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(Excerpts)

Moscow's Sweet Life

The Soviet Elite's Daily Life, by ***

....Since Nikita Krushchev's abdication -- he appreciated contacts with the outside world and opened the Kremlin's gates to strollers -- the Soviet Union's top officials again keep themselves aloof from the people as they did in Stalin's time.

When the elite come to work in the morning or ride home at night, they never get out of their official cars. They live in residential areas, their leisure time is spent in country estates and clubs, according to strict protocol. When they make official trips they use special trains and only planes that take off from special airports like Moscow-Vnukovo II and land at special airports -- perhaps near Sochi.

People do not see them and hardly know them. On 1 May or on 7 November, the anniversary of the revolution, when the officials stand on top of Lenin's tomb and review the parade, Red Square is closed off. Only those marching by see their leaders, but they see them only as the leaders want to be seen: from afar and on high.

The pictures that are carried past and which decorate the fronts of houses on holidays show the faces of the top officials like icons in a pose that has been established for years (and long outmoded). In newspaper photos and on TV the faces also appear with the same established, masked expression, bare of emotion.

No Soviet reader learns anything about the private life of the Soviet elite from his press. He was not told that Premier Kosygin received the news of the death of his wife Klavdiya while reviewing the 1 May 1967 parade (Kosygin remained on the tribune); he hears nothing about his rulers' children or illnesses. Yet probably the Kremlin leaders live much further apart, are more isolated from the people and are much more old fashioned than Soviet citizens imagine.

Hardly any jokes are told about Brezhnev or Kosygin. When a Soviet citizen talks about his government he says: "They decided...," "They are doing it" -- they up there.

In the morning between 9:00 and 10:00 those who are interested can see their rulers -- if they want to. That is when the Kremlin leadership goes to work...

...Since Lieutenant Ilyin's attempt to fire a pistol at Brezhnev's car from behing the Borovitskiy gate on 22 January 1969, security precautions have been strengthened. Police sentries along the customary [illegible] approaches, all other traffic is immediately halted, and the traffic light

on the Borovitskiy gate is switched to red.

Politburo members' cars can be recognized by the blank plate they carry on the front bumper. The four-place license number beginning with 11, is carried only in the rear and is frequently changed in order to make identification difficult....

....On Moscow's big through streets the convoys use a special center lane---a system introduced by Stalin. It is for special vehicles belonging to the police, the fire department, ambulances and -- a rather unusual privilege in the modern world -- for the elite. Since 1967 the center lane has been widened a few centimeters at each spring renovation....

The Moscow Telephone System Was Made by Siemens

Perhaps it is their conservatism that makes the Kremlin politicians prefer black limousines with curtained windows and the timeconsuming land route. Even the car telephone as a means of communication is not yet widespread in the Soviet Union's leadership circles. Politburo members' official cars have them, and also the vehicles of the top generals and State Security Police (KGB). But a department minister, a division administrator or a regional party chief does not yet have such equipment.

In the large antechamber of the Moscow chief mayor, Promyslov, in the City Soviet House on Gorkiy street, there are two large tables. On them stand over a dozen phones (with dials). The Moscow telephone system was made by the German Siemens company which was already installing long distance communications systems in the time of the czars and whose Petersburg branch manager was Leonid Krasin, a well-known Bolshevik. Later he ran the young Soviet state's foreign trade; he died as ambassador to London in 1926.

The most modern technology however, is concealed between the battlements of the Kremlin walls. TV cameras installed there survey Red Square day and night.

This centrally controlled surveillance system cannot be seen from outside. It serves to spot incipient rioting on the Square, unauthorized demonstrations and even assassination attempts. In 1967 the security organs were unable to prevent an old Lithuanian farmer from blowing himself up with a home-made bomb in front of Lenin's tomb.

He probably wanted to protest the Soviet government's minority policy. In Moscow they said the assassin wanted to destroy Lenin's body but had been kept from doing so when a West German tourist group approached; in order not to endanger the visitors he had run outside with the ticking bomb....

....On the first floor of the Kremlin are Brezhnev's and Kosygin's private offices in addition to those of Politburo members Masurov, Polyansky (both vice premiers), Podgorny (chief of state) and Suslov, (Central Committee Secretary). Even Anastas Mikoyan, honorably discharged from the Politburo, still has an office in the Kremlin as member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Parliament of the USSR. During breaks in the sessions, Mikoyan takes a constitutional in the court next to St. George hall: 50 paces back and forth, for ten minutes. His bodyguard marches in the opposite direction.

During sessions of the Supreme Soviet the top officials can easily be observed close at hand. About 100 of them sit on raised government benches behind the speaker's rostrum. To the right of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov have their seats. Behind them sit the rest of the Politburo members in the order of rank.

Almost all wear dark suits. Only chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov sometimes appears in an elegantly tailored light gray flannel suit; his choice of ties is in excellent taste.

While individual speakers are at the rostrum, the Politburo members usually unabashedly converse together. Brezhnev -- with the golden stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Work and Hero of the USSR on his chest -- likes to tell funny stories, which make Kosygin and Podgorny break out into wide grins. Pelshe, the 72 year old Latvian, oldest member of the Politburo and chief of the party court system, stares steadily ahead. He laughs only when the others do.

Thick bundles of documents are considered status symbols of industriousness. Kosygin's overwork and nervousness show through his constantly moving fingers and his playing with a pencil.

The Party Leader Can Cry When Necessary

Several rows behind Brezhnev sits his closest confidant, Central Committee Secretary Katushev. He busily leafs through papers. When he writes he looks like a diligent grammar school boy. He has a habit of covering the paper in front of him with his arm and hand as if he were trying to prevent his neighbor from copying.

Ukrainian party chief Petr Shelest, separated from Brezhnev by an aisle, usually sits with his elbows spread wide apart on his desk and broods. Besides Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov, Central Committee Secretary Kirilenko is the only one who dares to address Brezhnev, the chief. Politburo members Shelepin, Masurov and Polyansky show definite restraint.

The fate of the Soviet Union is decided almost incidentally -- pro forma. In this pseudo-parliament, the Supreme Soviet, the defense budget is passed something like this:

The chairman explains to the 1517 deputies: "We now come to defense expenditures. Any remarks? No. All in favor of passing the defense budget?" All deputies raise their hands. Without looking up the president continues: "Opposed -- none. Abstentions -- none." Within 20 seconds the Supreme Soviet has approved the 20 billion ruble budget (80 billion marks) for the USSR's military might.

Anyone who has an opportunity to observe party chief Leonid I Brezhnev more frequently in public gets the idea that he consciously acts like a sovereign. His face seems bloated, his eyes swollen. At public occasions in the early morning, Brezhnev looks as if he hadn't had enough sleep and suffers from hangovers. He often vainly combs his hair. At the Bulgarian party congress in Sofia in the middle of April, before beginning his speech of greeting he brushed his hair back with both hands.

Brezhnev is a man who can cry at the right time. As in Bratislava in 1968, when they played the "Internationale," and at the Kharkhov tractor plant in the spring of 1970 when managers and workers cheered him, there were tears in his eyes.

The widespread Russian and Ukrainian custom of kissing on meeting and leaving is especially marked in Brezhnev. The secretary does not confine himself to the traditional kiss on the cheek, but also tends to kiss heartily on the mouth. A comparison of the various Politburo members' techniques shows that none can kiss like Brezhnev.

