

DATES WORTH NOTING

September 10-13	Sofia	International Conference of Solidarity with the Workers and People of Palestine. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions.
September 12-18	Dublin	38th International Congress of PEN, the respected writers organization. Representatives from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have sometimes attended previous congresses. However, the Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi M. Markov, told the 5th Soviet Writers Congress in Moscow on June 29th that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott PEN congresses, as it has done in recent years, because of Western criticism of Soviet literary policies, including the imprisonment of unorthodox writers in the Soviet Union.
September 13-24	New York	UN Preparatory Committee meets for the 1972 World Conference on Environmental Problems.
September 15	Bulgaria	25th anniversary of the Bulgarian Peoples Republic.
September 21	New York	26th United Nations General Assembly opens.
September 23-25	Santiago	1st Latin American Journalists Conference of the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists. The main

		objective of the conference is to establish a Latin American Journalists Federation affiliated to the IOJ. The conference is also to discuss "freedom of the press" -- although the main organizers of this conference come from Communist countries where freedom of the press is not tolerated (e.g., the beginning of a free press in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union invaded that country).
September 27- October 13	Japan Europe	Emperor Hirohito is to visit Belgium, the UK, West Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, France and Switzerland. It will be the first trip abroad for a reigning Emperor of Japan.
September 30- October 3	Prague	4th All-Christian Peace Assembly. Sponsored by the Soviet-dominated Christian Peace Conference. See backgrounder, "The Soviet Church in Political Action," in this issue.
October 2-3	Warsaw	Seminar on European Security. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Peace Council. The WPC is trying to promote a people-to-people approach to European Security so as to create a public opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a governmental European Security conference "without prior conditions."
October 13-16	Iran	2,500th anniversary of the Persian Kingdom. Dignitaries

		from all over the world, including many heads of state, will attend.
October 19	Japan USSR	15th anniversary of the signing of a protocol by Japan and the USSR ending their technical state of war (WW II). The protocol left hanging the question of sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union seized when it entered the war in the closing days as Japan was collapsing.
October 19-21	Poland	15th anniversary of the Polish Communist Party's successful defiance of the Soviet Union in choosing Gomulka, only recently released from prison, to head a more independent government. The Polish action was a repercussion of the Poznan workers riots in June 1956.
October 23- November 4	Hungary	15th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution started by students and workers, joined by liberal Communists, and crushed by Soviet tanks, 1956.
October 28	Europe	British House of Commons is to vote on British membership in the Common Market.
October 31	USSR	10th anniversary of removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's mausoleum and reburial at an inconspicuous place beside the Kremlin wall. This symbolic, though very important act of de-Stalinization, was partially undone by

the Brezhnev regime last year when it had a bust of Stalin placed over his new grave at the Kremlin wall. In May this year Stalin's portrait was paraded before top Soviet leaders for the first time since 1956, at celebrations in the Georgian SSR and Brezhnev's speech at the celebrations included praise of Stalin.

November 11
(October 30,
old calendar)

USSR

150th anniversary of the birth of Fyodor Dostoevski. Although Dostoevski is reputed to be one of the most popular authors among Soviet readers today and is regarded internationally as one of the world's great writers, his works are still censored in the USSR. Key passages in The Brothers Karamazov, for instance, are missing from Soviet editions. Soviet schools do not teach Dostoevski in their courses on Russian literature.

November 26-27

Czechoslovakia

Tentative dates for parliamentary elections. There have been no parliamentary elections since 1964 -- the elections scheduled for 1968, the year of the Soviet invasion, never took place. The elections this year will be held under provisions of a new repressive law passed in July that insures the Communist Party control of the selection of candidates.

November 28

Uruguay

General elections. A leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front), under strong Communist influence, is striving to duplicate the Allende victory in Chile.

PENETRATION OF AFRICA VIA THE TAN-ZAM RAILROAD

1. The construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad, now in progress, will provide a 1200-mile rail link between the rich copperbelt of Zambia and the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thereby freeing land-locked Zambia from dependence on white-minority regimes for an outlet to the sea. Construction of the railroad also brings into sharp focus the foreign policy objectives of Communist China, as reflected in its huge subsidy of men, money and materials for this project. It is a major step in the Communist Chinese objective of increasing its influence and enlarging its presence in Africa.

2. The railroad is Communist China's most important foreign aid project, and for it the regime has granted an interest-free loan of almost \$400 million, divided equally between Tanzania and Zambia; both are considered major influence targets of China. Among all African countries the Chinese Communist presence is strongest in Tanzania where they have steadily increased their investment and involvement, and where they have identified themselves with President Nyerere's commitment to liberate the white-dominated blacks of south Africa. In addition to the railroad, Peking is helping to build a naval base in Tanzania, is training and equipping the 10,000-man Tanzanian army, known as the Tanzanian People's Defence Force, and is aiding the air force. Chinese Communist military aid to Tanzania is by itself estimated between \$10-\$15 million. Other Tanzanian projects in which Communist Chinese aid is involved include a state farm, construction of a stadium and a saw mill. In Zambia they are helping to build a major highway between Lusaka and Choma, and three broadcasting stations near Lusaka.

3. The probable motives underlying such heavy Communist Chinese involvement in East Africa [REDACTED]

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25X1C10b

a) The Chinese decision to undertake the railroad project demonstrates not only that Peking is willing to take on a project that was turned down by the West, but it also provides a showcase for displaying Chinese technical capabilities. (This despite a recent report that a railroad tunnel has collapsed, killing three Chinese and about twenty Africans, and another report of a British TV documentary on the construction work: The film showed Chinese workers loading flatcars with rails which had been pre-laid in concrete ties. The rails were stacked vertically and then moved down the tracks to be set down, one after another, as sections

of a ladder might be laid end to end. According to one who saw the film, this seems to be a fast method of track-laying, but the railroad has a slightly "meandering" appearance. Presumably it will be adequate for slow-moving freight if not for crack passenger trains.)

b) Commitment to the railroad ostensibly puts the Chinese Communists squarely on the side of African nationalism, since it is probably viewed by other African countries as a major Chinese effort to support Zambia in its struggle to have its own route to the sea, thus no longer having to rely so greatly on transportation routes through Rhodesian and Portuguese African territory. Likewise, their almost exclusive presence in Tanzania gives the Chinese Communists access to the numerous southern African insurgent groups based there. Furthermore, if Nyerere fears possible retaliation from the south for harboring the liberation movements, he probably believes that it would be only the Chinese who would give him any substantial support against the countries of southern Africa.

c) The railroad project provides the Chinese with an easy means of infiltrating their own propagandists and revolutionists into Africa. Of the estimated total work force of 50,000, there are already close to 15,000 so-called Chinese technicians posted in the area -- outnumbering the Tanzanian army by several thousand. Most of them are reported to be soldiers in the engineering or signal corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and among them are doubtless experts in propaganda and in guerrilla warfare. Assuming that the railroad will require a long period of maintenance by Chinese technical personnel, once it is completed, and given the fact that many such Chinese workers traditionally remain for years in the areas where they have worked on building projects, they can probably count on solid and prolonged entrenchment in this area.

d) With such entrenchment, enhanced as it will be by the railroad, the Chinese will be within easy reach of the vast natural resources of Central Africa with its cobalt, copper, gold, diamonds and other minerals, as well as its natural agricultural wealth.

e) Since the Chinese are trying to develop a long-range missile capability and are therefore probably considering the Indian Ocean as a likely test impact area, they would then need monitoring facilities near this area, and a land-based facility in East Africa would have many advantages over an instrumentation ship.

4. Since construction began on the railroad last year, there have been reports of a variety of new problems

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a) Under the terms of the aid agreement, about half of the credit for the railroad project is being used to finance imports for sale locally to defray the cost of the Africans' participation. However, the commodity imports from Communist China during the past year have not been sufficient to provide the required local revenue. This has stemmed from high import prices, the poor quality of many Chinese goods, uncertain shipping dates and Chinese inability to guarantee a steady flow of spare parts for some of the imported equipment.

b) African workers on the project are becoming increasingly disgruntled about work conditions: They feel that salaries are too low, the workday is too long and that the work shifts are badly timed for workers to get adequate transportation to their homes. They have also complained that the key jobs are all held by the Chinese, and even some of the menial jobs have been taken over by the Chinese. These conditions, plus growing racial tensions, have led the Africans to threaten a strike if the situation is not soon improved.

5. Attached is a detailed background study of the Tan-Zam Railroad. It was written in 1969 and contains a wealth of information useful for propaganda. Your attention is called in particular to Section 4, "Possible Chinese Gains," for several additional themes. Also attached is material from the U.S. and foreign press which provide analysis and comment on the Chinese involvement in Africa. Although most of these appeared last year, before or at the time construction on the railroad began, they contain themes still valid for our purposes.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1971

THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY

1. Background

Serious interest in a railroad connecting the Zambian Copperbelt to the Tanzanian Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam dates to the early 1950's. In 1951, Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners undertook a feasibility study on behalf of the government of the territory of Northern Rhodesia with the purpose of determining the possibilities deriving from a rail link between Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. The firm's conclusion was that such a railroad would not be economically viable although it might provide political and strategic advantages to the territories concerned. With decisions for Northern Rhodesia being made in Salisbury, the huge cost was the dominant consideration, and the scheme was shunted aside.

In the election campaign in Northern Rhodesia in 1962, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the present ruling party in Zambia, focused on the political rather than the economic benefits of the rail line and exploited the rail issue to its advantage. UNIP argued against dependence on Rhodesia for exporting Zambian copper and importing almost everything that Zambia needed. Victorious in the election of January 1964, UNIP under President Kenneth Kaunda undertook to carry out its campaign pledge for the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway (see the map, inside front cover) and requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD - World Bank) for a loan to build the line.

The government of Zambia was joined in its request to the IBRD by the government of Tanzania. President Julius Nyerere saw the rail line as an opportunity to open up the agricultural potential of the Kilombero Valley and the mineral resources of the Mbeya area, both stymied by a lack of transport. A recent survey indicated a potential of 300 million tons of coal and 45 million tons of iron ore south of the area through which the railroad would pass. In addition, Tanzania expects to share in the revenue resulting from the passage of Zambian copper shipments through its territory.

The Tanzanian-Zambian request was rejected by the IBRD, which concluded after a survey that the railroad would cost some \$162 million and would operate at a loss until about 1990. Later the cost estimate was revised upward to \$390 million. The IBRD noted in its report that transport through Rhodesia's existing railroads was economically more

sensible, that no political development was really likely to disrupt it, that the Zambian economy was unlikely to be able to afford a second railroad system, and that if routes were needed to the north and east, a road system would be economically more feasible. These findings were confirmed by two further surveys, one by East African Railways and another by Lonrho.

As Rhodesia's threat to proclaim a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the UK approached, the sense of urgency that the Zambians felt toward the Tan-Zam Railway increased. Zambian dependence on Rhodesian railroads was a political handicap to any Zambian government, however much more sensible economically such an alternative might be.

During 1964 and 1965, Tanzania and Zambia, alone or in concert, sought assistance from the US, the UK, Canada, West Germany and Japan -- public or private, as individual contributors or in consortium -- but to no avail. All the western countries made reference to the 1964 IBRD report as the basis for their refusal to subscribe to the underwriting of the railroad and instead offered to assist in the improvement of road facilities. In desperation, Tanzania had even turned to the USSR for help in August 1964 but was rejected outright by the Soviets who refused not only to build the railroad but even to conduct a survey. It was then that Nyerere seriously looked to Communist China for assistance.

The initial Tanzanian approach to the Chinese for aid may have taken place as early as July 1964 during a visit by Vice President Kawawa to Peking. A more urgent request for assistance probably was made by President Nyerere during his trip to China in February 1965. In any event, in July 1965 Nyerere announced that China was willing to help. A month later a Chinese survey team arrived in Tanzania. The team studied the proposed route in Tanzania, but not in Zambia, and remained in the country for several months. Although their report, in Chinese and Swahili, turned out to be of little help, the Chinese indicated a willingness to undertake a more comprehensive survey and even to build the railroad.

While Tanzania concentrated on seeking Chinese Communist aid, Kaunda continued to seek aid from the West because of his preference for Western financing and his concern over Chinese political intentions in Africa. Finally in September 1965 -- just two months before Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the UK and Canada agreed to finance a \$420,000 feasibility survey

which was carried out by three firms headed by Maxwell Stamp Associates, a British economic consultant firm. The survey was completed in August 1966, and the resultant Stamp report recommended that the project be undertaken and concluded that the high capital investment was justifiable on economic grounds even if there were no political objections to using Rhodesia Railways. To handle the increase in Zambian traffic assumed by the report, the Rhodesia system itself would have to make a large capital increase.

The Stamp report put the cost of construction and rolling stock for the Tan-Zam Railway at \$353 million, in addition to \$33 million required to enlarge the harbor at Dar es Salaam to handle annually an estimated 2.5 million tons more of cargo. Thus the total cost would be \$386 million on the assumption that the railroad were built by modern construction techniques.

On the basis of assumptions that (a) the line would be completed by the mid-1970's; (b) almost all of Zambia's non-fuel traffic would be transferred from existing routes through Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola to the new line, bringing total freight on the line to more than 4 million tons by 1981; and (c) operating costs per ton-mile would rank among the lowest of the world's railroads and would be nearly 30 percent below those of Rhodesia Railways, the report estimated that by 1981 revenues would reach about \$100 million and profits almost \$52 million.

Complete comparisons of railroad versus road systems have not been made, but copperbelt experts have pointed out that most of the rail traffic would travel the full 1,000 plus miles of the railroad. American and Western European arguments for the superiority of roads assume that traffic will be picked up and let off at many points along the route, an assumption which is not valid for the Tan-Zam Railway.

On the basis of the Stamp report, Zambia hoped that a consortium of the UK, US, West Germany, Japan and the IBRD could be formed to pay for an engineering survey and eventually for construction of the railroad. It was largely this hope which kept Zambia -- and through Zambia, Tanzania -- from pursuing any Chinese offer of assistance during 1966. Early in 1967 the Stamp report was submitted to the African Development Bank (ADB) and to the IBRD for joint review and financial assistance. This was the second time that the IBRD reviewed the project. Experts from the United Nations Development Program were also asked to review the report.

In March 1967 the ADB and the IBRD issued a report sharply criticizing the Stamp survey's economic analysis and recommending a re-examination of its findings. Additional technical studies were also suggested for both the railroad and the port of Dar es Salaam before a decision could be taken to finance an engineering study. Zambia and Tanzania indicated their willingness to allow the IBRD and ADB to undertake further technical studies, but they refused to permit a re-examination of the project's economic feasibility. The United Nations Development Program experts reached conclusions similar to those of the ADB-IBRD review.

Stamp's traffic projections and revenue forecasts for the proposed railroad were overly optimistic. Zambia is unlikely to transfer all of its non-fuel traffic to the new line as many of its imports will continue to come from South Africa and Rhodesia because of lower prices. Moreover, Rhodesia is likely to insist on a share of Zambian traffic in exchange for low railway rates on coal shipments and other goods. As a result, revenues would be substantially less than Stamp estimated. The IBRD, for example, estimates that roughly 50 percent of Zambia's imports and about 20 percent of its exports will continue to be shipped over existing routes. The IBRD believes that the railroad would carry less than 3 million tons of freight in 1981 and that revenues would be roughly one-half those estimated by Stamp. The lower traffic levels would result in higher operating costs per ton-mile because of high fixed costs. The low operating costs envisioned by Stamp seem to be unrealistic in the light of experience on the Rhodesia Railways, which now handles the bulk of the traffic to be carried by the new line and which is an efficiently run system. The anticipated revenue of the line does not provide an adequate basis for financing the project.

The railroad would result in few economic gains for Zambia and Tanzania. Zambia's northeastern region, through which the railroad would pass, has little development potential. The area is sparsely populated and for the most part the land is infertile and can support little more than subsistence agriculture. Although deposits of manganese, coal, copper and a few other minerals are located along the proposed right of way, they are small. While Tanzania would earn some foreign exchange from transit services provided to Zambia, few other benefits may be expected. The government's scheme to develop the relatively fertile Kilombero Valley in the southwest would require large investment and numerous skilled personnel -- both of which are in critically short supply in Tanzania. Also, much of the area through which the railroad would pass is infested

with Tsetse fly, and the population is small and widely scattered. Some minerals are located in southwest Tanzania, including the Songwe coalfields, but the deposits are generally of poor quality and not commercially exploitable, even with relatively low-cost rail transport.

Zambian goods are expected to account for almost all the railroad's tonnage. Tanzanian traffic would be very small because southwestern Tanzania is largely unpopulated and the country does not have the capital or skilled manpower needed to develop the region. Some traffic would also come from the Katanga copperbelt, but the amount would not be very great. Congolese exports over Rhodesia Railways now total less than 10,000 tons annually, and it is unlikely that all of this traffic would be diverted to the Tan-Zam railroad.

Outbound traffic on the railroad would consist almost entirely of copper, and the inbound traffic of a wide variety of imports. The railroad would not carry POL for Zambia, because of the Italian-built, 1060-mile 8-inch petroleum pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola on the copperbelt can carry the required POL. Also, the coal needed to operate copper smelters in Zambia would probably continue to be imported from Rhodesia because the Wankie Colliery is the cheapest source of coal for Zambia.

2. Chinese Offer

After the negative review by the ADB and the IBRD of March 1967, Kaunda finally realized that Western support for the railroad was not likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, Zambian efforts to develop other railroad transport routes which would avoid Rhodesia had proved equally unrewarding. Thus the long-standing Chinese offer became more attractive. Overcoming his inner doubts, Kaunda sounded out Communist China regarding its willingness to construct the Tan-Zam Railway. Encouraged by the Chinese response, Kaunda visited Peking in June 1967. Shortly afterwards, negotiations began between Tanzania and Zambia on the one hand and China on the other, and on 5 September 1967 an agreement was concluded.

Tanzania and Zambia see the 5 September agreement as a firm commitment by Peking to follow through with the project. According to the tripartite agreement, China was to finance building a railroad through an interest-free loan with no strings attached. If current Chinese aid practices continue, loan repayment is likely to extend over

a very long period and might well include at least partial payment in Zambian and Tanzanian goods. These terms would be highly favorable by Western and even Soviet standards. In addition, the agreement called for China to provide technical assistance for surveys and construction of the railroad. The agreement was necessarily vague on the size of the over-all Chinese loan and the number of Chinese technicians to be involved because accurate estimates were not available at the time the agreement was signed. In any case, this very simple contractual form is often used by China. According to the agreement the project was to proceed through three stages: (1) preliminary investigations; (2) engineering and design surveys, for which the Chinese pledged a \$14 million interest-free loan; and (3) construction. Discussions among the three governments will take place between each stage, and more detailed agreements will follow.

Present Chinese planning is reported to call for a single-track railroad between Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, and Kidatu, Tanzania, a distance of about 960 miles. Other reports have indicated that the Chinese will extend the line from Kidatu to Dar es Salaam to avoid transshipping at Kidatu. All rolling stock, signalling and communications equipment will be supplied by the Chinese. The railroad engineers will be provided by the Tanzanians and Zambians, but maintenance of line and equipment will be handled by the Chinese for at least 10 years after the completion of the railroad. During this period the Chinese will train Tanzanian and Zambian maintenance teams. The construction loan will be for 10 years with the terms and dates of repayment to be determined after the railroad is in operation on the basis of capability for repayment by Tanzania and Zambia.

The estimated Chinese cost for the construction of the railroad is reported to be \$60 million for the Tanzanian section and \$20 million for the Zambian section if maximum use is made of Chinese materials and labor. The Chinese estimate is between 20 and 25 percent of the best Western estimates.

3. Chinese Survey

Starting in December 1967, a nine-man Chinese team of railroad and construction experts carried out preliminary investigations of the Zambian section of the Tan-Zam Railway, similar to the 1965 preliminary study of the Tanzanian section. A 600-man team of

Chinese technicians began the detailed railroad survey in Tanzania in February 1968 and a 350-man team began the Zambian section of the survey in November 1968. The Tanzanian portion of the survey is already completed and the Zambian portion should be completed before the end of 1969. At present the number of Chinese in Tanzania is estimated at up to 1,200 and in Zambia between 500 and 700.

As a result of unfortunate experiences in Southeast Asia as well as in Africa resulting from excessive local Chinese revolutionary zeal, the Chinese attempted initially to keep their presence unobtrusive and their visibility low. Indeed, at the outset in Tanzania and Zambia, they sought to present an image of hard-work and austerity with an almost total absence of adornment and frivolity. In support of this image, the Chinese railroad surveyors keep to themselves, carefully refraining from fraternization with the local population except for group meetings sponsored by the Chinese embassies in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The only regular and continuing contact with the locals is maintained by Chinese public relations men or medical technicians. As a result of this low-key approach, the Chinese surveyors have made a generally favorable impression on the Tanzanians and Zambians whom they meet in the bush during their surveying work.

Shortly after their arrival in Zambia, the Chinese surveyors established three base camps as regional headquarters for the railroad survey.

The base camps are located at the Mkushi River Hotel in Mkushi, the Crested Crane Hotel in Mpika, and a large building in Kasama. Security is very strict at all the camps, which are surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by Chinese personnel. Local Zambians who are employed as guides and manual laborers live outside the camps. Visitors are discouraged, and even official visits are only reluctantly permitted. All visitors, including government officials, are closely questioned before admittance. All activities in the camps, including even simple domestic routines, are discontinued until the visitor departs.

Living conditions in the base camps are very crowded with most of the workers living under roofs with only the spillover in tents. (All personnel in the field camps live in floorless tents set up over sand.) In the headquarters buildings, 8 men sleep in rooms 8 feet by 12 feet on tiers of bunks. Each room has a wash basin, but the entire building uses the same toilet facilities, which are filthy. Meals are eaten in the bedrooms because what used to be the dining rooms are used as sleeping quarters for additional

Chinese. The bedrooms are also used as offices during the day. The food is almost all canned and imported from China. There is little variety. Occasionally, vegetables are obtained from local markets, but so infrequently that the Chinese are planting their own gardens.

Life in the camps is austere and monastic. There is group study of Mao's thoughts in the morning before work and singing of revolutionary songs in the evening. Each man carries with him into the bush his book of Mao's thoughts. Each member of the survey teams does his own washing and a certain amount of manual labor, regardless of his position.

The only women with the survey teams are attached to the medical staffs. There have been unconfirmed reports of the Chinese taking Zambian women into their camps at night and of engaging in homosexual practices with local men.

Although most Chinese in the camps are not permitted to move about on their own, conditions are different in Lusaka, and the Chinese there are rapidly becoming as evident as those in Dar es Salaam. Groups of six or seven Chinese may be seen in most hotels, with the Ridgeway Hotel apparently the Chinese favorite. The Chinese in Lusaka are always seen in groups and do not talk to or mix with the local population. They are apparently free to come or go into the city as they please, using any form of transport -- road, rail or air.

The activities of the Chinese medical technicians attached to the survey teams have been especially rewarding from the Chinese point of view. Originally these technicians only accepted patients for treatment in clinics set up at the camps of the railroad surveyors, but when the Chinese saw how popular their medical work had become among the local population, the medical technicians began moving out among villages in the bush to increase the number of prospective patients treated. Local government officials have been included among their clientele.

The primary method of treatment of the Chinese medical technicians is acupuncture -- a method of treatment involving the puncturing of a part of the body with needles two or three inches long. This treatment is combined with the passage of drugs to the patient. Although stories of miraculous cures have come out of the bush, other reports indicate that the general inattention to basic sanitary procedures by the Chinese "doctors" may well result in acupuncture practices inducing infection as well as cures

in the patients.

Dissemination of Chinese propaganda accompanies all treatment by the medical technicians and provides a channel to get propaganda into the remotest corners of Tanzania and Zambia. Initially the Chinese were more aggressive in their propaganda efforts in Tanzania than in Zambia. Several sharp rebuffs from the government of Zambia to the Chinese embassy in Lusaka and a written protest by Kaunda to Chou En-lai served as a temporary check on Chinese distribution of propaganda in Zambia. With the recent large influx of Chinese into Zambia, however, Zambian government capability to monitor and control the activities of Chinese propagandists has declined. This decline is apparent in the villages where unsuspecting schoolteachers are provided with propaganda materials by the Chinese and even in the cities where the Chinese employ seemingly innocent accounts of the activities of the surveyors to insert into local media pro-Chinese and anti-Western and anti-Soviet propaganda.

The Chinese attacks on the USSR have inspired Soviet counterattacks: for example, the newspaper, Times of Zambia, on 6 May printed a Radio Moscow broadcast which claimed that the policies of Mao had caused a drop in the Chinese standard of living. Again on 7 May the Times reported a Moscow broadcast on the "armies of Mao." This same issue of the Times also included a reply from the Chinese embassy in Lusaka to the Soviet blast of the previous day. Thus, Zambia is becoming a propaganda battleground for the Chinese and the Soviets.

The gradual step-up of Chinese propaganda output in Zambia began in February 1969 with the arrival of a top NCNA propagandist whose objective was to gain wide play in Zambian media for news of the ostensibly beneficial activities of the surveyors. The new visitor was immediately successful, and favorable local coverage of the surveyors immediately increased. Coverage by the Zambian press, radio and TV, and the Zambian Information Service became frequent and friendly. Subsequently the Chinese undertook several surveys to assess the impact of their overt propaganda in Zambian media and their covert disseminations in the bush. They have been reported to be pleased with the results of these surveys obtained to date.

In addition to Chinese propaganda activities, the governments of Tanzania and Zambia have experienced, as a result of the Chinese presence, problems in other fields including labor and security.

The Chinese engineers and workers on the survey teams are setting labor norms that disturb the trade unions of Tanzania and Zambia. Surveying in some of the most difficult terrain in East Africa, the Chinese teams work ten hours every day, including Sunday, for a base pay less than that of local trade unionists and with no overtime or extra allowances. The Chinese eat frugal five-minute lunches and flaunt their spartan work methods before the locals. They are virtually self-sufficient in all their requirements, having brought with them from China almost everything that they believed they would need, ranging from dustbrooms and gasoline tanks through electricity generators and engineering equipment to trucks and Chinese-style landrovers. They service all their equipment themselves.

The Chinese take advantage of the inability of the governments of Tanzania and Zambia to keep a close watch and control over the activities of the railroad surveyors. It is very likely that these governments do not even know the actual number of Chinese surveyors in their countries. Several techniques are employed by the Chinese to infiltrate more of their people than show up on airport manifests or transient rolls. Under one technique, after the arrival of a plane full of Chinese, a single Chinese will sign the manifest for large numbers of his incoming colleagues who mill about the airport. He will write a Chinese surname -- for example, Li -- and beneath it write a dozen or so ditto marks. Another technique was first observed in Mali. To obfuscate the local custom authorities, an incoming group of Chinese surveyors is met at the airport by a large group of Chinese already in the country. The two groups mingle in a spirit of exuberance and make a mass exodus past the bewildered customs officials.

Other Chinese activities may be more serious in the long run. These activities include the movement of arms into Tanzania and Zambia for passage to African liberation movements and the unobserved use made of the freedom given the survey teams to survey and map an enormous area of Zambia, much of it previously uncharted.

It seems certain that the Chinese will be able to prepare detailed military topographical maps of Tanzania and Zambia as a byproduct of the survey. Such maps could prove invaluable if the Chinese ever undertake large-scale military support of the liberation movements located in Tanzania and Zambia.

The extra-curricular activities of the Chinese survey teams have greatly disturbed President Kaunda, who on numerous occasions has publicly expressed his fears and

frustrations resulting from these unauthorized Chinese activities in Zambia. Even President Nyerere of Tanzania, considered by many to be more lenient to the Chinese than Kaunda, noted in a press interview on 5 May in Mwanza that he was aware of the dangers of a policy of close relations with Communist China. He made clear his understanding of the anxiety of the outside world since his policy "might let the Chinese into their sphere of influence," but China was willing to build the Tan-Zam Railway which Tanzania wanted and the West had refused to build it. Nyerere added a warning to China. "We are a stubborn people," he said. "The Chinese will learn that if they want to control us they will get into trouble."

