche, mes camarades de France et d'Europe, est de la comprendre (...). Elle marque le début d'une nouvelle période de notre histoire politique : la lutte de tous les exploités du « socialisme » contre leurs exploités (...).

Contre les bureaucrates qui se sont appropriés l'Etat national et ses propriétés. Au seuil de ce nouveau combat de classe, il faut savoir choisir où nous situer.

Nous serons ceux qui, demain, lutteront pour le pouvoir des travailleurs dans les usines, dans les villas et les campagnes, à tous les niveaux de l'activité sociale et, du même coup, pour la destruction de l'Etat des nantis qui parlent du socialisme.

Pour le moment, nous sommes faibles, les meilleurs d'entre nous tombent sans gloire aujourd'hui. Mais gare à la revanche ! »

K.B. Autocritique dans le sang de quelques camarades. (25-8-1969.)

« Nous devons nous unir pour que les années 50 ne se répètent pas. L'abus de pouvoir et le mépris des lois ne connaissent pas de limites, atteignent les plus hauts fonctionnaires comme les simples citoyens, les personnes engagées politiquement comme celles qui ne le sont pas.

Il faut donc édifier un rempart contre l'illégalité dont sont issus les procès politiques. »

Karel Kaplan.

« Mécanismes pour un procès »

Traduit dans « Politique Aujourd'hui », 9/10-1970 et 12-1970.

« Il importe d'entreprendre une nouvelle et exhaustive investigation, et, en particulier, il faut repenser les conditions fondamentales du socialisme. Il me semble en effet que des conséquences de notoriété générale telles que l'irrespect envers l'individu, la destruction de la liberté, la digestion de

l'homme par la masse, les camps de concentration, etc., ne sont, précisément, que des conséquences, et que nous demeurerons tous prisonniers du subsidiaire et du superficiel aussi longtemps que nous ne nous rendrons pas compte que le socialisme humaniste jaillit d'autres racines que le socialisme bureaucratique, que l'un et l'autre procèdent de conceptions différentes de l'histoire, de l'homme, de la vérité. Nous pourrions aussi résumer cela en ces termes : l'expérience tchécoslovaque convie le socialisme à une pensée critique, à une méditation philosophique sur le primordial et l'essentiel.

Karel Kosik

Entretien avec Antonin Liehm, dans « Trois générations ».

« L'union politique révolutionnaire des ouvriers et des intellectuels devrait partir du fait qu'elle s'appuie sur une action mutuelle et bilatérale, sur un dialogue. L'attribut naturel des uns et des autres, comme couches sociales modernes, c'est l'aptitude à une vue d'ensemble qui dépasse les aspects partiels ou partiels, c'est, en outre, un esprit critique qui n'épargne rien ni soi-même. Aussi doit-on tenir pour symptomatique de circonstances anormales que l'intelligentsia soit dans l'obligation de convaincre autrui de sa propre importance, ne pouvant, de surcroît, exercer son rôle critique normal envers la société comme envers elle-même. Le lien révolutionnaire des ouvriers et des intellectuels naît de cette donnée que les deux couches ont à la fois cerveau et mains, que toutes deux travaillent et pensent ; le sens de leur union, c'est d'innover sur le terrain politique ; cette nouveauté politique indéfinie se réalise précisément dans cette association et résulte du dialogue, du contact et de l'influence réciproques. L'union ne signifie donc pas qu'une couche s'aligne sur l'autre, que l'une emprunte tout à l'autre ; sinon, il n'y aurait pas d'union, mais simple écrasement. »

Karel Kosik (Ibidem)

CPYRGHT

L'Union des Ecrivains proteste et appelle à protester

... La Tchécoslovaquie vit, depuis trois ans, sous le régime de l'occupation armée.

Nous avons toutes raisons de craindre que ses dirigeants après avoir longtemps affirmé leur hostilité aux procès politiques, ne soient maintenant engagés dans la voie d'une répression aussi brutale que sournoise, qui tend à priver tous les intellectuels de leurs moyens d'existence, quand

elle ne les prive pas de leur liberté.

C'est pourquoi l'Union des Ecrivains, réunie en assemblée générale, appelle tous les démocrates à protester avec éclat contre des procédés incompatibles avec un véritable socialisme.

Le 7 février 1972.

Adresser les signatures au siège de « L'Union des Ecrivains », 23, rue Gazan, Paris-14^e.

POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
17 February 1972

CPYRGHT

THE ANSWER

First in a few lines, then in a long, gray anonymous communique, I had the answer to the question which in this same column last week I directed to the leaders of the PCF [French Communist Party] in general and to Roland Leroy in particular.

In a few lines, first of all, as filler in L'Humanite of Friday, 11 February, just below the news of the arrival of Queen Elizabeth of England in Thailand: "During a brief trip that he made to Czechoslovakia, Comrade Leroy had talks with Comrades Gustav Husak, Secretary-General of the CCP [Czechoslovak Communist Party] and Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP. Comrade Paul Courtieu, member of the Central Committee of the PCF, participated in this fraternal discussion."

How far will they go? I asked. The answer came quickly. While they were throwing into prison my comrades who were his comrades, Roland Leroy was fraternally clinking glasses with their jailers.

The long anonymous communique, for its part, came out on page three of the Paris edition of the L'Humanite of Saturday the 12th, and was rerun that Monday the 14th in the same paper. It explained that the PCF still "disagrees" with (it is now longer a question of censoring) "the military intervention of 21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia," that it was quite right to congratulate itself over the declarations of G. Husak, according to which there would be no "prefabricated political trials" in Czechoslovakia, and that it plans "to develop and strengthen its close cooperation with the CPSU and with all the other Communist Parties," thus with the CCP. And this is why, the communique goes on to specify, Comrade Leroy was clinking glasses with the jailers of my comrades who used to be his comrades. That's how it is.

But then, how is it that, very fraternally, Vasil Bilak himself explained in camera to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the 21st of last October that "at present there are only a few parties which have reservations concerning the current line of our party: above all the Communist parties of Australia, Great Britain, Spain and re certain problems, also the Italian Communist party?" Then, the PCF no longer has any reservations? Who's lying? V. Bilak or the Secretary of the PCF who doesn't even dare sign his communique?

Or, in reading the two texts more closely, should one conclude that it is only the interpretation of the past that still causes differences (friendly) and that the trials which are being prepared against the authors of the Prague Spring will not be considered by the PCF as "prefabricated," but will fall in the category of acts justified in advance in this ambiguous phrase of the anonymous communiqué: (the Party) "has always considered

it the duty of the socialist authorities to protect the new regime against every attempt to cast doubt on it by illegal means, as well as against all external interferences?"

Upon reflection, that's surely it: Husak, in toasting with Roland Leroy the condemnation of my imprisoned comrades who were his comrades, must have explained to him about the interference of our Italian comrade Ochetto and the subversive activities of the old Communist militants Hübl, Hochman, Kaplan, Bartosek, etc. Roland Leroy was convinced. On his return he convinced George Marchais.

We eagerly await the next step: the communique justifying the non-prefabricated trials. Like those of the 1950's. To be added as an annex to the little orange book, a chapter on freedom in the "advanced democracies."

Paul Noirot

POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
17 February 1972

CPYRGHT

la réponse

J'ai eu, d'abord en quelques lignes, puis en un long et gris communiqué anonyme, la réponse à la question que je posais ici même la semaine dernière aux dirigeants du PCF en général, et à Roland Leroy en particulier.

En quelques lignes d'abord, dans les « puces » de *l'Humanité* du vendredi 11 février, juste en dessous de l'annonce de l'arrivée de la reine Elizabeth d'Angleterre en Thaïlande : « Au cours d'un bref séjour qu'il a fait en Tchécoslovaquie, le camarade Leroy a eu un entretien avec les camarades Gustav Husak, secrétaire général du PCT, et Vasil Bilak, membre du Présidium et secrétaire du Comité central du PCT. Le camarade Paul Courtieu, membre du Comité central du PCF, a participé à cet entretien fraternel. »

Jusqu'où iront-ils ? Interrogeai-je. La réponse est venue vite. Tandis qu'on jetait en prison mes camarades qui furent les siens, Roland Leroy trinqua fraternellement avec leurs geôliers.

Le long communiqué anonyme est sorti, lui, en page 3 de l'édition parisienne de *l'Humanité* du samedi 12, et il a été reproduit à nouveau ce lundi 14 dans le même journal. Il explique que le PCF est toujours « en désaccord (ou en désaccord de réprobation) avec « l'interven-

tion militaire du 21 août 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie », qu'il a eu bien raison de se féliciter des déclarations de G. Husak selon lesquelles il n'y aurait pas de « procès politiques préfabriqués » en Tchécoslovaquie, et qu'il entend, dans ce cadre, « développer et renforcer sa coopération étroite avec le PC US, avec tous les autres partis communistes », donc avec le PCT. Et c'est pourquoi, précise encore le communiqué, Roland Leroy a été trinquer avec les geôliers de mes camarades qui furent ses camarades. Dont acte.

Mais alors, comment se fait-il que, très fraternellement, Vasil Bilak lui-même expliquait le 21 octobre dernier devant le Comité central du parti communiste tchécoslovaque réuni à huis clos qu'« il ne reste à présent que quelques partis qui font des réserves à l'égard de la ligne actuelle de notre Parti : il s'agit avant tout des PC d'Australie, de Grande-Bretagne, d'Espagne, et, sur un certain nombre de problèmes, également du PC italien » ? Le PCF ne fait donc plus de réserves ? Qui ment ? V. Bilak ou le secrétariat du PCF, qui n'ose même pas signer son communiqué ?

Où alors, en lisant de près les deux textes, faut-il conclure que seule l'interprétation du passé prête à diverger (amicale), que les

procès qui se préparent contre les inspirateurs du Printemps de Prague ne seront pas jugés par le PCF comme « préfabriqués », mais rentreront dans la catégorie de ces actes justifiés par avance dans cette phrase ambiguë du communiqué anonyme : (le Parti) « a toujours considéré que le pouvoir socialiste a pour devoir de protéger avec rigueur le nouveau régime contre toute tentative de le remettre en cause par des moyens illégaux, de même que contre toute ingérence extérieure » ?

A la réflexion, c'est sûrement cela : Husak, en trinquant avec Roland Leroy à la condamnation de mes camarades emprisonnés qui furent les siens, a dû lui expliquer les ingérences de notre camarade italien Ochetto et les activités subversives des vieux militants communistes Hübl, Hochman, Kaplan, Bartosek, etc. Roland Leroy a été convaincu. En rentrant il a convaincu Georges Marchais.

Attendons avec curiosité la suite, le communiqué justifiant les procès non préfabriqués. Comme dans les années 1950. A joindre, en annexe, au petit livre orange, chapitre sur les libertés dans la société de « démocratie avancée ».

Paul Noirot ■

L'ESPRESSO, Rome
20 February 1972

CPYRGHT

HUEBL'S LETTER TO HUSAK

Prague

Dear Comrade First Secretary, Gustav Husak:

I address myself to you once more in writing, despite the fact that my previous letter of 18 February of this year has remained unanswered. I consider it indispensable to communicate new information to you, so that you cannot say later that you were not told about it.

Since 1 July 1970, that is, from the time when my employment as Rector of the Party Political College came to an end, I have been out of a job. Since then I have received no salary; I cannot receive unemployment benefits, nor have I been allowed the grant from the journalists' fund for which I had asked and to which I was indeed entitled, having been a journalist for many years; in short, I am totally deprived of the means of livelihood.

Moreover, the ten months which I have spent searching for a job have brought no result whatever. Not only have I not been able to find work corresponding to my qualifications as a historian of the modern period, but I have not been able to find a job of any kind, either in Prague or in Bratislava. This was not because people did not want to take me on but because I am on the "black list," and directors of every type of office and factory are afraid -- if they take me on -- of getting involved. They know, in fact, the relevant precedents: they know that the director of an institute who had had hired the former secretary of the Prague Party organization -- and this with the explicit agreement of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPCS -- was later dismissed; and the city committee of the party justified his dismissal by the very fact that he had taken on Bohumil Simon.

I worked in the apparat of the party from 1947, except for period 1964-68. If a private employer behaved in this way toward someone who worked for him for twenty years, he would be justly condemned as asocial. If a French Communist could not find employment in his homeland, the French Communist Party would certainly protest against this method of discriminating against citizens on the basis of their political convictions. And when this kind of thing occurs within a party in power, in a country which in its very name defines itself as socialist, are we to consider it normal, just, natural, and even downright normalized?

Of course, you can cite various declarations by yourself and other representatives of the leadership in which it is affirmed that those who have been expelled from the party also have the right to work corresponding to their qualifications. I personally know hundreds of persons expelled from the party, but there is not even one of them who has been able to find work corresponding to his qualifications -- unless you consider that a job measuring water-levels is appropriate to the qualifications of a /former/ professor of cybernetics. You are deceiving either yourselves or public opinion, domestic and foreign, about the reality of the present situation.

On 1 October last my wife, Eliska Skrenkova, special assistant in the Faculty of Russian Studies at the University of 17 November, was also dismissed. The management of the school had invited her to resign voluntarily, telling her that otherwise she would be dismissed on the ground that she was "unworthy of trust." She replied that, because her salary had been the only means of support for the family since 1 July, she could not agree to resign; and the Rector, Otakar Taufer, then dismissed her without further ado on the ground of being "unworthy of trust." Dismissal for being "unworthy of trust," reserved for those who try to subvert the socialist order (evidently in the case of my wife it is possible to subvert the socialist order by simply teaching Russian) makes it practically impossible to find other work of any kind.

So, at a time when my own prospects of finding employment -- in a situation marked by lay-offs, checks on non-party people, etc. -- are minimal, we find ourselves facing the dismal prospect of being left at the end of the year without the indispensable means for maintaining even minimal living standards. And on top of that we have two sons whom we must not only feed but also educate.

Thus, there has been created an atmosphere in which there is no way out, an atmosphere which has brought more than one to madness. In such a situation it is possible to understand the protest of the poet, Stanislav Neuman, who lost all wish to live when the party trampled underfoot the ideals for which he entered the political struggle; and so he committed suicide.

The men marked down are being destroyed materially and crushed morally. You are tolerating a situation in which -- in violation of the the Constitution -- a section of the public has been arbitrarily deprived of all rights, including that of existence and that of defending one's honor. We are outcasts in this society, and with regard to us everything is permitted. I am not exaggerating; it is literally true.

Recently there was published the Slovak translation of the book, Beware of Zionism!, written by Ivanov, to which Yevgeny Yevseyev has added a note on Czechoslovakia. It came out in an extremely large edition, and is being used as a basis for the preparation of party reports and to illustrate the zionist background of the events of 1968. The work has been produced by the party publish-

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ing house in Bratislava, and Yevseyev's commentary carried by the party journal Vychodoslovenske Noviny (Eastern Slovakian Journal). In this work I am accused of having been one of the leaders of zionist subversion in Czechoslovakia. Last spring I had already been accused by Trencianske Noviny (Trencin Journal) having been nothing less than one of the "heads of the international zionist plot," apparently because I had gone to Trencin to give lectures and not to Tel-Aviv as the guest of Ben Gurion (I may say in passing that these were lectures on the need for a new constitutional set-up in Czechoslovakia and for the return of Husak and others to political life); at the time I let it go, considering it as a clumsy joke that didn't come off.

But since similar absurdities are now being repeated with increasing frequency in ever more important and influential organs, it seems to me that there is no longer anything much to laugh at. This country experienced its first "Dreyfus affair" with the case of Hilsner (he too, like Dreyfus, a Jew, and he too falsely accused). A second "Dreyfus affair" -- but a much more absurd and bloody one was imposed on the country with the trials of Slansky and others. Do you want it to happen a third time, with all the concomitant phenomena of political agony?

The above-mentioned Yevseyev talks about espionage and conspiracy, in a style worthy of a pupil of Beria. He includes me among the members of a zionist club which was allegedly directed by a foreign diplomat named Zucker. It is of course useless to try to defend oneself by objecting that it is hard to believe that an Israeli diplomat could carry on such activity -- and still less direct a club -- in a country which had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel. It would be equally useless to make the objection that in my whole life I have never known anyone called Zucker. Perhaps I shall then have to confute the charge of zionism by demonstrating my -- forgive me -- "pure aryan origin"? For experts of the caliber of Yevseyev, a diaeresis (Umlaut) on the "u", the "a" or the "o" of the name, and even more the fact that one condemns the anti-semitic character of the trials in the 'fifties, constitutes sufficient proof to establish the Jewish origin of the accused. He evidently goes by the principle established by the old anti-semite Lueger: "I decide who is Jewish." What a humiliation for a movement that has had among its ranks Marx, Liebknecht, Luxemburg and Lenin!

At this point I must ask a question: are we to take as still valid the resolution of the 1963 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPCS, in which it was declared that the trials of the 'fifties were falsely rigged and that all the accused were free of guilt? This is certainly not a rhetorical question, now that the Czechoslovak Government weekly Narodni Vybor (National Committees) has published in seven installments a "review" of this Soviet work on zionism. This pamphlet has been published by Narodni Vybor in seven installments, numbers 34 to 40. And you are looking on tranquilly while the party press and the government weekly are preparing an atmosphere suited to a new series of political trials!

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Do you not at least realize that the trial of alleged zionists in the 'fifties was directly linked with the trial of so-called Slovak nationalists? Anyone who knows the way such trials are managed can easily imagine how in an early phase Huebl would be questioned about his relations with Zucker in Kriegel's club. As far as such an interrogation is concerned, the fact that this club did not exist and that I did not know Zucker at all is of no importance. At a later stage, Huebl could be brought to confess having acted as a link with the Slovak conspirators -- for example, Husak's club. In a country which is like one great Dionysian ear competent agents will certainly have documented how often I went to Bratislava, and how I regularly stopped in Ohrancov mieru-Street and then in 4a Ostravska-Street. In addition, they will be able to cite our appearances together on television, our frequent meetings and our common activity in the federative commission.

I am not joking: I just want to impress on you with the greatest seriousness that if you permit this campaign to keep on developing, it will end by forming a tidal wave that will sweep over your heads as well. It is not an accident that the ideologist of the new trials, Lang, is already rebuking you, saying that "with your silence of complicity, holding yourselves neutral between the two sides of the barricade, you seek to hide the more or less important part which you played in the recent events" (Narodni Vyborny, No. 39, p. 11). These circles take the criticisms which you have expressed in Rude Pravo about as seriously as the USA takes the 457th serious warning from China! Through your preceding praise for the activity of the Cechie circle, the ultra-Stalinist club founded after the invasion, you have given your blessing to all this.

If you think I am exaggerating, consider the year that has just passed and draw up a balance-sheet.

When twelve professors were dismissed from the Party Political College in 1964, you described it as an arbitrary act by Novotny, of the most serious kind; but 75 have been dismissed in 1970!

What has happened to your comrades who were imprisoned with you in the 'fifties? All of them who had been rehabilitated again under Novotny are being once more expelled from the Party, with the usual accusations being made against them. Even their children are being expelled from the party.

Where are the members of the commissions who sought to achieve their rehabilitation and yours? Almost without exception, they have all been expelled from the Party and have lost their jobs.

Where are those political figures who worked for your return to political life? They have been excommunicated and deprived of any possibility of political action. Perhaps this has happened in accordance with the law laid down in Machia-

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CPYRGHT

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velli's Prince: "He who helps others to gain power is digging a grave for himself." But Lenin insisted that party leaders should behave loyally toward their comrades.

Where have these men ended up? Who can say?

There is the other side: where are those who falsely accused you, interrogated you, condemned you, imprisoned you, and finally did all they could to prevent your rehabilitation? You know better than anyone what positions they hold today, to what high posts you are often obliged to appoint them.

You are caught in the fatal clasp of your former jailers. Nevertheless, I would like to remind you once more of how -- and it's not so long ago -- you and I found ourselves in agreement with Marx's saying: "A revolution which, like Saturn, devours its own offspring, has taken the wrong road."

LE MONDE, Paris
20-21 February 1972

CPYRGHT

MR. MARCHAIS CHARGES MR. MITTERRAND WITH BECOMING IDENTIFIED
WITH AN ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN

The fate of Czechoslovakia has continued to have an impact on the French left as witness the response, full of bitterness, that the French Communist Party's politburo has sent Francois Mitterrand, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, on this subject. The executive office of this party had issued on 9 February 1972 an appeal condemning the political repression in Czechoslovakia and requesting the authorities of that country to review "their present positions." The national secretariat had then transmitted this appeal to all the organizations of the left so that the latter might become identified with it or might participate in the formulation, in the same spirit, of another protest.

It is in reply to this initiative -- whose authors assert that it was in no way provocative -- that Georges Marchais, deputy secretary general of the PCF [Parti Communiste Francais; French Communist Party], wrote a long letter to Francois Mitterrand in the name of the French CP's politburo, a letter made public on 18 February 1972. Mr Marchais recalls the assurances given by Gustav Husak, secretary general of the Czechoslovak CP, to the delegates of the French CP as regards the absence of political repression in his country

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considers that the initiative of the Socialist Party is "ill-founded and untimely." After enumerating a bill of particulars against the Socialists relating to facts that have nothing to do with present events in Czechoslovakia, Georges Marchais charges Francois Mitterrand and his friends with giving their support to an anti-communist campaign.

The tone of this letter is fairly surprising and it astonished the Socialist leaders who had just read with interest the statement of the French CP's politburo. As Claude Estier, a member of the Socialist Party's national secretariat, noted on Europe 1 television network on Friday, the Socialists had seen in the letter the confirmation of the fact that "the French communist leaders were themselves preoccupied by the situation in Czechoslovakia." Georges Marchais' communication indicates at any rate that they are extremely sensitized to this problem and to its consequences in French domestic policy.

A.L.

CPYRGHT

After rejecting the Socialist protests, Georges Marchais wrote the following in his letter to Francois Mitterrand:

"You claim to be 'desirous of upholding in all places and in all circumstances the right of individuals to criticize and to the free expression of their opinions even though these be contrary to the established order.'

"We note your claim with interest but are obliged to find that your expressed concern has not always been corroborated by facts.

"Accordingly, to restrict ourselves to a timely example, you have not raised a protest against the scandalous decision, taken recently by the Senate of Hamburg, to prohibit members of the German Communist Party from being hired in the civil service, that party still being banned in the German Federal Republic of Willy Brandt.*

"The workers and democrats cannot fail to draw an analogy between the lack of initiative that you often display in the defense of liberties 'in all places and in all circumstances' and the haste that you have evidenced, thanks to our free press, as soon as a socialist country is concerned.

*The KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands; Communist Party of Germany], which in 1951 won only 2.2 percent of the

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"We remind you also that the French communists and other democrats have had to wage on numerous occasions an uphill struggle against the repression of 'Individuals' rights to criticize and to the free expression of their opinions even though these be contrary to the established order,' a repression that was also the result of governments in which men presiding over the destinies of the French Socialist Party today used to participate. This is incidentally why, beyond all polemics, if we ourselves give democratic guaranties in our practice and our proposals for the future, it behooves us to request same from the Socialist Party."

Georges Marchais went on to recall the principles which he holds, specifically the acceptance of criticism and challenge expressed in legal forms. He added:

". . . One cannot help wondering about the significance of an initiative like yours. The latter, by reinforcing a campaign with very evidently anti-communist overtones, cannot but tend to raise new obstacles in the path of unity, to seek new pretexts to delay once again the time for a political agreement taking the form of a joint government program."

ballots and thereby lost all its parliamentary representation, was outlawed by the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe on 17 August 1956. This proscription was never lifted. However, a new legal communist party, which inverted the letters in the old set of initials and is known as the DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei; German Communist Party], was established in Frankfurt on 26 September 1968 under the presidency of Mr Kurt Bachmann. The DKP, forming a single front with various organizations of the German extreme left, obtained at the general elections of 1969, under the banner of the ADF [Action for Progress and Democracy], no more than 0.6 percent of the ballots cast. Its offers of collaboration with the German Social Democratic Party never met with any notable response.

LE MONDE, Paris
20-21 February 1972

CPYRGHT

M. Marchais reproche à M. Mitterrand de s'associer à une campagne anticommuniste

Le sort de la Tchécoslovaquie n'a pas fini de peser sur celui de la gauche française, comme en témoigne la réponse, toute en aigreur, que le bureau politique du parti communiste vient d'adresser à ce sujet à M. François Mitterrand, premier secrétaire du parti socialiste. Le bureau exécutif de cette dernière formation avait lancé le 9 février un appel condamnant la répression politique en Tchécoslovaquie et demandant aux autorités de ce pays de réviser « leurs positions actuelles » ; le secrétariat national avait ensuite transmis cet appel à toutes les organisations de la gauche afin qu'elles s'y associent ou qu'elles y adhèrent. Dans le même esprit, d'un autre côté,

C'est en réponse à cette initiative — dont ses auteurs assurent qu'elle n'avait rien d'une provocation — que M. Georges Marchais, secrétaire général adjoint du P.C.F., a, au nom du bureau politique, écrit une longue lettre à M. François Mitterrand, lettre qui a été rendue publique le 18 février. M. Marchais rappelle les assurances qui ont été données par M. Gustav Husak, secrétaire général du P.C. tchécoslovaque, aux délégués du P.C.F. en ce qui concerne l'absence de répression politique dans son pays (le Monde daté 19 février), et considère que l'initiative du parti socialiste est « mal fondée et inopportune ». Après avoir énu-

mer une mesure avec ce qui se passe en Tchécoslovaquie, M. Marchais reproche à M. Mitterrand et à ses amis d'apporter leur renfort à une campagne anticommuniste. Le ton de cette lettre est assez surprenant, et il a étonné les dirigeants socialistes, qui venaient de lire avec intérêt la déclaration du bureau politique du P.C.F. : ils y avaient vu, comme M. Claude Estier, membre du secrétariat national, l'a noté vendredi à Europe 1, la confirmation du fait que « les dirigeants communistes français étaient eux-mêmes préoccupés par la situation en Tchécoslovaquie ». La lettre de M. Marchais montre en tout cas qu'ils sont extrêmement sensibles aux conséquences de la politique intérieure française. — A. L.

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Après avoir opposé une fin de non-recevoir à la proposition socialiste, M. Marchais écrit : « Vous vous déclarez « soucieux de maintenir en tous lieux et en toutes circonstances le droit des individus à la critique et à la libre expression de leurs opinions, fussent-elles contraires à l'ordre établi ».