Brezhnev's mixture of a certain polish -- he wears well-cut, single-breasted suits -- manly brutality and affability in his official appearances, is usually quite effective with women. A woman observer once said that Brezhnev had the charm of a St. Bernard.

Married to a plain woman, he has the reputation of not being particularly fastidious. In Moscow they say that there is a liaison with Lyudmila Sytsila, a popular, very stately, buxom, "merited singer of the people." She is no longer young. She was already known during the war for her work entertaining troops.

Brezhnev also likes to be surrounded by young girls, dancers, but not from the Bolshoy Ballet -- from folk dance groups and operetta companies.

His daughter Galina, in her early thirties, can be seen at the May and November parades on the tribune for the elite in front of the Kremlin walls in an expensive fur coat. Galina for many years has had a yen for the circus. She was first married to an animal trainer, was divorced, and then was friendly with a trick marksman.

At present she goes around with a magician from the Moscow state circus. The party leader is supposed to have told his daughter several times that she should finally pick out and marry a decent man from the official circles or the military hierarchy.

Brezhnev's city apartment is in a house that was built right after the war at number 24 Kutuzovskiy prospect. It is on the right side of the prospect and looking from the Hotel Ukraina it is directly behind the second traffic light. Trustworthy middle echelon officials also live in the same building. Brezhnev's apartment has five rooms on the fifth floor. Below him, on the fourth floor, lives KGB Chief Andropov, and on the sixth floor is Minister of the Interior Shchelokov.

Brezhnev Cooks for the Chief of the Secret Police and is Enthusiastic About Soccer

A limousine with watchful KGB agents is always in front of the apartment house. In the courtyard are military guards and a telephone in the sentry box. In addition security police keep watch on the ground floor of the stairwell. Unauthorized visitors have no chance to pass through the iron gate which is taller than a man.

Brezhnev often spends his spare time with Andropov and Shechelokov, the holders of all police power. The three are considered as of one heart and mind. Frequently there are also officials and friends whom Brezhnev knows from his days as a party official in the ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. The group is spoken of as the "Dnepropetrovsk Mafia."

Brezhnev keeps open house for these friends. He likes to cook for guests. He stands in the kitchen in his shirtsleeves preparing foods which he himself serves with either vodka or Armenian cognac.

Leonid Brezhnev is an enthusiastic soccer fan. He rarely misses one of the big soccer games in Moscow. His favorite team is the Moscow Dynamo. The party leader watches out of town games on TV. The world championship between West Germany and Italy was carried live from Mexico. This was at his personal request, since he did not want to miss the game. World championship games in which the Soviet Union is not involved are usually not sent direct.

Box seats are always reserved for Brezhnev and his guests in the Lenin Stadium. The starting whistle blows only after Brezhnev is seated. He has been known to come as much as 20 minutes late -- and the game then starts 20 minutes late!

Brezhnev loves to hunt as do his colleagues Podgorny and Kosygin. He often drives into the forest area around Zavidovo, 120 kilometers north of Moscow, on the upper Volga, east of the Leningrad highway. This area is closed to Russians and foreigners with the exception of being the vacation "base" for foreign diplomats and journalists. It is a collection of carefully fenced in weekend houses with a restaurant. A guard opens the padlock on the fence only after the visitor has shown a pass.

When Finnish Chief of State Kekkonen visits the Soviet Union, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny usually go hunting with him in the Zavidovo forest.

At these times Yuri Andropov, chief of the secret police and Politburo candidate is not allowed to show his face. He earned his fame with Kuusinen, the Finnish-Russian communist. During the war Andropov was head of Komsomol, the party youth organization in the Karelo-Finnish Soviet republic and Kuusinen was chief of state. After Stalin's death Andropov, the Russian who knew how to get along with non-Russians, was ambassador to Hungary -- a post he also held during the 1956 uprising.

Brezhnev's other friend, Minister of the Interior Lieutenant General Nikolay Shchelokov, is head of the uniformed police (militia) and of the criminal police. It is known that as a music lover he likes to play the piano; he is an ardent admirer of Soviet cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, with whom he also has a personal friendship.

A Criminal Police Agent Helped in a Bank Holdup

On 12 November 1970, Rostropovich, 44, sent an open letter defending author Alexandr Solzhenitsyn to the editors-in-chief of Pravda and Izvestya and to two other papers. In it he criticized official Soviet cultural policy. Solzhenitsyn is currently staying in the dacha given the cellist by the state organs for his artistic services.

The dacha is in Shukovka, 20 kilometers west of Moscow. Solzhenitsyn moved there after being expelled from the writers' union. Rostropovich told him: "As long as I live and as long as I have this dacha, you will be my guest."

Shchelokov maintains friendly contacts with Rostropovich and other artists and writers. He also has troubles with his son who last year finished his studies at the Institute for World Economics and International Relations. In 1969 Shchelokov, junior, got friendly with a Russian woman who was about ten years his senior. She is not of higher circles, had been married, and was divorced because of the younger Shchelokov.

The interior minister's son was determined to marry his girl friend against his parents' wishes. The father sent in the police over which he was in charge.

The woman was several times ordered to break up her relationship with the young man. Both were shadowed by the police. They continued to meet in secret. Finally the woman was threatened with deportation from Moscow and with "still other difficulties."

When even these threats proved to no avail, young Shchelokov was taken into the diplomatic service and after brief training, was sent to the Soviet embassy in Australia. His boss now is Ambassador Mesyatsev, until recently chairman of the Radio and Television Committee.

Interior Minister Shchelokov often criticized the Soviet police in articles and speeches. At the Moscow writers club he explained last year that when he took over the job he had had to fire some 50,000 policemen for inefficiency. The militia's prestige needed improvement. Special care must now be given to the selection of police recruits. In the future only the best of the working class will be trained as police candidates. Especially, he said, "they must know how to read and write."

Soviet papers never report big crimes. Thus, nothing was said in November 1968, when burglars broke into world famous violinist David Oistrakh's apartment while he was on tour abroad with his wife. The burglars made off with works of art, jewelry and cash worth 40,000 rubles (160,000 marks). Even West German Ambassador Allardt was not immune from burglars in his apartment at 46 Vorovskiy street. The thief was caught, although it is not know whether he was working on his own or for the KGB.

As the year 1968 ended, a motorized gang held up a savings bank branch in Moscow. In the ensuing fire-fight the bandits were captured; one of them was a member of the Moscow criminal police.

Pretty young Russian girls are generally afraid of being attacked in Moscow. Young ladies want to be escorted not just to the front door, but right up to their apartments. They are afraid of being attacked in the apartment house elevator.

People yearn for law and order. This however is not symbolized by Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev. His reputation does not have a very high rating. Rather it is Prime Minister Kosygin of whom many Russians speak with a great deal of respect. Kosygin is considered the only Politburo member seriously concerned about the people, especially about improving their standard of living....

Kosygin Collects Jazz Records and Discusses With Intellectuals

Kosygin regularly maintains a salon in his apartment. There are lively discussions with intellectuals from the Soviet establishment. This circle of regular visitors includes Jewish prima ballerina Maya Plisetskaya and -- until he became seriously ill -- Novy Mir editor-in-chief Tvardovskiy, besides author Konstantin Simonov -- who pleaded for publication of Solzhenitsyn's latest novel August 1914 in West Berlin in April and who also criticized Soviet censorship.

