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
PERSPECTIVES

OCTOBER 1971

MASTER
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ELECTIONS IN URUGUAY: THE CHALLENGE FROM THE LEFT

1. Early this year, after several months' preparation, some seventeen political movements and parties in Uruguay formed the Frente Amplio or Broad Front electoral alliance to support their own leftist candidate in the presidential election scheduled for 28 November 1971. Of the groups making up the Front, the most prominent include such traditional leftist organizations as the Communist Party's front organization known as the Leftist Liberation Front (Fidel), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PSU) and the Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO), plus dissident factions from both the Colorado and Blanco parties, which have been the governing parties of Uruguay for more than one hundred years. In composition and goals the Broad Front is strikingly similar to the Popular Unity Front of President Salvador Allende of Chile, and there is little doubt that the Uruguayan leftists hope to follow his example and use similar methods to eventually establish their own brand of socialism in Uruguay.

2. Since, by realistic estimates, the Broad Front is not expected to win this election, [REDACTED]

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and thereby to attract the additional support it will need to pose a major challenge in the 1976 elections. (Although there will doubtless be public boasts of impending victory by Front supporters, privately they are probably bearing in mind that in Chile Allende ran for the presidency three times before he finally, if narrowly, made it on the fourth try.)

3. Allende's victory in Chile, and the subsequently renewed popularity of the united front concept facilitated the formation of the Broad Front which the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) views as a potentially powerful force that will give impetus to attainment of its own objectives. Although the coalition is putting up non-Communist candidates for president and vice-president and the Communist Party will probably remain discreetly in the background, it is certain to be the dominant influence behind-the-scenes, through its own front group (Fidel). Already the influence of the more extreme left is evident in such Front proposals as rejection of the "dictates" of the International Monetary Fund, nationalization of banks, and a moratorium on external debts. (Along with the Communist Party of Chile, the Uruguayan party is one of the largest, best organized and best financed parties in Latin America. It has made modest but steady political gains in the past fifteen years, due in large part to the steadily deteriorating economy of Uruguay during these years.

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Nevertheless, because of its size, discipline and strong leadership, other leftist parties feared domination by the PCU and therefore resisted its overtures to set up a political front until the Popular Unity front won in Chile a year ago.)

4. Although some experts have estimated that the Broad Front could not win even twenty-five percent of the vote, conditions in Uruguay have deteriorated so rapidly in recent months that if this trend continues at the same accelerated pace, the Front could soon gather significant, additional support. The present government should therefore be urged to take stringent, emergency measures both in relation to Uruguay's economy and its internal security. (For three years President Jorge Pacheco has staked the future of his government on the two policies of economic stabilization and uncompromising repression of the Tupamaros, the most effective urban guerrilla organization in Latin America; it is trying, through violence, to bring about a socialist revolution in Uruguay. Not only has the government's economic program been increasingly compromised by rising prices and wages, shortages, bankruptcies and factory closings, but its policy of repressing terrorism was badly undermined in early September by the successful prison break of practically all of the Tupamaros under detention.)

5. Although direct participation of the Tupamaros in the Front is unlikely, the terrorists would probably not work actively against a group that seeks to weaken the government which they also oppose. The Front, on the other hand, will probably capitalize on its claim that it is the only political group capable of communicating with the Tupamaros and therefore of ultimately bringing an end to their violence. While the Front will very likely have the support of Tupamaro sympathizers who have no other electoral alternative, Tupamaro terrorism could create a backlash of feeling against the Front and a consequent loss of support for it.

6. If the Broad Front does make a credible showing in this year's election, then, just as the success of the Allende's Popular Unity Front in Chile proved to be an example to the Uruguayan left, the Uruguayan experience would encourage disparate leftist groups in other countries to reconcile their differences sufficiently to form a popular electoral front and to choose and try to elect candidates for high office.

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CUADERNOS DE MARCHA, Montevideo
March 1971

ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION OF FRENTE AMPLIO DISCUSSED

The precedents, conditions, and reflections that have led to the formation of the Frente [Amplio] make up a long, ramified filament system, like roots in the past. It is a topic for study that does not lend itself to simplifications. But the proposing and organizing of the Frente Amplio is a much more definite and precise process on which it is possible to write very accurately and concisely, thus avoiding the whole annoying problem of modesty and overevaluation.

The proposal to form the Frente was formulated by the Christian Democratic Party on 23 June 1968, exactly 10 days after the emergency security measures had been introduced, which later became a permanent system. The measures had been adopted in the middle of a wild inflation, as a result of the climate of disaster created in the immediately preceding weeks by the Acosta and Lara scandal, devaluation and faithlessness, all this added to the frustration of the year of Gestido's administration.

Some thought at that time that the security measures were a temporary phenomenon. In the opinion of the Christian Democrats, they meant a positive confession of impotence of the old political systems. At that time, it fell our lot to state it publicly, on behalf of the party, in a television message containing the essence of the diagnosis:

"The fact that this economic policy is maintained and the manner and conditions in which it is maintained oblige us to recognize that behind the economic crisis there is a political crisis. And that we shall not overcome the economic crisis, if we do not overcome the political crisis. A crisis of Uruguayan democracy, a crisis of Parliament, a crisis of the electoral system. But substantially a crisis of the political parties.

"Today, everybody admits it. It suffices to recall some facts to realize that this crisis of the parties is especially deep-seated.

"First fact. The Colorado [Liberal] Party had criticized that economic policy severely for 8 years. The people believed that they were voting against it when they voted for the Colorados. They viewed with amazement all the feelers, contradictions, forward and backward movements in the past year. And now, since November, they see that the same policy that existed previously is being established again with determination and firmness. This is causing tremendous confusion and tremendous frustration. A few Colorado deputies have gone so far as to shout out in distress that the citizenry was being cheated.

"Second fact. The Colorado Party is supporting the government, saving its ministers in the Chambers, voting for essential laws, but it is not defending the policy. Deputy Cigliutti, Senator Vasconcellos, Se-

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nationalist forces holding positions diametrically opposed to the government's policy. The Vice President of Uruguay was to head a demonstration, a few days ago, against the government's economic policy, and he made statements to the press that imply a very harsh, very bitter criticism of this policy. On the other hand, if there are those, outside the Colorado Party, who are in agreement with the broad features of that policy, voting in the Chamber obviously does not reflect this. The votes are lost among the smaller-scale political oppositions. We thought and everyone thinks that parliamentary support of the government should stem from the conviction of the members of parliament. Today we are witnessing a divorce between conviction and votes.

"Third fact. The executive branch, which is becoming more and more separated from its political bases, forms its cabinets with men from banking, big business, and is showing itself to be increasingly more loyal to its economic line, tied in with international agencies, which are being consulted much more and informed much more and listened to much more than the legislature.

"Because the President disagrees radically with prominent persons and influential leaders in his own party, or because he believes that they cannot give him a base for governing, he is floating about with backing or parliamentary support in an atmosphere of instability that is doing the country serious harm.

"The big parties have lost their capability of representing the will of the voter on the real problems being debated, and they have ceased being useful instruments of government. And this is not by chance. This is because years ago -- favored by electoral legislation and by the lema law -- they became large voting cooperatives without common authorities, without a common program, without any basic unification factor. And that is now irreversible. The government association does not function, not by chance but rather because it cannot move backward in the process of several years."

And the answer to the diagnosis, the only possible one, which is the Frente solution, came immediately:

"In view of that, we must state that it is possible, however, to make a different policy. But, what happens to those of us who talk about that policy? What does the public see of those of us who maintain that it is necessary to govern on radically different bases, of those of us who talk about implementing the agrarian reform without delay, of those of us who talk about putting basic foreign trade items in the hands of the state, of those of us who talk about making a controlled handling of exchange at least for basic items, of those of us who talk about maintaining the buying power of wages at all costs, of those of us who talk about so many topics agreeing on the expressions? What does the public see? It sees us atomized, pulverized, divided up among various parties, paralyzed frequently by party discipline, and it realizes that this does not shape up a government solution. It does not form a different real possibility.

"It is imperative, in our opinion, to make that different policy. We say that there even is more than one policy in opposition to the one being implemented by the government.

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"We propose ours, but we are in a party and we are not alone, and by virtue of that fact we come here today to ask publicly about this which is one of the main ideas of this message: Is it or is it not possible in this serious national emergency to unite around a minimum common program, to join efforts to propose and support a different policy solution?"

"That is to say, are those of us who disagree with the present line capable of drawing up a minimum common program and of uniting our efforts to defend and support the replacement of the present policy with a different one?"

"Because if they continue to see us totally dispersed, incapable of supporting a different policy, the public may believe that there is no solution and that we shall continue from election to election rotating the big parties in the government, until total destruction is reached. And the country cannot endure this course much longer."

Then the party called on the Chief Executive firmly to bring about the dissolution of the Chambers by means of Articles 147 and 148 of the Constitution and to hold new elections.

"It does not seem to us that we can afford the luxury of waiting 4 more years to consult the people, while we continue to deteriorate," the message said.

This solution, which was about to take concrete form the following year at the time of the censure against Peirano, aimed at a complete re-statement of the political base, in order to face up to the crisis:

"We reaffirm our faith in that democratic policy that makes the people the judge. But, in order for this judgment to have meaning, political truth is required. And that is another basic point. That is what we are calling for. Beyond old party disciplines, he who agrees with the broad lines of the present policy must of necessity support the government, must support it in the Chambers, must stake everything on it and spend himself with it, and must answer to the people. And the government must know on whom it can count and the people must know who supports it. And those who propose a different policy must agree on a minimum common program and stake everything against the government to change the policy, to provide another, different solution. Without going through this political truth, popular elections have no meaning and there is no democratic solution.

"It may be said: what happens then to the big parties? Many great decisions have been taken in Uruguay disregarding the officials of the big parties. Dividing them transversally, in a certain way. In 1933, the coup d'état confronted Blancos [Conservatives] with Blancos and Colorados with Colorados. The 1942 reform likewise. The establishment of the collegiate system likewise. And the latest constitution reform, within the memory of everyone, was by the agreement of Colorado and Blanco groups against Blancos, Colorados and other political groups. It is nothing new for men of various parties to rally around a real problem to provide it with a real solution required by the country, when the whole party cannot provide those solutions.

"But those were temporary solutions and this is a much more permanent problem."

"We are convinced that the solutions to the Uruguayan crisis will divide the big parties necessarily transversally, because they no longer represent solutions. This problem is very permanent and of great dimensions. For years, we have been revolving around this pin of the economic crisis, without being able to free ourselves from it and we shall not be free of it in any way for a long time."

The message was not a mere expression of opinion, but rather the start of a political operation on which there was to be patient insistence for 3 years. Copies of that text were presented to representatives of the political groups identified as opposition and formal interviews were requested, some of which were held and others could not be obtained or turned into informal talks.

The idea began again to be treated systematically during 1969, and in December of that year we took advantage of the offer of an interview in Marcha to restate the proposal publicly, putting forth then more details, particularly with regard to program.

We answered the question of whether the crossroads of the nation's politics might give rise to a great popular front as follows:

"It can, and in my opinion it must, give rise to a common front. The economic crisis and the reply to the economic crisis, the dictatorship and the reply to the dictatorship are the major political problems at present. And they will not be solved in one spell or in one term of government administration. They will occupy the country for a good number of years.

"How are we to move forward, if we do not join the maximum backing of the people in support of a political force capable of performing the task? It is necessary to remove from command the White and Colorado political right, the economic oligarchy, and the foreign powers that are attempting to manipulate us like something of theirs. But, in order not to incur anarchy and the conflicts of the last few administrations, we have to pull the country out of the crisis by transforming it thoroughly by democratic ways and in a truly national and popular direction. And this is not done without coordination of programs and actions, and without the massive backing of organized people.

"That is the great task. If we advance in that direction, the sufferings and bitter experiences of this Pacheco period will not be lost. If we confuse the people, if we attempt to make the people forget, if, when we draw and set up a government, we again let government and opposition votes and subservient and combative votes be turned over and added together, we make a mockery of the suffering of the people and we postpone the solution of the nation's problems."

After recalling the 23 June message, we added:

"Someone once described us as ingenuous because of this proposal, alleging that groups of the same political party, diametrically opposed in the very serious events of this period, will, however, join their votes in the long run. I do not now want to talk of probabilities. I am

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will make gestures of freedom, of courage, of the creation of new things that I judge beneficial. I am merely stating what strikes my eyes as logic. And I do not shut myself up in the fatalism of those alcoholics who, since they believe it impossible to break away from their deeply rooted habits, stubbornly entrench themselves in them until they destroy themselves."

With regard to program, we proposed the following guidelines as a basis for discussion. This list came to be named "the nine points."

"1. Putting rights and freedoms back in force, acting by law and within the Constitution, and restoration of parliament. I know that this does not create enthusiasm in everyone: in the followers of Pacheco, because they are well favored, in others, because they prefer to think about retaliation. However, I believe that it is indispensable. We have already proved where the present state of affairs leads.

"2. Establishment of a planned policy of structural change and of development. I insist: of change and development, not of pure stabilization and freezing. But to do that here, in Uruguay, and with broad participation of the people (trade unions and political parties) in preparation and in supervision. In other words, nationalization and democratization of the country's leadership. Viewed from another angle, putting an end to subservience and domination by the oligarchy.

"3. Liquidation in banking of foreign influence and private chaos and speculation. Placing banking really in the hands of the country is indispensable for putting an end to the present monstrous system of usury and to channel funds with a collective benefit.

"4. Initiation of a vigorous agrarian reform that will make possible both the technical and the social transformation of the countryside and will liquidate disastrous powers and privileges.

"5. Nationalization of the big items of foreign trade, and in particular the marketing of the leading agricultural-livestock products, thus putting an end to the pressure groups and speculation centers that have harmed the country and thrown its development off course.

"6. Promotion of a strong industrial impetus. Establishment once and for all of large industries with Uruguayan funds, which, like the iron and steel industry and the fishing industry, have not come out up to now of discussions. Reorganization of branches that are in a state of crisis, like the meat industry. Opening of foreign markets by means of integration and industrial supplementation. Uruguay of the future will be industrial or it will not exist.

"7. Vigorous expansion, slanted toward the people, of three social sectors: housing (by taking thorough advantage of the Housing Law), health (by establishing an effective health insurance), and education on all levels.

"8. Courageous redistribution of income by increasing real wages and by planning a more equitable distribution of wages and pensions, and putting an increasing share of the investment in the hands of the workers.

9. Encouragement of Integration. The country cannot develop in isolation. But integration does not consist in making a free market for foreign trusts, but rather a bloc of countries in solidarity with each other to industrialize themselves, to defend their trade, their position with regard to creditors, their social and cultural conquests.

"All this and more is easy to say. But it requires thorough reforms of public administration and of private enterprises themselves and, of course, of social security and labor legislation. I certainly do not claim with this to exhaust the revolutionary content of our party program, or to establish a solution for others to accept. It will probably be necessary to talk. An immediate step is not the country's whole future."

This interview gave rise to a side controversy. The newsman asked whether, in case the Blanco and Colorado sectors should not agree to form the front, we would seek an agreement with "leftist parties" and "sectors of the people." Since that question undoubtedly had a name, the reply was:

"I have answered you in connection with what you stated: a Frente Amplio (agreement or party), of the people, progressive, nationalist, and democratic. The idea must be stated in those dimensions.

"If you now ask about a possible bilateral agreement between the Christian Democratic Party, on the one hand, and the Communist Party or the FIDEL [Leftist Liberation Front], on the other, I answer you: it is not possible. The differences are too deep-seated to overlook them for an opportunist combination that would lead to nothing. This does not prevent us from being in agreement in certain cases, for example in resisting the rightist dictatorship or in defending labor unions or wages.

"We are not members of any front. If the ambitious idea does not work, what we shall do will be, as I have already said, to open our party to those who may see in it a channel for their ideals and their hopes."

The subsequent controversy in which Bruschera participated and who had been writing lucidly on the topic made it possible to clarify the position better. The party's call did not include lists of those who were invited or those who were excluded. But the idea of the Frente Amplio could not be replaced with a bilateral FIDEL-PDC [Christian Democratic Party] agreement, or by a traditional leftist union, and it could not even start with that.

Without a doubt, beyond the discussion on the pertinency of a bilateral combination or of a usual leftist union, the position of FIDEL favoring the front proposal was expressed publicly. This time also, there was no definitive reply.

In the program of activities for 1970, it was decided to insist once more on the proposal for a front. A schedule of official interviews with the opposition sectors, picked up with new interest by the press, was developed in the winter months. This time, the reactions were very far from the initial scepticism. Two years of Pacheco's dictatorial rule had demonstrated convincingly the dimensions and depth of the deterioration and they showed the Frente Amplio as the only democratic opening toward the future.

angry reaction of Alberto Heber when he said that PDC was a little B-team that wanted to form a combination to play in the A-category. Today, he surely can have no doubts that the "combination" is playing in the A-category. But General Seregni's front solution and the position of the executives of the List 99 to work toward an abandonment of the party and the formation of the Frente Amplio were undoubtedly the events that upset the balance. From then on, the phase of "the front proposal" ended and the phase of "organization of the Frente Amplio" started.

The National Commission of the PDC meeting on 28 June insisted on a call for a front. The July convention ratified the line. But the National Commission meeting on 3 and 4 October already authorized the leaders concretely to organize a first union with List 99 and other groups, authorizing the opening of the party and maintaining the original proposal of the Frente Amplio without exclusions. The replies by other groups, clear in the case of FIDEL, less conclusive in other cases, then showed the doors open.

From that time on, the public events accelerated. On 7 October, the manifesto of prominent persons appeared and gave rise to the establishment of the committee called by the people the committee "of the independents." And at the end of October, the List 99 meeting was held in the Ateneo motion-picture theater and represented a clamorous pronouncement.

The prominent persons committee promoted, starting at that time, an intensive opinion movement supported by the dailies Ya and El Popular and characterized by an increase in the number of roundtables in Montevideo and in the interior where all the Front groups turned out their support and their membership, but it also picked up a very large, spontaneous public response among the politically uncommitted masses. For a while, the initial political activities carried on by PDC were intertwined with the activities promoted by the committee.

Early in December, the long process was marked by an event that then gave it an irreversible nature. On 4 and 5 December, the Congress of List 99 was held to determine the abandonment of the party and the decision to form the Frente Amplio and, at the same time, the National Commission of PDC met to ratify its positions and in particular that the Frente would be without exclusions. Once the bases for the program had been determined -- minimum but specifying the type of front that it was desired to construct -- an open call would be made and the incorporation of all those sharing those bases would be accepted.

On 7 December, the Movimiento Blanco Popular y Progresista [People's Progressive Blanco Movement] also abandoned the party and announced its incorporation in the Frente.

On 18 and 19 December, the Platense assembly and the convention certified the definitive decision by the party.

The following steps, taken jointly with the List 99, led to the last preparatory event: the establishment of the Frente del Pueblo [Peo-

ple's Front] with its declaration of principles, and the call by the People's Front for the 5 February meeting in which the Frente Amplio was to be established. That document is a key factor. The definition of the characteristics of the Frente Amplio and the 12 points of the program specified the task to be performed and enabled each political sector to decide, in an open call, on incorporation on its own account.

On 5 February, when the delegations met in the hall of the Legislative Palace, the preparatory structuration had ended.

From then on, the Frente Amplio would organize itself.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 July 1971

CPYRGHT

POLARIZATION PERIL IN URUGUAY

"I've had to do things to this country that no one ever should have to do," President Jorge Pacheco Areco told a visitor to Uruguay last year. He meant that he had felt compelled to impose drastic measures utterly foreign to South America's most durable democracy in an effort to recharge an economy plagued by inflation, inefficiency and strikes, and to maintain public order against the urban terrorism of the Tupamaro revolutionaries.

Mr. Pacheco's actions, launched with such obvious reluctance, have had but limited success. The peso continues weak, unemployment is high, businesses are still failing and the once-lucrative tourist trade is off sharply. Security forces have captured some guerrilla leaders but have not wiped out the Tupamaros, who still hold four hostages, including close friends of the President and Britain's ambassador to Montevideo.

Yesterday a long-rebellious Chamber of Deputies voted the first impeachment action against a President in Uruguayan history. It fell far short of the two-thirds

majority necessary to remove Mr. Pacheco at once; but it will force the Senate to conduct its own impeachment vote within sixty days. Mr. Pacheco had infuriated his enemies by reimposing special security measures the day after Parliament had repealed them.

The constitutional question is cloudy but the political motivations are clear. Mr. Pacheco's foes have little hope of removing him now, but they count on the impeachment action damaging his prospects for re-election in November. The current fight will further polarize the country and probably enhance the election chances of the so-called Wide Front, a coalition of leftist forces similar to the one that elected President Allende in Chile.

It is difficult to chart any satisfactory way out of this situation for Uruguay. The hope must be that the democratic forces in the two major parties will come to their senses and coalesce in time to preserve a society that for years was a model for the hemisphere and, indeed, for the world.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 July 1971

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Uruguayan House Acts to Oust President, but First Move Fails

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, July 23 (AP) — The House of Deputies voted today to impeach President Jorge Pacheco Areco.

The action grew out of the President's restoration of security measures Congress had annulled. The measures were imposed originally two years ago in an effort to curb terrorism and labor unrest.

Sponsors of the impeachment motion failed to obtain the two-thirds majority required for immediate removal of Mr. Pacheco.

The action is to be considered next week by the Senate, where a two-thirds vote favoring impeachment would mean

automatic removal. Informal polls show that the Senate favors impeachment, but not by a two-thirds margin.

The House approved impeachment, 52 to 2, in a session that began Thursday afternoon and ended after 10 hours. Since the House has 99 members, 66 votes were needed to remove the President immediately.

The National party sponsored the proceedings, charging the President with "violating the constitution." The action was supported by the so-called wide front, a leftist coalition including Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats and dissident members of the President's Colorado party.

The Colorado party has a ma-

majority in both houses, but intraparty differences lead party members to vote independently on many issues.

This is the first time that the Uruguayan Congress has tried to impeach a President.

Mr. Pacheco, in office since 1967, has used executive decrees to maintain press censorship and arrest without formal charges. The police and the army have been unable to curb raids, bombings and kidnappings by the left-wing Tupamaro guerrillas.

Opposition political parties say the President's security measures block them from campaigning freely for the November elections. The President has not said whether he would run for re-election.

EL POPULAR, Montevideo
16 August 1971

INTERVIEW WITH BROAD FRONT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIBER SEREGNI

A few days ago, the television program "The Candidates on Channel 10, Who They Are and How They Think," directed by Omar De Feo, presented the Broad Front's candidate for president, General Liber Seregni. The following is the text of the dialogue held by the announcer and the subject during the interview. As our readers will be able to see, the interview was of continuous interest because of the nature of the questions asked and the replies offered by the future president of the easterners.

Question: General Seregni, are you a revolutionary or not?

Answer: Well, if a revolutionary is defined as someone who wants structural changes in the dynamics of a society that correspond to adaptation to the distinct conditions being experienced, and someone who wants a change in the classes in power, replacing an economically powerful small group with the power of the people, then I am a revolutionary.

An Absurd Question

Question: Gen Seregni, does the Broad Front constitute in any way the political arm of the armed seditious movement?

Answer: Forgive me, but this question is as absurd as it would be to say that the seditious movement is the armed branch of our political movement. We have said before that they are two distinct movements that have laid out different paths. The seditious movement believes that the armed path is the only viable one for attaining power. We believe that we must proceed via institutional routes in order for the people to accede to the government and to power.

Question: Do you give alms regularly?

Answer: No, no, frankly no, because I would feel inferior to myself if I were to give alms.

Irony and Defamation

Question: Gen Seregni, do you feel yourself to be the object of irony in the political controversy?

Answer: Look, irony does not bother me. Irony is one thing, and low, defamatory personal attacks are something else. However, they do not bother me either, because I understand that those who engage in them do so because they have no real reasons to cite, and consequently they have to take up these low weapons.

Question: Does the Broad Front call for reforms in depth in the country? As president, Gen Seregni, would you promote these reforms gradually or rapidly?

Answer: No, the entire process must be planned. Sharp leaps lead to breaks, while planned affairs lead correctly and decisively to the objectives we are proposing.

Repudiation of Terrorism

Question: Gen Seregni, how did you feel when your sister was the object of a recent assault?

Answer: Look, over and above the purely family matter, the shock that could have been related purely to the family, what I felt is what I still feel with respect to any act of violence or any act of terrorism -- profound repudiation, because our Broad Front and I personally place the human being and his rights over and above everything else.

Question: Gen Seregni, do or do you not view as a misfortune the fact that the country is experiencing a crisis such as the present one?

Answer: I would say that this question should not even be asked. How could it be other than a misfortune when the nation and the people suffer as a result of the crisis? It is a profound misfortune, but every negative element trails something positive behind it. After this crisis has passed, and precisely because the people have acquired greater awareness from it, we shall make our Uruguay a better place.

Not a Vocation, But a Civic Obligation

Question: How did your political vocation come about, General Seregni? Have you always had this inclination, or did it spring up abruptly just now?

Answer: Well, my vocation has been the military vocation. However, as a civic obligation, I have always been interested in the affairs of my country and, of course, in politics. This interest grew as I advanced in my career. I am now entering into political activity itself for the first time. Of course, while I was in the military I was limited to my career and to the obligations that it presupposes.

Question: How did you feel when you had under your command the troops that intervened at the university and in the militarization of the banking workers?

Answer: The troops under my command occupied the university premises. I felt at that time that I was assisting in pacification at an extremely difficult time for our country. At the time of the militarization of the banking workers, I was doing my duty and fulfilling an obligation as a military man on active duty, within the framework of security measures adopted by the executive power and endorsed by tacit acceptance on the part of the legislative power.

Question: How did you obtain your principal military ranks, by competition or by selection?

Answer: Well, beginning with the rank of captain I obtained all my ranks as a commander and higher officer through competition.

Question: Gen Seregni, many people indicate that they are reluctant to vote for you because they believe that in the end, the Broad Front will be at the mercy of the best organized force that supports it -- that is, the Communist Party. What is your opinion?

Answer: Our Broad Front is a coalition of political groups in which the leadership organisms are composed of all the forces in democratic representation. Consequently, domination is by the citizenry supporting the various groups, since our Broad Front constitutes the politically organized people.

Question: What do you prefer to give to your wife, a flower or a piece of jewelry?

Answer: A flower. When we were young, it was a flower because it could not be anything else, but now I find that to me, the message of a flower is more expressive of my feelings.

Definition in Two Words

Question: Could you define the present government in two words, and not more than two?

Answer: In two words?

Question: In two words.

Answer: Antinational and antipopular.

Question: Gen Seregni, the middle class has been a bulwark of the country's democratic system for a long time. Would you promote a recovery of the Uruguayan middle class on the same socioeconomic foundations?

Answer: No. Nothing is the same. In the change and in the dynamics of a society, we shall seek the recovery of our middle class that has suffered so much in recent times. However, we shall also seek the elevation of the working class and the most dispossessed classes. The framework cannot be the same, since society must be dynamic and in continuous transformation. The framework of these transformations is defined in our programmatic foundations.

The Role of Religion

Question: Is religion a positive or a negative factor in human evolution?

Answer: Look, De Feo, I am not religious. However, to the extent that it operates in the field of ethics, issuing standards of morals and of human coexistence tending to greater solidarity and greater justice, and to equality among men, I consider that religion is and has been extremely positive. This is even more so at the present time, when the church, deeply rooted in its flock, is committing itself and taking up a position.

Question: On international policy, do you condemn equally any attack on the sovereignty of nations? For example, to cite a specific case, the invasion of the Dominican Republic and the invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Answer: Our position is very clear from that point of view. Our basic principle of international policy is the self-determination of peoples, which consequently involves the principle of nonintervention. We firmly believe that every intervention is punishable.

The Causes of Violence

Question: Gen Seregni, do you believe that the seditious movement in the country will cease on your acceding to the presidency?

Answer: I do not just believe it; I am certain of it, if, as we believe and have said on other occasions, the seditious movement and violence are in response to profound causes of injustice and social inequality. The Broad Front in the government presupposes the people in the government. There would then be no reason for injustices and inequalities.

Question: You are a man accustomed to military discipline and to the exercise of command. Do you impose it in your home?

Answer: These are two different things. In the armed forces, in the army, the function to be carried out imposes command and imposes discipline for the purpose of making decisions and achieving consistency in efforts directed toward a common goal. In the family, De Feo, it is different. In the family one attempts to achieve happiness through love. It is completely different.

Question: Are you timid, passionate, or bold?

Answer: What kind of question is that? I believe that all of us, all human beings, share in these characteristics. Nevertheless, I can tell you this: I acknowledge in myself a kind of timidity, especially in my struggle as a child and a young man. I believe that I am bold when I know where I am heading, and I am intensely passionate when I am engaged in a task.

Question: Are you bold and impassioned now, as a candidate?

Answer: It would have to be that way.

The Generation Regrouping

Question: Do you believe that there is a family crisis, and what importance do you attribute to it?

Answer: Well, a great deal has been said about this, and there actually has been a generational crisis and a lack of understanding between parents and children. However, here in Uruguay since the appearance of the Broad Front, there has been a family regrouping based on the same conception of the country, of the family, and of the duty of each person.

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Question: As president, what kind of guarantees would you give foreign capital that wished to enter the country? Or would you not be interested in it?

Answer: No. Any capital that would come to our country for the purpose of promoting development within the framework of planning and that would insure that development would be welcome. It would be welcome and in such cases it would have all guarantees.

Question: These would be the same guarantees as for domestic capital?

Answer: Of course.

Question: Have you been subjected to many disappointments in your life?

A Disappointment, a Hope

Answer: In the personal field, few; I can frankly say very few. In the civic field, recent times have certainly shaped a profound disappointment over seeing our country being submerged more and more in crisis and decomposition. However, a hope was born with the Broad Front and the disappointments that have been experienced are no longer important.

Question: Were you a friend of General Gestido?

Answer: I could not say that I was a friend of his. I did not have that pleasure and that honor because of the difference in age and because of the fact that we never served together, since we belonged to different branches of the military. However, I had enormous respect for General Gestido, and I understand that he also had respect and consideration for me. The most important position that I held in my career, that of commander of Military Region No 1, was given to me by Gen Gestido when he assumed the presidency of the Republic.

Question: Do you trust or mistrust those around you?

Answer: I must trust those who work with me and I cannot be too cautious. If I reach the point of mistrusting a person, I prefer to part with him.

Question: Are you ambitious in politics?

Answer: Well, healthy ambition is present in all our activities. However, not the ambition to power, but rather the ambition to serve the country, the ambition to have the ideas that we consider best applied for the purpose of taking our country forward to the future that we wish for it and which our country and our people deserve.

"I Believe in Friendship"

Question: Do you believe in friendship, or do you believe that people use each other?

Answer: I believe deeply in friendship as a feeling that is pure and that goes much beyond any utilitarian objective.

Question: Then you enjoy conversation?

Answer: Greatly. I would almost say that I am too much of a conversationalist. However, I am absolutely certain and absolutely convinced that we human beings will achieve communication and understanding with each other only through dialogue and conversation.

Question: As a stockholder in the company Teletipo, Inc., did you feel yourself to be a capitalist?

Answer: Never. To me that company, which at one time was incorporated, was a place to work. I am no longer part of it, but while I was part, I regarded it as a place to work.

A Militant

Question: General Seregni, is your candidacy purely circumstantial, and consequently if the Broad Front does not win in November, will you cease to be active in that electoral coalition and consequently disappear from politics?

Answer: Look, gravitation is something circumstantial and is related to the abilities that one might have, as well as how he is regarded by his fellow citizens and working colleagues. In any case, ever since we joined the Broad Front we have considered it to be a historic and far-reaching policy and we have devoted ourselves wholly to it. We shall continue to be active in it, whatever the role or task that is assigned to us.

Question: Do you like soccer? Which is your favorite team?

Answer: Well, I like it and I liked it as a child, just as all children do. As a young man, I confess that I had too much of a "stiff foot," so that I have seen more soccer as a spectator than as a player. Now with respect to the team I like, I can tell you that I was advised once that a candidate should never say which team he supports, so as not to estrange the other ones.

Question: But you played soccer and had a "stiff foot." You alternated with Alvarito Gestido, who appears in the photograph that you have.

Answer: Yes, but we alternated with Alvaro Gestido on the baseball diamond, when we were regimental colleagues in the 5th Artillery.

Question: So you could not demonstrate what kind of "stiff foot" you had?

Answer: No, unfortunately, I could not.

Question: Do you consider yourself more as an army general than as a candidate for the presidency of the Republic?

Answer: Well, you see, I am an army general and I shall be to the day of my death. At present I am temporarily a candidate for the presidency, and I now should and do act like a candidate for the presidency.

Question: They say that you decided to retire because you wanted more drastic repression.

Answer: Many obscenities are spoken, De Feo, but those who in 1968 were in governmental and in opposition positions, in the trade unions, and at the university know very well what my position was in this respect.

"Friend Seregni"

Question: Which do you prefer to be called, General Seregni or Comrade Seregni?

Answer: Well, I am a general by profession and by military vocation, and the term comrade has a connotation that is rather too warm for all of us engaged in this joint undertaking. I would say that I like very much to be called comrade general, but I like it still more when a few young voices chant "Friend Seregni" at ceremonies. I feel this most profoundly.