4. Possible Chinese Gains

The Chinese offer of assistance for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway is unprecedented for Communist China and represents by far China's single largest foreign aid project to date. It would be the third largest foreign aid project in all Africa, outweighed only by the billion-dollar Aswan High Dam, where the USSR provided about one-third of the cost in credits, and by the Volta Dam in Ghana which was mainly financed by the US.

On the basis of the Stamp report estimates of cost (see page 3, above), if the Chinese do eventually construct the railroad, they would be undertaking a project which could equal more than one-third of their total economic aid commitments since 1956 and almost match all of their actual aid expenditures to date. Since the inception of the Chinese aid program in 1956, China's total worldwide commitments amounted to somewhat more than \$1 billion while actual expenditures were about \$400 million. Annual commitments reached a peak of \$310 million in 1964 but averaged about \$120 million in 1965 and 1966 and declined to under \$100 million in 1967. Drawings on aid since 1964 have averaged about \$75 million annually.

China has had a series of political and diplomatic reverses in Africa since its highwater mark in 1964 when 18 African governments recognized Communist China. Since then, as a result of Chinese subversive activities, Burundi, Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Ghana have broken diplomatic relations with China; Kenya and Morocco have expelled Chinese diplomats; Ethiopia, which has never had diplomatic relations with China, threw out the local NCNA representative, and China withdrew its mission to Tunisia. Presently more African states (21) recognize Taiwan than Communist China (14) and more African states have voted against Chinese Communist admission to the UN (20) than

have voted in favor of admission (15). One important objective of the Tan-Zam Railway, therefore, is to permit Communist China to recoup some of its recent losses in prestige and position in Africa and to reassert its interest in Africa's development.

The Chinese are publicly committed to a policy of continuing revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries. In the process of constructing the Tan-Zam Railway, the Chinese will improve their access to masses of the local peasantry who may be "ripe for revolution" as Chou En-lai noted in 1964. The Chinese also will increase their ability to work with members of southern African liberation movements, far from prying eyes, in remote bush areas of Tanzania and Zambia. In view of previous Chinese performances in Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali, the Chinese may very well set up on-the-scene guerrilla training camps, even unknown to most members of the Tanzanian and Zambian governments. Such camps would provide bases for subversion not only against southern African targets but also against Congo (Kinshasa). Once the Tan-Zam Railway was completed, it could provide an artery for sustaining a large-scale Chinese-supported military effort directed at Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Congo (Kinshasa). With the availability of the railroad, such an effort could encompass heavier weapons, including artillery, not used to date by the guerrillas.

A permanent, secure Chinese position in Zambia would give the Chinese access to mineral resources of which they are currently in short supply such as copper, gold and diamonds. The potential access to Congo (Kinshasa) would place the Chinese within reach of the world's largest known source of cobalt as well as uranium. In 1962, the Union Miniere du Katanga produced 68 percent of the Free World's cobalt. Since the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, the Chinese have been hard pressed to obtain for their reactors sufficient quantities of suitable uranium and the cobalt required to enrich it.

China must rely on labor-intensive methods to build the railroad as it does not have sufficient construction machinery.


Consequently, large numbers of laborers will be required for the period of construction, a period that should last at least five years. Tanzania and Zambia cannot supply the required labor force, and on the basis of its previous experiences, China would not be willing to accept local laborers in large numbers even if they were available. Therefore, China can be expected to import the requisite labor force. In the short run, the impact on the local economics of such a force could be significant and in the long run it could become an ethnic and subversive problem.

Historically speaking, Chinese railroad workers employed in the US and in Peru and Indian railroad workers in East Africa remained behind after completion of the projects on which they were employed.

Present Chinese plans call for the provision of continuing technical assistance in running the railroad and providing replacement equipment as necessary. There have been reports that the Czechs and Japanese were willing to supply rolling stock for the railroad, with the Czechs indicating a willingness if necessary to participate with the Chinese in the funding. This Czech willingness predates the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and probably has now given way to sentiments hostile to the Chinese. Even if the Czechs were still willing to participate in the railroad, the Chinese are unlikely to accept them or the Japanese and are likely to induce the governments of Tanzania and Zambia to refuse recent Italian offers to provide operating personnel after the railroad is built. Zambian problems operating present railroad facilities indicate conditions probably will deteriorate further. Therefore, in the absence of other foreign assistance, the Zambians will have to rely increasingly on the Chinese for help in the operation, maintenance and repair of railroads in Zambia.

In spite of sincere protestations of non-alignment by Nyerere and of friendship for the West by Kaunda, these African leaders will find themselves increasingly at the mercy of the Chinese once construction of the railroad is well underway. The governments of Tanzania and Zambia, of necessity, will have to curry favor with their Chinese benefactors. They will gradually have to provide special treatment for the Chinese at the expense of other countries toward which the Chinese are hostile. A partial list of anticipated Chinese gains, based largely on precedents established elsewhere, include: (a.) limitations on the freedom of movement of all foreigners other than Chinese Communists; (b.) increasing toleration of Chinese efforts to spread propaganda; (c.) favored treatment for Chinese imports, including consumer items which are non-essential or of marginal quality; (d.) growth of Chinese influence in the military, police and other local elements which come in frequent contact with the Chinese (it appears that in the future only the Chinese will train the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force); (e.) virtually total suppression of any criticism of China and the Chinese in local media and by public officials; (f.) partial Chinese control over the local economy through long-term loan and barter deals which commit the participating country to import Chinese goods that are not necessarily compatible with national needs at foreign exchange rates set by the Chinese; (g.) tendencies on the part of the host countries to look the other way

while the Chinese use their land as a springboard for sub-
version against neighboring states; and (h.) support for
China in international councils such as the UN.



CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, London
January 1970

CPYRGHT

CHINESE AID AND TRADE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

THE decision to build three new Chinese radio transmitters in Zambia following the visit to Peking by Siketa Wina, Zambian Minister of Information, signifies further evidence of China's growing involvement in Africa and the revolutionary movements in Southern Africa and Rhodesia. China has already built two similar transmitters in Brazzaville and Tanzania which have been used to broadcast anti-Western propaganda and revolutionary theory to neighbouring states.

The radio stations are only part of the invisible foothold China is gaining in Africa. Visible Chinese influence is evident with the growing number of stores selling Chinese goods and books and the increasing army of engineers and technicians arriving in Africa on various capital-aid projects. More than 300 Chinese personnel are expected in Lusaka to add to the 340 surveyors already employed on the 1,042 mile Tanzania-Zambia railway.

Work on the railway is progressing rapidly according to reports from Chinese and African sources. Since the initial survey started in December, 1968, the survey-team is said to have completed the preliminary survey of the 550 mile main route from Dar-es-Salaam to the heart of the copper-belt. The whole project is due to be completed by 1975.

By providing an advance of the capital cost of between £100-£130 million, most of the labour and probably all the contract, including rolling stock, China has surprised both African and Western observers, many of whom declared the project both uneconomic and impractical without massive British and American support. The route rolls through some of the most difficult terrain in the region, rising from the coast at Dar-es-Salaam to the high, hilly areas of the Central African plateau at 7,000 feet with its bushland and savannah before reaching the Zambian copperbelt.

Apart from gaining valuable engineering experience, ('learning while doing and doing while learning' according to Chairman Mao's teaching) China is hoping to win friends and influence enemies. Much has been made in both the African and Chinese news media of the conditions under which the Chinese are employed. The Chinese engineers accept what appears to be conditions similar to the local Africans. They exist separately and frugally though their standards are still considerably better than the average rural African's. Nevertheless, this provides a useful contrast to Europeans working in the copper-mines and expatriate officers in government institutions who expect to maintain living standards well beyond the means of the few affluent Africans.

Moreover, it appears that in addition to their spartan life the Chinese are willing to devote much of their spare time to welfare projects such as repairing bridges, helping with harvests; and according to one N.C.N.A. report of March 26, they also provide medical services, acupuncture and other forms of traditional Chinese medicine for local Africans. Successful treatment of local ailments includes one outstanding cure of a five-year-old deaf mute.

Feasibility studies by British firms who laid the permanent way across India, South Africa and much of Latin America, found the financial cost of the railway too great and the economic returns too small; on the other hand, China has ignored the cost, putting politics to the fore on the assumption that as a prestige project the railway would be an ideal

Chinese assistance is not only limited to the TANZAM Railway. The Friendship Textile Mill, built with Chinese labour at a cost of £3 million in the form of an interest-free loan, is turning out 90 million square yards of cloth annually and is expected to make Tanzania self-sufficient in cloth by the end of 1970. The mill, the first of its kind in Africa being fully integrated and capable of printing patterns on cloth spun from locally produced cotton, was completed in 18 months from design to finish and is now operating with the minimum Chinese supervision and is providing employment for 3,000 workers.

The Upenja State Farm in Zanzibar, built on 1,300 acres of arable land with Chinese assistance, is now producing rice, fruit and vegetables and poultry-meat on land previously thought unproductive. While in Somalia, a Chinese hydro-geological survey team has been drilling wells and mapping the territory since March, 1969, and Chinese bicycles are on sale in Mogadishu.

This activity adds up to a new rise in Chinese influence in Africa which, following the 1965 Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Algiers, fell to its lowest ebb and remained ineffective during much of the cultural revolution. The mainspring of China's campaign to gain support in Africa began late in 1966 with the formation of the Sino-Tanzanian shipping line and the first of a new series of loans to African countries starting with U.S. \$17 million to Zambia.

African opinion was generally apathetic and prior to 1967 in some states it was positively hostile. Coups in Ghana, Dahomey, The Central African Republic and Burundi preceded the exit of Chinese personnel accused of sabotage and subversion. Ghana's new Head of State at the time, General Ankvah, emphasised China's efforts had been in setting up spy-schools, military training camps and instruction in sabotage in jungle camps rather than agro-technical stations and rural industry.

Chinese involvement need not, however, be construed as part of a plot. China is publicly committed to revolution in the region, but at the same time is willing to offer aid to countries who turn their eyes away from U.S.-Soviet sources. The countries falling into this category are still few in number and so quite a small fragment of China's resources allocated for aid against imperialism can have a marked effect on recipient territories. In 1968 China budgeted £750,000 for African liberation movements.

This dual personality China displays in Africa as a provider of aid to non-aligned newly-emerged States on the one hand and as agent-provocateur in the wars of liberation on the other means that no African Head of State can ever be quite sure that the Chinese are on his side or if they are secretly plotting against him. Thus, Col. Bokassa of the Central African Republic (C.A.R.), himself the recipient of a Chinese U.S. \$4 million loan, could say realistically in July, 1967: 'To have peace one must not admit the Chinese into one's country because they teach subversion. I tell you that the C.A.R. had in its territory a Chinese school for subversion and even a military training camp'.

Westerners who tend to see the growing Chinese influence in Africa as a curious mixture of the yellow peril and red menace seem to forget the extent of Western assistance; for every Chinese technician there are ten or twelve Westerners working on joint aid ventures. Perhaps the Africans are more pragmatic than Europeans. China's aid, in any case, tends to be piecemeal. Most aid is in the form of long-term loans rather than direct grants and since 1954 China has provided little more than U.S. \$950 million. Zambia and Tanzania are the chief recipients of this aid. Since 1961 Tanzania received £12½ million. A further £117 million was promised for rural development. In contrast, in 1968 East African countries, excluding Tanzania and Zambia, received from Britain alone approximately U.S. \$56 million in bilateral grants and loans.

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China's trade with Africa is not great; in 1962 it registered approximately 4 per cent of her total trade. In 1964 this was valued at U.S. \$90 million. By 1968 this value had dropped to an estimated U.S. \$74 million. Before relations were severed with Ghana, trade agreements were signed for increases in two-way trade up to U.S. \$12 million. But this never materialised, despite the exchange of Ghanaian industrial diamonds, grains and cotton for Chinese machinery, fertilisers and agricultural products. Total trade amounted to less than a quarter of the original estimates. Guinea's five-year trade agreement suffered a similar fate.

In spite of China's cash grant of U.S. \$2.8 million in May, 1964, relations with Kenya have never been good. Two Chinese diplomats and an N.C.N.A. correspondent were expelled from Kenya for 'interfering in Kenya's internal affairs'. In June, 1967, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires was expelled for attacking a speech by Tom Mboya in a Nairobi newspaper. Red Guards retaliated with an attack on the Kenyan Embassy in Peking a few weeks later. In 1968, China accused Kenya of pursuing a two-China's policy as a result of articles on Taiwan in the Kenyan press. When Tom Mboya was assassinated in July 5, this year, the Chinese embassy was the only mission that failed to fly its flag at half mast.

It is unlikely that China will improve her trading position among African states. Even Chinese low-priced goods are too costly for unsophisticated rural markets and in any case they tend to compete with local products. In countries such as Kenya where relatively buoyant markets are available, relations have been soured by political failures. Because of this China favours emphasis on small but well chosen projects.

The TANZAM line is a gamble to recoup in the '70s the lost ground of the '60s. In the meantime, Peking will continue to focus its aid on favoured recipients such as the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union (Z.A.N.U.) which advocates hit-and-run tactics across the Zambian border into Rhodesia, and the South African Pan African Congress (P.A.C.), trying at the same time to block all Soviet interference in what China now considers her rightful sphere of influence. This was evident at the International Conference of Solidarity with the Freedom Fighters of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies, held in Khartoum in January, 1969. China denounced this meeting as a 'Soviet revisionist plot'. Peking's African allies were conspicuously absent from the meeting.

China's future position in Africa hinges on her capability of maintaining friendly relations with African states with hostile political systems. Coups and rumours of coups are endemic in developing Africa. Zambia has had its share of rumours of a coup for some months now, and Peking could be faced with a similar situation to Ghana, but with an expensive railway line on her hands. The truth is that while China is trying to sweep Africa with revolution, like the Soviet Union she remains willing to pursue ties with bourgeois and military régimes. In the economic field China continues to maintain trade worth £5 million a year with South Africa.

The time has come for Peking to make up for lost ground. The Chinese now have relations with nine African states south of the Sahara, compared with 12 in 1965. In this respect the railway and other projects are gambles that have to pay off.

[Kieran P. Broadbent is a member of the staff of the Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics.]

What puzzles Tanzania's friends, and scares its enemies, however, is China's role as arms supplier and military adviser. Up to January of this year Canadians advised the army, and trained Tanzanian pilots. This arrangement was not totally satisfactory because of Canada's membership of Nato - which Tanzania accuses of arming Portugal with weapons to suppress African guerrillas. Sweden and Czechoslovakia were mentioned as alternatives, and it was pointed out that Italy is training the Zambian air force. It soon became clear, however, that it was China that would fill the gap. Naval and air force personnel went to China for training, and Chinese engineers began work on a naval base in Dar es Salaam harbour. They had already built several army barracks.

All these measures are being taken in preparation for what Tanzanians believe will be an eventual armed confrontation with the south. Their greatest fear in fact is of a Rhodesian, South African or Portuguese pre-emptive strike. (It has been reported that the Chinese have warned them not to provoke one at this stage; the present low level of 'freedom fighting' in Africa - except in the Portuguese territories - suggests this advice may have been offered, and heeded. President Kaunda even denies harbouring any guerrilla bases in Zambia, although this is patently untrue. But it would be naive in the extreme to imagine that in the long run the Chinese will be a restraining influence.)

The African guerrillas welcome Chinese help, but they are at pains to point out that they are first and foremost nationalists. Just as President Nyerere tries to balance the Chinese by western advisers, so the guerrilla groups make much of the assistance they receive from private groups in America and Britain, and government contributions from Sweden.

Supporting the guerrilla groups gives the Chinese the chance to engage in political indoctrination in the training camps, particularly those remote from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. They undoubtedly have made some useful converts. But Chinese penetration of Zambia may not be as far advanced as some western observers fear.

TIMES OF ZAMBIA
29 October 1970

CPYRGHT



THERE is little doubt that the world's eyes will be focussed on Tanzania and Zambia to see if what they expect to happen as a result of the generous gesture by the People's Republic of China to finance a railway linking the two countries does, in fact, come about.

Indeed, what they are saying is to see to what extent China's manipulation of African states is more crafty than that of people who have been with us for many decades.

In the Western world's consistent devaluation of its own political skills, which immediately gives room to the over-estimation of Chinese effectiveness, we are not competent to intervene. But we can only say that the West must surely be the best judge of its own capabilities.

This thought process of the West must also best be summed up as "condescending" and somewhat insulting in its under-estimation of the African leaders' ability to choose what they consider to be in their national interest.

It is all very well for

Britain to sit back and dread the myth of Chinese expansion in Africa. Perhaps if the Chinese are as politically crafty as the West credits them, then they might have already taken a leaf out of the now unscrambled British Empire.

The predictable politician does not get very far. The West must have made its predictions about Chinese intentions in this part of the world. It cannot ring true that the Chinese would be as naive as to give credence to the wild notions of the West about the real meaning

of their gesture in this railway project.

In all this there is one man, in addition to the Chinese people, to whom the Zambian people owe a debt of gratitude. It is Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania.

He has been unflinching in his determination to get us out of a predicament that can only be the inevitable concomitant to our land-locked geographical position.

Last, but not least, we would draw attention to a recent picture story published in an East African newspaper, headlined "The Promised Land." It has the following caption:-

"Wall posters in Peking call for volunteers to go to Tanzania to help build the Tanzania railway line, in this picture issued by the Hsinhua news agency. This poster being studied by workers calls for volunteers to come forward in their thousands.

"Those workers who

decide to settle in Africa after the said task is completed will receive good land and houses for themselves and their families. Similar calls for volunteers are taking place throughout China.

"The photograph was contributed by Dr Siegmund Brauner, of the German-African Society, which works to build friendship between East Africa and East Germany."

It may be worth our leaders trying to discover the authenticity of this article. How they do it is not for us to say.

EAST AFRICAN STANDARD
27 October 1970

Tazara railway started

Tanzanians and Zambians are naturally jubilant over Tazara, the new name for the Tanzam rail link, and the Chinese join in the general satisfaction.

This venture is the most ambitious overseas aid project launched by the Chinese People's Republic and the first of any magnitude on the African mainland. When finished, in about five years' time, the 1,056-mile railroad will be the longest built by the Chinese inside or outside their own country. Paradoxically, it has been left to them to carry through a prestigious scheme bandied about by Western concerns for decades, just as the Russians stepped in, when the World Bank and the U.S. withdrew, to construct the Aswan Dam.

The circumstances which gave impetus to the project are widely known — Zambian isolation after the Rhodesian U.D.I. Surveys were undertaken before U.D.I., with the object of linking the Zambian and East African networks, expanding the opportunities for trade between the two areas.

British engineers commissioned in 1952 to make a survey found no insurmountable obstacle. After all, the British forged the Mombasa-Kisumu railway 70 years ago, without all the modern aids to clearing, excavating, levelling, bridging and so on, besides the medical and other welfare facilities for the thousands of workers. The British engineers relied for labour on Africans and imported Indians, some of whom stayed behind when the work was finished, founding families living chiefly in Kenya.

This was the origin of the Asian problem which confronts the Kenyan and British Governments today. Several thousand Chinese workers have been sent to Tanzania and Zambia. There is no reliable evidence to prove the Chinese Government has this colonial type of African penetration in mind.

A picture allegedly showing Peking wall posters appealing for volunteers to help build the railway, and promising land and houses for those who wish to stay on, has been denounced as false propaganda, circulated by the C.I.A. and not the Hsinhua News Agency, as indicated in the caption. Whatever the truth of this incident may be, the Governments of the two countries will not be anxious to repeat the massive political and human errors committed in East Africa, bequeathed on today's independent countries by the British railroad pioneers, even though they acted in good faith and could not foresee the consequences.

Both the World Bank and a U.N. study undertaken soon after Tanzanian independence found against the Tanzam project on economic grounds. Zambia would be enabled to export copper, it was argued, but what would the trains carry back from Dar es Salaam? It is hoped the successful completion of Tazara will swell the trade between Zambia and East Africa. So many items, including agricultural produce, consumed in Zambia today but imported from South Africa because of the special conditions caused by the geographical situation could be obtained from Tanzania and Kenya. This departure would help to join.

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(THE ECONOMIST)
FOREIGN REPORT
29 October 1970

CPYRGHT

Peking's 'Trojan horse' in Africa

The ceremonies in Dar es Salaam this week to mark the start of construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway have put the spotlight on China's mounting influence in Africa. The railway is being financed by a long-term, interest-free loan from Peking of approximately £169 million; it is the biggest aid project the Chinese have ever undertaken. There is little doubt that China hopes the railway will be both a Trojan horse for Chinese trade and a conveyor belt for the spread of Mao's thinking.

To some extent the project marks a shift in Peking's policy towards Africa. The excesses of the cultural revolution prompted several African states to sever diplomatic relations with Peking, on the ground that Chinese agents were engaging in subversive activities on African territory. Peking decided at this stage to combat western and Russian influence by concentrating on a few selected countries.

Tanzania is one of the chief of these. Even before the railway deal was fixed, Peking had become involved in about 20 aid projects in that country. But what the Chinese wanted was a major prestige project — something that would parallel the Russians' building of the Aswan Dam. The Tanzania-Zambia rail line was the answer.

So far the Chinese — there are 6,000 of them — have behaved impeccably in Tanzania and Zambia; they seem content to let their political ambitions wait, for 20 years if necessary. They were fully aware of the initial handicaps they had to overcome. Indeed, in 1965 the Zambians were so suspicious of China (whose embassy had been expelled from nearby Burundi for subversion) that they refused to let the preliminary rail survey team enter Zambian territory; the first report was confined to the Tanzanian section. **President Kaunda** dragged his feet for nearly two years, presumably hoping for a late counter-offer from the west, which never came, before entering into an agreement.

Today China finds itself the major aid giver to both Tanzania and Zambia, and sole military adviser and chief arms supplier to Tanzania. A commodity agreement tied to the railway loan indicates that China will replace Britain as the two African countries' most important trading partner. Meanwhile, the two countries' support for the liberation struggle enables the Chinese to maintain close contact with southern African guerrillas.

But China's presence is balanced by that of other aid-giving nations, notably Canada and the Scandinavian countries (whom **Dr Nyerere** often praises). The Tanzania-Zambia highway is being built by a western consortium including USAID (United States Aid for International Development). And, to underline the Tanzanians' pragmatic approach, an American business efficiency team is currently advising the Tanzanian state trading corporation and the development planning ministry. There is not a single Chinese adviser in any ministry in either Dar es Salaam or Lusaka. Very few senior officials of any sort go to China for training, partly because it has been found difficult to integrate them into the administration when they return.

Nor are the Chinese particularly popular with local people. They appear humourless and aloof, and they do not mix. Those Tanzanians who have been to China for training complain of condescending behaviour on the part of their hosts.

Linked by air, pipeline, road and rail

Immediately after U.D.I., the Canadians, British and Americans operated an emergency airlift of oil and other vital supplies into Zambia, besides taking out copper. Subsequently, the "hell run" started. Tanzania and Zambia got together, with an Italian company, to run articulated trucks transporting cargoes of 13,000 tons a month at the peak. The oil pipeline was laid, with Italian help, and the highway from Dar es Salaam to Tunduma started, with loans from Sweden and the U.S.

In addition to the airways, Zambia will ultimately have the combination of the oil pipeline, railway and trunk road as outlets through friendly country to the Indian Ocean, instead of having to depend on the overland route via the enemy territories of Rhodesia and Portuguese-held Mozambique or South Africa.

After the World Bank had turned down the project, the British and Canadians were approached for help. A joint survey formed the opinion that the railroad was both feasible and an economic proposition, but nothing practical materialised. It was at this juncture that the two neighbours turned to the Chinese. Their tripartite agreement was signed in Peking a little over three years ago. The Chinese had responded with alacrity. After the terms had been agreed and the paper work finished, they began at once to send in engineers and technicians, with equipment for the workshops and building the line.

The cost is estimated at the colossal figure of £169,000,000, for which the Chinese Government has made available a loan repayable over a period of 30 years, without interest. The internal costs, including indigenous labour and materials, will amount to rather more than half the total figure. These will be defrayed by the generation of local credit arising from the purchase of Chinese goods. Manufactured articles and processed agricultural produce have begun to appear in the shops. Stocks will become greater as more consumer goods are imported and, as a result of the visit of a Tanzanian State Trading Corporation mission to Peking, Chinese vehicles and machinery are bought. It follows axiomatically that such an enormous increase in imports from China, to build up credit as part of the loan will mean curtailing imports of similar goods from other countries; though Tanzania and Zambia will still hope to continue trading with them, or else the Chinese local credit cannot be created as envisaged. When repayments start in 1973, the two countries will have their railway for the low cost of about £2,700,000 annually, which they will share, spread over years when money at today's values will almost certainly have depreciated.

WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1970

TANZAM RAILROAD COULD ENHANCE PEKING'S ROLE IN AFRICA

CPYRGHT

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania—Driving a spike into a railroad the hardly seems like a political act. But it may be so here. The Chinese Communists are building a railway through Tanzania into Zambia that could change the politics of Africa far more than its economics.

Ceremonies recently at the two terminals—Dar es Salaam on the Tanzania coast of the Indian Ocean, and Kapiri Mposhi on the copper belt in Zambia—officially inaugurated construction of the 1,056-mile railroad, the greatest foreign aid project ever attempted by the Red Chinese.

For the Africans, the proj-

ect promises one simple political change. It will free black Zambia from its dependence on white southern Africa, especially for the export of its copper. Economically, the railroads of white Africa can do the job for Zambia. Politically, however, they have become unpalatable.

For the Chinese, the motivation is not as clear and simple. But the railroad will give the Chinese enormous presence and potential influence in an area that could become vital if there ever is a race war between white and black Africa.

The Chinese Communists already have more economic influence in Africa than in any

other foreign country in the world. In fact, the only larger Chinese Communist groups elsewhere are military units in North Vietnam and Laos.

In strict financial terms, the Chinese project is an example of extremely generous foreign assistance.

The Chinese are financing the project with a \$400 million, interest-free loan that Tanzania and Zambia will pay back over 30 years, beginning in 1983. Considering the interest that \$400 million would earn by the 21st Century, the loan is practically a gift.

In the past decade, Western economists, including a

bank, opposed construction of the railway on two grounds:

First, Zambia already had an outlet to the sea through the Rhodesian and Portuguese African rail systems and, second, an American-built tarred road from Tanzania to the Zambian copper belt, scheduled for completion next year, would enable Zambia to export all the copper it wanted through black Africa.

But these strict economic arguments ignored both politics and history.

As a Tanzanian government press release put it last week, the Western world had "forgotten that elsewhere many similar schemes were undertaken regardless of immediate economic benefits."

As an example, the government cited the first railroad in east Africa, the Uganda Railway built by the British from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria at the turn of the century.

That railroad, which moved through undeveloped tribal lands, was derided in the British Parliament at the time as "a gigantic folly" and "a railway with two ends and no middle."

The British government, however justified it on political grounds. Ministers said the railway would end the caravan slave trade and would enable the British, rather than the Germans, to control the source of the Nile River.

In the end, the railway had an even more important political result. It opened Kenya to white settlement and made that country the only "white man's colony" in east Africa.

In the opening ceremonies for the Chinese railway in Dar es Salaam last week, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia dealt with one of the major political problems of the railway—suspection of the Chinese.

Kaunda said Western opponents of the railway had "a rather psychopathic fear of the intentions and objectives of the Chinese." He dismissed this as "arrogance."

"The Chinese people are our friends," he said, "and they will remain so as long as it is to the benefit of our respective peoples."

Kaunda also told the Chinese delegation on the platform that the Africans "pledge to fight malicious campaigns being waged against the railway by the detractors."