» Nous en prenons note avec intérêt, mais force est de constater que ce souci n'est pas toujours corroboré par les faits.

» C'est ainsi que, pour nous limiter à un exemple actuel, vous ne vous êtes pas élevés contre la décision scandaleuse, prise récemment par le Sénat de Hambourg, de refuser l'accès de la fonction publique aux membres du parti communiste allemand, lui-même toujours sous le coup d'une interdiction dans la République fédérale allemande de Willy Brandt (1).

» Les travailleurs et les démocrates ne peuvent manquer de mettre en parallèle l'absence d'initiative dont vous faites souvent preuve s'agissant de la défense des libertés « en tous lieux

» et en toutes circonstances » et l'empressement que vous manifestez, sur la loi d'informations incontrôlées, dès lors qu'il s'agit d'un pays socialiste.

» Nous vous rappelons également que les communistes français et d'autres démocrates ont eu à soutenir à maintes reprises une dure lutte contre la répression du « droit des individus à la critique et à la libre expression de leurs opinions, fussent-elles contraires à l'ordre établi ».

(1) Le parti communiste allemand (K.P.D.) qui, en 1951, n'avait obtenu que 2,2 % des suffrages et perdu de ce fait toute représentation parlementaire, a été interdit par la Cour constitutionnelle de Karlsruhe, le 17 août 1956. Cette mesure n'a jamais été levée, mais un nouveau parti communiste légal intervenant les lettres du sigle, le D.K.P. a été fondé à Francfort le 26 septembre 1968 sous la présidence de M. Kurt Bachmann. Le D.K.P. formant un front commun avec diverses organisations d'extrême gauche n'a obtenu aux élections générales de 1969, sous la bannière de l'A.D.F. (action pour le progrès et la démocratie) que 0,8 % des suffrages exprimés. Ses offres de collaboration avec le parti social-démocrate n'ont jamais trouvé d'écho notable.

répression qui fut aussi le fait de gouvernements auxquels participaient des hommes qui président aujourd'hui aux destinées du parti socialiste. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, au-delà de toute polémique, si nous donnons nous-mêmes des garanties démocratiques dans notre pratique et nos propositions pour l'avenir, nous sommes fondés à en réclamer du parti socialiste.

M Marchais rappelle les principes auxquels il est attaché, notamment l'acceptation de la critique et de la contestation s'exprimant dans les formes légales, et ajoute :

« ... On ne peut que s'interroger sur la signification d'une initiative comme la vôtre. Celle-ci, en apportant renfort à une campagne aux motivations très évidemment anticommunistes, ne peut que tendre à dresser de nouveaux obstacles sur le chemin de l'unité, à rechercher de nouveaux prétextes pour retarder une fois de plus l'heure d'un accord politique prenant la forme d'un programme commun de gouvernement. »

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
18 January 1972

CPYRGHT

PRAGUE REGIME SUPPRESSES ALL OPPOSITION

At official gatherings in Prague the consolidation process in Czechoslovakia is described as "already completed." This seems to be as much a part of the communist propaganda's world of lies as is Husak's assertion that there have been no political trials in his country since 1968. Last weekend the Czechoslovak regime found itself obliged to admit officially that some 150 people had been imprisoned in a wave of arrests during the last few days. Among those arrested were Huebel, former director of the party academy, Pachman, former world chess champion, and Kynzl, the well-known journalist. They were all accused of having engaged in anti-government activity. At the same time Czechoslovak Prime Minister Korcak in a speech to factory workers in Prague issued a warning to all those seeking to disturb relations with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

Thus, after three and a half years of Soviet occupation, the situation in Czechoslovakia can not yet be regarded as consolidated, since the government is still forced to maintain peace and order by intimidating the people with periodic mass arrests. Several actions of this kind were carried out in the second half of last year alone, and arrests have for years been part of the daily fare in this country under the yoke of the Soviet Union. Thus last May about 2000 people were arrested in Moravia. At that time Nova Svoboda, organ of the North Moravian communist party praised the "good cooperation" between people and police in this action carried out against "parasites."

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In previous cases the trials were either secret or semi-secret. Thus last July for example, Professor Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav Cerensky and his wife Dr Edita Cerenska, Dr Hubert Stein and Mrs Milada Kubjasova, all recognized scientists and journalists, were put on trial and accused of "subversive activity." The notorious trial ended with their being sentenced to long prison terms of between two and 12 years. Even Pavel Licko, the prominent Slovak writer, was sentenced at a secret trial by a Prague court at the end of August. Other long-term prison sentences were also meted out to well-known writers and journalists like Vladimir Skutina, Vladimir Vavra, Arnost Vrajik-Prazak, and Vladimir Burda.

Intimidation

On 8 October 1971 the regime had the federal parliament pass a new law on safeguarding state secrets and security. This was done to assure it legally a free hand in carrying out terror tactics and to have a two-fold deterrent effect by intensifying police methods. The terror trials carried out on the basis of the new law are intended to demonstrate not only the regime's power to arrest anyone and send him to jail, but are also supposed to intimidate those who still dare to maintain contacts with foreigners or even make the slightest criticism of the system.

It is certainly conceivable that the present wave of arrests is related to the summit conference of Warsaw Pact states to take place at the end of the month in Prague, and that the arrests are supposed to prevent possible anti-Soviet demonstrations. Often before, Husak has tried to muzzle his potential opponents by terroristic means prior to important events. His purpose was to let the opposition elements understand that those who do not submit to the goals of the Soviet rulers will sooner or later have to reckon with political removal and punishment.

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
18 January 1972

CPYRGHT

Neue Verhaftungswelle in der CSSR

Prager Regime unterdrückt jede Opposition

Von unserem Osteuropa-Korrespondenten

tmf. Der bei offiziellen Anlässen in Prag stets als «bereits abgeschlossen» bezeichnete Konsolidierungsprozess in der Tschechoslowakei scheint ebenso in die Lügenwelt der kommunistischen Propaganda zu gehören wie die Behauptung Husaks, dass es in seinem Land seit 1968 keine politischen Prozesse gegeben hätte. Am vergangenen Wochenende sah sich das tschechoslowakische Regime gezwungen, nun auch offiziell einzugestehen, dass im Laufe einer Verhaftungswelle in den letzten Tagen

wieder 150 Personen, darunter der frühere Leiter der Partei-Akademie, Hübel, der ehemalige Schachweltmeister Pachman und der bekannte Journalist Kynzl festgenommen wurden. Sie alle wurden oppositioneller Tätigkeit beschuldigt. Gleichzeitig warnte der tschechoslowakische Ministerpräsident Koreak in einer Rede vor Fabrikarbeitern in Prag alle jene Personen, die die Beziehungen zu sozialistischen Ländern, insbesondere zu der Sowjetunion, stören wollen.

Von einer Konsolidierung der Lage in der Tschechoslowakei kann also nach dreieinhalb Jahren sowjetischer Besetzung noch immer nicht die Rede sein, da die Regierung nach wie vor gezwungen ist, die Bevölkerung durch periodische Massenverhaftungen einzuschüchtern, um Ruhe und Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten. Allein in der zweiten Hälfte des vergangenen Jahres wurden mehrere derartige Aktionen durchgeführt, und Verhaftungen stehen seit Jahren auf der Tagesordnung in diesem von der Sowjetunion unterjochten Land. So wurden zum Beispiel im Juli letzten Jahres in Mähren rund 2000 Personen verhaftet. Das Organ der nordmährischen KP «Nova Svoboda» lobte damals die «gute Zusammenarbeit» zwischen der Bevölkerung und der Polizei bei diesen gegen «Schmarotzer» durchgeführten Aktionen.

Im August folgte eine weitere Verhaftungswelle, bei der laut offiziellen tschechoslowakischen Meldungen in insgesamt 4000 Fällen Hausdurchsuchungen durchgeführt und 178 Personen festgenommen wurden. Im November, kurz vor den sogenannten «Wahlen», versuchte das Regime, die Opposition durch ähnliche Aktionen einzuschüchtern, denen unter anderem der international anerkannte Historiker Jan Tesar, der angesehene Philosoph Ladislav Hedjanek und der Historiker Batek zum Opfer fielen, die bereits 1969 mehrere Monate im Gefängnis verbringen mussten.

Zur gleichen Zeit führte das Regime auch mehrere Terrorprozesse durch, in denen vor allem intellektuelle drakonische Strafen erhielten. Es handelte sich dabei jeweils um geheime oder halbgeheime Verfahren. So wurden zum Beispiel im Juli Professor Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav Cernsky und seine Frau Dr. Edita Cernska, Dr. Hubert Stein und Frau Milada Kubjasova — alles anerkannte Wissenschaftler und Journalisten — vor Gericht gestellt und der «Wahlarbeit gegen die Republik» beschuldigt. Der berüchtigte Prozess endete mit

ihrer Verurteilung zu langjährigen Kerkerstrafen zwischen zwei und zwölf Jahren. Auch der prominente slowakische Schriftsteller Pavel Licko wurde in einem Geheimprozess von einem Prager Gericht Ende August verurteilt. Weitere langjährige Kerkerstrafen erhielten unter anderem bekannte Schriftsteller und Journalisten wie Vladimir Skutina, Vladimir Vavra, Arnost Vrajik-Prazak und Vladimir Burda.

Einschüchterung

Am 8. Oktober 1971 liess das Regime vom Bundesparlament ein neues Gesetz über den Schutz von Staatsgeheimnissen und Staatssicherheit verabschieden, um sich auch gesetzlich eine freiere Hand zur Ausübung des Terrors zu sichern und durch Verschärfung der Polizeimethoden eine doppelte Abschreckungswirkung erzielen zu können. Die aufgrund des neuen Gesetzes durchgeführten Terrorprozesse sollen nicht nur die Macht des Regimes demonstrieren, jedermann verhaften und ins Gefängnis bringen können, sondern auch jene Personen einschüchtern, die immer noch wagen, Kontakte mit Ausländern zu pflegen oder auch nur die leiseste Kritik an dem System zu üben.

Es ist durchaus nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die gegenwärtige Verhaftungswelle mit der Ende dieses Monats in Prag stattfindenden Gipfelkonferenz der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten im Zusammenhang steht und mögliche antisowjetische Kundgebungen verhindern soll. Husak hat bereits des öfteren vor wichtigen Ereignissen versucht, seine potentiellen Gegner durch Terrormassnahmen mundtot zu machen, um den oppositionellen Elementen zu verstehen zu geben, dass jene, die sich den Zielen der sowjetischen Machthaber nicht unterwerfen, früher oder später mit ihrer politischen Beseitigung und Bestrafung rechnen müssen.

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
 12 February 1972

CPYRGHT

WAVES OF ARRESTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Arrests, trials and convictions of prominent supporters of the Prague Spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia have recently been on such a scale as to show that the settlement with the reformers is by no means completed. The most recent developments contradict Husak's statements following the "elections" of last November, when he took the more than 99 percent "vote of confidence" by the people as an occasion to announce a "more conciliatory course." The recent events also expose once and for all the party chief's earlier assurances that he wants no political trials as a mere formality. Although the trials are no longer based on false statements, political views are established through extensive interpretation of extremely vague paragraphs. The sharper course meets with the tendency discernible in almost the entire East bloc, of associating the policy of relaxation of tension with the West with internal tightening. But it also signifies an admission by the present authorities that the people have not lost their sympathy for the efforts toward reform.

The Prague Spring as Ghost

At the end of last year, the organ of the Central Committee of the party, Tribuna, published two articles announcing extensive ideological efforts to fight the "rightists." Here Jan Fojtik, Secretary of the Central Committee, stated that opportunism wanted to raise "petty bourgeois ideas" -- a label for the reformist ideas -- to the level of general public opinion, and Bohuslav Kucera, chief of the socialist satellite party, stated at the same time that memories of the past were still relatively alive among the people. The influence of the "rightists" had been too strong in 1968 to justify an assertion today that a sufficient level of ideological-political unity has already been reached. The election results of November, publicly acclaimed at the time as proof the "unity" of the party and people, are again made relative. Hence Kucera writes that representatives of the right had also voted for the party for opportunistic reasons, just to discredit the vote.

A first wave of arrests in November could be explained as a measure in connection with the elections. According to reports from Czechoslovak underground publications, 95 persons were arrested at that time, among them the former party secretary from Brno, Jaroslav Sabata, and student leader Jiri Mueller, who had already been expelled from the party in 1966, for criticism of Novotny. Most of the arrested persons were accused of distributing handbills. The action by the security organs at that time was officially confirmed at the beginning of this year.

Fear of Emigres

A second wave of arrests followed around the beginning of the year. The arrested were again accused of producing and distributing hostile handbills, but also of other "actions hostile to the state," such as the formation of anti-regime groups, and the intention of disturbing the process of consolidation in the country. The arrest of Italian television journalist Valerio Ochetto is also seen in connection with the arrests of that time. Ochetto is still in custody. He is accused of the illegal import and export of certain publications, and it is intimated that he acted as a liason between the supporters of the reform in Prague and the groups of exiles in Rome around Jiri Pelikan, former head of Prague television. Among the Czechoslovak personalities arrested around the same time, who are accused of activity hostile to the state and of connections with both emigre circles and hostile foreign organizations, are Milan Huebl, former rector of the party university, and chess champion Ludvik Pachmann, former radio journalist Karel Kyncl, and Jan Sling, son of Ota Sling, who was hanged following the Slansky trial, all of whom had been arrested at other times before.

In recent weeks and days, other personalities have been arrested, including former Prague party secretary Jiri Littera, historian Karel Kaplan, philosopher Karel Kosik, the painter Hegr, journalists Vladimir Nepras and Jiri Lederer, and Rudolf Slansky,

son of former party secretary Slansky. Some of these people, like Kosik, Slansky and Hegr, have in the meantime been released, according to reports from the French news agency.

But the conviction of Jiri Lederer a week ago has left more of an impression, because he was sentenced to 2 years in prison for critical statements about Gomulka's policy -- statements which he made 4 years ago and which have been repeated officially by Gierek himself in the meantime. The fact that he was nevertheless convicted after so long a time for "insulting an allied nation," makes Pelikan's fears seem justified, that more political trials will follow in Czechoslovakia, which are supposed to prove the existence of an alleged "second center" in the party, and thus hit the "Prague Spring." Pelikan also finds undeniable parallels in current events with the trials of the 1950's, from which Husak, himself a victim at that time, continually dissociates himself verbally.

Dangerous Theater

Prague, 10 February. Eight members of the former "Waterloo" theater group from Ostrava have been sentenced by the court of this city to 3 to 20-month prison sentences for "grossly distorting" the play Der Sohn des Regiments [Son of the Regiment] by Soviet author Valentin Katayev, and hence for defaming "a state of the communist world system." According to reports in the organ of the Communist Party of Northern Moravia, Nova Svoboda, three of the sentences were conditional.

The group had produced the play in May 1969 and had, according to Nova Svoboda, changed the entire dialogue "into a parody, in order to make light of the heroic struggle of the Soviet army during World War II." The eight defendants were also accused of other offenses, particularly of taking part in a meeting held by the journalists from the revue Tramp, in October 1970. There resulted anti-communist provocations against the allies of Czechoslovakia, especially against the USSR.

Strong Criticism of Prague from Italian Communists

Rome, 11 February. The Italian communists' weekly, Rinascita, Thursday branded the most recent arrests of intellectuals and journalists in Czechoslovakia, among them also a reporter from Italian television, with the title "More Bad News from Prague." The path taken in August 1968 had not only solved no problems, it said in the article, but had created new ones. The Italian communists dissociated themselves from the campaign, which was being organized by the class enemies, in order to undermine socialism.

Verhaftungswellen in der Tschechoslowakei

Drohende Prozesse

Von unserem Korrespondenten

Wk. Wien, 10. Februar

CPYRGHT

Verhaftungen, Prozesse und Verurteilungen prominenter Anhänger des Prager Frühlings von 1968 haben in der Tschechoslowakei in letzter Zeit ein Ausmaß angenommen, das zeigt, daß die Abrechnung mit den Reformern noch keineswegs abgeschlossen ist. Die neueste Entwicklung widerspricht Äußerungen Husaks nach den «Wahlen» im vergangenen November, als er den über 99prozentigen «Vertrauensbeweis» der Bevölkerung zum Anlaß nahm, einen «versöhnlicheren» Kurs anzukündigen. Die jüngsten Vorgänge entblößen auch endgültig die früheren Zusicherungen des Parteichefs, daß er keine politischen Prozesse durchführen wolle, als bloßen Formalismus. Die Prozesse stützen sich zwar nicht mehr auf falsche Aussagen, führen aber die politischen Absichten auf dem Wege über die extensive Auslegung äußerst vager Paragraphen ein. Der verschärfte Kurs kommt der fast im ganzen Ostblock spürbaren Tendenz entgegen, die Entspannungspolitik gegenüber dem Westen mit einer internen Strafung zu verbinden. Er bedeutet aber auch ein Eingeständnis der heutigen Machthaber, daß die Bevölkerung ihre Sympathien für die Reformbestrebungen nicht verloren hat.

Prager Frühling als Gespenst

Ende des vergangenen Jahres kündigte das Organ des Zentralkomitees der Partei, «Tribuna», in zwei Artikeln größere ideologische Anstrengungen an, um die «Rechte» zu bekämpfen. Dabei erklärte Jan Fojtik, Sekretär des Zentralkomitees, daß der Opportunismus «kleinbürgerliche Vorstellungen» — ein Etikett für die reformerischen Vorstellungen — zur allgemeingültigen öffentlichen Meinung erheben wolle, und Bogoslav Kucera, Chef der sozialistischen Satelliten-Partei, erklärte gleichzeitig, die Erinnerungen an die Vergangenheit seien in der Bevölkerung immer noch verhältnismäßig lebendig. Der Einfluß der «Rechten» sei 1968 zu stark gewesen, als daß man heute behaupten könnte, man habe bereits einen genügenden Grad von ideologisch-politischer Einheit erreicht. Das Wahlergebnis vom November, damals laut als Beweis der «Einheit» von Partei und Volk gepriesen, wird nun wieder relativiert. So schreibt Kucera, es hätten auch Vertreter der Rechten aus Opportunitätsgründen für die Partei gestimmt, gerade um den Wert der Abstimmung herabzusetzen.

Eine erste Verhaftungswelle im November konnte noch als Maßnahme im Zusammenhang

mit den Wahlen erklärt werden. Nach Angaben aus tschechoslowakischen Untergrundpublikationen waren damals 95 Personen verhaftet worden, darunter der frühere Parteisekretär von Brünn, Jaroslav Sabata, und der Studentenfürher Jiri Müller, der schon 1966 wegen Kritik an Novotny aus der Partei ausgeschlossen worden war. Den meisten Verhafteten wurde Verbreitung von Flugblättern vorgeworfen. Die damalige Aktion der Sicherheitsorgane ist zu Beginn dieses Jahres offiziell bestätigt worden.

Angst vor Emigranten

Eine zweite Verhaftungswelle folgte um die Jahreswende. Wieder wurde den Betroffenen die Herstellung und Verbreitung feindlicher Flugblätter vorgeworfen, aber auch andere «staatsfeindliche Aktionen», wie die Bildung regimegegnerischer Gruppen und die Absicht, den Konsolidierungsprozeß im Lande zu stören. Im Zusammenhang mit den damaligen Verhaftungen sieht man auch die Festnahme des italienischen Fernsehjournalisten Valerio Ochetto anfangs Januar. Ochetto ist immer noch in Haft. Es wird ihm die illegale Ein- und Ausfuhr gewisser Schriften vorgeworfen und angedeutet, daß er als Verbindungsmann zwischen den Reformanhängern in Prag und den exilierten Kreisen in Rom um Jiri Pelikan, den früheren Chef des Prager Fernsehens, gedient habe. Zu den ungefähr gleichzeitig verhafteten tschechoslowakischen Persönlichkeiten, denen staatsfeindliche Tätigkeit und Verbindungen zu emigrierten Kreisen wie auch feindlichen ausländischen Organisationen vorgeworfen wurde, gehören Milan Hübl, ehemaliger Rektor der Parteihochschule, der bereits früher verschiedentlich verhaftete Schachmeister Ludwik Pachmann, der ehemalige Radiojournalist Karel Kyncl und Jan Sling, Sohn des nach dem Slansky-Prozeß gehängten Ota Sling.

In den letzten Wochen und Tagen sind weitere Persönlichkeiten festgenommen worden, darunter der frühere Prager Parteisekretär Jiri Littera, der Historiker Karel Kaplan, der Philosoph Karel Kosik, der Maler Hegr, die Journalisten Vladimir Nepras und Jiri Lederer sowie Rudolf Slansky, der Sohn des früheren Parteisekretärs Slansky. Einzelne dieser Persönlichkeiten wie Kosik, Slansky und Hegr sind inzwischen, nach Meldungen der französischen Nachrichtenagentur, wieder freigelassen worden.

Bedeutend mehr Eindruck hat aber die Verurteilung Jiri Lederers vor einer Woche hinterlassen, weil ihm die zweijährige Gefängnisstrafe wegen kritischer Äußerungen über die Politik Gomulkas auferlegt wurde — Äußerungen, die er vor vier Jahren getan hat und die inzwischen

von *Gierek* selber offiziell wiederholt worden sind. Daß er nach so langer Zeit dennoch wegen «Beleidigung einer befreundeten Nation» verurteilt wird, läßt die Befürchtungen Pelikans berechtigt erscheinen, daß in der Tschechoslowakei *weitere politische Prozesse* folgen würden, die das Bestehen eines angeblichen «zweiten Zentrums» in der Partei beweisen und damit den «Prager Frühling» treffen sollen. Pelikan findet im gegenwärtigen Vorgehen auch unüberschbare *Parallelen zu den Prozessen der fünfziger Jahre*, von denen sich Husak, selber ein Opfer jener Zeit, verbal immer wieder distanziert.

Gefährliches Theater

Prag, 10. Febr. (apf) Acht Mitglieder der ehemaligen Theatergruppe «Waterloo» von Ostrava sind vom Gericht dieser Stadt zu 3- bis 20monatigen Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt worden, weil sie das Stück «*Der Sohn des Regiments*» des sowjetischen Autors *Valentin Katajew* «grob entstellten» und dadurch «einen Staat des kommunistischen Weltsystems» diffamiert hätten. Drei der Strafen wurden nach Angaben des Organs der KP Nordmährens, «*Nova Svoboda*», bedingt ausgesprochen.

Die Gruppe hatte das Werk im Mai 1969 durchgeführt und dabei laut «*Nova Svoboda*» sämtliche Dialoge «in eine Parodie umgewandelt, um den heroischen Kampf der sowjetischen Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg zu bagatellisieren». Den acht Angeklagten wurden noch weitere Vergehen vorgeworfen, vor allem, daß sie im Oktober 1970 an einem von den Journalisten der Revue «*Tramp*» veranstalteten Treffen teilgenommen hätten. Dabei sei es zur *antikommunistischen Provokation* gegen die Verbündeten der Tschechoslowakei gekommen, vor allem gegen die UdSSR.

Heftige Kritik der italienischen Kommunisten an Prag

Rom, 11. Febr. (apf) Die Wochenzeitschrift der italienischen Kommunisten, «*Rinascita*», hat am Donnerstag unter dem Titel «*Neue Hiobsbotschaften aus Prag*» die jüngsten Verhaftungen von Intellektuellen und Journalisten in der Tschechoslowakei, darunter auch ein Reporter des italienischen Fernsehens, gebrandmarkt. Der im August 1968 eingeschlagene Weg habe nicht nur keine Probleme gelöst, sondern neue geschaffen, heißt es in dem Artikel. Die italienischen Kommunisten distanzieren sich von der Kampagne, welche die *Klassenfeinde* organisierten, um den Sozialismus zu untergraben.

THE ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT, London
 17 February 1972

CPYRGHT

Prague's fear of detente

The Czech government is cracking down hard on the vestigial elements of Dubcekism because it fears that the Soviet moves for east-west detente may reactivate liberal forces in Czechoslovakia. That this is the basic explanation of the current wave of repression by the Husak regime has been made clear by recent official (and quasi-official) statements from Prague. But a number of other interesting aspects of the present crisis have come to light

On 10 February the party organ, *Rude Pravo*, vehemently attacked western interpretations of east-west co-operation and European security, particularly the Nato view that 'relaxation of tension' should lead to a free flow of information and ideas between east and west. The paper's criticism was also directed at 'certain circles of the west German Social Democrats'. The theory of the 'free flow of ideas' was depicted as a Trojan horse ploy by western diplomats, to weaken the structure of the east European countries and to create new tensions in Europe.

This unusually sharp attack, together with other developments in Czechoslovakia, does a lot to clear up the 'mystery' of the recent arrests. The simple theory that the Husak regime is still taking revenge against those responsible for the 'spring of 1968' is hardly tenable. The arrests must be seen in the context of other developments; further (which is not fully appreciated in the west), the repressive policy has in fact been in operation since last autumn, and has had several significant aspects. Specifically:

(i) **The 'cat-and-mouse' tactics.** So far, about 200 persons have been detained in four waves of arrests between the beginning of November and the first days of this month. Almost all of those rounded up have had certain common characteristics: they are committed marxist intellectuals who were expelled from the party before or during the purge of 1969-1970. Only a few have been put on trial - among them the well-known journalist, **Jiri Lederer**, who got a two-year prison sentence; some have been released while other prominent figures were being rounded up. This cat-and-mouse policy suggests that there will not be mass political trials. At the moment, the primary

political unrest.

The grotesque character of the charges levelled against those already on trial to some extent bears this out. Lederer was sentenced for an article written almost four years ago criticising the then Polish party leader, Mr Gomulka. The fact that Gomulka was overthrown in December, 1970, and that Lederer's views of him are now the official line in Warsaw, made no difference at all. Eight actors were given prison terms ranging from three to 20 months for 'a crude misrepresentation' of a play by a Soviet author, Valentin Katajev.

(ii) **Control of the border guards.** On 22 December a bill was approved by the federal assembly transferring control of the border guards from the ministry of defence to the ministry of the interior. This step clearly indicates the growing power of the state security apparatus. Most significant, however, is the official justification of this measure. 'Czechoslovakia's western borders', wrote *Rude Pravo*, 'require tightened security, because of developments in the international and military-political sphere'.

In the supposed atmosphere of budding detente, this reasoning might sound odd; in fact, it is another aspect of the theory that 'the free flow of ideas between east and west' is dangerous.