Question: Do you feel as comfortable as a Broad Front presidential candidate as you would have felt as a candidate of Batlle-ism within the Colorado motto?

Answer: The Batlle-ism business could have been and was not. The Broad Front is a reality and I am comfortable, profoundly comfortable, and at peace with my conscience within the Broad Front.

Question: Do the opinions of your wife have any influence on you?

Answer: Well, no, I would not say influence. When a couple are on good terms, what there is is an exchange of ideas and intermixture, and not influence in the sense in which it might be understood, as the domination of one by the other.

Question: What domestic politician have you admired or do you admire the most?

Answer: Mr Jose Batlle y Ordonez.

Question: And on the international level?

Answer: On the international level and during the contemporary era, De Gaulle. Whatever the differences of a political nature that one might have had with him, he was a man who devoted himself completely to his country above everything else and who put his country above everything else. In addition, he consulted his people at every turn, and the day that a referendum said that the majority of the people were not with him, he immediately withdrew to his home. There was in what he did the meaning of what our forefather Artigas said, "My authority emanates from you, and it ceases"

Question: How would you define yourself, as a Peruvianist, a Castroite, or a Chileanist?

Answer: I define myself as a Uruguayanist. However, I prefer to say it in terms that are dearer to us -- as an easterner, because this has the connotation of our ancient homeland.

The Ideology of the Broad Front

Question: Does the Broad Front have a single ideology or several? Which one would you employ in the government?

Answer: Ideologies are sometimes confused with philosophies, policies, or political doctrines. Our Front has one absolutely express ideology which emanates from its programmatic bases.

Question: Do you consider Fidel Castro's latest speech, the one that referred to the Uruguayan elections, to be an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of our country?

Answer: No, because the references to our country must be regarded within the context of the speech. What there was there was a general evaluation of the American situation, but in no way any interference in the domestic affairs of our country.

Question: How did you feel when you retired?

Answer: Well, it is difficult to say these things. Only I know the moments I experienced on transferring to a retirement situation, and the profound heartbreak that having to adopt that decision presupposed for me.

The External Debt

Question: As president, what position would you take with respect to the external debt? Moratorium, refinancing, or strict fulfillment of the obligations?

Answer: We believe that reconversion of the debt is absolutely necessary for the country, because it is not possible to fulfill the commitments that have been contracted. The country's resources do not permit it, without the risk of its very life as a country and the risk of its dying from anemia. The commitments will be paid, because our country should fulfill its obligations. However, it must above all else survive and march forward along the path of progress and development.

Question: Do you have any personal wealth?

Answer: In the material realm, I have an apartment here in Montevideo, a house in Punta del Este, and an automobile. Although it might appear to be demagogy, my greatest wealth is my family and the innumerable friends I have.

Updated and Traditional Batlle-ism

Question: You have said that you are an updated Batlle-ist. What is the difference between this and a traditional one?

Answer: Well, there is the difference between those who believe that time and society are static and those of us who believe that society must be dynamic and be adapted to the times successively experienced. To me, the program of the Broad Front is updated Batlle-ism.

Question: As a general of the nation, you have committed yourself to respect for the constitution of the Republic, which consecrates the republican-democratic system. As a candidate for the presidency, you are accepting the support of groups who are struggling to replace that system. Do you feel released from the commitment to defend the democratic-republican system of government?

Answer: Not only do I not feel released, but on the contrary, committed now as a politician, because it is a matter of applying our programmatic bases. That is my political commitment, and the programmatic bases of the Broad Front insure the multiparty system and the exercise of representative democracy.

Question: Do you have a hobby?

Answer: Well, I would say two: fishing and playing pool.

Question: Do you win or lose at these two?

Answer: Well, sometimes we win and sometimes we lose.

The Family in the Society Proclaimed by the Broad Front

Question: What role do you assign to the family in the society proclaimed by the Broad Front?

Answer: The most important one, De Feo. The family is and should be the foundation of a society. The society must even be the extrapolation of the family into the social field. Perhaps I feel this so deeply because I am of Italian descent and I have received this profound and binding sense of family from my ancestors. The best memories that I have of my childhood are of the family gatherings following the death of my grandfather, when we got together at the house of the oldest uncle for birthdays, at Christmas, and for New Year's.

Young People Now

Question: General Seregni, what is your opinion of young people today?

Answer: The best of opinions and the best of praise. Young people today, like the young people of all times, have the ability to devote themselves totally without holding back. However, our young people in recent years have above all shown the capability of standing firmly against despotism, fighting for freedom and fighting for equality.

Violence From the Left and From the Right

Question: General Seregni, do you believe that acts of violence from the left should be condemned equally severely as similar acts from the right? In any case, will the amnesty being proclaimed by the Broad Front be applied equally to both?

Answer: In reply, I believe, to an earlier question, I told you that

to me and to our Front, violence is always to be repudiated, particularly violence against human beings. With respect to your second question, we are proclaiming an amnesty in cases where the crimes can be called sociopolitical in nature. Any crime of a sociopolitical nature deserves special treatment that is different from that accorded to common crimes.

Question: In any case, can sociopolitical crimes lead subsequently into common crimes?

Answer: This can happen.

Question: General Seregni, we await your final words for tonight.

Answer: Well, my final words will be words of gratitude to Channel 10 and of gratitude to this audience for having been permitted in such an objective manner to communicate with the citizenry of my country. I am completely certain that following these long and grievous years of crisis and despair, the country will know how to take the path corresponding to it, and that it will be able to cause everyone to join forces in order to fashion the homeland that we want.

De Feo: Many thanks, General Liber Seregni, candidate for the presidency of the Republic for the Broad Front, and to you, ladies and gentlemen. Until next Friday. Thank you very much.

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URUGUAY STANDS STILL-AWAITING NOVEMBER VOTE

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Foreign Service
MONTEVIDEO, Aug. 13

Uruguayans, whose national sport is politics, seem to talk of little else these days than the general elections coming Nov. 28. And that is about as far into the future as the dispirited country cares to look.

Businessmen say they are reserving all investment decisions until after the elections, and the already aching economy responds accordingly. Rental agents report that customers demand contracts running no further than November.

Despite the violence and agitation that is chronic and that occasionally approaches chaos, most citizens consulted say they think the voting actually will take place. But few predict the result or its consequences to a country where urban guerrillas (luparyaros) have operated with impunity for years. The historically for-

ward-looking republic has suffered a social dissolution during the last five years. One dismayed diplomat calls it "Latin America's sole developed nation, on the road to under development."

Several Alternations

This exemplar among South America's diminished democracies faces these alternatives in the election:

- The Frente Amplio (literally, "Broad Front"), an Uruguayan approximation of the Marxist-dominated Popular Unity Front of President Salvador Allende in Chile—which is the only other democracy in the southern cone of South America. The Frente Amplio's candidate is retired Gen. Liber Seregni, 54.

- Election of one of numerous declared candidates of the traditional Colorado and National parties, and thus continuation of complex personalist politics.

- Re-election to President

News Analysis

Jorge Pacheco Areco, 51. The constitution prohibits reelection, but Uruguay occasionally amends the constitution on the same ballot that it votes the effects of that change. Thus, in 1966 it voted to abolish a nine-man collegiate presidency at the same time that it selected the president to replace it.

President Pacheco has not said whether he will run again, though he has made it clear that he is available if chances look good. He would be one of several candidates of the Colorado Party.

Under the unique election law, factions of a party each run their presidential candidate. Their votes are added together and if this total is greater than the totals of the various factions of the opposing parties, the leading factional candidate becomes president. The fac-

ing views—then share the spoils proportionately.

Seregni says that this system has been fostered by the oligarchy which, protecting its own interests, has weakened the country and provoked a frustration expressed in the extreme leftist Tupamaro terrorists.

The general, who retired in protest against what he calls senseless repression of the terrorists, alleges that only he can end the violence—by reincorporating the Tupamaros into a society on the road to socialism.

Polls show that his front of several small leftist parties might well win in Montevideo, though the Colorado Party to which he once belonged holds the overall edge because of its strength in the countryside.

Montevideo has about half of the total population, estimated at just under 3 million. Nobody is sure because, despite a relatively enormous government payroll, official statistics are almost nonexistent.

Workers Don't Produce

Critics of the Frente Amplio have asked how extensive could be the socialization of an economy in which 300,000, or close to half of the work force, already work for the government.

Part of the economic problem is that productivity of these workers is low.

Those who favor Pacheco's reelection say that only more of his stern rule can allow rebuilding of the run-down economy.

Pacheco has defied the eloquent but often aimless congress by decreeing unpopular economic and security measures. As a result, an impeachment process is under way; it probably will fail, but only because it requires a two-thirds majority.

The security measures include suspension of some of Uruguay's ample civil liberties. According to Pacheco, only thus can the Tupamaros "common delinquents" be controlled.

But as he was insisting that habeas corpus was expendable, 88 women prisoners—self-acclaimed Tupamaros—all broke out of jail

with an ease that made the government's heavily augmented security forces look as unproductive as the bureaucracy. (After a similar jailbreak last year, Pacheco had taken the jails from the education ministry and put them under the interior.)

Pacheco has also challenged the constitution by ordering the rearrest of a couple who had been granted habeas corpus. This could result in another proceeding, similar to an impeachment, against the president.

Pacheco took office in 1967. He was the vice presidential candidate of the winning faction. The president, Oscar Gestido, died soon after taking office.

From the start, Pacheco—or his cabinet ministers, since he rarely makes public statements—has stressed the need of rationalizing the economy. For half of this century Uruguay prospered on sales of meat and wool to Europe. Social legislation, starting with the eight-hour day in 1915, kept pace.

But Uruguayans ate a lot of the beef, and taxed exports for industrial experiments that did not prosper. For the last 15 years, the economy actually has shrunk, and only the fact of the very low population growth rate—one of many exceptions here to Latin patterns—has prevented drastic decline in living standards.

Despite Pacheco's unpopular measures, the economy hovers near crisis. The peso is hopelessly overvalued at the official rate of 13.5 cents to the peso. The rate is expected to remain unchanged through elections because Pacheco vowed that no devaluation would be necessary.

But the citizen who travels abroad must pay high prices for goods at a de facto devaluation.

And even on the national airline, Pluna, he faces the embarrassment of having his country's own money refused for purchases abroad. Pluna offsets some of the losses typical of state enterprises here by selling Scotch whisky and American cigarettes to passengers.

Cabinet posts are unstable as the currency. Sometimes the ministers are dismissed by Pacheco, more often by the congress.

Smuggled Beef

Partly because of the tax load that cattle growers carry, private investment in the industry has fallen away and government funds have not replaced it. A U.S. Department of Agriculture study estimated that with fuller exploitation of the rich pampa, Uruguay could quadruple its cattle production. Uruguay is as big as Nebraska, with almost all of the land suited for cattle raising.

Meat-packing plants, once foreign-owned, are now under the government. But an unknown portion of the exported beef bypasses the plants, smuggled on the hoof over the border to Brazil, where prices are better.

Pacheco's other target, terrorism, is on the increase as the economy stagnates.

The Tupamaros hold five kidnap victims, including the British ambassador, in the world's most looked-for jail. After five years bank robberies, sackings of arsenals and army posts, the Tupamaros have provoked creation of a rightist counter-terror group.

High school advocates of both sides battle occasionally until the schools are closed. Then, with paradoxical orderliness, the youths return to the classrooms for what are known as cleanup days, to undo the damage of their conflicts.

The government closes left-wing newspapers but others spring up. All are censored or independently gathered news on the Tupamaros, and now labor conflicts must be reported via government handouts.

Most of these measures are challenged by Montevideo's legions of lawyers. When the law school recently sought to present a debate on the government acts, it could find no one to argue for the official policies.

Pacheco backers say that the silent majority is with him whether this is so is one of the unknowns in the waning months of a notably unjoyful campaign.

What is known is that Uruguay, however overromanticized as the Switzerland of South America, the triumph of the universal middle class, has separated thoroughly from that past.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
26 August 1971

LEFTISTS, DISSIDENT MODERATES BUILDING PARTY IN URUGUAY

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Foreign Service

MONTIVIDEO — An old man in a thick coat said the neighborhood was full of pensioners, and the issue was the demise of Uruguay's social security system.

A cripple in a hand-propelled tricycle said the housewives required "conscientization," a familiar word in Latin American politics meaning social awareness.

Some 60 people were crowded into an unheated room, on a cold night — it's midwinter in Uruguay — in a poor neighborhood. The subject under discussion was the national election next Nov. 28.

The meeting had been called by the Frente Amplio, a center-left coalition that has broken with Uruguayan political tradition with a vigorous attempt to organize in the neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Committees

Election campaigns here usually have consisted of negotiations, among party factions, to form short-lived alliances of convenience under the umbrellas of either the Colorado Party, now ruling, or the National Party.

The Frente Amplio — literally, Broad Front — brings together dissidents from both of those parties with small and often mutually antagonistic fragments of the Marxist left and the Christian Democrats.

People from all of these

groups come together to work in neighborhood committees. The Frente's candidate for president, retired Gen. Liber Seregni, 54, says that, win or lose, these committees will stay in business

after the election to become the watchdogs of the next government.

Some 230 committees have been organized, most of them in Montivideo, where half of Uruguay's 3 million people live.

Robert's Rules

Speakers at the neighborhood meeting did not mention their party affiliation. But listeners could easily detect their militancy. Many were Communists.

The March 26 Movement, named for the date of this year's big rally at which the Frente Amplio was founded, was also represented. This group accepts the possibility of a peaceful ascension to power, but just barely. The movement is described by members of the front as a potential bridge to the violently leftist Tupamaros.

As the student chairman of the meeting steered it toward nominations for committee representatives, speakers displayed an astonishing knowledge of Robert's rules of parliamentary procedure. For half a century Uruguayans debated their differences, and even this far below the legislative level they are masters of parliamentary procedure.

There were almost as many viewpoints as people present. Arms waved, speak-

ers shouted, and the single light bulb illuminating the sparse room fairly danced on the end of its wire.

Committees Are the Key

The man on the tricycle turned to this obvious Yankee and said, "If we keep going on this way, we Uruguayans will never get to the moon."

Finally, around midnight, a compromise was worked out which would allow the executive committee to elect the representatives at a meeting the next day.

In an interview a few days later, presidential candidate Seregni praised the neighborhood committees for bringing out large numbers of people who had never before participated in politics.

He said the committees were the key to his three aims for the Frente Amplio: conscientization, mobilization and organization.

But he conceded that none of these had yet worked its way up the party structure from the committees.

Asked if he believed the Communists would be willing to submerge their party identity in the neighborhood committee, he replied that they would have to or be left out. But he said the parties would not give up their organizations.

Other persons within the front said there is division over whether the committees should simply be tools of the election or a truly permanent popular organization.

WASHINGTON STAR
3 September 1971

CPYRGHT

President May Win Vote In Uruguay but Lose Job

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff Writer

Announcement that President Jorge Pacheco Areco intends to run in the Nov. 28 Uruguayan presidential election raises the possibility that he might win the election while losing the simultaneous constitutional amendment referendum that permits his candidacy.

Uruguay's constitution prohibits a president from succeeding himself, and the necessary amendment will be part and parcel of the balloting among the candidates. Passage of the amendment requires approval of 35 percent of all registered voters and half of all those who vote.

Publisher May File

There is some reason to believe that Pacheco, an energetic enemy of the Tupamaro urban guerrillas and of all leftist extremists, is more in search of vindication of his policies than of election. He has two options as a Colorado party candidate: One is to designate an alternate who would receive all his votes if the amendment fails; the other is to run without an alternate. In

the latter case, all his votes would go to the eligible Colorado candidate with the most votes.

As of now, that candidate might well be publisher Jorge Batlle, who is expected to enter the lists this month at the head of his Colorado faction. Batlle, whose grandfather was a national hero, has the family name and a powerful wing of the party going for him but has been hurt by allegations that he profited by advance knowledge of a currency devaluation a few years ago.

An added complication is the entry of a third party, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), against the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties. The Frente is fielding Gen. Liber Seregni and has attracted most of the small far left groups, including the Tupamaros.

Most observers believe the Frente has little chance of winning in November, but the Blancos are in considerable disarray and this means Seregni might finish second. It is generally felt by experts that the Frente Amplio is about five years away from any real threat of electoral victory.

What is really at stake is whether democratic Uruguay, which is a cradle-to-grave welfare state, will endorse Pacheco's political and economic policies. There is little to distinguish Colorados from Blancos beyond the personalities of the leaders of the various factions in each party. Both are democratic parties. The Frente Amplio is committed to policies and backed by groups that would align Uruguay with Chile and Cuba if it came to power.

The experts believe the next president will be of the Colorado party. Some feel, furthermore, that Pacheco would be content if the popular vote was a vindication of his regime even if he was prevented from election by failure of the constitutional amendment.

Oddly enough, Uruguay, which has had some disastrous economic years in the past decade, is in a better position than most Latin countries as a result of the new U.S. economic policy. Of its \$180 million in reserves, it has nearly \$150 million in gold. With dollars losing their attraction around the world, Uruguay is looking pretty good in terms of its holdings.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Guerrillas Tunnel to Montevideo Jail and Free 111

CPYRGHT MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sept. 6 (AP) — Members of the Tupamaro guerrillas organization freed 111 prisoners from a maximum security penitentiary today.

Once clear of the prison, the 111 disappeared, possibly in automobiles or a bus, sources reported. The sources said that among the prisoners were all the important leaders of the

Marxist urban guerrilla organization, including one of its founders, Raul Sendic, who had been arrested a year ago.

The break was made, the sources said, through a 40-foot tunnel dug from a house across the street from the prison into a prison cell.

It was the second major prison break in less than two months engineered by the guerrillas, who have kidnapped for

a campaign against the Government. Last summer, the guerrillas killed a United States police adviser, Dan A. Mitrione, of Indianapolis, and released an American agriculture expert, Claude L. Fly, of Fort Collins, Colo., after 208 days.

The Tupamaros still are holding six persons, including the British Ambassador, Geoffrey Jackson. Mr. Jackson will have spent eight months in captivity

The Government said that 106 of the men who fled today were Tupamaros and that the five others were common criminals. Before the break, there were 500 prisoners in the Punta Carretas federal prison, on the outskirts of Montevideo.

On July 17, 39 Tupamaro women escaped from the women's jail in Montevideo through a tunnel that led from a cell to

WASHINGTON POST
8 September 1971

Uruguay to Hold Vote Despite Prison Escape

From News Dispatches

MONTEVIDEO, Sept. 7—Uruguay's President Jorge Pacheco Areco announced today that presidential elections, in which he will be seeking re-election, will be held as scheduled on Nov. 28 despite the crisis caused by the escape from prison on Monday of 106 Tupamaro urban guerrillas.

At the same time, Pacheco accepted the resignation of Uruguay's prison director and announced that he had refused to accept the resignations submitted by the minister of the interior, who heads the national police, and the

defense minister.

The escape, in which five common criminals accompanied the 106 guerrillas, freed every major Tupamaro leader captured in the past two years. The prisoners escaped through a 120-foot tunnel between the jail and a nearby home.

Despite tightened security measures, there was no indication that Uruguayan authorities had found any clue to the whereabouts of the escaped prisoners.

The Tupamaros hold five hostages, among them British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson, who will have been a prisoner

of the group for eight months on Wednesday. The others being held by the group include three prominent Uruguayans and an Argentine industrialist.

Pacheco has steadily maintained a no-negotiations policy toward the group.

In the election—in which Uruguayans will also vote on a constitutional amendment which would permit Pacheco to succeed himself—the country's two traditional parties, the Blancos and the Colorados, are being opposed by a coalition of leftist political parties called the Frente Amplio.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 September 1971

CPYRGHT

URUGUAY'S GUERRILLAS GROW BOLDER

Uruguay's urban guerrillas, the Tupamaros, act more and more as if they are a law unto themselves.

In quick order this past week, they carried off a daring escape that resulted in the freeing of 106 Tupamaros from a Montevideo jail. The freed prisoners included Raúl Sendic, founder and leader of the Tupamaros.

Then the guerrillas released the British Ambassador to Uruguay, whom they had held hostage almost nine months. From the Tupamaro point of view, there was no longer any reason to hold Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson since the Uruguayan Government no longer holds more than a handful of Tupamaro prisoners.

The Tupamaros' defiance of the established government has been growing. When

they were first organized they maintained something of a Robin Hood image, carrying off robberies and turning over the stolen goods and money to Uruguay's poor.

But more and more they have adopted terrorist tactics, including the kidnapping of foreigners and Uruguayans alike for ransom. They also began a wave of bombings and shoot-outs with police that have brought a degree of terror not only to Uruguay but also to the capital city, Montevideo.

For the most part, the Tupamaros' activity has been centered in Montevideo. In some measure, this is a natural development in the small South American nation, since half the country's population of 4.5 million is concentrated in the capital.

The inability of the government of Jorge Pacheco Areco to do much about curbing

Tupamaros activity suggests just how serious the guerrillas have actually become and how hard it is going to be for any government to deal with them.

The escape of the Tupamaro prisoners, the second such effort in three months, significantly strengthens the guerrilla cause. Though there has been evidence that Mr. Sordin, the leader, was directing guerrilla activity from his jail cell, there is a feeling in Montevideo that his escape will trigger a number of new Tupamaro activities.

Uruguay at the moment is in the midst of a presidential election campaign—pitting the established political system against an increasing strong front of leftist persuasion. The Tupamaros have given nominal support to the front, the "Frente Amplia," but many of their members are only slightly more sympathetic to leftist politicians than to the established political parties.

The Tupamaros want to do away with Uruguay's traditional political system, seeking to replace it with a government they feel would be more interested in social progress.

Longtime observers of the Tupamaros, who have watched their growth the past eight years, say the basically urban guerrillas are stronger today than ever before. In fact, there is a feeling that among all the urban guerrillas throughout Latin America, it is the Tupamaros in Uruguay that pose the biggest threat to any of the established governments of Latin America.

Government links helpful

Part of the Tupamaros' strength stems from the support they receive from people close to government.

The government itself, however, is very much at odds with the Tupamaros. Presi-

dent Pacheco Areco succeeded to the presidency upon the passing of Gen. Oscar Gestido in 1969. It was General Gestido's victory in the 1967 election that was seen as evidence that Uruguayans were supporting firm solutions to their economic and political problems.

President Pacheco Areco now plans to run in the Nov. 28 presidential election. But the announcement that he plans to run raises the possibility that he could win the election, yet lose the simultaneous constitutional amendment referendum permitting his candidacy.

Succession snag on ballot

Under Uruguay's Constitution a president is prohibited from succeeding himself—and the necessary amendment to allow President Pacheco Areco to succeed himself will be part and parcel of the balloting among the candidates in the November voting.

Passage of the amendment requires approval by 35 percent of all registered voters and half of all those who vote.

It seems likely that Tupamaro activity will be directed against President Pacheco Areco's effort to succeed himself. But it is not clear whether the Tupamaros will swing all their support behind Frente Amplia, which is fielding Gen. Liber Seregni for the presidency. The Frente Amplia has succeeded in attracting most of the small far-left groups, including large elements within the Tupamaros.

At the present moment most observers believe that the front has little possibility of winning in November, but will depend, according to the same observers, upon Tupamaro activity because the guerrillas at present maintain the support of about one-third of the Uruguayan population.

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1971

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URUGUAY'S LEADER WARNS ON REBELS

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sept. 11—President Jorge Pacheco Areco, whose Government was undermined this week by successes of the urban guerrillas called Tupamaros, today promised to become even tougher in his battle against them.

"I will take all, hear me well, all the steps needed to defeat this subversion of your security," the President said in a 15-minute address over all of Uruguay's radio and television stations. The speech was a reaffirmation of the President's three-year-old policy of re-

pression, but he did not announce any new measures.

This week the Tupamaros, who have been active in Uruguay for eight years, freed 106 of their comrades from Montevideo's Punta Carretas prison. Then they claimed as another success their release of the British Ambassador, Geoffrey H.S. Jackson, whom they had held as a hostage for eight months and one day despite all the efforts of the government to find him.

Lack of Means Cited

President Pacheco, a 51-year-

career politician who succeeded to the presidency four years ago on the death of President Oscar D. Gestido, said Uruguay had not been prepared for the Tupamaros. He said the rules of democratic institutions and a lack of means had handicapped the Government.

The Tupamaros have used Uruguay's strong democratic traditions and institutions, particularly the free judiciary, to their benefit. However, President Pacheco last July defied a congressional vote that maintained extraordinary presidential powers that have permitted

judicial orders, press censorship and, last week, the punitive closing of four Oppositions daily newspapers.

In the speech, President Pacheco assumed personal responsibility for the decisions of his Government in fighting the Tupamaros and the steady economic decline of Uruguay.

"From now on, more than ever, the responsibility will be mine and only mine," he said. Then he accused prison security forces of having been corrupted or scared into permitting the Tupamaros to escape. He promised that the guilty would

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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
12 September 1971

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WHAT NOW FOR TUPAMAROS?

THE Tupamaros, the Uruguayan urban guerrillas who last week released British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Jackson, have grown in a decade from a small group of political activists to an armed force which has brought Uruguay to the verge of civil war.

Their success has been made possible by the virtual collapse of the once prosperous meat exporting economy of Uruguay, and the host of social problems which have followed in its wake.

Their revolt is also an attack on the entrenched traditional Conservative and Liberal parties (Blancos and Colorados) who have hitherto dominated Uruguayan politics. The Communist party, a strong minority, chose the line of orthodox, Moscow-style legality.

Raul Sendic, a Socialist law student who never finished his course, is generally considered to be the founder of the Tupamaros, which began about 1960 as an activist group among the sugar-cane workers in north-west Uruguay. He was among the 100-odd prisoners who last week made their suspiciously spectacular escape from gaol in Montevideo.

From open cane-field agitation within the bounds of legal opposition Sendic's movement went underground about 1962 when he was arrested for leading a march on Montevideo.

Shortly after this the Tupamaros blossomed first into a "Robin Hood"-style gang which won popularity distributing stolen food in poor districts, raiding casinos and corrupt finance houses and holding dubiously rich citizens to ransom.

This phase changed dramatically in the mid-Sixties to the present open warfare with the Government when the Tupamaros began assassinating policemen alleged to have tortured imprisoned members of the movement.

This culminated in the seizure and "execution" of the American police adviser, Dan Mitrione,

in July 1970. The guerrillas, incredibly, insisted that he had introduced brutal interrogation methods, including torture, in both Brazil and Uruguay. Latin America would hardly seem in need of imported lessons in torture, but Mitrione was a convenient symbol of "American imperialism."

Similarly, the holding of Aloysio Gomide, the Brazilian Consul, ransomed after six months' captivity, served to "punish" the Brazilian military regime for its repression of "native patriots."

Why should the British Ambassador have been among their victims? After all he is a diplomat representing the country which helped create Uruguay as an independent buffer state between Argentina and Brazil early last century. For the guerrillas, however, he may have been a useful symbol of Britain's erstwhile economic hold on the River Plate countries.

Above all, the Tupamaros have shown up the complete inability of the Uruguayan Government under its tough ex-pugilist president, Jorge Pacheco Areco, to protect foreign ambassadors, and the incompetence of the police and small armed forces in their heavy-handed, fruitless search for prisoners.

The Tupamaros still hold four local celebrities, including President Pacheco's close friend and adviser, Senor Pereyra Reverbel, seized once before and released with a caution and now "sentenced to life imprisonment."

The unfinished history of the Tupamaros has been presented in glowing heroic terms by the International Left and by the other side, it must be admitted, with misleading abuse. The guerrilla movement appears certainly to have drawn its leadership mainly from the young educated middle and upper classes.

But to attack these dedicated dangerous men and women as "mere thugs," and to suggest that there is no popular content in the movement is to misunderstand the nature of all present Latin-American revolutionary movements.

Genuine impatience with, and rejection of, the outworn forms of European and North Ameri-

can democracy imported by the ruling classes of the last century is an important and real ingredient of their protest.

Uruguay has long been the target of that somewhat dishevelled monster, "international Communism," with tons of subversive literature being imported from Moscow, Peking and Havana.

But despite their obvious tie-up with the Latin-American Solidarity Organisation, run from Havana, the Tupamaros represent an authentic Uruguayan growth.

They have adopted the name used by the Gaucho bands of the Uruguayan patriot Artigas in his revolt against Spain in 1811. The word itself was originally a derisive term applied by Spaniards to all anti-Imperial rebels after the failure of the native rebellion in Peru in 1780, led by an Indian called Tupac Amaru.

Though they reject ideological labels, the Tupamaros are essentially Marxist, believing that the workers' state should own all the means of production and distribution. The irony about this is that in Uruguay the state has for several generations owned a great deal of these.

The country is in the hands of a stultifying bureaucracy which the new Left would call state Capitalism. This label avoids the need to acknowledge defects in Socialism, whose welfare programmes have helped to sap the initiative of Uruguayan citizens to such an extent that their major preoccupation today is to qualify for a state pension.

The question for the guerrillas now is exactly what attitude they intend to take to the new "broad front" of Left-wing political forces which will challenge the Blancos and Colorados at the poll in November.

There have been some indications that the revolutionaries support this new political force which groups Communists, Christian Democrats, Trotskyites and the whole Left-wing bag under a "progressive" soldier, General Liber Seregni. But though the front draws vast crowds to its meetings, the old machine could still win out.

The odds are anyway that what is nearer to civil war than mere terrorism is going to get a lot rougher.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 September 1971

CPYRGHT

The tragedy of Uruguay

Uruguay today is an example of a nation in which almost everything is going badly. It wasn't always so. This smallest of South American nations, and a country once regarded as the Switzerland of the Southern Hemisphere, used to boast a high standard of living, political stability, and social mobility of a broad order.

But those days of heady enthusiasm over Uruguay have vanished. Uruguay today is a nation of fear and uncertainty. The Tupamaros, the urban guerrillas, have grown increasingly strong in the last two years, are practically a parallel government to established authority invested in President Jorge Pacheco Areco. The daring escape of 106 Tupamaros from a Montevideo jail through a newly dug tunnel is evidence of just how strong the Tupamaros have become and how effective they can be. But even more impressive is the grip of terror in which their activities have placed the bulk of the Uruguayan population. Behind the growth of the Tupamaros is the steadily worsening picture of Uruguay's economy and political structure.

The economy has slipped steadily in the past 20 years and Uruguayans today have only a small evidence of their once strong economic position. Uruguay may still be a middle-class nation, but it is faded middle class, saddled with debt and an inflationary spiral that has eaten away most savings. Part of the problem stems from social welfare schemes, adopted at a time when beef and wheat were prime exports, and Uruguay's financial coffers were full. Today Uruguay can no longer pay for the luxury of social welfare in which people, for example, retire at 50 or 55.

These problems would be bad enough. But the postwar years have brought with them a growing political chaos. No single political group has been able to muster enough support to effectively lead the na-

tion. With political drift and uncertainty at all sides, as well as the steadily worsening picture, it is not surprising that the Tupamaro guerrillas have won so much support for this disgruntled and unhappy population.

There can be some satisfaction that British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson was released after nine months in Tupamaro captivity. But there are a number of Uruguayans still held by the Tupamaros and the capability of the Tupamaros to carry off other diplomatic kidnappings has not diminished.

The problems of this tiny South American country are so many and varied, that it is hard to know where to begin seeking solutions. But it can be hoped this November's presidential election, in which President Jorge Pacheco Areco is seeking re-election, along with the constitutional amendment which would permit the very election he seeks, will be carried off with some measure of tranquillity.

Yet a victory for Pacheco Areco would certainly unleash new Tupamaro activity since they oppose him vigorously. The Tupamaros, however, have shown some evidence of going along with the election, supporting the candidate of a broad leftist coalition known as the Frente Amplio. If this coalition works to win, the Tupamaros might temporarily at least slow their terrorist activities. Interestingly enough, both Pacheco Areco and the Frente Amplio drafted economic plans which could parallel each other and could provide the basis for some solution to the worsening economic picture. Both have as their essential ingredient a degree of economic austerity which the country badly needs.

At this moment, Uruguay desperately needs a period of relaxed tension. It is just possible that the election could provide such a relaxation.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

October 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

October 13-16	Iran	2,500th anniversary of the Persian Kingdom. Dignitaries from all over the world, including many heads of state, will attend.
October 19	Japan USSR	15th anniversary of the signing of a protocol by Japan and the USSR ending their technical state of war (WW II). The protocol left hanging the question of sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union seized when it entered the war in the closing days as Japan was collapsing.
October 19-21	Poland	15th anniversary of the Polish Communist Party's successful defiance of the Soviet Union in choosing Gomulka, then only recently released from prison, to head a more independent government. The Polish action was a repercussion of the Poznan workers riots in June 1956.
October 23- November 4	Hungary	15th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution started by students and workers, joined by liberal Communists, and crushed by Soviet tanks, 1956.