An example of the kind of campaign Kaunda had in mind came up recently in a Nairobi newspaper. The newspaper published a picture that showed a recruiter in China promising volunteers free land in Tanzania if they would work on the railroad there. The Chinese government has denounced the photograph as phony and diplomats here agree.

The fabricated photograph, however, did awaken fears some Africans and many outsiders have about the numbers of Chinese coming to Africa. Already 4,700 Chinese are at work on the railroad alongside 7,000 Africans. The number of Chinese should reach 6,000 by the end of the year.

The photo also recalled another historical problem of railway building in east Africa.

To build their railway, the British imported 32,000 Indian coolies at the turn of the century. Of these, 2,500 died in Kenya and 6,500 became too sick to work. The British returned the sick coolies and 16,000 healthy ones to India. But 7,000 remained to settle in east Africa and become the nucleus of the resented Asian minority that controls much of the commerce of east Africa today.

When the Chinese project was first announced, many Western skeptics did not believe they could do the job.

It took the British twice as long as they intended and it cost them twice what they expected to build their railway. But the British were slowed by lions that ate 28 Indian workers and two British supervisors, warring tribesmen who stole rails to make spears and telegraph wire to make necklaces, and terrible climate, terrain and disease.

The Chinese also will face difficult problems in pushing their railway through mountainous terrain and tropical climate. But they actually are ahead of schedule.

Although the official opening was celebrated last week, the Chinese began work several months ago. More than 100 miles of bridges, culverts and embankments have been built, all ready for the laying of rail.

The betting now is the Chinese will finish the job by their target date of 1975.

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
8 November 1970

Die chinesische Eisenbahn ins Herz Afrikas Verbindung des sambischen Copperbelt durch Tansania mit dem Indischen Ozean

CPYRGHT

Rasches Fortschreiten der Bauarbeiten

CPYRGHT *Le. Dar es Salaam, Ende Oktober*

Vor drei bis vier Jahren nahmen es viele westliche — vor allem amerikanische — Diplomaten in Dar es Salaam mit einem Ausdruck milder Ueberlegenheit zur Kenntnis, wenn von den Chinesen und ihren Plänen die Rede war, eine über 1800 km lange Eisenbahn von der Hauptstadt Tansanias durch das teils sumpfige, teils gebirgige und unerschlossene Hinterland, kurz durch sehr schwieriges Gelände bis nach Kapiri Mposhi zu bauen, wo sie Anschluß an das sambische Bahnnetz haben soll. Man zweifelte daran, ob die Chinesen genügend technische Voraussetzungen und technisches Gerät besitzen, um ein solches Projekt zu verwirklichen, das nach einer Studie der Weltbank unwirtschaftlich sein soll und deswegen als nicht unterstützungswürdig erachtet wurde. Im übrigen werde, so wurde eingewandt, ein gutes Jahrzehnt vergehen, bis die Arbeiter und Techniker Mao Tsetungs den ersten Zug über diese Strecke laufen lassen könnten. Was aber könne alles in dieser Zeit geschehen? Bis dahin werde die Straße zwischen Dar es Salaam und Lusaka, über die das Kupfer aus Sambia an die Küste transportiert werden könne, mit schwedischer, italienischer und amerikanischer Hilfe asphaltiert sein. Im Verlaufe dieser Zeit könnten der Präsident Sambias, Kenneth Kaunda, und sein Kollege in Tansania, Julius Nyerere, davon überzeugt werden, daß sie mit ihrem Bahnprojekt auf das falsche Pferd gesetzt hätten.

Technische Leistungsfähigkeit der Chinesen

Damals wie heute weiß man im Grunde recht wenig über das kommunistische China. Man denkt in der Regel an gewaltige Heere von Kulis, die in Fronarbeit mit primitiven Werkzeugen unüberschbare Erdmassen bewegen und in technischer Hinsicht etwa dort stehen sollen, wo der Westen vor rund fünfzig Jahren stand. Man hat über China inzwischen zwar einiges hinzugelernt, zum Beispiel, daß seine Techniker Wasserstoffbomben herstellen und Langstreckentraketen über riesige Distanzen schießen können. Aber auch wer Gelegenheit hatte, die Chinesen seit 1967, als die ersten Geologen und Bahnexperten das Trasse festzulegen und zu vermessen begannen, in Tansania zu beobachten, mußte seine Vorstellung von der technischen Rückständigkeit der Untertanen Maos ziemlich rasch und gründlich revidieren.

Inzwischen sind in Ostafrika nach offiziellen Angaben 4700 Chinesen über die Meere heran-

gebracht worden — und mit ihnen modernes technisches Gerät wie Erdbewegungsmaschinen, Traktoren, Stahlträger für Brücken sowie Bohrmaschinen für den Tunnelbau. Schon jetzt sind die Chinesen mit ihrem Programm beträchtlich weiter voran, als dies westliche Fachleute vorausgesehen hatten. Sie haben bereits etwa 110 Brücken fertiggestellt und auf weiten Strecken Dämme aufgeschüttet. In der Nähe von Dar es Salaam soll noch im kommenden Monat mit der Herstellung von Beton-schwellen begonnen werden, wobei mit einem täglichen Ausstoß von 2000 Stück gerechnet wird. Die gegenwärtigen Berechnungen sehen vor, daß die Strecke in etwa vier Jahren betriebsbereit sein werde.

Verpaßte Chance des Westens?

Am 26. Oktober hat Kaunda vor den Toren Dar es Salaams in Gegenwart des chinesischen Ministers für auswärtige Handelsbeziehungen, Fang Yi, den Grundstein für dieses gewaltige Unternehmen gelegt. Kaunda streifte dabei in seiner Rede kurz die Vorgeschichte des Projekts: eine Studie der Weltbank, die zu dem Ergebnis kam, daß die Bahn unökonomisch und den Aufwand nicht wert sei — eine spätere Studie, die von der kanadisch-amerikanischen Firma Maxwell Stamp angefertigt wurde, sei allerdings zum gegenteiligen Ergebnis gekommen; aber alle Ueberredungskünste hätten nichts genützt: im Westen sei er allerorten auf kühle Ablehnung gestoßen. Der Westen habe den Fehler gemacht, das Projekt nur nach wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten zu beurteilen, und die besondere wirtschaftliche Lage Sambias als Binnenland, das von feindlichen Nachbarn umgeben sei, nicht sehen wollen. Möglicherweise sei diese ablehnende Haltung auch aus «politischen und ideologischen» Motiven zu erklären, aus Rücksicht auf Südafrika, Rhodesien und Portugal. Besonders Großbritannien hielt Kaunda die «vested interests» im «weißen», südlichen Afrika vor, die durch das Bahnprojekt gestört würden. Sambia müsse sich aber langsam von der wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit gegenüber dem südlichen Afrika lösen, wobei mehr die politischen als die ökonomischen Faktoren im Vordergrund stünden. Im übrigen stehe es Tansania und Sambia frei, sich seine Helfer selber zu wählen — auch seine Freunde und seine Feinde. Dem Vertrag mit Peking über den Eisenbahnbau liege die Zusicherung «gegenseitiger Achtung und Nicht-einmischung» zugrunde. Also bestehe aller Anlaß, den Chinesen dankbar zu sein. Es könne kein Zweifel mehr darüber bestehen, daß das Projekt verwirklicht werde.

Die dynamische Aktivität der Chinesen in Tansania und Sambia hat jetzt schon bei einigen west-

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erinnert an den *Assuan-Damm* in Ägypten, für den der damalige amerikanische Außenminister John Foster Dulles nicht zu interessieren war. Der Auftrag zum Dammbau an die Sowjets öffnete diesen zunächst den Weg zu einer wirtschaftlichen Penetration Ägyptens und schließlich zu militärischem und politischem Einfluß, der nicht nur auf Kairo beschränkt geblieben ist, sondern sich auf die meisten Länder des arabischen Raumes erstreckt, dies in einem Maße, daß Moskau sich nicht nur wichtige strategische Basen gesichert hat, sondern auch in der Lage ist, in der Auseinandersetzung mit Israel ein entscheidendes Wort mitzureden.

Fest etablierte chinesische Präsenz

Ähnlich könnten sich die Dinge in Tansania und in Sambia unter chinesischer Regie entwickeln; denn in Tansania beschränkt sich Peking nicht nur auf die Finanzierung und den Bau einer Eisenbahn, sondern hat auch andere Projekte übernommen und bildet schließlich die *Landarmee*, die *Luftwaffe* und die *Kriegsmarine* aus. Peking ist auch auf den Wunsch der tansanischen Regierung nach *modernen Waffen* wie Düsenjägern gegen mögliche Bedrohungen durch die Portugiesen eingegangen — ein Wunsch, den Ende letzten Jahres eine kanadische Militärkommission ablehnte, da ein solches Instrument viel zu kostspielig sei, die Ausbildung viel zu lange dauere

niern immer wieder die zht unberechtigte Antwort zu hören, daß es der Westen in der and gehabt hätte, den hinesen den Zugang zu rsperrn, daß aber jetzt ese *Chance vertan* sei.

Subversive Ausstrahlungen

Aus dem Kongo-Kinshasa ist aus zuverlässigen Quellen zu erfahren, daß seit Beginn dieses Jahres schon wieder *chinesische Waffen* über den Tanganjikasee zum Westufer im Bereich von Fizi geschmuggelt werden. In den Jahren der kongolesischen Rebellion, was heißt von 1964 bis 1966, waren die Chinesen die Hauptwaffenlieferanten der Aufständischen und benutzten Schleicherwege von Bujumbura in Burundi und von Kigoma am Ostufer des Tanganjikasees aus. Die Halbinsel vor Fizi am Tanganjikasee war das letzte Widerstandsnest der Rebellen, das 1966 von weißen Söldnern unter dem südafrikaner Mike Hoare nach hartem Kampf aufgehoben wurde. Man fand damals ein ganzes Arsenal von chinesischen Waffen: schwere Maschinengewehre, schwere Minenwerfer, Hand-

und im übrigen den militärischen Gesetzen nicht entsprechen. Diese Tatsachen sind sicherlich auch den Chinesen bekannt. Aber wie bei den Sowjets in Ägypten stehen auch bei ihnen in Ostafrika *politische Aspekte* im Vordergrund. Sie werden daher in Kürze *Düsenjäger* an Tansania liefern, weil sie wissen, daß dadurch bis in unabsehbare Zeit Instruktoren, Berater und technische Assistenten unerlässlich sein werden.

Man wird daher wohl auf Jahrzehnte hinaus mit einer *chinesischen Präsenz* in Tansania und Sambia zu rechnen haben, die sicherlich auch ihre Ausstrahlungen auf die *Nachbarländer* ausüben dürfte. Nicht nur stärkt sie den Rücken der Afrikaner im Kampf gegen die portugiesische Herrschaft in Moçambique und in Angola, sondern sie verschafft ihnen in Ostafrika auch eine *propagandistische Basis* in einem Maße, wie es ihnen bisher in keinem Teil des schwarzen Kontinents zu errichten gelungen ist. Zwar mögen die Zusicherungen der «gegenseitigen Achtung und Nichteinmischung» den Präsidenten Nyerere und Kaunda genügen; doch besteht dabei die Gefahr, daß beide sich einem naiven Wunschdenken hingeben, wenn sie glauben, daß Peking nur aus Motiven brüderlicher Nächstenliebe gegenüber «armen und ausgebeuteten schwarzen Brüdern» handle. Wenn derartige Besorgnisse in Dar es Salaam geäußert werden, bekommt man allerdings von den Tan-

Zwar ist der Kongo-Kinshasa heute gegen Aufstände nicht mehr so anfällig. Aber die Chinesen planen in allen ihren Unternehmungen auf lange Zeit. Und die gegenwärtige Lage im Kongo könnte sich auf allzu afrikanische Art über Nacht ändern. Die «*Befreiungsbewegungen*» im südlichen Tansania, die gegen die Portugiesen in Moçambique operieren, werden schon seit Jahren mit chinesischen Waffen versorgt, und offenbar hat die tansanische Regierung selbst seit langem die Kontrolle darüber verloren, wieviel militärisches Gerät aus Peking in ihr Land gelangt.

Von besonderem Gewicht sind natürlich die *wirtschaftlichen Interessen* Pekings. In erster Linie ist da der Kupferreichtum Sambias zu erwähnen; aber auch die noch unerschlossenen Eisenerz- und Kohlenvorkommen in den südlichen Landesteilen Tansanias dürften mitspielen, wie auch die große Vielfalt tropischer Agrarprodukte. Durch den Anschluß an das sambische Eisenbahnnetz stellt die neue Linie nicht nur eine leistungsfähige Verbindung zwischen dem *Indischen Ozean* und dem sambischen *Copperbelt* dar, sondern darüber hinaus noch mit der Schatzkammer des kongolesischen *Katanga*. Zudem glaubt man in Peking wohl schwerlich an die Aufrechterhaltung des Status quo in Afrika, sondern rüstet sich vermutlich mit Geduld auf einen allmählichen Zerfall der weißen Herrschaft in den Ländern südlich des Sambesi.

Technische Aspekte

Zu der feierlichen Grundsteinlegung in Dar es Salaam wurden von dem tansanischen Informationsministerium zum erstenmal einige nähere Angaben und Zahlen über das Eisenbahnprojekt veröffentlicht. Die Länge der Strecke von Dar es Salaam bis nach *Kapiri Mposhi* in Sambia, wo sie Anschluß an das sambische Eisenbahnnetz findet, wird 1859 Kilometer betragen. Man hat die sambische Spurweite von 1,064 Metern gewählt, was

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reits bestehenden Ostafrikanischen Eisenbahn verwendet werden kann, die über eine Spurweite von nur einem Meter verfügt. In den offiziellen Informationsblättern wird geschätzt, daß die neue Eisenbahn eine Kapazität von 1,75 Millionen Tonnen jährlich in beiden Richtungen werde bewältigen können. Während der Unterbau der ostafrikanischen Eisenbahnen nur mit einem Gewicht von 30 Kilo pro Meter behaftet werden kann, soll die neue *Tansania-Zambia Railroad* (abgekürzt Tazara) 45 Kilo-Belastung pro Meter aufnehmen können. Man rechnet mit Höchstgeschwindigkeiten bis zu 100 km/h, während auf den ostafrikanischen Linien nicht schneller als mit 60 km/h gefahren werden darf.

Abgesehen davon, daß Sambia nach Fertigstellung der Tazara auf die *portugiesische Eisenbahn nach Beira* verzichten kann, wird sie auch das Hinterland von Tansania erschließen, in dem reiche Eisen- und Kohlevorkommen prospektiert worden sind. Außerdem erhofft man sich neue landwirtschaftliche Anbauflächen im *Rufiji-Tal*, das bis dahin wegen seiner verkehrstechnischen Unzugänglichkeit praktisch brachlag. Am Streckenbau sind gegenwärtig nach den offiziellen Angaben insgesamt 12 000 Arbeiter und Techniker beschäftigt, wovon 4700 Chinesen. Man erwartet, daß sich diese Zahl noch auf 20 000 Arbeiter und Techniker erhöhen werde.

Kredit und Importzwang

Peking hat Tansania und Sambia für den Bahnbau einen zinsfreien Kredit von 2 866 000 000 tansanischen Shilling (rund 1,5 Milliarden Schweizerfranken) eingeräumt. Die Rückzahlungen sollen 1983 beginnen und sich über einen Zeitraum von 30 Jahren erstrecken. Die örtlichen Kosten (local costs) werden auf 52 Prozent des Kredites berechnet, die von den Regierungen Tansanias und Sambias durch *Import chinesischer Waren* auf Grund eines «Commodity credit agreement» aufgebracht werden sollen.

Nach den Informationsblättern soll die bereits angelaufene Einfuhr chinesischer *Gebrauchsgüter* (Spielzeug, Porzellan, Textilien usw.) nicht erhöht werden, sondern man will vielmehr sogenannte *Kapitalgüter* wie Baumaterialien importieren, deren Gesamtwert sich etwa auf 200 Millionen tansanische Shilling pro Jahr (etwa 110 Millionen Franken) belaufen dürfte. Peking wird auch das *Rollmaterial* für die Bahn liefern. Die Kosten dürften etwa 20 Prozent der Gesamtausgaben ausmachen. Die Aufwendungen für den Ausbau des *Hafens von Dar es Salaam* werden von den Chinesen nicht finanziert. Gegenwärtig existieren nur drei Piers für Hochseeschiffe. Drei weitere sind aber bereits im Bau; zwei zusätzliche sind geplant. Sobald die Eisenbahn in Betrieb genommen sein wird, glaubt man acht bis zehn weitere Piers mit speziellen Verladeeinrichtungen zu benötigen, vor allem für große Massengutfrachter, die speziell für den Transport von Urzen eingerichtet sind.

NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
8 November 1970

CPYRGHT CHINESE GAIN INFLUENCE THROUGH RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION

Three or four years ago many western diplomats in Dar es Salaam, especially Americans, wore expressions of mild superiority while listening to Chinese plans to build a railroad in Tanzania. This road was to be more than 1800 kilometers long and extend from the Tanzanian capital through hinterland that was either swampy or mountainous or inaccessible, through difficult terrain, to join the Zambian railroad system at Kapiri Mposhi. There was some doubt that the Chinese had sufficient technical qualifications and equipment to carry out such a project. After all, following a study showing it to be economically unfeasible, the World Bank had refused financial backing. Furthermore, it was argued that it would take Mao Tse-tung's workers and technicians at least a decade before they could run their first train on this road. How much could happen during that time? By then the Dar es Salaam-Lusaka highway, over which copper could be brought to the coast, would have been paved with Swedish, Italian and American aid. In that time Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda and his Tanzanian colleague Julius Nyerere could become convinced that they had backed the wrong horse in choosing the train project.

CPYRGHT

Chinese Technical Skill

Then as now very little was known about communist China. As a rule we tend to think of tremendous hordes of coolies doing compulsory labor with primitive tools on endless masses of land; we think of them being technically where we in the west were about 50 years ago. Of course we have learned a little more about them in the meantime; for instance we know that their technicians can build hydrogen bombs and propel long-range missiles over tremendous distances. But anyone who had the opportunity to see the first geologists and railroad experts mark out and survey the line in Tanzania quickly had to revise his ideas about archaic technical knowledge in Mao Tse-tung's subjects.

In the meantime, according to official figures, some 4700 Chinese have crossed the ocean. With them they have brought modern technical equipment like earth moving machines, tractors, steel girders for bridges as well as drilling machines for tunnel building. The Chinese are already considerably farther along in their program than western experts had anticipated. They have already finished some 110 bridges and thrown up dams over long stretches. By next month they are supposed to start on the manufacture of concrete blocks near Dar es Salaam. and figure on producing 2000 per day. Current calculations picture the stretch in operation in about four years.

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On 26 October Kaunda laid the cornerstone for this tremendous undertaking at the gates of Dar es Salaam in the presence of the Chinese chairman of the Economics Relations with Foreign Countries Commission, Fang I. Kaunda, in his speech, briefly outlined the early history of the project: a World Bank study had shown that the road was economically unfeasible and not worth the expense; a later study by the Canadian-American Maxwell Stamp Company had, it is true, come to the opposite conclusion; but all attempts at persuasion had been in vain; the project had been coolly received everywhere and met with refusal. The west had made the mistake of looking at the project only from the economic point of view. It had not considered Zambia's special economic situation as a landlocked country, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Possibly this negative attitude could also be explained by "political and ideological" motives: they did not want to offend South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. Kaunda pointed especially to Great Britain whose "vested interests" in "white" southern Africa would have been disturbed by the railroad project. But Zambia would slowly have to free itself from dependence on southern Africa, and political rather than economic considerations were more important here. Furthermore, both Zambia and Tanzania were at liberty to choose their own helpers -- and their own friends and enemies. The contract with Peking to build the railroad was based on the assurance of "mutual respect and non-intervention." Thus there were due grounds to be thankful to the Chinese. There could no longer be any doubt that the project would be realized.

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ready made several western observers reevaluate their thinking. They remember the Aswan Dam in Egypt in which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would show no interest. The contract with the Soviets to build the dam opened for them the way to economic penetration of Egypt. Finally it led to military and political influence that did not stop in Cairo. It has extended to most of the countries in the Arab sphere, and to such a degree that Moscow has not only secured important strategic bases but is also in a position to have a decisive say in the dispute with Israel.

Chinese Presence is Firmly Established

Under Chinese administration, events could develop in a similar fashion in Tanzania and Zambia. Peking has not limited itself to financing and constructing a railroad in Tanzania; it has also taken over other projects and is now training the army, air force and navy. At Tanzania's request, Peking has agreed to supply modern arms such as jet fighters against possible Portuguese threats. At the end of last year a Canadian military commission denied this request on the grounds that such instruments were too expensive, training would take too long and anyhow the military situation did not warrant it. The Chinese certainly also knew these facts. But just as for the Soviets in Egypt, political aspects are more important to them. Therefore they will shortly deliver jet fighters to Tanzania because they know that this will make it necessary to keep instructors, advisers and technical assistants there for some

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Thus we will have to reckon with a Chinese presence in Tanzania for decades. And this will surely have its effect on the neighboring countries. This not only stiffens the Africans' backs in their fight against Portuguese domination in Mozambique and Angola, but also presents the Red Chinese with a propaganda base in East Africa to a degree that till then they had been unable to secure anywhere on the black continent. The assurances of "mutual respect and non-intervention" may be enough for Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. Yet they may be giving in to wishful thinking if they believe that Peking is acting purely out of motives of brotherly love for the "poor and exploited black brothers." When such concerns are voiced in Dar es Salaam, however, the answer the Tanzanians give, not without some reason, is that the West had the opportunity to keep the Chinese out but now it has lost this chance.

Subversive Emanations

Reliable sources in Congo-Kinshasa report that since the beginning of this year Chinese arms are again being smuggled across Lake Tanganyika to the western shore of the area around Fizi. During the Congolese rebellion, that is from 1964 to 1966, the Chinese were the chief arms suppliers for the rebels and used secret roads from Bujumbura in Burundi and from Kigoma on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. The peninsula at Fizi on Lake Tanganyika was the last rebel nest of resistance. In 1966 it was wiped out after a hard fight by white mercenaries under the South African Mike Hoare. At that time an entire arsenal of Chinese arms was found: heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, hand grenades, and automatic rifles.

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of course Congo-Kinshasa is not as susceptible to uprisings today.

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But in all their undertakings the Chinese plan for the future. And the current situation in the Congo could change overnight, as it does so frequently in Africa. The "liberation movements" in southern Tanzania operating against the Portuguese in Mozambique have been supplied with Chinese arms for years. Apparently the Tanzanian government itself has long since lost count of the amount of military equipment from Peking in its country.

Of especial importance, naturally, are Peking's economic interests. The most important to be considered is Zambia's wealth of copper. But of equal importance may be the iron ore and coal deposits in the southern parts of Tanzania which to date have been inaccessible and also the great number of tropical agricultural products. The tie-in with the Zambian railroad not only provides an efficient connection between the Indian Ocean and the Zambian copper belt but in addition, with the great treasure chest of Congolese Katanga. In this area Peking probably hardly believes in the maintenance of the status quo in Africa, but is probably patiently girding itself for the inevitable disintegration of white domination in the countries south of the Zambesi.

Technical Aspects

At the festive cornerstone-laying in Dar es Salaam the Tanzanian Information Ministry for the first time published several details and figures on the railroad project. The length of the stretch from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia where it meets the Zambian railroad net will

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be approximately 1,004 meters, gauge track like that of

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Zambia. This means that the rolling stock cannot be used on the East African road, which has a one-meter gauge. Official information releases estimate that the new road will be able to handle 1.75 million tons annually in both directions. Whereas the East African roadbed can take only 30 kilograms per meter, the new Tanzania-Zambia railroad (Tazara for short) can carry 45 kilograms per meter. They figure on top speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour as against a maximum of 60 kilometers per hour on the East African line.

Apart from the fact that Zambia, after completion of Tazara, can dispense with the Portuguese railroad to Beira, the road will also provide access to Tanzania's hinterland in which rich iron and coal deposits have been prospected. In addition they hope to win new agricultural land for cultivation in the Rufiji valley. To date, because technical reasons make it inaccessible, it has been practically a wasteland. According to official reports, a total of 12,000 workers and technicians, including 4700 Chinese, are at work on the road. It is expected that this figure will rise to 20,000 workers and technicians.

Credit and Export Pressure

Peking has made available to Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free credit of 2866 million Tanzanian shillings (about 1.5 billion Swiss francs). Repayment is to start in 1983 and extend over a period of 30 years. Local costs are calculated at 52 percent of the credit and are to be defrayed by the Tanzanian and Zambian governments through

imports of Chinese goods on the basis of a "commodity credit agreement."

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According to the information releases, the current importation of Chinese consumer goods (toys, china, textiles, etc) is not to be increased, but rather so-called capital goods like construction materials are to be imported. Total value may run as high as 200 million Tanzanian shillings annually (about 110 million francs). Peking will also supply the railroad's rolling stock. Costs may be some 20 percent of the total expenditures. The Chinese will not finance the development of the port of Dar es Salaam. At present there are only three piers for deep sea ships. Three additional ones are currently under construction; two further ones are planned. As soon as the railroad has been put into operation it is thought that an additional 8 to 10 more piers with special loading facilities will be needed, especially for large bulk goods freighters, specially equipped to transport ores.

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
6 December 1970

Pekings afrikanischer Brückenkopf

Auf der Baustelle der Tansania — Sambia-Eisenbahn

Von einem Sonderkorrespondenten

CPYRGHT

In den Straßen Dar es Salaams bringen unter Mangobäumen, aus denen jetzt die reifen Früchte fallen, fliegende Händler die Spruchweisheit des Vorsitzenden Mao an den Mann. Zwischen Stadt und Flughafen weist ein mit chinesischen Zeichen beschriftetes Schild den Weg zwischen hochstämmigen Kokospalmen zum Yombo Railroad Centre. Und in dem prächtigen Naturhafen der Stadt läuft kurz vor Sonnenuntergang die «Jianhua» aus Kanton mit Hunderten von Pekings Entwicklungshelfern ein und macht unweit der Luxuskarawanserei des Kilimandscharo-Hotels fest. — Die chinesische Präsenz drängt sich bei einem kurzen Besuch Tansanias, von den geschilderten Zufallsbeobachtungen und -begegnungen abgesehen, nicht auf. Das Hauptvorhaben Pekings

— der Bau einer über 1800 Kilometer langen Verbindungsbahn zwischen dem sambischen Kupfergürtel und dem Hafen von Dar es Salaam, der *Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR)* — fällt kaum in die Augen. Die Camps der chinesischen Bautrupps liegen nicht nur hinter Stacheldraht, sondern zum Teil auch hinter spanischen Wänden, die dem Passanten jeden Blick auf die Materiallager und Baumaschinen sowie die notorisch kamerascheuen Untertanen Maos verwehren. Ebenso wenig sind die eigentlichen Baustellen zugänglich. Besichtigungswünsche, bei den tansanischen Behörden vorgebracht, werden dem fremden Besucher gerne mit dem Hinweis auf die Empfindlichkeit und Geheimnistuerei «unserer chinesischen Freunde» abgeschlagen. Aber er braucht nicht lange, um herauszufinden, daß so viel Diskretion auch dem einheimischen Bedürfnis entspricht. Man hat wenig Lust, Pekings Engagement an die große Glocke zu hängen. Da und dort ist sogar die Einsicht vorhanden, daß den, der sich grün macht, gar leicht die Ziegen fressen. — auch wenn man diese Bedenken afrikanischer formulieren würde.