(iii) **The advance of the hardliners.** The changes which took place in the state and party organs last December were significant. One of the top hardliners, **Alois Indra**, resigned his position in the party secretariat to become president of the national assembly. The fact that Indra's successors in the secretariat, **Frantisek Ondrich** and **Vaclav Svoboda**, are both diehard apparatchiks from the Novotny era dispels any illusion that the shifting of Indra might lessen the hardliners' influence. If anything, the opposite is true: the hardliners have maintained (or increased) their ascendancy in both the secretariat and the national assembly.

They also secured an important position in the government through the appointment of **Bohuslav Chnoupek** as foreign minister. Chnoupek, a former newspaper correspondent in Moscow, has long been a favourite of the Russians. Before the Soviet invasion in 1968 he signed a petition requesting military intervention, and it is said that the Russians were keen to have him appointed Minister of the Interior, in succession to Josef Pavel, a Dubcekite.

Two conclusions emerge from these developments. First, the image of Husak as a moderate trying to keep the hardliners at bay has lost much of its credibility; Husak's attitude and that of the more identified hardliners are now almost indistinguishable. Second, the hardening attitude of the Prague regime almost certainly reflects the increasing rigidity of the Russians towards the conditions governing east-west detente.

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
25 February 1972

CPYRGHT

The French Left Quarrels

CONTROVERSARY ON THE WAVE OF ARRESTS IN PRAGUE

By our Paris correspondent Men Dosch

Paris. The internal split in the French Left does not solely manifest itself in the debate over which is the proper road toward socialism. To be sure, it is above all, and quite naturally so, the difference of opinion regarding France's future under a socialist regime which have up to now thwarted all efforts towards agreement and a unified program of government. But since the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia, there exists for the French Left an additional bone of contention.

These days the old quarrel between socialist and communists has flared up anew. The socialists, under the leadership of Francois Mitterand, directed an appeal to the regime in Prague in which they condemned the renewed repression in Czechoslovakia. The same letter was sent to all parties and groups of the French Left with the request to join in with the socialists and draft, united, a letter of protest. The request of the socialists was squarely refused by the communists. The very tone of the reply published in the newspapers seems to indicate that here a sore point has evidently been touched. It is true that right after the entrance of the Warsaw Pact forces, the French Communist Party dared condemn the intervention. But since then it has taken the position that the events in Czechoslovakia are the internal affair of a fraternal party. In the reply to the socialists, Georges Marchais, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, quotes assurances by Gustav Husak to the French communists who recently visited Prague, assurances which should dispel any worries about a growing repression. To Marchais the initiative of Mitterand and his socialist friends is nothing more than part of an anti-communist campaign.

This new socialist-communist controversy, as inconsequential as it may appear, is nevertheless symptomatic of the difficult situation in which the French communists find themselves. On the one hand, one discerns time and again the aspiration to appear to the French voters as a French communist party, an indigenous version of communism. On the other hand, there is the necessity of coordinating one's own policies with those of a Moscow-dominated international communism. A few days ago, central committee member Jaques Duclos was awarded the Order of Lenin in Moscow. On that occasion, Duclos declared all anti-communism to be inextricably bound up with a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union. This clearly partisan attitude draws the French communists again into an atmosphere of bondage to Moscow, a fact which repels patriotic Frenchmen who are also opposed to the government and, at the same time, drives large portions of the Marxist, Maoist young left into isolation or into the arms of the socialists. Finally, there is the need to make some kind of an arrangement with the socialists, for only they can be considered as partners in a coalition; without this partner the possibility of a "people's front" recedes far far into the distance.

Mitterand and his friends obviously hold the advantage in this matter. They can draw upon a wide spectrum of non-communist parties and groups for a partner; to them, in turn, Mitterand and his Socialist Party are the more attractive the greater the differences between the socialists and the communists are.

BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
25 February 1972

Frankreichs Linke streitet sich

CPYRGHT

Kontroverse um die Prager Verhaftungswelle

Von unserem Pariser Korrespondenten Men Dosch

Paris. Die innere Zerrissenheit der französischen Linken erschöpft sich nicht nur in Fragen über den «rechten Weg» zum Sozialismus. Gewiss sind es naturgemäss vor allem die Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die Zukunft Frankreichs unter einer sozialistischen Regierung, die bisher alle Einigungsbestrebungen und ein gemeinsames Regierungsprogramm vereitelt haben. Seit dem Einmarsch der Warschau-Pakt-Truppen in die Tschechoslowakei indessen, gibt es für die französische Linke einen zusätzlichen Streitpunkt.

Dieser Tage flammte der alte Streit zwischen Sozialisten und Kommunisten wieder auf. Die Sozialisten mit François Mitterrand an der Spitze richteten einen Appell an die Führung in Prag, in welchem sie die neuerliche Repression in der Tschechoslowakei verurteilen. Der gleiche Brief wurde an alle Parteien und Gruppen der französischen Linken abgesandt mit der Bitte, sich den Sozialisten anzuschliessen und ein gemeinsames Protestschreiben zu verfassen.

Das Ansinnen der Sozialisten wurde von den Kommunisten rundweg abgelehnt. Der Ton, des in den Zeitungen publizierten Antwortschreibens lässt zudem vermuten, dass hier offensichtlich ein wunder Punkt gestreift worden ist. Die französische KP hat es zwar unmittelbar nach dem Einmarsch der Warschau-Pakt-Mächte gewagt, die Intervention zu verurteilen. Seither aber stellt sie sich auf den Standpunkt, die Ereignisse in der CSSR seien eine innere Angelegenheit einer Bruderpartei. In der Antwort an die Sozialisten beruft sich der kommunistische Generalsekretär Georges Marchais auf Zusagen Gustav Husaks an französische Kommunisten, die kürzlich in Prag weilten, Zusagen, die allfällige Besorgnisse über eine zunehmende Repression vertreiben

sollten. Für Marchais ist die Initiative Mitterrands und seiner sozialistischen Freunde nichts anderes als ein Teil einer antikommunistischen Kampagne.

Diese neue sozialistisch-kommunistische Kontroverse, so nebensächlich sie erscheinen mag, ist doch symptomatisch für die schwierige Situation, in der sich die französischen Kommunisten befinden. Einerseits erkennt man immer wieder das Bestreben, sich den französischen Wählern als französische KP, als autochthone Version des Kommunismus zu präsentieren. Auf der andern Seite steht die Notwendigkeit, die eigene Politik mit jener des von Moskau dominierten internationalen Kommunismus zu koordinieren. Vor wenigen Tagen wurde das ZK-Mitglied Jaques Duclos in Moskau mit dem Lenin-Orden ausgezeichnet. Duclos erklärte bei dieser Gelegenheit, jeder Antikommunismus sei untrennbar verbunden mit einer feindseligen Haltung gegenüber der Sowjetunion. Diese klare Parteinahme wiederum bringt die französischen Kommunisten in den Geschmack der Moskau-Hörigkeit, eine Tatsache, die national gesinnte, aber regierungsfeindliche Franzosen abstösst, und zugleich weite Teile der marxistischen, maoistischen jungen Linken in die Abkapselung oder in die Arme der Sozialisten treibt. Zu all dem kommt die Notwendigkeit, sich mit den Sozialisten gleichwohl auf irgendwelche Art zu arrangieren, denn nur sie kommen als Koalitionspartner in Frage; ohne diesen Partner rückt eine «Volksfront» in Frankreich in eine unsichtbare Ferne.

Mitterrand und seine Freunde sitzen da offensichtlich am längeren Hebelarm. Für sie kommen neben den Kommunisten ein breites Spektrum nicht-kommunistischer Parteien und Truppen als Partner in Frage, für die Mitterrand und seine sozialistische Partei um so attraktiver ist, je grösser die sozialistisch-kommunistischen Differenzen sind.

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NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
10 février 1972

REVUE DES LIVRES
par I.F. STONE

Let History Judge
par Roy A. Medveded
Knopf, 584 p., 12,50 dollars

L'EXPLOITATION ABUSIVE

DE LA PSYCHIATRIE

A Question of Madness
par Zhores et Roy Medveded
Knopf, 223 p., 5,95 dollars

par I. F. STONE

A Chronicle of Current Events

Journal du mouvement pour les droits
de l'homme en Union soviétique publié
bi-mensuellement dans Samizdat de
Moscou, Nos 16 à 21, reproduit en version
anglaise par Amnesty International
Publications, Turnagain Lane, Farringdon
Street, London E.C.4, England, 10,00 dollars par an

"La lutte capitale, à mon sens, est la
lutte contre la peur -- la peur qui s'est
emparée des hommes depuis l'époque de
Staline et qui les étreint toujours,
permettant ainsi à ce système de survivre.
Vladimir Bukovsky

Les voix de l'opposition qui filtrent jusqu'à nous à travers les frontières de l'Union soviétique doivent éveiller à l'Ouest un double intérêt. Elles constituent les prémices d'une lutte qui tend à réaliser une synthèse du socialisme et de la liberté. Elles sont aussi un avertissement sur ce qui peut survenir ailleurs. Car ce qui dresse les non-conformistes du bloc soviétique contre le régime, c'est plus que le reflet du retard pris par la Russie et de la dégénérescence du marxisme.

Les habitudes et la mentalité inséparables de la bureaucratie et de la police politique secrète sont des phénomènes universels; la technologie a amélioré en tous lieux les moyens de surveillance et de répression; les méthodes nouvelles employées avec les non-conformistes, telle la pratique soviétique de les interner dans des asiles d'aliénés, peuvent se répandre dans notre société après avoir contaminé le monde communiste. La théorie selon laquelle le communisme et le capitalisme finiront bien par converger a été mise en avant par les optimistes qui espèrent que le communisme deviendra plus libéral et le capitalisme plus socialiste. Mais la convergence -- si en tout lieu les esprits indépendants ne sont pas sur le qui-vive -- peut se développer de façon moins idyllique. Les formes de la société industrialisée, qu'elles soient capitalistes ou soviétiques, peuvent emprunter, les unes aux autres, les pires traits. La lutte qui se poursuit là-bas pour la réforme de la société est liée à la lutte qui se déroule ici pour empêcher sa dégradation. Il s'agit de la même cause, à une échelle planétaire.

Cinquante années d'expérience du communisme ont démontré que sans la liberté le socialisme, quelles que soient ses intentions avouées, finit par devenir un cauchemar étouffant. Un tiers de l'humanité vit pourtant sous son joug, et le Tiers Monde s'oriente dans la même direction. La mobilisation totale des ressources productives dans les pays insuffisamment développés semble difficile à atteindre sans une certaine forme de socialisme et -- pour tout dire -- une certaine forme de contrainte s'exerçant sur la force laborieuse, la plus importante des ressources. Nombre de traits caractéristiques du stalinisme revivent en Chine sous le régime de Mao et à Cuba sous le gouvernement de Fidel Castro. La difficulté d'arriver à une synthèse entre le socialisme et la liberté n'est pas moins urgente, entre tous les problèmes impérieux qui se posent à l'humanité, que l'abolition du racisme.

La discussion clandestine qui se poursuit en Union soviétique peut contribuer à une solution à deux stades différents du développement social. Comment une société communiste arrive-t-elle à revenir à la liberté d'expression et au règne de la légalité après avoir construit son armature industrielle, fondement d'une vie meilleure? Comment une société en voie de développement peut-elle s'inspirer des leçons de l'ère stalinienne pour éviter les pièges où tant d'énergie humaine, d'idéalisme et de puissance de travail peuvent être ruinés ou gaspillés par l'acceptation paresseuse des clichés sur la dictature du prolétariat?

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La légalité et la liberté exigent une rançon et peuvent en vérité ralentir le développement. Mais l'histoire des années de Staline, comme le dit Roy A. Medveded dans Let History Judge, montre que les vacances officielles de la légalité et l'absence de liberté exigent, elles aussi, leur tribut -- et ce tribut est lourd. Mais la rançon la plus onéreuse peut-être est celle de la reconquête ardue de la légalité et de la liberté après la perte de ces deux bienfaits. C'est ce qui ressort de A Question of Madness, de Roy et son frère jumeau, "Zhores", c'est-à-dire Jaurès.¹ L'expérience qu'ils relatent est un nouvel avertissement en face du glissement vers les habitudes néo-staliniennes en Union soviétique. La Chronicle of Current Events, que l'on peut se procurer dans sa version anglaise grâce à "Amnesty International", est la publication clandestine dans Samizdat -- publication impressionnante par sa sobriété et par sa volonté de s'en tenir aux faits -- de l'action d'une petite armée héroïque d'opposants qui essaient de combattre à contre-courant et d'instaurer les droits de l'homme en Union soviétique. Ces opposants écrivent un des plus grands chapitres de l'histoire de la lutte pour la liberté, et leur succès ou leur échec final aura des répercussions mondiales.

Les intellectuels de l'Ouest peuvent et doivent leur venir en aide. Dans A Question of Madness, on peut voir à quel point sont importantes les protestations et la publicité que suscite à l'étranger l'héroïsme d'une poignée de non-conformistes embastillés. Les lettres et les télégrammes émanant de savants de l'étranger -- et la publicité faite sur les ondes de la B.B.C. et sur d'autres postes étrangers -- ont permis d'obtenir la libération de Jaurès Medveded de l'hôpital psychiatrique où il avait été interné pour le livre dans lequel il attaquait le lysenkoïsme et pour les efforts qu'il avait déployés en vue de multiplier les contacts entre les savants soviétiques et leurs collègues de l'étranger.²

1. Je crois qu'il vaut mieux s'abstenir de transposer en alphabet cyrillique le nom français de Jaurès. Je me référerai donc, pour ma part, à ce nom, et non à celui de "Zhores". Medveded a reçu le prénom de Jaurès en souvenir du grand socialiste français, comme son frère jumeau porte celui du leader communiste indien, M.N. Roy. La presse britannique, quand elle veut parler de Jaurès Medveded, ne l'appelle pas autrement. Car c'est en vérité son prénom.

2. The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, par Zhores Medveded, a fait l'objet d'une critique de David Joravsky dans The New York Review du 29 janvier 1971, et The Medveded Papers, par Zhores également, a été analysé par le professeur Joravsky dans The New York Review du 23 septembre 1971.

Le livre est en lui-même un récit extraordinaire, aussi passionnant qu'un bon roman, dans lequel les frères jumeaux, Jaurès entre les murs d'un hôpital psychiatrique et Roy en liberté, décrivent dans des chapitres qui alternent et qui se répondent comment a été gagnée la bataille pour la libération de Jaurès. Malheureusement, aucun autre opposant n'a eu l'énergie et le prestige -- à défaut d'un frère jumeau -- de mobiliser un aussi vaste secteur de l'élite scientifique soviétique et tant de savants étrangers. Manifestement, les Medveded divisent encore la bureaucratie. Les protestations venues de l'étranger ont permis aux éléments plus sages et plus conciliants du pays de faire valoir que la prolongation de l'incarcération de Jaurès produisait à l'étranger une impression peu digne de l'Union soviétique.

Roy Medveded se serait même laissé dire par un informateur, qu'il ne désigne que par l'initiale "R", qu'au sein du ministère de la Santé Publique le psychiatre en chef, le docteur Andrei B. Snezhnevsky, a dit au médecin responsable de l'internement de Jaurès: "Un congrès psychiatrique international va se tenir, cette année, à Mexico. Quelle tête, je vous le demande, va y faire notre délégation après une telle affaire?"³ Nous retrouverons plus loin le Dr. Snezhnevsky.

II

Le congrès de Mexico n'a pas été fidèlement rapporté dans la presse occidentale; il a fini en réalité par devenir une suite de A Question of Madness. L'issue pourrait décourager les opposants au régime soviétique si les psychiatres ne s'organisaient pas sur un plan indépendant pour répondre à leur appel. La veille du congrès (28 novembre - 4 décembre 1971), deux messages provenant de l'Union soviétique avaient été adressés aux congressistes. L'un, signé par Andrei Sakharov et trois autres savants soviétiques, émanait du Mouvement en faveur des droits de l'homme qui publie la Chronicle depuis 1968 et s'efforce de créer en Union soviétique un mouvement semblable à celui de l'"American Civil Liberties Union". Dans une lettre ouverte publiée par The Times de Londres, le 23 octobre dernier, les signataires demandaient au congrès de Mexico d'ouvrir une enquête sur "l'ensemble des questions relatives aux droits des personnes placées sous le régime des malades mentaux", et ils ajoutaient sans détour: "Il ne faut pas oublier que la pratique de tels abus peut être un moyen de persécution politique." La lettre ne se référait pas directement à l'internement d'opposants dans les institutions psychiatriques et les "hôpitaux"-prisons de l'Union soviétique, mais elle demandait que des commissions fussent instituées "dans différents pays" pour l'étude de ce problème.

3. A Question of Madness, pp.62-3

CPYRGHT L'autre appel émanait de Vladimir Bukovsky, héros de la lutte pour la liberté en U.R.S.S., âgé de vingt-neuf ans seulement, qui a déjà passé sept ans de son existence dans les asiles d'aliénés, les "camps de redressement par le travail" et les prisons soviétiques. Il a été arrêté pour la première fois en 1963: il était en possession de copies du livre de Djilas, The New Class. Taxé de folie, il a passé un an et demi à l'hôpital-prison de Leningrad. En décembre 1965, il était arrêté de nouveau et envoyé à l'Institut Serbsky de psychiatrie judiciaire, qui passe pour une institution du KGB dans le flot montant de la littérature clandestine en U.R.S.S.⁴

Le crime de Bukovsky à cette époque était d'avoir organisé à Moscou une manifestation de 200 personnes. Les opposant déployèrent une banderole qui réclamait le "respect de la Constitution" et demandèrent que les écrivains Sinyavsky et Daniel bénéficient d'un procès public. Bukovsky fut détenu au Serbsky jusqu'au mois d'août suivant et libéré sans explications après que le mouvement pour l'amnistie internationale eut envoyé un représentant à Moscou et menacé d'ouvrir une enquête sur l'affaire. En janvier 1967, il fut à nouveau arrêté et condamné cette fois à trois ans de camp "de redressement par le travail" après l'organisation d'une nouvelle manifestation en faveur d'autres écrivains arrêtés. Après sa libération en janvier 1970, cet homme d'un rare courage envoya à l'étranger 150 pages de documents comprenant des copies des diagnostics faits par des psychiatres qui avaient fait interner dans des hôpitaux psychiatriques six adeptes de la croisade pour les libertés civiles en Russie. Parmi ces documents se trouvait le rapport médical sur le célèbre général de brigade Grigorenko. A ces documents, Bukovsky avait joint une lettre qui lançait un appel aux psychiatres de l'étranger.

"Je me rends compte, écrivait-il,⁵ qu'à distance et sans l'information clinique nécessaire, il est très difficile de déterminer l'état mental de quelqu'un, et de diagnostiquer la maladie ou de certifier l'absence de toute affection. Je vous demande donc d'exprimer votre opinion sur ce seul point: "Les diagnostics ci-dessus mentionnés contiennent-ils suffisamment de preuves scientifiquement fondées pour permettre de se prononcer non seulement sur les maladies mentales décrites dans les diagnostics, mais aussi sur la nécessité d'isoler complètement ces personnes de la société?"

4. Si les accusations des Chronicles sont exactes, l'Institut Serbsky est un établissement où la police secrète peut obtenir un verdict de folie si les autres psychiatres d'Union soviétique ont refusé de certifier que les opposants au régime étaient des malades mentaux.

5. Pour le texte de cette lettre et la documentation résumée ici, cf. The Times, de Londres, 12 mars, 1971.

Bukovsky disait qu'il serait heureux que la question fût inscrite à l'ordre du jour du congrès de Mexico. Il lançait un appel aux psychiatres pour qu'ils consacrent quelques instants au problème de cet emploi abusif de leur discipline scientifique, "tout comme les physiciens trouvent le temps de combattre l'emploi de leur science à des fins nuisibles pour l'humanité".

Deux semaines après la publication de cette lettre et des informations contenues dans ces documents, dans The Times (Londres), en mars dernier, Bukovsky était arrêté encore une fois. Mais la documentation qu'il avait envoyée à l'étranger était traduite et, en septembre dernier, quarante-quatre psychiatres britanniques envoyaient au Times une lettre résumant l'étude à laquelle ils avaient soumis ces documents. Ils se déclaraient "contraints d'exprimer de graves doutes sur la légitimité du traitement forcé infligé aux six intéressés et d'un internement indéfini sous le régime prévalant dans les hôpitaux-prisons psychiatriques".⁶ Ils déclaraient que sur les six intéressés, quatre "ne paraissaient avoir aucun symptôme qui indiquât la nécessité d'un traitement, et surtout d'un traitement d'une nature aussi punitive". Dans le cas des deux autres, Gobanevskaya et Fainberg, les diagnostics officiels montraient qu'ils avaient présenté des symptômes de maladie mentale dans leur vie antérieure. Mais la maladie était survenue, dans un cas, sept ans et, dans l'autre, dix-huit ans avant leur arrestation (ils avaient pris part à une manifestation de protestation contre l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie qui s'était déroulée le 25 août 1968 sur la Place Rouge). Les documents ne montraient aucun signe de récurrence de la maladie dans l'intervalle.

Les quarante-quatre psychiatres britanniques concluaient que les diagnostics pour les six intéressés "semblaient n'avoir été" motivés que par des actes relevant de l'exercice des libertés humaines fondamentales -- définies dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme et garanties par la Constitution soviétique". Ils rendaient hommage au courage de Bukovsky, demandaient au gouvernement soviétique de reconsidérer son cas, et lançaient un appel à leurs collègues, "à travers le monde, afin qu'ils étudient la volumineuse documentation mise à leur disposition, qu'ils discutent de l'affaire avec leurs collègues soviétiques, dont nous savons, disaient-ils, que certains ont des doutes aussi graves que les nôtres", et qu'ils portent la question, comme le demandait Bukovsky, devant des conférences internationales comme celle de l'Association psychiatrique mondiale à Mexico.

6. Cf. The Times (Londres), 16 septembre 1971, pour le texte de cette lettre

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Medveded avait été remis en liberté au moment où se réunit le congrès. Mais les autres opposants -- et Bukovsky, bien entendu -- étaient encore détenus. Le congrès ne voulut pas répondre à ces appels, bien que le docteur Ramon de la Fuente, président du congrès et président de l'Académie mexicaine de médecine, ait dit dans son discours d'ouverture que de nombreux documents avaient été reçus de "certains points du monde où les opposants politiques étaient traités comme des malades mentaux". Garder le silence sur une situation aussi ignominieuse, déclara le docteur de la Fuente, pèserait lourdement sur notre conscience".⁷

Le congrès n'en resta pas moins silencieux. Des "sources" anonymes ont donné à penser au Times de Londres que "les efforts déployés pour "endocotriner" les psychiatres -- formule certainement désobligeante et fortement entachée elle-même de propagande -- "avaient été considérés comme une tentative d'enrôlement d'une association scientifique dans la guerre froide"⁸. C'était là, semble-t-il, un écho à l'interview accordée au quotidien de Mexico, Excelsior, par le professeur Andrei V. Snezhnevsky, psychiatre en chef du ministère soviétique de la Santé publique et membre de la délégation soviétique au congrès. C'est évidemment le même docteur Snezhnevsky qui s'était montré inquiet de l'effet que pourrait avoir sur le congrès de Mexico l'affaire Medveded. Il devait qualifier les appels aux savants "de manoeuvre de la guerre froide maniée par des experts en la matière".

En réalité, d'après le docteur Snezhnevsky, ces appels reprenaient une calomnie occidentale bien connue qui avait couru longtemps avant la guerre froide. Au début du vingtième siècle, déclara le professeur soviétique, le professeur Bazhenov avait affirmé dans un congrès russe de psychiatrie que la presse, notamment celle d'Europe occidentale, parlait souvent de l'internement de personnes saines d'esprit dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques de Russie. "Elle agit ainsi, avait dit le professeur Bazhenov, pour des motifs politiques et intéressés".¹⁰

7. Les News de Mexico, 30 novembre 1971

8. The Times, 4 décembre 1971. Par suite d'une erreur technique, la dépêche provenait de Buenos-Ayres, et non de Mexico. Il arrive que les journaux britanniques soient plus ou moins précis sur les origines des dépêches qui viennent du continent américain.

9. New Yorker Times, 3 décembre 1971

10. Excelsior, 1er décembre 1971. Le premier congrès russe de psychiatrie de ce siècle, d'après l'Histoire de la Psychiatrie russe, de T.I. Yudin (que l'on trouve en édition russe à la Bibliothèque du Congrès), s'est tenu en 1911. Nikolai Bazhenov (1857-1923) était un psychiatre de premier plan de l'époque tsariste. La phrase dont il s'est servi: "notamment la presse d'Europe occidentale", semble indiquer qu'il y avait également des protestations dans la presse russe, et peut servir à rappeler que sous les tsars la presse - pour réglementée qu'elle était - était plus libre qu'elle ne l'est aujourd'hui en U.R.S.S.

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Bien avant la révolution, le régime tsariste avait, en effet, expérimenté la méthode thérapeutique qui réserve aux extrémistes le traitement des aliénés. Il y a peut-être une raison pour que le docteur Snezhnevsky ait jugé nécessaire de blanchir le régime pré-révolutionnaire lui-même, victime de la propagande politique "intéressée" de l'Occident. Solzhenitsyn, dans sa protestation publique du 15 juin 1970 contre l'internement de Jaurès Medveded, rappelait que le tsar Nicolas avait réservé le même sort au philosophe Chaadaev en 1836 après que ce dernier eut critiqué, dans une de ses "Lettres philosophiques", l'oppression qu'il avait constatée dans son pays natal à son retour d'Europe occidentale. C'était déjà une vieille coutume russe. Jaurès Medveded, dans A Question of Madness il rapporte que sous Alexandre Ier le cadet Zhukov fut déclaré fou pour avoir écrit un recueil de vers sur la liberté, exercice poétique encore dangereux de nos jours en Union soviétique.