Kosygin, so they say in Moscow, has a predeliction for jazz. He has a large collection of Cool Jazz records. He is a well traveled man -- not like Brezhnev who has never been to the west. Of all the Politburo members he has the most contact with the outside world. His son-in-law is Zherman Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology. The urbane Gvishiani, whose father was a police general under Stalin, speaks fluent English and often travels abroad. Always dressed in the latest western styles, he may be the only man in the Soviet official elite to wear a blue button-down shirt. Krupp manager Berthold Beitz says of Gvishiani: "I'd hire him as sales

manager in a minute."

Gvishiani says that the best way for him to relax is to sit behind the wheel of a car. He maintains that he owns only one Volga. This is surely an understatement. It is known that the parking place for the elite has many foreign vehicles. Very much in keeping with the Lenin tradition, Leonid Brezhnev prefers a Rolls Royce "Silvercloud." Recently he has been using this vehicle more frequently, even on official occasions.

Until now the Moscow elite wanted to be seen on official occasions only in Soviet vehicles. However, at the end of April Brezhnev appeared at a state visit in Sofia in a Mercedes 600. Baybakov, head of the Planning Committee, drives a Chevrolet Impala in his spare time. President Podgorny prefers a Mercedes 600 for his private trips. Two such Mercedes limousines were delivered to the Kremlin in recent years. However, Daimler-Benz service crews who go yearly to the West German embassy in Moscow are not allowed to inspect these vehicles...

Even Top Officials Have Only Hearsay Knowledge About the West

...Politburo members spend their hot summer vacations away from Moscow on the Black Sea in Sochi or Gagra. The unconventional children of the elite travel to the Baltic countries where one can watch Finnish TV...

...Most top officials have no idea of what life in the west is like. They themselves never were there and members of the diplomatic service tailor their reports to what Moscow wants to hear. Emissaries of the secret information apparatus are often not believed; journalists who are occasionally sent out on important missions to take soundings give distorted ideological interpretations. Public opinion, which could correct the official picture of capitalism, does not exist and could not even work, as long as Soviet citizens are not permitted to travel in the west in greater numbers...

"Kremlyovka Provides Servants and Dachas"

...Top officials' privileges are related to their jobs -- and carefully graduated. Servants, official residences, dachas, chauffeurs and official cars are provided by a special agency which the people call the "Kremlyovka."

Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Andropov or Kosygin do not have their daily needs taken care of in ordinary stores. For members of the Politburo and the Central Committee there are special stores which the Russians call "Spetsmagazin."

These are no ordinary stores. They are in buildings that from the outside look like offices or residences. They also have no number. Admission is only by special permission.

Special stores are divided into commissaries for food supplies, luxury goods, clothing, furniture and leather goods. They have everything that can be found in western department stores.

A privileged person pays an administrative fee of 50 rubles on the first of every month at his special food store. The payment of this registration fee entitles him to draw all the food supplies he needs for his household in any quantity and without cost.

It goes without saying that these stores are extremely well stocked, and have all the goods that the people have to do without. An order of three kilograms of caviar, 10 bottles of French cognac, whiskey, pâté de foie gras, lobster is no problem here.

The orders are delivered free. Articles like English suit material, foreign perfume, records, books, tape recorders and Italian ties are available here to the elite without difficulty.

There are special stores in the Kremlin, near the Defense Ministry on Frunse street, at the Kammeny bridge near the Estrada theater. There are also closed off departments, branches of the special store, on the top floor of the GUM department store. There is also a food supply department here for diplomats and correspondents from the eastern bloc states. This group of people, because they have no hard currency, cannot buy in the hard-currency stores that have recently been set up by the Soviet authorities for the colony of western foreigners.

The have-nots with soft currency also include diplomats from the Arab countries. The special GUM section provides this group of people with food and luxury items which, while they are not of as high quality as that available in the foreign currency stores, are considerably better than that sold in the ordinary Soviet stores...

...Some personages in the Soviet Union's public life, like Heroes of Socialist Labor, bearers of the Order of Lenin, meritorious writers and artists of the people, have one privilege in common with the highest officials. This puts them into the communist social order in which "everyone receives according to his needs" -- without money or proof of accomplishment. These people have an "open account" in the State Bank.

Pop Films and Dior Styles Are Found Only at the "Club"

The holder of an "open account" has the right to withdraw any amount of money he wants in rubles. The only condition: these amounts are for personal use only: purchase of a car or dacha, etc.

Those who have these privileges do not live as if they were in the land of milk and honey. They are always afraid that if they abuse the privilege, they will lose it. Thus in practice, the "open account" works like a checkbook (which is unknown in the USSR).

Besides the party elite, those who have these privileges are mainly those citizens who bring hard currency into the state. Artists like Rostropovich and Oistrakh, Bolshoy Ballet or folk dancers who frequently play abroad, receive part of their pay in hard currency or more precisely in currency coupons. An administrative order by the State Bank (Gosbank), with no legal regulation, makes 40 percent of the box-office returns available to these people in foreign currency....

...Soviets who bring in foreign currency are allowed to spend a part of the money abroad for such things as American refrigerators, French clothes and German cars. Their currency coupons are also valid in the Beryoska stroes, reserved for foreigners. These are located in hotels and airports as well as in several special stores where they offer luxury consumer goods.

The expensive furs worn for show by the wives of Soviet ambassadors on social occasions, however, come from an entirely different source: the "private distributor," a forwarding department for special purposes that also supplies the Moscow partiarch with delicacies for his reception of foreign guests.

This graduated system of privileges causes cynics in informed circles on the Soviet capital to say there should be a large banner spread across the Kremlin wall: "Kt u nas yesty, tozhe yest." -- He who is with us also eats [a pun on the word "yest" which means both "to eat" and "to be"].

No Soviet official in Moscow who is particular about his appearance would even think of eating in one of the usually miserable Moscow restaurants. There, in public, is not the place for a Soviet official to be. Celebrations are either private or in a club organized for the various professional groups like the Writers Club, House of the Architects, Doctors' Club, Officers' Club, or the House of the Journalists (dom zhurnalistov).

There one is among one's equals. Western journalists are admitted to the Journalists Club on Thursdays only. In the corporate clubhouses the kitchen is terribly good and the waiter is friendly. The best steak in Moscow is served at the Journalists' Club. And if you want lobster, then you have to go to the Dom Kino, the moviemakers' club on Brest street. Admittance to this club is restricted to members and their guests. Foreigners are not allowed.

Dom Kino is where actors and artists, sons and daughters of officials and ministers, the elegant young world of Moscow all meet. Here is where movies are regularly shown -- the newest films from the west -- films that will never be shown in ordinary theaters. The young Soviet elite had seen films like "Easy Rider" or "Blow Up" before most of the diplomats of the western foreign community in Moscow.

Western visitors to Moscow often ask if there are no elegant women in this city of several millions. They can be found at Dom Kino. Here is where you meet Stalin Prize Winner Roman Karmen, director of documentaries on the Spanish War and World War II. Although many young members of the establishment sniff at his last work, Tovarich Berlin, this does not keep them from admiring his young wife and her pretty daughter by her first marriage, in the Dior dresses they bring back from Paris.