October 28	Europe	British House of Commons is to vote on British membership in the Common Market.
October 31	USSR	10th anniversary of removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's mausoleum and reburial at an inconspicuous place beside the Kremlin wall. This symbolic, though very important act of de-Stalinization, was partially undone by the Brezhnev regime last year when it had a bust of Stalin placed over his new grave at the Kremlin wall. In May of this year Stalin's portrait was paraded before top Soviet leaders for the first time since 1956, at celebrations in the Georgian SSR, and Brezhnev's speech at the celebrations included praise of Stalin.
November 11 (October 30, old calendar)	USSR	150th anniversary of the birth of Fyodor Dostoevski. Although Dostoevski is reputed to be one of the most popular authors among Soviet readers today, and is regarded internationally as one of the world's great writers, his works are still censored in the USSR. Key passages in <u>The Brothers Karamazov</u> , for instance, are missing from Soviet editions. Soviet schools do not teach Dostoevski in their courses on Russian literature.

November 21-23	East Berlin	Conference on ABC Weapons (atomic, biological, chemical) sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Scientific Workers. The conference is expected to stress European security as part of the Soviet drive to promote a people-to-people approach to it, thereby creating a climate of opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a governmental European security conference "without prior conditions."
November 26-27	Czechoslovakia	Confirmed dates for parliamentary elections. There have been no parliamentary elections since 1964; the elections scheduled for 1968, the year of the Soviet invasion, never took place. The elections this year will be held under provisions of a new repressive law passed in July that insures the Communist Party control of the selection of candidates.
November 28	Uruguay	General elections. A leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front), under strong Communist influence, is striving to duplicate the Allende victory in Chile. (See article in this issue.)

November 28	Mexico City	5th World Congress of the World Psychiatric Association. Western correspondents in Moscow reported 18 September that according to Soviet dissidents the unofficial Soviet Human Rights Committee (led by Sakharov and others) has appealed to the World Psychiatric Association to help establish international guarantees for the rights of the mentally ill. Previously, Soviet dissidents have complained about the KGB's use of Soviet mental hospitals for the imprisonment and torture of political dissidents who are sane.
December 2	Florence	International Youth Meeting on European Security sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Democratic Youth. Although WFDY is currently promoting a campaign of militancy in Latin America under the slogan "Youth Accuses Imperialism," WFDY is avoiding a militant posture in Europe to gain backing for the Soviet drive for a governmental European security conference.
December 5	USSR	Constitution Day and 35th anniversary of the present Soviet Constitution, adopted under Stalin in 1936. For several years dissidents have held a brief public vigil in Moscow on this day, which the police break up. The government's failure to observe the Constitution

		is a major theme in Soviet dissidence.
December 10	Worldwide USSR	Human Rights Day, commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948. In 1970 the unofficial Soviet Human Rights Committee was formed by Sakharov and other Soviets who said their independent organization would be guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
December 19	Indochina	25th anniversary of the beginning of the French Indochina War.

BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THE SOVIET UNION

Under a general heading of "Problems Facing the Soviet Union, July 1971," a Headquarters-based writing/research project has compiled extensive overt background materials for use on a multitude of topics concerning the USSR. Attached is a detailed index to the compilation which can be cited by Field Stations wanting to order background materials on any given topic (e.g., refer to: EC-5, Bureaucracy and Individual Apathy, pp 322-358). The full 2,532-page compilation can go only to those Stations having a demonstrated need for it; the full set takes up over three feet of shelf space and is expensive to duplicate. A companion 500-page summary volume, for which the index is also attached, is available on request.

Please address your requests to this Staff, Attn: Branch 2.

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SI-6 Massive Foreign Propaganda

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October 1971

SAMIZDAT: THE UNOFFICIAL SOVIET PRESS

The recent surfacing in the West of some eleven issues of Political Diary, a previously unknown samizdat journal, affords an excellent peg for discussion of this and other similar samizdat journals. The attached backgrounder is so designed.

Political Diary has been circulating quietly for the past seven years throughout what appears to be a small but high-level segment of the so-called "loyal opposition." Its appearance in the West suggests that disaffections and dissidence run deeper and are more widespread among Soviet intellectuals than had previously been assumed. Certainly, the hard-liners in the Soviet leadership could squelch the voices of dissent if they so desired. But if they did so, the result would be an irretrievable loss of international prestige and, more importantly, an even greater alienation of vital elements of Soviet society.

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The main journals discussed in the backgrounder are Political Diary, the Chronicles of Current Events, Social Problems, and the Ukrainian Herald. The Alexander Herzen Foundation, Amstel 268, Amsterdam, Netherlands has the rights for a Russian-language edition of Political Diary; rights for other languages have not yet been settled. The Chronicle is being published in English by Amnesty International. (A copy of Amnesty's subscription form is included with the unclassified attachments.) Selections from the first eight issues of Social Problems may eventually be published in several languages. Perspectives will carry notices as editions become available. Headquarters maintains stores of samizdat material which will be relayed in response to field requests. Languages in which this material is available include Russian, German, French and Spanish. Press Comment regularly carries Western press articles based on samizdat materials; a sampling is included with the unclassified attachments.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

October 1971

SAMIZDAT: THE UNOFFICIAL SOVIET PRESS

A few weeks ago, dissident sources in Moscow simultaneously released to three Western newspapers a sampling of eleven issues of Political Diary, a hitherto unknown Soviet samizdat journal. Then, early last month the 20th issue of the Chronicle of Current Events reached the West. Both occurrences afford an opportunity to take a fresh look at the burgeoning Soviet unofficial press, or samizdat, that is slowly eroding the blanket of official silence with which the Soviet regime smothers or distorts all news or discussion of protest and reprisal. In addition to Political Diary and the Chronicle, a third samizdat journal called Social Problems is devoted mainly to questions of Soviet law and is designed to test regime tolerance of a legally constituted Soviet Committee on Human Rights. Other samizdat bulletins, such as the Ukrainian Herald or Exodus, represent special interest groups.

Samizdat in Politics

The word samizdat is a play on GOSIZDAT, the name of the monopoly-holding official State Publishing House. The "sam" part of the word stands for "self." The whole translates as "we publish ourselves," we, the people, that is, not the State. Samizdat has no printing presses; it is done by typewriter, each page produced with four to eight carbon copies. By the thousands of tens of thousands of fragile, smudged onionskin sheets, samizdat spreads across the land a mass of protests and petitions, secret court minutes, excerpts from Solzhenitsyn, and Orwell's Animal Farm and 1984, and Nicholas Berdyayev's philosophical essays, documents of the Czech Spring, all manner of sharp political discourse and angry poetry.

The names of a few of those known to be involved in the production of samizdat journals, such as Valeriy Chalidze, are probably more familiar to Western than Soviet ears and certainly the movement represents no immediate danger to the Soviet government. But there is no doubt that the Soviet leadership takes samizdat seriously. As output has grown both in quantity and intellectual quality, the writing has become increasingly political in content. The practice has spread from what the regime once regarded as a small band of scruffy scribblers to the ranks of the intellectual elite -- apparently attracting ever more representatives of the loyal opposition within the Party. The ruling group also has some cause for concern in that among the intellectual elite, members of the so-called scientific-technical intelligentsia are particularly solidly represented.

Political Diary (Politicheskiy Dnevnik).

Mid-August saw the Western debut of a new unofficial Soviet journal called Political Diary as eleven of its back issues were simultaneously released to two American (Washington Post and New York Times) and one Norwegian (Aftenposten) newspapers. For seven years, beginning in 1964, this journal has appeared monthly; in all 82 issues have been published. Those who have read samplings from this longest-lived of all the Soviet samizdat periodicals, describe its typewritten, two column pages as filled with straightforward, chatty, and informative discourse, often bordering on the satirical. Issues vary in length from 25 to 160 pages and may include articles on domestic and foreign policy (all unsigned), translations from the foreign press, reprints of letters, petitions, and some political gossip (also unsigned).

Political Diary, which may have ceased publication some time in late 1970, is believed to have circulated secretly among a very small group of scientists, writers, historians, journalists and Party elite, who are also its contributors. It reportedly is the organ of an anonymous group of liberal intellectuals, loyal citizens who want to work for reform within the Soviet system. Their goal is a democratic version of Communism. Judging from the available sampling, however, the group may have been out of step with official positions on virtually every major issue since Political Diary first appeared. Political Diary has opposed Soviet involvement in the Middle East, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Writers' Union, the "retirement" of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy from Novy Mir, the pompous character of the Lenin Anniversary, and the rehabilitation of Stalin. (Attached are reprints of some articles and translated excerpts from Political Diary that have appeared in the Western press.)

Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika Tekuyushchiye Sobytiye)

Often tattered and scarcely legible, the Chronicle of Current Events has been circulating as a regular bimonthly clandestine newsletter since 1968; in all 20 issues have appeared. This journal, with the avowed purpose of securing civil rights for Soviet citizens within the letter and spirit of the Constitution, reprints on the front page of each issue the text of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (theoretically binding on the USSR) guaranteeing the right to freedom of opinion and expression. It reportedly circulates among intellectuals in major Soviet cities with the speed of a brush fire. In the more than three years of its existence, the format and quality of Chronicle have been remarkably consistent, while the size of individual issues and the diversity of its reporting sources have continued to slowly expand.

Dispassionate in tone, Chronicle runs brief bulletins on the conditions of political prisoners in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals, of political trials, and the whole gamut of subjects touching on the infringement of civil liberties within the USSR. For the record, top KGB investigators, prosecutors and judges who are involved in the more important political trials are all identified by name. Like Political Diary, Chronicle also reprints letters, petitions, and regularly offers listings of the latest officially proscribed Western and Soviet authors circulating in samizdat in the USSR. The similarities, however, appear more as evidence of a cross-fertilization of ideas rather than of mere repetition. As with Political Diary, the editors of Chronicle remain anonymous.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Chronicle series is their dedication to accuracy. Issue number 18, for example, listed nine corrections going back as far as August 1968 when the third issue had erroneously reported that Czechoslovakian newspapers had disappeared from Soviet newsstands even before the invasion. In their correction, the editors of Chronicle explained that while Czech newspapers continued to be on sale right up to 21 August, their apparent "disappearance" came about only because the public had such great interest in what was happening in Czechoslovakia that editions sold out almost immediately. It speaks well for the Chronicle editors that they chose this "error" as a peg to remind their audience of what happened to Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968. For the Chronicle readers, brought up on tendentious press distortion and unbridled polemics, such fastidiousness with reportorial accuracy must indeed be refreshing.

Social Problems (Obshchestvennyye Problemy)

Most scientists first joined the ranks of political dissenters to protest against stultifying Party controls over Soviet science and over information exchange. By now, many have moved on to criticism of political repression in other fields as well. Last December, these men formalized their efforts by openly organizing a "Human Rights Committee" to promote the study and dissemination of information relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. The full members of the Committee -- Andrey Sakharov, Valeriy Chalidze, and Valeriy Tverdokhlebov -- are well known scientists. Designated as technical consultants to the Committee are mathematician Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin and physicist Boris Tsukerman. Yesenin-Volpin, a sometime poet and self-taught legal authority, is a seasoned protester who has been three times imprisoned -- most recently in a psychiatric institution. Tsukerman, the other legal expert associated with the Committee, became increasingly active in Zionist causes and emigrated to Israel earlier this year. Two "associate members" of the Committee, Nobel Prize-winning author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and underground balladeer Aleksandr Galich, were so recognized for their "individual contributions" to the human rights struggle.

Social Problems, published in manuscript form since late 1969, is edited by Valeriy Chalidze and is presumed to be the house organ for the Human Rights Committee. The eighth issue, November-December 1970, for example, was devoted entirely to the Committee's deliberations. Unlike his counterparts with the Chronicle and Political Diary, Valeriy Chalidze prints his name and telephone number on the title page of each issue, openly acknowledging his role as the "compiler" of Social Problems. To emphasize his intent to hold open dialogue on issues of human rights and to strengthen his premise that such activity is protected by Soviet Constitutional guarantees, Chalidze accepts for publication only signed articles.

Social Problems carries carefully reasoned and scholarly treatises from both domestic and foreign sources bearing on such issues as forcible detention in psychiatric institutions, the right to public trial, class discrimination in Soviet law, and freedom from self-incrimination during pre-trial interrogations. The legal commentaries, which comprise the bulk of the articles, are in line with Chalidze's expressed intent to explore the capacity of Soviet law for protecting human rights and to investigate the "extent to which Soviet (legal) guarantees correspond to those recommended by the United Nations." (See the attached reprint from Newsweek, 21 December 1970.)

Voices of Dissatisfaction

While Russian samizdat, early in the post-Stalin period, was exposing the brutalities of the Stalinist system, Ukrainian writers were dealing with the same issues but adding a special touch on the forced Russification of the Ukraine. The civil liberties question which dominated in Russian samizdat, also pertained in the Ukraine, but to it Ukrainian intellectuals added the allegation that the political repression directed against them was motivated by the Soviet regime's efforts to minimize the importance of Ukrainian culture. Although Chronicle reporting touched on Ukrainian affairs, the Ukrainian intellectuals believed that too little attention was being paid to events affecting their national cause. In January 1970, they began issuing their own samizdat journal, the Ukrainian Herald (Ukraiinskyj Visnyk). There have been four issues to date.

The Herald has adopted the writing style of the Chronicle, downgrading polemics in favor of factual reporting. The editors of the Herald describe their task as one of providing "objective information about hidden processes and phenomena in Ukrainian public life" but outside the jurisdiction of the censor. "By nature of its content and task," the editors write, "it is entirely legal and constitutional. The Herald does not consider as anti-Soviet activity criticism of certain persons, organs, institutions, including the highest, for errors committed in resolving internal political problems and especially for violations of the democratic rights of individuals and the nation, but as a right guaranteed by the principles of Socialist democracy and constitution."

The Ukrainians are not the only dissatisfied, vocal minority within the multinational and multireligious Soviet state. Jewish samizdat took on periodical form as Exodus in April 1970 and is now in its fifth issue despite the fairly high level of Jewish emigration permitted since spring. The reportorial bulletin of the Crimean Tatars is called Information. The Evangelical Christian Baptist or "initsiativniki," who broke away from the Baptists Church in 1965, have at least two samizdat journals -- a monthly Bratsk Leaflet (Bratskiy Listok) and a quarterly Herald of Salvation (Vestnik Spaseniya). There are then at least seven samizdat journals circulating in the USSR -- seven because it is assumed that Political Diary may have ceased publication with its September 1970 issue. And this aspect of samizdat does not take into account the numerous essays, poems, petitions and book-length documents that circulate individually.

Clearly, despite the Soviet regime's repressive tactics during the last few years, the samizdat movement has not diminished but has become even more contagious among the Soviet oppressed and among Soviet intellectuals. Its character too has changed -- what started out to be a small-scale revolt against restrictions on artistic freedom has developed into a quest for broad political, social, and economic reform. That the anonymous publishers of Political Diary chose this moment in history to surface the story of their well-kept secret could easily mean that they feel the threat of even greater neo-Stalinist repression at home. The authorities could certainly eliminate the voices of dissent if they chose to do so. However, this might now mean a resort to repression on a scale which would cost the regime too much -- partly in terms of international prestige, but more importantly in the alienation of vital elements of Soviet society.

SOVIET CIVIL RIGHTS

To the Editors:

Amnesty International has now started publishing the *Chronicle of Current Events*.

This, as you know, is the major periodical publication for the promotion of civil rights in the Soviet Union. A dispassionate and factually accurate document, it enjoys a wide unofficial circulation in the USSR. It has now been appearing for nearly three years at approximately two-monthly intervals, and contains unique information on political trials, political prisoners, the labor camps, the *samizdat* (typescript) publications, etc. The Soviet

civil rights movement is neither centrally organized nor in any general sense anti-Soviet. It concerns itself mainly with the difficulties of the Soviet citizens detained by the authorities because they have asserted the rights to freedom of expression and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR.

Over the last three years, in many cases, it has been possible to check the authenticity of the materials in the *Chronicle*. The main methods used have been checking against a) Soviet press reports, b) Western press reports, c) information from travelers, d) other *samizdat* materials. These methods

have revealed a high level of accuracy and reliability on the part of the *Chronicle*. No single event has been significantly misreported and no nonauthentic document has been either mentioned or summarized.

The *Chronicle* is now available to the general public and will appear six times a year at an annual subscription of \$10, including airmail postage (\$2 for single copies) from AID Inc., Room 6E, 777 UN Plaza, New York City 10017.

Peter Calvocoressi

London

The Chronicle of Current Events (USSR)

The *Chronicle* has now been appearing in Moscow for nearly three years. It contains accurate news on political trials, extra-judicial persecution, political prisoners, the Soviet forced labour camps, *samizdat* (i.e. typewritten) publications etc. The Soviet civil rights movement is neither centrally organised nor in any general sense anti-Soviet; yet the *Chronicle* has to be circulated unofficially, in a more or less clandestine way, in the USSR. The *Chronicle* is a unique and valuable record of the movement in the USSR for the protection of civil rights.

The text of the *Chronicle*, translated into English and printed as six separate issues every year - will run to some 250 - 350 pages in all. Every issue will contain an index of names and brief annotation.

The annual subscription will be £3.50 - (US \$10) including packing and air mail postage. Please send your cheques to Amnesty International Publications, Room 6, Turnagain Lane, Farringdon Street, London EC4, making them payable to Amnesty Publications.

I enclose a cheque/money order for £ as annual
\$ subscription(s) to the Chronicle of Current Events.

To: Amnesty International
Publications,
Room 6, Turnagain Lane,
Farringdon Street,
London, E.C.4.

Date.....

Name.....
(BLOCK LETTERS)

Address.....

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WASHINGTON POST (underlining added)
22 August 1971

'Loyal' Secret Journal Chides the Kremlin

By Anthony Astrachan

Astrachan was Moscow correspondent for The Washington Post until recently. He is now its United Nations correspondent.

AN UNAUTHORIZED journal unknown before today shows the existence of an equally unknown "loyal opposition" in the Soviet Union—a tiny, informal group of liberal Marxists placed highly enough to try to influence Soviet policy.

Many of their ideas resemble those of Alexander Dubcek and other reformers whose efforts to put a "human face" on communism in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were crushed by the Soviet invasion of that country.

The journal, called simply Political Diary, has appeared monthly since the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Soviet unofficial sources made copies of 11 of the 82 issues available to The Washington Post, The New York Times and the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.

Political Diary's unidentified editors and writers, and presumably its readers, are clearly loyal to the basics of the Soviet system—the Bolshevik revolution, the ideas of Lenin, the leading role of the Communist Party, and the constitutional function of most Soviet institutions. Many are profoundly, sometimes dogmatically Marxist. "Opposition" may thus be too strong a term for them.

But they are interested in a democratic version of communism and in human rights. They are critical of Stalin and his legacies. They discuss Kremlin politics, the Soviet economy, cultural control, nationalities policy and other internal affairs. They also discuss foreign policy, relations among Communist countries, arms control and questions of philosophical and sociological theory.

Absolute secrecy surrounded the existence of this free-speaking journal, in contrast to the Chronicle of Current Events that circulates among outright political dissidents, which is widely

known to Soviet intellectuals and abroad. The long-term secrecy suggests that the number of readers is very small and carefully selected, and that the responsible people were anxious to avoid being confused with the dissidents, who have sought foreign contacts and the largest possible audience inside the Soviet Union.

Seeking an Outlet

THE CURRENT DEPARTURE from the previous secrecy about Political Diary suggests to some observers that the liberal Marxists feel their chances of influencing Soviet policy from within have shrunk under the restrictive regime of Leonid Brezhnev, and that outside knowledge of their existence may help. Western reports of such events are broadcast back into the Soviet Union in Russian by short-wave radio stations like the BBC, Voice of America and Radio Liberty.

Whether putting forth opinions or facts, one of the most important things about PD is the way it gives its readers information the ordinary Soviet citizen never hears about, from both Soviet and foreign sources.

This can be as simple as repeating the candid account of the reasons for Khrushchev's overthrow that the great Bolshevik survivor, Anastas Mikoyan, gave the workers of the Red Proletarian factory in Moscow in 1964. It can be as complex as analyses of the reasons that the Moscow intelligentsia disagreed with Soviet support of the Arabs in the Middle East, or of what was really going on in Czechoslovakia in 1968 while the Kremlin spoke only simple-minded propaganda.

One of Political Diary's chief interests is the recurring attempt to rehabilitate Stalin or revive Stalinism. Outsiders tend either to regard this as an uninterrupted process, or to take at face value the recent 24th Party Congress, which labeled Stalinists and anti-Stalinists equally pests. PD shows that the reality is often more complex than either view.

The journal noted, for instance, in June 1965, that S. I. Murashev, deputy minister of higher and secondary education, had demanded the reintroduction of some of Stalin's work into the social science syllabuses. "When Murashev asked the economists and philosophers which works of Stalin they proposed to include in the philosophy and political economics course, the ministry's heads of departments replied: None.

"A member of the political economics department explained: Stalin wrote only one work on economics, 'The Economic Problems of Socialism,' and press criticism showed that it contained more incorrect than correct material. If we asked students to study this work, we should only confuse them.

"Murashev took all the syllabuses away with him and said he would amend them himself."

A conference of ideological workers from all parts of the Soviet Union was the scene of a more serious attempt to rehabilitate Stalin in October, 1966.

D. G. Sturua, secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, set the tone: "We are sometimes called Stalinists, but we see nothing discreditable in that. We are proud to be Stalinists. I am a Stalinist, because the triumphs of our people in the years of collectivization and industrialization are linked with the name of Stalin. I am a Stalinist because for us the name of Stalin is linked with the victories of our people in the years of the patriotic war [World War II]. I am a Stalinist because for us the name of Stalin is linked with the victories of our people in the rebuilding of our economy after the war."

PD reported that about 70 per cent. of the ideologists applauded, while the others remained silent or protested. The self-proclaimed Stalinists attacked Novy Mir and Yunost, literary magazines at the liberal end of the Soviet spectrum. A leader in this was Stanislav Pilotovitch, a Belorussian party secretary who made one of the sharper of-

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after the writer won the Nobel prize last year, and who was recently given the sensitive post of Soviet ambassador to Poland. Novy Mir and Yunost have been purged of some of their most liberal editors, but they are still published and still show occasional courage.

A Guessing Game

POLITICAL DIARY'S reports on Kremlin politics are sometimes as speculative as those of Western correspondents in Moscow, though rumors are always clearly labeled as such. Sometimes they are factual—and show that outside observers can be wrong in two directions at once. In April, 1970, the party leader seemed unchallengeable to some observers, in deep trouble to others. Both were wrong — or both were right.

PD reported that the text of Brezhnev's speech at the Lenin centenary celebrations, which an outsider might think sacrosanct, had been challenged before publication. Two conservative critics who are high Central Committee officials labeled it "revisionist." The speechwriters, headed by three equally high Central Committee men, replied by accusing the critics of attacking the general party line. In the end, the text of the speech remained substantially unchanged, the journal said. Such detailed information on Kremlin squabbles is very rare. This report suggested that Brezhnev's ideological position was middle-of-the-road long before the 24th Party Congress a year later made it obvious.

Such officially unreported details also dot PD reports on other subjects:

- In June, 1965, Sizov, head of the Moscow police, addressed a public meeting on subjects like student drunkenness in Red Square, which the editor of the Journal noted resulted in the firing of several school directors and teachers; the increase in the consumption of vodka and of police drunkenness cases, and the beating up of a foreigner at the Likhachev auto factory, in which the secretary of the factory Komsomol (Young Communist) Committee and the secretary of the state-and-party control group took part.

- During the 1970 cholera epidemic, the authorities encouraged a mass exodus of tourists and visitors from Odessa two days before a strict quarantine was imposed and no one was allowed to leave. Up to Sept. 2, 1970, official announcements spoke only of "infection," and the word "cholera" was not mentioned. PD told its read-

ers, as the Soviet press did not, that the World Health Organization fined the Soviet Union for ignoring epidemic regulations.

- Non-Russian nationalisms constitute an explosive problem that may prove decisive for the Soviet future. Facts about discrimination and nationalist feelings are hard to come by, though Soviets and foreigners know both exist.

PD provided important evidence in one case, a 1965 meeting between Mikoyan and a delegation of Volga Germans who were seeking to have their autonomous republic re-established on the Volga instead of remaining dispersed in Central Asia.

The Germans were deported during World War II, another case of Stalin's racial paranoia. They were officially rehabilitated in 1964, but not allowed to return to the Volga. Before the war, one delegate said, they had five institutions of higher education, 400 schools, a national theater, a publishing house and 25 newspapers and periodicals. In 1965 they did not have even one school.

Mikoyan promised them newspapers and schools (at least one paper and several schools teaching in German now exist.) He promised they would have more than the one deputy they then elected to the Supreme Soviet. But he told them they were needed in Kazakhstan to help manage the virgin lands: "We cannot undertake to re-establish the republic under existing conditions, because it would cause vast economic losses; but we will meet you halfway on your cultural needs."

A bitter letter from the delegation to Mikoyan afterward complained that East Germany, "from the very moment of its creation, was showered with every kind of care and attention by the U.S.S.R., but Soviet Germans are still suffering the moral consequences of the war. One might think that the home of the fascists was not in Germany, but among the Soviet Germans . . ."

A Heady Mixture

A PART FROM ITS interest in current events, Political Diary reproduces both historical research and free-speech discussions that would seldom if ever see the light of official Soviet day.

One historical note reviewed the statistical manipulation by which Stalin made the gross national product appear to grow faster than it actually

did, to justify the bloody methods of collectivizing agriculture and industrializing the economy.

Many PD reports described life in the Soviet prison camps. One by Irina Kakhovskaya, the sole survivor of the Left Social Revolutionaries, mentioned the torture of a young son of one of her comrades, which persuaded the father to become an informer against the rest so the child would be released.

Others named particular individuals as accomplices in the purges of the 1930s. One documented the fact that Andrei Sverdlov, son of the revolutionary hero who became the first Soviet head of state, became an agent provocateur for the secret police, arranging the betrayal of other children of Soviet leaders. He served and survived the architects of the purges, Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria, who successively headed the secret police. Sverdlov spent a year in a Kremlin psychiatric ward (a Westerner is fascinated to learn that the Kremlin hospital has a psychiatric ward) after the 20th Party Congress, at which Khrushchev laid bare some of Stalin's crimes. But in 1969 Sverdlov was still living in a large apartment building reserved for government officials and acting as a watchdog against "Trotskyite" errors in newspapers and magazines.

An article on the 1957 struggle between Khrushchev and the "anti-party group" led by old Stalinists Georgi Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich revealed some previously unknown details. Among them was the fact that Molotov planned to arrest Khrushchev, though rumors at the time said he would be made minister of agriculture. Ivan Serov, then the secret police chief, played a role in Khrushchev's victory; he even grabbed Marshal Kliment Voroshilov by the collar in the Kremlin and told him to end a three-day continuous meeting of the anti-Khrushchev presidium so that the larger Central Committee, with a pro-Khrushchev majority, could take over.

A Remarkable Boldness

ESSAYS THAT TURN Political Diary into a forum for free discussion may seem tame to Westerners used to a wide range of ideas. In Soviet terms, however, it is almost literally incredible to find a factory worker named A. I. Sbitnev, from Ulan-Ude in the Soviet Far East, writing a letter to

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Kommunist did not publish the letter; PD did, in December, 1964.

The journal reported on the interplay of science and politics by carrying a summary of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov's great 1968 essay calling for convergence of the Western and Soviet systems. It carried a dialogue between Sakharov and propagandist Ernst Genri in which Sakharov maintained that the idea of preventive war was an illusion which missile technology had made impossible. Another article discussed the environmental cost of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

A party member named Aleksandr Ivanov (probably a pseudonym) wrote an attack on Stalinism in 1969, condemning both the expulsion of novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the writers' union and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. "What a black lesson for all future generations," he wrote

pseudo-socialism into Czechoslovakia under the hypocritical pretext of defending its socialist development! August, 1968 is a blow at the practice of socialism, at the world Communist movement. It is a blow at the ideal of socialism, at genuine Marxism, at the authority of Communists in the eyes of progressive humanity . . . We are branded by historical disgrace."

READING THE JOURNAL suggests that the men responsible for this amazing array of material are primarily scientists, writers, historians, journalists—some of them old Bolsheviks, many of them party members, most of them people who move in party circles, people who do not wield power themselves but are personally close to individuals who do.

They differ from the better-known political dissidents who call themselves the Democratic Movement in their loyalty to the Soviet basics in their wide range of interests, and in their comparatively narrow range of professions. The dissidents are usually outside the Soviet political culture;

many oppose the fundamentals of the Soviet system outright. They concentrate on human rights to the exclusion of most other subjects, and they come from a wider variety of places and professions.

The two groups have in common a commitment to free discussion and the rule of law. Many of PD's reports of violation of human rights were also carried in the dissidents' Chronicle of Current Events—but the Chronicle carried many items that PD did not.

Neither group likes the label "underground," which has connotations of conspiracy, illegality and total opposition in Russian, though both the Chronicle and PD are unauthorized and uncensored. PD is even reluctant to use the term *samizdat* (self-published).

The sources who made copies of the 11 issues available said the unofficial publication is continuing. The 11 issues date from December, 1964, to September, 1970, and run about 250,000 words, enough to fill a 100-page book — and the 82 issues so far probably run about 1,750,000 words.

Reading Between the Lines

CPYRGHT

NOVELIST ALEKSANDR Solzhenitsyn—unpublished in his homeland since 1964 and anathema to the party ideologists — still ranked near the top of a poll of readers of the official Literary Gazette.

The fact, like most of the poll results, was never officially published in the Soviet Union. It is one of several examples of intellectual refusal to toe the hard line documented in Political Diary, an unofficial journal of opinion published in Moscow.

There is no sign that many intellectuals are ready to support Solzhenitsyn against the authorities if it means risking their own professional standing, jobs or freedom. But it is fascinating and significant that readers of Literaturnaya Gazeta, the orthodox organ of the writers' union that later expelled Solzhenitsyn, ranked him among the two or three most popular writers in a 1968 poll. PD reported on the poll in its December, 1969 issue—after the union threw the novelist out.

Asked whose literary works they would like to see in the Gazette, 13.2 per cent of the readers named Konstantin Paustovsky (who died

in 1969); 12.6 per cent named Solzhenitsyn, 9.7 per cent Konstantin Simonov and 9.6 per cent Vasily Aksionov. All are writers of high quality, and all are markedly liberal by Soviet standards. All are best sellers, but none is widely published, though Simonov's earlier works are sometimes available and all but Solzhenitsyn have been printed since the fall of Nikita Khrushchev.

Asked whose recently published works they particularly liked, Gazette readers named Simonov (14.1 per cent), Mikhail Bulgakov (13.8), Solzhenitsyn (10.4) and Ilya Ehrenburg (10.2). This was significant because Solzhenitsyn has not been officially published since 1964 and because Bulgakov and Ehrenburg, both dead, were in trouble with the ideological leaders as often as not.

Of many other writers named in the poll, only novelist Mikhail Sholokhov would have the unqualified approval of the cultural authorities, though all but Solzhenitsyn are still officially publishable. At the time of the poll, Solzhenitsyn's "Cancer Ward" and "The First Circle" were available in the U.S.S.R. only in *samizdat* ("self-publishing," typed copies)—as is still

Yevgeny Yevtushenko was the most popular poet, named by 41 per cent of Literaturnaya Gazeta readers, followed by Robert Rozhdestvensky, Andrei Voznesensky, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Aleksandr Tvardovsky, and Sergei Yesenin. Yevtushenko, Voznesensky and Tvardovsky are liberals in the official literary-political spectrum; Mayakovsky and Yesenin committed suicide in the early years of the Soviet regime; many Moscow litterateurs rate Rozhdestvensky as a competent mediocrity.

Two other questions on the poll showed significant results:

- Asked what pre-revolutionary writers they had read or re-read in the previous two or three years, the readers named Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoyevsky, Ivan Kuprin, Ivan Bunin, Pushkin, Turgenev and Lermontov.

The editor of Political Diary noted: "The popularity of Dostoyevsky, Bunin and Kuprin is remarkable, considering that they are not taught in school."

- Asked what literary magazines they read regularly, Literary Gazette readers put Yuzmost (Youth) at the top with 29.6 per cent and Novy Mir (New World) at 28.7 per cent. Both are at the liberal

end of the official range. The conservative magazine *Otkryabr*, which sometimes appears to speak for hard-line ideological leaders, was read by only 5.4 per cent of Gazette readers.

Those readers are definitely intelligentsia. The majority have had or are receiving higher (college-level) education. (Less than half of all Soviet citizens over the age of 10 have more than a 7th grade education.)

Khrushchev's Fall

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POLITICAL DIARY began as Nikita Khrushchev fell. Its early issues contained several articles on the ousted leader, including one that mentioned that there had been two attempts on Khrushchev's life while he was in power, in one of which a Soviet navy cruiser was blown up only minutes after he left it.

The December, 1964, issue contained the following report, which while it did not discuss foreign policy reasons for Khrushchev's overthrow, was candid by the standards of the time and provided a fascinating picture of the politburo mind at work. Anastas I. Mikoyan, then a politburo member and head of state, supported Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev in turn, and is the only recent politburo member to have gone voluntarily into honorable retirement.

A. I. Mikoyan appears in the party register as a member of the party organization of the Krasny Proletary (Red Proletarian) factory. A party meeting took place at the factory on Dec. 14. Among the notes sent in was one with the following question:

"What is the reason for the unexpected removal of Comrade Khrushchev, and why was his removal delayed?" Mikoyan answered in approximately the following terms:

"There is no denying Khrushchev's achievements, for they are

great—in the struggle for peace, the liquidation of the remnants of the personality cult, the development of socialist democracy, and the preparation and management of the most important party congresses . . .