Si les autorités soviétiques avaient tenu à prouver que tout cela était pure calomnie, le docteur Snezhnevsky aurait été l'homme idéal, et le congrès le lieu rêvé pour faire cette démonstration. A Question of Madness témoigne qu'il a joué un rôle capital dans l'affaire Medveded. Il fait figure dans ce livre d'homme patelin, expert dans l'art de jongler avec les deux faces d'une question. Dans une rencontre privée avec un ami de Jaurès, il a dit qu'il ne faisait aucun doute que la commission psychiatrique qui avait mis Medveded à l'ombre eût agi selon les règles en constatant qu'il avait une personnalité psychopathique, mais il a tenté d'ouvrir la voie à la remise en liberté de l'interné en ajoutant qu'il ne pensait pas que le diagnostic nécessitât l'hospitalisation forcée.

Quand cinq des plus prestigieux académiciens de l'Union soviétique, dont Sakharov et le célèbre physicien Peter Kapitsa, sont allés trouver Petrovsky, ministre de la Santé publique, pour lui demander la libération de Jaurès, ils ont été accueillis par le docteur Snezhnevsky. Celui-ci leur a dit que si les psychiatres qui avaient fait interner Jaurès avaient commis une erreur, le ministère de la Santé publique avait suffisamment de pouvoir pour la redresser sans l'intervention des "profanes". Il n'en a pas moins parlé des "hallucinations du réformateur obsessionnel" comme d'une variété de maladie mentale assez grave pour exiger l'hospitalisation, "et à ce moment-là il a jeté un regard professionnel pénétrant sur Sakharov", comme pour bien faire voir à l'académicien qu'il était, lui aussi, tenu à l'oeil.

Mais le ministre de la Santé publique, Petrovsky, était peu disposé à entrer dans la voie d'un compromis. Il a contredit le docteur Snezhnevsky

11. Cf. pages 135-6 pour la lettre de Solzhenitsyn et pp. 181-2 et 196-7 pour les autres cas pré-révolutionnaires.

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en affirmant que le ministère ne s'ingérait pas dans ces questions-là. Il a accusé Sakharov de "comportement antipatriotique" pour avoir soulevé la question, et quelqu'un a même rappelé ce que Pavlov avait dit un jour au sujet d'un cas antérieur de violation de la légalité: "C'est notre propre m.... à nous, Russes. Nous nous en tirerons nous-mêmes sans l'aide de l'étranger".¹² La citation était authentique, sinon élégante.

Roy Medveded raconte que "dès le début de 1953", c'est-à-dire avant la mort de Staline, Petrovsky, parlant devant un groupe de jeunes médecins, leur recommanda "de répudier les idées désuètes sur le rôle du médecin dans la société et de connaître à fond les idéaux de l'humanisme stalinien". Il est toujours, semble-t-il, un humaniste de ce genre. Mais la pression de l'élite scientifique de l'Union soviétique et des savants influents de l'étranger s'est révélée si forte que Jaurès devait être libéré en juin 1970, moins d'un mois après son incarcération.

Personne à Mexico ne connaissait mieux l'affaire que le docteur Snezhnevsky. Personne n'était mieux placé pour défendre l'Union soviétique si les accusations étaient réellement une calomnie tout au plus bonne à alimenter la guerre froide. A l'ouverture du congrès un troisième appel à son adresse fut publié à Moscou et reçut une large publicité dans la presse mexicaine.¹³ Dans cette lettre ouverte, neuf membres de la Commission des droits de l'homme de l'Union soviétique attirèrent l'attention des délégués sur le rôle de premier plan qu'avait joué le docteur Snezhnevsky dans le cas de Medveded. La dépêche Reuters-Amérique Latine citait également une interview accordée en octobre aux Izvestia par le docteur Snezhnevsky et dans laquelle il démentait toutes les accusations, disant qu'il était "absolument impossible" que des personnes saines d'esprit fussent internées dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques en Union soviétique!

Le congrès était le lieu idéal pour le dire si c'était la vérité, et pour le dire à voix haute et de façon pertinente. Un tract en anglais, en français et en espagnol contenant les constatations des quarante-quatre psychiatres britanniques n'avait-il pas été abondamment diffusé parmi les 7.000 psychiatres qui assistaient au congrès et provoqué plus de discussions que tout autre sujet soumis à l'assemblée?

Mais le lendemain de cet appel, quand le président de séance demanda au congrès de prendre position contre l'internement des opposants dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques, le docteur Snezhnevsky et la délégation soviétique quittèrent immédiatement la salle. Ils déclarèrent qu'ils ne pouvaient

12. Cf. A Question of Madness, pp. 128-32

13. Cf. la dépêche Reuters-Amérique latine en provenance de Moscou publiée dans Excelsior du 29 novembre 1971

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discuter de la question parce que le congrès n'avait pas d'interprète officiel en langue russe. "Le docteur Snezhnevsky, déclara un de ses adjoints, n'a pas confiance dans une traduction non officielle".¹⁴ Le docteur Snezhnevsky décida, par contre, d'accorder une interview à Excelsior, et ce fut la seule occasion où il évoqua la question en public. "Demandez-moi tout ce que vous voudrez sur cette affaire, dit-il au journaliste qui l'interviewait, nous pouvons en parler pendant des heures". Mais son interlocuteur ne lui posa aucune question curieuse, et le docteur Snezhnevsky repoussa aussitôt avec la dernière énergie, mais gratuitement, l'accusation (lancée il y a vingt ans) selon laquelle les Soviétiques s'étaient livrés à des "lavages de cerveau" sur des prisonniers américains pendant la guerre de Corée.

III

En conclusion de son interview, le docteur Snezhnevsky affirma que non seulement des psychiatres, mais des juges, et notamment des Américains, avaient étudié la procédure pénale psychiatrique de l'Union soviétique. Il ajouta qu'un livre sur la question avait été publié aux Etats-Unis à la suite de ces visites et de ces études, et dit implicitement que ce rapport faisait en réalité justice de toutes les accusations. Le livre, cité par les défenseurs de l'Union soviétique dans les discussions en coulisse du congrès, est The Report of the First US Mission on Mental Health to the USSR (Rapport de la première mission américaine sur la santé mentale en U.R.S.S.), qui a été publié en février 1969 par le Département américain de la Santé publique, de l'Education et des Affaires sociales (HEW)¹⁵. Le président de la Cour d'appel fédérale du District de Columbia, le juge David L. Bazelon, était le seul homme de loi ou juriste de cette mission américaine, qui comprenait sept membres.¹⁶

14. Cf. Excelsior du 30 novembre 1971, où cette déclaration figure dans les informations de la première page. Je désire remercier la bibliothèque de l'ambassade du Mexique d'avoir mis à ma disposition sa collection de journaux.

15. Public Health Service Publication No. 1893. Superintendent of Documents, 3,50 dollars.

16. Les autres membres de la délégation étaient le dr. Walter E. Barton, directeur médical de l'American Psychiatric Association; Mike Gorman, directeur de la Commission nationale pour la lutte contre les maladies mentales; le dr. Alan D. Miller, commissaire au Département de l'hygiène mentale de l'Etat de New York; le dr. Harold M. Visotsky, directeur du Département de la Santé mentale de l'Illinois; le dr. Stanley F. Yolles, directeur, et le dr. Philip Sirotkin, directeur-adjoint de l'Institut national de santé mentale.

Mais le rapport du Département américain de la Santé publique, de l'Education et des Affaires sociales ne discute nulle part, ni ne mentionne même, la possibilité de l'internement éventuel des opposants au régime dans des établissements psychiatriques. La visite de la délégation américaine a eu lieu en septembre 1967, alors que cette méthode de répression appliquée à l'opposition avait reçu peu de publicité à l'Ouest. Depuis cette époque, "des centaines de travailleurs, d'étudiants, d'artistes et d'intellectuels mentalement sains", d'après une dépêche récente de l'Associated Press provenant de Moscou,¹⁷ auraient été internés dans des institutions psychiatriques "pour désaccord avec la doctrine officielle".

Quand un représentant de la délégation visita l'Institut Serbsky à Moscou, il ne se douta nullement, semble-t-il, que les opposants au régime considèrent cet établissement comme une institution du KGB. Le rapport du Département américain de la Santé publique le dépeint comme "l'institution la plus prestigieuse de l'U.R.S.S. pour les examens mentaux". C'est un vieil immeuble dont l'entrée est interdite par des portes de fer, dit le rapport. Ces portes qui glissent électriquement sur des rails pour l'admission des visiteurs font partie d'un système de sécurité très strict où figurent des soldats qui servent de geôliers". Les portes inhabituelles avec dispositif électrique de manoeuvre et la présence de soldats transformés en geôliers dans un hôpital psychiatrique ont peut-être frappé le visiteur par leur caractère insolite, car le rapport poursuit: "Des précautions aussi poussées, nous a-t-on expliqué, sont nécessaires, car on examine à Serbsky quelques-uns des cas les plus difficiles de l'Union soviétique". Il est regrettable que personne n'ait demandé si les soldats étaient souvent appelés pour les consultations.

Quand l'enquêteur américain s'est vu refuser, lors de sa première visite, l'autorisation d'assister en observateur à un examen en cours auquel procédait un médecin légiste, son guide semble s'en être tiré avec une explication pour le moins ingénue. "La raison de ce refus, poursuit le rapport, a peut-être été une interprétation par trop littérale d'une instruction du ministère de la Santé publique qui menace les psychiatres de poursuites pénales s'ils divulguent le contenu d'un rapport d'examen médical dans toute autre occasion que le contexte judiciaire". Diffusée par Samizdat, cette théorie procurerait aux prisonniers politiques soviétiques quelques instants d'hilarité!

La notion du souci scrupuleux, "par trop littéral", des droits du patient, est risible à la lumière de ce que l'on sait maintenant sur la façon dont la police politique exploite l'Institut Serbsky. En outre, elle ne semble guère compatible avec ce que le rapport du Département américain de la Santé Publique tient lui-même à dire sur l'absence de contrôle

17. Roger Ledington, Post de New York, 12 janvier 1972

de l'autorité judiciaire sur les internements civils. "Le représentant de la délégation, dit le rapport, a été intrigué par l'absence de tout recours aux tribunaux dans la procédure d'internement civil. La législation soviétique ne prévoit pas de contrôle de l'autorité judiciaire sur les pratiques de l'internement civil." Le rapport indique ensuite que "les Russes expliquent cette carence de plusieurs façons. Ils soutiennent en premier lieu que les organismes officiels de la Santé publique exercent une surveillance constante sur le système des internements civils pour s'assurer qu'il fonctionne correctement... Ensuite les Russes font valoir que le contrôle de l'autorité judiciaire n'est pas nécessaire, car les psychiatres n'ont aucune raison d'interner ou de détenir un patient sans justifications".

C'est le dernier cri de la jurisprudence bureaucratique. La délégation visiteuse n'a pas accepté telle quelle l'explication. Car le rapport la commente en termes réservés: "L'absence de contrôle de l'autorité judiciaire en Union soviétique reflète peut-être la croyance que le public en général n'a pas besoin de superviser les responsables gouvernementaux pour s'assurer qu'ils respectent tous les droits positifs et toutes les règles de la procédure. Les Américains auront quelque peine à accepter cette notion. Nous ne partageons pas une foi aussi aveugle quand il s'agit de nos gouvernants". A en juger par la Chronicle, nombre de citoyens soviétiques ne la partagent pas non plus.

Ce rapport ayant été cité par ceux qui font l'apologie du gouvernement soviétique dans la controverse actuelle sur la question fondamentale qui n'a jamais été soulevée au cours de leur visite, le juge Bazelon et ses collègues se doivent à eux-mêmes, et à la cause de la justice, d'examiner les diagnostics et les autres documents envoyés en Angleterre par Bukovsky et de rendre public leur jugement à ce sujet. Sur ma proposition, The New York Review a demandé à "Amnesty International" en Angleterre de fournir toute la documentation; nous la mettrons à la disposition du juge Bazelon et de ses collègues quand elle arrivera.

Si le juge Bazelon et ses collègues déclarent forfait, un groupe "ad hoc" de psychiatres américains fera ce qu'ont fait les quarante-quatre psychiatres de Grande-Bretagne et établira son propre rapport. Le fait est qu'à Mexico, les moeurs peu démocratiques qui ont cours en Union soviétique dans le traitement des accusations publiques se sont répandues jusque dans les rangs du congrès psychiatrique. La bureaucratie de l'Organisation mondiale et de l'Association psychiatrique américaine a permis, en fait, à la bureaucratie soviétique de classer et d'étouffer les protestations. Les bureaux ont affirmé que le congrès mondial n'avait à sa disposition aucune règle de procédure qui lui permet d'agir.

Or, c'est l'inverse qui semble vrai. Ceux qui sont allés à Mexico pour soulever la question ont constaté que l'arsenal de la procédure avait été mobilisé pour rendre impossible toute protestation efficace des psychiatres de la base. J'ai téléphoné à deux psychiatres américains, le docteur Alfred Bloch, de Los Angeles, et le docteur Richard S. Green, de Sands Point (Long Island), qui sont allés à Mexico avec des résolutions de protestation (le deuxième muni de tous les pouvoirs nécessaires à la suite d'un vote écrasant de l'Association psychiatrique du comté de Nassau) pour constater finalement que les portes de ce que l'on appelle l'"Assemblée générale", distincte du congrès lui-même, leur étaient interdites.

On leur a dit que l'Assemblée générale n'était ouverte qu'aux délégués officiels des soixante-sept nations participantes, et ils n'ont pu obtenir que la délégation officielle des Etats-Unis introduise leurs résolutions. Les portes de l'Assemblée générale ont été également interdites à la presse. Toute la procédure, y compris les conditions dans lesquelles sont choisies les délégations successives à ce congrès, s'entoure d'un épais brouillard bureaucratique. Le congrès mondial semble dirigé par des cliques animées du souci de se perpétuer.

D'autres organisations psychiatriques ont répondu aux appels venus de l'Union soviétique. Le bureau directeur de l'Association psychiatrique canadienne a avalisé en janvier dernier les constatations d'une équipe de l'Association médicale de la Colombie britannique sur les utilisations abusives de la psychiatrie à des fins politiques en Union soviétique. Elle a demandé à l'Organisation mondiale de la santé et à l'Association psychiatrique mondiale de procéder à une nouvelle étude. Les soixante membres du bureau exécutif de la Fédération mondiale pour la santé mentale, réunis à Hong-kong le 25 novembre dernier, ont voté une résolution de protestation et réclamé une nouvelle étude à l'unanimité, moins une voix. Mais l'Association psychiatrique mondiale, qui dirige le congrès mondial, n'a pas réagi.

De même l'Association psychiatrique américaine. Le Journal of Psychiatry (britannique) a publié en août dernier sur les documents Bukovsky un article analytique écrit par le docteur Richter, l'un des quarante-quatre. J'ai demandé à Robert L. Robinson, rédacteur en chef de Psychiatric News, publication officielle de l'Association psychiatrique américaine, si cet organe avait publié quelque chose sur l'appel en faveur de Sakharov lancé par la Commission pour les droits de l'homme en Union soviétique ou sur les documents Bukovsky. Il m'a répondu par la négative. Après le congrès mondial, et peut-être pour apaiser les protestations au sein de l'Association psychiatrique américaine, les membres du conseil d'administration ont voté le 9 décembre par 14 voix contre 4, d'après le compte rendu de Robinson paru dans le numéro du 5 janvier, une résolution tendant à

... ce que l'Association se déclare fermement "hostile à tout usage illicite des installations psychiatriques pour la détention

des personnes sur la seule base de leur opposition politique en quelque lieu que ce soit". La résolution votée avait été formulée par la Commission d'information publique.

Mais une formule aussi anodine que celle-là est fort éloignée de l'institution d'une commission qui aurait mission d'étudier la documentation actuellement disponible sur la situation en Union soviétique.

De nombreuses discussions se sont poursuivies, semble-t-il, dans les coulisses du congrès. Ceux qui sont favorables à l'Union soviétique ont supplié les psychiatres soviétiques d'apaiser les critiques en apportant leur soutien à une résolution conçue dans les mêmes termes que celle adoptée plus tard par l'Association psychiatrique américaine. Mais les représentants de l'Union soviétique ont refusé d'appuyer une résolution de ce genre. Ceux qui tenaient les leviers de commande de l'Assemblée générale se sont inclinés devant les désirs des Soviétiques. Le compte rendu de Robinson paru dans les Psychiatric News du 5 janvier est révélateur à cet égard. Après s'être référé au discours inaugural du président mexicain, le docteur Ramon de la Fuente,¹⁸ et à sa courageuse affirmation que la question ne pouvait en toute conscience être passée sous silence, le compte rendu de Robinson disait:

Non seulement l'Association psychiatrique mondiale n'était habilitée par aucune disposition ou mécanisme constitutionnels à prendre position sur la question, mais il est devenu manifeste, à mesure que la semaine s'écoulait, que ses dirigeants n'avaient pas le désir de prendre une décision qui aurait déplu à la délégation soviétique et l'aurait vraisemblablement amenée à quitter la salle des séances et à couper les ponts avec l'Association pendant un certain temps.

Robinson poursuivait ainsi dans son compte rendu: "Que leur souci ait été justifié, c'est ce que démontrent les commentaires faits à l'auteur de ces lignes par le docteur Boris Lebedev, l'éminent psychiatre de Léninegrad. Celui-ci a dit tout net que les psychiatres soviétiques étaient tout aussi partisans que les autres du principe énoncé dans la résolution de l'Association psychiatrique américaine, mais qu'ils ne se souciaient pas de soutenir une résolution dont s'emparerait la presse occidentale pour attaquer l'Union soviétique" - et les opposants au régime soviétique pour attaquer sur place l'utilisation abusive de la psychiatrie par la police secrète.

18. La présidence du congrès mondial revient toujours à un psychiatre appartenant au pays dans lequel se tiennent les assises, et le discours d'ouverture des travaux est prononcé par la même personne. Les scrupules émouvants du docteur de la Fuente ont donc été un accident local que la bureaucratie psychiatrique n'avait peut-être pas prévu.

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IV

La suite la plus tragique du congrès de Mexico a été la sentence implacable infligée à Vladimir Bukovsky pour avoir envoyé à l'étranger les rapports psychiatriques sur lesquels le congrès s'est abstenu d'agir. Un tribunal dont l'accès a été interdit à la presse occidentale (y compris à un correspondant du quotidien communiste britannique)¹⁹ l'a condamné à sept ans de prison et de camp de "redressement par le travail" et à cinq ans d'exil, soit le maximum de la peine pour "agitation et propagande anti-soviétiques". Tel est, aux termes du célèbre article 70 du Code criminel russe révisé, l'arsenal des peines qui a remplacé l'antique législation, tout aussi vague, réprimant les "crimes contre-révolutionnaires".

La Commission internationale des Juristes qui siège à Genève a émis une protestation en disant que même sous la législation soviétique les accusations portées par Bukovsky n'étaient diffamatoires, et donc punissables, que si elles étaient fausses. Mais, fait observer la Commission, non seulement la défense n'a pas été autorisée à produire des témoins, mais l'accusation n'a pas été mise en demeure de rapporter la preuve que les accusations étaient fausses. Ainsi un autre coup a été porté à l'effort précaire actuellement tenté en Union soviétique pour rétablir la "légalité socialiste" ou le règne de la loi. Ce sera vraiment un miracle si Bukovsky, avec les troubles cardiaques et rhumatismaux que lui ont valus les sept années d'incarcération qu'il a déjà accomplies dans les camps, les prisons et les "hôpitaux" soviétiques, survit à cette nouvelle condamnation à douze ans de prison supplémentaires.²⁰

On peut comprendre que les psychiatres soviétiques aient fait à Mexico le vilain travail du KGB; s'ils avaient agi autrement, ils n'auraient sans doute pas été autorisés à se rendre à nouveau à l'étranger, et ils auraient pu craindre avec raison d'être un jour eux-mêmes jetés dans un asile d'aliénés pour s'être montrés "coullants", en privé, sur le cas Medveded. Mais les psychiatres du "monde libre" n'ont pas la même excuse.

La guerre froide se sert depuis longtemps du baillon, dans l'un et l'autre camp, pour imposer silence aux opposants. Il serait scandaleux que les intellectuels de notre camp y voient aujourd'hui une excuse pour se baillonner eux-mêmes. Le crime du silence sur ce qui se passe à l'intérieur

19. Le Sun de Baltimore, 6 janvier 1972.

20. Câbles provenant de Genève, le 12 janvier 1972, publiés dans le New York Times (dernière édition de New York seulement), le Washington Post, et le Sun de Baltimore. Cf. la page "Opinions" du New York Times du 13 janvier, pour la déclaration finale de Bukovsky au tribunal telle qu'elle a été communiquée clandestinement par ses amis à l'Agence Reuters, et cf. également le résumé exhaustif, mais lugubre, du cas Bukovsky dans The Times (de Londres) du 10 janvier, fait par son correspondant à Moscou, David Bonavia.

de l'Union soviétique est inexcusable, surtout à l'heure où la rémission survenue dans la guerre froide s'accompagne en fait d'un serrement de vis dirigé contre l'opposition en U.R.S.S. et au sein du bloc soviétique en général. Cette politique est conforme en tous points à la doctrine soviétique selon laquelle la coexistence pacifique ne doit pas s'étendre à la sphère de l'"idéologie". La paix peut apparaître sous un jour merveilleux, mais le libéralisme est toujours redouté comme une maladie contagieuse.

Transiger avec les obligations de l'aide mutuelle et les principes médicaux d'antan, comme l'a fait l'Association psychiatrique mondiale, c'est faire le jeu de la bureaucratie et de la police secrète dans les deux camps.

Les deux livres des Medveded et la Chronicle que nous soumettront à plus ample analyse dans un article de conclusion, montrent pour quelles raisons les recours à l'internement psychiatrique se multiplient en Union soviétique et comment la carence du congrès de Mexico doit encourager cette tendance néo-stalinienne. Ils nous offrent également l'occasion d'évaluer les chances de l'instauration authentique de la liberté sous les régimes communistes.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 March 1972

CPYRGHT **What happened to Tet?**

The rainy season in Vietnam is now only a few days away. Usually, the rains begin around the first of April and are soon too heavy and too persistent to permit military campaigning on anything but local scale.

It is, of course, conceivable that the North Vietnamese will still launch their long-expected offensive just short of the beginning of the rains. American and allied forces have called off their alert. They are vulnerable in that they assume the danger is over. A general attack now would indeed be a "surprise."

Yet an attack now would be unconventional, and dangerous for the attacker. It is a general presumption in Washington and Saigon that the offensive has in fact been called off. And that leads to the fascinating question of why.

There is no doubt that the military high command in Hanoi had planned an offensive for this dry season and made extensive preparations for it. Intelligence sources say that the volume of men and supplies moved down the trails for this operation exceeded anything known in the Vietnam war since the Tet offensive of 1968.

True, that movement was attacked from the air by the heaviest bombing counter-offensive of this war, perhaps of any war. And yet, in spite of all the bombing, elite units of the North Vietnam Army were actually deployed deep in South Vietnam

in preparation for the attack. There is no reason to think that it was called off for shortage of ammunition, supplies, or a good stiffening of first-quality troops from the north.

That leaves two possible explanations for the non-Tet of this last dry season.

One is that to be successful the burden of the offensive would have to be carried, as in 1968, by local Viet Cong forces who were no longer ready and willing. The local Viet Cong did suffer heavy losses in 1968. Perhaps their morale has not been up to another such effort since then.

The other explanation is that President Nixon's trip to Peking set up a chain reaction which restrained Hanoi from the effort it had planned.

Perhaps there was some of both. It may be a long time, if ever, before the historians can sort this one out. If a chain reaction was set up in Peking the Chinese are not likely to want to talk about it. They would hate to give the Russians a chance to accuse them of selling out their Communist "brothers" in Hanoi.

Yet the Chinese do have the most practical of reasons for pulling back on the "hawk" faction in Hanoi. Until the Peking trip they were held motionless in the grip of Russian hostility on one side and American on the other. They had to negotiate one or the other away in order to be able to breathe safely. They chose to negotiate with Mr. Nixon.

THE ECONOMIST
11 March 1972

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Vietnam

Has the big attack been called off?

FROM OUR SAIGON CORRESPONDENT

North Vietnam's leaders, bereft of Uncle Ho's unifying influence since 1969, are believed to be in disarray about how to win the war. The crux of the problem is whether to mount a general military offensive fairly soon—maybe this autumn, before the American presidential election, or perhaps early next year, or to adopt a long-

haul strategy of smaller-scale warfare while rebuilding and consolidating the communist north. The argument is not new, but some of the ingredients are of more recent vintage, and it may even be that individual members of the politburo in Hanoi have switched sides because of changes in the situation.

The progressive American withdrawal from South Vietnam poses a curious dilemma for North Vietnam. To some extent it strengthens the argument of those who want to deploy the north's slender resources for internal development, while merely keeping the peace in the south. The withdrawal, as the war may perhaps be won there

more easily. This argument gained strength after last year's disastrous floods in the Red river delta, which not only caused economic havoc but placed added strain on the morale and discipline of people in North Vietnam.

On the other hand there are evidently those who hold that the risks of delay are too great. What if President Thieu continues to gain strength in the south? Besides, can China, Russia and other communist countries be relied upon to continue their substantial level of support?

Despite recent assurances of unwavering solidarity from Moscow and Peking, the Vietnam war has lost some

of its glamour for the communist world after all these years. Soviet aid to North Vietnam during 1971 has been estimated at about £210m; China's contribution was approximately half that figure. Much of the aid is required simply to feed North Vietnam and keep its economy afloat. But a large proportion is directly earmarked for the war effort, which would collapse without it. If, as is widely believed, the Soviet Union intends to ask President Nixon for technological help during his Moscow visit in May, he might suggest that the Russians should stop sending so many resources to Vietnam.

The group in Hanoi which advocates

a quick crack at victory is thought to be led by Truong Chinh, the party's chief theoretician. The defence minister, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has also been associated with talk about main-force warfare and decisive leaps forward—a contingency for which the North Vietnamese army has recently shown signs of preparation along the borders of South Vietnam.

The opposing school, which favours a long-drawn-out preparation for victory while rebuilding the north, seems to be led by the party secretary, Le Duan. It may well be that this view currently prevails. It is interesting that the North Vietnamese did not in the

end launch the offensive they were expected to make in February, even though they completed the necessary preparations. The obvious explanation at the time was that the leaders in Hanoi realised that the attack would probably fail. But it is equally plausible that in a see-saw debate within the politburo the advocates of the long haul had it called off because it would have been too expensive. In South Vietnam this week President Thieu ordered his troops to put more stress on smaller-unit guerrilla warfare. He believes the communist command has decided to revert to guerrilla tactics.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 February 1972

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Captured North Vietnamese Soldier Tells of His Hard March South

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

PLEIKU, South Vietnam, Feb. 16—When Pt. Bul Van Auleft his native village near Hanoi last fall to begin the long march to South Vietnam, he says, his parents and relatives cried for a long time. For no soldier from their village had ever returned after infiltrating into the South.