Die Vorteile, die die Eisenbahn den drei Partnern bringt, liegen auf der Hand. Sambia wird von der politischen Hypothek frei, sein Kupfer auf dem Schienensystem des «weißen Afrika» — via Rhodesien und Moçambique — an den Indischen Ozean verfrachten zu müssen. Tansania wiederum erhofft sich, abgesehen von der Verstärkung des Transithandels, Anreize zur Erschließung von Kohlen- und Eisenerzvorkommen sowie des landwirtschaftlichen

Potentials im jetzt noch unzugänglichen Hinterland. Der Wert des Brückenkopfs für Peking — der möglicherweise hauptsächlich zur Subversion im «weißen» Afrika südlich des Sambesi aufgebaut wird — wird wesentlich davon abhängen, ob es sich das Vertrauen der Gastländer und der Anstößer, die zur ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft gehören, erwerben kann. Das Mißtrauen etwa Kenyas ist wach. Nicht nur gegenüber den guten Worten Maos im roten Büchlein, das in Nairobi konfisziert würde, sondern auch gegenüber den nachteiligen Auswirkungen, die der Bau der Bahn durch den Einstrom chinesischer Waren (deren Gegenwert zur Deckung der örtlich anfallenden Baukosten dient) auf einheimische Industrien im Embryonalzustand haben könnte. In dem Mißbehagen schwingen selbst historische Erinnerungen mit: der Bau der Ostafrikanischen Eisenbahn führte seinerzeit zu einer starken Vermehrung der asiatischen Bevölkerung; die indischen Gastarbeiter setzten sich im Lando fest.

Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob die TAZAR für Peking wird, was der Hochdamm von Assuan für Moskau — ein Fuß zwischen Tür und Schwelle. Die Vorgeschichte des Projekts gemahnt an jene des Staudamms: die Gutachter der Weltbank und westlicher Staaten (allerdings auch der Sowjetunion) zeigten Tansania und Sambia in Sachen TAZAR die kalte Schulter. Wenn die Lektion von Assuan offenbar in dieser Hinsicht nicht beherzigt worden ist, kann sie wenigstens in anderer nachträglich fruchtbar werden: im Verzicht darauf, bei Voraussagen über die technische Kompetenz der unerwünschten Entwicklungshelfer den Wunsch mit der Wirklichkeit zu verwechseln. Die Schwierigkeiten des Streckenbaus im Kipengere-Gebirge sind offenbar gewaltig. Aber vorläufig widerspricht nichts der Erwartung, daß Peking das gesteckte Ziel, einen betriebsbereiten Schienenstrang binnen fünf Jahren, wird erreichen können.

Die Weltbank hat seinerzeit ein Darlehen mit der Begründung abgelehnt, der Bahnbau sei unwirtschaftlich. Nun erscheint sie auf der Liste möglicher Kreditgeber für den Ausbau der Hafenanlagen von Dar es Salaam, den die — wider besseres Wissen oder aus höherer Einsicht, das wird sich zeigen, ertrotzte — Bahn notwendig macht.

NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
6 December 1970

CPYRGHT

PEKING'S AFRICAN BRIDGEHEAD

In the streets of Dar es Salaam, under the mango trees from which ripe fruit is falling now, vendors are peddling the wisdom of Chairman Mao. Between the city and the airport a signboard lettered in Chinese points the way through the coconut palms to the Yombo Railroad Center. In the beautiful, natural harbor of the city, shortly before sundown the vessel "Jianhua" from Canton arrives with a cargo of hundreds of Peking development helpers and ties up not far from the luxury caravansary of the Kilimanjaro Hotel. On the occasion of a brief visit to Tanzania, apart from the above-mentioned casual observations and encounters, the Chinese presence is not obtrusive. The principal Peking project -- construction of a railroad connection (more than 1800 kilometers in length) between the Zambian copper belt and the harbor of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR) -- is hardly visible. The camps of the Chinese construction force are not only behind barbed wire but also in part concealed by "Spanish walls" which prevent the passer-by from catching a glimpse of the materials stores and construction machinery as well as of the notoriously camera-shy subjects of Mao. The actual construction sites are equally inaccessible. Requests to visit the sites, placed before Tanzanian authorities, are frequently rejected with a reference to the sensitivity and the secretiveness of "our Chinese friends." But the visitor does not need too much time to find out that so much discretion also suits the locals. There is little inclination to broadcast Peking's involvement. Here and there it is understood that he who makes himself green can easily be gobbled up by the goats -- even if this idiom were to be phrased in a more African manner.

The advantages which the railroad brings to the three partners are obvious. Zambia will be rid of its political mortgage of having to ship its copper on the railroad system of "White Africa" -- via Rhodesia and Mozambique--to the Indian Ocean. Tanzania, on the other hand, is hoping that apart from strengthening transit trade it will be able to provide stimuli for uncovering coal and iron ore deposits as well as expanding the agriculture potential of the currently still inaccessible hinterland. The value of the Peking bridgehead -- which is possibly being expanded mainly for purposes of subversion in White Africa south of the Zambezi -- will essentially be dependent upon whether it can earn the confidence of the host countries and objectors which are members of the African community. The distrust of, say, Kenya has been awakened. Not only vis-a-vis the good words of Chairman Mao in the little red booklet, which was confiscated in Nairobi, but also with respect to the detrimental effects which the construction of the railroad could have on native industry which is in the embryonic stage through the influx of Chinese goods (whose value serves to cover local construction costs). Even historical memories play a role in this feeling of malaise. Construction of the East African Railroad had, at one time, led to a strong multiplication of Asiatic peoples; the Hindu workers settled in the land.

It remains to be seen whether TAZAR will become for Peking what the Aswan High Dam is for Moscow.-- a foot in the door. The preliminary history of the project is a reminder of that pertaining to the dam: the experts from the World Bank and from Western countries (however also from the Soviet Union) showed Tanzania and Zambia a cold shoulder with respect to TAZAR. If the lesson of Aswan was obviously not heeded in this regard it can at least bear fruit in other matters subsequently: refusal, in predicting the technical competence of the unwanted development helpers, to confuse wishes with reality. The difficulties of the construction project in the Kipengere Mountains are obviously horrendous. But for the time being nothing is contradicting the expectations that Peking will be able to accomplish the goal of constructing an operational railroad within five years.

The World Bank had at one time rejected a loan with the justification that the railroad project was uneconomical. Now it [the Bank] appears on a list of possible lenders for the improvement of harbor facilities at Dar es Salaam which the railroad -- defiantly [built], be it against better judgment or through a stroke of higher insight -- now makes necessary.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
20 June 1971

CPYRGHT

CHINESE DOMINATE TANZANIA

COMMUNIST Chinese penetration of Tanzania, which has long been alarming to her African neighbours, has now reached danger point.

Chinese military personnel in the country now exceed in number the total strength of the small Tanzanian Army, which is itself falling under Chinese control.

The latest figures given by the Tanzanian Government reveal that the 50,000-strong labour force working on the 1,200-mile Tan-Zam railway project (from the coast inland to Zambia) now includes 13,000 Chinese "technicians."

What the figures do not reveal is that almost all of these technicians are, in fact, soldiers of the Chinese-People's Liberation Army. They come from its Railway Corps, its Engineering Corps and its Signal Corps, but have all had basic military training.

This is not the first time that the Chinese Army has been used for such major construction projects abroad. Furthermore, it has an awkward habit of sitting tight even after its work is completed.

Thus Chinese Army personnel, in civilian guise, as in Tanzania, built the strategic highway linking Katmandu and Lhasa, the capitals of Nepal and Tibet. The job was finished in 1967.

Still in Nepal

But the Chinese soldiers are still in Nepal. They persuaded the Nepalese Government to allow them to remain for 10 years to "maintain" the 72-mile Nepalese section of the road.

Whether President Nyerere will need 10 years to get his

13,000 Chinese helpers out of Tanzania remains to be seen.

But quite apart from the alarm spreading throughout East Africa, there are already signs of friction between the Chinese and the Tanzanians themselves. Hints of labour unrest and racial animosity have appeared even in official Tanzanian reports.

Thus it is clear that there has been a head-on clash between the native labourers and their Chinese overseers on the railway over the provision of food. The Chinese decided that as the Africans' practice of preparing their own meals wasted far too much time, they would provide the food themselves.

The average African labourer earns about 170 Tanzanian shillings (£10) a month and the Chinese started deducting 55 shillings (£3.24) from this for the meals service.

Quite apart from their resentment at losing such a chunk of their wages, the Africans found they could not stomach the overseers' food. Piles of it have been found thrown away on the construction sites.

The Chinese are clearly aware of this mounting domestic hostility and of the growing unease among Tanzania's six African neighbours. They keep their Army teams out of sight and confined to their own special camps when not working on the railway.

Their supplies come in Chinese vessels which bring in, and unload by night, equipment for Tanzania's own Army, the 10,000-strong "People's Defence Force."

Chinese control of military supply and training in this force became absolute when Canadian

military instructors in Tanzania had to be withdrawn abruptly two years ago, when President Nyerere refused to renew his training agreement with Ottawa.

Recent Chinese arms deliveries have included at least 16 medium tanks, similar to the Soviet T-62 class, to reinforce the small armoured element of 12 Chinese light tanks in the Tanzanian Army.

Artillery provided has included 24 field guns and some six to eight howitzers. All this equipment arrived with a full range of spares and ammunition.

Large quantities of mortars and light arms, together with ammunition, have also been shipped to Dar-es-Salaam in the past few months as well as at least 100 military lorries and large numbers of Jeep-type vehicles.

Boats and planes

In early April the Chinese vessel Gui Lin also off-loaded two 100-ton Shanghai-class fast coastal patrol boats for the tiny Tanzanian Navy bringing its total strength up to six patrol boats.

Peking has also undertaken to deliver to Tanzania two squadrons (about 24) of MiG-17 type interceptors. The first group of 50 Tanzanian Air Force trainees left for China at the beginning of the year for training in the handling of these Chinese-built aircraft.

Eventually, the Chinese have agreed to train 250 Tanzanians as pilots and technicians. All candidates are being selected by the Chinese on the spot and subjected to vigorous examinations by a team of Chinese doctors in Tanzania.

WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1971

**Service to Start
On Tanzam Railway**

Router

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania—Passenger trains will start running by the end of this year on the 1,200-mile stretch of the Chinese-assisted Tanzam

Railway project, a Tanzanian official said today.

The section lies wholly in Tanzania and represents about 40 per cent of the 1,200-mile road link with Zambia.

REUTER, Nairobi
17 July 1971

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS REUTERS MISQUOTE ON RAILWAY COST

CPYRGHT

Dar es Salaam, 17 July (REUTER)--The Tanzanian Government said today REUTERS had misquoted the Zambian finance minister over the cost of the Chinese-financed railway to link Lusaka and Dar es Salaam.

"The attention of the Tanzanian Government has been drawn to a report which was circulated by REUTERS news service that Hon. Mwanakatwe, Zambian minister of finance, told the Zambian Parliament on July 15, 1971, that the Tanzam railway now cost 17 million kwacha (nearly 10 million sterling) more than originally estimated. "The extra cost, the report stated, arose because the Chinese engineers found tunnelling on some sections more difficult than originally thought. The government wants to make it known to all concerned that the report is a complete misquoting of what the Hon. Mwanakatwe is known to have told the Zambian Parliament. This case of misreporting is unfortunate because the estimated cost of the railway, which the People's Republic of China so generously agreed to assist in financing, still remains the same as agreed between China, Zambia and Tanzania.

"The Tanzania Government has information that what in fact the Hon. Mwanakatwe was asking parliament was merely to request for budgetary provision to fulfill Zambia's obligations as agreed on between the three parties," the Tanzanian Government statement said.

NCNA
25 June 1971

NYERERE DENIES RUMORS ABOUT PRC TECHNICIANS

CPYRGHT

Dar es Salaam, June 24 --"Tanzania is ours and we shall defend it for the benefit of Africa," declared Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere when he was addressing army men of the Tanzania military academy at Mbuluni, south of the capital, on June 22, according to press reports here.

He said that former colonial powers would like to see Tanzania and other countries in Africa play their former part--the victim of exploitation. Those who colonized Africa would still like to maintain their sphere of influence should they have the opportunity to do so. Tanzania's resolution to gain independence was therefore not in their interest and they would go all lengths to ensure that they can continue with their exploitation.

Referring to the anti-China rumour concocted and spread recently by the British paper "DAILY TELEGRAPH" about Chinese railway technicians in Tanzania President Nyerere said that this is just one of the ways in which colonialists wanted to pick up a quarrel with Tanzania in an attempt to exploit it.

He said that if the imperialists and exploiters win in one country, they look for another where they can strike a blow. "If they come, they will come seriously, and we must be prepared for them by being serious."

CPYRGHT

The president called on the Tanzanian soldiers, peasants, and workers to be as serious and tough as the Vietnamese and Chinese in their fight against aggression and exploitation. He said that Viet Nam has been fighting a war of liberation since 1945, first with the French who later gave up and withdrew, and later with Americans who will have no alternative but to withdraw.

The president called on the soldiers to learn diligently at the academy so that they can defend the country better for the benefit of the whole African Continent.

WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1971

China Trade Fair Planned in Zambia

Router

LUSAKA, Zambia, Aug. 13—China will hold a trade exhibition in Lusaka in October in an attempt to boost Zambian interest in Chinese goods.

Zambia has to import Chinese products worth about \$11 million each year under an agreement by which Peking sells goods here to offset the cost of the 1,000-mile railroad the Chinese are building between Zambia and Tanzania.

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September 1971

THE RUSSIAN CHURCH IN POLITICAL ACTION

If Lenin had felt sure of himself in 1918 he would no doubt have outlawed all forms of worship in the Soviet Union. Instead, he opened a period of religious persecution that still flourishes. Today, churchmen who dare to be outspoken about their constitutional rights to practice religion are imprisoned while those who are politically docile and subservient to the dictates of the Soviet regime are sent abroad for "dialogues" with Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, etc. It is this subservient group that the Soviet regime uses to build up its facade of religious tolerance at home. This "tolerance" embraces some 14 officially recognized church denominations throughout the USSR, the largest of which are the Russian Orthodox and Islamic Churches. In exchange for official toleration, the Soviet regime extracts obeisance from church leaders, support for its foreign and "peace" policies, and uses Communist dialogues with foreign religious groups to promote Communist popular front tactics.

Ecumenical Dialogues

In the decade preceding the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the USSR was highly successful in utilizing its own subservient church representatives, particularly those from the Russian Orthodox Church, to maneuver supposedly apolitical ecumenical groupings into espousing Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. This was accomplished by working through the Christian Peace Conference, founded in 1958, and by the entrance in 1961 of the Russian Orthodox Church into membership in the World Council of Churches. The failure of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Christian Peace Conference to take any significant action or stand following the invasion of Czechoslovakia (with the exception of individuals such as Russian Orthodox dissenter Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov, later imprisoned) convinced many world Christian leaders that what they had viewed as positive experiment with a unique East-West dialogue had been fast turning into an Eastern monologue. Mounting evidence of continued religious persecution (as recounted in samizdat publications reaching the West) that goes on behind the facade of official "tolerance" has further increased the wariness of some Communist and most non-Communist religious leaders about Soviet intentions.

Christian Peace Conference

Since its founding in 1958 by a group of East European theologians in Prague, the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) has functioned as the primary channel through which Communist churchmen reach and try to

influence world Christian bodies and public opinion in general. During the first ten years of its existence, the CPC also characterized a new subtlety in Soviet manipulation of Communist fronts and permitted Soviet "peace" propaganda to become an effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Before the founding of the CPC, Soviet peace organizations were notorious for their inflexibility in prohibiting either pronouncements or proceedings to deviate in the slightest from Soviet policy. Within the CPC, however, individual Soviets stayed in the background and permitted an impressive degree of freedom in theological discussions so long as they could feel sure that the desired resolution on a given topic (Vietnam, Zionism, West German revanchism, etc.) would be forthcoming. This small degree of permissiveness in organizations such as the CPC greatly enhanced the potential of such groups to attract non-Communist support.

The Christian Peace Conference, which prefers to call itself a "movement" rather than an organization, grew rapidly. Only 47 participants (of whom only four came from the West) attended the founding meeting in 1958. During the next ten years, the CPC sponsored three large international meetings called All-Christian Peace Assemblies. The third Assembly, held in Prague 31 March - 5 April 1968, was attended by over 500 delegates from 55 countries, representing churches of 20 European, 18 African, and 12 American countries. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was represented by a Roman Catholic theologian. Some 63 observers were sent from organizations such as the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, and the British Council of Churches. Among non-Christian attendees were representatives from the Buddhist religious societies of Ceylon and the USSR. Conference documents listed the names of 82 newspapers, magazines, and radio-TV reporters accredited to the Assembly. The "Czechoslovak Spring" was at its height during the third Assembly, and for the first time after twenty years of imposed silence, Czechoslovak Christians were free to disclose how their churches had been manipulated and infiltrated by the Communist Party.

Four months after the close of the third Peace Assembly, Czechoslovakia was invaded, signaling the beginning of the metamorphosis of the CPC from a quasi-independent grouping to one completely under Soviet control. The president of the CPC, Dr. Josef Hromadka and its general secretary, Jaroslav Ondra, both of whom spoke out against the invasion, were purged from the CPC in the course of its "normalization." Hromadka had been a firm believer in the Soviet socialist revolution, a member of the Soviet-run World Council of Peace, and in 1958 he received a Lenin Peace Prize for "his services to the cause of Communism at home and abroad, and especially in the ecumenical movement." The day after the invasion, Hromadka wrote the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia that "the Soviet government could not have made a more tragic mistake.... Only an immediate withdrawal of the occupying armies can partly mitigate our common tragedy." The reply came from the

Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church who, in an angry letter, called Hromadka's views "inadmissible expressions."

In a subsequent memorandum written for internal CPC use, Hromadka wrote that the cause of peace could not be served "with views and tasks given to us from outside" and without the "courage to listen to each other and to make decisions freely in real dialogue." This memorandum marked an irrevocable turn in the life of the CPC and eventually forced the resignations of its general secretary and president. The 15 November 1969 issue of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that the CPC as "breaking up," and said that until the Soviet-led invasion some members of the organization had taken "Soviet speeches about peace as genuine and had placed themselves at Soviet disposal as a church program for such propaganda. The invasion shocked many and the work of the CPS has been crippled ever since."

Following Hromadka's departure, Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) succeeded in gaining almost complete control of the organization and the situation within the CPC rapidly deteriorated. During an early 1970 Working group meeting, for example, Nikodim's high-handed tactics in the handling of procedural matters and his complete disregard for any opposition within the CPC, caused a walkout by seven of the Western representatives, including those from France and West Germany. By mid-1971, associated groups in most of Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. had all but withdrawn from active participation in the CPC as it is run under Nikodim. The Fourth All-Christian Peace Assembly is scheduled to meet in Prague this month, from 30 September to 3 October 1971. The prognosis is for a very slim attendance.

Nikodim, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, at 31 and with little theological training, became the youngest Bishop in the ROC and in 1963, at age 34, was elevated to Metropolitan, a rank just below that of Patriarch. As head of the church's Department of External Relations in Moscow, Nikodim directs all ROC foreign relations and is the ROC's representative in the World Council of Churches. How Nikodim functions as an articulate foreign affairs spokesman for the Russian church, and thereby for the Soviet regime, is described in the attached newspaper clip reprints.

After its founding in 1948, the Soviets at first viewed the Geneva-based World Council of Churches (WCC) as "a tool of Western imperialism." But by the mid-1950's and as the WCC grew in stature and size, the Soviet regime began to see a possibility for using the organization as a co-activist in its own "peace" campaign. Feelers were put out and by the time of the WCC Third General Assembly in New Delhi in late 1961, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) had been admitted to membership. The entry of Russia's largest church into the WCC was hailed by many as a triumph of Christian unity over political disagreement; others were not so sure.

Concerning Metropolitan Nikodim as representative of the Russian church in the WCC, Michael Bourdeaux noted, in his book Opium of the People (1965), that upon Nikodim's entry into the WCC, he began campaigning for the WCC to play its part in the peace forum, particularly by supporting resolutions adopted by the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC). If challenged, Nikodim would answer, "By supporting such causes we gain standing in the eyes of our government." Bourdeaux commented that it was "surprising that he never said that it must be a basic Christian concern to further the cause of peace in the world." When asked what contribution the Russian Church could bring to the WCC, "instead of giving me an answer about the richness of the Russian liturgy...or saying it would bring a new stream of Christianity into a predominantly Protestant movement, Nikodim started talking of the value to Western Christians of the social experience they would gain from the Soviet Union."

As the chief organizational expression of the ecumenical movement in the world today, the WCC is by dictate of its charter apolitical. Nevertheless, as the ROC became increasingly active, WCC statements increasingly reflected an imbalance in their political orientation. For example, following the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the statement issued by the WCC "deplored the military intervention" and called for the removal of the Warsaw Pact troops "at the earliest possible moment." In contrast, WCC statements on Vietnam issued during the same year had adopted standard North Vietnamese-Soviet terminology in calling for "an immediate and unconditional" halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. presence in Vietnam, according to WCC statements had brought about "mortal suffering of the Vietnamese people," while the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia was viewed by the WCC as an "ill-considered action."

The type of imbalance as reflected in these and other statements on East-West political issues has been a source of disillusionment to many Western churchmen. The inadequacy, if not lack of response, from the WCC to appeals from those imprisoned in the USSR because of religious persecution is to many an added frustration. Within the ecumenical movement, an increasingly critical eye is being cast on "what it means to be in responsible communication with Christians in Communist societies." (Among the attached clippings are included some which illustrate recent developments of political trends within the WCC.)

SAMIZDAT SOURCES ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE USSR

The Soviet constitution guarantees each citizen the right to practice religion and states that anyone who prevents him from so doing is liable to punishment. Samizdat* sources, however, provide evidence of religious persecution and show that Soviet laws are so framed as to enable the authorities to imprison believers for nothing more than the normal practice of their faith.

Most samizdat documents on religious matters come from the Russian Orthodox and Baptist sources. Religious protesters tend to concentrate on denominational matters. Only a few individuals, such as Russian Orthodox dissenter and writer Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov or the late Boris Talantov, have signed non-religious protest documents.

Modification of the constitution is one of the Soviet believers' chief demands. Since May 1929, believers do not have the right to teach religion to children or to other adults (except in officially recognized seminaries). Soviet believers have also appealed for their constitutional rights as they stand; they have petitioned the officially approved religious authorities to permit a democratically elected hierarchy and appealed for the registration of so-called illegal sects, such as the dissident Baptists, and for the reinstatement of dismissed churchmen and against the closure of churches.

Imprisonment

Believers are frequently charged under Article 142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code - "violation of the laws on separation of Church from State and school from Church" - for which the maximum punishment is three years' deprivation of freedom. They may also be charged under Article 227 for encouraging religious activities "harmful to the health of citizens" or inciting people "to refuse to participate in social activity or to fulfill their civic obligations." Since 1961 this has carried a maximum sentence of five years deprivation of liberty or exile. The longest known sentence on believers were those of 15, 13 and ten years' imprisonment given to leaders of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People in Leningrad in 1967 and 1968. This group has produced a political program for democratic reform and was engaged in clandestine paramilitary self-education and organization work.

* samizdat translates as "we publish ourselves," that is, not the state, but we, the people.

According to a protest letter sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1969 by the imprisoned writers Daniel, Ginzburg and Galanskov, believers are prohibited from receiving any religious literature and may not even have a Bible while in prison.

One result of putting so many believers in prisons and labor camps has been that they have sometimes formed religious groups there. Mikhail Sado, serving a long sentence in one of the strict regime prison camps for criticizing Khrushchev, founded the All-Russian Social-Christian Alliance, according to a samizdat document written and distributed by Alexander Petrov-Agatov, himself a prisoner.

Dissident Baptists

A great deal of documentation about persecution of their members has been provided by the Evangelical Christian Baptists or initsiativniki, who broke away from the Baptist Church in 1965 and have never received official recognition. They have at least two regular samizdat publications - including a monthly, Bratsky Listok, and a quarterly, Vestnik Spaseniya.

The initsiativniki, who had objected to the compromises made by the leaders of the Baptist Church to placate the Communist regime, are particularly active, and some 500 of them have been imprisoned since 1961. The repressive measures taken against them were described in an appeal to the party leadership by 1,453 women in March 1969. They said their children were victimized and beaten up at school and sometimes forcibly removed from the parents by the KGB (secret police) and placed in children's homes. They had addressed thousands of petitions to the authorities begging for an end to persecution but it became even harsher:

"Fines beyond our means, beatings-up, dismissal from jobs and institutes, confiscation of flats, arrests of fathers, husbands and, improbably as it may seem, mothers - this is the reply we have received so far from you to all our complaints.. ."

Russian Orthodox Church

Less is known about the treatment of rank-and-file members of the Orthodox Church but the cases of three leading dissidents have been reported in the underground journal, Chronicle of Current Events. Levitin-Krasnov who was arrested in September, 1969, and subsequently released has signed a number of protests about the abuse of civil rights in the Soviet Union and about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. After his arrest, a number of documents were circulated attesting to the excellence

of his character and the legality of his actions. A letter from seven Christians, addressed to the World Council of Churches in September, 1969, said:

"Anatoly Emmanuilevich was doing his duty as a Christian and none of his activities . . . infringed Soviet laws. . ."

Boris Talantov, a lay member of the Orthodox Church, who wrote a series of protest letters about the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, was tried in September 1969, for allegedly publishing "anti-Soviet propaganda." Chronicle No. 10 (October, 1969) reported that he was given a two-year sentence in a labor camp.

Neither the charge against the Orthodox priest Pavel Adelheim, arrested in December 1969, nor his sentence is known, but his character was smeared by Pravda Vostoka (the Uzbek Republican newspaper), which accused him of sadism towards his wife and children. According to Chronicle No. 13 (April 1970) however, his initiative and energy had enabled believers in Kagan to build a new, stone church. He was

". . . a young, well-educated priest and a good preacher, enjoyed great love and authority among his parishioners. His ecclesiastical activity was beyond reproach from the viewpoint of civil law."

Ukrainian Uniate Church

Increased activity of the Uniates, who acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope (but have been illegal since 1945), has been matched by increased persecution. According to Chronicles Nos. 7 and 8 (April and June 1969), priests have been detained and beaten up by the police. On 18 October 1968, the homes of ten were searched and religious objects confiscated. In January 1969, Bishop Velichkovski, who was about 70 years old and in poor health, was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for infringing regulations. (Bishop Velichkovski had been sentenced to ten year's hard labor when the Uniate Church was forcibly integrated with the Orthodox Church in 1946.)

Further information has come from a samizdat essay of January 1970, Chronicle of Resistance, by Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian historian. He condemned the appropriation of religious works of art from a Uniate church in the Kiev area, which belonged to a strongly nationalistic minority, the Hutsuls. Arguing that religion and national culture had become inseparable in Eastern Europe, he said:

"One must inevitably conclude that a fight against the Church is a fight against the culture. The anti-religious struggle is, in fact, a kulturkampf. It is more convenient to destroy the foundations of a nation as a whole under the guise of a struggle against religion. . ."

Sectarians

Few Sectarian protest documents have come to light other than those of the Evangelical Christian Baptists, but Chronicle No. 14 (June 1970) reported the case of a woman Adventist from Belorussia who was detained in December 1969, and illegally searched. Her money was confiscated without a receipt. In April 1970, her house was searched and religious literature confiscated. Chronicle No. 15 (August, 1970) noted that ten-year sentences had been passed on two women members of the schismatic True Orthodox Church and sentences of ten years and seven years plus five years' exile on two Jehovah's Witnesses.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
12 March 1971

Jailed Russian Christians appeal to the West

By Dr CECIL NORTHCOTT, Churches Correspondent

CHRISTIANS imprisoned in the Soviet Union for their faith have smuggled out an appeal through their relatives asking for help from Christians in the West. They claim that children have been taken from parents because of their religious upbringing.

The appeal, in the form of a letter, bears 45 signatures of prisoners' relatives.

The signatures have been vouched for by authorities in Britain who know the situation for Christians in Russia.