"More and more errors and serious shortcomings, however, accumulated in the work and leadership of N. Khrushchev. These shortcomings were largely due to his subjective impulses, and manifested themselves because of his age (he is 70), and his sclerosis. This made him irritable, impetuous, indiscreet and restless. He could not work more than three hours at a stretch. He was always wanting to be on the move . . . In all his actions he tended to improvisation and snap decisions. His speeches contained more emotion than reason, and once he started speaking he could not stop. You have read many good speeches by him, but they all had to be corrected by the Central Committee, because on delivery he would wander off the point and say many superfluous things not written in the text . . .

"When serious difficulties arose with agriculture, Khrushchev made no attempt to find the underlying, objective causes, but started pushing people around and reshuffling them, although the causes of the difficulties were not connected with the people in charge . . .

"Khrushchev suffered from an uninterrupted organizing itch, an

inability to leave well enough alone . . . [He split the party organization into a branch for industry and a branch for agriculture and proposed to subdivide the agriculture organization further].

"The changeover to the seven-year plan was quite irregular. When the planning organs prepared the seven-year plan proposal, Khrushchev suggested to Satyukov [then the editor of *Pravda*] that the proposal be published in *Pravda* before it had been discussed by the Central Committee presidium and plenum. The Central Committee, confronted with the *fait accompli* of publication, had no choice but to approve the proposal. We are now going back to five-year plans again.

"When the Khrushchev question was before the Central Committee presidium, 22 people spoke, to the point and without abuse. Khrushchev himself was in the chair. We did not publish a secret letter about it, not wishing to wash dirty linen in public or exaggerate the affair. We decided to tell the party and the people ourselves, face to face. I think Comrade Khrushchev was dealt with constitutionally.

"So a good job has been done. A normal state of affairs has been established in the Central Committee leadership, everyone speaks his mind freely where before they hardly dared. They all have their say, where only Khrushchev spoke before."

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... and on Foreign Policy: 'From Crisis to Crisis'

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY is in a parlous state, according to a Soviet observer, "politically and morally isolated," tossed from crisis to crisis and committed to military expenditures that imperil the Soviet economy.

It sounds astonishingly like American criticisms of U.S. foreign policy and it contradicts some Western views of apparent Soviet success in the Middle East or the world's oceans.

But it also reads like a sober, realistic assessment in a 10,000-word essay signed "A.R." and published in the April, 1970, issue of Political Diary. It is one of several foreign-policy pieces in the unauthorized journal that contradict official Soviet self-appraisals and at the same time illuminate them.

A.R. complained that "almost all the key crises of the last decade have caught us unawares. As a result, important decisions have often been made hurriedly, without the necessary study and analysis, even without the necessary discussion."

As a further result, A.R. noted, China, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Romania "and even Cuba" had ceased to be Soviet allies in the 1960s or had become unwilling ones. He said that the U.S.S.R. had to deploy 20 to 30 divisions on the Sino-Soviet border after the 1969 border incidents with China, and that the invasion of Czechoslovakia cost between 5 and 6 billion rubles (\$5.5 billion to \$6.6 billion). He also charged that coups in the Third World reduced Soviet influence there (as the Sudan has again demonstrated, a year later) and that the expenditure of vast aid funds brought no returns, only setbacks.

Money needed for such tasks and for changes in modern military technology caused the Soviet Union to spend at least 30 per cent of its gross national product on defense, A.R. declared, while the United States spent only 10 per cent of its GNP. But the American GNP is at least twice as big as the Soviet Union's (a fact not often mentioned in the U.S.S.R.), the United States has forged ahead of the Soviet Union in many important economic sectors like chemicals and computers,

and "the economic development of the U.S.S.R. has noticeably slowed down. In the 1960s, the increasing lag of the U.S.S.R. behind the main capitalist countries in science and technology has been especially noticeable."

The combination of factors led "to the overstraining of our economy, the absence of sensible reserves, the reduction of expenditure on peaceful branches of the economy . . . The inevitable result is the development of inflation."

In this situation, A.R. urged, the Soviets should make concessions on Berlin and forces in Europe (a line which party leader Brezhnev has taken up in his own way) and on strategic arms limitation, which he called much more important for the U.S.S.R. than for the United States. He called Sino-Soviet tensions and the Middle East the most dangerous points for world peace and thought concessions there might be more difficult.

The Czech Dilemma

MOST POLITICAL DIARY articles on foreign policy were more specific than A.R.'s broad survey. During the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, the journal kept its readers informed of what the Soviet press was not telling the people about the events in Prague, from the abolition of censorship to the defection of a Czech general to the United States to a threat by E. P. Slavsky, a cabinet minister and Central Committee member, that "if necessary, we'll even shoot Dubeck."

One article in July, 1968, criticized the famous "2,000 words" manifesto of Czech writer Ludwig Vaculik—not because the critic thought it was wrong but because it was tactically "irresponsible." PD said that the signers of the manifesto had put up with Antonin Novotny's Stalinist rule for years. Now they suddenly wanted everything changed at once, despite the dangers this posed of "anarchy" and "a fresh irony of history." The Soviet invasion a month later provided the feared irony.

Another article that month criticized the warning letter sent Prague by the

five Warsaw Pact powers that later invaded Czechoslovakia. The letter said it was impermissible to allow a social democratic party to be revived in a Communist country. The article said it might be impossible in practice in Czechoslovakia at the moment, but that it was "irregular" to insist that the setting up of a social democratic party in a socialist country was impossible in principle. The claim was also bad tactics at a time when the French and Italian Communists were trying to reassure the social democrats in their countries that cooperation with the Communists would not foredoom them.

Communist Party leadership need not mean Communist monopoly of power, the article insisted, especially since such a monopoly implied that the Communist Party was itself the source of power in a socialist state. The people, not the party, were the source of power, and this meant that the Communist Party's mandate should be renewed by "a mechanism different from our present [no choice] electoral system." In Moscow, this is heresy.

Split Over China

AFTER THE SINO-SOVIET border flared up in 1969, Political Diary summed up six "trends of opinion" on China among its contributors. One, attributed to an academic China expert, said there was no real threat of war; the Chinese leaders were promoting a myth of one "so as to hold the popular masses in subjection and justify the low living standard." That sounded like Soviet propaganda—until the expert added, "Our government, too, has certain internal problems at present, and some distraction of attention from these seems useful to certain people. Therefore in many cases we are reacting to border incursions more sharply than in recent years."

The second opinion, attributed to an academician, a government official and a reserve officer, said there was no immediate danger but that China was certainly preparing for a big war with the U.S.S.R. "War with China is inevitable . . . In the face of such a mortal danger we must think seriously about the possibility of preventive war."

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against China. It is essential precisely now, when China is not yet ready for a big war, to strike a blow, perhaps with conventional weapons, at the main centers of the nuclear rocket industry and to destroy China's main rocket bases."

In contrast, a writer and a historian said, "No preventive war with China is permissible." The West and Japan would aid China, the Soviet Union would be isolated, war would cripple the economy and an atomic strike would destroy large parts of Japan, India, Southeast Asia and the Soviet Far East as well as "a large proportion

of the Chinese."

The fourth view, held by an old Bolshevik, was that it was essential to avoid war even if the U.S.S.R. made territorial concessions. The country needed Chinese help to develop the Far East in any case, "and in 200 years, under communism, national boundaries will have lost their significance."

A more pragmatic approach came from another academician, who held that the Soviet Union should neither concede territory unilaterally nor start a war, but that if the Chinese attacked first, the Soviets might have to

use tactical atomic weapons at the front—though not strategic nuclear weapons on rear areas. The U.S.S.R. might have to make a strategic retreat from the Far East to Lake Baikal, but China would not be able to endure a long war or hold the seized territory.

The last view, attributed to another academician and a writer, held that war was possible but not inevitable. It said that preventing an upsurge of Stalinist tendencies in the Soviet Union, combined with a relaxation of tensions in Europe, would prevent a worsening of Sino-Soviet relations.

—ANTHONY ASTRACHAN.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
22 August 1971

Sample Items Taken From 'Political Diary' Published in Soviet Union

CPYRGHT

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 21—Following are samples of the content of the underground Soviet newsletter *Politicheskyy Dnevnik* (Political Diary), as translated by Bernard and Marie-Jeanne Gwertzman. The first purports to be the substance of remarks at a local party meeting in 1964 by Anastas I. Mikoyan, then a member of the Kremlin leadership, in explanation of the ouster of Nikita S. Khrushchev as party leader and Premier by the group headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksie N. Kosygin. The second sample consists of excerpts from an unsigned article, published after the six-day Arab-Israeli war in 1967, discussing what is described as widespread opposition to Moscow's support of the Arabs against Israel.

Mikoyan and Khrushchev

We cannot deny the merits of Khrushchev. They were great in the fight for peace and for liquidation of the consequences of the cult of the personality, in the development of socialist democracy, in the preparation and convening of important congresses—the 20th, 21st and 22nd—and in the adoption of the party program.

But as time went on, Comrade Khrushchev's mistakes and serious shortcomings ac-

cumulated in his work and leadership. These shortcomings to a significant degree were caused by his subjective attitude and his age—he already was 70—and by a sclerotic condition. In connection with this, he became short-tempered, fidgety, impetuous and restless. He could not work more than three hours in any one place.

He sought to be continuously on the move and on trips. He was inclined in all his actions to improvise, to solve problems on the run. His speeches contained more emotion than reason. Once he began to speak, he could not stop. You have read many of his good speeches, but the Central Committee had to correct all of them because, in the course of a speech, he departed from the theme and said much more than was in the text.

As a rule he did not confine himself to the time limit, and his speeches dragged on for an extra one-and-a-half to two hours. In his speeches he often repeated himself. Comrades from the Central Committee told him to speak a little less about himself and not to repeat the same thing, and to give others an opportunity to speak. Fawning over Khrushchev became widespread in the press. Irritability, intolerance to criticism—these features were also not to the liking of those

comrades whom he moved into leadership work.

When agriculture deteriorated, serious difficulties arose. Khrushchev did not begin to look for the deep objective reasons but began harassing people, transferring them, although the reasons for the difficulties did not lie with people. Not all people are geniuses. One can abuse them, but that does not help matters.

Khrushchev suffered from an organizational itch. He had an inclination toward endless reorganizations. Why was the party leadership divided into industrial and agricultural areas and why were industrial and agricultural regions and district committees created?

When that plan was proposed to the members of the Presidium and members of the Central Committee, the motives of the division and the specialization of the party leadership seemed logically very convincing on the surface. It seemed to us that a universal leadership was less effective and that a division would raise the level of the leadership, make it concrete, bring it closer to production.

The opposite results turned out. The Leninist-territorial-productive principle of building the leadership of our party was destroyed. The division contradicted the party rules.

We have no antagonistic classes. There are friendly classes of workers and peasants. But differences remain between them, and the party must take them into account. The unity of workers and peasants is a basic law, under which the leading role must remain with the working class. And what happened? Such a reorganization led not a narrowing but to a widening of the gap between the workers and peasants.

In the local regions intolerable conditions were created for services for the population where it lived. For example, to receive a work certificate or some other document, it was necessary to travel somewhere into the interior to a production administration. A man became sick—our region does not take responsibility. The same with the police, with ordinary services. All this created chaos for the workers and led to massive discontent, letters, complaints.

Not pleased by this reorganization, Comrade Khrushchev thought up a new one: The creation of 12 committees to guide specialized sectors of agriculture—livestock, crop growing, cotton growing and separate industrial crops, poultry farms, etc. For every such committee there would be created its own machinery with the number of employees up to 500 to 600 men. He also proposed to cre-

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ate political sections under these committees, in this way to reduce the role of party organizations of the collective farm and state farms. The Central Committee explained to him that such a type of leadership in a military format resembled the Chinese method. He was shown the absurdity of his proposals. They were put aside and rejected.

It was not normal to go over to a seven-year plan. When the planning organs prepared a seven-year draft, Khrushchev proposed to Satyukov [editor of Pravda] to publish it in Pravda without preliminary examination in the Presidium of the Central Committee and in a plenary meeting. In such a way, the Central Committee was faced with a published draft and there was nothing for it to do but ratify it. Now we are again going over the five-year plans.

When the Khrushchev issue was raised in the Presidium of the Central Committee, 22 people spoke, in a businesslike way, without abuse. Khrushchev defended himself. We did not make public the secret details about all this, not wanting to wash our dirty linen in public and not wanting to exag-

gerate it. We decided to inform the party and the people by word of mouth. I believe we acted on Comrade Khrushchev according to the rules.

The entire Presidium has remained virtually without change. There are three generations in the Presidium: (1) The old—that is, Shvernik and myself. (2) The middle—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny. (3) The young—Shelepin, Shelest, although in age they are not so young. Brezhnev is 56, about the same as Kosygin. Kozlov is hopelessly sick. Shelepin and Shelest are 46. They all have great experience in party and economic work. I was a People's Commissar for 30 years.

Khrushchev was constantly on trips. Therefore, Brezhnev, in fact, directed the Central Committee organization and Kosygin the Council of Ministers.

And so a good deed was done. Now a normal atmosphere was established in the leadership of the Central Committee. Everyone speaks freely, but earlier they were reticent. Now everyone talks, and earlier only Khrushchev spoke. Now the Leninist leadership exists in practice. The Central Committee has great experience, the changes will benefit the people and soon

this will be felt in practice.

The Six-Day War

The defeat of the Arabs was an extremely painful diplomatic setback for the Soviet Union. It was significant that despite this a significant part of the population of our country, and especially the intelligentsia, has taken a position quite different from the official view.

The position of a significant part of the intelligentsia is characterized not so much by sympathy as by unfriendliness toward the Arab leaders who suffered defeat. This is more a pro-Israeli than a pro-Arab position.

I have observed no outbursts of anti-Semitic feeling. The sympathy of many intellectuals toward Israel is explained not by the fact that there are many Jews within our intelligentsia, for similar positions were taken by the Russian part of the intelligentsia. G.I. Glikson, for example, said that those feelings were characteristic also for the Ukrainian and Moldavian intelligentsia. A basic reason for this, it seems to me, can be found in the general oppositionist (partly also pro-Western) feelings that characterize many leading intel-

lectuals now.

To a large degree, of course, much of the information of the intelligentsia about the events is second hand (a large number of people in June listened not to Soviet but to British and American and, to some extent, Israeli broadcasts).

There is evidence that in May, 1967, the Soviet Union was against the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Arab territory and against the blockade of the Aqaba Strait. But Nasser, believing in his superiority, acted independently and handed us a fait accompli. In these difficult conditions the Soviet Union, having aligned itself too closely with Egypt, lacked freedom to maneuver and had to support Nasser.

Believing that, with our diplomatic and military protection, he did not have to fear direct American intervention, Nasser evidently wanted a victory over Israel to achieve his hegemony in the Arab world. In analyzing the events in the Middle East, our press was silent about the blockade of the Aqaba Strait and the pullout of the United Nations troops, which were not simply provocations but acts of aggression.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
23 August 1971

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Bravery in Russia

KNOWING the power and ruthlessness of the Soviet secret police, we never cease to be astounded by the courage of a handful of Russians who struggle for civil rights in their homeland.

The best known, of course, is Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize-winning novelist. Refusing to take orders from the literary commissars, he is doing the greatest writing in Russian today. And when the Kremlin refused to let his books be published in Russia, he boldly had them published abroad.

Naturally, such defiance has earned Mr. Solzhenitsyn harassment by the KGB, the state security apparatus. Recently, a friend of his, visiting the writer's country cottage, surprised KGB agents on an illegal search and was viciously beaten by them.

Instead of prudently keeping silent, Mr. Solzhenitsyn wrote an open letter of protest to the KGB chief and to Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. In the letter, which he passed to foreign correspondents, he charged that for years the KGB had opened his mail, seized half of it, spied on him, shadowed his visitors, persecuted his friends, tapped his telephone, bugged his apartment, etc.

Referring to the police agents as robbers, Mr. Solzhenitsyn told the head of the feared KGB: "I demand from you, Citizen Minister, the public identification of the robbers, their punishment as criminals and an explanation of this incident. Otherwise I can only believe that you sent them."

* * *

Another brilliant Russian risking his career and perhaps his liberty is Prof.

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Andrei D. Sakharov, often called the father of the Soviet H-bomb. In a country where forming public organizations is a strict monopoly of the communist party, Prof. Sakharov not only helped found the Soviet Committee for Human Rights but also joined it to the International League for the Rights of Man, based in Strasbourg, France.

The committee has tried to defend intellectuals who have been illegally arrested and thrown into psychiatric hospitals. It insists that the regime grant the civil rights guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, a democratic document that is much perverted in practice.

Mr. Sakharov is protected by the great respect in which he is held by other scientists. Also, it is thought that he is essential in certain scientific research. Otherwise he would be studying

not nuclear physics but the bottom of a Siberian salt mine.

In an open letter recently to the interior (police) minister, Prof. Sakharov said: "The current persecution of people for ideological reasons brings shame on our country, its people and all mankind. . . . The further democratization of our country is an urgent necessity. I ask the leaders of our country to discuss these matters."

Perhaps it is wishful thinking, but with the courage of such men it is possible to believe that the talented Russian people will have a rebirth in freedom. If that ever happens, names like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov will shine in honestly rewritten Soviet history books. And the names of their tormentors, including party boss Leonid I. Brezhnev, will be handled in disdainful footnotes.

NEWSWEEK

21 December 1970

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THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

The Human Rights Committee joined by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn differs from similar groups of Soviet dissenters in one important respect: its founders are scientists, men who hold a privileged place in Soviet society and who traditionally have more leeway in criticizing the government. This fact, however, makes the committee a particular embarrassment to Moscow. Consequently, of its three founders, probably only renowned physicist Andrei Sakharov is relatively invulnerable to attack. His colleagues, physicists Valery Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, could face active official harassment and even prosecution.

In spite of this, Chalidze recently discussed his committee's plans and goals. He spoke in his one-room apartment in the center of Moscow, a room cluttered with such mementos as hunting trophies, swords and antique candelabra. A human skull on his desk added a touch of macabre to the setting. Pacing quickly back and forth, the handsome, saturnine physicist spoke to NEWSWEEK in a one interview:

"We guarantee the right of association. We plan to give consultative aid to the organs of power in applying guarantees of the rights of man. We also will give creative aid to others who study this problem and try to provide legal enlightenment. The committee's task is not to unmask and demand but to study and recommend—taking into account the real conditions here and the difficulties of the state in this sphere. It demands patience.

"Do you want us to make a revolution? Don't be silly. We will merely study human rights as guaranteed in Soviet law. We aim at generalized study without devoting attention to particular cases. We will study the extent to which Soviet guarantees correspond to those recommended by the United Nations. This does not hinder us when we act in a personal capacity to speak out in defense of the rights of man in individual cases. One of the things the committee will seek to study is the violation of human rights in this country. We were prompted to do so by such violations. My utterances in this regard, as published in *samizdat* [typewritten documents circulated clandestinely in Russia], are indicative. I and

my colleagues have come out in defense of Grigorenko, Medvedev and Pimenov.*

"An increasing number of scientists are starting to get interested in the defense of the rights of man. Our work and reports are published in *samizdat*. Judging from the degree of attention paid to this among intellectuals, I presume this problem interests many people. I hope the authorities will in time use our consultative help, despite the fact that we are not jurists.

"What influence will our committee have? We will endeavor to foster the legal education of society to implement the rights of man in this country. If the public has matured enough to be able to absorb the ideas proclaimed by the French Revolution, then we could say that we have some influence. And if the government ignores us? We will just go on making recommendations and more recommendations."

*Former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko, a prominent dissenter, was declared insane last February and sent to a mental hospital. Russian geneticist Zhores Medvedev, confined to an asylum last May, was released only after protest by leading Soviet scientists. Mathematician Revolt Pimenov was exiled this autumn for possession of "subversive" materials.

"Our organization is legal because Paragraph 126 of the Soviet Constitution

THE OBSERVER, London
7 June 1970

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Russian rebel executed

by a Correspondent

A SOVIET naval officer, a prominent member of the oppositional 'Democratic Movement', was recently put on trial, sentenced to death and executed in the Soviet Republic of Estonia on the Baltic Sea.

This is reported in the latest issue of *The Chronicle of Current Events*, an underground periodical which has been appearing in Moscow since April 1968 and which has proved well informed and reliable in the past. If the report is true, this is the first time a political rebel has been executed in Russia since Stalin's days.

The report does not mention the name of the victim, identifying him simply as a Navy officer of the Baltic Fleet. But there are reasons to believe that he may well be Gennadi Gavrilov, who until a year ago served on a Soviet nuclear submarine and at the same time started

a political action group known as 'The Union for Political Rights.' Though secret, the Union was not illegal in terms of the Soviet Constitution.

In a pamphlet which Gavrilov wrote in September 1968, he advocated political and intellectual freedom, the rule of law and parliamentary democracy—all within a framework of socialism. 'The existing relationship between the individual and society should be changed,' he said. 'The Communist Party should be a teacher, not an overlord; it should guide instead of suppressing.'

Refused to co-operate

He also professed to be an admirer of Dubcek and his programme and he branded the invasion of Czechoslovakia as shameful for Russia. The Union chose as its method of struggle 'a support for the progressive wing' within the present power structures and the spreading of information. It

also supported the organisation of meetings and demonstrations, 'as guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.'

Gavrilov and several of his friends were arrested in Tallin and Kaliningrad, two Soviet naval bases on the Baltic. Some sources say that the security police burst in as Gavrilov was printing the first issue of the Union's newspaper, named *The Democrat*, in a private flat near Tallin. In a subsequent investigation, Gavrilov refused to co-operate with the secret police.

Other leading members of the Union broke down under interrogations. As a result, more than 30 Navy and some Army officers were arrested.

The Soviet authorities regarded the organisation as a dangerous conspiracy. Since it involved mostly younger service officers, the Government was probably more alarmed by it than by all other protests combined.

The 'Insanity' of Dissent

We must start by asking whether the people who find their way into the special [mental] hospitals are always real mental patients. I myself have seen Prof. D.R. Lunts, [the chief psychiatric examiner] of Moscow's Serbsky Institute, arrive at work in the uniform of a KGB [secret police] colonel.

Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko
Chronicle No. 11

7 July 1970. The trial of Natalya Gorbanevskaya. Moscow City Court.

The procurator pointed out that on 25 August 1968 Gorbanevskaya committed a crime [demonstrating against the invasion of Czechoslovakia] and that it was established that she was one of the compilers of *A Chronicle of Current Events*.

Defense counsel began with the fact that Gorbanevskaya, who was a

talented poet and translator, had until her arrest been engaged in much socially useful work in the field of literary translations.

According to Professor Lunts, Gorbanevskaya was suffering from a creeping form of schizophrenia which "has no clear symptoms" but which causes an insufficiently critical attitude toward one's own mental state. The illness takes its course without affecting fitness for work.

The court decided that Gorbanevskaya had, while of unsound mind, committed acts falling under the criminal code and would be placed in a psychiatric hospital. The period of treatment was not indicated.

Chronicle No. 15

In Yavas [prison camp], Aleksandr Ginzburg [author of an underground account of the 1966 Sinyavsky-Daniel trial] has been charged with tak-

ing part in hunger strikes and with being a bad influence on other prisoners. On August 25, 1970, he was taken to Vladimir prison. The prison regime at Vladimir includes many more restrictions than a labor-camp regime. Only letters from close relatives are accepted; parcels of books are banned; relatives have a right to two half-hour visits a year.

Chronicle Nos. 7 and 15

Larisa Bogoraz [wife of Yuli Daniel and herself in Siberian exile] has been told that she cannot be nominated for release on parole since she has not changed her views on the sending of troops into Czechoslovakia, and since she refused to take part in the June elections to the Supreme Soviet. Master of philological sciences Bogoraz is working as a construction laborer.

Chronicle No. 15

A Word With the Authorities

The primary source of news on Soviet dissent is a typewritten underground bulletin called *A Chronicle of Current Events*. The excerpts on this and subsequent pages were adapted from translations of the *Chronicles* by British scholar Peter Reddaway, whose book "Underground Russia" will soon be published by Cowles Book Co.

7 July 1970. Moscow City Court.

Friends and acquaintances [of the defendant], who were gathered outside the court, realized that it was possible to listen at the windows. About fifteen people were standing quietly when police sergeant Kichkin appeared. He began breaking up the group. He threw Julia Vishnevskaya to the ground. Vladimir Telnikov addressed Kichkin: "How dare you treat a woman like that?" A policeman and two vigilantes seized Telnikov by the hair and dragged him into a car.

Chronicle No. 15

May 1969. Kiev Regional Court.

Prosecutor: Do you know whom we were fighting [in the last war]?

Boris Kochubievsky: Fascism.

P: What were we fighting for?

Was it freedom?

K: Yes.

P: Did we win?

K: Yes.

P: Well, there you are then; so we have freedom.

Chronicle No. 8

April 1970. Leningrad party office.

Party secretary Medvedev: Your scientific achievements are all well and good. But this collection of anti-Soviet literature...

Mathematician Revolt Pimenov: There was not a single line in it undermining Soviet authority.

M: If you think that we'll let everyone say and write just what they like, that will never happen. We do still have enough power not to let people commit acts which will harm us. Never will there be any concessions at all in the sphere of ideology!

Chronicle No. 15

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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1970

How Russia Uses Asylums to Kill Dissent

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By Abraham Brumberg

On leave as editor of the bimonthly *Problems of Communism*, Brumberg is writing a book on political opposition in the Soviet Union under the auspices of Georgetown University's center for Strategic and International Studies and the Ford Foundation.

THE RECENT FLIGHT of a distinguished Russian biologist and a young Russian writer has highlighted one of the most reprehensible methods used by the Kremlin in dealing with political dissenters: forcible commitment to special psychiatric institutions.

The biologist, Prof. Zhores Medvedev, was "fortunate." As a result of public pressure from within and outside the U.S.S.R., Soviet authorities released him after keeping him in an asylum

ground that he had evinced signs of "extreme nervousness", and after praising the doctors who had placed him there for having performed their "humanitarian duties."

The 27-year old writer, Vladimir Bukovsky, first described his experiences in a Soviet asylum in an interview in *The Washington Post* May 17 and later in a filmed interview with the then CBS correspondent in Moscow, William Coe. Possibly because the story of Bukovsky, like that of Medvedev, had become a minor cause celebre, he, too, has been left alone.

The cases are hardly unique. Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of Soviet citizens have gone into mental hospitals in recent years merely for

rights to freedom of speech, press and assembly. What follows is a distilled report on their experiences.

It is based on official Soviet sources, on reports by Western correspondents in Moscow and on the enormous body of "samizdat" literature — "self-publishing" articles, letters, petitions and books that have been circulating clandestinely in the Soviet Union over the past few years. In particular, it is based on information in *The Chronicle of Current Events*, a remarkable underground newsletter which has been appearing, with uncanny regularity, every two months since April, 1968. Its meticulous reports on protest activities in the Soviet Union, and on measures to suppress them, have never been

their accuracy has been borne out many times.

A Stalin Device

IT WAS UNDER Stalin that the practice of alienating perfectly sane non-conformists by confining them in mental hospitals was firmly established. According to a samizdat letter by S. P. Pisarev, a Communist since 1918, a decorated war veteran and himself a onetime inmate of a prison-hospital, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party set up a special commission in 1958 to investigate the abuses perpetrated by "special psychiatric hospitals" under Stalin. As a result of its findings, "hundreds of healthy people" were restored to liberty.

The commission also recommended that the hospitals be removed from the jurisdiction of the secret police and placed under the Ministry of Health. As with other commendable initiatives of the initial post-Stalin era, however, this proved to be short-lived.

The recommendations were quietly shelved, the culprits mentioned in the report were left at their posts and the commission members were removed from their jobs in Central Committee bureaucracy. Indeed, "special psychiatric hospitals" acquired a new lease on life under Khrushchev (who believed that only "mentally deranged persons" would deviate from "the will of the collective") and under his successors Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Who are the offenders, what is the nature of their "abnormal" behavior and what are the criteria used for committing them to insane asylums? To begin with, not all of them are "politicals," even in the rather flexible sense in which this term is used in the U.S.S.R. People have been detained for "psychiatric observation" merely for contacts with Western tourists; so have alcoholics and religious believers.

In fact, the practice of confining sundry transgressors in mental hospitals, thus obviating the need for open trials, adherence to certain procedural niceties and unfavorable publicity, has become so widespread that even Soviet officials have found it necessary to criticize it. Thus a legal expert, A. Koblikov, writing in the April, 1967, issue of Soviet Justice, asserted that it was "illegal" to commit to psychiatric institutions those acquitted by courts or who had completed their jail sentences.

Case Histories

BY AND LARGE, however, the major criterion for confinement in insane asylums is "political activities" ranging from possession and circulation of samizdat material to participation in open protest demonstrations. Here are a few recent cases, representing only a fraction of those on which evidence abounds, each preceded by the bizarre "diagnosis" of the offender's illness:

Case #1: "Chronic Schizophrenia."

Name: Vladimir Lvovich Gershuni (nephew of a famous leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the largest in czarist Russia). Age: 38. Occupation: Bricklayer. Past history: Arrested in 1949, tortured, sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. Latest arrest: Oct. 17, 1960. Charge: Dissemination of "falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system" (Article 190-1 of the criminal code). Evidence: 20 copies of a leaflet in defense of Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko (a prominent figure in the Soviet dissent movement) published in Paris by the International Committee for the Defense of Human Rights.

Treatment: First held for five months in the Butyrki Prison in Moscow, then transferred to the Serbsky Institute of Psychiatric Diagnosis (the most infamous of all the prison hospitals, headed by Dr. D. R. Lunts, whose services to the secret police go back to the Stalin period) and from there back to the Butyrki prison. Interrogated by the KGB, by a "forensic medical team," and by an "ideological diagnostic team" and declared mentally ill.

Trial held March 13, in camera and in absence of accused (the customary procedure in such cases). The witnesses, all colleagues of Gershuni, testified that he held strong opinions on various political subjects but "denied that Gershuni was mentally ill and emphasized that he was a good workman and a morally stable person." Counsel for defense challenged basis for diagnosis and demanded a new psychiatric examination. Sentence: Confinement to a special psychiatric hospital for an unspecified term (also customary). Postscript: Gershuni was at first placed in a cell with insane criminals. In protest, he declared a hunger strike which lasted for 14 days. Finally placed in cell with other "politicals."

Case #2: "Schizophrenia. Paranoid personality development."

Name: Valeria Novodvorskaya. Age: 19. Occupation: Student. Arrested: Dec. 5, 1969 (Soviet Constitution Day). Charge: Violation of Article 70 of the criminal code (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda). Evidence: "A Poem on Constitution Day" composed and distributed by N. in the form of a leaflet.

(Here are some of the lines: "Thank you, Party/For all you have done and are doing/To nurture the hatred we feel today/Thank you, Party. Thank you, Party/For the high noon of groveling duplicity/For the inertia, deception and mental dishonesty/Thank you, Party. Thank you, Party/For all the falsehoods and lies/For all the portraits and informers/For the shots in Prague's square.")

Trial: March 16, 1970, held not only without offender but without her knowledge. Sentence: Forceful confinement in a special psychiatric hospital.

Case #3: "Creeping schizophrenia."

Name: Victor Kuznetsov. Age 33. Occupation: Graphic designer. Past history: Detained by KGB in March, 1965, after participating in a debate on "Cynicism in Social Life" at Moscow University; in October, 1966, recounted his earlier experience at a meeting of the International Student Discussion Club in Moscow, again interrogated and committed to a mental hospital for two months.

Latest arrest March 21, 1969. Charge: Violation of Article 70. Evidence: Dissemination of works by Andrei Sinlavsky and Yuli Daniel (the two writers sentenced to labor camps in 1966 for publishing "anti-Soviet" works abroad) and other samizdat manuscripts. Trial: July 16, 1969. Defense lawyer's plea for open hearing rejected. "Commission of experts" (including Lunts) had found him insane and a "woman expert from the Serbsky Institute who appeared in court without ever having seen Kuznetsov agreed with the opinion of the preliminary commission." Sentence: Confinement in special psychiatric hospital.

Case #4: "Residual signs of an organic illness of the central nervous system with changes in the personality and deterioration of the intellect."

Name: Vladimir Borisov. Age: 37. Profession: Electrician. Forcefully removed from his place of work June 12, 1969, placed in an ambulance and driven

Finally, one more case, that of Victor Fainberg, whose diagnosis, "schizophrenodoxy," was branded by the Chronicle as "cynical even for institutions of this sort." A young art critic, Fainberg participated in the Aug. 25, 1968, Red Square demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Even more revealing is the case of Vladimir Borzov (No. 4 above). Upon his arrest, "one of the doctors came up to him and said, 'Listen, buddy,

"The whole horror of the position of a healthy man who finds himself in a position of helplessness in the fact

that he himself begins to realize that in time he will become like those who surround him. My military training, and maybe the iron constitution which my parents passed on to me, enabled me to learn quickly to insulate myself from my surroundings, and my internment in the hospital passed without any particular harm to my psyche.