Private Au's journey ended three days ago when his company of 80 men was spotted by an American observation plane in the Central Highlands near Kontum. Air strikes were called in, killing almost all of his comrades, and Private Au was captured by an American helicopter pilot who swooped down on the survivors.

Private Au, who says his mission was to bolster North Vietnamese strength in the Highlands in preparation for a major offensive, discussed his experiences on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in an unusual interview today. In the past, the South Vietnamese Army has seldom allowed interviews with enemy prisoners.

Although the Central Highlands has remained quiet this week, American and South Vietnamese officials in Pleiku, the headquarters of Military Region II, which includes the Central Highlands area, still be-

lieve that the Communists will launch a major attack here by this weekend.

Division Infiltrated

The capture of Private Au, and the discovery that his unit, the 304B Division, had just infiltrated into Kontum Province from North Vietnam, added to the expectation that Hanoi would launch its predicted Tet offensive in the Highlands.

"Actually, the Tet offensive has already begun," said John Paul Vann, the chief American official in Military Region II. "It began last week with a series of small-scale attacks in Binh Dinh Province on the coast and an attempt to cut the highway up to the Highlands."

Mr. Vann, a short, intense man, believes that some of the isolated South Vietnamese Ranger camps along the Cambodian and Laotian borders, such as Banhet, may be temporarily overrun.

But, he argued, the disparity is great between what the Communists have told their men they will do and what they are now capable of achieving. The Communists have somewhere between 35,000 and 60,000 men, most of them regular North Vietnamese soldiers, in the mountainous, jungle-covered Central Highlands.

But the South Vietnamese

and their allies have 200,000, and they are well prepared for any offensive, Mr. Vann asserts. "Actually, I welcome a Communist offensive," he said. "For after the enemy expends himself and loses many of his men, he has to stay quiet until next year and gives us a chance to expand our control."

Since a prolonged North Vietnamese siege of Fire Bases 5 and 6 in Kontum Province last spring, enemy activity in the Central Highlands has been at its lowest level since the build-up of the war in 1965, Mr. Vann added.

Private Au, who was interviewed with another member of his unit, Private Nguyno van Minh, in South Vietnamese headquarters in Pleiku, appeared tired and nervous, but in good health. He spoke through a South Vietnamese Army interpreter.

A slight, boyish-looking 20-year-old with close-cropped hair and an easy smile, Private Au said that his officers had told him very little about conditions in South Vietnam, except that his unit was to help liberate the South Vietnamese from the Americans.

"At home in my village, the people didn't pay much attention to the war," he said. "The war has been going on so long, who knows when it will end.

Besides, they are more interested in planting their crops."

Private Au, who was drafted last May, explained that he had not been happy about joining the army. "None of the soldiers from my village who have gone off to the South have ever returned, and I can remember only one time when anyone in the village got a letter from a relative who had been sent south." Private Minh told a similar story.

Other North Vietnamese prisoners have previously reported that until the last year or two the Ho Chi Minh Trail network has been largely a one-way street, with few soldiers ever going back to the North.

Private Au's unit marched during the day, but it was hard going, with steep mountains and mud up to the men's knees. At first they got food, at stations along the way, but as they moved farther south they were given only rice and salt and were often hungry.

"We could hear air strikes in the distance," Private Minh reported, "but we never experienced any ourselves until three days ago. The worst problem was the fear—we didn't know what to expect—and all the marching. We got so tired."

THE ECONOMIST
19 February 1972

They had a holiday while they waited

FROM OUR SAIGON CORRESPONDENT

A volley of fireworks lit up the Saigon sky on Monday night, but it was not the much-rumoured Tet offensive. People were just trying to frighten away evil spirits at the start of the Year of the Rat. With both sides having declared a ceasefire for the lunar new year—the communists for four days, and the South Vietnamese and the Americans for 24 hours—the fighting had stopped.

Well, not quite. A few minor guerrilla attacks were reported in various parts of South Vietnam, and the Americans' B-52 bombers were diverted to Laos for an intensified bombardment of the Ho Chi Minh trails. But despite all the recent speculation about a major communist offensive, officials in Saigon were not expecting trouble before the end of the week. The phrase "Tet offensive" has stuck in people's minds ever since the bloody events of 1968, but the hopeful guess is that the communists have little to gain from an onslaught during Vietnam's main family reunion of the year except the element of surprise. And this year, unlike 1968, South Vietnam's army was on full alert all week.

At the beginning of the week American and South Vietnamese officers were picking Sunday, February

20th, as the likelier date for an attack; that is the day before President Nixon's arrival in Peking. North Vietnam has not concealed its anxiety about the shift of Chinese policy towards the United States last year, and the uneasiness persists in Hanoi despite assurances of undiminished support from Peking. It is now becoming quite clear that China considers Russia, not the United States, as the greatest threat to its security. And Russia is the chief arms supplier to North Vietnam, and currently the most active supporter of its persistent search for total military victory.

The fear in Hanoi is that Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions in Indochina could provide the ground for a narrowing of the gap between Chinese and American ideas about how to end the war. So it is highly desirable for North Vietnam to provide an unfavourable backdrop for Mr Nixon's talks in Peking: an offensive that calls into question the success of Vietnamisation, sets off a new wave of breast-beating and defeatism in America, and tells Chou En-lai that victory is close and therefore not to be compromised.

An offensive which coincides with the Nixon visit might achieve these aims, and also spoil some of Mr Nixon's favourable publicity at home.

But if it started too early the Saigon government might have time to get on top of it while Mr Nixon is still in Peking, thus proving his contention that vietnamisation is working. At any rate, that is the reasoning used in Saigon to explain the fact that things were still so quiet on Thursday morning.

North Vietnam's other main target, of course, is vietnamisation itself. The communists' concern over this programme is revealed in their policy statements, including their refusal to negotiate a political settlement unless vietnamisation is stopped. A really successful attack now could have a decisive demoralising effect on Saigon's forces before what is expected to be a final all-out communist campaign a year from now.

As the Tet holiday drew towards its close this week, the men in the military planning offices conceded that the North Vietnamese might be strong enough to launch spectacular assaults in three regions: just south of the demilitarised zone, in the central highlands around Pleiku and Kontum, and in the provinces around Saigon. But they were still waiting, with fingers crossed, to see when it would start, how rough it would be—and even whether the big thing might be put off until the autumn.

THE ECONOMIST
19 February 1972

CPYRGHT

The electronic war

The gadgets take over

Ever since the 1968 Tet offensive the Americans have got anxious at about this time of year. But this year their precautions have gone to unusual lengths. They have brought another aircraft-carrier to the Vietnam coast; more B-52s have been put into Guam; and the bombing of what are believed to be jumping-off points for the predicted communist offensive has been

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uncommonly well advertised. Above all, the American command now has more sophisticated methods of assessing enemy activities than relying on hunches and anniversaries. The electronic war along the Ho Chi Minh trails is in full swing.

Since 1968 the Americans have laid a \$3,000m electronic network along the communists' supply route from North Vietnam. The development of electronic warfare for Vietnam began earlier, under Mr McNamara. But it was the successful use of electronic sensors to detect enemy troops during the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968 that

converted General Westmoreland to the idea of their wider use.

The most common form of sensor is shaped like a torpedo, with antennae made of green plastic which blend in with the Laotian jungle. When dropped from the air, the torpedo part of the sensor is buried and then records the movement of men or vehicles passing by. There are also acoustic sensors, which pick up noises above ground, and a host of other devices implanted on the trail: metal detectors to detect enemy troops, electronic sensors to detect enemy troops during the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968 that converted General Westmoreland to the idea of their wider use. The most common form of sensor is shaped like a torpedo, with antennae made of green plastic which blend in with the Laotian jungle. When dropped from the air, the torpedo part of the sensor is buried and then records the movement of men or vehicles passing by. There are also acoustic sensors, which pick up noises above ground, and a host of other devices implanted on the trail: metal detectors to detect enemy troops, electronic sensors to detect enemy troops during the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968 that converted General Westmoreland to the idea of their wider use.

up trucks' ignition, and the notorious "people-sniffers." These eerie devices are said to detect the ammonia in human urine.

The sensors and their like are laid in patterns parallel with the Ho Chi Minh trails. Their signals are relayed back to computers in Thailand which can then calculate the number of men or vehicles, their speed, distance apart and direction. The patterns of signals built up by the computers can reveal other subtleties. For instance, a convoy which takes an unexpectedly long time to pass a set of sensors may reveal that there is a truck park in the area; a southbound convoy which stops and then heads back towards the north may indicate a dump; and silence from the sensors may mean that the North Vietnamese have constructed another bypass.

Once the targets are identified, it is up to the bombers from the four American bases in Thailand and the jets flying off the Seventh Fleet's aircraft-carriers to attack them. The most common bomb is the 750 lb blockbuster. But there are other bombs,

as ingenious as the sensors: bombs with radar, TV, and laser guidance built in. There is also the particularly destructive "mother" bomb which rains smaller bombs over a wide area. One form of bombing is "geological bombing." Geological faults are surveyed and then bombed in the hope of causing landslides across part of the trails.

Airborne gunships have been fitted up with computers which relate automatic-sighting devices, such as infra-red radar for night work, to the actual firing. In all, it makes up a much more precise system of bombing than anything the Americans had four years ago. As General Westmoreland once mused, "I see combat areas under 24-hour surveillance where we can destroy anything we locate through instant communications and almost instantaneous application of firepower."

That, at least, is the theory. Whether it works in practice is another matter. The United States Air Force claims that it destroys almost 85 per cent of all war material coming down from North Vietnam. Even more impartial

observers estimate that the flow along the Ho Chi Minh trails is 40 per cent less than in previous years. But there is a cost.

Probably the number of non-combatants killed and wounded is small; there have never been many people living in the tangled hills through which the trails run, and most of them fled from the fighting some time ago. But the damage to the countryside is great. Large parts of eastern Laos, north-eastern Cambodia and the north-west of South Vietnam are now virtually free-fire zones. The days when targets in Laos and Cambodia had to be carefully checked out with the authorities in Phnom Penh and Vientiane have pretty well gone. Now the computers in Thailand do it all.

Yet it seems likely that the new capital-intensive war will go on for some time. The Americans' casualties in this aerial war are tiny. And is any politician going to campaign on a "bring back the sensors" platform in the United States?

The following are excerpts from news dispatches of January, February and March 1972.

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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
8 February 1972

By IAN WARD in Saigon

Waves of conjecture

According to the South Vietnamese high command, Hanoi's military re-deployment over the past two months has resulted in at least five and probably seven infantry divisions inside South Vietnam or in adjacent border areas. A further breakdown reveals the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Divisions — originally Viet Cong units but now comprising 80 per cent North Vietnamese regulars — stationed in Eastern Cambodia within walking distance of some of South Vietnam's most important population centres.

Hanoi's 320th Division, usually based in the Tchepone area of the Laos panhandle, has been sighted in the Communists' base area 600 near the tri-border. The Second Division, code-named NT2, formerly operational on the central coastal plains, is in the same region.

Some 6,000 Communist troops are known to be in the general

vicinity of Kontum city, and with them upwards of 50 tanks. Nearby, in Binh Dinh, long a Viet Cong stronghold and South Vietnam's least pacified province, Communist agents are busy organising "uprising committees" whose activities they clearly intend to co-ordinate with the coming offensive. Finally, further north, the 308th Division has returned to the demilitarised zone after assisting in flood relief throughout the Red River delta of North Vietnam.

This time Washington has decided to encourage speculation from Saigon's bevy of instant experts—television reporters and newspaper journalists. The reasoning is simple. In an election year it is far better to prepare the American public for torrid battles than have these erupt unannounced as in 1968.

At least the psychological impact of heavy South Vietnamese losses will be felt by the public—what—even though history has

shown that the first sign of trouble will automatically be interpreted by the Western Press as yet another Government débâcle.

Currently on offer is a complex battle strategy—a drive at the central highlands to suck in Saigon's strategic reserve, a feint at the capital city itself and a push to the coast along Route Nine, slicing off a chunk of Quang Tri province—a sort of thinking man's guide to Communist intentions. That three predicted commencement dates for the offensive have come and gone without incident in no way diminishes the waves of conjecture.

Optimists within the Government, and particularly in the Saigon high command, insist that the South Vietnamese military will not only prove the validity of Vietnamisation and pacification in the coming weeks, but will go on to demonstrate that 1972 is, for all intents and purposes, the war's final year. They estimate the number of

pointers to success.

High on the list are the remarkable strides made by the Thieu administration in terms of general political control. Saigon would not be normal without a liberal sprinkling of anti-Government fervor, yet the fact remains that there is no viable alternative to Thieu. And this has never been better appreciated by the opposition groupings than at this moment.

Vietnamisation and pacification are also considered plusses for the Government despite the outpour-

ings from sceptics who insist that both activities merely maintain facades of success.

Programmes of this nature, which must retain standards while continuing their expansion, are, by definition, delicately balanced. Setbacks in one field or another tend to produce a string of alarming statistics, readily available and open to limitless speculation.

That the war, for the past 18 months, has been fought essentially outside South Vietnam's borders—on the battlefields of Cambodia and Laos—is a testament in itself.

Having said this much, even the optimists concede the critical nature of world public opinion as fashioned by Press reports emanating from Saigon. No one appreciates better than they how Tet 1968, the Cambodian invasion and last year's Laos fighting became of incalculable propaganda value to the Communists.

Their confidence over the outcome of the Government's battlefield strategy does not extend to the war for international public opinion.

THE WASHINGTON POST
9 February 1972

Viet Province Prepares for Expected Battle

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By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

QUINHON, Feb. 8—The order has gone out to all government forces in Binh Dinh province that any soldier seen carrying a weapon but not wearing a helmet can be shot on the spot.

The reasoning behind this drastic regulation is that enemy troops in the past have managed to infiltrate close to villages and military outposts by donning government uniforms easily purchased in marketplaces.

"You see, now we will break the Vietcong plan," Col. Nguyen Van Chuc, Binh Dinh's province chief said

with a grin the other day. "They cannot find helmets (or boots for that matter) so they cannot fight."

For weeks now, Binh Dinh, a populous coastal province about 200 miles north of Saigon and one of South Vietnam's least secure areas, has been braced for a surge of enemy activity.

Indeed, many here in Quinhon, the provincial capital, are predicting a full-scale offensive. One captured document said the date would be Jan. 27. Now senior Americans fix the date as Feb. 10. Others make it even later.

Reinforcement

Among the signs of trou-

ble in Binh Dinh are intelligence reports that a North Vietnamese regiment recently crossed into the province from neighboring Quangnai to join the two regiments already there.

A 19-year-old North Vietnamese soldier, who defected to the government because he was weak from malaria and discouraged about ever getting home again, described in detail how his unit spent six months training in the Binh Dinh jungles for an assault they were told would come on Feb. 16, the second day of the Tet new year holiday.

"Cadres said this would be the big year," the soldier said in an interview at the

government center for defectors. "We would have to go all out this year or the war would drag on for another five."

Moreover, the South Vietnamese secret police confirmed in December that Vietcong political cadre were busily engaged in organizing "general uprising committees" and instructing people to make preparations for a big attack.

If what the Communists really do have in mind is another Tet-style military offensive, with the kind of popular uprising that failed to happen in 1968, then Binh Dinh is certainly one of the best places in South Vietnam to go all out.

THE ECONOMIST, London
13 January 1972

CPYRGHT

Confidence in Saigon

In Saigon, the mood on the eve of Tet is one of reasonable confidence – despite the expectation that the communists will make some sort of attack during the next few weeks. At the moment, the fighting is largely confined to the far north and extreme south.

The general picture is one of increasing prosperity. Transportation and commerce are flowing throughout the country, with the outgoing American troops being rapidly replaced by incoming ‘carpet-baggers’, sniffing possible big profits in the near future.

Both politically and economically, Saigon now sees itself in a position of strength. The controversial election of last October is now fading in the public’s memory; the new austerity measures are being pushed and accepted; the countryside is almost at peace; foreign money is coming in; oil drilling is about to start; and adequate continued support from the United States, both military and economic, is reasonably assured – thanks in no small measure to astute tactics by **Pham Kim Ngoc**, the economics minister, whose new schedule of ‘tiered’ exchange rates neatly hung the Vietnam albatross around Washington’s neck.

If anything, there is perhaps an excess of ebullience. The new draft investment law is couched in terms which suggest that its authors imagine that foreign capital is fighting to get in; the terms for repatriation of profits are not sufficiently attractive to lure investors, who have many other options. Second thoughts are now surfacing.

As **President Thieu** and his advisers see it, a democratic structure will be maintained but the future of the country will be in the hands of the army; there will be no more well-meaning but starry-eyed meddling by Washington to change this basic reality. There will be no demobilisation, and hence no significant unemployment. The surplus manpower of the armed forces will be used increasingly on development projects, but the armed forces will remain around their present strength for a long time to come. Thieu’s scenario is that, if there should be a ‘Peace of Amiens’ for a few years, South Vietnam should be ready to take the communists on, if and when they reopen the war in the late 1970s or 1980s. His more hawkish supporters talk seriously about a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam – ‘next time’.

All this may look like rhetoric to western observers – but it is a far cry from the mood of January, 1968. At the moment Thieu has probably firmer control than ever before. South Vietnam is gearing itself for a possible communist attack – but also for foreign business.

BALTIMORE SUN
12 March 1972

CPYRGHT

Pentagon clings to the view that a Hanoi offensive is likely

Forecasts of attacks

Forecasts of possible attacks in February—in part designed to insulate the public against shock effects—had come from Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Army chief of staff, and U.S. officials in Vietnam and at the Paris talks.

General Westmoreland said during a Vietnam visit January 31 that there was “every indication” the enemy was preparing for an offensive. Pased on intelligence, estimates, this could come in February. “Indications” were that it would come in the highlands and northern border regions.

He noted that the military forces had to develop their plans on the basis of the capabilities being shown by the fur.

Mr. Laird, too, spoke at the end of January of “several (enemy) spectacylars THIS YEAR, probably some time in February, and undoubtedly against this summer and some time

before the presidential election herem

The officials proved to be wrong in predicting the timing for the first attack,s but not, authorities say, in their estimate of the enemy build-up, which is still going on.

There is thus no chortling in official circles, as there has

been in some areas, over the failure of an offensive to materialize as yet.

"All the evidence shows the enemy is building the capability for an offensive," a well-placed Defense Department source said. "There are even larger forces in place than there were a few weeks ago. Units long in South Vietnam are being beefed up. We don't have the enemy's plans, but we'll believe the capability for attack has subsided when we see those divisions move away."

The enemy divisions (usually numbering 8,000 to 10,000 men) believed preparing for attacks, six in all, are strategically located along the Ho Chi Minh trail opposite the northern part of South Vietnam, with some elements inside the country, and opposite Military Region 3.

Opposite Khe Sanh

The 304th Division is reported opposite Khe Sanh in the far northwest, the 324th near the A Chau Valley, and the 320th partly in the Central Highlands, and partly in the enemy's so-called B-3 front in the tri-border area where Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam meet. A fourth division, the 308th, has moved down from Vinh and is available across the buffer zone.

These forces are in addition to smaller units normally based in the B-3 front.

The other three divisions, the 5th, 7th and 9th in eastern Cambodia, have moved closer to the border of the 3d Military Region.

Officials can only offer their best judgment as to why an enemy in an attack posture has not actually attacked. They are heavily persuaded, however, that serious disruption of the

foe's schedule was caused by the aerial counteraction.

Systematic strikes

This began with systematic B-52 strikes in mid-January and was bolstered in mid-February by Air Force and Navy fighter-bomber attacks.

There was also the increased readiness of the South Vietnamese ground forces, making it additionally difficult for the foe to achieve the sort of surprise that it managed in Tet, 1968.

And there remains the simple explanation that this may not have been the time chosen by Hanoi for attacking.

An authoritative analysis holds, however, that it is hardly possible the Allied forces were victims of a hoax, given the knowledge at hand of battle orders and extensive battlefield preparations.

Rise in enemy raids

There was no visible disposition to hold off because of President Nixon's visit to China, according to this reasoning, and in fact there was a rise in enemy raids in and around population centers after Tet in mid-February. These raids proved to be unimpressive, however, and analysts conclude the enemy tried to mount some attacks but that the plans flopped.

The effort to build up strength near population centers continues, hand-in-hand with the bolstering of division forces near the borders, it is said.

All authorities continue to express confidence in the South Vietnamese ability to cope with the attacks when and if they come, assuming the continuing availability of American air support.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1972

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Any Enemy Offensive Expected to Be Long

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

Troop Shifts Described

The intelligence data on which the Pentagon officials base their projections of North Vietnamese intentions over the next few months report the recent movement of three divisions—the 320th, the 324-B and the 304th—into positions along the Laotian-South Vietnamese border; a fourth, the 308th, is reported poised just above the northwestern end of the demilitarized zone.

About 50,000 replacement troops are said to be strung out along the infiltration "pipeline" from North Vietnam through Laos. Since the trip normally takes about three months, the replacements should enter South Vietnam in February, March and April, the intelligence reports say.

The level of infiltration, up more than 10 per cent over last year, appears channeled toward units in the northern half of South Vietnam rather than those in Cambodia and the southern half, as were most replacements last year, intelligence analysts say. They discern plans for major combat in the two northern military regions.

Because they believe the enemy's supplies are deficient,

they expect the offensive to be focused close to sources of supply. Operations in the southern half of the country are expected to be limited to rocket and terror attacks.

'Probably Into May'

The continued movement into the northern end of the pipeline, the analysts add, leads to the conclusion that operations will not end after a week or two of heavy fighting. "We look for repeated assaults throughout the dry season, probably into May," a general said.

The intelligence reports said that the flow of trucks along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos is at record levels, with each truck carrying about four tons of supplies. In two nights last week, it was said, American gunships damaged about 200 trucks a night.

"This won't stop the flow," an analyst said. "They merely feed more trucks into the system. But it reduces and slows the delivery effort, without doubt."

The American planners believe that United States and South Vietnamese fighter-bombers could play a decisive role in efforts to meet the expected assaults. Whether this would mean heavy strikes against supply depots in North Vietnam,

as hinted in recent Presidential speeches, has not been decided, the officials said.

"But if North Vietnam moves the 308th Division through the DMZ into South Vietnam," a ranking official said, "I would expect a decision to bomb supporting supply targets as far up the peninsula of North Vietnam as is necessary to stop the flow. That, at least, is what we'd recommend to the President."

The Political Advantages

The analysts say that, from Hanoi's perspective, an effective campaign this spring and summer might offer a real prospect of eliminating the last vestiges of American force and making moot the question of the United States presence as a negotiating issue.

The officials believe the North Vietnamese have concluded that the political advantages of such a result would outweigh whatever military risks might be entailed. They analyze North Vietnamese thinking in this way:

Besides embarrassing President Nixon during his visit to Peking starting Feb. 21, bloody combat after a hiatus of nearly four years should rekindle the Vietnam issue during the Presidential campaign. Widely publicized defeats of South Vietnamese troops, if they were, might convince the American public that Mr. Nixon's policy

of Vietnamization—turning the war over to Saigon in the expectation it could protect itself—was a failure.

North Vietnam could well view that as enhancing the prospects of the Democratic candidates for the Presidency, most of whom, according to the Pentagon theory, might be expected to pledge a quick and total withdrawal of American forces. Alternatively, if President Nixon considered his reelection endangered, he might decide to shift his strategy to take the issue away from his Democratic rival.

The prospect of a series of enemy attacks this spring, particularly in the Central Highlands and the northern provinces of South Vietnam, has been suggested in recent weeks by the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Mr. Kissinger and various generals and civilian advisers.

More recently some local officers in the field, Vietnamese and American, have said they believed the speculation had been overstated.

Brig. Gen. Pham Van Phu, commander of South Vietnam's First Division, at Hue, voiced doubt that the North Vietnamese in his sector would be supplied to begin a major offensive for at least a couple of months. The commander of the nearby Third

Division, Brig. Gen. Vu Van Giai, voiced similar doubts.

Officials in Washington say that even though enemy forces do not have what a cautious planner would regard as requisite supplies for a major assault, they may still be ordered to proceed, depending more than usual on infiltration for enough ammunition and replacements to continue the attack.

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April 1972

RUSSIFYING RELUCTANT SOVIET NATIONS

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which exploits to the fullest propaganda possibilities of all anniversaries, has issued a decree for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922. Like the year-long tedium of the Lenin Centenary in 1970, this "celebration" will also serve an ulterior purpose. Just as the Lenin anniversary attempted to revive the moribund religion of Leninism and use it to reunify all Communist parties under direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this year's special effort is to insure continued Russian domination of the non-Russian minority nationalities of the Soviet Union.

With cavalier but typical disregard for the facts, the decree states (according to TASS International, 21 February, attached), "The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friendship of free peoples, that history has never seen before," and "all the peoples of the country have come to see by their own long experience how rich are the fruits of unity," and "the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test of practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a complete victory." Those familiar with Communist style will recognize that such exaggerations are the most necessary when they are the least accurate. Certainly Communist parties around the world, to whom Soviet Russia presents itself as the only model, recognize the falsity of such words. So do the nationalities coerced and dragooned into the Soviet Union; they are the most affected and least deceived.

The 50-year effort to dominate and Russify these subject peoples is one of the cruelest sagas of modern imperialism and one of the least known. Within seven years of establishing the new Soviet Union, many old non-Russian Bolsheviks had been purged. The constitution had affirmed the republics' right to secede but Moscow had made it clear that each republic was considered an inseparable part of the USSR. In the 1940's Stalin moved whole populations* (including Communist Party and Komsomol members) out of the Caucasus and Crimea to Soviet Asia, ostensibly for collaborating with invading Germans. The death toll of these long

*The most prominent nationalities were Balkars, Chechens, Ingushi, Kalmyks, Karachai, Meshketians, and Crimean Tatars.

marches went well over 40%! One scholar, Robert Conquest,** estimates conservatively that 1,650,000 people were deported from their ancestral homelands in addition to 200,000 Germans who had moved into the Volga farmlands after World War I. Incredible as it seems, neither the mass deportations nor even the existence of these nationalities were mentioned in the Soviet press from the migration period until 1956, the year Khrushchev exposed many of Stalin's crimes. They and their homelands simply ceased to exist. Russians and Ukrainians were quickly moved in to fill the vacuum and place names were changed. The Russian minority now dominates these areas, even where some deported peoples have been allowed to return. Russian language takes precedence, intermarriage is officially encouraged, provincial arts and languages are discouraged. Russification extended to the Baltic countries as well. By the 1959 census, Russians constituted 26% of the population of Latvia (67% in the capital, Riga) and 20% of Estonia. In the south the Kazakhs were a mere 25% of the Kazakhstan population.