The letter, published in today's *Church of England Newspaper*, says that during the last months of last year, 591 people spent 15 days each in prison for the offence of being involved in prayer and worship meetings.

Bibles confiscated

The Christians concerned belong to the Evangelical Christian Baptist groups who actively propagate the Christian faith and distribute Christian literature which is forbidden under Soviet law.

The letter asks that children who have been taken away from their parents because of religious upbringing should be returned.

Bibles and other religious literature confiscated during searches of believers' homes should be given back.

The letter says: "Evidence was given that hundreds of prayer gatherings have been broken up by the authorities and worshippers had been beaten. The fines for attending worship and prayer meetings amounted to over 94,300 roubles (over £40,000)."

It adds that "scores of believers had been expelled from higher and middle educational institutions or had not been allowed in because they were known to belong to those who believed in God."

The prisoners ask Christians in the West to pray for them on the first Friday of every month.

PHILIPPINES HERALD
14 September 1970

Romanian Pastor Says Commies Persecuting Christians with 200,000 Still in Prisons

CPYRGHT

TOKYO — (AP) — A persecuted every year in 1965, he said he organized the Christian and 200,000 Christians says he spent 14 years in are still in prisons." Mission to the Communist a communist prison has Speaking with news-ist World — an under- declared that communist men, the Rev. Fr. Wurm- ground mission to help countries are persecuting brand claimed that in Christians in Communist Christians with about Communist countries. countries. He said this 200,000 still in prisons. Christians are put into mission helps by sending prison without reason. materials such as bibles

The Rev. Richard Wurmbrand, 61, was recently in Japan to attend the 12th Baptist World Congress, but was ordered out of the meeting when he shouted against the participation of Soviet delegates.

The Rev. Wurmbrand said "communist countries lie about the freedom of religion. Thousands of people are being

"I myself was put into a prison in 1951 and was given a 25-year sentence without reason," the Romanian pastor said.

"I was chained with a 50-pound chain to my legs in most of the time in the prison. I hardly saw the sun or read newspapers and books during my internment. Since he was released from prison in Romania

through secret couriers or by balloons.

The pastor said he has established mission branches in 18 countries, including the United States, Britain, Australia and the Netherlands. Wurmbrand said he hopes to set up similar missions in Japan and other Asian countries.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 September 1969

Soviet Religious Dissenter Is Reported Arrested

CPYRGHT

By JAMES F. CLARITY
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, Sept. 14—Anatoly Y. Levitin, a religious dissenter, is reported to have been arrested three days ago for anti-Soviet activity.

Mr. Levitin, a 54-year-old former Russian Orthodox priest and a writer of articles accusing the Soviet Government of stifling religious freedom, was said by reliable sources to have been arrested in his Moscow apartment after it was searched for three hours by the police.

The sources said the apparent reason for the arrest was Mr. Levitin's signing last May of a petition to the United Nations calling for an investigation of "the repression of basic civil rights in the Soviet Union." Police officials refused to disclose the specific charges over the weekend, the sources said.

Mr. Levitin, whose writings have been published in the West under the pseudonym Krasnov, spent seven years in a prison camp and died in 1956.

Levitin-Krasnov, a Critic of
Atheism, Signed Civil Rights
Appeal to U.N. in May

in which he said Soviet officials, including the security police, had tried to persuade him to stop writing polemical articles against atheism. Early this year, he was one of 15 dissidents who formed the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the U.S.S.R.

Crimean Tatar Held
The sources said another dissident, Mustafa Dzhimlev, who is a leader of the Crimean Tatar protesters, was also arrested last week near Tashkent, in Central Asia. The Tatars, who were exiled in World War II for alleged collaboration with the Germans, want permission to return to their homes. The first member of the Initiative Group, to be arrested

was Genrikh Altunyan, who was charged last July with anti-Soviet activity. He also signed the petition to the United Nations.

The arrests have reduced to 12 the number of members of the dissident group still at liberty. The sources said the recent pattern of police interrogation and surveillance indicated that additional arrests might be made soon.

The security police have questioned seven of the 10 members living in Moscow, the sources said.

Police surveillance of the three others has stopped in recent days, according to the sources. They said this was a possible indication that the three members might be arrested.

They are Pyotr I. Yakir, a historian and son of a Soviet general executed in the Stalin purges of the nineteen thirties; and Natalya Gorbarevskaya, a poet.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 July 1969

Soviets exploit (and curb)

religion

By Paul Wohl
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The two events couldn't have contrasted more sharply.

At a time, earlier this month, when a world conference of religions was convening in Zagorsk near Moscow, a group of industrial workers in the city of Gorky had a petition pending before the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations protesting restrictions imposed on Orthodox believers.

These events — the solemn international conference at the ancient Orthodox church center of Zagorsk and the denial of the constitutional right of freedom of worship in an industrial city only a few hundred miles away—are characteristic of the Kremlin's ambivalent religious policy.

In Zagorsk the party sought to use the Orthodox church, and those churches and religious organizations which accepted the invitation of Patriarch Alexis of Moscow and all Russia, as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

But in Gorky the party, disturbed by the growing acceptance of religion, sought to frustrate the believers' legitimate demands.

'Noble work'

The Zagorsk Conference for International Cooperation and World Peace was opened by Patriarch Alexis. Premier Alexei N. Kosygin greeted the conference as a contribution to "the noble work of strengthening world peace and mutual understanding of peoples."

Izvestia of July 2, alone among Soviet newspapers, published the Premier's message on an inner page. For the benefit of the foreign press Tass sent out a stream of communiqués on speeches made at the conference. Churches and religious organizations of 44 countries of Asia, Africa, Europe, and America were represented.

Besides the various Christian denominations, Muslims and Buddhists were represented. The chief rabbi of Moscow, Jehuda Leib Levin, was invited to a preparatory meeting.

The participation of Muslims and Buddhists was especially played up. Currently Soviet Muslims in Central Asia are being ardently wooed by Moscow as a means of contrasting their relatively favorable situation with the sad lot of the Muslim Kazakhs and other tribes on the Chinese side of the border. The

Soviets are also eager to improve their image among the Muslims of the Middle East, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

The Buddhists are an object of Soviet solicitude because of their role in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia:

Vietnam view

The main speaker at the conference was Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad and Novgorod who is in charge of foreign affairs in the Orthodox church. (The rank of a metropolitan is above that of an archbishop). The Metropolitan declared the solution for Vietnam was the withdrawal of the forces of the United States and its allies. In Europe, he said, a security conference was needed.

The Archbishop of Minsk demanded everything be done to prevent nuclear armament of West Germany. Czechoslovakia's suspended priest and onetime chairman of the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship society, Josef Plojhar, complained of "the intrigues of the imperialists aimed at breaking up the unity of the socialist countries."

In short, the conference was an attempt to mobilize religions all over the world for the purposes of Soviet policy.

Domestically, however, the Soviet Government has no use for religion. Even the condition of the Orthodox church has become critical. Metropolitans and bishops continue to be treated gently as long as they follow the party line. But the rank and file of the Orthodox believers are harassed.

Formerly atheist pressures were directed, mainly against the evangelical Baptists, who refuse military service, against the sects, and against religious Jews.

Orthodox congregations enjoyed precarious protection as Russia's historic national church. These congregations according to the Soviet, consisted mainly of elderly people of peasant origin. A majority were women.

Survey of parents

But in recent years Orthodox congregations seem to have attracted the young. The city of Gorky, the former Nizhni-Novgorod, which before the revolution had more than 40 churches for its then 110,000 inhabitants, is an example.

A recent survey published in the youth monthly, *Molodoi Kommunist*, of November showed that in two districts of the city (neither has a church), 60 percent of the parents up to the age of 30 had had their children christened. Baptism was performed either at home or, preferably, in one of the three remaining churches in formerly agricultural suburbs.

Disturbed by the spread of religious customs in Gorky, the Soviet youth organization conducted a survey of the parents.

These parents were "only the uneducated," according to a young Komsomol worker at the start of the survey.

But the results showed differently. Almost half of the young parents had graduated from seventh or eighth grade; 17 percent had finished high school. Only 4.3 percent had a summary schooling.

"The number of baptized people among children of pre-school age and school age and also among adults has increased in recent years," it is stated in another investigation about the city of Gorky, published last year in "Questions of Scientific Atheism."

Labor title bestowed

In a book called "Against an Illusory Happiness," published by two historians in Leningrad in 1968, we read that young believers stand for "renunciation of violence and adherence to the concept of love of God." Without this, they believe, there can be no "positive reorganization of society." According to some of these young believers, "Only the faithful can attain a classless society, because they build it with love and not with force."

Other Soviet authors have mentioned that out of 100 believers, 60 to 80 are either holders of the title of "shock workers of Communist labor" or are in the running for this honor. In an industrial city like Gorky, this seems to happen fairly frequently.

When alert believers in Gorky learned from a Western broadcast that Metropolitan

Nikodem had stated abroad that new churches may be opened in the Soviet Union at the request of a sufficiently numerous group of believers (as provided in the law), they decided to ask the local authorities for permission to open a fourth church. The existing three suburban churches could accommodate at most 4,000 persons, and by conservative standards there were at least 110,000 believers in the city.

Religion ridiculed

The request was signed by 1,500 people, each giving his name, address, and profession. The majority of the signatories were young male industrial workers.

The petition got nowhere. First the petitioners were told their request had not been presented in the right form. Then they were advised that "most stadiums, movie theaters, and palaces of culture also were overcrowded." On other occasions the petitioners were insulted. Religion, one official said, was a "disease."

For more than a year the request was shunted from one authority to another. Finally in September the request was addressed to Party Secretary-General Leonid I. Brezhnev. While this was going on the petitioners were threatened, thrown out of work, or otherwise harassed. An appeal to the Patriarch was of no avail.

Ultimately the believers of Gorky sent a petition to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations where the case now is pending.

A comparison of the pomp and circumstance surrounding the recent world peace conference of religions in Zagorsk with the facts reported to the United Nations by the believers of Gorky shows the double yardstick used by the Kremlin in religious matters: the exploitation of the idealism of foreign believers when it comes to international affairs and repression of religious people who ask for the respect of their constitutionally guaranteed rights at home.

THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
1 July 1970

CPYRGHT

Russian Baptist Leader Imprisoned

News has reached London of the arrest in Kiev of Georgi Vins, 42-year-old Russian Baptist leader. He had been free for less than a year, following an earlier three-year sentence meted out to him for leading his sect's reform movement. The news of his arrest is contained in a document signed on March 16 by his wife Lidia and four other members of the Council of Baptist Prisoners' Relatives.

It appears that Vins had been released early in 1969, whereupon he entered a hospital to recover from the debilitating effects of imprisonment. Then he once again applied himself unstintingly to the cause of the reform Baptists, resuming the role he had performed up to 1966. During the latter part of 1969 he represented his movement in an effort to reach a reconciliation with that segment of the Baptist Church which is recognized by the state.

Consultation at Tula

On Dec. 6 Vins and his associates were for the first time given permission by the Soviet authorities to meet together in conference; 120 of them met at Tula and held a daylong consultation. One of the matters they discussed was their leaders' desire to work as full-time pastors. Since their movement had not been recognized by the state, in the eyes of the authorities such work constituted a crime.

A letter requesting permission to carry out pastoral tasks was sent to government officials, but a month later Vins was arrested. And now he has been arrested precisely for the offense of "not working"—that is, for serving as a pastor. He has been sentenced to a year at hard labor.

Also emerging from the Tula conference was a call to all unregistered congregations to attempt to register with the authorities. Many have been making such applications for years, but so far the state has refused to accept them.

Legalization Unlikely

The arrest of Vins makes it very unlikely that the state will legalize the

reform Baptists—despite an intimation to the contrary made by a Soviet delegation that recently visited in England. Already, Baptists in Krivoi Rog are reported to have been heavily fined for attempting to register.

The December meeting at Tula seems to have been cynically exploited by the Soviet authorities as a means of isolating the most active of the Baptists still urging reform. The subsequent arrest of Georgi Vins is yet one more attempt to terrorize the reformers into abandoning their basic demand for an end to outside interference in church affairs, into acquiescing in the more pliable attitude of the officially recognized Baptist group.

A new wave of arrests of Baptists in other parts of the Soviet Union has also been reported. Another prominent leader who had already served one prison term is almost-blind Mikhail Khorev; he was rearrested at Kishinev on Dec. 18. His wife had been taken ill the day before and had been hospitalized, so their young children were left with no one to look after them.

Conditions in the prison camps still seem to be very bad where Baptist inmates are concerned—so bad that Ivan Afonin, 44, died on Nov. 22 at Komsomolsky camp in the Tula region; he had been forced to work while seriously ill. **MICHAEL BOURDEAUX,**
13 Red Hill, Chislehurst,
Kent, England.

AMERICA
14 March 1970

CPYRGHT

**Soviet Baptist
Sect Suffering**

The document, as it originally reached the world outside the Soviet Union, was in handwritten,

mimeographed form. It bore the brave signatures of 62 relatives of "Imprisoned Members of the Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists" (a splinter group known as the *initsiativniki*). Its purpose was simply to call to the attention of fellow Christians—and to ask their prayers for—the plight of those "condemned for the word of God in the U.S.S.R. as of November 1, 1969."

The list of the imprisoned, 174 names in all, is in nine columns: serial number, full name, year of birth, date of arrest, article under which charged, type of sentence and number of years, address of next of kin, number of dependents, place of imprisonment. Unquestionably authentic, the document details in its pages the continued persecution of this one small sect from 1961 to November, 1969.

In that time, more than 500 members were arrested.

In many cities and towns (explicitly named), houses of prayer were seized—and in some cases demolished. Heavy fines were levied on those attending prayer services, or allowing the use of a room for them; Bibles and hymnbooks were confiscated and (often enough) burned. Children were interrogated about their religious upbringing, forced to testify at trials against their parents, and taken by court order from their parents and placed in children's homes to be "re-educated."

The full text of this starkly moving document will be reproduced in a forthcoming issue of *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* (published by the National Council of Churches, Room 621, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y. 10027. \$10 a year). The semi-monthly RCDA is unique in its sources and hence in its news services. It is especially disconcerting, therefore, to hear that budgeting difficulties at NCC imperil its work.

CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON POST
23 January 1971

Cream of Christendom Backs Liberation Fight

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By Marjorie Iyer

Special to The Washington Post

ADDIS ABABA, Jan. 22— For 12 days they met, nearly 200 of them. The cream of non-Roman Catholic Christendom, the best that 239 member churches had to offer.

The central committee of the World Council of Churches covered a formidable range of topics in its meeting here on African soil.

It stood bloodied but four-square on the rightness of giving humanitarian aid to liberation movements battling racial oppression.

It set tentative guidelines to encourage Christians to join with their neighbors of other faiths in mutual searches for justice, peace and just possibly even greater spiritual understanding.

It demanded an end to capital punishment throughout the world. It condemned alike both political trials as repressive government measures and political kidnappings by antigovernment groups.

It spun a few more cables for the bridge across the chasm that still divides Roman Catholics from Protestant, Anglican, and Orthodox Christians.

It condemned both political and economic imperialism in Africa and appealed to member churches for substantial support of the WCC program of no-string-attached aid for developing peo-

ples and nations.

It gave the green light to a variety of studies, ranging from the problem of political hostages to nothing less than the future of man and society.

It implored the British government not to sell arms to South Africa; it rearranged the ecclesiastical furniture in its own house.

These were the actions of an elite group of Christians that includes a score of heads of churches. Bishops by the dozen, theologians, professors, pastors and ordinary laymen and women.

While the policy-making central committee makes no claim to speaking for the WCC member-churches, the statements and pronouncements issued here this week must be seen as a consensus of the best thinking of worldwide Protestant-Anglican-Orthodox Christianity today on the more pressing issues of church and society.

This being the case, it is reasonable to assume that the 450 million pew-sitters of the now 252 member-churches (13 new ones were taken into membership here) are following the deliberations with deepest interest.

The assumption may be reasonable, but it could hardly be further from actual fact. In truth, about the only time the vast majority of church members are aware of what the World Council of Churches

is doing is when one of its actions, for one reason or another, causes widespread controversy.

For the rare congregation that makes use of the excellent study materials produced by the WCC, there are a thousand more who couldn't even tell you the name of the organization's head.

A recent study by a United Methodist researcher—and the United Methodist Church is one of the pillars of the Council—found that some 60 per cent of laity polled could not identify the Rev. Eugene Carson Blake, the WCC general secretary.

The WCC has been made acutely aware of its communications gap both by the financial crunch that has hit it somewhat harder than its constituent denominations, and by the controversy that erupted last fall over the grants to southern African liberation movements.

Neither lay members nor clergy—nor in many cases, denominational headquarters—had any inkling that the unprecedented action was even contemplated.

And once the barest details of the action by the WCC's executive committee hit the newswires, it was often weeks before the grassroots church people could learn any details—let alone something of the reasons for—a move that by

that time had widely though erroneously been interpreted as WCC endorsement of terrorism and violence.

The result was a flood of angry letters and editorials, a generally baffled and sometimes outraged constituency and all around a near-total lack of understanding.

With this bruising experience fresh on their minds, members of the central committee and Council staff alike have been searching here for ways to improve communication with the constituents and the world at large.

They have not been notably successful.

Shrinking income and rising costs have prevented beefing up the WCC's miniscule public information department.

There were admonitions to the general secretary to write more letters to heads of member-denominations—men driven into speed-reading classes to keep up with the volume of mail they already receive.

Another proposal would require the WCC's 100-member Geneva secretariat, when visiting in a strange city, to appear before at least one congregation in that city. That's a little like a plan to sell aspirin by requiring the executives of the company to drop in on at least one drug store every time they make a trip.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 August 1971

Aided by historic link

Soviet tentacles spread over Orthodox church aisles

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

CPYRGHT

The Kremlin, encouraged by the Russian state's historic link with the Russian Orthodox Church, is seeking to spread its influence among Orthodox churches throughout the world.

Its medium is the Russian patriarchate in the ancient city of Zagorsk near Moscow.

A step in this direction was made at the Russian Orthodox Church sobor, or legislative assembly, that convened between May 28 and June 3.

Although the official reason for the sobor was to elect Metropolitan Pimen as successor to the late Patriarch Alexis, one consequence of these discussions was to facilitate contacts between the Russian patriarchate and the Orthodox churches in the United States and throughout the Americas.

According to an English scholar, Dr. Michael Bordeaux, fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, who specializes in the problems of the Russian Orthodox Church, there was considerable political significance in the sobor's convening.

Dr. Bordeaux's findings are confirmed by recent developments in the Orthodox Churches of South America and the Middle East.

Major decisions

The sobor made two major decisions:

First, it decided to move toward a reunion with the "old believers," a branch of Russian Orthodoxy that does not recognize the patriarch. The purpose seems to have been to broaden the church's basis in Russia and to establish links with the congregations of old believers abroad, especially in the United States.

The second decision was the abstention from the traditional excommunication of the Russian Orthodox Churches in exile. The latter hitherto lacked ecumenical standing. Now it looks as if this position might be reversed.

London This applies especially to the autocephalous Russian Orthodox church in America under Archbishop John of San Francisco, which recognizes only the general authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul, who lacks universal jurisdiction comparable to that of the Pope in Roman Catholicism, but holds the position of *primus inter pares* among the patriarchs and heads of autocephalous churches.

In contrast to the Russian Orthodox Church in America, the Russian Orthodox Church in England under Metropolitan Anthony Bloom recognizes the authority of the Russian Patriarch.

In addition to the large church headed by the Orthodox Archbishop of San Francisco, there are several smaller Orthodox churches in the United States that do not wholly reject the authority of Zagorsk.

In the Middle East, the Russian Orthodox Church, under the leadership of Metropolitan Nikodim, who functions as the foreign minister of the church, has been able to regain at the expense of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople the important position that Russian Orthodoxy once traditionally held in this part of the world.

The Greek Patriarch of Antioch, a man of Arab stock, once again has moved closer to his Russian counterpart. In Egypt, the Greek Patriarch of Alexandria is said to have made his peace with the Soviet Union. The Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, too, has resumed relations with Zagorsk. Yet, officially, all Middle East patriarchs of the Greek church recognize the primacy of Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople.

Resentment seen

By taking an active part in the worldwide ecumenical movement and meeting with the Pope, Archbishop Athenagoras appeared in the role of spokesman for all Orthodox Christians of the world.

This was resented in Moscow, which preferred to be in direct relations with the Vatican and with the patriarchs and autocephalous archbishops of Orthodoxy without the intermediary of the Phanar. When Archbishop Athenagoras intended to visit Zagorsk and other Russian church centers three years ago, he was given to understand he would not be welcome.

It is not believed that Moscow aims at gaining for Zagorsk the primacy held by Constantinople, but the Soviets clearly seek to enhance the authority of the Russian church and to strengthen their influence in the Phanar.

Should Turkey ever insist that the ecumenical patriarchate, traditionally headed by a Greek archbishop, be removed from Istanbul, the primacy in the Orthodox church might become a pan-Orthodox institution in which Zagorsk, alias Moscow, would most likely be dominant.

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR
20 February 1971

Canterbury Denounces WCC Grants

CPYRGHT

LONDON (AP)—The Archbishop of Canterbury has condemned grants by the World Council of Churches to black African revolutionaries as fostering "emotional belligerence."

The Geneva-based council, a largely Protestant grouping of

denominations voted in September to give \$200,000 to 19 organizations, 11 of them associated with so-called African freedom movements.

Dr. Michael Ramsey's spiritual leader of the Anglican Church, told the church's General Synod the World Council

grants aimed to combat racial injustice had only one target—white racism.

"When symbolic acts of moral judgment are made in the name of a large section of worldwide Christendom, it is unfortunate if the symbolic acts give a one-sided impres-

sion," said. "Why limit the formula to white racism?"

"I am led to think that far clearer thinking is needed about the methods of the Church's witness in the fields of social and political action."

HUMAN EVENTS
26 June 1971

How Soviet Union Dudes World Council of Churches

CPYRGHT

By RUSSELL KIRK

The World Council of Churches, with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, is a vast ecumenical organization. Its aim is the reunion of communities of Christians, long split into a chaos of denominations and sects and cults: an end devoutly to be desired. But the WCC has become involved in political attitudes and commitments that have much reduced its reputation and diminished contributions of funds from various churches and many individuals.

During the past year the most dismaying action by the World Council was the granting of subsidies to various African terrorist organizations (which, of course, prefer to be called "liberation" groups) operating against the Portuguese provinces of Angola and Mozambique, and against the Republic of South Africa. [See HUMAN EVENTS, Nov. 14, 1970, page 17.]

Those guerrilla gangs actually have been diminishing in numbers and effectiveness during the past year, in part because they have outraged African tribes in the regions where they operate. But the WCC, by giving money to this failing fanatic cause, in effect prolongs the struggle and the killing. How ecumenical!

A gentleman long associated with the World Council recently remarked to me that the great majority of the WCC's supporters look upon the organization

as devoted to ecumenical labors; if they understood how deeply involved the World Council has become in international politics—including the politics of terror—they would be deeply shocked. And he suggests that we see at work the subtle influence of Soviet Russia upon the World Council.

How can a Christian organization become the dupe of an atheist and totalist regime? Why, in part because the Russian Orthodox clergy in the council claim that they represent by far the largest single body of Christian communicants among all the 200-odd churches affiliated with the council.

The WCC defers to the Russians proportionately. But the Russian Orthodox Church is a mere puppet of the Soviet regime [see article above], which permitted the Orthodox hierarchy to join the WCC (in 1961) only because this might enable the men in the Kremlin to influence world opinion through the WCC's bureaucracy and propaganda apparatus.

The Russian Orthodox people in the WCC claim that there exists in the USSR some 22,000 functioning churches, an extravagant assertion which nobody in the WCC challenged. Actually, according to Russian government sources, at the time Khrushchev fell from power

there were only 7,500 churches still functioning in the Soviet Union; there may be fewer now; moreover, the congregations of many of those churches are dismally small. But the WCC bureaucracy finds it prudent to ignore these facts.

Also the WCC has found it best to sweep under the carpet the undoubted fact that the Soviet Union engages in persecutions of Christians, Jews and Moslems.

Four years ago Baptists in Soviet Russia appealed to the WCC for aid, sending proof that more than 200 Baptists were in Soviet prison camps, in consequence of deliberate persecution. The council merely acknowledged receipt of these documents, and has done nothing whatever, it appears, to intervene in favor of these brothers in Christ—although at the next meeting of the WCC's executive committee, the WCC dignitaries endorsed protests against Greece and South Africa for imprisoning political opponents.

Opposition to domination or undue influence by Soviet Russia exists within the WCC. Yet the Russian Orthodox hierarchy—wholly subservient to the Soviet state—move their way gradually toward more positive power in the WCC, feeling confident that the council's general secretary is Dr. Eugene Carson

THE BALTIMORE SUN
15 January 1971

World Council Of Churches' Special Fund Is Playing Politics In Africa

CPYRGHT

Russell Kirk

In aid of terrorist groups in southern Africa, the World Council of Churches has appropriated \$200,000. (The WCC people prefer to call these terrorists "guerrillas"; but it is no more fun to be murdered by a "guerrilla" than by a "terrorist.") I have written more than once in criticism of this ghastly "special fund" of the WCC.

Various members of the council bureaucracy have replied—most recently, the Rev. Eugene L. Smith, executive secretary at the WCC's New York office. Dr. Smith protests that the money given to terrorist bands is meant for "welfare" activities. One might as well argue that donations to the Hitler youth organization were harmless, because used for "strength through joy" exercises. The practical effect of such grants is to enable the terrorists to use their other money (much of which comes from Soviet Russia or Communist China) for activities purely murderous.

Is it wrong, Dr. Smith continues, to give assistance to the victims of war? The council has assisted "victims of the Vietnamese conflict on both sides," both Nigerians and Biafrans during that struggle, and so forth. So why complain about help to rebels in southern Africa?

It is well to relieve suffering among innocent noncombatants, impartially. But that is not what the WCC has done in southern Africa. How much money has the WCC given to the thousands of victims who were loyal to the Portuguese administration of Mozambique and Angola, and who have been slaughtered and harried by the nationalist bands? Not one cent. And the WCC's subsidies are handed over not to the victims, but to the very groups which kill and burn in those lands.

If the WCC planned to aid all revolutionaries everywhere, at least in that the council would be consistent. But it is not so. What have the self-

righteous bureaucrats of the WCC done to relieve the suffering of the black Christians of the southern Sudan, for instance, who have contended for years against Muslim forces from Khartoum? Nothing whatsoever.

Apparently the WCC is interested principally in helping revolutionaries who are professed Marxists, and whose alleged "oppressor" are professed Christians. Would it have been wrong for Christians to have helped the anti-Soviet risings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia? Dr. Smith asks. Alas, that is now an academic question, and rather a strange one for a WCC officer to raise: for the WCC did nothing to assist those "freedom fighters."

To succor refugees is one thing; to give money to fanatic ideologues, a very different thing. It was praiseworthy for the WCC to feed and lodge Palestinian refugees; it would not be praiseworthy to subsidize the reck-

less Palestinian liberation groups.

Readers seriously interested in this controversy ought to consult sources less prejudiced than the publications of the WCC and its allies. On what is happening in Africa, I commend, for instance, two books (both published by the firm of John Day): Pieter Lessing, "Africa's Red Harvest"; and a collection edited by Frank Meyer, "The African Nettle."

Nothing did more injury to medieval Christendom than the ferocious Crusades against the Muslim states — which turned into general butchery and destruction, regardless of religion. Nothing could be more opposed to the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth, the Prince of Peace, than subsidies to political fanatics who spread devastation. Whose liberty and prosperity would be improved by carrying throughout southern Africa the ruin which fell upon the Congo?

THE BALTIMORE SUN
22 January 1971

Split Imperils Church Council

CPYRGHT

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Jan. 21 (Reuter)—The World Council of Churches, already threatened with a serious budgetary crisis, faced the prospect of schism after a walkout by several Orthodox churches marred the closing session of its central committee meeting here today. The walkout was staged by

churches associated with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in protest against the Russian Orthodox Church's unilateral decision to grant autonomy to its American branch.