"The one thing I cannot forget, the one thing that sometimes wakes me up at night, is a wild nocturnal cry mixed with the hollow sound of shattered glass. From that I could not insulate myself. Evidently during sleep, one's nerves have no defense mechanism against such stimuli. But I can imagine what a man must go through if he is receptive to everything around him through his highly strung nervous system, and if his defense mechanisms are not as well developed as mine are."

The Nonconformists Lot

THE TENDENCY to view any kind of nonconformist behavior in "clinical" terms, to regard the rebel against society as a "screwball" at best or a dangerous psychotic at worst, is not restricted to any one country. But nowhere, it seems, does it assume such

ugly forms as in the Soviet Union. One of the most dismaying items in the Chronicle, for instance, concerned the young Riga student Ilya Rieps, who on April 13, 1969, tried to set himself on fire as a gesture of protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. His attempt was aborted by a few sailors, who "rushed up to him, stifled the flames" and then "beat him up."

Prime Minister Kosygin himself, at a news conference at the United Nations in June, 1967, branded Svetlana Stalin, a "morally unstable and sick person," and Komsomolskaya Pravda, on July 22 of the same year, described her as a "sick woman whose personality shows evidence of sexual anxiety."

A different, though equally revealing, example is provided by Gen. Grigorenko. In 1964, one of his "medical examiners," a well-meaning woman psychiatrist, asked him, in a tone of utter amazement, what had prompted his "anti-Soviet activities." Didn't he, as chairman of the Cybernetics Department of the Frunze Military Academy, earn a fabulous salary—what was it that he lacked?

"I looked at her," says Grigorenko, "and realized that anything I said would

be in vain; that for her, any person, who makes material sacrifices, is insane, however lofty his motives. So I answered briefly: 'You won't understand. I couldn't breathe'"—a remark which the doctor interpreted in its literal sense and, "with joy in her eyes," jotted down in her notebook. At last she had proof that "before her sat a crazy lunatic." Such, observes Grigorenko drily, was this woman's "political illiteracy and philistine mentality."

The 13th issue of The Chronicle of Current Events reports on the circulation of a manuscript by G. Shimanov, a 33-year-old philosopher, entitled, "Before My Death." Shimanov describes his experiences in an insane asylum to which he had been committed for his stubborn espousal of his religious beliefs. Attached to the manuscript, says the Chronicle, are "two appeals . . . to Soviet and world opinion (dated last Feb. 24) containing a clarion call to speak out against the practice of committing mentally healthy people to mental hospitals because of their opposition views." The evidence of this practice is here.

October 1971

SHIFTING THE UNITED NATIONS SCENARIO ON CHINA

The United Nations General Assembly, whose 130 members are scheduled to convene on September 21st, will surely be the stage this year for a rewritten melodrama on the China question. Until the dramatic American initiative on China forced a worldwide reappraisal of the struggle over who should represent China in the UN, the annual fall rites had gone on, relatively unchanged, for two decades. The issue of seating Peking first came before the General Assembly in 1950 and since that time the scenarios have been monotonous in their predictability. The first scenario, which lasted for ten years, involved behind-the-scenes discussions in the UN which regularly ended with a decision to postpone the China question for another year without debate. The second scenario, which has gone on for the past ten years, has been enlivened only by the so-called Albanian Resolution, very explicitly entitled "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations." As unequivocal as its title, the Albanian resolution, which has remained essentially the same for the past decade, offered the UN's member nations a hard-line solution to the thorny problem of who was to represent China in the UN: admit Peking; throw out Taipei. The new U.S. resolution on the problem now offers member nations broader latitude. The 1971 U.S. resolution calls for the seating of both Taipei and Peking in the UN, "affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China" and goes on to recommend that Peking "be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

In an attempt to protect Taipei's membership, even while proposing the seating of Peking, the U.S. has submitted another resolution proposing that the question of expelling Taipei from the UN be treated as an "Important Question." Practically speaking this means that when the issue comes to a vote Taipei could not be ousted from the UN unless two-thirds of the membership voted for it. To accomplish the seating of Peking, on the other hand, will require only a simple majority vote.

As this is written it appears that the General Committee of the General Assembly will move both the Albanian and U.S. resolutions onto the agenda of the plenary session. Although voting on the China question could take place early in the session, most seasoned observers feel it unlikely that the China debate will be moved ahead of the general debate which traditionally follows the opening ceremonies.

A practical reason for not rushing into the China issue also lies in the fact that a number of nations are still debating the question on their home fronts even while in the process of moving their

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U.S. Resolutions on China Issue

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
Sept. 22—Following are the
texts of the two American
draft resolutions on China
that were formally intro-
duced today:

First Resolution

The General Assembly, re-
calling the provisions of the
Charter, decides that any
proposal in the United Na-
tions General Assembly which
would result in depriving the
Republic of China of repre-
sentation in the United Na-

tions is an important ques-
tion under Article 18 of the
Charter.

Second Resolution

The General Assembly,
having considered the item
entitled "the Representation
of China in the United Na-
tions,"

Noting that since the
founding of the United Na-
tions, fundamental changes
have occurred in China,

Having regard for the ex-
isting factual situation,

Noting that the Republic
of China has been continu-
ously represented as a mem-

ber of the United Nations
since 1945,

Believing that the People's
Republic of China should be
represented in the United Na-
tions,

Recalling that Article 1,
Paragraph 4, of the Charter
of the United Nations estab-
lishes the United Nations as
a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations,

Believing that an equitable
resolution of this problem
should be sought in the light
of the above-mentioned con-
siderations and without prej-
udice to the eventual settle-
ment of the conflicting claims

involved,

Hereby affirms the right of
representation of the People's
Republic of China and rec-
ommends that it be seated as
one of the five permanent
members of the Security
Council;

Affirms the continued right
of representation of the Re-
public of China;

Recommends that all Unit-
ed Nations bodies and the
specialized agencies take into
account the provisions of
this resolution in deciding the
question of Chinese represen-
tation.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 1971

CPYRGHT

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Taipei Can Coexist With Peking

*The Island Need Not Be a Rival of China
Nor Need It Be Governed by the Mainland*

By JOHN K. FAIRBANK

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.—China is not a
new land settled by nineteenth-cen-
tury pioneers devoted to self-determi-
nation. The Chinese have a distinctly
non-American background. The con-
cept of Taipei's autonomy under Pe-
king's sovereignty comes from two
thousand years' experience in the
world's largest political unit, which in-
vented bureaucracy and civil service
examinations when Europe was still
in the Dark Ages.

This central sovereignty-local auton-
omy concept has at least three com-
ponents. The first is the One China
ideal of the unity of the whole Chinese
realm, "all within the four seas." This
appealed to countless generations be-
cause unity meant peace—no more
civil wars and, since unity meant
strength, no more invasions. This One
China tradition is reinforced today
by modern nationalism. "Two Chinas"
is a dirty phrase meaning weakness
and civil war.

Second, the great Chinese revolu-
tion since 1911 (the biggest in history)
has been determined to wipe out the
nineteenth-century humiliations of un-

equal treaties, special foreign privileges
in treaty ports, and imperialist spheres
of influence. American troops in Tai-
wan suggest a sphere of influence.
They are in fact more an insult than a
menace. Peking must claim sovereign-
ty in order to get rid of the imperialist
past.

Third, the enormous Chinese realm
has never been a unitary state tightly
controlled from the capital. Equal in
size to Western Christendom, the Chi-
nese empire was similarly broken up
by geography but never became a con-
geries of separate nations. Maintain-
ing the central power was a constant
miracle of political engineering. It re-
quired intensive political indoctrina-
tion and maintenance of the ruler's
prestige, but also balancing of central
and local interest, cooperation and
compromise between the capital and
the provinces. Political unity rested on
a multitude of local deals such that
regional leaders found it easier to
acknowledge the central sovereignty
than to rebel against it. Neither the
emperors of old nor Mao today could
control China by simple fiat. Often
the central government, like that at
Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek, was

acknowledged but bargained with in
the outlying provinces. Local leaders
have often been happy to bow to the
center but slow to pay their taxes.

In short, political-economic auton-
omy has been a well-established feature
of the Chinese landscape. The crucial
question is whether a local regime
challenges the central power in theory
and has military means to mount a
challenge in fact. This has been Chiang
Kai-shek's posture, but without Amer-
ican backing it would lack reality. The
Chinese civil war can die away if the
United States will stop backing one
side. Taiwan need not be a rival of
Peking, nor need it be governed from
the mainland. Judging from numerous
precedents, Taipei can coexist with
Peking as an autonomous part of China
—not an ideal situation but a *modus
vivendi*.

This sovereignty-autonomy combina-
tion is not esteemed by the Western
legal mind, but international law is
perhaps sufficiently malleable to cover
it. If the Ukraine can have an interna-
tional personality with a U.N. vote and
a treaty-making power, certainly a
part of China can be similarly accom-
modated by the international lawyers.

The issue is less legal than political, whether a *modus vivendi* can be worked out and some kind of balance accepted between the island and the continent. For us, the essence of the situation is to keep it obscure in law until it is clarified in the passage of time by the operation of the many interests involved—interests far too varied and complex for us Americans

to comprehend or mastermind from a distance.

We should maintain our Taiwan defense commitment but otherwise not try to unscrew the inscrutable.

John K. Fairbank is director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard.

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BALTIMORE SUN
12 September 1971

At the U.N., two Chinas make sense

By PETER J. KUMPA

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Washington.

Never has the world seen as much furious diplomatic activity as it is seeing now and will see as 1971 moves into the fall season. Old friends and old foes are at it already traveling and talking around the world.

In Washington, American and Japanese ministers were growling last week over hard-boned economic issues. Other U.S. diplomats were at it in SALT negotiations with the Russians and with the Vietnamese Communists in Paris. Here in the State Department and all over Europe, preparations were under way for a future European security conference or simply a meeting on ways to reduce forces in Europe.

Russia and America

President Nixon had trips scheduled to chat with the Japanese emperor in Aomori, Alaska, while the emperor was stopping on his way to Europe. Canada and China were also on the White House travel schedule.

The Russians dropped another proposal for a world disarmament conference. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's top three leaders, party boss Leonid I. Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorniy, were already for some jet action that would take them in the next few months to such distant points as Canada, France, Algeria, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia and North Vietnam.

A tip Van Winkle coming out of a 20-year sleep now would be most surprised to see such once-silent sulking enemies as the West and East Germans talking Berlin settlement specifics.

Viet Cong and the Saigon government representatives still facing each other in Paris, and the North and South Koreans finally discussing ways to bring together families broken geographically by war.

The list is not complete, but the trend is overwhelming. The leaders of the tribes of man on this swirling globe are rushing around in a period of crunching change. We are all in a flux out of which will come new balances in the world's political structure, new equilibria in the military, economic and other human spheres.

What is so hopeful is that it looks as if man can pull off the change with fewer conflicts than the 14 recorded international wars and 24 civil ones since 1945. What is so promising is that man seems to have accepted the biblical admonition to go and reason together.

The United Nations, the world's forum, should get a new blast of oxygen in its tired fires from the new diplomatic winds. It will move toward a new look, for what is certain is that Communist China, the People's Republic of China, will be voted membership into the international body.

What is uncertain is whether the Chinese will take a page from the recent histories of the other three divided countries—Germany, Korea and Vietnam—and sit in the same room with their old antagonists. They swear they will not.

The problem is how the Chinese will be asked to take their seat. The General Assembly will have to choose between two invitations to send to Peking.

One invitation could come through the Albanian resolution, for it is sponsored by the tiny Balkan ally of the Chinese.

15 to 20 other countries. This is a sweet, red-ribboned one, for it brings Peking in while at the same time pitching out the hated enemy, President Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China.

American diplomats have etched another kind of invitation, contained in two resolutions that please neither the Chinese Communists nor Nationalists, the one that fits into President Nixon's foreign and domestic considerations and, best of all, looks at this stage like a close winner in the General Assembly.

The first part is a procedural resolution that states that depriving the Chinese Nationalists of a seat is an important question. Under the rules, important questions requires a two-thirds rather than a simple majority of those voting in the General Assembly. In other words, if adopted by an assembly majority, it would require a two-thirds vote before the Albanian invitation could be sent to Peking.

The second resolution, technically avoiding a two-China or a one-China-one-Taiwan approach, calls for the "right of representation" of the People's Republic of China and the "continued right of representation of the Republic of China."

The American resolution seeks to underscore the goal of making the United Nations "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations" and therefore has to be regarded as a major step by the United States towards the full implementation of the principle of universality of membership.

As to which government should bear the "China" name, the resolution states that acceptance could be "without prejudice to the eventual outcome of continuing negotiations." This is an im-

pleist invitation for the Chinese to eventually step back from any future American involvement in that dispute.

Flexibility apostle

Sworn as they must for their own U. N. tactics that they will not accept the American invitation, the Chinese Communists might change their minds. Who can be certain they won't, considering the remarkable flip they have taken recently in accepting a proposed visit by President Nixon, the leader of the imperialist camp?

Peking's master philosopher, party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, it should be recalled, is an apostle of flexibility. He once sweated as a petty bureaucrat in the Kuomintang cause. If it serves his goal, the advancement of his China, can he long resist the temptation of grabbing for such a goodie as U.N. membership, an overview of world diplomacy through a Security Council window in New York without prejudice to his interests in uniting his country?

Better still, there is a good chance that if the American resolution were adopted

and the Assembly voted that the Nationalists, burning from such humiliation, would walk out.

The end of the story might not come in November when this imagined plan might be completed. The Chinese Communists might linger over a decision, but one invitation or another will be ready for them by then.

October or November debate

As the China tussle now looks, the General Committee of the Assembly will move both the Albanian and American resolutions on the agenda of the plenary session. It seems unlikely that the China issue will be moved ahead of the opening September general debate but will rather come in for 10 days to two weeks of argumentation late in October or early in November.

Why bother with the fancy two-step resolution? Isn't it enough to bring in a nation of 800 million souls after all these years of exclusion? Shouldn't we seek universality?

Precisely. We should. The argument for bringing in the Chinese Communists should be no less reasonable for keeping

The dual representation approach is not the sort of two-China formula that would have the U.N. take away any rights from either government. It is not the sort that should damage any future U.S.-Chinese rapprochement which is based on broader power considerations.

Obviously, other factors inspired the authors of the American resolution. There is President Nixon's sensitivity to the conservative voter who would shudder at a full, uninhibited leap into Mao's arms. There is an obligation, a moral one, for the United States to do its best for an ally, the Chinese Nationalists. Other friends, like the Japanese, would ponder about an America that switched partners too easily.

The American resolution does bring in Peking without the regressive approach of the Albanians in shutting up alleged undesirables like the Nationalists in locked rooms.

The United Nations should be a cathedral with open doors for all established operating governments, including Mao's and Chiang's.

Mr. Knapu is diplomatic correspondent in The Sun's Washington Bureau.

THE ECONOMIST
17 October 1970

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The disputed sovereignty of Taiwan could be one of those problems which would profit from a period of benign neglect. The Canadians pointed the way in this direction by their manner of recognising Peking. They accepted Peking as the rightful government of mainland China, and thus at the same time rejected Chiang Kai-shek's pretensions to return to the mainland. But they left the status of Taiwan unresolved. The Chinese did not accept this formulation easily; this is why the negotiations took 20 months. But, in the end, accept it they did, even though they used the joint communiqué to reassert their own insistence that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

If the Canadian terms can set the pattern for the Italians and the others queueing up to recognise China—and this is why the Chinese bargained so hard—they could be a model for the UN as well. This would mean putting Peking in the China seat and putting the question of a separate seat for Taiwan on the shelf. There is a case for hoping that time might then begin to erode the problem. That is easily said, and there is no doubt at all that the United States would be increasingly embarrassed at having to protect and get along with an outcast Taiwan. But time will remove before long the two old men, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, who have dug their heels

in too deep to compromise. It might start to change the atmosphere in both Peking and Taipei once the old intransigents had gone. It could even change the calculations of the United States if the Americans get anywhere with their hopes of a better relationship with a China that seems to be locked in a permanent quarrel with Russia. Out of all these changes, any of several solutions might peacefully evolve.

One group of people who hope that time will be allowed to take its course are the Taiwanese—the 11 million ethnic Chinese who have lived on the island for up to 300 years as distinct from the 3 million Nationalists who fled there in 1949. The Taiwanese regard the Nationalists, who have ruled them repressively for 20 years, as alien intruders. They have no sympathy for the *raison d'être* of the regime—the reconquest of the mainland—and no involvement in the Nationalists' diplomatic struggle to be accepted as the government of the whole of China. There are Taiwanese who argue that the world would be doing them a favour if it debunked these claims by expelling Taiwan from the United Nations.

These Taiwanese militants—a tiny minority of some 1,000 activists at home, perhaps as many more abroad and several thousand others in prison—are not very clear about what would happen next if Taiwan did find itself without its UN seat. But they agree on one thing that

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would not happen—an armed revolt. The mass of the Taiwanese people are too passive and too attached to their rising incomes, and the Nationalist police are too widespread and too efficient, for that. What they hope will result—perhaps after an initial period of increased repression—is greater political awareness among the Taiwanese and a conscious effort by the Nationalist government to adjust to its real status as the government of several small offshore islands. An important part of this adjustment would be the growth of a system of representative government which would necessarily bring significant numbers of Taiwanese into the places where decisions are taken.

After this it is not impossible that the Taiwan problem might begin to solve itself. A post-Mao communist leadership in Peking, faced not with a challenger but with a similarly pragmatic—and historically distinct—non-communist government on Taiwan, might concede that it had enough on its plate and quietly drop its slogan about reconquering Taiwan if its counterpart in Taipei dropped its own equally implausible claim. The two governments might then follow the German pattern of de facto recognition and trade while reserving the possibility of eventual reunion for the indefinite future. The west could be perfectly happy with this outcome if the communists agreed to leave Taiwan as part of the non-communist world in matters of defence and economics. On Taiwan, even the silent majority would probably prefer the outright independence that their militants are demanding. But since a formal split into two states will be the hardest solution

they would probably be satisfied with a live-and-let-live arrangement so long as it gave them a greater voice than they now have in their own government. Union with the mainland would be the least satisfactory conclusion for the Taiwanese. But then it would be up to them to stop their government from carrying it out.

The least likely solutions of the Taiwan problem are the most extreme ones: the overthrow of the communist government on the mainland by indigenous or external rebels, or an armed takeover of Taiwan. The Americans are now committed to preventing an invasion in either direction and they are not likely to opt out of this responsibility until some kind of lasting modus vivendi is achieved. But the key element in the benign neglect policy is that, apart from keeping the two sets of Chinese from each others' throats, the interest of the western world is to encourage a process that would give the Taiwanese greater political freedom than they enjoy now.

Peking's admission to the United Nations is not about to lead to the obliteration of Taiwan. Nor will it produce a transformation of the Chinese communists into amiable debating partners. As a member of the United Nations, China would probably be difficult, obstructionist and free with the use of its veto power, much as the Russians were in the early 1950s. It may change with the years, and with the impact of international diplomatic society. It may not. But that is not the point. The case for Peking's admission rests on the fact that Mao Tse-tung and not Chiang Kai-shek is the effective ruler of mainland China.

THE BERLIN AGREEMENT

The series of German negotiations, of which the Berlin Agreement is an essential part, are the product of two antithetical hypotheses regarding the future status of Europe. The Western Allies' (and German Chancellor and former mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt's) position has been based on the assumption that an agreement re Berlin is a first step toward decreasing the division between the two Germanys and between East and West Europe. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has made certain tactical concessions regarding West Berlin primarily in the belief that the treaty, in the long run, will create conditions favorable to its own objectives of getting the U.S. out of Europe and of impeding European unity. Since it is difficult, at this juncture, to foresee all the consequences of the negotiations, some time will have to pass before it is possible to know which hypothesis is the more accurate. It is quite possible that changes and realignments will occur in Europe which neither side expected. It is likely, however, that the Berlin Agreement will come to be regarded as the step which made new relationships possible.

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[REDACTED] It is the first and provisional phase of talks which hopefully will lead to a treaty governing specific problems of access, communications and representation; it has not changed the status of Berlin nor has it resolved the German problem. If the technical details of the Agreement are successfully worked out between East and West Germany in phase two of the negotiations, the final agreement may create an atmosphere in which some of the more basic East-West issues can subsequently be discussed.

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Contrary to Soviet propaganda claims, the treaty does not mean that the division of Germany has been accepted as permanent nor that East Germany has been recognized. Neither does the establishment of a Soviet Consulate in West Berlin imply that the Western powers have accepted a de facto limitation of their authority.

As expected, immediately after the Agreement had been signed, Soviet propaganda organs began to press for a conference on European security. They also indicated that since peace is just around the corner, NATO and the European Community are superfluous.

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October 1971

THE BERLIN AGREEMENT

On 3 September 1971, the United States, Great Britain, France and the USSR (the World War II occupying powers) signed a provisional agreement on Berlin. The negotiations, which lasted 17 months, related primarily to procedures governing access and representation; however, some of the provisions, as well as the language, have implications for the status of the city and for relations between the two Germanys. The new agreement covers inter alia:

- a. Access: The Soviet Union has accepted responsibility for facilitating the exchange of civilians and goods to and from West Berlin through East Germany.
- b. Communications and Visits: Telephone, telegraph, transport, etc. between West Berlin and East Germany are to be improved. Additional crossing points through the wall will be opened to accommodate permanent residents of West Berlin to "travel and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons."
- c. Representation: While specifying that West Berlin is not a constituent part of West Germany, the agreement affirms the city's ties to West Germany and acknowledges Bonn's right to maintain an official presence. However, official acts on the part of the Federal Republic government are not to be executed in the city. West Germany is authorized to perform consular services for West Berliners and to represent the city's interests in international organizations. Warsaw Pact countries of East Europe will henceforth accept West Berliners traveling on West German passports, as they long ago accepted West Germans themselves.

The text of the agreement contains several references to the "German Democratic Republic." These are being interpreted by Moscow and East Germany as de facto recognition of the East German regime. The Soviets gained the right to establish a Consulate General in West Berlin.

Details regarding the implementation of the agreement are now being worked out between East and West Germany (as well as the West Berlin governing body, the Senat) in the second phase of the negotiations. Once an agreement has been reached on Berlin, the German states are expected to begin work on a general treaty defining their relations.

The immediate accomplishment of the Berlin Agreement is to define procedures relating to status and access, thus reducing the chance of international confrontation over the city. However, the text is replete with linguistic imprecisions and in the final analysis implementation will still depend on the good will of the parties involved.

Another immediate result of the agreement on Berlin is that several previously negotiated treaties on other aspects of East-West detente may now be put into effect. In this category are the Moscow Treaty of August and the Warsaw Treaty of November 1970, negotiated by Chancellor Brandt, which have to do with West Germany's relationship to the USSR and Poland. Mr. Brandt had specified that these treaties could go into effect only after an agreement on Berlin had been worked out. NATO had also indicated that successful negotiations on Berlin must precede any pan-European meeting such as a conference on European security which the Soviet Union has been advocating for a number of years.

Beyond the immediate problem of procedures, the signing of the Berlin Agreement has long-range consequences for Europe and the United States which need to be considered.

For 26 years Berlin has been the focus where the vital interests of America, the USSR, and Europe converged. Cynics have observed that if Moscow really wanted to get the U.S. out of Europe and to prevent European unity, it had only to make some genuine concessions on Berlin. Chancellor Willy Brandt's negotiating hypothesis has been that the Soviet Union, because it was playing for higher stakes, would prove to be accommodating on specific issues. One of the interesting aspects of the current negotiations has been Soviet willingness to make some concessions and to oblige its East German protectorate to accept them. Since the Soviet Union is not in the habit of making concessions without the prospect of good returns, it is important to know what these higher stakes are.

Some of the long-range advantages the Soviet Union hopes to derive from the Agreement are thought to include:

- a. Encouraging what it interprets as a U.S. trend to reduce its overseas commitments, with the ultimate objective of breaking up NATO and getting the United States out of Europe.
- b. Preventing or retarding the development of an economic and military united Europe.
- c. Securing its western flank because of the need to commit large forces to its border with China.

d. Obtaining access to European markets and technology.

If the Soviet Union regards the Berlin Agreement as a starting point from which those goals can ultimately be attained, its willingness to be accommodating re West Berlin specifics is more readily understandable. It is worth noting that, since the signing of the Berlin Agreement, Soviet propaganda has emphasized with renewed vigor one of its favorite themes, viz., that nothing now stands in the way of the immediate convocation of a conference to discuss a pan-European detente.

The two German states are now attempting to work out the specifics of the agreement signed by the four World War II Allies. Once this has been accomplished, the negotiations will probably move on to broader discussions on the relationship between the two Germanys. The wider problem of East-West relations will presumably be discussed at a general conference (such as a conference on European security) some time in the latter part of 1972 or in 1973. The achievement of any real detente between East and West Germany is unusually difficult because their aims are antithetical. Brandt's negotiators are working on the principle of gradual adaptation and change through expanded contacts. The East Germans, on the other hand, aware of their basic weakness vis-a-vis West Germany, are insisting on a policy of strict separation. These basic differences ensure that negotiations between the two states still have a long way to go.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1971

The Text of the Four-Power Agreement Governing the Status of West Berlin.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 3—Following is the official English-language text of the Berlin agreement and its annexes as made public today by the State Department:

Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin

The Governments of the United States of America, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Represented by their ambassadors, who held a series of meetings in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the America sector of Berlin,

Acting on the basis of their quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and of the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the four powers, which are not affected,

Taking into account the existing situation in the relevant area,

Guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements of the situation,

Without prejudice to their legal positions,

Have agreed on the following:

PART I— GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.

2. The four Governments, taking into account their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, agree that there shall be no use of threat of force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means.

3. The four Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.

4. The four Governments agree that in the event of differences in legal views,

the situation which has developed in the area, and as it is defined in this agreement as well as in the other agreements referred to in this agreement, shall not be changed unilaterally.

PART II— PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN

A. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment.

Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex I, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

B. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declare that the ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.

Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that commu-

nications between the Western sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these sectors will be improved. Permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas.

The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

Detailed arrangements concerning travel, communications and the exchange of territory, as set forth in Annex III, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

D. Representation abroad of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin and consular activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Western sectors of Berlin can be exercised as set forth in Annex IV.

PART III— FINAL PROVISIONS

This quadripartite agreement will enter into force on the date specified in a final quadripartite protocol to be concluded when the measures envisaged in part II of this quadripartite agreement and in its annexes have been agreed.

Done at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American sector of Berlin, this day of September, 1971, in four originals, each in Russian, English, French and German languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

For the Government of the French Republic:

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

ANNEX I

Communication from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(A) of the quadripartite agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

[1]

Transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be facilitated and unimpeded. It will receive the most simple, expeditious and preferential treatment provided by international practice.

[2]

Accordingly, (a) Conveyances sealed before departure may be used for the transport of civilian goods by road, rail and waterways between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of seals and accompanying documents.

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(b) With regard to conveyances which cannot be sealed, such as open trucks, inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of accompanying documents. In special cases where there is sufficient reason to suspect that unsealed conveyances contain either material intended for dissemination along the designated routes or persons or materials put on board along these routes, the content of unsealed conveyances may be inspected. Procedures for dealing with such cases will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

(c) Through trains and buses may be used for travel between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will not include any formalities other than identification of persons.

(d) Persons identified as through travelers using individual vehicles between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany on routes designated for through traffic will be able to proceed to their destinations without paying individual tolls and fees for the use of the transit routes. Procedures applied for such travelers shall not involve delay. The travelers, their vehicles and personal baggage will not be subject to search, detention or exclusion from use of the designated routes, except in special cases, as may be agreed by the competent German authorities, where there is sufficient reason to suspect that misuse of the transit routes is intended for purposes not related to direct travel to and from the Western sectors of Berlin and contrary to generally applicable regulations concerning public order.

(e) Appropriate compensation for fees and tolls and for other costs related to traffic on the communication routes between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the maintenance of adequate routes, facilities and installations used for such traffic, may be made in the form of an annual lump sum paid to the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany.

[3] Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

Annex II **Communication from the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II(b) of the quadripartite agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honor to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

[1]

They declare, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, that the ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it. The provisions of the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Constitution operative in the Western sectors of Berlin which contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in effect.

[2]

The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundesversammlung, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, including their committees and fraktionen, as well as other state bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany will not perform in the Western sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of Paragraph 1.

[3]

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will be represented in the Western sectors of Berlin to authorities of the three Governments and to the senate by a permanent liaison agency.

ANNEX III

Communication from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II (c) of the quadripartite agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

[1]

Communications between the Western sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these sectors will be improved.

[2]

Permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas. In order to facilitate visits and travel, as described above, by permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin, additional crossing points will be opened.

[3]

The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstücken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

[4]

Telephonic, telegraphic, transport and other external communications of the Western sectors of Berlin will be expanded.

[5]

Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of Paragraph 1 to 4 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

ANNEX IV

A. Communication from the governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II(d) of the quadripartite agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, have the honor to inform the Government of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

[1]

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organizations and in relations with other countries.

[2]

Without prejudice to the above and provided that matters of security and status are not affected, they have agreed that:

(a) The Federal Republic of Germany may perform consular services for permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin.

(b) In accordance with established procedures, international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany may be extended to the Western sectors of Berlin provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case.

(c) The Federal Republic of Germany may represent the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin in international organizations and international conferences.

(d) Permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin may participate jointly with the Republic of Germany in international exchanges and exhibitions. Meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation may be held in the Western sectors of Berlin. Invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

[3]

The three Governments authorize the establishment of a consulate general of the U.S.S.R. in the Western sectors of Berlin accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accordance with the usual procedures applied in those sectors, for the purpose of performing consular services, subject to provisions set forth in a separate document.

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B. Communication from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II (d) of the quadripartite agreement of this date and to the communication of the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with regard to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

[1]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organizations and in relations with other countries.

[2]

Provided that matters of security and status are not affected, for its part it will raise no objection to:

(a) The performance by the Federal Republic of Germany of consular services for permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin;

(b) In accordance with established procedures, the extension to the Western sectors of Berlin of international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case;

(c) The representation of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany in international organizations and international conferences;

(d) The participation jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany of permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin in international exchanges and exhibitions, or the holding in those sectors of meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with

international participation. Invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

[3]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments have given their consent to the establishment of a consulate general of the U.S.S.R. in the Western sectors of Berlin. It will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments, for purposes and subject to provisions described in their communication as set forth in a separate document of this date.

Final Quadripartite Protocol

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the French Republic,

Having in mind Part III of the quadripartite agreement of Sept. 3, 1971, and taking note with satisfaction of the fact that the agreements and arrangements mentioned below have been concluded,

Have agreed on the following:

[1]

The four Governments, by virtue of this protocol, bring into force the quadripartite agreement, which, like this protocol, does not affect quadripartite agreements or decisions previously concluded or reached.

[2]

The four Governments proceed on the basis that the following agreements and arrangements concluded between the competent German authorities shall enter into force simultaneously with the quadripartite agreement:

(To be filled in after agreements concluded)

[3]

The quadripartite agreement and the consequent agreements and arrangements of the competent German authorities referred to in this protocol settle important issues examined in the course of the negotiations and shall remain in force together.

[4]

In the event of a difficulty in the application of the quadripartite agreement or any of the above-mentioned agreements or arrangements which any of the four Governments may experience or in the event of nonimplementation of any part there-

of, that Government will bring the matter to the attention of the other three Governments to the provisions of the quadripartite agreement and this protocol and to conduct the requisite quadripartite consultations in order to ensure the observance of the commitments undertaken and to bring the situation into conformity with the quadripartite agreement and this protocol.

[5]

This protocol enters into force on the date of signature.

Done at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American sector of Berlin this — day of —, 1971, in four originals each in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

For the Government of the French Republic:

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

AGREED MINUTE I

It is understood that permanent residents of the Western sectors of Berlin shall, in order to receive at appropriate Soviet offices visas for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, present:

(a) A passport stamped "issued in accordance with the quadripartite agreement of Sept. 3, 1971,"

(b) An identity card or other appropriately drawn up document confirming that the person requesting the visa is a permanent resident of the Western sectors of Berlin and containing the bearer's full address and a personal photograph.

During his stay in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a permanent resident of the Western sectors of Berlin who has received a visa in this way may carry both documents or either of them, as he chooses. The visa issued by a Soviet office will serve as the basis for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the passport or identity card will serve as the basis for consular services in accordance with the quadripartite agreement during the stay of that person in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The above-mentioned stamp and passport or identity card will be used by permanent residents of the Western sectors of

Berlin for journeys such as may require it.

AGREED MINUTE II

Provision is hereby made for the establishment of a consulate general of the U.S.S.R. in the Western sectors of Berlin. It is understood that the details concerning this consulate general will include the following. The consulate general will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three governments in accordance with the usual procedures applying in those sectors. Applicable Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to the consulate general. The activities of the consulate general will be of a consular character and will not include political functions or any matters related to quadripartite rights or responsibilities.