The Crimean Tatars have suffered most of all the "un-nations." These Turkic-speaking Muslims lived under a Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic until 1928 when their leaders were executed or thrown into concentration camps. As a consequence, a few thousand Tatars joined the Germans to fight the Russian despot during World War II. For the traitorous actions of this small minority of Tatars, Stalin deported all Crimean Tatars -- some 200,000. According to Andrei Sakharov, the prominent Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights champion, 46% of them -- mostly children and old people -- died en route to Siberia. The Tatar Republic was abolished. Tatar buildings were destroyed, their books burned and even cemeteries were ripped up. The region is now part of the Ukraine.

In 1956 Khrushchev rehabilitated many of the nationalities when he denounced both Stalin and the mass repression against "whole nations." But it was not until 1964 that the Crimean Tatars regained some civil rights and limited cultural freedom. But even now, unlike some groups, the Tatars have not been permitted to return to their homelands. Virtually the entire population has demonstrated and petitioned for redress of their grievances. In reply, hundreds were arrested and imprisoned for "bourgeois nationalism" (which is the charge leveled against more than half of all the camp and prison inmates throughout the USSR). Meanwhile, the Soviet press announces that the Crimean Tatars are happy where they are.

The most populous of the minority nations: the Ukraine, and the most prosperous: the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and

**The Nation Killers: Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, Robert Conquest, MacMillan, 1970.

Estonia are the centers of resistance to Russification. Both regions exhibit a fine contempt and hatred for their Russian masters. The effect of repression on other peoples, too, has been to increase their resistance to official assimilation efforts. The minority groups who escaped persecution, as in the Volga region, have already been partly assimilated. Why, then, has Moscow decided to push this seemingly unproductive minorities campaign now? The reason may lie in several current developments which feed Soviet paranoia over what it calls a lack of unity but which is actually a matter of rising discontent over 50 years of Russian-imposed political and cultural domination:

-- Nearly 250,000 Jews, 8% of the Soviet Jewish population, have applied to emigrate. Under pressure of world opinion, nearly 15,000 were permitted to leave in 1971. Those remaining have been severely harassed in the regime's effort to suppress further agitation, but the success of the few has surely emboldened other minority peoples.

-- Courageous dissenters among Russian intellectuals might take up the nationalists' cause. Both Andrei Amalrik, author of "Will Russia Survive Until 1984?" and Sakharov have expressed sympathy with the struggle. Dissident General Petr Grigorenko, still imprisoned in a mental asylum, has actively supported the Crimean Tatars' pleas. The possibility of the nationalists and internationally known intellectuals speaking with one voice raises before the Soviet leaders the fearsome specter of another international scandal of the magnitude created by their misuse of psychiatric hospitals to suppress dissent.

-- Rising nationalism among Eastern European Communist countries could infect Soviet nationalities and vice versa. While Tito fears that separatist demands of the Croat republic of Yugoslavia and the federation crisis they precipitated could bring Soviet troops in for a Czech-like crackdown, Moscow undoubtedly sees Croat chauvinism as a dangerous precedent for its own republics. In varying degrees, the Czech experiment of 1968 and the Polish food riots of 1970 were also protests against centralized Moscow authoritarian command over all Communized peoples. This centralized Moscow control is, of course, the real meaning of the "spirit of socialist internationalism" of which Brezhnev spoke to the 24th Party Congress in 1971 while he railed against "nationalist chauvinism."

-- The stagnating economy and agricultural failures throughout the Soviet Union require continued exploitation of the resources of non-Russian republics. Any loosening of the tight economic reigns over the richer republics could spell enormous difficulties.

With all these pressures simmering below the surface, the CPSU can be expected to flood the country from now until the December anniversary with exhortations to unity, decrying the evils of nationalism. Harsher repressive measures can also be expected. In January alone, twelve nationalist dissidents were arrested in the Ukraine and 100 in Lithuania for anti-state activity. Many protests and many trials have been kept quiet. A Latvian group of Communists has protested attempts to Russify their country (see attached).

The effect of this nationalities problem on the Soviet Union is twofold. First, since to the regime unity means stability, the regime's failure to "unify" all peoples reinforces their fear of relaxing controls and thus results in even stronger conservatism. But this extreme conservatism in turn serves to sharpen nationalist discontents.

Secondly, the obvious hypocrisy of the regime on the nationalities question adds to the alienation of the intellectuals and humanists, who are the very people most secessionist-minded. An example of this hypocrisy is the CPSU accusation that the southern republics are blind to the distinction between the "progressive historic meaning of the union for the Caucasus with Russia and the colonialistic actions of the Czars in the Caucasus." While the Soviet leaders continue to call for liberation of peoples in non-Communist countries around the world, righteously declaring all peoples' right to self-determination, they condemn every breath of nationalistic feeling among their own (non-Russian) peoples. Finally, the CPSU continuously cites Lenin to bolster the centralized control concept but ignores his pre-revolutionary statements (as Lenin did after he took power) on the right of the republics to disagree, even to secede. The ultimate and most visible symbol of the fraud inherent in Soviet nationalities policy is the fact that two Soviet nations, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, which patently have no independence of any kind -- thus even less than the minimum granted to the Soviet Union's East European satellites -- hold seats in the United Nations!

TASS, Moscow
22 February 1972

CPSU DECISION ON 50TH ANNIVERSARY

The Central Committee of the CPSU has adopted a decision on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be marked on December 30. "For its political significance and socioeconomic consequences the formation of the USSR occupies an outstanding place in the history of the Soviet state," says the decision published here.

This action made it possible to ensure favourable conditions for reshaping society on socialist principles, raising the economy and culture of all the Soviet republics, strengthening the defence might and the international positions of this multi-national state. "The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friendship of free peoples, that history has never seen before."

Great merit in creating the multi-national socialist state, the decision notes, goes to Lenin.

On 30 December, 1922, the first all-union Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted a declaration on the formation of the USSR.

The treaty on the formation of the union was first concluded by the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet republics. In 1924 the Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet republics, and in 1929 the Tadzhik Soviet Republic were formed. In 1936 the Kazakh and Kirghiz autonomous republics were made into union republics. In the same year the Azerbadzhan, Armenian and Georgian republics, earlier comprised in the Transcaucasian Federation, became constituent members of the USSR.

The reunification of the Ukrainian people in 1936-1945 and of the Belorussian people in 1939 were stupendous events. In 1940 the working people of Latvia, Lithuanian and Estonia restored Soviet statehood and the republics joined the USSR. As a result of the reunification of the Moldavian people the Moldavian Autonomous Republic was made into a union republic.

"The practice of forming a multinational state of a new type, shows that only a socialist revolution ensures the close unification of all the popular forces led by the working class, aimed at eliminating the system of capitalist exploitation and the system of national oppression at the same time".

"Only the communist party, which expresses the vital interests of the working class, of all working people, which pursues a Leninist nationalities policy, could rally together all the nations and nationalities into a single internationalist brotherhood and direct their efforts towards the building of a new society", the decision says.

The path towards the unification of equal peoples into a socialist family was neither easy nor simple.

"Formidable difficulties connected with economic and cultural backwardness had to be overcome, the attempts by counter-revolution to utilize in its aims the legacy of former national strife, bourgeois nationalism and great-power chauvinism, the resistance of the national-deviationists within the party--had to be fought".

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4

The Central Committee of the CPSU notes that the formation of the USSR was dictated by the objective course many-sided experience of the Soviet peoples, a reflection of their aspirations. The question of the unification of the Soviet republics was broadly discussed: The working people of all the nationalities expressed their unbending will and determination to unite their forces and resources for achieving the common goal--the building of socialism and communism.

The decision states that the Soviet Union is approaching the red-letter date "with great achievements in all spheres of life".

The concentration of material assets and efforts, the selfless mutual aid of the Soviet people made it possible to create a highly-developed industry and large-scale mechanised agriculture in all the republics. Instead of the feudal and semifeudal borderlands of Tsarist Russia, there have grown up industrial and cultural centres, well-appointed towns and villages. Exploitation and the exploiter classes, unemployment, illiteracy, have been eliminated, the workers and peasants alliance has strengthened. Socialist nations have formed, the social and ideological-political unity of the Soviet people has firmly taken root. More than forty peoples who in the past had no script are now the possessors of developed literary languages. The culture of the peoples, socialist in content, national in form, is flourishing.

"All the peoples of the country, notes the decision, have come to see by their own long experience how rich are the fruits of unity".

"A new historical community of people has emerged during the years of socialist and communist construction in the USSR--the Soviet nation", states the decision. It has formed on the basis of social ownership of the means of production, unity of the economic, socio-political and cultural life, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the unity of the interests and communist ideals of the working class. All the material and spiritual conditions necessary for the further growth of every Soviet person, for the all-round development of the personality, have been created in the USSR.

"The Marxist-Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test of practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a complete victory", the decision points out.

"The formation and successful development of the USSR of its tremendous international significance, an important milestone in mankind's social progress", the decision stresses. The Soviet experience of creating a multi-national socialist state has won world recognition and is of invaluable aid to all fighters for social and national liberation. The system of capitalism is now opposed by the world socialist system. Relations between socialist countries "are increasingly characterized by constantly growing political, economic and cultural ties, by a development of economic integration, by an active exchange of experience and knowledge and close cooperation in the field of foreign policy".

"The USSR comes out on the world scene as a force firmly and consistently pursuing a policy of peace and friendship, upholding the Leninist principles of equality of nations, resolutely opposing colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of national oppression. This policy was and is a most important factor resisting the aggressive strategy of imperialism and reaction, an instrument of active struggle against wars of conquest, for the security and freedom of the peoples, for social progress", the decision says.

With the young national states the USSR has established relations based on equality, mutual respect, non-interference into internal affairs and on all-round cooperation in the common anti-imperialist struggle. "The Soviet Union consistently supports the revolutionary movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for economic liberation from imperialism, for social progress. The USSR conducts a policy of international solidarity with the patriots who are fighting arms in hand against the still existing colonial and racist regimes"

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4

The Soviet Union consistently upholds the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The decision notes that the constructive and realistic programme of struggle for peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of the peoples, set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress, is of tremendous importance for the implementation of the USSR's Leninist foreign policy course.

It is a mighty, monolithically united Soviet people, confidently and purposefully advancing under the leadership of the communist party along the road mapped out by the party's programme, by the 24th CPSU Congress which is approaching the USSR's 50th anniversary, the decision says.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1972

Soviet Organizing Fete For Its 50th Anniversary

By THEODORE SHARAD
Special to The New York Times

CPYRGT

MOSCOW, Feb. 22—As plans for the bicentennial of the American Revolution appear to be floundering on, the Soviet Communist party, which runs a tight ship, laid down the law today for an anniversary of its own, and there were no ifs or buts.

A party decree filling all of the front page and half of the second page of all major newspapers this morning mobilized the nation's resources for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union next Dec. 30.

The Soviet Union was established in 1922, five years after the Communists seized power in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

In the first five years after that revolt, a chaotic political situation and Civil War led ultimately to the formation of nominally independent Soviet

republics, which then banded together to become the Soviet Union, or, as its full title runs, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the United States, plans for the country's 200th birthday have been bedeviled by the failure of Philadelphia, the proposed center of the 1976 celebrations, to come up thus far with an acceptable plan.

Today's Communist party decree, setting the keynote for the Soviet celebrations, contained such sweeping instructions mobilizing people in all walks of life as to raise some doubt whether the preparations would leave time for anything else this year. The nation already faces the problem of meeting the ambitious production goals set by the current five-year plan.

The decree called on the editors of the major news-

papers, all of which are officially controlled, to publicize preparations for the 50th anniversary and to vaunt the party's policy toward this country's national minorities, which is being presented as a model of interethnic relations.

The Soviet Union's political structure of republics and other minority areas is nominally based on the various ethnic communities that have been settled within its boundaries.

Judging from the party decree, the anniversary celebrations are to be used mainly to portray the Soviet Union as a country in which ethnic animosities have been eliminated, bias and prejudice rooted out, and the various communities live in peace with one another.

However, the decree also launched a campaign of indoctrinating citizens in ethnic relations, suggesting that at least

some vestiges of ethnic prejudice, nationalism and chauvinism still survive.

All industrial plants, farms, offices, schools and construction projects, as well as military units, were instructed to hold meetings commemorating the anniversary.

Communist youth organizations received orders to indoctrinate young people particularly in what the Communists view as their approach to ethnic problems.

Political commissars in the armed forces are to focus their talks "on further strengthening of friendship and fraternity among servicemen from different ethnic groups."

Writers and artists were called upon to work on ethnic themes, and the 50th anniversary is to be commemorated with conferences, exhibitions, festivals and sports events.

LATVIAN PROTEST HELD AUTHENTIC

Letter Circulated in Europe
Charges 'Russification'

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26—A letter attributed to 17 Latvian Communists, complaining about what they say are efforts by Moscow to "Russify" their Baltic republic, has been sent to several foreign Communist parties.

A copy of the letter, which has been published in Western Europe, was made available recently to The New York Times by Latvian émigrés here. United States Government analysts who have studied it say they believe it is authentic and consistent with what was already known of the nationalistic tendencies still prevalent in Latvia, which was forcibly annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940.

The Voice of America has already broadcast the full text to the Soviet Union.

The letter is not signed, but in the body of the document the 17 say: "We are Communists

and most of us have been such for 25-35 years and more. We wish only well to socialism, Marxism - Leninism and mankind."

They declare, "We cannot sign this letter," but do not say why.

Russian Chauvinism Charged

The chief complaint in the 5,000-word document is that the Soviet leaders are practicing

"Great Russian chauvinism" and are seeking to force the smaller Soviet ethnic groups, such as the Latvians, to assimilate with the Russians.

Although an effort was made to redress ethnic problems after Stalin's death, the letter says, current policy is to transfer as many Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians — all Slavs—to Latvia and the other Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania.

The letter criticizes the creation of new industrial sites in Latvia and the influx of non-Latvian workers. It points out that the republic now has "a number of large enterprises where there are almost no Latvians among the workers, engineering - technical personnel, and directors."

"There are also those where most of the workers are Latvians but none of the executives understands Latvian," it asserts. "There are entire institutions where there are very few Latvians. The apparatus of the Ministry of Interior in Riga, for example, has 1,500 em-

ployees, but only 300 of them are Latvians."

The Interior Ministry supervises the police force.

The letter says that about 65 per cent of the doctors do not speak Latvian "and because of this often make crude mistakes in diagnosing illnesses and prescribing treatment."

'Just Indignation' Cited

"All this calls forth just indignation in the local population," it declares.

The letter maintains that priority is given to "the progressive Russification" of all life in Latvia, and the assimilation of the Latvians."

There are now about 2.4 million people in Latvia, of whom only about 57 per cent are ethnically Latvian, a drop of 5 per cent in the last decade. Russians make up 30 per cent of the population, a 3 per cent increase. Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Jews and Ukrainians make up the remaining 13 per cent.

The decrease in the percentage of Latvians living in Latvia has been due not only to the influx of non-Latvians, but also to the exceptionally low birth rate in the republic, combined with an aging Latvian population.

For instance, in 1969, Latvia recorded a birth rate of only 14 per thousand, which is the smallest of any republic in the Soviet Union. Its death rate was 11.1 per thousand, the second

highest after Estonia. This means that its natural increase (birth rate minus death rate) was only 2.9 per thousand, also the smallest in the Soviet Union. The natural increase for the Soviet Union as a whole in 1969 was 8.9 per thousand.

Russian Broadcasts Noted

The letter states that although Latvians still are in the majority, two-thirds of the radio and

television broadcasts are in Russian. Latvian writers have more difficulty getting their works published than Russians, it says, and "in all republic, city, and district organizations, in most local organizations and in all enterprises, business is conducted in Russian."

"If there is a single Russian in an organization, he will demand that the meeting be conducted in Russian, and his demand will be satisfied," the letter goes on. "If this is not done, then the collective is accused of nationalism."

The letter specifically decries the "loud preaching" of mixed marriages in the republic and says that Latvian language theater groups must produce Russian plays but that Russian language groups rarely have Latvian ones.

The letter was received by the Communist parties of Rumania, Yugoslavia, France, Austria and Spain among others. It calls on them to use their influence with Soviet leaders to improve the state of the Latvian and other ethnic groups.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
13 March 1972

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG reports on a new trend in Soviet protest

Ukraine's law-abiding dissidents

In the latest drive against Soviet dissidents more arrests have taken place in the Ukraine than anywhere else in the USSR. Three names have already been mentioned in the official Soviet press: Ivan Svityehny, a literary critic and translator; Vyacheslav Chornovil, a journalist and critic; and Yevgen Sverstyuk, a literary critic and educationist.

Dissident sources in the Ukraine have now disclosed the names of 13 more prisoners: Irene Stasir, a poetess;

Stephanie Shabatura, an artist specialising in carpet designs; Vasyl Stus, a poet and literary critic; Alexander Serhiyenko, a teacher; Leonid Zelenenko and Zinoviy Antonyuk, about whom there is no biographical information.

Nicholas Shumuk, who had already spent 27 years in labour camps in prewar Poland and then under Soviet rule; Stephanie Hulyk, a student; Michael Osadchy, a poet and philosopher; Ivan Hel, a worker and student of history; the Rev. Vasyl Romanyuk, a Roman Catholic priest; Gregory Chubay, a poet; and Hryhoriy Kochur, a translator.

Why has the KGB singled out the Ukraine as a special target? Since the charge against the defendants will no doubt be "nationalism" as well as having engaged in "anti-Soviet activities," it is important to realise that national sentiments have been rising throughout the Soviet Union.

The Chronicle of Current Events — that remarkable clandestine periodical — has within the past year reported the arrests and trials of "nationalists" in such widely scattered areas as Armenia, Tadzikistan, Lithuania, Moldavia, on the movement of Jews to Israel, and on the campaign waged by the Crimean Tartars and the Meskhetians for their right to return to their original homelands, from which they were expelled at the end of the Second World War for having

collaborated with the Nazi invaders.

Nowhere, however, have national feelings been more strongly held than among the 40 million Ukrainians—the second-largest group in the Soviet Union, and the second-largest nationality next to the Russians.

Indeed, the entire history of Soviet Ukraine is one of continuous turmoil, of efforts, on Moscow's part, either to come to terms with the powerful currents of nationalism in the Ukraine, or to suppress them by methods ranging from outright terror to the banning of the Ukrainian language from institutions of higher learning and the assignment of Russians to leadership posts in traditionally Ukrainian areas.

Moscow's difficulties were increased during the immediate postwar period with the absorption of millions of Western Ukrainians who lived in areas formerly belonging to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.

Separatist sentiments were much stronger among the Western Ukrainians than those who had already lived for nearly three decades under Soviet rule, and so were Right-wing ideological predilections, which led many Ukrainians to wage bitter guerrilla struggles against the Red Army in some areas well into the late 1940s.

With his customary disregard for distinctions, Stalin labelled all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism as "bourgeois" and "anti-Soviet." In the 1930s, the cream of the Ukrainian intelligentsia — many of whom were unflinchingly loyal to the Soviet regime — was decimated on charges of "bourgeois nationalism." During and after the Second World War, whole village populations would often be accused of collaborating with the anti-Soviet guerrillas, and either massacred or deported to Central Asia and the Far Eastern parts of the country.

These strong-arm methods were superseded by cultural and administrative Russification — policies which continued until well after Stalin's

death, and which have been only partially ameliorated under Khrushchev and his successors. Yet the very relaxation of Soviet policies in the Ukraine — above all the elimination of wholesale terror — has created a situation which the regime may well consider potentially more dangerous than sporadic military forays by starving and poorly armed guerrillas.

In the mid-1960s, a new breed of Ukrainian nationalists came to the fore. Known as the *shestidesiatniki* (men of the sixties), these have been mainly young intellectuals, many of whom had been dedicated members of the Komsomol (the Communist youth organisation) and of the Communist Party.

"Card-carrying" members or not, almost all consider themselves Marxists or democratic Socialists, as well as inheritors of the humanistic traditions of nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature. Their protest against specific policies of the regime has not been voiced in anti-Soviet terms but rather in legal terms.

Much as their counterparts in Moscow and Leningrad, they have not criticised Soviet laws and institutions as such, but rather those who have consistently violated them — the police, the courts, the censors.

To the extent that they have opposed forced Russification and have urged a greater degree of cultural autonomy for their country, they have done so on strictly constitutional grounds — in other words, as freedoms granted both to individuals and to national groups by the Soviet Constitution (freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience — articles 124 and 125), and as legitimate expressions of Lenin's views on the rights of ethnic minorities in a Socialist society.

True, some of them have also either alluded to, or openly come out in favour of, separate Ukrainian statehood — but again, basing themselves on the Soviet Constitution, article 17 of which guarantees the right of secession to all republics of the USSR.

In 1965-66, the secret police descended on these young intellectuals, detaining about 100 of them, and finally sentencing

about 20 to terms of hard labour ranging from six months to six years. The blatant violations of judicial norms perpetrated by the KGB and the courts (most of the trials, for instance, were held in secret) were highlighted in two remarkable documents compiled by Vyacheslav Chornovil. Chornovil himself was arrested in 1967 on charges of possessing "anti-Soviet documents," and sentenced to three years hard labour (the term was later reduced to 18 months).

In one of his letters from the labour camp, Chornovil — who is again under arrest — summarised what may be termed not only his personal, but the collective credo of the "men of the sixties":

"I categorically state, contrary to all illogical assertions... that I have always firmly adhered to the principles of socialism and continue to do so. But not of that socialism which tries to regiment not merely the actions but also the thoughts of individuals. I cannot imagine true socialism without guaranteed democratic freedoms, without the widest political and economic self-government of all the cells of the state organism down to and including the smallest, without a real guarantee — and not merely a paper one — of the rights of all nations within a multinational state."

It is these men and women, who again find themselves the objects of the secret police's wrath. Yet much has changed since 1965-6. For one thing, much as the authorities may try to smear the Ukrainian dissident with the brush of "bourgeois nationalism" and attempt to link them with the activities of Right-wing Ukrainian groups abroad, they will find it impossible to lend any credence to such charges.

The Ukrainian dissidents may be described — for want of better terms — as "national Communists" or "national democrats." Their ranks have swollen over the past five years or so, and their activities have grown correspondingly.

Perhaps their most notable achievement is the *samizdat* journal, the Ukrainian Herald, five issues of which have

appeared so far. In many respects similar to the Chronicle of Current Events, it has also published many literary works by Ukrainian writers and poets.

Its principal aim, however, has been to document all violations of "Socialist legality" in the Ukraine, all expressions of protest and dissent — by Ukrainians as well as other ethnic groups — and all manifestations of Russification and "Great Power chauvinism" by the Russian authorities.

Even more important — and most likely the key to the current crackdown in the Ukraine — is the steady but unmistakable convergence between the aims and tactics of the Ukrainians and the other dissidents in the USSR.

Five years ago, the eloquent pleas of the Ukrainian intellectuals for national and basic human freedoms found little echo among the intellectuals in Russia. Within the past two

years, however, the Chronicle of Current Events has enjoyed immense popularity and sympathy for the aspirations of the Ukrainian dissidents. There have even been reports of actual collaboration between groups in Moscow and Leningrad on the one hand and those in Kiev or Lvov on the other.

There can be little doubt that this growing ideological and practical collaboration causes considerable discomfiture in Moscow. For it is only by espousing popular grievances that the civil rights movement in the Soviet Union can hope to break out of its isolation, and begin to assume the character of a genuine mass movement.

While national aspirations have so far been voiced mainly by intellectuals (as they have been in every country over the past century), there is mounting evidence that they have struck a responsive chord among many ordinary men and women, who bitterly resent the manipu-

lative and arrogant tactics of (bosses).

Finally, it is worth speculating to what extent national awareness in the Ukraine (or for that matter in the Baltic republics) has been encouraged by the relative successes scored by the Jewish "exodus movement." Indeed, if the history of the emergence of public opinion in the USSR is ever written, the Jews may well turn out to have been one of its major catalysts.

There is no hard evidence of interaction between Jewish and Ukrainian nationalism, but it is curious that Soviet spokesmen have, over the past few months, taken to attacking alleged cooperation between "Zionists" and Ukrainian nationalists.

Articles under such titles as "Unholy alliance—collaboration between Zionists and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" have been appear-

ing in the pages of the Soviet First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Piotr Shelest, in a speech in Lvov said that "the Zionists and the nationalists have one master, one idea — a fierce hatred for everything Socialist, frantic anti-communism, and anti-Soviet activities."

Shelest repeated these charges on November 22 before a conference of Ukrainian "ideological workers," and at a meeting of the Lvov regional party committee on November 22 the "unholy alliance" was again fiercely denounced. These charges are patently absurd. If anything, Jews inside the Soviet Union, as well as Zionist spokesmen abroad, have been inordinately cautious lest the "exodus" movement be identified with any other manifestations of dissent in the USSR.

SHORT SUBJECTS

MOSCOW-CAIRO: RELATIONS RUFFLED?

Officially, all is well between Moscow and Cairo: Marshal Grechko left Egypt in late February amid renewed expressions of mutual regard; earlier in the month, after Egypt's President Anwar Sadat visited Moscow, he called his talks there a big success "in the formulation of common understanding." Actually, according to Sadat's own words, he was going to Moscow to seek Soviet support for a renewal of the war expressed in the form of long-range weapons, capable of striking deep into Israel. Instead, he came home with a communique stating both parties would push for a political settlement. And out of Grechko's visit came only agreement that the Soviet Union would improve Egypt's "defensive" capacity.