Metropolitan Meilton, Bishop of Kadikoy in Turkey, who is also vice chairman of the council's central committee, led the

Constantinople delegates' walkout.

He said later that, unless the council overruled the Russian decision, the whole question of his churches' membership of the world council would be reviewed.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople represents some 100 mil-

lion Christians around the globe.

The World Council's budgetary problems were also revealed during the 12-day meeting. Officials said the crisis had arisen through increased demands from member churches for new activities and a sharp rise in inflation, which had brought chaos to the council's budget.

Questioned today, Metropolitan Nikodim said, "I do not know of any such documents, or even if Talantov exists." Metropolitan Nikodim's swimming style has been described as "like a walrus," and for some unexplained reason he always keeps one fist out of the water. He is known to have a prodigious appetite for both food and drink. During a 1963 visit to a Protestant seminary in the United States he was informed that the campus was dry and replied, "I know. That is why our suitcases are so heavy." One of his few spare-time activities is the preparation of an analysis of Roman Catholic reform during the reign of Pope John XXIII.

NEWSWEEK

25 May 1970

CPYRGHT

The Diplomatic Russian

When a patriarch of the Orthodox church dies, canon law forbids any discussion of a possible successor for 60 days. Even so, the death last month of Alexei, 92-year-old Patriarch of Moscow and of All Russia, has inevitably focused attention on Alexei's brilliant "foreign officer," Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad, as his most likely replacement. The burly, bearded Nikodim first became widely known in the West in 1961 when he headed the Russian Orthodox delegation to the World Council of Churches General Assembly in New Delhi. At 32, he was then the youngest archbishop of any church in the world, but his keen grasp of Western ways and Eastern politics immediately impressed—and continues to mystify—older churchmen outside Russia. "Some Soviet churchmen we meet are genuine government stooges," says one Norwegian bishop. "Some follow the official Soviet line only as far as is necessary for survival, and some, like Nikodim, are such skilled equilibrists that no one can tell where their heart is."

Ambiguity, of course, is a vital attribute for any churchman in a state where atheism has been the official creed for 50 years and the government holds effective control over all church property. Prior to the Bolshevik revolution, the Orthodox operated 600 churches in Moscow alone. Today there are only 40—but this is double the number that were open to the Muscovite faithful before Alexei became patriarch in 1945 and, by convincing Stalin that the Russian church could further Soviet aims, managed to regain some control over the church's internal administration. More important, many of the church's 50,000 clerics live far more comfortably than the average Russian worker. Salaries for some bishops and priests, reports NEWSWEEK's Moscow bureau chief, John Dornberg, range between \$550 and \$1,100 a month—five to ten times as much as an average skilled industrial worker earns—and a plain parish priest in a large city may have a car, a private home and a country cottage.

Babies: Thanks to these relatively benign government policies, the church is regaining the interest of younger Russians. A recent poll in the industrial city of Gorki, for example, revealed that 60 per cent of the babies born there have been baptized. Fully 50 million Soviets, a fourth of the total population, identify themselves as Orthodox. During Orthodox Easter services this month, Communist

hecklers outside Moscow's Novodevichy Monastery complained that the Soviet police were actually "protecting the church from the people."

On the other hand, government attitudes toward the Orthodox church are inherently fickle. Nikita Khrushchev campaigned against the church in the late '50s, closing all but three of its seminaries, and now once again, complain Orthodox officials in the U.S., Communist ideologues are mounting a concerted campaign in party journals against the church's growing influence. At least two dozen of the church's clergy and laymen, Russian clergy in the U.S. say, have been imprisoned by Soviet authorities in the past three years merely for demanding those religious rights guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

The price the church must pay for its uncertain freedom is unswerving public support of the Soviet Union's foreign policies by the patriarchate. Alexei repeatedly denounced U.S. "imperialism" and in 1962 he sent a personal letter to President John F. Kennedy protesting U.S. resumption of nuclear testing. In the past decade, many of these denunciations have come through Nikodim, convincing right-wing Russian Orthodox faithful in the U.S. that the church's youthful foreign minister is actually a high-ranking officer in the Soviet secret police. But other Westerners who have worked with him are equally convinced that such anti-U.S. statements merely represent what one of Nikodim's colleagues describes as "the donkey on which we ride to international conferences—just as Jesus once rode on a donkey to Jerusalem."

Greater contact with the West has been a chief aim of Nikodim's foreign policy and one that has won him considerable respect in the WCC. "He is a born mediator and a good diplomat," says one enthusiastic council official. "Five mistakes by Nikodim and we would lose all contact with the church in the U.S.S.R."

Apple: At home, the 41-year-old metropolitan seems to be well-loved within his Leningrad archdiocese, even though he lives rather like a Slavonic potentate on three separate—and ample—government salaries. At the end of a diplomatic journey or sometimes after a hard day at the office, his ruddy face can be seen hobbling like a bearded apple on the surface of a Leningrad swimming pool.

Among some Orthodox faithful, however, Nikodim's modern life-style and quick rise to the top are considered inappropriate for a Russian patriarch. "Alexei was a saint," says one Muscovite. "Nikodim is not a true man of God, but an ambitious politician."

Ultimately, of course, the Kremlin will exert a strong influence on the Holy Synod's selection of Alexei's successor, which will probably take place before the end of the year. And for all of Nikodim's obvious talents—he speaks five languages and has traveled throughout the world—the aggressive archbishop may prove too independent for Communist taste. Some Orthodox clergymen, in fact, believe the Kremlin may finally give the nod to Archbishop Pimen, the 60-year-old Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolonna, who has temporarily assumed administrative responsibility for the patriarchate. Beyond that, says a Slavic historian in New York, "Nikodim may feel that the foreign ministry is more crucial for him and for the church than the patriarchal throne."

More is at stake in the synod's decision than just the choice of a patriarch. After half a century of domestic turmoil, the Russian church is clearly bidding for leadership of the world's estimated 126 million Orthodox Christians. Primacy of honor among Orthodox prelates still belongs to a Greek, the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople. But Athenagoras, 84 and ailing, finds himself shepherd of a diminishing flock amid a host of increasingly hostile Turks.

Pressure: Other ancient Orthodox sees are also under stress. The patriarchate of Antioch is torn between two hostile factions. The see of Alexandria is losing its Greek constituents under political pressure from Egypt's militant Moslem regime. And by granting independence to the Russian Orthodox Metropolia in the U.S. earlier this year (NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16), the Moscow patriarchate assured itself of considerable American support in the pan-Orthodox conferences of the '70s.

"Ancient Rome has been corrupted by papism," a fifteenth-century Russian monk once wrote. "Second Rome [Constantinople] has been profaned by the Turk. Moscow is the third Rome, and a fourth there will not be." Five centuries later, the monk still speaks for the Russian church.

Blake, an American citizen—no Communist, but in effect a person who sees no enemies to the left.

When, early in 1967, Dr. Blake was chosen as the WCC's new chief officer, the Moscow patriarchate enthusiastically applauded his selection. Well they might. In contrast with his independent (if self-opinionated) positions when he was a power in American Protestantism, he defers almost servilely to Russian Orthodox attitudes.

It is much in the Soviet interest that terrorism should continue in southern Africa—dividing Western allies, seriously draining the slender resources of Portugal and embarrassing richer South Africa, diverting attention from Soviet

imperialism, opening a way for massive Soviet influence in Africa generally.

Without openly demanding that the WCC support guerrillas in Africa, the Soviet-dominated Russian Orthodox clergy in the WCC can use its votes and influence for that grim purpose. In several other instances, the WCC has issued pronouncements on world crises which favor Soviet interests—one during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 being especially notorious.

Even most defenders of the WCC's subsidies to terrorists probably believe that those grants were made merely to advance "racial justice." (How "racial justice" is promoted by enabling bands

of fanatic blacks to murder large numbers of other—and peaceful—blacks, as in Angola and Mozambique, I find it difficult to understand.) But behind this allegedly humanitarian policy lies the approval—disproportionately powerful in the WCC labyrinth—of Moscow's ideologues.

It is significant that the WCC does nothing to assist the Negro Christians of southern Sudan, for years slaughtered by the troops of the Moslem government at Khartoum. Those victims of the upper Nile mean nothing to the Kremlin. As matters are drifting, the WCC may become increasingly the dupe but also the instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
6 July 1968

Ecumenical Russian

Boris Nikodim

CPYRGT

Special to The New York Times

UPPSALA, Sweden, July 5 —Several years ago at an ecumenical meeting, a woman delegate reported to a fellow church leader that water lilies had appeared in a nearby swimming pool.

Closer investigation revealed that the object in question was not a flower but the head of Metropolitan Boris Nikodim, his long beard floating in front of him and his equally long hair behind. The 39-year-old Russian church leader, who led morning worship this morning at the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches with a 45-minute Russian Orthodox prayer service, is known as one of the most avid swimmers in the ecumenical movement and also as one of its most controversial figures.

He moved onto the stage of international ecclesiastical affairs in 1961, when he led the Russian Orthodox Church into the World Council of Churches at its Assembly in New Delhi, India. The fact that this move required the consent of the Soviet Government led to frequent charges that he was not so much a churchman as a tool of the Communist Party.

While recognizing that the Russian Church provides a

conspicuous voice for Soviet foreign policy at international gatherings, however, most leading ecumenical figures are privately convinced of the sincerity of the Metropolitan's Christian commitment.

Holds 3 Titles

Metropolitan Nikodim holds three titles in the Russian Orthodox Church. He is a member of the Holy Synod, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod and chairman of its Department of External Church Affairs.

His duties keep him moving constantly between his apartment in the Leningrad Theological Academy and the Patriarchate in Moscow. He also has renovated house of his own in Serbrany Bor, a western suburb of Moscow, on an island in the Moscow River.

Aides say that the metropolitan rises relatively late but that he runs like a deer until 10 or 11 o'clock at night and then takes home a pile of work. Some fear that he is overextending himself.

Metropolitan Nikodim is stocky and below average in height, with alert green eyes and is balding. He has a sense of humor, and his health had been described as excellent. Recently, however, he has been reported to have made several visits to health spas

in Czechoslovakia. But it is difficult to learn much about his personal life.

He was born Boris Georgievich Rotov in 1929 in the village of Frolovo. He was attracted to the church at an early age and became a protégé of the local bishop. The fact that he spent a good deal of time serving as an altar boy and in the bishop's study is said to have drawn criticism both from his teachers and his parents, whom he has described as "a-religious but not antireligious."

Trained in Engineering

Although he received early training in engineering, he accepted monastic vows in 1947 at the earliest possible age, 18. He was graduated in 1950 from the Leningrad Theological Seminary and in 1955 from the Leningrad Theological Academy.

Metropolitan Nikodim is a liturgical specialist who knows hundreds of prayers and liturgies by heart and loves to conduct the long rites for which his church is known.

The Metropolitan is known for a prodigious memory that permits him to understand most major languages and to conduct liturgies in every active Orthodox tongue. His memory is aural rather than visual, and he is unable to read the same languages.

As a negotiator, he is con-

sidered skillful but not intransigent and has been known to have prevented deadlocks by withdrawing motions made by his own delegation. "He doesn't want to play the great veto man," said one church leader here.

On some matters, however, such as Russian Orthodox in the United States who have renounced the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate, he has pursued an unwavering hard line.

Metropolitan Nikodim said today that he had "no personal acquaintance" with the existence of a protest movement by Russian laymen against the official leadership of the church.

Dissension Reported

Recent published reports have indicated that laymen in the area of Kirov, about 500 miles north of Moscow, have lined up with other dissenting groups within the Soviet Union, including imprisoned writers and intellectuals. The reported author of the attack was Boris Vladimirovich Tantalov, who has described Metropolitan Nikodim as a liar and a betrayer of his fellow Christians. He is said to have written to Patriarch Aleksei of Moscow that the Metropolitan was "not worthy to bear the high office of Metropolitan of the Orthodox church."

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September 1971

RECENT SOVIET-ROMANIAN TENSIONS

With the third anniversary of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia still fresh in memory, world attention has focused on the recent, increased Soviet pressure on Romania, whose foreign policy for some years has followed independent lines in some respects at variance with those of the Soviet Union. In domestic policy, Romania, under the strict dictatorship of President and Party chief Nicolae Ceausescu, is blameless by the perverted standards of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Over the years he has exercised even more restrictive ideological controls over the population than most of his East European allies, and the Communist Party has no competition as it imposes the standard Communist version of Socialism on the country. (Despite the already tight ideological controls, Ceausescu early in July undertook further measures to eradicate from the domestic scene what he considers the remaining non-Communist influences. See the attached Washington Post and Economist accounts.)

In foreign policy, Romania has behaved as any normal sovereign state might --- pursuing a course calculated to advance her own national interests while respecting the legitimate interests of other states, including the USSR. Thus, Romania recognized West Germany in January 1967 and became the first Warsaw Pact power to do so (other than the USSR itself). Romania is also the only Soviet Bloc country currently maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. For many years, and ahead of the other East European states, Romania took substantial initiatives to cultivate closer relations with the West. Throughout the Sino-Soviet rift, Romania has sought to keep lines of communication open with Communist China and to develop closer relations. (At times during the rift, Ceausescu has apparently offered to serve as mediator.)

In all such actions, Romania has merely tried to give substance to the often stated principle of national sovereignty agreed to within the Soviet Bloc.

While it is evident that the Soviets and their East European sycophants regard many of Romania's actions on the international scene as provocative and even anti-Soviet, there is little objective warrant for such a view. Romania preserves correct relations within the Soviet Bloc in that she honors her basic commitments as a member of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Romania is also allied to the Soviet Union by a treaty of

friendship and mutual assistance. She joins in the praise of the USSR's "peace policy" and in the condemnation of "international imperialism." In the light of these considerations, it would scarcely be appropriate to portray Romanian foreign policy as anti-Soviet.

Romania has often expressed divergent views within the Soviet Bloc. She condemned the misuse of the Warsaw Pact to invade Czechoslovakia and now insists on balancing the need for cooperation within the Warsaw Pact against the requirements of national sovereignty. She continues to resist hasty integration of the Soviet Bloc economies under Comecon or the establishment of supra-national economic organs. Such divergencies stem not from indiscriminate anti-Sovietism, but from legitimate insistence on national sovereignty.

Differences between Romania and the rest of the Soviet Bloc are apparent in the bitter polemics and propaganda battles that erupt from time to time. However, by an objective standard Romania is either speaking out in defense of her principles of independence or, more often, is merely reacting to what she regards as unwarranted Soviet or Soviet-inspired attacks and attempts to limit her sovereignty.

Even Romania's differences with the Soviet Union expressed in world Communist councils (usually over Communist China's place in the world movement), as in the case of the World Communist Conference in June 1969 and in many of the preparatory meetings for it, reflect this same, consistently applied principle.

It is as if Ceausescu were trying to establish a new standard for Communist countries in their relations with the Soviet Union: while consistently adhering to the Marxist-Leninist view of uncompromising ideological hostility to the West, he rejects the traditional concept of satellithood under Soviet domination, which requires full and automatic conformity to Soviet policy, in favor of a form of partnership in which a common objective is independently pursued.

The problem is that the Soviet Union does not seem to appreciate the significance of Romanian efforts in behalf of the common ideology, nor does the Soviet Union accept the validity of enlightened self-interest in the prosecution of foreign policy.

In the Soviet view, this principle has been superseded by what has become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine governing relations among Communist countries. This doctrine, while promising Communist countries the right to pursue their independent sovereign course, immediately limits their sovereignty by declaring that they cannot pursue any policy which adversely affects the joint interests of the

"socialist commonwealth."* These interests are of course, determined by the Soviet Union in its own national interest.

The Soviets have operated in Eastern Europe in the spirit if not the letter of the Brezhnev Doctrine ever since their takeover after World War II when Stalin viewed the slightest deviation as indicative of anti-Sovietism. There were brief periods after Stalin's death when the methods of subjugation appeared to become more subtle and sophisticated, but even then the compulsion to keep a tight rein by whatever means certainly did not change. Hungary's deviation in 1956 and Czechoslovakia's in 1968, while far from anti-Communist or anti-Soviet on the part of the leaders who governed those countries, still earned them a military invasion and occupation. Whether or what drastic measures may be used against Romania is by no means clear. Military action which most observers consider unlikely, cannot, however, be automatically precluded.

It is in the light of the above considerations concerning Soviet and Romanian foreign policy motivations that recent developments in the relations of the two countries, and more particularly the wide-ranging speculation of the free world press concerning these relations, should be viewed. (The attached news accounts and analyses are a mixture of fact, speculation asserted as if it were fact, and even sheer fiction, so that it requires a careful and discriminating eye to gain some insight into the true relationship which prevails between the two countries.)

Following is a brief summary of the developments (amply, if not always accurately, elaborated in the attached news accounts) that led to the new air of crisis in Soviet-Romanian relations.

Ceausescu's visit to Communist China 1-8 June was regarded with intense displeasure by the Soviet Union, though the visit was merely the logical culmination of a policy of friendship toward China followed by Ceausescu for several years. It should also be noted that as much

* The Soviets have never made clear just what the boundaries of the socialist commonwealth are. There is no doubt that they include at least the six East European Communist regimes of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia and Albania have always been somewhat nervous as to whether the strictures of the Brezhnev Doctrine are intended to apply to them as well. Occasional dark hints from the Soviets suggest that they do not even exclude Communist China from the reach of the Doctrine.

as the Chinese wish to enlist Ceausescu's support in their anti-Soviet campaign, Ceausescu firmly declines to lend his voice to Chinese anti-Soviet designs.

The Comecom meeting of 27-29 July in Bucharest was heralded as a possible confrontation between the Soviet Union and Romania, with the Romanians opposed to Soviet proposals for close integration of the East European economies and possibly for supranational supervisory organs. While it is not known what transpired behind the closed doors of the conference, the resultant communique merely affirms that "integration is desirable but realizable only in a span of 15-20 years." This postponement, in effect, of integration may have been the agreed result of the months, if not years, of planning that preceded the July conference, rather than some hastily arrived-at compromise. In any case Romania was not the only Comecon member disapproving rapid integration: at least Poland and Hungary would hold a similar view. Supranational organs were not mentioned.

The Crimean summit of 2 August, ostensibly an informal meeting of vacationing East European and Soviet leaders excluded Ceausescu. Press speculation notwithstanding, it is not known whether Ceausescu was invited or whether he boycotted the meeting. However, the summit did highlight Ceausescu's unique position in East European councils. And though the post-conference communique made no reference to Romania or China, Sino-Romanian relations probably were a topic for discussion. It is also hard to avoid parallels between this summit and the similar exclusive conferences that preceded the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Finally, prominent in the realm of speculation are the news reports about Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria, supposedly sometime in August. Transit of troops through Romania would be convenient for the participants, but it is far from clear whether the Soviets would request Ceausescu's permission, and if they did, whether Ceausescu has or has not given permission. There is no evidence apart from news speculation that transit of troops is an issue in contention.

Wherever the truth lies in the crisis atmosphere of Soviet-Romanian relations, it is to be hoped that the Soviets will not make the same mistake they made in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet image in the eyes of the world and their several efforts to cultivate a detente atmosphere would again suffer a severe setback. It would seem they would have much more to gain by permitting Romania the freedom of action she is attempting to exercise within the common Communist design.

WASHINGTON POST
26 July 1971

CPYRGHT

Cultural Crackdown Aims at Young

Romania: An End to Permissiveness

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUCHAREST, July 25—

The overworked description of Romania as a Communist country that is "liberal" in foreign policy but orthodox domestically has been validated with dramatic suddenness here this month.

A puritanical new code of cultural and ideological conduct, which has abruptly cut short a period of relative permissiveness, was pushed through by President Nicolae Ceausescu while the cheers were still echoing from his bold journey to China, North Korea, and North Vietnam in June.

While messages of support pour in from provincial party organizations, the daily fare of Western beat music on the radio has been all but stopped. Western films, and the American TV crimebusting series "The Untouchables," have been dropped from television in response to the President's plea for less violent, less "noxious" programs.

The agent for several British rock groups who arrived here in the thick of the excitement returned home without signing a single contract.

Romanian journalists say that more articles are being rejected for publication than usual, because government officials lack guidelines for interpreting the new policy.

Harsh as the new policy seems to some, it is fairly consistent with the one that has been followed by Romania ever since 1965. That formula has been to balance an independent foreign policy with a tight rein on the home front.

Many foreign and Romanian observers think the "17 points" laid down by

President Ceausescu on July 6 is essentially a foreign policy document to strengthen Romania against Soviet pressure. Criticism of the government by the Soviet Union and its allies came into the open after Ceausescu's visit to China.

Romanians say the 17 points would be equally acceptable in Moscow, Peking or East Berlin. As such, the policy is documented proof of Romanian conformity and reliability, and intellectuals appear ready to accept this argument.

"Independence requires sacrifice. Sometimes a castle must be sacrificed in chess to win the game," said a Communist moderate this week.

'Period of Ascetism'

"We are entering a period of ascetism," said a writer who describes himself as a "constructive conformist."

Nevertheless, there has been no statement or even clear hint that foreign policy considerations alone prompted the new line.

And well-placed Romanians say that other important factors are involved. One probably was Ceausescu's desire to assert his leadership dramatically at a time when criticism had begun to be heard against his domestic programs both from conservative bureaucrats and moderates, and when some had been voicing fear that the China trip had been too much of a risk.

Another factor may have been the leadership's genuine conviction that decadent influences from the West, and slackness in the party itself, had begun to loosen orthodox seams of Romanian society.

The July 9 mass meeting up his policy code with a

long speech to practically everybody of any importance in Romanian political, economic, and cultural life was described as acrimonious. Large parts of it were omitted from press accounts of the meeting.

There was open criticism by party officials of rising criminality, admissions of poor morale among workers, and rebukes against youthful vagabonds who rough up people on the street. It was also noted that venereal disease, particularly among young people, was once again on the rise, after being virtually wiped out in 1949.

Target Is Youth

The principal target of Ceausescu's 17 points was Romanian youth. He declared that tendencies toward "parasitism," and an "easy-going life without work" will be combatted; that alcohol will be forbidden in youth clubs and that "atheistic propaganda" will be strengthened to fight "mysticism" among young people.

Radio and television programs will be improved and programs cultivating the "spirit of violence, the bourgeois way of life and a mentality noxious to youth education" will be stopped. Foreign musical repertory will be "screened to avoid musical pieces expressing decadent currents."

"The arts must serve a single purpose: the socialist, Communist education," Ceausescu said, according to Agerpres, the Romanian news agency.

"In Romania, only those works of art and literature can be accepted which are in conformity with the standard of the working class, which serve the people, socialism and the revolution. It is necessary for the party bodies, at

all levels, to exercise their role of leader and guide in these sectors of activity."

Romanian secondary and high school students already work four to six hours a week on state projects and sources said this week that this would almost certainly be increased now.

The document announced that party officials will be sent to political refresher courses and that tough ideological criteria will be applied in book publishing houses, theatres, even factories.

Technocrats and "specialists" also came in for criticism for failing to concern themselves enough with ideological and political thought.

Western diplomats find conflicting elements in the events surrounding the regime's ideological and cultural counterattack.

Used Persuasion

They note that in his speech Ceausescu repeatedly ruled out the feared "administrative measures" in carrying out the new policy and instead resorted to persuasion.

While several conservatives were fired, Education Minister Mircea Malita, who has a reputation as a "modernist," has been kept on even though his ministry was singled out for special criticism.

Dmitri Popescu, a close associate of Ceausescu who is described as a middle of the road, was named head of the State Committee for Art and culture while retaining his party post as cultural "tsar."

Books of impressionist painting are still on sale at some selected bookstores. Moreover, there has as yet been no noticeable change in the overall atmosphere in Bucharest. Ceausescu has done away with such things as po-

Political arrests. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
 'mitted Romanians limited contacts with foreigners.

Romanian officials have been emphasizing to foreigners that the cultural policy announcement will have no effect on the country's effort to stimulate western economic contacts and investments.

Party intellectuals insist that the new policy is a sincere response to certain negative facts of Romanian life.

Judging by a sign at a Bucharest construction site, the worker morale and slackness mentioned at the July 9 meeting is indeed a problem. It read, "Comrades, only through firm discipline at work places and the elimination of motivated and unmotivated absences will we obtain the desired results."

Earlier this year Romanians were shocked by an unprecedented mass murder in which the culprit killed five girls and dismembered their bodies. The suspect is awaiting trial. In another case, guilty verdicts were handed down against provincial officials who were said to have embezzled millions of lei (18 to the dollar) from the state. The sentence was death.

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, American pop and beat culture has a strong appeal to youth. One young man selling pottery gave a

western visitor some of his wares in exchange for a promise to send him a pair of American jeans. Last year, the pop group Blood, Sweat and Tears received a tumultuous welcome in Romania, though the entertainers had to abide by a promise not to "wiggle."

American diplomats themselves complain that the Office for Film Distribution often selects the poorest American films and serials because they are the cheapest.

Quality Films Rejected

On the other hand, Romanian officials have also rejected such quality films as "Easy Rider" and "Midnight Cowboy," and the military-spoofing film "Mash" was turned down because it purportedly glorified violence.

Sources in the cultural world do not interpret the recent tightening as directed against western culture however, but against bad works. They are, therefore, hopeful that the American plays "Enemy of the People" by Arthur Miller and "The Effect of Gamma Rays on Man-in-the-Moon Marigolds," by Paul Zinder, will be produced as planned at the national theater this fall.

These sources say that the policy shift was squarely aimed at Romanian writers

who copy western styles without understanding them. Plays such as Josif Naghila's "The Dark," which had a one-day run in the spring, have been sharply attacked for portraying intellectuals and authorities alike in a bad light—and clumsily.

The play portrayed a bumbling professor trying to get the police to evict two young vagabonds who had invaded his home.

Nevertheless Romanian intellectuals concede that the immediate effect of the new policy will be to inhibit all kinds of criticism, constructive or otherwise—and it is clear that it has spread uneasiness and considerable confusion among all strata of Romanian life.

"In the theatre," Ceausescu said, according to Agerpres, "the good plays should continue to be staged and those which do not correspond to the education of the people should be removed. The staging of a play should not be started unless it is approved by the party and state bodies."

Problem Is Causes

"If our youth is more decadent than ever, if it prefers western beat music to Romanian operas and folk songs, if it is drinking more and working less, there must be a deprootred cause.

But nobody is asking after the causes," said a historian.

Opinion samples are seldom employed to measure attitudes in Romania, but those social surveys that have been taken show a continuing interest among young Romanians in religion, and dissatisfaction with the lack of choice available in music and the arts.

However, older Romanians seem willing to accept the new guidelines as an adjunct to Romanian independence.

"We are a socialist country" said one artist. "We just haven't got time for debates on sexual freedom at this time."

He went on to charge that while American writers and intellectuals may have more freedom than in Romania, they also have less sense of participating in political and social life.

"Freedom is something you have to look at very closely," he said. "From a distance you may see two birds jumping. One is jumping higher and you assume it is freer. But then you go closer and you see that that bird is in a cage and it is jumping only when the man who is holding the cage pulls it. The other bird is doing less jumping but it is more free. But if it jumps too much the man could put it in a cage too."

THE ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT
 12 August 1971

CPYRGHT

The two faces of Rumania

In its issue of 29 July, FOREIGN REPORT drew attention to the pressures being applied by the Russians on Rumania, to make it fall into step with the other Warsaw pact countries. These pressures are being intensified. According to east European sources in Vienna, Rumania's deviationist line in international affairs was one of the main topics of discussion at last week's meeting of communist party chiefs in the Crimea — to which President Ceausescu was not invited. This week the influential Moscow *Literary Gazette* significantly reprinted a trenchant attack on Rumania from the Polish party paper, *Trybuna Ludu*.