The three Governments are willing to authorize an increase in Soviet commercial activities in the Western sectors of Berlin as described below. It is understood that pertinent Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to these activities. This authorization will be extended indefinitely, subject to compliance with the provisions outlined herein. Adequate provision for consultation will be made. This increase will include establishment of an "Office of Soviet Foreign Trade Associations in the Western Sectors of Berlin," with commercial status, authorized to buy and sell on behalf of foreign trade associations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soyuzpushnina, Prodtorg and Novesport may each establish a bonded warehouse in the Western sectors of Berlin to provide storage and display for their goods. The activities of the Intourist office in the British sector of Berlin may be expanded to include the sale of tickets and vouchers for travel and tours in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other countries. An office of Aeroflot may be established for the sale of passenger tickets and air-freight services.

The assignment of personnel to the consulate general and to permitted Soviet commercial organizations will be subject to agreement with the appropriate authorities of the three Governments. The number of such personnel will not exceed 20 Soviet nationals in the consulate general; 20 in the office of the Soviet foreign trade Associations; one each in the Soyuzpushnina, Prodtorg and Novesport offices; six in the Intourist office; and five in the Aeroflot office. The personnel of the consulate

general and of permitted Soviet commercial organizations and enterprises may reside in the Western sectors of Berlin upon individual authorization.

The property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Lietzenburgerstrasse 11 and at Am Sandwerder 1 may be used for purposes to be agreed between appropriate representatives of the three Governments and of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Details of implementation of the measures above and a time schedule for carrying them out will be agreed between the four ambassadors in the period between the signature of the quadripartite agreement and the signature of the final quadripartite protocol envisaged in that agreement.

(NOTE FROM THE THREE AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR)

The Ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America have the honor, with reference to the statements contained in Annex II of the quadripartite agreement to be signed on this date concerning the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin, to inform the

Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the following: The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany immediately following signature of the quadripartite agreement a letter containing clarifications and interpretations which represent the understanding of their Governments of the statements contained in Annex III of the quadripartite agreement. A copy of the letter to be sent to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany is attached to this note:

The ambassadors avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. the assurances of their highest consideration.

(Signed by the three ambassadors.)

(ATTACHMENT TO NOTE)

His Excellency
The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn.
Your Excellency:

With reference to the quadripartite agreement signed on Sept. 3, 1971, our Governments wish by this letter to inform the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the following clarifications and interpretations of the statements contained in Annex II, which was the subject of consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

during the quadripartite negotiations. These clarifications and interpretations represent the understanding of our Governments of this part of the quadripartite agreement, as follows:

A. The phrase in Paragraph 2 of Annex II of the quadripartite agreement which reads: "... will not perform in the Western sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of Paragraph 1" shall be interpreted to mean acts in exercise of direct state authority over the Western sectors of Berlin.

B. Meetings of the Bundesversammlung will not take place and plenary sessions of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag will continue not to take place in the Western sectors of Berlin. Single committees of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag may meet in the Western sectors of Berlin in connection with maintaining and developing the ties between those sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the case of fraktionen, meetings will not be held simultaneously.

C. The liaison agency of the Federal Government in the Western sectors of Berlin includes departments charged with liaison functions in their respective fields.

D. Established procedures concerning the applicability

to the Western sectors of Berlin of legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany shall remain unchanged.

E. The term "state bodies" in Paragraph 2 of Annex II shall be interpreted to mean: the Federal President, the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Cabinet, the Federal ministers and ministries, and the branch offices of those ministries, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, and all federal courts.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of our highest esteem.

For the Government of the French Republic: Jean Sauvargues

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Sir Roger Jackling

For the Government of the United States of America: Kenneth Rush

(SOVIET REPLY NOTE)

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note of the ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, dated Sept. 3, 1971, and takes note of the communication of the three ambassadors.

(Formal close.) (Signed by the Soviet Ambassador, Pyotr A. Abrasinov.)

LE MONDE, Paris
25 August 1971

L'ACCORD

CPYRGHT

Les gouvernements de la République française, de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

représentés par leurs ambassadeurs, qui ont tenu une série de séances dans le palais précédemment occupé par le Conseil de contrôle allié dans le secteur américain de Berlin,

agissant sur la base de leurs droits et responsabilités quadripartites et des accords et décisions correspondants des quatre puissances au temps de la guerre et de l'après-guerre, qui ne sont pas affectés, tenant compte de la situation existante dans la région correspondante,

guidés par le désir de contribuer à des améliorations pratiques de cette situation,

sans préjudice de leurs positions juridiques,
sont convenus de ce qui suit :

Première partie : dispositions générales

1) Les quatre gouvernements s'emploieront à favoriser l'élimination de la tension et la prévention des complications dans la région correspondante.

2) Les quatre gouvernements, tenant compte de leurs obligations aux termes de la Charte des Nations unies, conviennent qu'il ne devra y avoir dans la région ni menace ni emploi de la force et que les différends devront être réglés uniquement par des moyens pacifiques.

3) Les quatre gouvernements respecteront mutuellement leurs droits et responsabilités individuels et communs, qui restent inchangés.

4) Les quatre gouvernements conviennent que, abstraction faite des divergences de vues juridiques, la situation qui s'est constituée dans la région, et telle qu'elle est définie dans le présent accord ainsi que dans les autres accords y mentionnés, ne devra pas être

Deuxième partie : dispositions relatives aux secteurs**occidentaux de Berlin**

a) Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. déclare que la circulation en transit des personnes et marchandises civiles entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne à travers le territoire de la République démocratique allemande ne sera pas entravée, que cette circulation sera facilitée de manière à se dérouler de la façon la plus simple et la plus expéditive, et qu'elle jouira d'un traitement préférentiel.

Des arrangements détaillés concernant cette circulation de caractère civil, qui sont indiqués à l'annexe I, seront convenus entre les autorités allemandes compétentes.

b) Les gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique déclarent que les liens entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne seront maintenus et développés, compte tenu de ce que ces secteurs continuent de ne pas être un élément constitutif de la République fédérale d'Allemagne et de n'être pas gouvernés par elle.

Des arrangements détaillés concernant la relation entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne sont indiqués dans l'annexe II.

c) Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. déclare que les communications entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et les régions limitrophes de ces secteurs, ainsi qu'avec les régions de la République démocratique allemande qui ne sont pas limitrophes de ces secteurs,

seront améliorées. Les résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin seront en mesure de se rendre en voyage et en visite dans ces régions pour des raisons humanitaires, familiales, culturelles, religieuses, commerciales ou touristiques, dans des conditions comparables à celles qui sont faites aux autres personnes se rendant dans ces régions.

Les problèmes des petites enclaves, y compris celle de Steinstücken, et des autres parcelles, peuvent être résolus par échange de territoire.

Des arrangements détaillés relatifs aux voyages, aux communications et à l'échange de territoire, qui sont indiqués à l'annexe III, seront convenus entre les autorités allemandes compétentes.

d) La représentation extérieure des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et les activités consulaires de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin peuvent s'effectuer comme indiqué à l'annexe IV.

Troisième partie : dispositions finales

Le présent accord entrera en vigueur à une date indiquée dans un protocole quadripartite final qui sera conclu quand les mesures prévues à la deuxième partie du présent accord quadripartite auront été convenues.

Fait au palais précédemment occupé par le Conseil de contrôle allié dans le secteur américain de Berlin le 2 septembre 1971, en quatre exemplaires en chacune des langues française, anglaise et russe.

LES ANNEXES**I. — Les accès****● COMMUNICATION DU GOUVERNEMENT DE L'U.R.S.S. AUX GOUVERNEMENTS DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, DU ROYAUME-UNI ET DES ETATS UNIS D'AMERIQUE.**

Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S., se référant à la partie II-A de l'accord quadripartite de ce jour, après consultation et accord du gouvernement de la République démocratique allemande, a l'honneur de faire savoir aux gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique que :

1) La circulation en transit des personnes et des marchandises civiles entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale allemande par la route, le rail et la voie d'eau à travers le territoire de la République démocratique allemande sera facilitée et ne sera pas entravée. Cette circulation recevra le traitement le plus simple, expéditif et préférentiel que prévoit la pratique internationale.

2) En conséquence :

a) Des véhicules, plombés avant le départ, peuvent être utilisés pour le transport des marchandises civiles par la route, le rail et la voie d'eau entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Les procédures de contrôle se borneront au contrôle des plombs et des documents d'accompagnement.

b) Pour les véhicules qui ne peuvent être plombés, comme les camions ouverts, les procédures de contrôle se borneront au contrôle des documents d'accompagnement. Dans les cas spéciaux, où il y aura une raison suffisante de soupçonner que des véhicules non plombés contiennent soit des objets destinés à être diffusés le long des voies affectées, soit des personnes ou des objets embarqués en cours de route, le contenu des véhicules non plombés pourra être inspecté. Les autorités allemandes compétentes conviendront des procédures à suivre en pareil cas.

c) Des trains et autocars directs peuvent être utilisés pour voyager entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Les procédures de contrôle ne comprendront pas d'autres formalités que l'identification des personnes.

d) Les personnes identifiées comme voyageurs directs, utilisant des véhicules individuels entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et la République fédérale d'Allemagne sur les voies affectées à la circulation directe, seront en mesure de se rendre à destination sans payer de péages ni de taxes individuelles pour l'usage des voies de transit. Les procédures appliquées à ces voyageurs ne devront pas entraîner de retard. Les voyageurs, leurs véhicules et leurs bagages personnels ne seront ni fouillés, ni retenus, ni interdits de passage sur les voies affectées, sauf dans les cas spéciaux, à déterminer d'un commun accord par les autorités allemandes compétentes, où il

y aura une raison suffisante de soupçonner un abus prémédité des voies de transit à des fins sans rapport avec le voyage direct à destination et en provenance des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, et contraires aux règlements généralement applicables en matière d'ordre public.

e) Une compensation appropriée pour les péages et taxes et pour les autres frais afférents à la circulation sur les voies de communication entre les secteurs occidentaux et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, y compris ceux pour l'entretien des voies, services et installations adaptés à cette circulation, pourra être fournie sous la forme d'un versement forfaitaire annuel de la République fédérale d'Allemagne à la République démocratique allemande.

3) Des arrangements appliquant et complétant les dispositions du paragraphe 1 et 2 ci-dessus seront convenus entre les autorités allemandes compétentes.

II. — Les liens avec la R.F.A.

● COMMUNICATION DES GOUVERNEMENTS DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, DU ROYAUME-UNI ET DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE AU GOUVERNEMENT DE L'U.R.S.S.

est adressée de la lettre suivante des Trois occidentaux au chancelier fédéral.]

Lettre des trois ambassadeurs au chancelier fédéral au sujet de l'interprétation de l'annexe II

Monsieur le chancelier,

Les gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, se référant à la partie II-B de l'accord quadripartite de ce jour, et après consultation du gouvernement de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, ont l'honneur de faire savoir au gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. que :

1) Dans l'exercice de leurs droits et responsabilités, ils déclarent que les liens entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et de la R.F.A. seront maintenus et développés, compte tenu de ce que ces secteurs continuent de ne pas être un élément constitutif de la R.F.A. et de n'être pas gouvernés par elle. Les dispositions de la loi fondamentale de la R.F.A. et de la Constitution en vigueur dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, qui sont en contradiction avec ce qui précède, ont été suspendues et continuent d'être privées d'effet.

2) Le président fédéral, le gouvernement fédéral, l'Assemblée fédérale, le Conseil fédéral et la Diète fédérale, y compris leurs commissions et leurs groupes, ainsi que d'autres organes étatiques de la R.F.A., n'accompliront pas dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin d'actes constitutionnels ou officiels en contradiction avec les dispositions du paragraphe 1.

3) Le gouvernement de la R.F.A. sera représenté dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin auprès des autorités des trois gouvernements et du Sénat par un office de liaison permanent.

[Suit une note informant le gouvernement soviétique que copie lui

Se référant à l'accord quadripartite signé le 2 septembre 1971, nos gouvernements désirent faire part au gouvernement de la République fédérale, par la présente lettre, des éclaircissements et interprétations qui suivent, relatifs aux déclarations contenues dans l'annexe II de l'accord quadripartite, qui a fait l'objet de consultations avec le gouvernement de la République fédérale d'Allemagne pendant la négociation quadripartite.

Ces éclaircissements et interprétations définissent le sens que leurs gouvernements donnent à la partie correspondante de l'accord quadripartite, à savoir :

a) La formule de l'annexe II, paragraphe 2, de l'accord quadripartite ainsi conçue : « N'accompliront pas dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin d'actes constitutionnels ou officiels en contradiction avec les dispositions du paragraphe 1 », sera interprétée comme désignant des actes accomplis dans l'exercice d'une compétence étatique directe sur les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin.

b) Les réunions de l'Assemblée fédérale n'auront pas lieu et les sessions plénières de la Diète fédérale et du Conseil fédéral continueront de n'avoir pas lieu dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin. Les commissions de la Diète fédérale et du Conseil fédéral peuvent siéger individuellement dans les secteurs occidentaux pour des affaires en rapport avec le maintien et le développement des liens entre ces secteurs et la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Dans le cas de groupes parlementaires, les réunions n'auront pas lieu simultanément.

c) L'office de liaison du gouvernement fédéral dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin comprend des départements chargés des tâches de liaison dans leurs domaines respectifs.

d) Les procédures établies touchant l'applicabilité de la législation de la République fédérale d'Allemagne aux secteurs occidentaux de Berlin resteront inchangées.

e) L'expression « organes étatiques » au paragraphe 2 de l'annexe II sera interprétée comme désignant : le président fédéral, le chancelier fédéral, les ministres et ministères fédéraux et les services extérieurs de ces ministères, la Diète fédérale et le Conseil fédéral et toutes les juridictions fédérales.

[Suit un accusé de réception de l'ambassadeur d'U.R.S.S., qui prend acte de la communication des Trois.]

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III. — Les communications entre les deux Berlins

Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S., se référant à la partie II-C de l'accord quadripartite de ce jour, et après consultation et accord du gouvernement de la République démocratique allemande, a l'honneur de faire savoir aux gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique que :

1) Les communications entre les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et

les régions limitrophes de ces secteurs, ainsi que les régions de la République démocratique allemande qui ne sont pas limitrophes de ces secteurs, seront améliorées.

2) Les résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin seront en mesure de se rendre en voyage et en visite dans ces régions pour des raisons humanitaires, familiales, religieuses, culturelles, com-

merciales ou touristiques, dans des conditions comparables à celles qui sont faites aux autres personnes se rendant dans ces régions. Afin de faciliter les visites et voyages des résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, comme il est indiqué ci-dessus, des points de passage supplémentaires seront ouverts.

3) Les problèmes des petites enclaves, y compris Steinstuecken, et les autres parcelles, peuvent être

résolus par échange de territoire.

4) Les communications téléphoniques et télégraphiques, les transports et les autres communications des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin avec l'extérieur seront développées.

5) Des arrangements appliquant et complétant les dispositions des paragraphes 1 à 4 ci-dessus seront convenus entre les autorités allemandes compétentes.

IV. — La représentation des Berlinois à l'extérieur

A. — COMMUNICATION DES GOUVERNEMENTS DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, DU ROYAUME-UNI ET DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE AU GOUVERNEMENT DE L'U.R.S.S.

Les gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, se référant à la partie II-D de l'accord quadripartite de ce jour, et après consultation du gouvernement de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, ont l'honneur de faire savoir au gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. que :

1) Les trois gouvernements maintiennent leurs droits et responsabilités relatifs à la représentation extérieure des intérêts des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et de leurs résidents permanents, y compris les droits et responsabilités qui ont trait aux questions de statut et de sécurité, tant dans les organisations internationales que dans les relations avec les autres pays.

2) Sans préjudice de ce qui précède et à condition que les questions de sécurité et de statut ne soient

pas affectées, ils sont convenus que :

a) La République fédérale d'Allemagne peut étendre ses services consulaires aux résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin.

b) Conformément aux procédures établies, les accords et arrangements internationaux conclus par la République fédérale d'Allemagne peuvent être étendus aux secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, à condition que l'extension de ces accords et arrangements soit précisée dans chaque cas.

c) La République fédérale d'Allemagne peut représenter les intérêts des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin dans les organisations et conférences internationales.

d) Les résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin peuvent participer aux échanges et expositions internationaux ensemble, avec les participants de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Des réunions d'organisations internationales et des conférences internationales, ainsi que des expositions à participation internationale, peuvent

se tenir dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin. Les invitations seront envoyées par le Sénat ou par la République fédérale d'Allemagne et le Sénat ensemble.

3) Les trois gouvernements autoriseront l'ouverture dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin d'un consulat général soviétique accrédité auprès des autorités compétentes des trois gouvernements, conformément à la procédure habituelle en vigueur dans ces secteurs, et chargé d'exercer les services consulaires conformément aux dispositions énoncées dans un document séparé en date de ce jour.

B. — COMMUNICATION DU GOUVERNEMENT DE L'U.R.S.S. AUX GOUVERNEMENTS DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, DU ROYAUME-UNI ET DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE.


Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S., se référant à la partie II-D de l'accord quadripartite de ce jour et à la communication des gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis

d'Amérique, relative à la représentation extérieure des intérêts des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et de leurs résidents permanents, a l'honneur de faire savoir aux gouvernements de la République française, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, ce qui suit :

1) Le gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. prend note du fait que les gouvernements des trois puissances maintiennent leurs droits et leurs responsabilités quant à la représentation extérieure des intérêts des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et de leurs résidents permanents, y compris les droits et responsabilités qui ont trait aux questions de statut et de sécurité, tant dans les organisations internationales que dans les relations avec les autres pays ;

2) A condition que les questions de sécurité et de statut ne soient pas affectées, ce gouvernement, pour sa part, ne soulèvera pas d'objection contre. (...)

[Suit une répétition mot pour mot des paragraphes A, B, C, D et 3 du document précédent des Trois.]



(Dessin de Oliphant dans le Los Angeles Times.)

LES PROTOCOLES

Sur les passeports des Berlinois de l'Ouest

Il est entendu que les résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, pour pouvoir obtenir dans les services soviétiques compétents des visas d'entrée en U.R.S.S., présenteront :

a) Un passeport muni du cachet « délivré en conformité avec l'accord quadripartite du 2 septembre 1971 » ;

b) Une carte d'identité ou un autre document dûment établi

confirmant que la personne sollicitant le visa est un résident permanent des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin et contenant l'adresse complète du porteur et sa photographie personnelle.

Pendant leur séjour en Union soviétique, les résidents permanents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin qui ont obtenu un visa selon ces procédures peuvent dis-

poser à leur convenance des deux documents ou de l'un d'eux. Le visa délivré par un service soviétique servira de titre pour l'entrée en U.R.S.S., tandis que le passeport ou la carte d'identité servira de titre pour les services consulaires conformément à l'accord quadripartite pendant le séjour de ces personnes sur le territoire de l'U.R.S.S.

Le cachet ci-dessus mentionné figurera sur tous les passeports utilisés par les résidents perma-

nents des secteurs occidentaux de Berlin pour voyager dans les pays qui l'exigeraient.

Le présent protocole règle les conditions d'ouverture d'un consulat général soviétique dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin. Il est entendu que les dispositions concernant ce consulat général seront les suivantes :

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Sur le consulat général soviétique

Le consulat général sera accrédité auprès des autorités compétentes des trois gouvernements, conformément à la procédure habituelle en vigueur dans ces secteurs.

Les lois et règlements alliés et allemands correspondants s'appliqueront au consulat général.

Les activités du consulat général seront de caractère consulaire, ne comprendront pas de fonctions politiques et ne s'étendront pas aux affaires en rapport avec les droits ou responsabilités quadripartites.

Les trois gouvernements sont disposés à autoriser un accroissement des activités commerciales soviétiques dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, comme il est spécifié ci-dessous. Il est entendu que les lois et

règlements alliés et allemands correspondants s'appliqueront à ces activités.

Cette autorisation sera prolongée indéfiniment sous réserve du respect des présentes stipulations. Les dispositions utiles seront prises aux fins de consultation. Cet accroissement comprendra l'ouverture, dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin, d'un bureau des associations soviétiques de commerce extérieur jouissant d'un statut commercial, autorisé à acheter et vendre au nom des associations de commerce extérieur de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques. Chacune des firmes Soyouzpushina, Prodtorg et Novoezport peut ouvrir dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin un entrepôt hors douane où elle pourra entreposer et exposer ses marchandises. L'agence

d'Intourist, installée dans le secteur britannique de Berlin, peut étendre ses activités à la vente de billets et de bons pour des voyages en U.R.S.S. et dans d'autres pays. La compagnie Aeroflot peut ouvrir une agence pour la vente de billets de passage et de service de fret.

L'affectation de personnel au consulat général et aux organisations commerciales soviétiques autorisées sera soumise à l'accord des autorités compétentes des trois gouvernements.

L'effectif du personnel ne devra pas dépasser le nombre de vingt ressortissants soviétiques pour le consulat général; vingt pour le bureau des associations soviétiques de commerce extérieur; d'un pour chacun des entrepôts hors douane; (...) pour l'agence d'Intourist; cinq pour le bureau d'Aeroflot. Les agents du consulat général et des organismes

commerciaux soviétiques autorisés, ainsi que les membres de leurs familles peuvent résider dans les secteurs occidentaux de Berlin sur autorisation individuelle. Les propriétés de l'U.R.S.S. situées Lietzenburgerstrasse n° 11 et Am Sandwerder n° 1 peuvent être utilisées à des fins qui seront convenues entre les représentants compétents des trois gouvernements et du gouvernement soviétique.

Les quatre ambassadeurs, au cours de la période qui s'écoulera entre la signature de l'accord quadripartite et celle du protocole quadripartite final prévu par cet accord, conviendront des détails d'application des mesures ci-dessus et de leurs délais de mise en vigueur.

[A signer à l'issue des conversations interallemandes, à la troisième phase de l'accord.]

Quadripartite final

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Les gouvernements de la République française, de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

Ayant à l'esprit la troisième partie de l'accord quadripartite du 2 septembre 1971 et prenant acte avec satisfaction du fait que les accords et arrangements mentionnés ci-dessous ont été conclus, Sont convenus de ce qui suit :

1) Les quatre gouvernements mettent en vigueur par le présent protocole l'accord quadripartite, qui, comme le présent protocole, n'affecte pas les accords conclus

ni les décisions prises par les quatre puissances antérieurement;

2) Les quatre gouvernements partent du principe que les accords et arrangements conclus entre les autorités allemandes compétentes (suit la liste de ces accords) entreront en vigueur en même temps que l'accord quadripartite;

3) L'accord quadripartite et les accords et arrangements entre autorités allemandes compétentes, qui s'ensuivent, mentionnés dans le présent protocole, règlent d'importantes questions examinées au cours des négociations et demeureront en vigueur ensemble.

4) Au cas où surgirait dans l'application de l'accord quadripartite ou de l'un des accords et arrangements mentionnés ci-dessus une difficulté que l'un des quatre gouvernements considérerait comme sérieuse, ou bien au cas où telle partie de cet accord ou de ces arrangements viendrait à ne pas être appliquée, ce gouvernement aura le droit d'attirer l'attention des trois autres gouvernements sur les dispositions de l'accord quadripartite et sur ce protocole, et de provoquer les consultations quadripar-

tes requises afin d'assurer le respect des engagements pris et de rétablir une situation conforme à l'accord quadripartite et au présent protocole.

5) Le présent protocole entre en vigueur au jour de sa signature.

Fait au palais précédemment occupé par le Conseil de contrôle dans le secteur américain de Berlin.

Le (...) 1971.

En quatre exemplaires, en chacune des langues française, anglaise et russe.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1971

The Berlin Agreement Is No Gift

By DEAN ACHESON

WASHINGTON—The Four-Power agreement on Berlin contains the first and last parts of a triptych. These with a middle part yet to be worked out between the East and West German Governments will put into effect a new agreement among the six concerned Governments on what has become known as "Access to Berlin."

If the triptych is completed by Inter-German agreement, for which the outlook is good but not certain, the result will be considerable improvement over pre-existing conditions in Berlin. However, the "Berlin problem" will not by any means have been "solved."

The occupying Governments have agreed on four major principles and relegated to the German Governments the making of detailed arrangements for carrying out the first three.

The first principle is that transit traffic of civilian persons and goods across East Germany between West Germany and West Berlin is to be unimpeded, facilitated, expeditious, and to receive preferential treatment. To those ends inspection of sealed conveyances will be limited to the seals and documents of through trains and buses, to identification of persons, and of unsealed conveyances to documents unless reason exists to suspect intended off-loading or receipt en route, in which case special agreed procedures will be permissible.

Through travelers using individual vehicles are to be exempted from tolls, fees, search, or detention, except for special procedures for suspected misuse of through transit. In lieu of fees and tolls West Germany will make contributions for upkeep of routes.

The second principle commits the Western powers in exercising their rights in West Berlin to maintain and develop the ties between those sectors and West Germany and also to continue to regard West Berlin as not part of West Germany and not governed by it. No element of the West

German Government will perform official acts in West Berlin to the contrary. That Government may maintain a liaison agency there accredited to the three occupying powers and the senate of West Berlin.

By the third principle communications between West Berlin and areas of East Berlin and East Germany will be improved. Permanent residents of the Western sectors will be permitted to visit East Berlin and East Germany freely and additional crossing points will be ordered. Problems of small enclaves may be solved by exchange of territory. Telecommunications and transport communications of West Berliners are to be expanded.

The fourth principle reaffirms the right of the three Western Governments to represent abroad the interests of West Berlin and its permanent residents. Without prejudice to this right and to matters of security and status, the West German Government may perform services for residents of West Berlin, may extend to West Berlin agreements and arrangements entered into, and may represent interests of West Berliners in international organizations and conferences. The latter, for their part, may participate with West Germans in these international exchanges and conferences. These may be held in West Berlin. The three Western Governments will authorize a Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. in West Berlin under a separate document specifying personnel, facilities and functions.

In the final protocol the Soviet Government takes responsibility—as do the other three—for seeing that all these agreements are carried out. This undertaking could be important.

These agreements, carried out with even minimal good faith by Soviet and East German officials, could markedly improve conditions of life in West Berlin. True, the Soviet Union has given up little, perhaps nothing

that cannot be retaken under specious excuses so commonly used to justify similar actions over the last twenty years. Nevertheless, why has the Soviet Union made any concessions at all?

In the first place, a Berlin agreement is a condition precedent to Brandt's submitting to the Bundestag for ratification his Polish and Soviet treaties (recognizing the division of Germany) and for pushing a European security conference and withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe. These are ends devoutly being sought by the Kremlin. Furthermore, Brezhnev and Company cannot fail to have observed that all is not well in the Eastern European satellites, among the Western Europeans and American allies and even in the Communist paradise homeland itself.

In Eastern Europe discontents which drove the Czechs to their own undoing are still moving more cautious neighbors to economic departures from the faith. In Europe monetary discord and trans-Atlantic trade strife are loosening political bonds. The United States approaches its quadrennial anarchy. The Soviet economic revival, which Khrushchev thought would enable him to bury us, cometh not. In fact, Soviet economic woes are no less than our own, only less publicized.

The old Soviet snakeroot remedy of "détente" is, from their viewpoint, good for all these ills. It helps the apparati in Communist countries to divert the maximum G.N.P. to military purposes with the least squawk. In liberal democracies, however, it leads to the greatest squawk at any diversion of G.N.P. to the suspect military-industrial complex national defense.

Conclusion: The Berlin agreement is no gift; nevertheless, suspect those bearing it. Especially beware of the euphoric fizz uncorked to celebrate it.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
7 September 1971

Berlin: half a victory

By DAVID SHEARS in Bonn

NOW it is up to the Germans. With the impending signing of the basic Berlin agreement, the Big Four leave the two Germanys to fill in the remaining small print.

Then it will be up to Nato as a whole to conduct the ensuing troop-cut negotiations with Russia with the same tenacity and patience as the British, French and American Ambassadors have displayed for the past year-and-a-half.

Unless the Russians upset the applecart with another display of bully tactics in Eastern Europe, this decade will produce the biggest spate of East-West negotiations since early post-war days. The opportunities—and the risks—for both sides are correspondingly great. It is a challenging prospect.

If the West keeps up its guard and avoids illusions—two big "ifs"—there is no reason why it should come off second-best, any more than it did in the Berlin negotiations. On balance, the Four Power pact is a worthwhile bargain for the West. Considering the inherent weakness of the Western position in discussing the status of a city marooned more than 100 miles behind Communist lines, the result is better than anybody had dared hope when the negotiations began.

Of course it's a compromise, said one leading Bonn diplomat. "So is any negotiated agreement: both sides can accept and live with. The critics who demand an outright victory for the West don't realise that you can't get a victory without a war."

An exhaustive analysis of the Berlin pact's faults and merits would take too long. But in a nutshell, it nails down the Russians for the first time since the war to a recognition of their responsibility for unhindered access to West Berlin. It confirms West Berlin's ties with West Germany and it makes life a little easier for the city's two million people.

It is no panacea. It cannot change the facts of geography and it does not diminish the Berlin Wall or reassert Four-Power authority over East Berlin, the capital of East Germany. But, in

so far as any paper agreement can do so, it defuses Berlin and its access routes as a source of constant pyrotechnics.

The best witnesses for the defence of the pact are the three Governments which negotiated it. Mr Heath, President Pompidou and President Nixon are not noted for naiveté or gullibility when dealing with the Russians. During the arduous negotiations in West Berlin's former Allied Control Council building the Americans, particularly, let it be known that they would rather have no agreement than a bad one.

Opposition Christian Democratic leaders in Bonn were evidently taken aback by the merits of the pact. Dr Kiesinger, the party chairman, and Herr Barzel, the Opposition floor leader in the Bundestag, conceded that the Russians had made some hefty concessions. After an initial comment that "the flags are being hauled down in Berlin," Herr Strauss was silent on the subject,

preferring to engage in a quarrel with Herr Barzel on monetary policy.

When even conservative newspapers like the *Rheinische Post*, which habitually attack Herr Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in forthright terms, describe the agreement as "halfway acceptable," it cannot be too bad. Virtually the only visible criticism comes these days from a few (by no means all) implacable commentators in Herr Axel Springer's newspapers.

If indeed the Russians have shown such an uncharacteristic willingness to compromise, what can be their motives? To hasten the exodus of American troops from Europe? To cement the division of Europe, notably by opening the way to ratification of Bonn's 1970 treaties with Moscow and Warsaw? To promote a European security conference (which Nato has said must await a final Berlin settlement) that would have East Germany as an equal partner?

Troop reductions

Less suspiciously, could one suppose that Moscow is genuinely interested for economic reasons or because of her preoccupation with China, in reducing tensions and troop strengths in central Europe? These are questions that Nato will explore in the major East-West negotiations on European security and troop reductions that might begin next year.

In the meantime the two Germanys have to fill in the chinks of the Berlin agreement. On Monday Herr Bahr and Herr Kohl, the West and East German State Secretaries, who have been quietly discussing an intra-German transport pact for months, will get down to the detailed procedures for Berlin traffic controls. On the same day, West Berlin and East German officials will begin negotiations on the Four-Power agreement allowing West Berliners to cross the Wall.

The Bahr-Kohl talks are the most important. It is vital that East Germany does not recover through the back door of technical negotiations any of the capacity for mischief-making on the Berlin autobahns which was removed in the Four-Power agreement.

Equally, Herr Bahr must resist East Germany's present drive to expand these talks into a full-scale East-West German transport pact having validity in international law. For that would mean an upgrading of East Germany's international status. It would lead to a treaty requiring ratification by the Bonn Bundestag. It could also hold up the final Berlin agreement.

But if all goes well—and Russia can scarcely let East Germany sabotage the whole Berlin exercise at this late stage—the Bahr-Kohl talks are expected to produce agreement within two to four months. The West Berlin-East

German discussions should also be wrapped up in this period.

This would allow the entire Berlin package to be signed and sealed by Christmas, possibly even in time for the Nato Ministerial meeting earlier in December.

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Nobody in Bonn would be surprised if the final signing ceremony were made a pompous affair, with the Big Four Foreign Ministers each bringing delegations to Berlin.

By then Herr Brandt's *Ostpolitik* will be rolling again. Late this month Bonn will resume its talks with Czechoslovakia aimed at "normalising" relations. Herr Scheel, West German Foreign Minister, will have had some preliminary chat with U Thant at the United Nations on the prospective admission of both German States to the World Organisation. This step—UN membership for East Germany—is foreshadowed among the "intentions" appended to Bonn's treaty with Moscow, which can then be submitted to the Bundestag for ratification. Herr Brandt's coalition cannot count on any support from the Opposition, but all it needs is a simple majority

and both the Moscow and Warsaw treaties will come into force by next spring.

Approval by the Bundesrat (Upper House), in which the Opposition enjoys a one-vote margin, is not constitutionally necessary. So the tentative timetable foresees that both the Moscow and Warsaw treaties will come into force by next spring.

Bonn's emissaries could by then be wooing Sofia and Budapest as well as Prague. But the main thrust of West Germany's *Ostpolitik* will be aimed at Herr Honecker's hard-liners in East Berlin. How can the East German régime be induced to allow more human contact and to reunite split families?

In the wide-ranging negotiations expected to start between Bonn and East Berlin as soon as the impending Bahr-Kohl talks end, the West Germans hold a few cards. One is recognition of Herr

Honecker's German Democratic Republic. Another is its UN membership.