Thus, there is reason to believe that the Moscow-Cairo relationship, ostensibly closer than ever, is plagued at bottom by mistrust and animosities probably more severe than ever. Arab commentators have recently published a number of reports indicative of strained Soviet-Egyptian relations and increasing frictions. Among them was a report that several hundred Soviet technicians and Soviet surface-to-air missile teams left Egypt in December for India, taking their missiles with them. Another, that a high-ranking Soviet advisor was expelled by Egypt or, alternatively, that he had sought asylum in Israel, ostensibly having fled with Egypt's war plans tucked under his arm.

Other accounts broke in the Arab press during the first week of March to the effect that "the recent expulsion from Egypt of a high-ranking Soviet military advisor for criticism of the Egyptian army was the result of a confidential investigation ordered by the Egyptian authorities into the role played by a number of such Soviet personnel -- both military and civilian -- according to an authoritative source in Cairo." Reportedly, until the investigation is completed, Egyptian Minister of War Mohammad Ahmad Sadeq has refused further contact with any of the Soviet military advisors.

According to the stories, commanders of Egyptian units have for some time been under orders not to obey instructions issued by Soviet advisors before checking with Egyptian general headquarters and this precaution was being extended to civilian contacts as well. The chief reason behind such precautions as well as the large-scale investigation, is growing belief among Egyptian officials that the steady increase in activities undertaken by Soviet personnel in Egypt is connected not so much with genuine Egyptian-Soviet military cooperation as with purely Soviet strategic interests in the region --

"interests which do not necessarily coincide with those of Egypt and the Arab struggle against Israel."

The Soviets, on the other hand, are still highly skeptical, even contemptuous, about the political reliability and professional competence of the Egyptian military. While in most countries the great majority of so-called "public lectures" could never be construed as indicative of official thinking -- in the closed society of the Soviet Union they are often used to convey leadership attitudes. And, thus, we are probably seeing a faithful reflection of Soviet thinking in the words of an economics professor of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As reported by a Western correspondent who attended a lecture given earlier this year, the professor dismissed the Arabs as "ignorant for the most part, and very difficult to teach. . . We have stressed the need for ideological training to the Egyptians and for self-improvement in the qualitative aspects of defense. A typical example of the responses we get was their telling us that they had recently increased by one and a half times the reading requirements in their army. Whereas Egyptian soldiers used to read for 30 minutes a day, they now read for 45 minutes!" (laughter in the hall).

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A CZECH SPEAKS WITH A RUSSIAN ACCENT

The 12 February issue of the Paris daily Le Monde carried excerpts from a 21 October 1971 speech by Vasil Bilak to the Czech Central Committee. Member of the Czech party presidium in charge of relations with other Communist parties, Bilak is one of the two or three most powerful men in the Czech leadership. He is also widely known as a mouthpiece for the Soviet Union and it is this role which makes his criticism of "fraternal parties" of particular significance. The following are excerpts from Bilak's remarks as published by Le Monde:

a. Rumania "Comrade Ceausescu's trip to the Peoples Republic of China aroused considerable concern, not only in our party and our Republic, but in other socialist countries as well and in progressive circles throughout the world. Even the bourgeois press characterized this trip as an anti-Soviet act as well as against the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The Rumanian delegation, as the communique it signed in China indicates, not only remained silent in the face of Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, it also accepted praise for -- as the Chinese put it -- the 'courage of the Rumanian Socialist Republic in resisting the pressure of a great power.' ..The Chinese leadership used the visit of the Rumanian delegation to further its own nationalist and anti-Soviet objectives."

b. Yugoslavia "But we must take account of reality: there exist in that country (Yugoslavia) forces which are not interested in Yugoslavia's socialist prospects nor in improving relations with the countries which form the nucleus of world socialism. The influence of the working class on the formation of Yugoslav policy is weak, and to date a number of efforts aimed at changing this state of affairs have not been successful. There are serious problems regarding even the unity of the League of Yugoslav Communists and its leading role in society. The leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists does not control written and spoken media. In its international relations, Yugoslavia still adheres to its position of so-called non-engagement, even though this policy separates it from the socialist community and from the international Communist movement. We do not wish to interfere in Yugoslav affairs, but we are concerned that socialist principles be strengthened in that country and that it is governed according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. On the basis of our own experience, we say frankly to the Yugoslav representatives that, in a harsh class struggle, admonitions and prayers addressed to the adversaries of socialism are not effective, and that inconsistencies and the abandoning of Marxist-Leninist positions are always costly."

c. Parties which criticized Soviet interference in 1968 "Certain fraternal parties have indicated that they are unable to revise their incorrect stands regarding Czech events in 1968 without endangering their unity and weakening their position vis-à-vis the people. At present there are only a few parties which have reservations regarding the line of our party: especially the Communist parties of Australia, Great Britain, Spain, and -- regarding certain problems -- the Italian Communist Party. Although, for quite some time, we have been aware of certain centrifugal tendencies in the policies of the Italian Communist Party, we have made an effort not to complicate mutual relations. It is for this reason that we have suggested on more than one occasion to the leadership of this party that we concentrate on those questions which unite us, that is, on the struggle against the common class enemy. However, our willingness to accommodate has not been reciprocated. On the contrary, the Italian party press has published views of leading party officials which sometimes take the form of violent attacks against our party and an open interference in our internal affairs. The fact that some Communist parties still don't understand what took place in our party and in our country also has more serious reasons which relate to different opinions on a number of questions concerning the program, strategy and tactics of the international Communist movement..."

d. The Sudan "It would not have been wise to have surrendered voluntarily positions acquired with such difficulty in the Sudan and elsewhere. We would only have been playing the game of

imperialism which would be happy to see us lose the chance of influencing future events and break off our contacts with progressive forces resolved to carry out their just struggle. Moreover, involved in the Sudanese question were factors which could not be publicly discussed. These factors were obviously the errors committed by the leadership of the Sudan party. The group around Mahgoub, which was increasingly adopting sectarian positions, was wrong to criticize the revolutionary democratic regime of Nimeiry's progressive officers which had overthrown a government representing the feudals and the grande bourgeoisie. Another part of the leadership, which favored complete cooperation with Nimeiry, rejected the methods of the Secretary General and caused a split in the party. Having escaped from prison, Mahgoub began to prepare a military coup d'etat which neither we nor the other fraternal parties knew anything about." According to Bilak, the putsch was poorly prepared and had neither the support of the army nor of the masses. Now, according to Bilak, it is a question of aiding the Sudanese comrades to recognize their errors and mend their ways.

On 14 February the leading Milan daily Corriere della Sera published what it described as additional material from the Bilak speech, including criticisms of the Hungarian, Polish and East German parties, as follows:

a. Hungary "According to Bilak, Hungary is now making the same mistakes that the Czech leaders made in 1966 and 1967: the Hungarian economic reform is having the same political consequences as the little reforms carried out during the last phase of the Novotny dictatorship in Prague; the economic machinery is escaping from party control, setting in motion centrifugal forces which, in time, could pose problems for the party leadership itself. The fall of Novotny and election of Dubcek was caused, according to Bilak, by a series of errors analogous to those which Kadar and his colleagues are currently committing. Bilak allegedly told the plenum that the 'Hungarian brothers' had been informed of the Czech viewpoint."

b. Poland "Bilak then said that he was skeptical regarding the efforts of the Polish chief Gierak to improve the country's standard of living. In the opinion of the Czech leader, the Polish regime was being too flexible vis-à-vis the Church which was a sign of weakness. Bilak then expressed 'serious reservations' regarding the reappraisal of the workers committees in the factories carried out by Gierak after his meetings with the workers' representatives of the Baltic shipyards. The relative autonomy granted these committees could develop into 'an anarcho-syndical situation,' which, objectively, would be opposed to the program Gierak was trying to carry out. Consequently, new conflicts could arise and the regime could be weakened later on."

c. East Germany "Finally, Bilak directed his attention to East Germany. It would take 20 years, according to Bilak, for the political and economic apparatus of East Germany to recover from the consequences of the 'sclerotic administration' of Walter Ulbricht."

* * * * *

ECONOMICS MAY BE POWER, BUT NOT FOR CHILE OR CUBA

The scheduled opening of the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD-III) in Santiago this month affords an opportunity to take a look at the two Marxist-socialist experiments in the Western Hemisphere, Chile and Cuba. While innovation and experimentation are usually healthy things -- and may be so in Chile and Cuba -- one cannot help wondering where President Allende and Premier Castro are going and how.

Since both have been in office, Castro for 13 years and Allende for 17 months, neither has created a single new industry, neither has rationalized or reorganized the private sectors they have gobbled up, nor imported desperately needed new technology, nor provided the proper inducements to rally the workers in support of their "experiments." Castro's program, instead, is slowly destroying the backbone of his economy -- the sugar industry -- and Allende, at the rate he is going, is in danger of doing the same for the Chilean copper industry.

In 1970, Castro pledged the "honor" of the revolution to an unprecedented goal of a 10-million-ton sugar harvest: it failed. The "Year of Productivity" was the title Castro gave 1971: it turned out to be wishful thinking. By this year, Castro is complaining that "it is more difficult to govern than to wage guerrilla warfare." Perhaps wisely, he announced no official production target for sugar in 1972, having admitted in mid-1971 that it would even fall short of last year's harvest. And it looks as though 1972 will be another year of underproductivity for the barometer of Cuba's economy. With an anticipated harvest at about 4.5 million tons, Cuba faces a trade deficit with the USSR of up to about \$600 million. Also, because of the anticipated shortfall, Radio Havana announced last month an additional one-third cut in the domestic sugar ration in order to meet "unavoidable export commitments." A move guaranteed to do little toward raising the already abysmally low productivity of most Cuban workers.

In Chile, where President Allende is replacing skilled technicians and managers with political appointees, a recent visitor to that country reports that standards of service and production have already dropped alarmingly. The visitor cites the decline of the state railways

as an extreme example of how effective the new experiment is: some 300 trained engineers replaced by political elements; construction and repair work at a standstill because of shortages of materials and imported equipment and this in spite of a 72% increase in government subsidy; and some 40% of the rolling stock out of service, awaiting repair. But it is the impact of the experiment on the copper industry that has the most serious implications: production in the three large nationalized mines dropped 8% between January and September and the shortage of skilled manpower has become so acute that the state copper corporation is contracting for Yugoslav copper technicians at inflated salaries to be paid in dollars. Meanwhile, agricultural production has fallen to the point that Chile has to import foodstuffs and meat has been rationed -- an unheard of state of affairs for that country.

Attached are brief fact sheets on the recent economic performance in both Chile and Cuba -- the records speak for themselves. Also attached are excerpts from The Economist, 11 March 1972, describing a recent visitor's evaluation of the Chilean economy.

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A NEW DEAL FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FARMER

South Vietnam has just been invaded by a new force - the volatile, tam-wearing, highly vocal president of San Francisco State College, S. I. Hayakawa. Hayakawa, who is very much his own man, went to "see for himself" and returned a positive apologist for South Vietnam's land reform program particularly the government's administration of it and the performance of the peasant upon whom its lasting success really depends. Hayakawa has written a relatively brief history of his findings which he prefaced by pointing out that although land reform has long been an issue in Vietnam previous efforts to make it mean anything have always foundered because of mismanagement and a lack of will on all sides to see it through. On the other hand the healthier aspect of today's major land reform program, called "Land-to-the-Tiller," Hayakawa decided, can be attributed to two new ingredients: today's program has been well designed and well received and, equally important, President Thieu and his government have given the program the highest priority. As a mark of its determination to see the program work, in fact, the Saigon government made the politically-difficult decision to raise the official price of rice in the cities. The peasant was thereby given a strong incentive to progress from subsistence farming to production for the market. No longer does the tiller of the land turn over one-third to one-half of his crop to the landowner; today, the man who tills the soil in many cases actually owns it. By November 1971 over 350,000 farm families had already received titles to over one million acres of land; it is expected that by spring of 1973, 800,000 former tenant farmers will have become owners of the land they are working.

Hayakawa described seeing endless fields of rice at all stages of development during his inspection tours -- "young green plants as well as fields ready for harvesting or already harvested." He also saw the "fruit orchards and vegetables filling every available space, even between the rice paddies." In the fields whole families were at work, threshing the rice by hand, winnowing and piling it onto huge mats where it lined the rural roads. The peasants are being taught livestock culture, crop rotation, irrigation and cooperative marketing, for the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program is not enough in itself. The basic human ingredient of the program is that when the tiller can prosper his ownership of the land will have lasting significance. (See attached article for additional details.)

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ITALIAN COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO REJECT CZECH COMRADES

Enrico Berlinguer, the new secretary-general of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the first man with a record of public opposition to the Soviet Union to be elected to that post, has reiterated and formalized PCI criticism of the Soviet-installed regime in Czechoslovakia. The message of greeting from the Czech delegation (which, among others, did not address the XIIIth Italian party congress held in Milan from 13-15 March), as circulated at the congress and printed in the party organ l'Unita, contained the following preface from the PCI:

"In the spirit demanded by an internationalism which acknowledges not only diversity but also deep divergencies and an approach which to us involves basic questions of substance, we publish the complete message of the Czech CP delegation which expresses the positions of that party, positions we do not share but which we believe should be brought to the attention of the comrades."

The Czech message is distinguished by its unembarrassed deference to Moscow and by its challenge to the "revisionist renegades who denigrate our party from abroad.." (including, presumably, the PCI itself):

"The XIVth Czech party congress completed the victory of the Marxist-Leninist forces over the right-opportunist and revisionist currents which in 1968 provoked a serious crisis in the party and throughout our society, thus preventing the advance of the counter-revolution against all the major socialist values of our country.

"The CPC has again taken the Leninist path and our Republic has again become a solid and integral part of the socialist community, of which the main strength and bulwark is the Soviet Union.

..."Our undeniable successes achieved during the current period obviously belie the various calumnies spread about our party and its policies by anti-communist centers in whose service opportunistic and revisionist renegades have shamelessly enlisted, and who from abroad denigrate our party, the socialist system and the ties [i.e. relations with the Soviet Union] of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia."

LE MONDE, Paris
12 February 1972

Tchécoslovaquie

Un rapport de M. Bilak au comité central sur les divergences avec plusieurs partis frères

Le 21 octobre 1971, M. Vasil Bilak, membre du présidium et du secrétariat du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, chargé des relations avec les partis frères, a présenté, à huis clos, au comité central, un rapport sur « certaines questions internationales ». Nous publions des passages de cette déclaration qui nous sont parvenus et qui sont consacrés à la politique d'autres P.C.

M. Bilak est un pro-soviétique notoire. En janvier 1968, il remplaça M. Dubcek. — nommé premier secrétaire du P.C. tchécoslovaque. — à la tête du parti slovaque. Après l'invasion, — accusé de « collaboration », — il dut céder sa place à M. Husak, mais après la chute de M. Dubcek il fut « réhabilité ». Il redevint un des principaux

dirigeants et fit en sorte que le parti normalisé reconnût le bien-fondé de l'intervention soviétique. Il affirme même que les troupes du pacte de Varsovie avaient répondu à un appel au secours des militants tchécoslovaques. En critiquant les positions de plusieurs partis frères, M. Bilak exprime vraisemblablement les pensées des dirigeants du Kremlin.

« Les positions de la direction du P.C. et de la République socialiste de Roumanie sur nombre de problèmes politiques internationaux importants, a déclaré M. Bilak, inquiètent non seulement les membres du parti, mais chacun de nos citoyens qui chérit le socialisme. La preuve en est fournie par les nombreuses questions posées aux réunions internes et publiques du parti sur les mobiles et le caractère de ces attitudes. C'est compréhensible (...).

» Les divergences qui se manifestent ne sont pas une particularité des rapports roumano-tchécoslovaques. Dans le passé, nous avions des bonnes relations de camaraderie et des opinions concordantes sur tous les problèmes essentiels de politique internationale. Ce n'est pas de notre faute si depuis longtemps déjà, et en dépit de grands efforts et d'une grande patience, nous ne trouvons pas de langage commun...

» La raison essentielle de ces divergences entre des partis communistes et ouvriers, dont le nôtre, et la direction du P.C. roumain c'est la tendance qu'a celle-ci à opposer les intérêts nationaux de la Roumanie aux obligations internationalistes découlant de l'appartenance de ce pays à la communauté socialiste. Elle voudrait créer une situation telle que la Roumanie pourrait profiter unilatéralement des avantages de la coopération entre pays socialistes et qu'en même temps elle ne se sente pas liée par les engagements collectifs découlant de l'appartenance de la République socialiste roumaine au pacte de Varsovie.

» Face aux revendications concernant le renforcement de l'unité des pays socialistes et l'approfondissement de l'intégration socialiste, la direction roumaine met l'accent sur les principes de non-ingérence et de souveraineté conçus en dehors de tout esprit

de classe : elle parle de la limitation indispensable de l'influence du pacte de Varsovie sur les pays socialistes, etc. Elle ne veut absolument pas parler de lutte contre les déviations opportunistes, contre le révisionnisme et le nationalisme dans le mouvement communiste international. Elle proclame même que la délégation du P.C. roumain avait signé, en faisant des réserves, les documents de la conférence de Moscou de 1969 et que cette conférence n'aurait pas contribué à l'unité du mouvement communiste mondial.

» Dans le travail idéologique du parti, tout ce qui est national est jugé de manière peu critique et fait l'objet de louanges qu'il s'agisse de l'histoire de la Roumanie, de la création littéraire et des arts en général ; on parle même des qualités extraordinaires du peuple roumain. Même si faisant preuve de la plus grande compréhension, nous voulons tolérer certaines spécificités — alors qu'elles nous sont incompréhensibles, — nous ne pouvons quand même pas fermer les yeux sur le fait que la direction du P.C. roumain adopte, en politique étrangère, une attitude dirigée contre les intérêts de la communauté socialiste et, en fin de compte, aussi contre les intérêts propres du peuple roumain.

» Bien que selon la pratique usuelle, les pays socialistes s'informent mutuellement des mesures importantes en matière de politique extérieure, la République socialiste roumaine, non seulement n'en fait rien, mais de plus, ne s'en tient même pas à une action commune dans des questions concernant les intérêts de tous les membres du pacte de Varsovie. La position de la direction roumaine sur les événements tchécoslovaques, prenant fait et cause pour les forces de droite, est suffisamment connue : cette direction persiste encore aujourd'hui dans ses opinions nocives.

Le voyage de M. Ceausescu en Chine

» Le voyage du camarade N. Ceausescu en République populaire de Chine, a suscité une grande inquiétude, non seulement dans notre parti et notre République, mais aussi dans d'autres pays socialistes et dans les milieux progressistes du monde entier. Même la presse bourgeoise a qualifié ce voyage de démonstration contre l'U.R.S.S. et contre le pacte de Varsovie tout entier.

» La délégation roumaine — ainsi qu'en témoigne le communiqué qu'elle a signé en Chine — a non seulement laissé passer sans rien dire les attaques des représentants chinois contre l'U.R.S.S., le pacte de Varsovie et le Commerce, mais elle a aussi accepté les louanges pour — comme l'affirmaient les Chinois — le « courage de la République socialiste » roumaine dans sa résistance à » la pression d'une grande puissance ».

» Cette attitude des dirigeants roumains, non fondée sur un esprit de classes, est attestée aussi par le fait qu'ils s'identifient à la thèse sur l'indispensable unification des Etats, petits et moyens, dans la lutte contre les prétendues superpuissances, ce qui dans le vocabulaire chinois sous-entend avant tout l'Union soviétique. C'est un paradoxe pénible : on se donne pour objectif d'unir dans la lutte contre le principal appui du socialisme — l'Union soviétique — même des pays tels que le Portugal, l'Espagne fasciste de Franco ou l'Arabie saoudite, où existe encore un régime semi-féodal et semi-esclavagiste.

» Il n'y a évidemment dans le communiqué sino-roumain aucune mention de l'indispensable unification du système socialiste mondial. La direction chinoise a profité de la visite de la délégation roumaine pour atteindre ses propres objectifs nationalistes et anti-soviétiques. Néanmoins, le rapprochement roumano-chinois a un caractère conjoncturel et peu stable, parce que les prétentions à l'hégémonie des dirigeants chinois et les objectifs nationaux limités du P.C. roumain sont logiquement en contradiction ; sans parler des besoins objectifs de la Roumanie, qui, sans une coopération avec les pays du Comecon, se trouverait évidemment dans une situation sans issue.

» La présidence du comité central du parti communiste tchécoslovaque estime de son devoir d'informer le comité central de ces graves problèmes. Mais il est inadmissible que l'on parle publiquement de ces questions dans les organisations du parti ou qu'une polémique à leur propos se déroule dans la presse, la radio ou la télévision. C'est pourquoi le présidium du comité central du P.C.T. a reproché au périodique de la jeunesse slovaque *Smena* d'avoir publié deux articles critiques sur la politique étrangère roumaine », a dit encore M. Bilak. En conclusion, il a affirmé qu'il n'y avait « aucune campagne contre la Roumanie » en Tchécoslovaquie et que celle-ci ferait tous ses efforts pour « influencer positivement le parti et la République de Roumanie ».

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Dans une autre partie de son exposé, M. Bilak s'est félicité de l'amélioration des relations de pays socialistes avec la Yougoslavie et a exprimé l'espoir qu'il en trait ainsi à l'avenir.

« Mais, a-t-il ajouté, nous devons tenir compte de la réalité : il existe dans ce pays des forces qui ne sont pas intéressées par les perspectives socialistes de la Yougoslavie, ni par une amélioration de ses relations avec les pays formant le noyau essentiel du socialisme mondial.

» L'influence de la classe ouvrière sur la formation de la politique yougoslave est faible, et nombre de tentatives pour changer cet état de choses n'ont pas, jusqu'à présent, été couronnées de succès. Il y a de graves problèmes, même en ce qui concerne l'unité de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie et de son rôle dirigeant dans la société. La direction de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie n'a pas en main la direction de la presse écrite et parlée.

» Dans ses relations internatio-

nales, la Yougoslavie s'en tient toujours à sa position de prétendu non-engagement, même si cette politique l'éloigne de la communauté socialiste et du mouvement communiste international.

» Nous ne voulons pas nous ingérer dans les affaires yougoslaves, mais nous sommes intéressés à ce que dans ce pays les principes socialistes soient renforcés et que sa direction se manifeste selon les principes du marxisme-léninisme. Sur la base de notre expérience, nous disons franchement, aux représentants yougoslaves que, dans une dure lutte de classes, les mises en garde et les prières adressées aux adversaires du socialisme ne sont pas efficaces, que les inconséquences et l'abandon des positions du marxisme-léninisme se paient toujours cher.

M. Bilak a aussi constaté que « la majorité absolue des partis frères appuie la politique actuelle du P.C. tchécoslovaque » d'autant que « notre expérience de la lutte contre l'opportunisme les aide efficacement dans la lutte contre

l'opportunisme dans leurs rangs ».

« Dans certains partis frères s'est manifestée l'opinion qu'ils ne peuvent réviser leurs prises de position incorrectes sur les événements tchécoslovaques en 1968 sans porter atteinte à leur unité et affaiblir leur autorité sur la population. La vie démontre toutefois que c'est exactement le contraire qui se produit. Les partis frères qui, dès le début, ont pris une position nettement internationaliste ou qui ont révisé leur opinion unilatérale originelle sur les événements tchécoslovaques ont renforcé leurs propres rangs et leurs liens avec la classe ouvrière et les travailleurs de leur pays. Il ne reste à présent que quelques partis qui font des réserves à l'égard de la ligne actuelle de notre parti. Il s'agit avant tout des P.C. d'Australie, de Grande-Bretagne, d'Espagne et, sur un certain nombre de problèmes, également du P.C. italien.

» Bien que nous ayons constaté depuis assez longtemps déjà certaines tendances centrifuges dans la politique du P.C. italien, nous

nous sommes efforcés de ne pas compliquer nos relations mutuelles. C'est pourquoi nous avons suggéré plus d'une fois à la direction de ce parti de se concentrer particulièrement sur les questions qui nous unissent, c'est-à-dire sur la lutte contre l'ennemi de classe commun. Notre complaisance n'a toutefois pas trouvé d'écho. Au contraire, la presse du parti italien a publié les points de vue d'éminents fonctionnaires du P.C. italien qui prenaient parfois l'allure d'attaques violentes contre notre parti et d'une ingérence ouverte dans nos affaires intérieures.

» Le fait que quelques P.C. ne comprennent pas encore de quoi il s'agit dans notre parti et dans notre pays a aussi des raisons plus profondes, dues à des opinions différentes sur nombre de questions concernant le programme, la stratégie et la tactique du mouvement communiste international. C'est pourquoi nous devons être patients afin que la vie et le temps confirment que la vérité est de notre côté. »

Les erreurs des communistes soudanais

Face à l'émotion soulevée en Tchécoslovaquie par les exécutions de communistes au Soudan, M. Bilak a jugé utile de préciser que ces « nobles réactions » témoignaient d'une méconnaissance de la situation.

« Il n'aurait pas été sage d'abandonner volontairement des positions difficilement acquises au Soudan ou ailleurs. Nous aurions seulement fait le jeu de l'impérialisme qui serait heureux de nous voir perdre la possibilité

d'influencer les événements intérieurs en rompant nos contacts avec les forces progressistes décidées à mener leur juste lutte. De surcroît, il y avait dans les événements soudanais, des facteurs dont il est impossible de parler publiquement », a dit M. Bilak.