Here is where cosmonauts and Soviet junior diplomats meet when they spend their home leave in the capital. The fine people of Moscow celebrate in these clubs. At New Years' parties in this "classless society" the women wear extremely low necklines, here they unashamedly show their jewelry and furs of excellent taste.

A Cooperative Apartment for Officials Costs 24,000 Marks

Moscow's "dolce vita" exists only behind carefully closed doors: because of official prudery it exists only in the elite's private residences. Several tall buildings are reserved for middle echelon officials in the inner city. These are cleanly finished, light yellow cinderblock constructions with large picture windows and balconies on Stanislavsky and Tolstoy streets. The lawns around these buildings are carefully tended. The stairways are spotless and the elevators work.

Chief mayor Promyslov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, lives in the elite skyscraper on Stanislavsky street. His monthly salary is 500 rubles. That is very little considering that this man is responsible for the fate not just of this city, but that he is also the head of all the housing construction companies, all department stores, all barber shops, all gas stations -- all communal enterprises -- in the city. But no one who has privileges needs a large salary.

Promyslov lives with his wife on Stanislavsky street in a three-room apartment with some 100 square meters (the standard living area per Soviet citizen established by Lenin is 9 square meters). There are two skyscrapers like this on Tolstoy street. This is where Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva lives with her husband, Vice Foreign Minister Firyubin who was third secretary of the Moscow city party before his marriage.

Her daughter Svetlana was married to the son of the former Party personnel chief, Frol Koslov. She was divorced and then worked at the Novosti press agency where many of the elite's children worked: Brezhnev's and Kosygin's daughters, as well as Krushchev's adopted daughter Yulya.

The press always has a job for the offspring of a top official if he does not have the ability or ambition to work in the economic administration, science or even in a Party office. In this society, in which connections mean everything, one's birth protects one from a social fall.

Since promotion is predicated on complete adaptation to the rulers, the upper crust always associates with its equals. Seclusion from those below and outside is a basic tenet of this system -- that is why they see to it that the various classes live closely together.

The middle echelon and lower officials in the ministries meet not only at work but also live together. Thus, right by the Kutuzovskiy prospect there is an apartment house -- not as well built as the above-mentioned houses -- in which only members of the Foreign Trade Ministry live. The same system holds for the other ministries and also for the editors of Pravda and Izvestiya.

Many officials try to break out of these areas by buying so-called cooperative apartments -- small private apartments. These can be bought for 6000 rubles (24,000 marks). Half of this amount -- over 20 months' salary -- must be paid in cash. The other half is paid over a long period as monthly rent.

Anyone who is someone owns a wooden house in the country, a dacha. If he is very special, he lives in a secluded dacha colony. Some 30 kilometers west of Moscow, on the road to Uspenskoye, in a tremendous wooded area, is a vacation area for the Kremlin elite, surrounded by barrier areas that can be entered only with special permits...

...On the access roads to the colonies are plaster figures of stags and deer painted brown. Politburo members have individual dachas in this tremendous area of woods and meadows. The area around each dacha is enclosed by a wooden fence, usually green, which prevents anyone from looking in. The entrance gates are guarded.

In recent years, party leader Brezhnev and his closest colleagues have built themselves modern ranch houses with large picture windows in the style of a California bungalow. These are surrounded by lawns and private swimming pools. This kind of building is found nowhere else in the Soviet Union. The construction work was done by soldiers in the engineer corps...

...Several kilometers west of Uspenskoye is Object "Gorky 10." Here is the guarded dacha settlement of the Council of Ministers, for government officials who belong to the Politburo or the Central Committee Secretariat. The individual houses were designed by a French architect and furnished with imported Finnish furniture.

It goes without saying that Complex Gorky 10 has a swimming pool, tennis courts, athletic fields, a clubhouse with a restaurant and movie theater, and a special store. Here too admission is by special permit only. Guests must be announced. The family members of this group -- if they have no private car -- have a special bus shuttle service in the morning, at noon and at night during the summer. The busses park along the Kremlin wall near the Spasky gate.

An Elevator on the Moscow River Bluff

The generals' dacha complex is in Gorky 6, right by Arkhangelskoye, the Yussopov castle from which the Prussian minister Otto von Bismarck sent letters to his wife. This is where Marshall Budenny lives at age 88. He drives a Zis made during Stalin's time. He has a colonel as his adjutant and his own chauffeur. Budenny, a former cavalry general, as inspector general, attends to hourse breeding for the army at a large stud farm near Uspenskoye (once visited by West German businessman Neckermann). Until a short time ago Budenny had himself lifted onto a horse every morning.

Right on the northwest shore of the Moscow River, close by Uspenskoye, are several modern, whitewashed buildings: the sanatorium of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. A modern swimming pool and gymnasium was finished last fall by army units. This is where top officials, including retired ministers and party secretaries and their wives meet for afternoon tea.

The complex is surrounded by a wonderful park with asphalted and illuminated paths. At the Moscow River bluff there is an elevator tower for those who find it difficult to walk. The elevator goes directly down to the river shore. The entire installation is guarded by army units.

Once when a western diplomat approached the vacation area he was apprehended and asked to leave the area. Walking in this area was not allowed, the officer explained. When asked what the buildings were for, the officer smilingly answered, "Eto khosyaistvo" -- this is an agricultural enterprise...

Beat Hits and Bikinis for Upper Class Daughters

In the weekend settlements near the village of Peredelkino is an artists' colony. This is where Boris Pasternak lived, and that is where he is buried. It is also the Moscow partiarch's summer residence.

The access to Peredelkino from the Moscow highway is barred. You have to take a roundabout way to get there from Vnukovo. Journalist Victor Louis lives in Peredelkino with his wife Janet. Louis, who travels around the western world on KGB assignments, has a wonderful collection of icons, an imported oil heating system, and a swimming pool.

His dacha too is surrounded by a high wood fence. Proudly he shows his guests the flood light installation, also imported from the west, for his private tennis court. His neighbor is Valentin Felin, the Soviet Union's new ambassador to Bonn. The Louis and Felin children play together.

The village of Uspenskoye lies in the middle of a beautiful mixed forest. Here on the shore of the Moscow River is the so-called "diplomats' pasture." This is a section of the shore which foreign diplomats and correspondents may use as a bathing beach -- under police surveillance.

The summer houses in the village itself belong, privately, to authors, artists, members of the Academy of Sciences, journalists, departmental ministers and officials of the middle echelon and ministerial bureaucracy...

...The tone in the village and at the beach is set by young people, the sons, daughters, nieces and nephews of the dacha owners. They do not typify the younger generation of the Soviet Union. The girls wear chic bikinis and tremendous sun glasses, not made in the Soviet Union. Cassette tape recorders blast forth the latest beat hits from the west. Kent cigarettes are offered here, and American chewing gum is used. Almost everyone knows everyone else.

These young people are "with it." They know what is going on in the world. They understand English, French or German, they regularly listen to BBC broadcasts, the Voice of America, or the Deutsche Welle. They read Samizdat, the underground press, discuss Solzhenitsyn, have read First Circle and crack jokes about the habits of the apparatchiky--the Soviet leaders who are their fathers, grandfathers and uncles.