But Bonn will be under time pressure. For East Germany will find many backers when she pleads for admission to the World Health Organisation meeting at Geneva in May, or the UN Pollution Conference in Stockholm the following month. If he waits too long, Herr Brandt will find that his best cards are no longer trumps.

When Herr Wehner, Social Democratic floor leader in the Bundestag, suggested the other day that East Germany might join the United Nations next year, the remark passed almost unnoticed. He could well be right. But what struck outsiders was the astounding change that the forecast—and the silent reaction—reflect in West German thinking since Herr Brandt became Chancellor less than two years ago.

WASHINGTON POST
5 September 1971

CPYRGHT

The Berlin Agreement—A Closer Look

As the signing and consequent publication of the Berlin agreement make clear, negotiation is the continuation of confrontation by other means. The United States has not given up its hope to reconcile a divided Europe. The Soviet Union has not abandoned its goal of nailing East Europe ever more firmly into the "world socialist system." But instead of trying to advance their respective conceptions by setting out tanks, head to head, in Berlin, the great powers are trying to advance their conceptions by diplomacy—that is, by politics acting over time.

"Berlin agreement" is a misnomer. The entity involved is not the whole city of Berlin, only West Berlin—in the language of the Berlin agreement (itself an expression of convenient usage, not a specific term of diplomatic art), "the Western sectors of Berlin." Long ago the Soviet Union folded its sector, East Berlin, into its client state of East Germany. It then said, quite precisely: what's ours is ours, what's yours is negotiable. It could say this because by the reality of geography Berlin sits 110 miles inside East Germany. It is and will remain physically vulnerable, regardless of what is inscribed in any agreement.

In our view Mr. Nixon wisely chose to accept the Russian offer to negotiate just on "the Western sectors." By doing so he conceded to Moscow a long leg up on its No. 1 foreign policy aim of confirming

the post-World War II status quo of Soviet control in East Europe. This is surely why Moscow was eager to make a Berlin agreement. But Mr. Nixon has now won a written Soviet commitment to ameliorate the disabilities—disabilities rooted in geography—of the unavoidably and unalterably exposed Western position in Berlin. The fact is that although the new agreement was drawn up by the Big Four and is called a "quadrilateral" agreement, the key operative sections of it do not involve mutual undertakings. They hinge entirely on unilateral undertakings by the Soviet Union in its role as patron of East Germany. Given the geography, it could be no other way.

One of the key sections governs West German access to the city: Moscow undertakes to assure that access will be "unimpeded." This is vital because East Germany has always sought to use its physical control of the ground across which access must take place to extract West German recognition of it as a sovereign state. West Germany, unwilling to drop its dream of ultimate German reunification, has refused to grant such recognition. The making of the new agreement signifies Moscow's commendable, not to say historic, decision to have no more international access crises of the sort which characterized the cold war. No one should ignore, however, that in the working out of the specifics of access, as the Big Four have instructed

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"competent German authorities" to do, there is the stuff of months of haggling: East Germans will, again try to translate control of the ground into recognition. West Germans will continue to hold back.

The second key leverage, and again one entirely dependent on Soviet leverage, commits Moscow to let the people of West Berlin expand their now-minimal contacts with East Berliners and other East Germans. This is the issue symbolized by the Berlin Wall, erected 10 years ago to prevent East Germans from fleeing their country and thereby to force them to reconcile themselves to it. Recognizing correctly that reunification lies beyond a remote horizon, West Germans have sought instead to ease the human costs of German division. This explains their determination to start to break through the Berlin Wall with more visits, communications, etc. East Germans, fearing perhaps not so much the renewed flight of their citizenry as the free exchanges which totalitarian societies cannot abide, have wanted to keep the Wall intact—or at least to sell openings in it dear. "Competent German authorities" are to hammer out the details of passage through the Wall, too.

We would not be surprised if inter-German nego-

tiations on this issue make negotiations on access look simple. Problems of access tend to start out as trivial or abstract and when they get important or real, the big powers step in. But problems of passage through the Wall are human and emotional, and must be managed by Germans themselves. The Wall brings the fundamental issue of the division of Europe to life in a way which no document or concept can.

We are, then, eager to commend the Big Four and especially their diplomats who wrote the agreement. Whatever else may be said about negotiation as against confrontation, it reduces the immediate physical dangers—in this instance, a precious achievement—and it makes most people feel more hopeful. We are not inclined, however, as some American officials apparently are, to hail the agreement as a triumph of American diplomacy in which Washington held firm and got more from Moscow than it gave. Such crowing is not only indiscreet but premature. It will take years for events to reveal if this agreement, and the further diplomatic projects it will facilitate, will help recreate a single harmonious Europe or whether the agreement will contribute to perpetuating—perhaps in a softer and thereby more endurable form—the two blocs formed after the war.

LE MONDE, Paris
25 August 1971

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Un quart de siècle de « provisoire »

1944

12 SEPTEMBRE ET 14 NOVEMBRE : les protocoles de Londres (confirmés à Yalta et complétés le 26 juillet 1945) qui définissent les futures zones d'occupation de l'Allemagne prévoient « une région spéciale de Berlin » qui sera confiée à une « Kommandatura » inter-alliée.

1945

23 AVRIL : les armées soviétiques occupent Berlin.

8 MAI : capitulation du III^e Reich.

1-3 JUILLET : entrée des Occidentaux dans leurs secteurs de Berlin coïncidant avec l'évacuation par les Anglo-Américains des positions occupées en Saxe et en Thuringe au-delà de la ligne de démarcation arrêtée à Londres.

2 AOUT : fin de la conférence de Potsdam.

30 AOUT : première séance du Conseil de contrôle allié responsable de l'administration de l'ensemble de l'Allemagne.

22 NOVEMBRE : les Quatre déclinent des couloirs entre Berlin et les zones occidentales et créent un centre pour la sécurité des vols (C.S.A.).

1946

20 OCTOBRE : élection à Berlin d'une assemblée municipale unique.

1947

24 JUIN : l'assemblée municipale élit M. Reuter (social-démocrate) au poste de bourgmestre, mais le commandant russe s'oppose à ce choix en usant du droit de veto.

1948

20 MARS : le maréchal Sokolovski quitte le Conseil de contrôle pour protester contre les entretiens séparés sur le problème allemand qui ont réuni, en février, à Londres, les trois Occidentaux et le Benelux.

21 JUIN : réforme monétaire dans les zones occidentales. Deux jours plus tard, réforme monétaire en zone soviétique.

24 JUIN : les Soviétiques interrompent toute circulation routière et ferroviaire vers Berlin-Ouest.

25 OCTOBRE : résolution du Conseil de sécurité (saisi par les Etats-Unis) demandant la levée immédiate du blocus. Veto

6 SEPTEMBRE : l'assemblée municipale, qui avait son siège dans le secteur oriental, est envahie par des manifestants d'extrême gauche. Elle se réfugiera (sans les communistes) en secteur américain.

30 NOVEMBRE : les Soviétiques convoquent, à l'Opéra de Berlin, situé dans leur secteur, une assemblée révolutionnaire qui vote la déchéance de la municipalité régulièrement élue et désigne un nouveau bourgmestre : Friedrich Ebert.

5 DECEMBRE : Ernst Reuter est élu, à l'unanimité, bourgmestre de Berlin-Ouest.

1949

FEBVRIER : des contacts sont amorcés à l'ONU sur Berlin. Une conférence des quatre ministres des affaires étrangères est convoquée.

4 AVRIL : conclusion du pacte atlantique.

4 MAI : un communiqué des Quatre annonce que le blocus sera levé le 12 mai.

8 MAI : adoption de la « loi fondamentale » de la R.F.A., précédant de peu l'adoption de la Constitution de la R.D.A.

1952

26 MAI : signature des accords de Bonn, donnant une nouvelle marge de souveraineté à l'Allemagne fédérale, et de Paris, qui rendent possible son réarmement.

1953

5 MARS : mort de Staline.

16 JUIN : manifestations ouvrières à Berlin-Est.

1954

25 JANVIER-18 FEBVRIER : conférence des Quatre à Berlin, sans résultats en ce qui concerne le problème allemand.

1955

5 MAI : entrée en vigueur des accords de Paris autorisant le réarmement de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest au sein du pacte atlantique.

1956

27 JANVIER : entrée de la R.D.A. dans le pacte de Varsovie.

1957

6 OCTOBRE : M. Willy Brandt est élu bourgmestre de Berlin-Ouest.

1958
27 NOVEMBRE : note soviétique proposant la transformation de Berlin-Ouest en « ville libre » dans un délai de six mois. Elle est rejetée par les Occidentaux le 31 décembre.

1959
10 JANVIER : l'Union soviétique propose la signature d'un traité de paix avec les deux Allemagnes.

11 MAI-5 AOÛT : conférence à quatre à Genève, sans résultats. (Des délégations des deux Allemagnes y siègent à titre d'observateurs.)

1960
16 MAI : conférence « au sommet » avortée à Paris.

1961
3 JUIN : Vienne — entretien Kennedy-Khrouchtchev, l'Union soviétique demande la signature d'un traité de paix allemand et la transformation de Berlin-Ouest en ville libre avant la fin de 1961.
13 AOÛT : pour enrayer l'exodo des citoyens de R.D.A., les au-

torités est-allemandes entreprennent la construction du « mur de Berlin ».

19 SEPTEMBRE : M. Spaak, ancien secrétaire général de l'OTAN, qui est favorable à la conciliation, se rend à Moscou sur la demande de M. Khrouchtchev, qui laisse entendre qu'il n'insistera pas.

17 OCTOBRE : M. Khrouchtchev confirme cette position devant le 22^e Congrès du P.C.U.S.

1962
11 SEPTEMBRE : M. Khrouchtchev menace de nouveau de signer un traité de paix séparé. La crise provoquée par la présence des fusées soviétiques à Cuba à la fin d'octobre mettra définitivement un terme à ses pressions.

1963
17 DECEMBRE : accord entre le Sénat de Berlin-Ouest et la R.D.A. sur l'octroi de laissez-passer aux Berlinois de l'Ouest pour les fêtes de Noël.

1964
16 OCTOBRE : chute de M. Khrouchtchev.

1966
OCTOBRE : les négociations sur les laissez-passer sont ajournées « sine die ».

10 NOVEMBRE : M. Kiesinger devient chancelier d'Allemagne fédérale, M. Brandt vice-chancelier et ministre des affaires étrangères.

1968
26 AVRIL : M. Schütz, nouveau bourgmestre de Berlin-Ouest, est refoulé par les autorités est-allemandes à la sortie de la ville.

11 JUIN : la R.D.A. décide d'imposer l'obligation de passeports et de visas pour les déplacements par voie de terre entre la République fédérale et Berlin. Protestation des alliés.

1969
FÉVRIER : la perspective de l'élection présidentielle ouest-allemande, qui doit se dérouler, comme les précédentes, début mars à Berlin-Ouest, provoque un regain de tension.

10 JUILLET : M. Gromyko déclare devant le Soviet suprême que l'U.R.S.S. serait disposée à des échanges de vues sur Berlin.

21 OCTOBRE : M. Willy Brandt devient chancelier.

16 DECEMBRE : les Trois, qui avaient fait une première démarche le 7 août, remettent trois notes identiques au Kremlin. Ils lui suggèrent d'ouvrir une discussion pour améliorer la situation à Berlin. Les Soviétiques notifieront leur accord le 10 février suivant.

1970
26 MARS : première rencontre à quatre depuis 1959 : les trois ambassadeurs occidentaux à Bonn et l'ambassadeur d'U.R.S.S. en R.D.A. se réunissent à Berlin.

12 AOÛT : traité germano-soviétique. M. Brandt se rend à Moscou.

3-4 DECEMBRE : réunion du Conseil de l'OTAN. Le communiqué final indique que la tenue de la conférence sur la sécurité européenne, réclamée par l'U.R.S.S., est subordonnée à un arrangement sur Berlin.

7 DECEMBRE : traité germano-polonais.

VERS LE 15 DECEMBRE : M. Brandt adresse un message aux Trois, demandant que les pourparlers soient accélérés.

LE MONDE, Paris
25 August 1971

CPYRGHT

LE RÈGLEMENT DU PROBLÈME DE BERLIN

Vingt-six ans après la fin de la guerre, on se demande encore par quelle aberration Soviétiques et Occidentaux s'enfermèrent dans cette solution bâtarde, grosse de tous les conflits possibles, par laquelle les seconds allaient soutenir à bout de bras, à plus de 200 kilomètres derrière ce qui allait devenir le « rideau de fer », une portion de ville dont les accès seraient tenus à merci par les premiers. Sans doute les Américains croyaient-ils encore sincèrement à la possibilité d'une coexistence harmonieuse entre les vainqueurs de la veille. Conscients de la valeur symbolique qu'aurait leur présence, aux côtés de leurs autres alliés, dans

l'ancienne capitale de Hitler, ils n'hésitèrent pas, appliquant à la lettre, contre l'avis de Churchill, les accords de Londres et de Yalta sur la délimitation des zones d'occupation, à céder en contrepartie à leurs partenaires une portion de la Saxe et de la Thuringe conquise par leurs troupes et qui constitue aujourd'hui une importante partie de la R.D.A. Quant à Staline, sans doute ne jugea-t-il pas possible de s'opposer à ses alliés sur ce point et de conserver pour lui tout seul cette ville que ses troupes avaient enlevée de haute lutte en avril 1945. Mais il vit le premier les avantages et les inconvénients de ce « provisoire » qui, bien évidemment, allait durer longtemps.

Personne, pourtant, ne pouvait s'estimer satisfait. Certes, Staline pensait avoir profité de la situation très vulnérable de la ville pour faire pression sur les Occidentaux et obtenir d'eux des concessions

ailleurs. Mais, en même temps, Berlin-Ouest était devenu une vitrine insolente du capitalisme au cœur du monde austère du socialisme, une épine au flanc de la R.D.A. et plus généralement du « glacis » laborieusement constitué par Moscou en Europe orientale. Comme les Occidentaux, engagés par la force des choses à défendre la « liberté de deux millions de Berlinois » ne pouvaient reculer, le conflit était inévitable.

La ville affronta en vingt-cinq ans deux principaux assauts d'un caractère très différent. Lors du blocus de 1948-1949, suite de la réforme monétaire décidée en Allemagne de l'Ouest, Staline voulait déloger les Occidentaux de leurs secteurs, mais sans chercher à compliquer une situation juridique déjà inextricable : l'arrêt des communications fut justifié par le besoin d'effectuer des « réparations » sur les voies d'accès, non pas par des demandes politiques précises. A partir de 1958, au contraire, M. Khrouchtchev posa le problème au fond :

d'abord en accusant les Occidentaux d'avoir, par leurs violations des accords de Potsdam, « scié la branche sur laquelle ils étaient assis » et en demandant la transformation de Berlin-Ouest en « ville libre démilitarisée », puis en menaçant, à défaut, de signer dans un délai fixé un traité qui donnerait à l'Allemagne de l'Est la souveraineté sur les voies d'accès.

La menace du traité de paix séparé a dominé les relations Est-Ouest pendant près de quatre ans. En 1961, le chef du gouvernement soviétique annonce même à Kennedy, pendant les entretiens « au sommet » de Vienne, que ce traité sera signé avant

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la fin de l'année en cours. Les nuages s'accumulent, cet été-là, avec l'érection du mur (seul résultat tangible, mais combien déterminant, de cette seconde crise) puis avec la reprise à grande échelle des essais nucléaires soviétiques, tandis que le président américain rappelle des réservistes. En septembre, M. « K », comme il 'avait d'ailleurs promis, « refroidit l'acier qu'il avait chauffé » en atténuant ses exigences quant à la date. Mais c'est toujours à Berlin qu'il pense lorsque, en 1962, il décide d'installer des fusées à Cuba. Si tout s'était déroulé selon ses plans, le renversement de la situation stratégique provoqué par ce « coup de

En fait, il faudra attendre encore plusieurs années pour voir s'amorcer une discussion sérieuse. Contrairement à une opinion répandue, le changement d'atmosphère n'est pas lié seulement à l'Ostpolitik du chancelier Brandt, puisque c'est en juillet 1969, trois mois avant l'arrivée des socialistes au pouvoir à Bonn, que M. Gromyko fait les pre-

poker » aurait amené le président américain, lors d'une rencontre « au sommet » prévue pour novembre, à faire les concessions décisives. L'échec de toute l'opération, en octobre 1962, enterre tous ces plans. Le problème de Berlin est, dès lors, mûr pour entrer dans « l'ère des négociations ».

mières « ouvertures ». Mais ce n'est que bien plus tard, au printemps 1971, et après plus d'un an de discussions à quatre, que les choses se dégèlent vraiment. Il ne s'agit plus alors de modifier radicalement le statu quo, comme Moscou le demandait naguère, mais de l'aménager en ajustant laborieusement les positions des uns et des autres. Il n'y aura donc, en principe, ni vainqueurs ni vaincus, mais les anomalies nées de vingt-cinq ans de guerre froide, à commencer par celle du mur, ne disparaîtront pas de sitôt. Quel que soit l'accord, Berlin-~~Ouest restera une enclave isolée dans un monde hostile.~~

MICHEL TATU.

October 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

Soviet Leaders Pack Traveling Bags. The recent expansion of Chinese diplomatic activity in the European area as well as the possibility of some sort of U.S.-Chinese rapprochement have frightened the Soviets into a flurry of diplomatic visits of their own. Thus, it has gradually come to light that Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Nicolai Podgorny have scheduled an active itinerary that will carry one or another of them to Yugoslavia, Algeria, France, Canada, North Vietnam, Iran and other areas (see attached New York Times account). Some observers have noted incidentally that Communist Party Chief Brezhnev is beginning to play a more dominant role in foreign policy and diplomacy than Kosygin, the head of government.

The Soviets have shown special sensitivity to China's quiet campaign to "win friends and influence people" in the Communist Balkan states of Romania and Yugoslavia (both of which maintain relations with China) and to China's efforts at reinforcing its ties with the long-time Balkan ally, Albania. The fact that all five countries concerned profess adherence to a common Marxist-Leninist ideology, albeit with diverging interpretations, makes the Soviets more nervous than do Chinese initiatives elsewhere in Europe. Thus, the recent visit of a Chinese military delegation to Albania and Romania, and the persistent rumor of a visit to the Balkan area by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (or some other high level representative) have made this area the center of Soviet pressure and propaganda attention, with accusations (met with counter-accusations) that the Chinese are trying to form some sort of anti-Soviet Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest-Peking axis. It will be of considerable interest to see how this extension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry into the Balkans develops in coming months.

* * * * *

Czech Underground Makes Election Plea. The activities of an underground opposition in Czechoslovakia calling itself the "Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens" occasionally come to the attention of the west. Most recently, the Movement distributed a secretly produced leaflet urging citizens to boycott the November general elections as a protest against the present Soviet-installed regime. The elections have been arranged by the regime as one more necessary step in the "normalization" procedure. Earlier this year, as part of the procedure, the regime mounted the second 14th Party Congress in place of the legal one held in August 1968 in the teeth of the Soviet invasion. At the latter Congress Husak, completely reversing his stand from that he took at the time of the invasion, personally thanked Brezhnev for the Soviet intervention,

and Brezhnev again mouthed his claim that thousands of Czechs had invited the Soviets to invade their country.

The last general elections were held in 1964 and those scheduled for 1968 were cancelled because of the invasion. The new "normalization" elections will be held 26-27 November, and in normal Communist style will be rigged with carefully chosen candidates and no competition for positions permitted. Although the regime cannot be sure that the population will turn out in sufficient numbers to give the appearance of widespread support for the regime, it is exerting every effort to mobilize the people to go to the polls. With a monopoly over all means of coercion and persuasion, the regime may succeed, while the underground opposition will make its own effort to prevent the sham from succeeding. Attached is an account of the appearance in Prague of the underground's leaflet. Attached also is a newsletter produced by the underground movement shortly before the third (1971) anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which, among other things, the Movement exposes the fraudulence of the second 14th Party Congress. A copy of the original Czech newsletter, which was translated and published in the Italian socialist newspaper Avanti, is included with the translation.

* * * * *

Morality - Swedish Government Style. The flexibility of Swedish official morality was nicely demonstrated in the Swedish government's handling of the Nobel Prize award to the famous Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The incident is described in a newly-published book, Middle Man in Moscow, by the Norwegian journalist Per Egil Hegge who, after being posted to Moscow for a number of years, was expelled last February.

Reportedly Solzhenitsyn did not want to go to Stockholm to receive his award for fear that he would not be permitted to return to his homeland. There was a possibility, however, that he could receive his award in Moscow, in the Swedish Embassy---and it is this episode of Hegge's book that is discussed in the attached news accounts. Briefly, Solzhenitsyn inquired whether the award ceremony could be held at the Embassy. After a time the answer was given that it could not---that he could not even be invited to the Embassy. The real reason for rejecting Solzhenitsyn was that the Swedish government did not want to risk offending the Soviet regime. The Swedish government finally went so far as to suggest to Solzhenitsyn that if he came uninvited to the Embassy, he would not be turned away!

When confronted with Hegge's account, Swedish Premier Olof Palme did not deny its accuracy, but rather lamely explained that

asking Solzhenitsyn to the Swedish Embassy might be regarded by the Soviet government as an anti-Soviet "manifestation."

There is something instructive in the spectacle of Sweden castigating the United States for its "immorality," particularly (but not only) for its involvement in Vietnam, and yet not giving a second thought to the immorality of disavowing a free voice like Solzhenitsyn's in order to placate a regime dedicated to eliminating free voices.

* * * * *

Chile's Free Press in Danger. President Allende's recent bitter attack on the independent, prestigious Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio, and his subsequent announcement that he would close down United Press International in Chile for transmitting information considered damaging to Chile abroad, again point up the threat posed by this Marxist government to freedom of the press in Chile. El Mercurio is the oldest and one of the most respected Spanish-language newspapers in the hemisphere, and it has been the target of government pressures and economic coercion since the Allende regime took office.

The attempts of the government to stifle it are typical of the Allende government's action in other sectors, all of which is designed to enable the government to carry out its programs without opposition and to give the regime complete control over all aspects of Chilean life. It parallels the government's efforts to abolish the bicameral legislature and replace it with a "people's assembly," and also its attempts to do away with the present judicial system and replace it with "people's tribunals;" it is in line with the changes made in the educational system which are designed to indoctrinate children with Marxist ideology, as well as the government's control and use of organized labor as an instrument toward achieving its goals.

Although Allende has attacked the UPI on several occasions, it is believed that the expulsion action is part of the larger and still building campaign aimed at silencing or taking over El Mercurio, which is vital as a major bastion of the free press in Chile. If it is taken over or put out of business completely, then the Allende government will have attained effective control of all the Chilean press, and the free press everywhere will have suffered .

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12 September 1971

Soviet Union:

Busy, Busy Keeping Up With the Thoughts Of Mao

The Soviet Union, in recent months, has watched with concern as its Communist rival, China, accelerated a global drive for prestige and world recognition. The Russians have been particularly worried over United States-Chinese rapprochement, President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking and China's effort to strengthen her position throughout the world and weaken that of Moscow.

Last week it became apparent that the Soviet Union had determined to strike back with a diplomatic campaign of remarkably broad dimensions. Moscow's motivation appeared to be one of countering Peking's rising influence and increasing its own wherever possible. The campaign took several forms.

There was an effort to rein China in by a sudden propaganda offensive.

There was a flurry of diplomatic activity seeking to improve Soviet relations in many areas—for example, with Hanoi—at China's expense.

There was a double-barreled campaign aimed at the United States. Moscow was seeking on the one hand to maintain and improve Soviet relations with Washington, thus preventing a further American drift toward China. On the other hand, it was trying to take advantage of any possible weak points. It had hastened to sign a new treaty with India, cashing in on India's concern over East Pakistan and American and Chinese support for West Pakistan. It also was going to attempt to profit by the strain in United States-Japanese relations caused by Mr. Nixon's China-trip plans and his new economic policy.

One possibility which emerged from the Kremlin early this week of a tacking of Premier Kosygin



Premier Kosygin: a traveling man.

and President Nixon in late October—a Soviet attempt to trump China's Nixon-trip ace.

There was no certainty that a United States-Soviet summit will be forthcoming. But the logistics of a suddenly arranged trip by Mr. Kosygin to Canada on Oct. 18 suggested that it may be in the offing. Russia has announced a major campaign in the United Nations for a world disarmament proposal. A Kosygin visit to the United Nations had a coincidental meeting with Mr. Nixon's Secretary of State. That is only one of the items

on the Kremlin's travel schedule. No fewer than seven major foreign trips have been unveiled by Moscow's Big Three—Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin and Premier Nikolai V. Podgorny.

Mr. Brezhnev is going to Yugoslavia as part of a Soviet pressure drive in the Balkans that already has caused deep concern in Rumania—whose independent course has, conversely, been a growing irritant to the Kremlin.

Hanoi to try to cash in on North

Vietnam's concern over the United States-Chinese détente.

Mr. Kosygin is going to Algeria, apparently to counter any Algerian drift toward Peking.

Mr. Brezhnev is visiting France, hoping to strengthen ties in Western Europe.

Mr. Kosygin will undertake the same assignment in Norway and Denmark.

In mid-October, Mr. Podgorny will go to Iran.

On top of all this, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is making a sudden trip to Moscow, close on the heels of the successful Berlin agreement. And Soviet diplomats are increasingly active in the Middle East and have been engaged in quiet efforts to improve relations with Israel.

As for relations with the United States, Soviet negotiators were trying to reach agreements on ABM rules and a limitation on strategic missiles. And last week it was announced that American and Soviet negotiators would meet in Moscow Oct. 12 to try to bring an end to the dangerous naval game of "chicken"—overly close mutual surveillance—that warships and planes of the two nations have been playing on the high seas.

An ominous accompaniment to the Soviet diplomatic campaign is an increase in Soviet-Chinese border tensions after an 18-month lull. There are diplomatic reports suggesting that the long and unproductive border negotiations between the Russians and Chinese that were begun in Peking in October, 1969—shortly after the two powers narrowly averted full-scale war—had broken down completely. Leonid F. Ilyichev, the Soviet negotiator, is known to have been in Moscow recently—supposedly for a vacation.

With an estimated 1,000,000 troops still concentrated on either side of the frontier, the possibility of new clashes and tensions cannot be excluded. The Chinese have not ceased building nuclear air-raid shelters in large cities and stockpiling food and arms in every village. The Russians have removed none of their crack nuclear-armed forces from the frontier and have, in fact, employed the time to construct permanent hardened fortifications and jump-off points at convenient locales along the border.

—HARRISON E. SALISBURY

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WASHINGTON STAR
9 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Russian Wanderlust

Top Soviet leaders will be familiar faces in many capitals around the world in the next few months. Premier Alexei Kosygin will turn up in Canada, Algeria, Norway and Denmark. Party chief Leonid Brezhnev has scheduled visits to France and Yugoslavia. President Nikolai Podgorny will be going to France (with Brezhnev) and North Vietnam. For good measure, the Russians first will receive an unexpectedly early visit from West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.

The list may not be complete. An intriguing outgrowth of Kosygin's Ottawa visit might be his showing up at the United Nations General Assembly, setting up the circumstances for a meeting with President Nixon reminiscent of the 1967 Kosygin-Johnson session at Glassboro, New Jersey.

The unprecedented scope of the Russians' travel preparations is far from purposeless. The diplomatic offensive is linked to many of the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives.

An over-all aim undoubtedly is to counter the effects of Communist China's emergence from diplomatic isolation and particularly the drama of the planned visit of Mr. Nixon to Peking. Undercutting Chinese influence also will be one of Podgorny's duties in Hanoi.

The Russians also will be pushing their proposals for a world disarmament conference, a European security confer-

ence that would solidify the post-World War II territorial changes in Eastern Europe and a reduction of armed forces in Central Europe. In all this it is no secret that the Soviets hope to reduce the American presence and influence in Europe, and enhance their own standing. With respect to Canada, Moscow welcomes our northern neighbor's gestures of independence from us.

The outgoing diplomacy of the Russians nevertheless should provide the Western democracies with chances to encourage those aspects of Kremlin policy that would contribute to a relaxation of world tensions. The four-power agreement on access to Berlin can be followed by broader agreements contributing to the stability of Europe and undermining the Brezhnev doctrine of heavy-handed Soviet bossism in the East. The Russians want more commercial and technological links with the West, and such peaceful intercourse could be helpful. There should be no attempt to exploit Soviet paranoia about Chinese intentions, lest a blow-up between the chief Communist rivals lead to an unstoppable conflagration.

So whatever mischievous aims might be part of the Soviet travel spree, there may be off-setting opportunities for promoting East-West harmony and reducing the justification for armed confrontation around the world.

WASHINGTON POST
8 September 1971

Pattern of World Activity

CPYRGHT

Reds Plan Trips, Include Canada

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

A week's visit by Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin to Canada starting Oct. 12 was announced yesterday, expanding an extraordinary schedule of global travel by the Kremlin's leaders this fall.

In the coming three months, an unprecedented volume of journeying through Europe, to the Mediterranean,

Asia, and now North America, is to be divided among Kosygin, Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev and President Nikolai V. Podgorny.

One major purpose for the crammed travel schedule, Western experts believe, is to compete with, and overshadow, China's new thrust onto the world scene, to which the United States is responding. The current schedule of Soviet visits abroad will display a pattern of intense Kremlin activity in advance of the projected—and still undated—meeting in Peking between President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

At the same time, the Soviet Union is moving toward other interlocking objectives, American officials noted. Moscow is gaining formal ratification of the post-World War II territorial changes that spread its power in Eastern Europe and it is working to create a mood of détente in Western Europe to reduce reliance on the United States. Moscow's leaders are also reaching out to cement Soviet relationships with unaligned nations and with Western nations, such as Canada, which want to counterbalance the weight of the United States.

Brezhnev stated on June 11 that the Soviet Union, in its "peace" offensive projected by the Soviet 24th Party Congress last March, was recognizing "the changed balance of forces in the world—both socio-political and military."

The United States, Brezhnev claimed, is now suffering from "the negative economic and political consequences of the unrestrained arms race" and costly "imperialism" in Indo-

china and elsewhere.

The Soviet Union, in pursuit of its current theme as the prime protector of world peace, is now preparing a new public appeal for a world disarmament conference, diplomats in Moscow reported yesterday. That also was projected by Brezhnev in March.

Western diplomats believe that one reason for the impending call for a world disarmament conference is to underscore differences between Moscow's "positive" policies and Peking's "negative ones. China, to the surprise of no one, recently rejected a Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear nations.

The newly announced Kosygin visit to Canada also has a China counter-point factor as well as an American one: The Peking government's first ambassador to Canada arrived in Ottawa six weeks ago.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced in Ottawa yesterday that Kosygin will visit Canada for seven or eight days beginning Oct. 18. Trudeau extended the invitation when he visited the Soviet Union in May.

At that time, Trudeau said his visit to the Soviet Union was motivated by concern that the "overpowering presence" of the United States posed dangers "to our national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even military point of view."

Canada, Trudeau said, sought "to diversify our points of contact with significant powers of the world." In Moscow, Trudeau signed an agreement for regular contacts with the Soviet Union, including meetings once a year at the foreign ministers level, on a pattern similar to the one established between the Soviet

Union and France.

Trudeau said the agreement in no way imperiled Canadian membership in the NATO alliance or its defense arrangements with the United States. But the fact that Canada had withdrawn part of its forces from NATO provided a sounding board for Brezhnev and Kosygin to proclaim that the time has come for the Western powers to join in a conference to reduce East-West forces in Europe.

Soviet sources said yesterday that there is no reason to expect that Kosygin's trip to Canada will be extended into a visit to the United States. Soviet leaders, on the contrary, appear far more interested in demonstrating their ability to be welcomed globally wherever President Nixon may travel.

The announcement in Bonn yesterday that West German Chancellor Willy Brandt later this month will make his second visit to Moscow within 13 months also enhanced the image Moscow seeks to convey of its own diplomatic mobility.

Kosygin will be the highest ranking Soviet official ever to visit Canada. Kosygin is also scheduled to visit Algeria Oct. 8-12 to help reinforce Soviet relations with Arab leaders in the Middle East which have experienced some strain in recent months, especially in the Sudan and Libya. In early December, Kosygin has trips planned to Norway and Denmark, the two Scandinavian members of NATO.

Brezhnev is due to travel to Yugoslavia later this month, and Brezhnev and Podgorny are scheduled to visit France Oct. 21-31. Earlier in October

Podgorny is to visit North Vietnam, a trip which is expected to enable the Soviet Union to capitalize on Hanoi's considerable disquiet about what its other main war supplier, China, will be discussing later with President Nixon.

Diplomatic sources in Moscow yesterday said that the Soviet Union has outlined to many Western and unaligned nations its intended call for a disarmament conference composed of all nations, under U.N. sponsorship.

The conference reportedly would deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons, although substantive nuclear weapons talks—on which the Soviet Union is known to continue to place its priority interest—are now under way with the United States at Helsinki.

Brezhnev projected this conference in March, when he expressed favor for "a world conference to consider disarmament questions to their full extent." At that time he also called for the conference of nuclear powers, the Soviet Union, United States, China, France and Britain—which China publicly rejected on July 30.

Peking, in spurning the offer coldly, said, "At no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks among the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries."