Meanwhile, in domestic matters the Ceausescu regime is tightening the screw on its own citizens; too many western observers overlook the fact that the sophisticated image which it projects in the international field does not apply on the home front. For the past five weeks Rumania has been in the grip of an 'ideological purity' drive. This was launched by Mr Ceausescu himself on 6 July when, in presenting a set of proposals to the party's executive committee, he said that the country must rigidly follow the communist line in artistic matters as well as political and educational ones.

CPYRGHT

Two theories are current about the reasons for this campaign:

1. East European sources allege that it is the quid pro quo in a deal with Peking; that during his visit to China in June, Mr Ceausescu promised China's leaders that he would put through a cultural revolution in exchange for Chinese financial aid.
2. Alternatively, it is said that Mr Ceausescu wants to strengthen the party's control at all levels of the nation's life in order to avoid giving the Russians any provocation for invading Rumania on the ground of 'protecting Socialist gains' (the phrase used by Moscow to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia).

The latter is by far the more credible theory of the two - though it may well be that the current 'purification' drive has acquired added impetus as a result of Mr Ceausescu's talks in Peking. In order to counterbalance its continued pursuit of an independent (or relatively independent) foreign policy, the Rumanian government must demonstrate that it is just as dedicated to socialism as any of its Warsaw pact neighbours.

But for the ordinary citizen such considerations do nothing to mitigate the rigours of the new ideological drive. Travellers in Rumania report what one has described as a 'bitter political east wind', which is casting a blight on much of the population.

In brass tacks this has already meant the following: (a) tightening of censorship; (b) intensified checks by the secret police on private property; (c) increasing discrimination against 'intellectuals', a term which is often interpreted to embrace all those with a modicum of higher education (for example, 80 per cent of university places next academic year are to go to children of working-class families); (d) compulsory overtime in a wide range of industries - though this may be a matter of economic necessity rather than part of the ideological campaign. These sources report a dissatisfaction with the regime that did not exist a year or two ago.

Mr Ceausescu's campaign appears to be based on the dubious assumption that such negative measures will create an upsurge of revolutionary dynamism. The Academy of Social and Political Sciences has been given the job of superintending the new campaign, and all communist youth organisations have been enjoined to play a full and active role.

At the same time, the whole apparatus of control has been reorganised. The state committee for culture and the arts is to co-ordinate the activities of the committee for radio and television; its new boss is **Mr Dumitru Popescu**, who at 42 is one of the more thrusting figures in the party hierarchy. He replaces Pompiliu Macovei, who was criticised earlier this year by Mr Ceausescu for inadequacies in the running of his committee and who pointedly indicated thereafter that ill-health might cause his early retirement.

Other prominent figures who have been dropped, or moved sideways, include **Ilie Radulescu**, the head of the propaganda section of the central committee, and **Ion Iliescu**, a former minister for youth, who accompanied Mr Ceausescu on his recent visit to Peking. In recent weeks Mr Iliescu seems to have fallen into disfavour, if not into disgrace; he too was criticised personally by Mr Ceausescu, at a special meeting of party activists on 9 July.

These changes may be little more than a routine reshuffling of the pack, which goes on regularly in all one-party countries; but they may reflect a lack of sureness at the centre. The repeated admonitions to 'maintain national unity' are also a significant straw in the wind; the government has called for a spirit of 'brotherhood' between

the Rumanian people and the Hungarian, German, Serbian and other ethnic groups in the country. It is obviously afraid that resentments in the minority regions might be exploited by Russia and its allies, particularly Hungary - which seems prepared to reactivate the problem of Transylvania. But these resentments may be exacerbated rather than allayed by the rigours of the new ideological drive.

In sum: the present Rumanian regime will continue to have two faces. In domestic affairs it is as repressive as any of its Warsaw pact neighbours, and will probably continue to be so. In foreign policy, it will strive to maintain its independence of Moscow without provoking the Russians to the point where they might intervene.

By now Mr Ceausescu is one of Europe's cleverest tight-rope walkers. His skill and nerve are being tested at the moment over the matter of the latest Warsaw pact exercises, scheduled to start in Bulgaria within the next few days. On 26 July the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest called on Mr Ceausescu and peremptorily demanded that the Russian troops involved in the exercise be permitted to pass through Rumania. Mr Ceausescu refused, and there the matter stands. Meanwhile, for good measure, the Rumanian press has given its blessing to the incipient Sino-American detente, and has welcomed the news of President Nixon's pending visit to Peking.

With Russian pressure mounting, the atmosphere in Rumania in some ways resembles that in Czechoslovakia exactly three years ago. But there is a fundamental difference. There has been no 'Prague spring' in Bucharest, and Mr Ceausescu is determined not to suffer the fate of Mr Dubcek. This is the reasoning behind the ideological purity drive.

In what looks like a studied display of insouciance, Mr Ceausescu and his wife are now on holiday at the Rumanian Black Sea resort of Neptun, with top members of the party's hierarchy and their families. But they took the precaution of inviting the Russian deputy premier and Soviet representative on Comecon, Mr Leschko - just as reinsurance.

THE ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT
29 July 1971

CEAUSESCU IN THE FAR EAST

The tour of China, North Korea and North Vietnam during June by Mr. Ceausescu, Romania's President and party General Secretary, accompanied by his wife and the Prime Minister, Mr. Maurer, again underlined his country's independence within the international Communist movement. In China his hosts showed by their praise of Bucharest's resistance to foreign pressure that they hoped to exploit it for overtly anti-Soviet ends, but the inclusion of Mongolia in the delegation's schedule and its call in Moscow on the way home were a reminder to the Chinese leaders that Romania's stand does not have a pro-Peking bias. Yet this did not prevent signs of Soviet unease, among them a *Moscow Radio* broadcast for Romania on the day of President Ceausescu's departure, which emphasised the provision for consultation in the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty of July, 1970, and claimed that an "overwhelming majority" of Communist parties had condemned China's foreign policy. And as if to minimise the impact of Ceausescu's likely assertions in Asia of the need to respect the independence of each State, the broadcast gave a reassurance that bloc co-ordination of policy did not "in any way" infringe the sovereignty and national interests of other countries.

CPYRGHT

Ceausescu's visit to China, from June 1 to 9, came exactly a year after that of Vice-President and party Presidium member, Emil Bodnaras. In the intervening months, Sino-Romanian relations have deepened and diversified under the influence of Peking's more extravert stance and Bucharest's awareness of the value of international relations outside the Soviet circle. While the Romanians refuse to switch their loyalty to China, they are clearly grateful for her friendship as they pursue their Balkan ties—including growing contacts with Greece—under the wary eye of Moscow.

In turn the Chinese leaders encourage Romanian self-reliance as an example to other States in Eastern Europe. In a welcoming editorial to Ceausescu on June 1, the Peking *People's Daily* praised Romania's opposition to foreign (clearly Soviet) interference in defence of her State sovereignty and her example to "small and medium" countries in withstanding "big-Power hegemony".

Peking's support for Bucharest has also been given concrete form in the loan of over 200 million dollars granted last November and generous relief after the 1970 flood disaster. Further aid may have been discussed during the recent visit when an "expansion of economic co-operation" was agreed. According to protocols signed in March, China will build and equip factories in Romania and under a trade agreement reached in February she will buy Romanian oil, steel and aluminium products. An exhibition showing the achievements of China's "Socialist construction" opened in Bucharest on June 15, described by a Chinese spokesman as "the biggest event arranged this year in a foreign country". Mutual trade exchanges are to increase substantially between 1972 and 1975.

Bucharest's aim is clearly to diversify its trade with both Eastern and Western countries outside the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and to receive aid from a variety of sources. China's reward for her interest is Moscow's discomfiture as well as the chance to establish an influence and presence, through Chinese technicians, in a Warsaw Pact member State.

Policy differences

Yet the Romanian leaders continue to resist Chinese efforts to make them take sides in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Both Ceausescu's speeches during the recent tour and the joint communiqué revealed that substantial differences of opinion with the Chinese persist. While Peking would welcome the communiqué's appeal for the abrogation of military blocs and withdrawal of troops within their borders, it does not share Moscow's interest in disarmament—a prominent theme of Ceausescu's remarks. Similarly, the communiqué recorded only Romania's view that European security was an urgent problem; China's objections to a Soviet-sponsored conference on the subject probably account for the lack of a more detailed joint recommendation. On the Middle East, the Romanians apparently failed to persuade their hosts of the desirability of a settlement in which the interests of all countries, including Israel, should be taken into account. On June 8, the Chinese

Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, reiterated Peking's full support for the Arabs and claimed that the "struggle of the Palestinian people" against Israel was "developing in depth". Ceausescu was far more moderate in his approach and the communiqué conceded that the two governments held different opinions.

More provocative from Peking's point of view was the Romanian leader's contention that there is no single centre of the Communist movement (a position for which it is vying with Moscow) and that all Communist parties are free to devise their own political line. In his turn, Ceausescu, while reiterating the need to respect the rights of small countries and the principle of non-interference, did not echo Chou En-lai's attack on Moscow as a "super-Power". However, in his speech at the Peking rally on June 8, he referred to the "victory" of China's cultural revolution and in the final communiqué praised Peking's "valuable contribution" to the Communist movement.

On the uncontroversial Communist slogans of anti-imperialism, the need to counter "Japanese militarism" and China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, the two sides were agreed. The Romanian President even acknowledged the importance of the Indochinese summit conference of April, 1970, which was a landmark in China's bid for influence with the North Vietnamese and probably weakened the Soviet position in Hanoi. Romania's recognition of Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian "Royal Government of National Union" in exile must be gratifying to Hanoi and Peking, particularly as Moscow has not severed its ties with the Government of the Khmer Republic. Discussions on Indochina were predictably to the fore during Ceausescu's stay in North Korea (June 9 to 15) and North Vietnam (June 15 to 19) and took up the major part of the communiqué issued in Hanoi. In this, both sides endorsed the Vietcong's ten-point peace proposals, the Pathet Lao's April, 1971, formula for a Laotian settlement and Prince Sihanouk's proclamation on Cambodia of March, 1970. Another prominent theme was the need for the withdrawal of all American forces from South Korea and Taiwan; the North Koreans (unlike Hanoi which keeps troops in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam) associated themselves with a demand for the withdrawal of all armed forces within their national boundaries.

On Communist party relations, the Romanians found common ground with North Korea and North Vietnam, both of which maintain neutrality between Moscow and Peking. One of the corner-stones of Kim Il-sung's policy is self-reliance (*chuche*) and, unlike Hanoi (which has to look to Peking as well as Moscow for military aid), he supported the Romanian view that there was no need for an international centre of Communism. At a rally in Pyongyang on June 14 he also emphasised that a Communist State's sovereignty must be based on independence in the economic and defence fields. Both the North Vietnamese and North Koreans reaffirmed the independence of all Marxist-Leninist parties, at the same time endorsing the need for unity in the Communist movement. Hanoi and Pyongyang had refused to send delegates to the 1969 world Communist conference in Moscow, probably anticipating that it would seek to isolate China and deepen the Sino-Soviet rift.

The party and State leaders of Mongolia, where Ceausescu stayed from June 21 to 24, are firmly committed to Moscow's side on all ideological matters, while heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for both economic and military help. Nevertheless, probably pressed by Ceausescu, they put their signature to a communiqué which laid down that relations between Communist countries should be based on the principle of equal rights and non-interference. For their part, the Romanians agreed that there should be greater co-operation within the CMEA, of which Mongolia is also a member.

The homegoing Romanian delegation was received by the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, during its brief stop in Moscow on June 24 though Soviet sources gave very little publicity to the tour. The Romanian Press and radio's coverage, in contrast, was so fulsome in its treatment of what was described as an important contribution to Communist and anti-imperialist unity as to suggest that the trip was being used in part as a means of enhancing the régime's prestige in the face of domestic criticism. Ceausescu's latest directive to the party (published on July 7) to launch a nation-wide campaign to instil Communist "purity" indicated that he has taken a leaf out of Peking's book in his approach to the restoration of discipline and the revival of revolutionary zeal within his own country.

ASIAN ANALYST
July 1971

CPYRGHT

Russia putting the screw on Ceausescu

There are signs that the Russians plan to step up their war of nerves against Rumania. **President Ceausescu's** friendship with China, which was capped by his visit to Peking in June, is seen by Moscow as an open challenge, and indeed an affront. Now as a result of the news of President Nixon's pending visit to China the Russian position has hardened.

; but, as the Russians see it, Ceausescu has been 'ganging up' with the enemies of the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian government is willing to play Moscow's hand, largely because of the deterioration in its bilateral relations with Rumania (see FOREIGN REPORT, No. 1201, 10 June, 1971). At the end of June, **Zoltan Komocsin**, who is in charge of foreign policy in the Hungarian politburo, brought the differences to the surface; he said that 'the future of the Hungarian and the Rumanian people, including the Hungarian minority in Rumania, is inseparable from socialism'.

This triggered an angry response from Komocsin's Rumanian counterpart, **Niculescu-Mizil**. The main target of the strongly worded attack was Hungary - but the message to Moscow was clear: Rumania would brook no interference by any of its Warsaw pact allies.

The Russians' main worry is not just Ceausescu's independent policy, but the extension of Chinese influence in the Balkans, reinforced by a possible Sino-American rapprochement. To prevent this, Rumania must therefore be brought to heel, without delay - but preferably without a military invasion. The Russians will apply the screw in three ways:

(i) *Political pressure.* The polemical campaign against Rumania will become increasingly virulent - and the Hungarians are joining loudly in the chorus. The Budapest

press now goes out of its way to publish embarrassing news about Rumania. For example, the trial and execution of the ringleaders of a Rumanian food racket were reported widely in the Hungarian newspapers and on the radio, though they were not reported in Rumania.

But it will take more than a polemical campaign to bring Ceausescu to heel. According to east European sources one possible move could be a conference of the prime ministers of the Warsaw pact countries, which would condemn Rumania's policy as a 'threat to the whole socialist community'. Alternatively, a summit meeting of the party leaders could be convened, for the same purpose.

(ii) *Economic sanctions.* This week's Comecon summit meeting in Bucharest gives the Russians a good opportunity. (The fact that Bucharest is the meeting-place is accidental; Comecon summit meetings rotate from capital to capital.) The Russians have stepped up their 'integration' drive, though in the past this has always aroused stiff Rumanian opposition. A Moscow radio commentary of 22 July suggested that 'as a necessary step towards closer integration among the socialist countries, international planning organs should be set up in the future'. MTI, the Hungarian news agency, set the tone when it urged Comecon to 'seek as extensive as possible economic integration'.

But the Russians could overplay their hand -- and in the process end up by alienating some of the other Comecon members instead of isolating Rumania. The Russians, however, can always create a crisis in Bucharest by cutting off or reducing raw material deliveries. Without the coal, coke and iron ore which Russia supplies, Rumania's heavy industry would break down.

(iii) *Military moves.* This sort of pressure has, in fact, already started; next month Warsaw pact military exercises will take place in south-eastern Bulgaria. The Rumanians refused to let Soviet troops pass through Rumania in order to meet the Bulgarian units at the site of the joint manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the troops can be transported by sea or air-lifted -- which may increase their psychological impact. Similar exercises are scheduled for September -- involving Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Soviet troops -- on the eastern fringes of the Hungarian plain, in the neighbourhood of the Rumanian border.

Ceausescu will put up resistance to all these pressures. But the question of how far the Russians will go may depend more on Chinese than on Rumanian reactions. Soviet-Rumanian relations are one more facet of the new era of ping-pong diplomacy.

WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1971

East Bloc Economic Summit Set

CPYRGHT

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

CPYRGHT

BUCHAREST, July 24 -- An economic summit conference of Communist leaders, due to begin here Monday, is being advertised as a fresh test of the Soviet Union's ability to squeeze discipline and unity from its allies, particularly Romania.

However, high Romanian officials, both in public and private, are stressing that while they will meet the Soviet Union's demands for more economic "integration"

and cooperation half way, they will not yield any of their national sovereignty to do so.

Almost since its founding in 1949, as a Communist response to the Marshall Plan, "Comecon," as the economic organization of the Soviet Union, its East European allies and Mongolia is called, has been a forum where weaker members probed the limits of their independence.

Though the sovereignty of each member is guaranteed in the charter, the extent to which it could be exercised has rested with the political skill of each country.

Next week's meeting of Comecon prime ministers, including probably Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, will deal with the question of integration, and will approve the new Comecon Investment Bank which Romania joined early this year.

However, Western diplomats say broader political significance for the meeting is obvious.

Romania's continued insistence on cultivating good relations with China, not a member of Comecon, and Peking's own diplomatic offensive has been casting a long shadow over preparations for the meeting.

Some Western diplomats speculate that China's initial

for a demonstration of authority.

The heart of Romanian policy on Comecon was set down yesterday by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu.

In a speech at the port city of Constanta he said:

"No matter how much interdependence in production between various sectors will develop, this must not lead in any way to the transgression of national sovereignty, must not influence in any way the right of the Communist party of each country, the workers movement, or the respective people, to self-dependently decide its own development programs according to its own wish."

It was the second time in two weeks that the Romanian leader has issued a major policy statement in which he has made clear that joint planning and supranational economic organizations were unacceptable.

At the same time, in Constanta, he ticked off the standard Romanian policy themes developed in the last few months as an answer to critics.

Balanced Praise

He balanced praise for the Soviet Union and its revolution with recognition of the great achievements of China and its great revolution. He called for a "resolute end to the imperialist policy of force, of dictates, and of interference in the affairs of others," a well as an end to pressure of any kind.

In reference to his Asian tour, he said that the aim was to strengthen the unity of anti-imperialist forces. The remark seemed aimed at rebutting the Soviet bloc view that links with China contribute to the disunity of world Communism.

Essentially, the argument within Comecon has been between the Soviet Union, which wants to emphasize efficiency by having each country specialize in its industrial production, and the less advanced countries such as Romania which think that Comecon policy should concentrate on spreading development to all members.

Few East European countries want to turn over to the Soviet Union the responsibility for setting economic priorities, fixing prices and financing technological development.

The Bucharest regime has also just passed legislation

enabling foreign corporations to invest directly in domestic undertakings and to own up to 49 per cent of the capital. This step, first taken by Yugoslavia in 1967, and since copied by Hungary, was once considered radical.

Gatt Negotiations

By coincidence the Comecon meeting is coming just as Romania's negotiations are nearing completion for membership in GATT, the tariff setting organization of industrial states, mostly Western ones. At the same time the Nixon Administration is pressing Congress to accord Romania most favored nation tariff concessions to ease Bucharest's export problems.

Western experts doubt that without help Romania can sustain its level of trade from the United States—in which imports have increased from \$8 million to \$68 million in five years.

Romania could be vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure. But the political aspects of Romania's western initiatives, as well as the credit it has obtained from China, cannot have failed to attract Moscow's attention.

Nevertheless there have been clear signs that Ceausescu's regime is trimming its sails in expectation of trouble. Warsaw Pact maneuvers are to take place this summer in southern Hungary, along the Romanian border.

American and Romanian officials insist that, contrary to western reports, Ceausescu was careful not to play a major role as a Washington-Peking intermediary on his Asian trip, so as to avoid inflaming Moscow tempers.

Also at the 50th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party in May Ceausescu was warmer than usual in praise of the Soviet army. And references to Soviet revisionism contained in a congratulatory telegram from Albania were omitted from the press.

On the homefront Ceausescu has recently strengthened his credentials as an orthodox leader domestically by pushing through a puritanical new cultural and ideological code no sooner than he had returned from Peking.

He subsequently performed the feat of ousting several hardline officials from his regime while tightening domestic controls.

WASHINGTON POST
27 July 1971

Red Bloc Leaders Meet on Economy In Romania

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

CPYRGHT

BUCHAREST, July 26.—Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and governmental leaders of eight other Communist countries arrived here today for economic consultations aimed at greater unity in the socialist bloc.

It was widely believed in Communist circles that the top level meeting of Comecon, the Communist economic organization, will try to reach long-delayed agreement on

closer integration of the economies.

The Soviet Union has been the leading force behind the integration movement. Harmonizing of economic planning, financing and development is in line with the long range Soviet political goal of increasing discipline and unity in the Communist bloc.

This goal, however, has faced objections of varying force from independent-minded Romania, and at the May 1970, Warsaw summit meeting, Comecon leaders failed to reach agreement on details of integration.

The negative Soviet reaction to the coming visit of President Nixon to China has suggested that broader political themes, such as Romania's continued cultivation of relations with Peking, could be discussed among the leaders.

Pravda said this week in connection with Mr. Nixon's visit Peking is "anti-Soviet," which was taken by some as

an indirect thrust at Romania.

Links With China

Romania has been seeking to strengthen its economic links with China, which is not a member of Comecon.

Yugoslavia is sending a fairly high-level observer to the meeting, Aleksandar Grilickov, a member of the Yugoslav cabinet.

Romania, and to a lesser extent Hungary, which is making an extensive economic reform tailored to Hungarian conditions, opposes any

form of integration that would result in supranational organizations and decision-making.

Aside from the political implications of the Chinese developments of recent weeks, the drive toward British entry into the Common Market is also likely to have a powerful impact on Comecon thinking. Far more than the United States, whose trade with Eastern Europe is miniscule, the East European countries look to Western Europe as a market, and as a source of technology.

The specter of a monolithic, protective West European eco-

nomie grouping, including Britain, worries many East Europeans.

Many of them feel that integration could put a stop to fruitful bilateral contacts already started with the West and make economic contacts with the Common Market and Scandinavia more difficult.

Achieved Little

Despite years of negotiations and bargaining, Comecon has failed to achieve a real multilateral economic system in Eastern Europe. Most contacts between the Commu-

nist countries remain bilateral and supranational organizations have accomplished little.

Poland and Hungary, for instance, want to move toward monetary convertibility, and a monetary system for clearing debts, gradually replacing the old barter system. But less developed countries such as Bulgaria oppose this idea.

Also, the less developed countries such as Romania and Bulgaria would like to see Comecon concentrate more on spreading the development funds, rather than on "specialization" which they feel would cultural "specialists" while East Germany, Poland and

Czechoslovakia moved ahead with advanced technology.

Price policy, economic models and the amount of decentralization remain matters for individual countries.

As a result, there are significant differences over such vital matters as how much freedom to give the market. These range from the rigid Soviet system to Hungary, which is loosening up.

Though Romania has been the most outspoken opponent of deep integration, Comecon suffers from other frictions, and Romania is not alone in opposing radical integration.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 July 1971

CPYRGHT

REDS' TRADE BLOC SETS INTEGRATION

Bucharest Meeting Ends— An Accord on a Convertible Currency Also Reported

By JAMES FERON
Special to The New York Times

WARSAW, July 30—Eastern Europe's trade bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, has reportedly agreed on a complex plan for economic integration, including a convertible currency.

Czech sources said today that the agreement came at a three-day meeting of Premiers and economic ministers from the eight member countries. The meeting of the council, which is known as Comecon, ended yesterday in Bucharest.

Heading the Soviet delegation was Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin. The other countries represented were East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Mon-

golia.

Although some officials, both Czechs and others, were skeptical over the reported achievements at the meeting, the agreement was described by one economist as a "milestone" in East European efforts to seek meaningful integration.

One of the agreement's goals, he said, is a convertible currency, possibly a special ruble, to facilitate multinational trading within the bloc. Most of Eastern Europe's trade is bilateral and the complexity of currencies offers little opportunity to settle accounts between partners and to make trading arrangements with third parties.

The agreement is expected to be published within a week.

Informants here said that the program was two years in preparation and that it would take "several five-year plans to implement."

A communiqué issued last night at the close of the meeting in Bucharest spoke of "gradual implementation within 15 to 20 years."

The communiqué appeared to contain a gain for Rumania in its reference to Comecon's goals as including "respect for state sovereignty, independence and

national interests and noninterference in the international affairs of other states."

Rumania's President and Communist party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, has long resisted Soviet efforts to turn Comecon into an instrument for planning the entire economy of Eastern Europe.

But a Czech economist said the new integration program was intended to harmonize national economies into an efficient trade bloc rather than to force them to adhere to unrealistic programs as part of an over-all plan.

The plan is said to include a multiplicity of subjects, from tourism to scientific-technical agreements. According to experts here, it seems to represent a practical effort to overcome the problems that have plagued Comecon since its inception two decades ago.

The organization is a loose regional association without executive powers. It was founded to counter Marshal Plan aid to Western Europe and early Western efforts to isolate the Communist bloc.

It has been beset by conflicting national interests within Eastern Europe, great diversities in local economies, lack of incentives in the more tightly controlled economic systems and heavily bureaucratic pro-

cedures. Attempts by Soviet leaders to use Comecon as an instrument for supranational economic direction have failed.

One official here said that conditions in Eastern Europe apparently had changed suffi-

ciently for the new plan to receive unanimous agreement among Comecon members.

The passage of time, one Czech economist said, had helped close the gap between Bulgaria and the more industrialized countries such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Other factors it was said included the present political tranquility in Eastern Europe and the continuing growth and probable expansion of the rival trading block, the European Common Market.

Division of Production

One Czech official said, however, that it remained to be seen whether the ambitious Bucharest protocol would succeed. He said that it might if it included plans for "a practical division of production, within the socialist camp."

"We have five countries producing automobiles," he said. "This is madness. Until we diversify properly, we cannot prosper and we won't compete in the West."

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
31 July 1971

Soviet Bid for Economic Union Seen Slowed by East Europeans

CPYRGHT

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, July 30—The Communist bloc's prime ministers agreed yesterday in Bucharest to work for closer cooperation and integration over a 20-year period, but along lines that were left noticeably vague in their final communique.

After meeting for three full days in the flag-festooned Romanian government building, the governmental leaders of the eight countries of Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic organization, said that "Socialist integration is not equatable

with the foundation of supranational" organization.

This phrase, which incorporated a basic policy premise of independent-minded Romania, appeared to rule out at least for the immediate future any dramatic impetus toward an East European version of the Common Market.

This also suggested to Western analysts that there had been no basic change in the preference of the East Europeans for bilateral rather than multilateral solutions to their economic problems, which are

now being highlighted by shortages of investment capital and modern machinery.

Diplomatic and Romanian observers in Bucharest said this week that whatever enthusiasm may have existed for a strong, centralized grouping in the East had probably already been dampened by the prospect that the West European unit may soon be expanded to include Britain and its partners.

This is because the East European countries, particularly Romania, are trying to expand

links with the West. Most of them think this trend would only be made more difficult by transforming Comecon from a loosely knit organization into a rival economic bloc.

Details of the program worked out and adopted this week will not be fully known until publication of an 80-page document later. But the wording of the communique suggested a disappointment for the Soviet Union which has led the movement for integration.

WASHINGTON POST
2 August 1971

Romania Says Independence Not Affected by Bloc Pact

CPYRGHT

VIENNA, Aug. 1—Romania said tonight its agreement to "integrate" its economy more closely with the other Communist nations does not mean it has surrendered any independence to them.

The agreement, announced Thursday, was hammered out by a three-day session in Bucharest of Comecon, the Communist common market. It said the seven nations had worked out a 20-year program of "cooperation and integration," but the details have

not been released yet.

Scinteia, the Romanian Communist Party newspaper, anticipated this release tonight with an editorial stressing that Romania's independence was still intact.

It singled out the points in the announcement that talked of "sovereign and equal socialist states . . . which self-dependently decide on the basis of full sovereignty on all problems pertaining to their economic and social development."

"The program," Scinteia said, "clearly specifies that the socialist economic integration proceeds on the basis of fully free consent"—meaning that any nation can opt out of any step of the integration process.

It said the program "does not affect the questions of internal planning"—although one agreement reached was to set up a central committee to coordinate the annual plans of the Comecon members.

Scinteia indicated that a battle arose at the Comecon

meeting over the issue of "national independence and sovereignty." It said this issue "has been the object of multiple concerns and discussions within which various opinions and views have been expressed."