Fascinated they listen to a former classmate, now second or third secretary at a Soviet embassy in Paris, London or Cairo. Their preferred topic of conversation is the west. In the last two years these young people have unabashedly made contacts with the western foreigners on the neighboring diplomatic meadow. Here they have developed friendships.

On this beach the Soviet citizens openly read western papers and magazines. The young ladies pounce on the latest editions of fashion papers from France, Germany and Italy. The men leaf through news magazines like Spiegel with interest. And on the other Moscow River shore, Soviet generals gallop by on expensive horses from the Uspenskoye army stud farm.

"I Would Like to Go to Rome or London Just Once"

The young people are not afraid to invite their foreign acquaintances to their dacha gardens. On weekends they have happy parties there in the late afternoon. The foreigners bring along iceboxes with whisky, gin and tonic and the Russian hosts roast a shashlik on an open fire. A comfortable atmosphere, overshadowed only by the watchfulness of the state organs.

The KGB patrols and the militia have not failed to notice this form of fraternization. But the young Russians with emphatic indifference say: "Nichevo."

"We are Soviet citizens and we can invite whom we want to our dachas." They have coined the phrase "Starshiy Leytenant Petrov" (First Lieutenant Petrov) for the watchful police. But despite this apparent unconcern, they listen carefully when they hear a motorcycle clatter by.

These young people no longer have illusions. They understand communism differently from their fathers. They know about nuclear physicist Sakharov's memorandum, demanding freedom of opinion and a multiple party system. They know that the economic and cultural development of their country, which they love, is stagnating. They abhor the regime's ideological twists.

Many had set their hopes on the Czechoslovak experiment. They cannot understand the bureaucratic imcompetence of central planning. They know that today's leadership cannot translate the wonderful accomplishments of Soviet scientists into economic efficiency.

They are most oppressed by the country's self-isolation. They want to travel -- not to the Crimea or to the Baltic. "I would like to visit Rome or London just once," says a young girl engineer in a bikini, whose father has just brought her back from a scientific congress abroad, in which he had participated. And then she adds: "But those are rosecolored dreams which can never come true. Here at home nothing will ever change."

Another young man says he may be able to travel to Warsaw or Budapest, in a group, of course. "But what kind of life is that. The group leader counts off every two hours, one, two, three, four, five... And then you sit in the bus and hear: 'On the right you see, on the left you see.' No, thanks. I would rather stay in the glorious Soviet Union. If I travel, I'd like to travel my own way."

This embitterment and resignation have caused the young people to turn away from politics. Several of them have read no Soviet paper for years: "Nothing but lies in these papers." One says: "I would read a Soviet paper only to learn if war had broken out, but I would probably find out first on the foreign radio."

PARIS MATCH, 7-14 June 1971

L'Intimite des Maitres de L'U.R.S.S.

Dans des ghettos d'habitation fermés, des lieux réservés à leur repos, des hôpitaux et des écoles spéciaux, la caste dirigeante de l'Union soviétique jouit de la vie de gens privilégiés éloignés du peuple. Pour moderniser la société soviétique, l'élite devrait remettre totalement en question le monopole de la pensée et de la domination du parti, mais elle a peur de le faire. Aussi, le maintien de la société de classe existant est-il devenu une règle d'Etat. L'enquête que nous publions ci-dessous a été réalisée pour l'hebdomadaire allemand « Der Spiegel » par un observateur à Moscou.

...Depuis le départ de Nikita Krouchev (qui appréciait les contacts avec l'extérieur et fit aussi ouvrir les portes du Kremlin pour qu'on y puisse s'y promener), les fonctionnaires — comme au temps de Staline — se tiennent de nouveau à l'écart du peuple.

Le matin, quand ils vont à leur bureau, le soir, quand ils rentrent chez eux, ils utilisent leur voiture de service. Ils vivent dans des « ghettos d'habitation », passent leurs moments de loisirs avec leurs semblables dans des maisons de campagne et des clubs plus ou moins luxueux, selon le rang qu'ils occupent dans la hiérarchie. En voyage de service, ils utilisent des trains spéciaux et des avions spéciaux, qui décollent d'aérodromes spéciaux (tels que Moscou - Vnukovo II) et qui atterrissent sur des aéroports spéciaux — comme celui qui est situé à proximité de Sotschi.

Le peuple ne les voit pas et ne les connaît qu'à peine. Lorsqu'ils apparaissent lors du 1er mai ou de l'anniversaire de la Révolution, le 7 novembre, perchés au sommet du Mausolée de Lénine, la Place Rouge est fermée. Seuls ceux qui défilent voient leurs dirigeants, mais ils les voient comme ceux-ci veulent être vus : à distance et grandis.

Les portraits qui sont présentés aux jours de fêtes aux frontons des maisons montrent les visages des hauts fonctionnaires comme des icones, raidis dans une pose toujours semblable depuis des années et le visage insensible aux outrages des ans. Sur les photos des journaux et à la télévision, le masque est le même, sans aucune manifestation d'individualité.

La presse est absolument muette sur la vie privée des dirigeants. Ont-ils des enfants ? Sont-ils malades ? Nul ne le sait. Lors de la parade du 1er mai 1967, le Premier ministre Kossyguine était à la tribune lorsqu'on lui apprit la mort de sa femme Klavdija. Il resta à la tribune, figé. La presse ne souffla mot de ce tragique incident. C'est le matin, entre 9 et 10 heures, que les pontes du Kremlin se rendent à leur bureau. Leurs voitures passent par les perspectives Kutusovski et Krlininski. Sur l'Arbat, devant le restaurant « Prague » elles tournent — contrairement au code mais sous la direction de policiers — dans la rue Frunze, passent devant le ministère de la Défense et s'engouffrent dans le Kremlin à travers la porte Boroviziki.

Depuis que, le 22 janvier 1969, un lieutenant de Leningrad nommé Iljin a tenté de tirer au pistolet sur la voiture de Brejnev, derrière la porte Boroviziki, les mesures de sécurité ont été renforcées. Les policiers, au centre de la ville et le long de l'itinéraire habituel, ont été munis d'appareils de radio : quand une voiture de haut fonctionnaire — toujours noire — approche, toût le trafic est stoppé et les feux de la porte Boroviziki bloqués au rouge.

On reconnaît les voitures des membres du bureau politique au fait qu'à l'avant la plaque minéralogique est vierge. Le numéro à quatre chiffres, commençant toujours par 11, est à l'arrière et continuellement changé, pour ne pas permettre d'identification.

Sur les grandes artères de dégagement de Moscou, les voitures des personnalités utilisent une travée spéciale intermédiaire, que seuls ont le droit d'emprunter la police, les pompiers, les ambulances et — privilège unique dans le monde moderne — les personnalités. Depuis 1967, lors des travaux de voiries, à chaque printemps, cette travée est élargie de quelques centimètres. Les voitures des membres du bureau politique sont munies d'un téléphone, ainsi que celles des généraux et des membres importants du K.g.b. Mais les ministres spécialisés ou les chefs de services du comité central ne disposent pas de ce moyen de communication. Il y a là aussi, hiérarchie.