Anthony Astrachan of The Washington Post reported that Viktor L. Issraelyan, No. 2 man in the Soviet mission to the United Nations, met with Secretary General U Thant yesterday to submit a request for an additional item on the agenda of the General Assembly session—on a world disarmament conference.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 August 1971

CPYRGHT

Pawn to Queen 3?

Moscow announces Mr. Podgorny to Hanoi, in October, and thus poses a test in sophistication for all foreign policy watchers.

The reflexive inclination of any American long conditioned by the "cold war" will be to assume that the purpose of the move is to thwart Washington. But to succumb to that temptation means you haven't caught on yet to the intricacies of the new power game.

Obviously, Moscow always enjoys a score off Washington. If it can get an incidental anti-Washington point or two out of the move it will be a dividend. But the thing to notice is that a high-level Chinese military mission was in Bucharest last week encouraging the Romanians to not cave in under Russia's current "war of nerves" against Romania.

From the Russian point of view China is meddling in European affairs. There is an active Chinese diplomacy in Europe. As one veteran diplomat phrases it: for the first time since Genghis Khan, China is playing an active and important role in European affairs. And the purpose is to make life as difficult as possible there for the Russians. China has become Romania's best foreign friend. It is encouraging the Romanians to just as much independence from Russia as it can—without being run over by Russian tanks.

What is Moscow's countermove?

Obviously, to encourage China's Communist neighbors in Asia to more inde-

pendence from Peking. And there are only two of them: North Korea and North Vietnam.

North Korea has already become adept at whipsawing Moscow and Peking against each other, to its own advantage. Hanoi has of late become more dependent on Peking. Its last Russia period was during the bombing around Hanoi and Hai-phong. Only Russia could provide the antiaircraft weapons. So during the bombing Hanoi veered into the Russian camp. Since the bombing it has veered back into the Chinese camp.

So now Moscow's best available way to try to counteract Chinese diplomacy in Bucharest is to practice more Russian diplomacy in Hanoi.

For Washington, it's something to watch with fascination. And there is a lesson in it. This is a new kind of power world. Not everything that happens in it is a "knavish trick" aimed at Washington. Many more are moves and countermoves between Moscow and Peking. Some will be startling in their novelty. Don't be surprised, for example, if some fine day Moscow suddenly makes up with Israel and resumes diplomatic relations.

In a two-power world it made some sense for John Foster Dulles to assume that anyone who wasn't for him was against him. In today's new world, even Washington can enjoy at times the luxury of sitting on the sidelines of other peoples' quarrels.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
15 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Leaflet Asks Boycott of Czech Vote

PRAGUE, Sept. 14 (AP)—An underground leaflet circulating here today labeled Czechoslovakia's forthcoming elections a farce and suggested voters boycott them to let the Communist regime know where they stand.

Nonvoting is "politically the most effective method in which a citizen can express his protest against the election farce and the current political situation," declared the type-written sheet bearing the name of a dissident group call-

ing itself the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens.

A Communist Party central committee session has been called for later this week to fix the November dates for Czechoslovakia's first elec-

tions in seven years. One candidate runs for each office in Czechoslovakia.

Nonvoting or invalidating of ballots, the clandestine leaflet maintained, would serve as a message of protest.

AVANTI, Rome
20 August 1971

APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE BY THE OPPOSITION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Secretly Disseminated on the Third Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion

Exactly 3 years ago, on the night between 20 and 21 August 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia started. On the third anniversary of the foreign military occupation, the Czechoslovak Citizens Socialist Movement, an underground organization, issued, in the last few days in defiance of police persecution, the following appeal to the people:

Czechoslovak citizens:

We address ourselves to you again, shortly after the end of that farce called by its organizers the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and which ended -- as we expected -- precisely like a farce. Unlike the real 14th Congress in 1968, this year's farce made no autonomous decisions and it intentionally ignored the basic problems of our country and of our people. Not only did it not protest over the restriction of Czechoslovak sovereignty, but, on the contrary, it expressed gratitude for this. Not only did it not oppose the destruction of political and cultural activity, but, on the contrary, it approved it as the culmination in a process of consolidation.

The incumbent leadership has had itself confirmed in power by that same Brezhnev by whose bayonets it had been installed in office. The delegates' unanimity was supposed to lend this comedy an appearance of legality, in the wake of the arbitrary purges and expulsions. It would appear that one phase is coming to an end. A way is being sought to pass from pure destruction to a pseudopositive policy. If the group in power wants to avoid or, at least, retard the fate that befell Novotny and Gomulka -- or before that, Rakosi -- it must begin to seek ways out of the crisis into which it has led the whole society. Thus, Czechoslovakia is entering a new phase of the crisis slowly and uncertainly, a phase that will be unable to solve any of the existing problems, since it will not be allowed to concern itself with the real causes of the crisis. However, this new phase will be able gradually to open up new possibilities for future social initiatives and thus prepare the ground for transition to subsequent phases in which -- a favorable domestic and foreign situation permitting -- it will be possible to tackle a solution to the Czechoslovak crisis.

Our 28 October 1970 manifesto rejected the motto of "the worse, the better." The Socialist opposition certainly has no need to adopt such a slogan. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the group in power to propagate this attitude.

We would be happy to observe any improvement -- even partial -- in social, political, and cultural conditions. We are in favor of any initiative from the bottom and from the top that might have that kind of result. The possibilities of proposing and exacting such improvements will gradually increase. However, we have no illusions as to the overall results of this kind of process, and much less do we want to foster hopes of this kind in others. Most responsible jobs on all levels are occupied by incapable, unimaginative people, devoid of any capability of thinking, who in their own interest will seek to prevent any improvement in the situation for fear that this might constitute a threat to the positions that they occupy. Together with our entire society, we shall welcome any step, even partial, toward an improvement of the situation. However, as revolutionaries, we consider every partial reform to be part of a process which must prepare an overall change in the situation and open the way to a humane and democratic socialism.

Although the people of this country welcome any change in a positive direction, they cannot let it come about at the cost of falsifying the past and the present, and they cannot allow it to be accompanied by undemocratic, bureaucratic methods of government or by a violation of the rights of man and of the citizen guaranteed by the Czechoslovak Constitution. Nor can we accept the cynical and reality-ignoring practice of "expressing gratitude for fraternal, internationalist aid." Such statements have the same value as the ones issued during the Nazi protectorate "in the name of all the Czech people," in which the attack against Heydrich was condemned, or those from the early 1950's demanding "in the name of the party and of the working people the punishment and destruction of the conspiratorial centers discovered thanks to the vigilance of comrade Stalin and comrade Gottwald."

The present Czechoslovak leaders can tell only each other this kind of lies. But they would do better not to forget their own statements. Dr. Husak was right, when, after August 1968, he had to state that it is not possible to govern long at bayonet point. In time he too will have to be convinced of how right he was. And not he alone. Meanwhile, the series of political trials taking place not only in Prague but also in the provinces continues for the purpose of intimidating public opinion and breaking up any opposition whatsoever.

At the time of the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, a whole group of important communist parties again expressed their disagreement with the 21 August 1968 intervention. Military intervention as a means of solving conflicts within the socialist camp is a method to be condemned, and as such it is continually being rejected by various socialist countries, like China, Yugoslavia, and Romania, and by most of the Western communist parties, like the Italian, the Spanish, the French, the Japanese, the Australian, and so on. These voices cannot remain silent, even if the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a "spiritual Biafra" were to be carried to completion.

Even if every opposition voice in our country were to be reduced to silence by terror and by repression of every legal expression of disagreement, leaving the way clear for the voice of official policy only, the problem of intervention will not cease to exist. However, the urgency of

this problem can be clearly be made known to the outside world to the degree the voices of the Czechoslovak opposition speak out strongly. It is not a question only of expelled or purged communists, who naturally cannot accept the official version of the counterrevolution and need for military intervention. All the other citizens also have the moral duty not to accept the political humiliation of their country and its subjugation after 21 August 1968. If they cannot express their opinion openly, they can at least maintain dignified silence.

In the last few years, 21 August has become a day of protest against the status to which Czechoslovakia has been reduced. This year, too, the people will find adequate ways to express their protest (empty streets, deserted public places). No one will succeed in making 21 August a day of gratitude. It will always remain a symbol of the struggle for the independence of Czechoslovakia and the autonomy of its people.

Elections that will not offer the citizens the slightest possibility for expressing their own true opinions will be held in November. Contrary to the law approved in 1967, the current election laws give the citizens no opportunity to influence the choice of deputies. All that is required of them is the handing over of the electoral certificates for show purposes. Such a plebiscite is unworthy of the people, as is the expected manipulation of the ballots by the election commissions in order to attain the requisite percentage. The most effective form of protest is nonparticipation in this purely formal act.

The general trend in the international situation toward a lessening of international tension and toward polycentrism within the communist camp is favorable to the efforts of the Czechoslovak people. If we have enough tenacity, persistence, and ingenuity, our efforts will be crowned with success in the future.

Let us commit ourselves now to the freedom of the political prisoners and to the end of new political trials!

Let us commit ourselves in the long run to the restoration of the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution!

Let us commit ourselves to the restoration of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and the autonomy of the Czechoslovak citizens!

The Czechoslovak Citizens Socialist Movement

August 1971

AVANTI, Rome
20 August 1971

CPYRGHT

DIFFUSO CLANDESTINAMENTE NEL TERZO
ANNIVERSARIO DELL'INVASIONE SOVIETICA

Appello al popolo dell'opposizione in Cecoslovacchia

La notte fra il 20 e il 21 agosto 1968, esattamente tre anni fa, cominciava l'invasione sovietica della Cecoslovacchia. Nel terzo anniversario della occupazione militare straniera, il «Movimento socialista dei cittadini cecoslovacchi», una organizzazione clandestina, ha diffuso in questi giorni, sfidando le persecuzioni poliziesche, il seguente appello alla popolazione:

Cittadini cecoslovacchi!

Ci rivolgiamo nuovamente a Voi poco dopo la fine di quella farsa che è stata chiamata dai suoi organizzatori XIV Congresso del Partito Comunista Cecoslovacco, e che si è conclusa — come ci si aspettava — appunto come una farsa. A differenza dal vero XIV Congresso dell'anno 1963, la farsa di quest'anno non ha preso nessuna decisione autonoma, ed anzi si è intenzionalmente disinteressata dei fondamentali problemi del nostro paese e del nostro popolo. Non soltanto non ha protestato per la limitazione della sovranità cecoslovacca, ma al contrario ha ringraziato per questo. Non soltanto non si è opposto alla distruzione della vita politica e culturale, ma al contrario l'ha approvata come la conclusione del processo di consolidamento.

L'élite attualmente dominante si è fatta confermare al potere da quello stesso Brezhnev dalle cui baionette è stata insediata. L'unanimità dei delegati dovrebbe conferire alla commedia un'apparenza di legalità, dopo gli arbitri commessi con le epurazioni e le espulsioni. A quanto sembra un'epoca sta finendo: si sta cercando il modo di passare dalla mera distruzione ad una politica pseudo-positiva. L'élite al potere, se vuole scongiurare o perlomeno allontanare il destino toccato a Novotny e Gomulka — o in precedenza a Rakosi — deve cominciare a cercare delle vie d'uscita dalla crisi in cui ha condotto tutta la società. La Cecoslovacchia entra così a passo lento ed incerto in una nuova fase della crisi, fase che non potrà risolvere nessuno dei problemi esistenti già solo per il fatto che non le sarà permesso occuparsi delle autentiche cause della crisi. Tuttavia questa nuova fase potrà gradualmente aprire nuove possibilità ad una futura iniziativa sociale, e così preparare il terreno per il passaggio ad ulteriori fasi in cui — con l'aiuto di una favorevole situazione interna ed estera — si potrà affrontare la soluzione della crisi cecoslovacca.

Il nostro manifesto del 28 ottobre 1970 si è opposto al motto «tanto peggio, tanto meglio». L'opposizione socialista non ha certo bisogno di far proprio un tale motto, mentre al contrario è nell'interesse dell'élite al potere favorire la diffusione di tali sentimenti. Saremo lieti di constatare ogni miglioramento — anche se parziale — delle condizioni sociali, politiche e culturali. Siamo in favore di ogni iniziativa dal basso e dall'alto che possa avere un tale risultato. Le possibilità di proporre e di esigere tali miglioramenti aumenteranno gradualmente. Tuttavia non ci facciamo illusioni sui risultati complessivi di un tale processo, e tanto meno vogliamo alimentare in altri speranze di questo genere. La maggior parte dei posti di responsabilità a tutti i livelli sono occupati da gente incapace, non creativa, priva di ogni capacità di pensare, che nel proprio interesse cercherà d'impedire ogni miglioramento della situazione nel timore che ciò possa costituire una minaccia di spodestarli dalle posizioni occupate. Insieme con tutta la società, accoglieremo con favore ogni passo, anche se parziale, verso un miglioramento della situazione. Tuttavia, come rivoluzionari, consideriamo ogni riforma parziale come parte di un processo che deve preparare un generale mutamento della situazione e aprire la strada alla realizzazione di un socialismo umano e democratico.

I cittadini di questo Paese, pur accogliendo con favore qualsiasi eventuale mutamento in senso positivo, non potranno ammettere che ciò avvenga a prezzo di una falsificazione del passato e del presente, né che sia accompagnato dalla conservazione di metodi di governo antidemocratici e burocratici o dalla violazione dei diritti dell'uomo e del cittadino che sono formalmente assicurati dalla Costituzione cecoslovacca. Non possiamo ammettere neppure il mondo cinico e in completo contrasto con la realtà con cui viene «espressa la riconoscenza per il fraterno aiuto internazionalistico». Tali dichiarazioni hanno lo stesso valore di quelle emanate durante il protettorato sotto il gioco nazista «a nome di tutto il popolo ceco» e in cui si condannava l'attentato contro Heydrich, oppure di quelle in cui, all'inizio degli anni cinquanta, si chiedeva «a nome del partito e del popolo lavoratore la punizione e la distruzione dei centri di complotto scoperti grazie alla vigilanza del compagno Stalin e del compagno Gottwald».

CPYRGHT

Gli attuali dirigenti cecoslovacchi possono raccontare soltanto a se stessi menzogne di questo genere. Ma farebbero meglio a non dimenticare le loro proprie dichiarazioni. Aveva ragione il dr. Husak quando, dopo l'agosto '68, ebbe a dichiarare che non è possibile governare a lungo sulla punta delle baionette. Col tempo si dovrà convincere anche lui di quanto avesse ragione. E non lui soltanto. Intanto continua la serie di processi politici che si svolgono non soltanto a Praga, ma anche in provincia, con lo scopo di intimidire l'opinione pubblica a spezzare qualsiasi opposizione.

In occasione dello svolgimento del XIV Congresso del PCCS tutta una serie d'importanti partiti comunisti ha nuovamente espresso il suo disaccordo con l'intervento del 21 agosto 1968. Il metodo dell'intervento militare come metodo di soluzione dei contrasti all'interno del campo socialista è un metodo da condannare, e come tale viene tuttora ripudiato da vari paesi socialisti, come la Cina, la Jugoslavia e la Romania, e dai maggiori partiti comunisti occidentali, come quello italiano, quello spagnolo, francese, giapponese, australiano, ecc. Queste voci non potranno tacere, anche se la trasformazione della Cecoslovacchia in un « Biafra spirituale » dovesse venire portata a termine.

Anche se ogni voce di opposizione venisse ridotta al silenzio nel nostro Paese dal terrore e dalle repressioni di ogni legale espressione di disaccordo lasciando campo libero all'unica voce della politica ufficiale, questo problema non cesserà tuttavia di esistere. L'urgenza di tale problema può tuttavia essere avvertita dal mondo circostante tanto più chiaramente con quanta più forza risuoneranno le voci provenienti dall'opposizione cecoslovacca. Non si tratta soltanto dei comunisti espulsi o epurati, che naturalmente non possono accettare la versione ufficiale sulla controrivoluzione e sulla necessità dell'intervento militare. Anche tutti gli altri cittadini hanno il dovere morale di non approvare l'umiliazione politica del loro paese e la sua soggezione conseguente al 21 agosto 1968. Se non possono esprimere apertamente la loro opinione, si chiudano almeno in un dignitoso silenzio.

Il 21 agosto è diventato negli ultimi anni una giornata di protesta contro la condizione a cui la Cecoslovacchia è stata ridotta. Anche quest'anno i cittadini troveranno i modi adatti per esprimere la loro protesta (le vie vuote, i pubblici locali disertati). Nessuno riuscirà a fare del 21 agosto un giorno di ringraziamento; esso rimarrà sempre un simbolo della lotta per l'indipendenza della Cecoslovacchia e l'autonomia del suo popolo.

In novembre si svolgeranno delle elezioni che non offriranno ai cittadini la minima possibilità di esprimere le proprie vere opinioni. A differenza della legge approvata nel 1967, le leggi elettorali elaborate attualmente non danno ai cittadini nessuna possibilità d'influenzare la scelta dei deputati. Si pretende da essi solo la consegna puramente dimostrativa dei certificati elettorali. Una tale forma plebiscitaria è indegna di cittadini, così come le previste correzioni delle votazioni all'interno delle commissioni elettorali, che hanno lo scopo di raggiungere in ogni distretto la percentuale necessaria per l'elezione. La più efficace forma di protesta è la non partecipazione a questo atto puramente formale.

La generale tendenza evolutiva della situazione internazionale volge alla diminuzione della tensione internazionale e al policentrismo all'interno del campo comunista, ed è pertanto favorevole agli sforzi del popolo cecoslovacco. Se dimostreremo una sufficiente tenacia, costanza e ingenuità, i nostri sforzi saranno in avvenire coronati dal successo.

Impegnamoci attualmente per la libertà dei prigionieri politici e, per la fine di nuovi processi politici!

Impegnamoci a lunga scadenza per la restaurazione dei diritti civili garantiti dalla costituzione!

Impegnamoci per la restaurazione della sovranità della Cecoslovacchia e dell'autonomia dei cittadini cecoslovacchi!

IL MOVIMENTO SOCIALISTA
DEI CITTADINI CECOSLOVACCHI

Agosto 1971

WASHINGTON STAR
4 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Moscow Site Refused For Author's Nobel

STOCKHOLM (AP) — Sweden's ambassador to Moscow rejected a request from the Nobel Prize-winning Soviet writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, that he be allowed to receive the prize at a ceremony at the embassy in Moscow, a Norwegian journalist says in a book to be published Monday.

Solzhenitsyn, who decided not to go to Stockholm to receive his prize in November, asked the embassy to arrange to have the award presented to him in Mos-

cow, journalist Per Egil Hegge wrote.

"This request which I took up with the Swedish Embassy on behalf of Solzhenitsyn was turned down. The Swedish representatives said such a ceremony would disturb Sweden's good relations with the Soviet Union."

Hegge was later expelled from the Soviet Union. Sweden's ambassador is Gunnar V. Jarring, U.N. mediator in the Middle East.

Ole Joedahl, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, in a statement today confirmed that this was true.

Hegge, whose book is titled "Solzhenitsyn Cannot Come," described how he told the Soviet author of the embassy's refusal of his request.

"Last Nov. 20, I met Solzhenitsyn at a secret meeting place," he recalled. "He came toward me with a broad smile and seemed quite happy. We started

to walk and I showed him where the Swedish Embassy was. When I broke the news that the Swedish Embassy would not receive him, he did not seem surprised and only said, 'Well, that's it.'

"I tried to persuade him to visit the embassy without an invitation, but he replied: 'I do not want to go there. If they do not want to invite me and cannot to talk to them about.'"

NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1971

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Swedish Rebuff to Solzhenitsyn Scored

Special to The New York Times

STOCKHOLM, Sept. 12—The

Swedish Government has been sharply criticized for its refusal to allow the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to be handed over to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in its Moscow Embassy.

The attack was made in a book, "Middle Man in Moscow," published here last week by Per Egil Hegge, a Norwegian journalist and a former correspondent in the Soviet capital.

According to Mr. Hegge, who was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, he had been in touch with several of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends in the summer of 1970. He was the first journalist to interview the Soviet writer after the Nobel Prize announcement was made early in October.

On Oct. 28, Mr. Hegge was approached by one of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends. Mr. Hegge refers to him by a cover name of Ivanov. Ivanov said that the prize-winner wanted to come to the Swedish embassy to discuss with the Ambassador, Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, whether he would be able to go to Stockholm for the Nobel Prize ceremony. Dr. Jarring had at that time temporarily left his mission as United Nations mediator

in the Middle East and was back on his regular post as Swedish Ambassador in Moscow.

Sought Moscow Ceremony

Ivanov also said that Mr. Solzhenitsyn wanted to know whether the embassy could arrange a Nobel Prize ceremony in Moscow for him if he was unable to go to Sweden.

A few days later Mr. Hegge took a walk in Moscow with a Swedish diplomat, whom he calls "A." "A" said he had to forward these inquiries to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in Stockholm. He added that he personally thought that it would be difficult to arrange a Nobel Prize ceremony in the Swedish embassy.

"Remember we are here to maintain good relations with Soviet authorities and a ceremony for the sharply criticized author Solzhenitsyn might be embarrassing," he is reported to have said.

Mr. Hegge said he could understand that but since the prize was normally given to winners by King Gustaf VI Adolf in Stockholm, the Ambassador, who was the king's personal representative might also be able to do it.

In November, Mr. Hegge and "A" met again. "A" said that

Mr. Solzhenitsyn would not receive an invitation to the embassy but that the Ambassador would see him if he came there without invitation. "A" also said that a Nobel Prize ceremony at the embassy was impossible.

This decision had been made on a high Government level in Stockholm. "A" said that he understood that this "did not look very heroic," but that the first duty of the embassy was still to keep up good relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hegge said he reminded the diplomat that Nobel Prizes had been presented to Soviet winners previously by Swedish Ambassadors. He mentioned the literature winner, Mr. Mikhail A. Sholokhov in 1965 and Lev D. Landau, the winner in physics in 1962.

Mr. Hegge said that if the Swedish decision became known outside the Soviet Union the behavior of the Swedish embassy would be widely regarded as diplomatic servility.

On Nov. 20 Mr. Hegge finally met Mr. Solzhenitsyn in person. The meeting was arranged in cloak-and-dagger fashion. Ivanov came first to the meeting place, and after making sure that no suspicious

persons were around Mr. Solzhenitsyn appeared.

Mr. Hegge and Mr. Solzhenitsyn walked toward the Swedish embassy. Mr. Hegge said that the author was not bitter nor even surprised at the Swedish decision. Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that since he would receive no invitation at all since the embassy did not intend to give him the prize he saw no reason for any further talks with the Swedish diplomats. He was said to be disappointed, however, that he would not be able to see the "famous Gunnar Jarring."

Later Mr. Solzhenitsyn was said to have asked the embassy via Mr. Hegge whether the embassy could possibly forward a letter from him to the Secretary of the Swedish Academy, Karl Ragnar Gierow. The embassy reportedly first said no but then reluctantly gave in on the condition that the letter be unsealed so that the embassy could check its contents. The letter eventually reached Mr. Gierow.

Commenting on Mr. Hegge's book, Premier Olof Palme said that Mr. Solzhenitsyn could certainly have received his prize at the embassy if he had consented to do it without a ceremony.

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Sweden and Solzhenitsyn

Sweden's world prestige gains no luster from revelations of the submission by its Government to Soviet cultural policy with regard to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's richly deserved Nobel Prize for Literature.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn, it will be recalled, decided last year not to go to Stockholm to receive his prize for fear the Soviet regime would not let him return to his native land. Now it emerges that Stockholm rejected a suggestion by the author that he be awarded the prize in a ceremony at Sweden's Embassy in Moscow. Premier Olof Palme has explained rather lamely that Mr. Solzhenitsyn could have gotten the prize at the embassy without a ceremony, but "a ceremony at the embassy might have been interpreted as a political manifestation against the Soviet Union."

It does not appear to have occurred to Premier Palme that his veto of the ceremony could also be interpreted as a political manifestation, one signifying subservience to the Soviet Government's literary-political standards and implying at least partial repudiation of the judgment of the Nobel Prize committee in honoring Mr. Solzhenitsyn. No similar concern seems to have bothered the Stockholm regime in repeatedly denouncing the United States on the Vietnam war and in giving haven to American deserters. Apparently the risks of offending Washington and Moscow are weighed on different scales in Stockholm.

WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1971

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ALLENDE TO CLOSE CHILE UPI OFFICE

**Allende to Close
Chile UPI Office**

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 15
(AP)—President Salvador Allende announced tonight that he would close the United Press International office in Chile.

He said the wire service had transmitted information he described as damaging to Chile abroad—specifically, a story that appeared in a Santiago newspaper this morning.

The story quoted the Bogota newspaper El Tiempo as saying that Colombian intelligence agents were investigating the possibility that a Chilean government plane reported missing last month over the Colom-

bia-Ecuador border was carrying "arms and subversive texts" destined for Colombian Communist subversives.

Allende spoke at a rally called by the Communist-controlled Workers Confederation to support his government against alleged "seditious" plots.

In New York, the UPI said it would have no comment.

DIARIO LAS AMERICAS, Miami
17 September 1971

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FUE CERRADALA UPI EN CHILE

SANTIAGO (Chile), Sept. 16 (UPI)—El presidente de la República, Salvador Allende, hablando anoche en una concentración pública organizada por la Central Unica de Trabajadores, anunció la decisión de su Gobierno de cerrar la agencia de noticias United Press International (UPI).

Allende fundamentó su decisión a raíz de un despacho transmitido por UPI trascribiendo una información del diario El Tiempo, de Bogotá, que se refería al avión de investigaciones actualmente perdido en la ruta Colombia-Ecuador.

Allende acusó también a United Press International de haber estado reproduciendo informaciones falsas e interesadas que publican diarios en el exterior y que dan una imagen falsa de su Gobierno.

Concretamente Allende se refirió a informaciones transmitidas sobre una supuesta entrevista que habría sostenido en Bogotá con el senador Ignacio Vives Echeverría, de ese país, actualmente procesado; y en Lima con el derrocado ex-presidente boliviano Juan José Torres.

Allende manifestó que había ordenado al Ministro del Interior, José Toha, que citara a su despacho al presidente de la Asociación de Corresponsales Extranjeros para darle a conocer la decisión de su gobierno contra United Press International.

El Presidente Allende manifestó que al regresar de su reciente viaje a Ecuador, Colombia y Perú se había impuesto de una campaña para distorsionar la realidad chilena, y agregó:

"A lo largo de mi recorrido (por esos 3 países) una agencia informativa que tiene un representante en Chile se destacó por las noticias falsas que ha propalado. Quiero que ustedes lo sepan. Se dijo que yo había tenido una entrevista a altas horas de la noche con un senador colombiano que tiene un proceso de esclarecimiento por de-

terminadas actuaciones en las Fuerzas Armadas de ese país, pretendiendo vincular mis conversaciones con eso político en la oscuridad, tenebrosamente. Falso, de faldad absoluta.

"Se dijo después que en el Perú yo había recibido al ex presidente de Bolivia. Ni me pidió audiencia, ni lo recibí, ni lo conozco. Si lo hubiera recibido, me habría bastado cinco minutos para decirle la responsabilidad que también tiene en el proceso que se desarrolla en su propia patria.

"Por eso es que no me extraña que hoy día aquí se haya reproducido un artículo de un diario colombiano. En ese artículo, que no voy a leer porque es muy extenso, se afirma, oíganlo bien, que la avioneta de investigaciones lamentablemente perdida en la selva, lo que significó la pérdida de la vida de tres funcionarios honestos, estaba destinada a llevar armas, agregando que esa avioneta ya cumplió la tarea que yo le había impuesto y que ahora había regresado a Chile, y que no hay constancia de que haya desaparecido. Y el dolor de los familiares y el ataque a una institución del estado, como es Investigaciones.

"El problema es crear un clima de dudas frente a la actuación del compañero de ustedes que recorrió esos países llevando el pensamiento del pueblo, pero representando a la inmensa mayoría de los chilenos, hablando con un lenguaje de claridad, pero respetando por cierto a los gobernantes y las instituciones de esos países.

"Por eso, yo le he dicho hoy al Ministro del Interior que llame a los representantes de los corresponsales extranjeros y les diga que mi decisión es cerrar la agencia United Press Information (SIC) en Chile. El juego es turbio y cobarde, porque aquí reproducen los diarios los infundios que quieren crear para atacar contra el gobierno y contra Chile."

DIARIO LAS AMERICAS, Miami
17 September 1971

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COMENZO NUEVO ATAQUE CONTRA "EL MERCURIO"

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SANTIAGO (Chile) Sept. 16 (UPI) --La Cámara de Diputados realizó una sesión especial para debatir lo que parlamentarios de izquierda calificaron de persecución política e ideológica del diario El Mercurio en contra de sus trabajadores.

La sesión fue convocada por parlamentarios de la Unidad Popular, de Gobierno, a raíz del despido de cinco empleados de El Mercurio, incluyendo dos periodistas. También se trataron problemas laborales en otros ór-

ganos de difusión.

El diputado socialista, Luis Espinoza, dijo que El Mercurio se ha convertido "en el ventilador de la sedición" y que "ha pisoteado la libertad de expresión y menoscabado las conquistas logradas por sus trabajadores".

Agregó que en el interior del diario hay grupos armados y dijo que "la indigestión política y mental que afecta a El Mercurio se debe al hecho de que no puede seguir accionando su imperio".

El diputado demócrata cristiano, José Monares, expresó que "la defensa que se está haciendo de los trabajadores despedidos de El Mercurio es una cortina de humo para controlar los medios de información".

Domingo Godoy, del Partido Nacional, de derecha, dijo a su vez que los trabajadores fueron despedidos por deslealtad a la empresa. Calificó a El Mercurio de serlo, independiente y responsable y agregó que se advierte en el país "una escalada de la Unidad Popular en contra de

la libertad de prensa para establecer la dictadura del proletariado".

Ayer El Mercurio denunció que se estaba ejerciendo presión contra el diario y que los cinco empleados fueron despedidos porque "no alaban" contra la autoridad de la empresa.

Ayer periodistas de diarios y radios de izquierda realizaron un desfile desde la sede del Colegio de Periodistas hasta el local del diario El Mercurio, para protestar por el despido de los cinco empleados.

PRENSA LATINA, Santiago
17 September 1971

EL MERCURIO COMMENT ON UPI CLOSING

The conservative newspaper EL MERCURIO came out today in open defense of the U.S. News Agency UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL [UPI] whose closing was ordered by the government as a result of its permanent dissemination of false or twisted reports on the national situation.

The spokesman for U.S. interests in Chile editorially labeled the decision announced Wednesday night by President Salvador Allende as a "blunder," not to mention that "it eliminates a source of information for Chileans and thus restricts the broad freedom called for by the constitution to receive, disseminate, and transmit news." Conscious of the repudiation its defense of UPI will receive from the public, EL MERCURIO pointed out that "within the reigning schematic fanaticism" the attitude "will be to look at it as a gesture of support to U.S. imperialist interests."

The newspaper came out in defense of the [word indistinct] mechanism used by the national opposition press, the continent's reactionary news media to relay false news originated in and out of the country. The newspaper said that "the UPI offices fell into disgrace because of its receiving function, that is, because its teletype machines picked up news from its main office which referred to certain aspects of President Allende's visit through the Andean countries."

EL MERCURIO attempts to ignore that on several occasions the government had to oppose damaging and twisted reports distributed by UPI from Chile. The most scandalous case was the report published from Santiago as a consequence of the murder of former Vice President Edmundo Perez Zúñiga. At that time the UPI teletype machines here were shut down. A Santiago-dated item reported that a power struggle would

follow the attack. Moreover, it was never explained why UPI distributed only commentaries adverse to the Chilean Government based on editorials and commentaries in the local and foreign press.

On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that all reports issued by UPI had the clearcut purpose of downgrading President Allende's successful trip to Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.

In this respect, it is stated: "Many journalists' reports could have been wrong regarding the president's trip through Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru--in the coverage of events such as His Excellency's meeting with the Colombian politician, Mr Vives, the skirmishes between members of the Chilean presidential party and the Colombian police, or the data regarding the cargo, destination, and objectives of a light plane of our investigations service... but these versions were published in detail by the local papers of the respective countries, and the news agencies limited themselves to transmitting resumes of reports and commentaries regarding Chile."

EL MERCURIO laments "that the journalists of the Andean countries had fallen into some errors," but that "in no case was it fitting to close the teletype services that bring in reports which the president corrects."

The paper adds: "To Chilean journalism the closure of UPI implies a serious restraint," because "it concerns an internationally prestigious news agency." It is then added: "The backlash that this measure will have for Chile's own prestige is obvious: it can no longer be asserted that unrestricted freedom of information exists in our country if a news agency is punished for transmitting news issued by foreign newspapers."

EL MERCURIO concludes: "The closing of UPI is therefore a dangerous step toward controlled information, for there will always be the possibility that this is only the first halting of an informative news channel and that other closures will be applied to all who displease the authorities."

Today the foreign correspondent groups allayed EL MERCURIO's concern when they unanimously pointed out that the closing of UPI "is a sovereign right of Chile," and that the interior minister had stressed that "the measure is entirely an exception and it in no way affects the freedom which the foreign correspondents enjoy for carrying out their professional work in Chile."