Although Scinteia did not refer to China by name, the paper said that besides the Comecon countries, Romania considered it "its lofty duty" to expand cooperation with all the socialist states which are not members of Comecon.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1971

Soviet Bloc Holds Parley; China Seen as Key Topic

CPYRGHT

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 2—The top leaders of all the Soviet-bloc countries except Rumania held a one-day meeting today and issued a communiqué denouncing deviations from Moscow's line and expressing "grave alarm" over the anti-Communist campaign in the Sudan.

Diplomatic sources here believed that the meeting, attended by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, was called at Soviet initiative to discuss primarily the latest developments in China's relations with the United States, and to agree on a joint position.

It was believed that the Rumanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu, who recently visited China, boycotted the session since alone of Russia's allies in the Warsaw Pact organization, Rumania strongly supports the moves to improve Chinese-American relations. The gathering was held somewhere in the Crimea, the southern area of European Russia adjacent to the Black Sea.

In Soviet parlance, "left-wing opportunism" generally refers to the policies of China. On occasion, "right-wing opportunism" can refer to Rumania or to Yugoslavia, which is not a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Another Communist country not a member of the pact, Mongolia, was represented at the meeting by its leader, Yumzhagin Tsedenbal, a further indication that China was a major subject of discussion, since Mongolia plays a strategic role in Soviet military preparations along the Chinese border.

To avoid drawing attention to Rumania's absence, Tass, the Soviet press agency, described the gathering as "a friendly meeting" of leaders "now spending their vacation in the Soviet Union."

But Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian leader, only yesterday was presiding at a meeting in Bulgaria marking the 80th anniversary of the Bulgarian party, and thus had to travel to the Crimea to participate.

The Soviet Union was represented at the meeting by President Nikolai V. Podgorny as well as Mr. Brezhnev. Two days ago, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Podgorny were reported to have met with the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, who was also present today. Others listed as attending were Erich Honecker of East Germany, Edward Gierek of Poland and Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia.

It was the first time Rumania has been absent from one of the Warsaw Pact's top-level meetings since 1968 when Mr. Ceausescu refused to join in the anti-Czechoslovak actions being planned by the rest of the bloc to end the liberal regime of Alexander Dubcek.

The communiqué itself did not mention China and was limited to affirmation of well-known Soviet position. But to Communists, the wording was clearly anti-Chinese in nature and could also be interpreted as critical of Rumania.

The declaration highly praised the meeting of world Communist parties held in Moscow in June, 1969, which in Soviet analyses has consistently been interpreted as having attacked Peking's policies, a point of view disputed by Rumania.

"Experience bears out the historic significance of the conference for further strengthening the unity of the world Communist and workers' class movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the struggle against right-wing and left-wing opportunism and for rallying all progressive and national liberation forces in the anti-imperialist struggle," it said.

Presumably, Mr. Brezhnev explained the Soviet position on the new turn in Chinese-United States relations. That position, as expressed in Pravda eight days ago, calls for careful study of the developing situation.

attack on China and the United States so long as their improved relations are not directed against the Soviet Union.

Regarding the situation in the Sudan, the participants in the meeting "expressed grave alarm in connection with the ruthless terror unleashed against the Communist party and other democratic organizations."

"They strongly condemn the lawlessness and arbitrariness, perpetrated by the Sudanese authorities, which is exploited by the forces of imperialism and reaction against the interests of the Sudanese people," the communiqué said.

But the seven countries gave continued backing to the Arab side in the Middle Eastern crisis, as well as to the Indo-Chinese Communists.

The communiqué said the participants "stressed the particular importance of the efforts to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the Socialist community, the international working class and Communist movement" as part of the effort to insure "new victories of the working class and of the cause of Socialism." In the Soviet interpretation, improving the "cohesion" of the Communist movement usually means closer adherence to Soviet policies.

Though this movement has received support from some countries, such as Poland, which feels it would gain from specialization in industrially advanced branches, it has met opposition from Rumania and to some degree, from Hungary and East Germany.

Any thought that Rumania was preparing to relax its insistence on sovereignty guarantees for Comecon countries, under Soviet pressure, appeared to be removed by an agreement to respect the sovereignty, independence and national interests of members.

Outside Links

The prime ministers agreed that the further consolidation of the East European economy would increase the possi-

cal unity and cohesion of the Socialist countries."

But the eight leaders also left the door open to links from the outside with Comecon, and vice versa. They agreed that outsiders could "take part totally or partially" in carrying out the program and, conversely, pledged to expand links both with underdeveloped and with capitalist countries.

The Bucharest meeting culminated two years of work on a long range program. This has been beset from the beginning by such basic questions as how to coordinate planning among countries that take different views on the relative importance of the market and the planning process in the economy.

Hungary, for instance, has been experimenting with decentralizing and allowing some prices to find their own level on the market, while the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Rumania all retain rigid centralized planning systems.

While Poland and Hungary favor moving by stages away from the present financial system, the Soviet Union has opposed this. Yesterday's communiqué made only a general reference to "improving commodity-monetary relations."

East Europe and the Soviet Union lack a convertible currency of their own, a fact which has political significance because it has impeded efforts of smaller countries to establish links with the West and has complicated both trade and financial cooperation.

Poland and Hungary favor moving away from the present system of clearing debts by commodity deliveries and towards a monetary system.

Mutual Dependency

Despite these problems, the Comecon countries last year took an initial step toward closer cooperation by establishing an investment bank on

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which countries can draw for hard currency to finance Western purchases.

The "unanimous" agreement of the Comecon prime ministers to support the general principle of closer links ex-

posed the recognition by each country that they are deeply dependent on each other at this stage of development.

Even Romania, whose natural resources make it the most

self-sufficient next to the Soviet Union, depends on Moscow for iron ore supplies for its vast steel works.

However, each country is seeking to expand trade and other links with the West.

Steps are under way to bring Hungary and Romania into foreign firms into joint ventures in which the outside company would provide working capital.

TIME

16 August 1971

COMMUNISTS The Crimean Summit

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It was quite a coincidence. The way Moscow tells it, the Communist Party boss of every nation in the Soviet bloc—with one notable exception—just happened to be vacationing on Russia's Crimean peninsula last week. Since they were all on hand anyway, even Mongolia's Yumshagin Tsendenbal, why not get together for a little fraternal talk?

The missing party chief was Rumania's independent-minded Nicolae Ceausescu, who was sunning himself on his country's own Black Sea coast. Was he deliberately overlooked by the Kremlin, or did he refuse to attend what was in reality a Communist summit conference? The question was asked with some nervousness in Eastern Europe last week; in August 1968 the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was preceded by two Warsaw Pact summit meetings from which the leaders of Prague's "Springtime of Freedom" had been excluded.

There are other ominous parallels. The 1968 meetings were accompanied by military maneuvers, and last week a new Warsaw Pact exercise dubbed Opal 71 began in Hungary, uncomfortably close to Rumania's western frontier. Early next week full-scale war games are scheduled to begin in Bulgaria, near Rumania's southern border.

Cozy Relations. Moscow is irritated with Ceausescu for a number of reasons. Rumanian combat units have not participated in Warsaw Pact maneuvers for more than three years. Under a law that he concocted shortly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, foreign troops may not cross Rumanian territory without permission from the National Assembly. As it happens, the Assembly suddenly went into recess a few days ago. That means that Moscow will have to fly three full divisions, totaling

as many as 40,000 men, to the impending war games in Bulgaria, or ship them across the Black Sea—unless it wants to risk marching them through Rumania without official permission.

What most unsettles the Kremlin at the moment, however, is Ceausescu's cozy relations with China, particularly now that Peking and Washington are beginning to speak to one another. The Russians believe that the Rumanian leader helped to open Peking's door to Richard Nixon both before and during his own trip to Peking in June. With 600,000 Russian troops stationed along China's borders and no sign of an end to the Sino-Soviet feud, Moscow considers Ceausescu's conduct a grave breach of Socialist solidarity.

Usual Secrecy. Accordingly, ever since Ceausescu returned from China, the Soviets have been seeking an opportunity to get the Warsaw Pact countries together to censure him for his Asian indiscretions. Two weeks ago, the Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest handed Ceausescu a letter from Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev. Foreign diplomats in Rumania believe that the letter advised Ceausescu that a Communist summit was going to be held in the Crimea but they disagree over whether Ceausescu refused an invitation or was snubbed. But as one high-ranking Rumanian official put it, "If we had been invited, we would have participated."

The meeting was surrounded by the usual secrecy; non-Communist observers are not even certain whether it was held at Sochi or 40 miles away at Pitsunda. Presumably, the conferees touched on a wide range of foreign policy problems—Berlin, the Soviet setback in the Sudan, China. What most interested Kremlinologists was the final conference communiqué containing a short but sharp denunciation of "left-wing and

right-wing opportunism." Translated, that means China on the left and Yugoslavia and Rumania on the right.

Ceausescu's Law. In view of such criticisms, how has Rumania's leader managed to survive? For one thing, he has remained markedly conservative in domestic affairs. That has made it impossible for the Soviets to accuse him of unorthodoxy. According to what Western observers call Ceausescu's Law, the more daring the foreign policy, the more rigidly conservative the domestic climate. Accordingly, Ceausescu followed up his Peking trip with a tough crackdown on those "invidious Western influences" that the Soviets regularly criticize as bourgeois and decadent.

Rumanians dubbed the new policy, which was announced only two weeks after Ceausescu's return from China, the *mini-culturală*, after Peking's Cultural Revolution. Among the casualties so far have been acid-rock music on state radio and in youth clubs (too Western), the movie *Midnight Cowboy* (perverted) and the American TV series *The Untouchables* (too violent). Ceausescu evidently believes that the *mini-culturală* begins at home; his teen-age son Valentin appeared last week with his formerly long locks closely shorn. He explained to friends that his father had ordered the haircut.

Will Nicolae Ceausescu's cultural purity save him from Russia's wrath? In all likelihood, the Russian-Rumanian crisis will prove to be nothing more than a Soviet campaign of intimidation. The situation is significantly different from Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Russians know that the Rumanians, like the Yugoslavs, would fight if they were attacked. Even so, the current war of nerves is an uncomfortable reminder to many East Europeans of that terrible August three years ago.

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 July 1971

Soviets Plan Balkan Exercises

CPYRGHT

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUCHAREST, July 28— Well-informed sources said this week that the Soviet Union plans to send three army divisions to Bulgaria for maneuvers in August, the first time since 1967 that Russian troops would enter the Balkans for such exercises.

However, the sources said that Romania has given no sign that it will permit the detachments to cross its territory to reach their destination. As a result, the troops presumably will have to be transported by ship across the Black Sea.

Under legislation passed by the Romanian national assembly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, only the assembly itself can authorize the entry of foreign troops into the country. With the parliament now on a lengthy summer recess, approval seems extremely unlikely.

Although there is no evidence that the maneuvers themselves are more than routine, diplomatic observers say they clearly have political relevance to the larger issue of long-range Balkan security.

Romanian officials have been emphasizing that their government is in an excellent position to press for some sort of regional security arrange-

ment because it has no territorial or political differences with any other Balkan country. They have said that a security arrangement could consist of mutual renunciation of force and open discussion of differences.

Balkan Cooperation

Speaking in the Black Sea port of Constanta last Friday, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu called for the Balkan countries to "seek the path of cooperation", and he said this should mean doing away with foreign military bases in the area.

He also called for an end to the old policy followed by imperialist powers of "dividing the Balkan countries and generally the small countries" and of "inciting a people against another."

Though imperialism is generally used in connection with the United States, political analysts said that the remark also could be interpreted as a reference to the bad relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which some feel could be exploited by the Soviet Union in the future.

In an area composed of independent-minded Romania, a Warsaw Pact member, nonaligned Yugoslavia, pro-Chinese Albania and the NATO countries Greece and Turkey, Bul-

garia stands out as the most loyal Soviet ally. However, Bulgaria's relations with Greece and Turkey have improved recently and Bulgarian leaders have also advanced the idea of exchanging security declarations to cover the region.

Two weeks ago, the Yugoslav government protested strongly to Bulgaria over the alleged overflight of its territory by two Bulgarian aircraft.

The matter of Balkan security will also be underlined this October, when Yugoslavia stages its biggest military maneuvers in recent years. Belgrade sources say they are aimed at demonstrating Yugoslavia's military preparedness for any aggression and, indirectly, at stressing the army's role as a stabilizing domestic element after a period of some political unrest.

Yugoslav Maneuvers

At present, there are no Soviet troops stationed in Bulgaria.

Although a member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has long opposed the division of Europe into military blocs, and has publicly opposed "cross-border" military maneuvers at the Geneva disarmament conference.

It has also declined to send

units to exercises held by the Warsaw Pact. Last fall, for instance, when the Warsaw Pact held the exercises code-named "Brothers in Arms" in East Germany, Romania sent a major as an observer. The sources here said they believe Romania will probably send staff officers to the Bulgarian maneuvers, in which three Soviet and two Bulgarian divisions will participate.

While apparently remaining firm in refusing to participate fully in the military operations of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has joined discussions at the political level. Moreover, there have been signs that Romania is anxious to avoid becoming isolated from its Communist neighbors, as Yugoslavia did after its break with Stalin in 1948. This week, for instance, the prime ministers of Comecon, the Communist economic organization, are meeting here to discuss closer forms of cooperation.

The sources here suggested that the planned Bulgarian maneuvers may have been scheduled in the place of similar exercises planned for Southern Hungary in late July.

The Yugoslav government, in connection with those maneuvers, said that it opposes war games on the soil of other European countries.

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1971

Around the World

CPYRGHT

Red Bloc Exercise Begins in Hungary

BUDAPEST—The Warsaw Pact launched surprise "tactical maneuvers" involving Soviet, Czechoslovak and Hungarian troops in Hungary yesterday. The war games code-named Opal 71

appeared to be a political game of pressure on neighboring Romania and Yugoslavia.

A terse announcement by the official Hungarian news agency MTI said the maneu-

vers had gotten under way on schedule after midnight but gave no indication as to the size of the forces being deployed. Diplomatic sources reported earlier that Warsaw Pact forces would also hold war games in Bul-

garia later this month.

The maneuvers take on political significance in the light of recent Warsaw Pact criticism of Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu's friendly policies toward China.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
27 June 1971

Yugoslavia fears Russian threat

By STEPHEN CONSTANT, Communist Affairs Staff

CPYRGHT

A SPECIAL commission of the Yugoslav Communist party has met in Belgrade to discuss anti-Yugoslav activities by Russia.

Among those who took part in the discussions was Mr. Veljko Misunovic, Yugoslavia's ambassador to Russia, and the country's Deputy State Secretary for National Defence.

According to Yugoslav reports, the discussions were rather pessimistic. Ever since Russia and her Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 "relations have not improved in any way."

TITO ATTACKED

The Russian official Press was accused of comparing the present internal situation in Yugoslavia with that which existed in Czechoslovakia before the invasion. The comparison was clearly intended "to stress the need for corresponding action to be taken."

Russia was attempting to isolate Yugoslavia on the international scene. She was encouraging subversion by Yugoslav "Cominformists" forces.

The term "cominformist" is used by Belgrade to describe anti-Tito Yugoslavs who sided with Stalin at the time of the post-war Stalin-Tito break.

The party commission again accused Russia of encouraging

"cominformists" Yugoslav émigrés living in Moscow to give public lectures attacking President Tito and his policies. One lecturer was a former Yugoslav partisan and now a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Army.

One lecture was given on President Tito's birthday. It attacked him in "particularly severe terms."

The most significant of the special commission's findings was that Russia was advocating that Yugoslavia should be dealt with in the same way as Czechoslovakia.

A few days ago at a meeting with Yugoslavian sportsmen, President Tito spoke of unnamed "enemies" who do not want a strong and united Yugoslavia.

"Geographically, Yugoslavia is situated in the most sensitive part of Europe. We are washed by waves from all sides. In the past we successfully repelled these waves and in the future we must do this even more successfully."

Tito was clearly referring to Russia and the "cominformists" when he mentioned the date 1948 the year of the Stalin-Tito row and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform.

"Recently certain people have even rejoiced at difficulties in our country, thereby indicating their wish that we should not succeed so as to prove that in 1948 and later we were wrong in the choice of our path of socialist development."

WASHINGTON STAR
27 July 1971

THE YUGOSLAV MOSAIC—2

Regional Units Prepared If Russia Invades

CPYRGHT

By ANDREW BOROWIEC
Star Staff Writer

BELGRADE — The young man browsing in a bookstore had fashionably long hair and was clad in a sportshirt of the latest Italian design.

He glanced at an array of

Second of 5 Articles

Western-style comics and girly magazines and selected two crudely colored small format booklets.

One was entitled "Rucna Bomba" (Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8) the other "Rucni Bacac" (Bazooka). He paid and casually

slipped them into his hip pocket, walking out into the sun-lit streets of Belgrade.

Hundreds of thousands — if not millions — like him form the vast Yugoslav territorial army, trained in guerrilla tactics ever since Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Few Signs of Fear

Organized in compact regional units with handy ammunition and weapons dumps, the territorials can be mobilized in the following six hours they can assume positions in innumera-

ble well chosen points of this rugged country.

A casual tourist basking in the warm sunshine of this country can discern few signs of tension or fear. Yet the concern about Soviet intentions is omnipresent. It permeates official circles, factories and villages, irrespective of internal nationality feuds and economic problems piled up before this country.

There is no fear. The sturdy, tough and proud Yugoslavs are steeped in the tradition of their partisan resistance to Nazi Germany. They are con-

fidant they could resist successfully any invasion from the Soviet bloc, causing a festering Vietnam type situation in the heart of Europe.

Country Unanimous

"Let the Russians try," is the phrase repeated throughout the republics forming the precarious Yugoslav mosaic.

Dislike — and a certain degree of contempt — of the Russians is widespread.

"Tito (Marshall Josip Broz Tito) could not succeed in leaving the Soviet Union if it was only his idea," one Yugoslav said.

"In this respect, the whole country is unanimous. Our conflict with the Russians did not start when they expelled us from the Cominform in 1948, but even before the war, when Tito defied Soviet efforts to dominate our Communist party."

"The Russians," said another, "have always wanted a lot from us — without giving anything in return."

Today the Soviet Union constitutes the biggest single outside threat to Yugoslav sovereignty. This threat haunts the Yugoslav leadership, the cadres of the Communist party and the ordinary citizens.

To the Russians, the success of the Yugoslav economic experiment in workers self-management is overshadowed by the country's persistent efforts to solve its nationalistic problems.

Currently consisting of six republics and two autonomous provinces, Yugoslavia is implementing a far-reaching program of accentuating the autonomy of the various regions under loose federal leadership.

If this succeeds — and more Yugoslavs feel it can — it would constitute an enormous threat to the seething nationality problem in-

creasingly plaguing the Soviet Union.

That is why Russia is the biggest single enemy of this venture in Yugoslavia, often described as the first country in modern history to become a confederation of sovereign states.

The constitutional amendments gradually put into effect call for a large degree of autonomy for the republics, reserving for the federal government the management of defense and foreign affairs plus some over-all economic guidelines.

Whispering Campaign

A rising whispering campaign against the new form of federation is in progress, fermented by Soviet agents and orthodox Yugoslav Communists, many of whom left the country in 1948. Some are now returning clandestinely, apparently preparing for the time when Tito leaves the scene.

In keeping with its liberal image, the Yugoslav government has no intention of limiting the free movement of persons in and out of the country. But to cope with the increasing underground threat, secret police services are being bolstered and the population of some areas is believed under

increased surveillance.

In ringing speeches at mass rallies, politicians are stressing "bratstvo" (brotherhood) and "jedinstvo" (unity). These are the weak points of the multi-national Yugoslav state on which Russia has been centering its efforts to subvert "Titoism."

However, during the past 20 years the Soviets have misjudged the country's internal situation on more than one occasion. Their often crude anti-Yugoslav policies have contributed to the dissipation of Soviet leverage here.

As far as the West is concerned, the maintenance and success of the Yugoslav experiment is of paramount importance.

A strategic country occupying the hearts of the historically unstable Balkan peninsula, Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country in a way protects the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Its collapse would shatter the equilibrium in the Mediterranean and further contribute to the instability in the Middle East.

That is why the United States has been bolstering this country with aid and grants totaling nearly \$3 billion over

the past 20 years, including some \$700 million in military assistance. The vaguely Marxist ideology of the regime and the omnipresent Communist red star appear of no importance.

First Line of Defense

Nonalignment constitutes Yugoslavia's first line of defense, backed by an ambitious foreign policy program and aid efforts throughout the countries of the "third world."

In his efforts to buttress the country internally against the possible Soviet threat, Tito has not hesitated to use tough, uncompromising measures. Among the victims are former Vice President and secret police boss Aleksander Rankovic and one of Tito's early associates now turned bitter critic, Milovan Djilas.

Rankovic was dismissed in 1966 because Tito felt he was the only man capable of taking over the country. It was not so much the takeover by Rankovic that Tito feared but the fact that in order to cope with Yugoslavia's precarious construction, Rankovic would have to rely on outside props, presumably provided by Russia. This would mean an end to "titoism" and an end of Yugoslav freedom.

SHORT SUBJECTS

Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote. The recent announcement that the Mexican-Soviet Cultural Exchange Institute has discontinued scholarships to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow is an appropriate footnote to the disclosures that followed the recent arrest of the North Korean trained members of the Mexican guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR). The cancellation, which applies not only to students already accepted but to future applicants as well, is obviously connected with the discovery that the MAR guerrillas were recruited while studying at Patrice Lumumba University. With the expulsion from Mexico of five Soviet diplomats in connection with this scandal, the Soviet Union is now rightfully, if embarrassingly, linked to North Korea in the business of promoting world-wide revolution. Thus it has apparently seen fit to lower its profile until this affair blows over. (See Perspectives issues of May and June 1971 for articles on Lumumba University and North Korean subversion.)

* * * * *

Can The New Svetova Literatura Accept Solzhenitsyn? From 1956 until May 1970, Prague's Odeon publishing house furnished its Czech intellectual audience with a bimonthly literary magazine designed to fill the void created by regime-imposed isolation from both Western thought and that of dissidents within the Bloc and the Soviet Union. Edited by prominent critics and writers this magazine, Svetova Literatura, exposed Czech poets and writers to the stimuli provided by the experimentation and innovations of proscribed Soviet authors -- Anna Achmatova, Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, etc. -- as well as the work of Russian emigres such as Ivan Budin and Vladimir Nabokov. Predictable suspension came in May of 1970. The Czech muse was dead; but not quite. At the beginning of August this year Svetova Literatura reappeared -- like Anne Boleyn atop the walls of the Tower of London, "with her head tucked underneath her arm." The new editorial board was revealed to be made up mainly of dogmatists from the 1950's including the man who liquidated the Union of Czech Writers, Karel Bousek of the Ministry of Culture. The new editorial board decreed in its policy statement that it will be the task of the revived periodical "to portray the progressive trends and phenomena in world literature from committed socialist positions and in the most accurate manner possible. Svetova Literatura will be a literary revue of socialist orientation."

According to this policy, the revived periodical has every right to sustain the exposure it so long accorded to Solzhenitsyn in such tributes as the one in issue no. 4, 1968, when the magazine drew attention to the author's moral greatness. We have appended a copy of Solzhenitsyn's challenge to the Soviet Security Police as it appeared in the 18 August 1971 issue of The Washington Post. The letter gives no evidence that it is the work of a person who has renounced socialism; it cannot be said to deviate one iota from socialist legality. Indeed, any strengthening of the legal aspects of socialism must surely be a progressive trend or phenomena of the sort that Svetova Literatura's directors wish to emphasize. And no one can maintain that the letter does not present the facts with the utmost clarity.

* * * * *

Warsaw Intercontinental On Its Way. The Intercontinental Hotel Corporation, a British construction firm, and the Polish tourist agency Orbis in mid-August signed a preliminary agreement for the construction of a 450-room hotel in Warsaw. Orbis will manage the hotel when it is completed, probably by mid-1974. The agreement while still tentative, ends a long period of Polish inaction on a project in which the Poles first expressed interest over two years ago. It can be taken to indicate that the Gierek regime is willing to conclude agreements with Western firms which had evidently been rejected by the Gomulka regime as too bold, and thus to catch up with the less timid Warsaw Pact countries. Bucharest and Budapest already are graced by Intercontinental Hotels.

* * * * *

New "Legal System" for Cuba. There has been a little-noted but significant development in Cuba in the recent declaration that a new legal system, that recognizes only "the power of the revolution" will soon be adopted. Known as the "Organic Law of the National Legal System," the new code officially subordinates the country's legal system to the Council of Ministers, headed by Castro himself. Although this subordination has in fact existed since Castro took over the government in 1959, it has now been officially codified and provides an opportunity to point out that Castro will use every means possible to strengthen his personal grip on the government.

WASHINGTON POST
18 August 1971

Solzhenitsyn's Challenge to the Police

Following is the text of the letter Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn sent Aug. 13 to Yuri V. Andropov, head of the Soviet police:

To the minister of government security of the U.S.S.R. Andropov

For many years I have borne in silence the lawlessness of your employees: the inspection of all my correspondence, the confiscation of half of it, the search of my correspondents' homes and their official and administrative persecution, the spying around my house, the shadowing of visitors, the tapping of telephone conversations, the drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of recording apparatus in my city apartment and garden plot, and a persistent slander campaign against me from speakers' platforms when they are offered to employees of your ministry.

But after the raid yesterday I will no longer be silent. My country house village of Rozhdestvo, Naro-Fominsky Rayon was empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on my absence. Having returned to Moscow because I was taken suddenly ill, I had asked my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to the country house for an automobile part. But it turned out there was no lock on the house and voices could be heard from inside. Gorlov stepped inside and demanded the robbers' documents. In the small structure, where three or four can barely turn around, there were about ten of them, in plain clothes.

On the command of the senior officer "To the woods with him and silence him"—they bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and dragged him face down into the woods and beat him cruelly. Simultaneously, others were running by a circuitous route through the bushes, carrying to their car packages, papers, objects perhaps also a part from the apparatus they had brought themselves. However, Gorlov fought back vigorously and yelled, summoning witnesses, neighbors from other garden plots came running in response to his shouts and barred the robbers' way to the highway and demanded their documents. Then one of the robbers presented a red identification card and the neighbors let them pass. They led Gorlov, his face mutilated and his suit torn to ribbons, to the car.

"Fine methods you have," he said to those who conducted him.

"We are on an operation, and on an operation we can do anything."

Captain—according to the documents he presented to the neighbors—Ivanov, according to his personal statement first took Gorlov to the Naro-Fominsky militia, where the local officers greeted "Ivanov" with deference. There, "Ivanov" demanded from Gorlov written explanation of what had happened. Although he had been fiercely beaten, Gorlov put in writing the purpose of his trip and all the circumstances. After that the senior robber demanded that Gorlov sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly refused.

Then they set off for Moscow and on the road the senior robber bombarded Gorlov with literally the following phrases: "If Solzhenitsyn finds out what took place at the Dacha, it's all over with you. Your official career [Gorlov is a candidate of technical sciences and has presented his doctoral dissertation for defense, works in the Institute Giprots of Gosstroya of the U.S.S.R.] will go no farther, you will not be able to defend any dissertation. This will affect your family and children and, if necessary, we will put you in prison."

Those who know our way of life know the full feasibility of these threats. But Gorlov did not give in to them, refused to sign the pledge, and now he is threatened with reprisal.

I demand from you, citizen minister, the public naming of all the robbers, their punishment as criminals and an explanation of this incident. Otherwise I can only believe that you sent them.

13 August 1971.

C-3

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin.

I am forwarding you a copy of my letter to the Minister of State Security. For all of the enumerated lawless actions I consider him personally responsible. If the government of the U.S.S.R. does not share in these actions of Minister Andropov, I will expect an investigation.

A. SOLZHENITSYN
13 August 1971

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September 1971

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