Le réseau téléphonique de Moscou est équipé de Siemens, firme allemande, qui déjà du temps des tsars fit des installations de télécommunication en Russie et dont le directeur de filiale à Petersbourg, l'ingénieur Leonid Krassine, fut un bolcheviste connu. Il dirigea plus tard le commerce extérieur du jeune Etat soviétique et mourut, en 1926, ambassadeur à Londres.

Mais les murs du Kremlin recèlent la technique la plus moderne : des caméras de télévision y sont installées pour observer, jour et nuit, la Place Rouge.

Ce système de surveillance, invisible de l'extérieur, sert à déceler toute tentative de démonstration interdite, toute tentative d'attentat : en 1967, les organes de sécurité devant le Kremlin n'avaient pas réussi à empêcher un vieux paysan lithuanien de se faire sauter, à l'aide d'une bombe de sa fabrication, devant le mausolée de Lénine. Il voulait protester contre la politique du gouvernement soviétique à l'égard des minorités. Officiellement, on annonce qu'il s'agissait d'un malade mental qui avait essayé de pulvériser la momie de Lénine, mais avait été dérangé par l'arrivée de touristes allemands et s'était enfui avec la bombe déjà amorcée.

Pendant une séance du Soviet suprême, les dignitaires se laissent observer de plus près : une centaine d'entre eux sont assis sur les bancs surélevés du gouvernement, derrière le pupitre du speaker. A droite de Brejnev, Kossyguine, Podgorny et Suslov. Derrière, les autres membres du bureau politique prennent place.

Presque tous portent des costumes sombres. Seul l'idéologue en chef, Michael Suslov, apparaît parfois dans un costume de flanelle gris clair, de coupe élégante : le choix de ses cravates trahit un certain goût. Pendant qu'un orateur est à la tribune, les membres du bureau politique continuent de parler entre eux, sans prêter attention à ses propos. Brejnev, qui arbore sur sa poitrine l'étoile d'or des héros de l'Union soviétique, la médaille de héros du travail socialiste et celle de héros de Tchécoslovaquie, raconte volontiers des histoires drôles qui font — évidemment — sourire Kossyguine et Podgorny. Le letton Pelsche, 72 ans, le doyen du bureau politique et chef du tribunal du parti se tait et garde le regard fixé devant lui. Il ne rit que lorsque les autres rient.

Les serviettes bourrées apparaissent comme symboles d'une grande occupation. Le surmenage et la nervosité de Kossyguine s'expriment dans l'agitation continue de ses doigts qui, le plus souvent, jouent avec un crayon.

Quelques rangs derrière Brejnev se tient son plus proche collaborateur, le secrétaire du parti communiste Katuschew ; il feuillette activement les dossiers. Lorsqu'il écrit, il a l'habitude de cacher la feuille de son bras replié : comme s'il voulait éviter qu'on puisse lire ce qu'il note.

Pjotr Schelest, chef du parti ukrainien, séparé de Brejnev par une travée, s'appuie en général sur ses coudes et médite. Outre Kossyguine, Podgorny et Suslow, Kirilenko secrétaire du P.c. est le seul qui ose s'adresser de lui-même à Brejnev, le chef. Les membres du bureau politique tels que Schelepin, Masurow et Poljanski gardent une retenue certaine.

Ceux qui ont observé Léonid Brejnev en public assez souvent, ont pu constater qu'il se comporte comme un chef absolu et ce, consciemment. Lorsqu'il tape sur l'épaule de ses collaborateurs, ceux-ci s'épanouissent d'être dignes d'un tel honneur. Son visage est bouffi, les yeux gonflés. Lors de manifestations qui ont lieu le matin, il a l'air de ne pas avoir assez dormi, d'avoir la « gueule de bois ». Souvent, il sort un peigne de sa poche et se recoiffe.

Brejnev est un homme qui sait et peut pleurer au bon moment : ainsi, à Bratislava, en 1968, lorsque « L'Internationale » a retenti ; ainsi, à l'usine de tracteurs de Charkow au printemps 1970 ; lorsque les fonctionnaires et les ouvriers l'ont acclamé, les larmes lui sont montées aux yeux.

L'habitude qu'ont les Russes et les Ukrainiens de s'embrasser lorsqu'ils se retrouvent est spécialement remarquable chez lui : il ne se contente pas du baiser sur la joue, mais pratique le cordial baiser sur la bouche. Personne n'embrasse comme Brejnev.

Le mélange d'une certaine attention à ce qui touche sa personne — il porte des costumes bien coupés — et de brutalité masculine et de cordialité, lors des réceptions officielles, ne reste souvent pas sans effet sur les femmes. Une observatrice a dit une fois de lui qu'il avait le charme d'un chien Saint-Bernard.

Marié à une femme qui a l'air plutôt « popotte », il a la réputation de ne pas être ennemi des plaisirs. On dit à Moscou qu'il a une liaison avec Ljudmila Syzila, une « chanteuse émérite du peuple », très populaire et au buste imposant. Elle n'est plus jeune : déjà pendant la guerre, elle était l'une des vedettes du « Théâtre aux armées ».

Mais Brejnev aime aussi s'entourer de jeunes filles, de danseuses — pas de la troupe du Bolchoï — mais appartenant à des troupes de danses folkloriques ou d'opérettes.

On voit sa fille Galina, 30 ans, lors des parades de mai et octobre, à la tribune officielle, enveloppée de fourrures précieuses. Galina montre depuis des années un goût spécial pour le cirque. Elle fut même mariée à un dompteur, divorça et se lia alors avec un champion de tir.

Pour le moment, elle vit avec un prestidigitateur du cirque d'Etat de Moscou. Son père lui a déjà demandé plusieurs fois de vivre définitivement avec un homme « convenable », membre de la caste des fonctionnaires ou officiers de l'armée.

A Moscou, Brejnev habite dans un immeuble construit après la guerre, sur la perspective Kutusowski, au numéro 21 qui, vu de l'hôtel « Ukrainia », est juste derrière le deuxième feu rouge, sur le côté droit de la perspective. Dans ce complexe habitent aussi des fonctionnaires dignes de toute confiance. L'appartement de Brejnev occupe cinq pièces au cinquième étage. A l'étage au-dessous, au quatrième, habite le chef du K.g.b., Andropow ; au sixième, le ministre de l'Intérieur, Schtschelokow.

Brejnev passe souvent ses moments de loisirs en compagnie d'Andropow et de Schtschelokow. Les trois hommes ont la réputation d'être excellents amis. Souvent, des fonctionnaires et

d'autres amis viennent s'ajouter à eux, des amis du temps où Brejnev était fonctionnaire du Parti dans la ville ukrainienne de Dnepropetrowsk. On parle de la « Mafia de Dnepropetrowsk ».

Pour ces amis, Brejnev aime faire la cuisine. Manches de chemise retroussées, il s'affaire dans la cuisine et prépare les plats qu'il sert lui-même à ses invités. Les convives ne boivent que de la vodka ou du cognac arménien.

Léonid Brejnev est un fanatique de football. Il est rare qu'il rate un important match à Moscou. Son club favori est le club « Dynamo ». Lorsque les matches ont lieu en dehors de Moscou, il les suit à la télévision. Lorsque, lors de la Coupe du Monde, le match entre la République fédérale et l'Italie fut retransmis en direct, cela eut lieu à la demande personnelle de Brejnev ; il ne voulait pas rater ce match. Sans cela, même pour la Coupe du Monde, quand l'Union soviétique ne participe pas, les matches ne sont, en règle générale, pas retransmis en direct.