Ces « facteurs » ce sont évidemment les « erreurs » commises par la direction du parti soudanais. Le « groupe autour de Mahgoub, évoluant aussi vers des positions sectaires », a eu le tort de

critiquer le régime démocratique révolutionnaire des « officiers progressistes de Nimeiry », qui avaient renversé un gouvernement représentant « les féodaux et la grande bourgeoisie ». Une autre partie de la direction, favorable à une coopération totale avec Nimeiry, repoussa les méthodes du secrétaire général et provoqua une scission au sein du parti. Mahgoub, après s'être enfui de prison, « commença à préparer un coup d'Etat militaire, dont ni nous, ni les autres partis frères

ne savions rien », précise M. Bilak. Il estime que le putsch était mal préparé, n'avait ni l'appui de l'armée ni celui des masses. De plus l'attitude négative du secrétaire général du P.C. soudanais à l'égard du projet de fédération des Républiques arabes lui a valu l'hostilité de l'Égypte et de la Libye et a fait le jeu des pro-américains. Maintenant, selon M. Bilak, il s'agit d'aider les camarades soudanais à reconnaître leurs erreurs et à agir autrement.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
14 February 1972

CPYRGHT

OFFENSIVA DEI «FALCHI» NEL PATTO DI VARSAVIA Marx secondo Praga

Per Vasil Bilak tre soli partiti comunisti passano dirsi veramente «ortodossi»: quello sovietico, quello mongolo e quello cecoslovacco - Dure critiche a Ungheria, Polonia e Germania orientale

DAL NOSTRO CORRISPONDENTE

Vienna, 13 febbraio.
Nel movimento mondiale comunista sarebbero soltanto tre i partiti veramente «ortodossi», degni di amministrare l'eredità ideologica e politica di Marx e di Lenin: il sovietico, il mongolo e il cecoslovacco. In questi termini si era espresso Vasil Bilak, membro del presidium del partito comunista

cecoslovacco. Legendò a Praga, il 21 ottobre scorso, il rapporto segreto davanti al plenum del Comitato Centrale. Le parti essenziali di quel documento erano state pubblicate ieri dal quotidiano parigino *Le Monde*. Bilak aveva però detto di più ed aveva tracciato un quadro nettamente pessimistico della situazione nella quale si tro-

va il cosiddetto campo socialista europeo. Da nuove informazioni ricevute oggi a Vienna, risulta che Vasil Bilak aveva formulato un giudizio negativo anche verso l'Ungheria, la Polonia e la Germania orientale, dove i partiti comunisti sarebbero più o meno lontani dai principi fondamentali del marxismo leninismo.

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✓ In Ungheria, secondo Bilak, si farebbero ora gli stessi errori che avevano commesso nel 1966 e nel 1967 i dirigenti cecoslovacchi: la riforma economica ungherese starebbe avendo le stesse conseguenze politiche delle « piccole riforme » che erano state attuate durante l'ultimo periodo della dittatura di Novotny a Praga: il meccanismo economico starebbe sfuggendo al controllo del partito mettendo in movimento forze centrifughe che, col tempo, potrebbero mettere in difficoltà la stessa direzione del partito. La caduta di Novotny e l'elezione di Dubcek sarebbero state provocate, secondo Bilak, da una serie di errori analoghi a quelli che ora starebbero compiendo Kadar e i suoi

collaboratori. Bilak aveva detto al *plenum* che i « fratelli ungheresi » erano stati informati di questo punto di vista cecoslovacco.

✓ Bilak si era poi detto scettico anche sugli sforzi del capo polacco Gierak diretti a migliorare il tenore di vita del paese. A giudizio del dirigente cecoslovacco, il regime polacco userebbe troppa arrendevolezza verso la Chiesa e ciò sarebbe un sintomo di « debolezza ». Bilak aveva poi manifestato « gravi riserve » sulla rivalutazione dei comitati operai di fabbrica, operata da Gierak dopo i suoi incontri con le maestranze dei cantieri navali del Baltico. La relativa autonomia riconosciuta a questi comitati potrebbe sfociare « in una situazione di anarco-sindacalismo » obietti-

vamente in contrasto con la gestione che Gierak tenta di realizzare. Potrebbero di conseguenza sorgere nuovi conflitti e il regime si indebolirebbe ulteriormente.

La requisitoria di Bilak si era rivolta infine verso la Germania orientale: occorreranno vent'anni, secondo Bilak, per risollevare l'apparato politico e l'economia della Repubblica Democratica Tedesca dalle conseguenze della « gestione sclerotizzata » di Walter Ulbricht. Sin qui, le informazioni sul « rapporto » ricevute nella capitale austriaca. Aggiunte a quelle fornite ieri da *Le Monde*, esse consentono di avere un quadro critico dei rapporti tra i paesi membri del Patto di Varsavia. Va notato che il rapporto era stato presentato al *Plenum* quasi quattro me-

si or sono: non sembra però che le cose siano migliorate. Al contrario, il rapporto Bilak dimostra l'esistenza, all'interno del « campo socialista » di una forte corrente dei « falchi » che si è proposta di instaurare, con mano ferrea, un sistema politico neostalinista, capace di escludere qualsiasi tentativo di riforme o qualsiasi tendenza a piani di liberazione. E' difficile poter dimostrare che le tesi di Bilak riflettano quelle di Breznev. E' nota comunque l'amicizia di Bilak con Schebest, il capo del partito comunista ucraino, esponente dei « falchi » moscoviti, che ha già criticato la politica brezneviana di « apertura » verso l'Occidente.

Ettore Petta

CUBA: THE ECONOMIC RECORD

Thirteen years into the Casto regime and Cuba is beset by its gravest economic crisis in history:

Overall outlook

Through 1971, Cuba registered some gains in the industrial sector and in fishing, and continued to invest heavily in expanding output. Agricultural production continued to decline. Efforts to revitalize sagging production of rice, coffee, tobacco, cattle, and fruit were unsuccessful. Strict rationing of food and consumer goods continued and on a few items, had to be tightened.

Trade deficits and foreign debts

Sugar represents about 85 percent of Cuban exports, nickle about ten percent, and tobacco, three percent. Because of declining exports and growing domestic needs, Cuba's trade deficit has been on a steady rise, especially her imbalance with the USSR which represents about 60 percent of Cuban imports. During 1971, the Soviet Union sent Cuba some \$510-million in economic aid plus \$240-million in military and other assistance. In all, Cuba is believed to owe the USSR \$4-billion --- a debt Moscow cannot realistically hope to collect. This year, because of the low sugar harvest anticipated for 1972, Cuba faces an estimated trade deficite with the USSR of up to \$600-million.

Sugar industry

The 1972 sugar harvest, mainstay of the fragile economy, is not likely to reach 4.5 million tons. Possibly the lowest yet on record. Two years of drought and unseasonably heavy rains will not help either. In 1970, Castro pledged the honor of the revolution to an unprecedented goal of a 10-million-dollar harvest. The whole island mobilized for the harvest as Christmas 1969 and New Year's Day 1970 were postponed until it was finished. When he failed by 1.5 million tons of the announced goal, Castro fired his sugar industry minister but admitted his own inefficiency as a leader and indicated Cubans were worse off than at any time since he took over. The 1971 crop was at a low 5.9 million tons.

Commodity rations

Castro's "sugar obsession" has caused severe cutbacks on other agricultural production. So, in a country famed for its tobacco production, Castro has warned that smoking is unhealthy and rations Cubans to two packs of cigarettes and two cigars every week. The 1970 sugar harvest reportedly contributed to a 25% drop in milk production. Now, milk is available to children under

two years and is rationed at two cans of condensed milk per month. Rice, the staple food in Cuba is rationed on a per capita basis of 34 pounds yearly (compared to 134.22 pounds pre-1962); meat is rationed at a per-capita low of eight ounces weekly (compared to about 73 pounds pre-1962); coffee is rationed at 1 1/2 ounces weekly; split peas, kidney beans and soya beans, at six ounces weekly; and butter or margarine, at four ounces every four months. In February 1972 the government cut individual sugar rations by two pounds per month. Gasoline and fuel oil have been rationed since 1968 and Cuban cities become increasingly dark as the government shuts off electric power to preserve the little there is.

Public health

The Cuban government has not published health statistics since 1966, but data released by the Ministry of Public Health before that date revealed: deaths from gastroenteritis had risen from 14 in 1958 to 1,662 in 1966; death by hepatitis for the same period jumped from 26 to 8,977; and incidence of syphilis, rose from 26 cases in 1958 to 1,863 in 1966.

Labor difficulties

Rationing and shortages of goods have cut per capita consumption of goods and services in Cuba by a minimum 25 percent. The average worker now can buy everything that rationing allows for a month with the equivalent of three weeks' work. This lack of incentive to work fosters the absenteeism that Castro frequently deplors in his public speeches. Further, deliberate production slowdown by disgruntled workers is reportedly widespread. In 1971 the government decreed an "anti-vagrancy law" providing for penalties, including prison terms, for troublesome workers. By the end of the year, a Cuban radio commentator noted that despite the shortage of manpower "loafers are on the rise."

CHILE: THE ECONOMIC RECORD

Seventeen months into the Allende regime and the economic outlook for Chile is indeed bleak:

Overall outlook

When he took office, President Allende -- walking in the economic footsteps of Fidel Castro in 1959 --- froze prices, ordered production quotas doubled, and began granting wage increases of from 30 to 50 percent. There was instant, but shortlived euphoria. Now, with inflation and deficit spending going up, productivity going down, and rationing threatened, Chile looks to be in for a tedious winter.

Industrial production

Since the Allende government has been in power, it has nationalized 102 industries --- copper mines, cement plants, breweries, textile mills and other enterprises all of which have shown large increases in costs, declines in productivity and either reduced profits or outright losses. Losses suffered by the state managed industrial enterprises have been covered by Central Bank currency issuances. This practice, together with the drying up of sources of new capital investment, could mean an even more rapid decline in production during the remainder of 1972 with alarming inflationary effects. Many skilled technicians and managers have been replaced by politicians and those technicians still in the newly nationalized copper mines predict absolute chaos by late 1972 or early 1973 in Chile's vital copper industry.

Investments and foreign reserves

State capital under the Allende government has been used, not for new investment, but to buy up existing companies and to finance dramatic, but delusionary, rises in salaries and social benefits. Following its decision to seize foreign properties without paying the foreign owners, Chile has become an unacceptable credit risk for potential new investors. Foreign currency reserves which stood at approximately \$550 million when Allende was inaugurated in November 1970, are now down to less than \$50 million. Allende's claim of an expected \$300 million in aid from socialist countries during 1972, as well as another \$100 million from international organizations during this year, will hardly close the gap.

Foreign indebtedness

Large-scale foreign aid and credits during the past decade sharply increased Chile's external debt (to approximately \$2.3 billion), with the heaviest repayments scheduled during the next few years (an average \$330 million annually during 1971-1973). Chile could have covered debt service obligations if copper production had increased by some 40 percent as had been anticipated under the previous management's expansion programs. Allende tried to use Chile's foreign indebtedness at the time of his assuming office as justification for his policy of nationalizing foreign businesses without compensation. Now that he finds his economic policies leading Chile to the brink of economic disaster, Allende has initiated efforts to refinance the foreign debt.

Chilean currency

Every foreign visitor is required to buy at least \$10 worth of Chilean escudos for every day he is in the country, at the official unrealistic rate

of 28 escudos for one dollar. The black market rate, available on any downtown corner in Santiago, is roughly 80 escudos per dollar. In the past 17 months, Chile has printed more paper money than in the previous 20 years combined. Like the Cuban peso, the escudo has value only at home.

Agricultural production

As a result of the "agrarian reform program" (early revealed to be a plan to organize all agricultural production into a system of state farms), agricultural production has dropped and cattle stocks have fallen. Production failures stem primarily from the rural Chilean's rejection of the state system. Workers on the state-run farms complain of low wages which result mainly from the incompetence and indifference of their politician/managers. To make up these failures, Chile must now spend about \$30 million a month to import food from abroad. Compounding the problem is the fact that payments must be made in hard currency from the vanishing foreign reserves because the sellers will not take Chilean escudos and will give only the most limited form of credit.

Cost of living

Food prices are higher than ever and the real rise in prices last year may have reached 35 percent. For the first two months of this year prices have already jumped up 10 percent with indications that the rate of increase is still going up. Most food items are in short supply. No beef is allowed to be sold in retail stores during the first ten days of every month. Allende increasingly talks of the possibility that foods may have to be rationed. Last year's women's march of "pots and pans" in Santiago vividly expressed a rising discontent with the direction of Chile's consumer affairs.

THE ECONOMIST, London
11 March 1972

CPYRGHT

CHILE WITH ALLENDE

Birth of a civil war

(Excerpts)

BY OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Santiago

In the Chilean summer, it is hard to imagine civil war. The yachts bob out in the Pacific at Algarrobo, beautiful girls sip pisco sours in the Grand Hotel at Zapallar, and apart from a few conscientious "summer widowers" Santiago is strangely empty over February as the population streams west to Viña del Mar and the other resorts. "Silo," the name of an obscure Argentine apostle of hippiedom crawled on the pavements, seems more relevant than all those political slogans that have eaten up the whitewash since President Salvador Allende took office in November, 1970. But summer is nearly over, and behind the holiday smiles most people are conscious of the long rough winter ahead.

Over the past year, there has been a complete transformation in Chilean politics. Last summer Dr Allende was performing a skilful balancing act; the opposition was fatalistic and divided; and although the economy was running down it was still possible to believe that the Popular Unity planners would abandon their ideological obsession with state control in order to persuade people to invest. Today, Dr Allende is very much on the defensive. The defeat that his coalition suffered in the by-elections in O'Higgins, Colchagua and Linares in January showed not only how strongly the tide of public opinion is running against him, but also that the opposition Christian Democrat and National parties have managed to submerge their personal differences and cement a firm alliance.

Last month, the Popular Unity leaders got together in a house at El Arrayan just north of Santiago to mull over their defeat. An extraordinary internal communist party document leaked to the conservative newspaper *El Mercurio* while the meeting was

taking place provided evidence of the squabbles within the government coalition as well as the bruising effects of the by-election. The communists blamed the "ultra-leftists" within the alliance for their defeat: "The enemy has tried to identify the idiocies of the ultra-left with the actions of the government. . . . The ultra-left tries to make out that there is a contradiction between trying to win over the middle class and trying to win over the proletariat. This idea has been expressed by Comrade Carlos Altamirano" (the secretary-general of the Socialist party). The communist tactic, in contrast, is to aim for the support of the middle class and of moderate opinion, to "neutralise and then win over the social base of the Christian Democrats" in order to isolate the most conservative elements.

The bid to win the centre is the key to Dr Allende's current political manoeuvres. He is trying to get the eight political groups that form his coalition to agree on a single list of candidates for the next election. He is also trying to build up the rump of the Radical party headed by Sr Carlos Morales and the Leftist Radical party (PIR) (more conservative despite its name) into a third force within the Popular Unity alliance. Sr Morales told this correspondent that he believed that Dr Allende was personally committed to the "decentralisation of power" within the coalition.

But the Radical party has lost much of its grassroots support, and many of its leaders are suspected of shady dealings. The PIR, on the other hand, is firmly opposed to marxist ideology, and has been one of the stumbling blocks for Dr Allende's attempts to move towards a single government party. Anyway, the support of the middle class does not depend upon which jobs a clutch of Radical or PIR leaders are

given within the cabinet, but on the state of the economy and the constant expansion of state control.

Economics is power

In the space of 16 months, Dr Allende's government has created enormous, possibly insoluble, economic problems. The men who run the economy—and above all Sr Pedro Vuskovic, the minister of economy who is closely aligned with the Communist party—are narrowly obsessed with widening what they like to call the "social area," a euphemism for state control. Since they have been in office, they have failed to create a single new industry of national importance, to import new technology, or even to rationalise or reorganise the private industries they have been swallowing up. On the contrary, skilled technicians and managers have been replaced by politicians and standards of service and production have dropped alarmingly.

Driving up to Santiago from Rancagua, this correspondent passed a crowded passenger train travelling at night with only five or six light-bulbs burning in the carriages. Most people were sitting in darkness. The decline of the state railways under the management of Sr Nahum Castro, a Socialist party militant, is an extreme example of the effects of Popular Unity supervision. According to some sources, 300 trained engineers have been replaced by political elements, including members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Mir) who advocate armed struggle in Chile. Despite a 72 per cent increase in the government subsidy last year, the work of construction and repair has slowed to a standstill because of shortages of materials and imported equipment. Some 40 per cent of the

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rolling stock is rumoured to be out of service awaiting repair.

But it is the impact of state management of the copper mines that has the most serious implications for the economy as a whole. Although total copper production in Chile rose last year, this was due to the opening up of the Exotica and Andina mines. Production in the three big mines taken over from American companies—Chuquicamata, Salvador and El Teniente—dropped by more than 8 per cent between January and September. The decline in production and the persistent labour troubles in the biggest copper mines cannot be shrugged off (as Mr Graham Greene and other observers have tried to shrug them off) as the result of the whims of a "labour aristocracy." Sr Carlos Correa Iglesias, a former supervisor at the Chuquicamata mine, has provided an insider's view of the copper crisis in a series of articles published in *El Mercurio* around Christmas. He showed that, under the direction of two communists, Sr Julio Zambrano (appointed president of the administrative commission with sweeping powers) and Sr Antonio Berthelon, the sub-director of industrial relations, the Chuquicamata mine has been turned into a happy hunting-ground for the extreme left.

Systematically, government agents have worked to expel managers and technicians regarded as politically "unreliable." The result has been the loss of scores of trained men with many years' experience. The shortage of skilled manpower became so acute that Codelco, the state copper corporation, prepared a contract for employing Yugoslav copper technicians at inflated salaries to be paid in dollars. At the same time, under state supervision company resources have been abused for political ends. It has been charged, for example, that the number of company guest houses at the Chuquicamata mine has been raised from three to eight in order to accommodate the communist Ramona Parra and socialist Elmo Catalan paramilitary brigades, which make use of company cars and store arms on the premises.

Mismanagement of the mines has added to the problem of low world prices. While the world market price of copper dropped from 80 cents at the end of 1969 to 47 cents at the end of 1971, production costs climbed to 32 cents—a very slim margin for a country dependent on copper as the prime earner of foreign exchange.

But the copper crisis is only part of the reason for Chile's economic malaise. The government has been working with formulae borrowed from the Russia of the 1920s and from Cuba. Sr Vuskovic's economic strategy is in a sense entirely political. It is concerned with power, with destroying the economic base of the middle-class opposition. That is why increasingly many Chileans are asking themselves whether political liberty is conceivable without economic liberty. On the one hand, the opposition can score heavily against Popular Unity in a by-election and has a good chance of winning a two-thirds majority in congress in the legislative election that is coming up next year. On the other hand, despite the constant opposition of a hostile congress that is now trying (through the Hamilton bill) to limit the power of the state to buy up private companies, the government has steadily tightened its grip over the economy by executive action and the purchase of shares.

The list of 91 companies scheduled for expropriation that was issued last month is a death-warrant for private enterprise. It remains to be seen whether the government has the power or the cash to execute it, since the take-over of the 91 depends mainly on the sale of private shareholdings, and many of the companies seem determined to resist.

Anyone who talks with the opposition and with individual businessmen in Santiago today will be immediately impressed by the new spirit of resistance. The case of the Papelera (Compania de Manufactura de Papeles y Cartones) late last year—when private shareholders held out against an attractive state offer to buy them out—set an important precedent.

But the overall outlook for the economy is bleak. Industrial investment is down to nothing, and not many people are convinced when Sr Vuskovic ascribes this to "monopolistic conspiracies." It is not just that private investors have stopped spending. The vast increase in state spending over the past year was used, not for new capital investment, but to buy up existing companies and to finance dramatic rises in salaries and social benefits. This creates a huge problem for the future. Industrial production rose by something like 10 per cent last year because managers were able to meet increased consumer demand by running down stocks and drawing on unused productive capacity. The drying up of new investment could mean static or declining production this year—with alarming inflationary effects.

Up to the end of 1971, the government played out the parable of the emperor's clothes: because Sr Vuskovic could not detect any sign of inflation, it could not exist. In fact, when you raise wages by 50 per cent and increase the monetary supply by 118 per cent in the course of a year, something is bound to happen to prices even if you apply a control system of steel-like rigidity. Figures produced by the Christian Democrats suggest that the real rise in prices last year may have reached 35 per cent.

At any rate, a series of dramatic price hikes early this year suggests that inflation has finally caught up with Popular Unity—the average price of cars, for example, is up by 56 per cent, petrol is up by 33 per cent, and on top of the price rises there is a new bill calling for a wage bonus of 120 escudos a month to enable workers to stay ahead of the cost of living. When you add to the prospect of this sort of inflation the shortage of foodstuffs (especially meat) and of imported goods, the burden of the foreign debt that Dr Allende's envoys are having trouble in renegotiating in Paris despite his softer line on copper compensation, and the huge budgetary deficit, it is easy to understand why the government is not looking forward to the next election.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
9 March 1972

A new deal for Viet farmer

By S. I. HAYAKAWA
President, San Francisco State College

UNTIL RECENTLY most South Vietnamese peasants were tenant farmers. Their resentment of avaricious landlords was a continuing source of discontent—a discontent that was skillfully exploited by the Viet Cong to turn village people against the government.

Today much of this has changed. In March 1970 President Nguyen Van Thieu signed the "Land-to-the-Tiller" law passed by the National Assembly. This legislation transfers ownership of more than two and a quarter million acres of rice land to tenant farmers.

Landowners, who traditionally received one-third to one-half of the crop as rent, are being compensated: 20 per cent in cash and the rest in bonds payable with 10 per cent interest in equal installments over an 8-year period. The new owners may not transfer or encumber their land for 15 years. It must remain in the possession of those who till it.

Thru November 1971 over 350,000 farm families have been issued titles to over one million acres of land. It is expected that by spring 1973, 800,000 former tenant farmers will have become owners. Furthermore, the government has begun a program to provide titles to the Montagnards for lands traditionally claimed by them. This program will ultimately involve 1,400 Montagnard villages and 500,000 acres of land.

LAND REFORM has been an issue in Vietnam for a long time. Previous efforts in this direction had foundered thru mismanagement and the lack of will to see it thru. The present program, however, shows considerably more promise for two reasons. First, it appears to be exceptionally well designed and well received. For this, part of the credit can be given to two Americans, Dr. Roy Prosterman of the University of Washington Law School and Robert L. Coate, San Francisco businessman and former California Democratic chairman. Dr. Prosterman helped to shape the final form of the legislation. Mr. Coate did much of the lobbying that got it thru the assembly.

Dr. Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California and chairman of the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam, describes the program as "revolutionary" in that it gives "the bulk of South Vietnam's farm land immediately to the several million Vietnamese now farming the land." It is, he believes, "probably the most important thing that's happened yet in Vietnam."

The second reason the program is promising is that President Thieu, himself more at home in the country than in Saigon, has given it the highest priority and is determined to carry it

thru. Even before this legislation was enacted, the government had made the politically difficult decision to raise the official price of rice in the cities, thereby giving the peasant incentive to progress from subsistence farming to production for the market.

With increased security, better distribution of fertilizer and pesticides, the introduction of "miracle" high-yield rice, and crop diversification already under way, the Land-to-the-Tiller program apparently came at just the right time to handsomely increase the farmer's stake in his newly-acquired land.

All the foregoing is what I have been told and what I have read. How is the program actually progressing? And how would someone like me, who doesn't know beans about farming, be able to tell? All I can do is tell the reader what I saw.

I was taken by car to the Mekong Delta around My Tho by Mr. C. F. Huang of the Chinese (Taiwan) Agricultural Technical Mission.

WE SAW endless fields of rice at all stages of development, young green plants as well as fields ready for harvesting or already harvested. There were fruit orchards and vegetables in every available space—even between the rice paddies. Ducks and chickens and fish were being cultivated for the market.

Mr. Huang explained how Chinese expertise was being used to help the Vietnamese—instruction in live stock culture, crop rotation, irrigation, cooperative marketing. The Land-to-the-Tiller program, he said, was not enough in itself. The tiller must prosper, or his ownership of the land is meaningless. In the area I saw that day, farmers certainly seemed to be prospering.

The prosperity manifests itself not in sophisticated farm-machinery, American-style, but in little power units like the outboard motor, used not only to navigate the canals and rivers, but also dismounted and used as irrigation pumps, in place of the slow, old-fashioned, treadle-operated water-wheel.

The road we drove was lined with newly harvested sacks of rice. In the fields whole families were at work, threshing the rice by hand, winnowing it and piling it onto huge mats.

The group I stopped to visit consisted of a pretty young girl and her father and brothers. I took snaps of the group at work, but when I tried to get a close-up of the girl, she was overcome with embarrassed giggles.

But her father stepped forward, and smilingly lifted up her straw sunhat so the light would fall on her face. So I snapped the picture.

DATES WORTH NOTING

April 10	U.S./CPR	1st anniversary of "ping-pong diplomacy," the first phase of the opening up of contacts between the United States and the Chinese Peoples Republic. On this date in 1971 the U.S. table tennis team arrived in China, and on the same date this year the Chinese table tennis team arrives in the U.S. for a return match.
April 13- May 17	Santiago	UNCTAD III meets. (See articles in this and last month's issues.)
Apr 13-15	Singapore	The ASEAN foreign ministers are to meet; they are expected to discuss the future alignment of Southeast Asian nations in world affairs.
April 15	North Korea	Kim Il Sung's 60th birthday.
April 17	USSR	Anniversary of the dissolution of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in 1956. The Cominform, like its predecessor the Comintern (Third International), was tasked by Moscow with asserting Soviet control over Communist Parties throughout the world. On March 8 this year the German newspaper <u>Frankfurter Rundschau</u> reported the Soviet Union is planning to set up a successor to the Cominform for its Warsaw Pact allies following the improvement of Chinese-U.S. relations.
April 27	Chile	Plebiscite at the University of Chile to determine the university's administration. This will be a test of popular support between Allende and the opposition.
April 28	USSR	52nd anniversary of the Soviet Army's invasion of Azerbaydzhan, a Moslem land bordering Iran and Turkey, in the Russian Communists' drive to reestablish Moscow's control over the Tsar's lands which had been freed by the Russian Revolution. On December 30, 1922 Azerbaydzhan, along

with Georgia (see May 7 below), Armenia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, were joined to Russia to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (This year is the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. See article in this issue, "Russifying Reluctant Soviet Nations.")

April 28	Japan	20th anniversary of the restoration of Japanese sovereignty following World War II. In the peace treaty, which was signed by 49 nations, the United States provided for return of Japanese islands it had captured during World War II: in 1968 the U.S. returned the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, and Marcus Island; and on May 15 this year the U.S. is returning Okinawa to Japan. By contrast, the Soviet Union has not signed a peace treaty with Japan and still holds the Northern Territories -- Japanese islands that it seized after declaring war on Japan in the last week of World War II.
May 7	Italy	Parliamentary elections.
May 7	USSR	52nd anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by Russia and Georgia and broken less than a year later when the Soviet Army invaded Georgia February 11, 1921. Georgia, formerly part of the Tsarist Empire, had gained its independence and been declared a republic on May 26, 1918. (See article in this issue "Russifying Reluctant Soviet Nations.")
May 15	Japan	Okinawa reverts from the United States to Japan, reestablishing Japanese sovereignty rights over islands captured during World War II.
May 22	U.S./USSR	President Nixon is to visit the Soviet Union.

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