Au Stade Lénine, des loges sont toujours réservées pour Brejnev et ses accompagnateurs et le coup d'envoi n'est donné qu'une fois qu'il est installé. Il est déjà arrivé qu'il ait eu vingt minutes de retard — le jeu n'a commencé que vingt minutes après l'horaire prévu.

Tout comme ses collègues Podgorny et Kossyguine, Brejnev adore la chasse. Souvent, il part dans la région boisée de Sawido, à 120 km au nord de Moscou, sur le cours supérieur de la Volga. Cette région est fermée aux Russes comme aux étrangers, à l'exception d'un lieu-dit « La Base » où sont reçus diplomates et journalistes.

L'autre ami intime de Brejnev, le général Nikolaï Schtschelokow, ministre de l'Intérieur, est le chef de la milice et de la police criminelle. On sait qu'en amateur de musique, il joue du piano et qu'il est un admirateur fervent du violoncelliste Rostropovitch, auquel, d'ailleurs, il est lié par une amitié personnelle.

Le 12 novembre 1970, Rostropovitch envoya une lettre ouverte au rédacteur en chef de « La Pravda », et à deux journaux moscovites, pour défendre l'écrivain Soljenitsyne. Dans cette lettre, il critiquait la politique culturelle fonctionnarisée de l'Union soviétique. Il abrite en ce moment l'écrivain dans sa datcha, qui a été mise à sa disposition par les organes officiels, en récompense de ses mérites artistiques.

Cette datcha est située à Schkowka, à 20 km à l'ouest de Moscou. Soljenitsyne s'y réfugia après qu'on l'eut exclu de l'Union des écrivains. Rostropovitch a dit à Soljenitsyne : « Tant que je vivrai et tant que cette datcha sera à ma disposition, tu es mon hôte. »

Schtschelokow entretient des contacts amicaux avec le violoncelliste et d'autres artistes et écrivains. Il a quelques soucis

avec son fils qui a terminé l'année dernière ses études à l'« Institut pour l'économie mondiale et les relations internationales ». Schtschelokow junior, qui a une vingtaine d'années, s'est épris d'une femme de dix années plus âgée que lui, qui ne fait pas partie du « meilleur milieu » et a divorcé pour lui.
Il était bien décidé à l'épouser, malgré le refus de ses parents. Le père a alors mis en branle la police qu'il a sous ses ordres. Plusieurs fois, la jeune femme s'est vu intimer l'ordre de couper toutes relations avec le jeune homme. Ils furent tous les deux surveillés par la police. Ils continuèrent à se rencontrer en secret. On finit par menacer la femme de déportation ainsi que « d'autres difficultés ».
Mais, comme les menaces restaient vaines, le jeune homme fut initié promptement à la vie diplomatique et expédié en Australie.
Schtschelokow, très souvent, adresse de violentes critiques à la police soviétique. L'année dernière, il avoua que depuis son entrée en fonctions, il avait été obligé de licencier 50 000 policiers pour incapacité notoire. Il forme le désir qu'une attention toute spéciale soit accordée au recrutement. Avant toute chose, il faudrait que les policiers sachent « lire et écrire »

La presse soviétique ne parle jamais des délits graves pourtant fréquents. Ainsi, en 1968, des cambrioleurs ont pillé l'appartement du violoniste mondialement célèbre, David Oistrach, lorsqu'il était en tournée avec sa femme à l'étranger. Ils emportèrent des objets d'art, des bijoux et de l'argent liquide d'une valeur de 40 000 roubles (vingt millions d'AF). La résidence de l'ambassadeur allemand Allardt n'a pas été épargnée non plus par les cambrioleurs. Le coupable a été arrêté, mais on ne sait pas très bien s'il travaillait pour lui ou pour le compte du K.g.b.
Vers la fin de l'année 1968, une bande motorisée attaque une filiale d'une caisse d'épargne. Poursuivie par la police, il y eut échange de coups de feu. On finit par arrêter les bandits. L'un d'entre eux faisait partie de la police criminelle de Moscou.
Les jeunes femmes russes redoutent les attaques dans la rue. Elles se font accompagner jusqu'à la porte même de leur appartement. Dans les blocs d'immeubles, elles ont peur d'être attaquées dans l'ascenseur.
Kossyguine passe pour le seul membre du Bureau politique à s'intéresser sérieusement au peuple, et surtout, à l'amélioration de son niveau de vie.

Kossyguine reçoit à « jour fixe » dans son appartement ; ce sont alors des discussions très animées avec les intellectuels de l'Establishment soviétique. Maja Plissetskaïa, la grande danseuse juive, fait partie du cercle des visiteurs réguliers et — jusqu'à sa grave maladie — le rédacteur en chef de « Novy Mir », Twardowsky, l'écrivain Konstantin Simonov — qui a plaidé en avril à Berlin-Ouest pour la publication du dernier roman de Soljenitsyne (août 1914) et a critiqué la censure soviétique. On dit à Moscou que Kossyguine a une prédilection pour la musique de jazz ; il a une collection de disques de jazz-cool. Ce grand voyageur — au contraire de Brejnev qui n'a encore jamais été en Occident — entretient les meilleurs contacts avec le monde extérieur. Son gendre est Dschermen Gwischiani, directeur adjoint du comité d'Etat pour la science et la technique. Toujours moderne et habillé à l'occidentale, il doit être le seul homme de la caste des fonctionnaires à porter des chemises Buttondown. Berthold Beitz, manager de Krupp, dit de lui. « Je l'engagerais tout de suite comme directeur des ventes. »

Il dit que sa plus grande détente est de se trouver lui-même au volant d'une voiture. Il affirme posséder une Volga. Il s'agit là sûrement d'un understatement : on sait que le parc automobile des personnalités soviétiques comprend de plus en plus de voitures étrangères. Léonid Brejnev, lui, utilise une Rolls Royce « Silvercloud ». Il s'en sert même de plus en plus, même lors de manifestations officielles.
Jusqu'à maintenant, les hauts fonctionnaires se sont attachés à ce que, lors des manifestations officielles, seuls soient utilisés des véhicules de fabrication soviétique. Mais, fin avril, Brejnev est apparu en Mercedes 600, lors de sa visite officielle à Sofia. Le chef du comité du plan, Baibakow, conduit à titre privé une Chevrolet Impala. Le chef d'Etat Podgorny préfère une Mercedes 600.

Les membres du Bureau politique passent leurs vacances d'été au bord de la mer Noire, à Sotschi ou Gagra ; les enfants des personnalités de moindre importance vont dans des régions de la mer Baltique. Il est complètement impensable qu'un membre du Bureau politique puisse exprimer le souhait d'aller passer ses vacances familiales à Saint-Tropez ou aux Bahamas. On le prendrait pour fou.

Pour les fonctionnaires moyens, les privilèges sont moindres : ils se limitent à la possibilité de pouvoir acheter des tissus provenant des pays de l'Est (surtout R.d.a.).

Mais au « Dom modeli », il y a régulièrement des défilés de mode pour les femmes de fonctionnaires qui veulent se tenir au courant de ce qui se fait de plus nouveau en Occident en matière de haute couture.

Autre privilège : les comptes « spéciaux » ouverts à la banque. Outre les personnalités du parti, les privilégiés sont les citoyens qui rapportent des devises à l'Etat : des artistes comme Rostropovitch et Oistrach ou les danseurs étoiles des ballets du Bolchoï, qui vont souvent en tournée à l'étranger et reçoivent une partie de leurs cachets en coupons de change. Sans règlement légal, simplement d'après une ordonnance administrative de la banque d'Etat (la « Gosbank ») pour ces personnes-là, 40 % des sommes gagnées sont disponibles en espèces étrangères.

Les citoyens soviétiques qui rapportent des devises à l'Etat ont le droit d'en dépenser une partie à l'étranger et, par exemple, de faire entrer en U.r.s.s. des réfrigérateurs américains, des vêtements français ou des voitures allemandes. Avec leurs coupons, ils peuvent faire leurs achats dans les « Berjoska », qui, dans les hôtels, les aéroports, ainsi que dans certains magasins spécialisés, offrent des biens de consommation de haut niveau. Il y a aussi les « datchas », ces villas parfois somptueuses où les nantis du régime passent leurs vacances.

L'entrée de Peredelkino, en venant par la route de Moscou, est fermée. On arrive à l'endroit par Wnukowo, en faisant de longs détours. Le journaliste Victor Louis y vit avec son épouse anglaise Janet. Louis, qui a voyagé en Occident pour le compte du K.g.b., a une merveilleuse collection d'icônes ,un chauffage central au mazout d'importation et une piscine.

Sa datcha est également fermée par une haute clôture en planches. Très fier, il montre aux visiteurs l'installation de projecteurs destinés à éclairer son court de tennis, également importé d'Occident.

Le village Uspenskoje est situé au milieu d'une merveilleuse forêt. Au bord de la Moscova se trouve ce qu'on appelle le « Pré des diplomates », une partie de la rive que les diplomates étrangers et les correspondants peuvent — sous la surveillance de policiers — utiliser pour se baigner.

A peu près à 30 km à l'ouest de Moscou, après Uspenskoje, se trouve un lieu de repos pour les personnalités éminentes du Kremlin, en pleine forêt, au cœur d'une région fermée.

La route qui conduit à cet endroit est en asphalte, toujours parfaitement entretenue et balayée de toute neige, même en plein hiver. C'est « la piste de course » de l'élite du Kremlin, surtout pendant le week-end.

A tous les croisements importants se trouvent des policiers. En outre, des patrouilles en civil et en uniforme circulent. Presque toutes les déviations vers Uspenskoje sont interdites à la circulation normale. Un panneau rond à raie jaune empêche d'entrer. Seuls ont droit de passer les véhicules qui se rendent dans une datcha bien précise ou porteurs d'un laisser-passer.

Des patrouilles de sécurité éloignent tous les visiteurs. La masse de la population n'a aucune idée de la manière dont les personnalités du Kremlin vivent ici.

Les maisons organisées en lotissements permettent aux organes de sécurité d'être continuellement informés sur les allées et venues de chacun, sur les relations qui se nouent. Dans ces conditions, l'éventuelle formation de groupes subversifs est impossible.

A quelques kilomètres à l'ouest de Uspenskoje se trouve « Gorki 10 ». C'est là que sont bâties les datchas des fonctionnaires du gouvernement qui ne font pas partie du Bureau politique ou du secrétariat du Comité central. Les maisons ont été conçues par un architecte français et sont aménagées en meubles finnois importés.

Il va de soi que le complexe « Gorki 10 » comprend piscines, terrains de sport, courts de tennis, club avec restaurant, cinéma et magasin spécial.

Là aussi, on n'entre que muni d'un laisser-passer.

Le complexe de datchas des généraux se trouve à « Gorki 1 », tout près du château de Jussupow, à Archangelskoje.

Sur le rivage nord-ouest de la Moscova, tout près de Uspenskoje, quelques bâtiments modernes tout blancs : c'est la maison de repos du Conseil des ministres et du Comité central. Une piscine et des terrains de sport modernes ont été construits l'année dernière par des unités de l'armée. C'est là que se rencontrent hauts fonctionnaires, ministres à la retraite et secrétaires du Parti, pour prendre le thé avec leur épouse.

Sur le bord escarpé de la Moscova, un ascenseur conduit directement au bord du fleuve. Il est surveillé par des unités de l'armée.

Un diplomate occidental, s'étant un jour approché de cette région, fut rapidement rejoint par un officier de garde qui lui intima l'ordre de quitter ces lieux : il était interdit de se promener.

Comme Rome et Paris, Moscou a aussi sa « dolce vita ». Elle se déroule derrière des portes bien fermées. La vie des fonctionnaires ne s'étale pas en public. On festoie en privé ou dans des clubs qui sont réservés aux spécialistes : Club des écrivains, Maison des architectes, Club des médecins, Club des officiers, Maison des journalistes (« Dom Journalistow »).

Dans ces clubs, la cuisine est bonne et le maître d'hôtel aimable. Le meilleur steak de Moscou est servi au Club des journalistes. Et quand on a envie de homard, on doit aller au « Dom Kino », club des professionnels du cinéma, dans la rue de Brest. Au « Dom Kino » se rencontrent des acteurs et des artistes, les fils et filles des fonctionnaires et des ministres, le jeune monde élégant de Moscou. Ici, on voit régulièrement des films qui ne passent jamais dans les cinémas soviétiques.

Les visiteurs étrangers de Moscou demandent souvent s'il n'existe pas dans cette ville énorme des jeunes femmes élégantes. On les trouve au « Dom Kino ». On y rencontre aussi des cinéastes comme Roman Karmen, lauréat du Prix Staline, metteur en scène de films documentaires sur la guerre d'Espagne et la

Seconde Guerre mondiale. De nombreux jeunes membres de l'Establishment font la moue quand on leur parle du dernier film de Karmen, « Towaritsch Berlin », mais cela ne les empêche pas d'admirer sa jeune femme et ses filles dans leurs robes de Dior.

Et la jeunesse, que pense-t-elle de cette vie close ? Oui, qu'en pensent ces fils et ces filles de « grands » du régime ? Quels sont aussi leurs espoirs ?

Dans les résidences de week-end du village de Peredelkino, au bord des piscines, ce sont les enfants des personnalités qui donnent le ton. Les filles portent d'élégants bikinis et d'énormes lunettes de soleil américaines. Ici, on entend les derniers succès des hit-parades occidentaux sortis de mini-cassettes. Ici, on vous offre des Kent, là, on achète du chewing-gum américain. Ces jeunes gens sont « in ». Ils parlent le français, l'anglais ou l'allemand, écoutent régulièrement les émission de la B.b.c., la « Voix de l'Amérique » ou des émissions allemandes, ils lisent la presse de l'underground (« Samisdat »), ils discutent de Soljenitsyne, ils ont lu ses œuvres et blaguent sur les habitudes des Apparatschik, les chefs soviétiques, qui sont leur père, grand-père et oncle. Ils préfèrent parler de l'Occident. Au cours de ces deux dernières années, ces jeunes gens ne se sont pas gênés pour prendre contact avec les Occidentaux du « Pré des diplomates » voisin. Là, des amitiés se sont nouées. Sur ces plages des bords de la Moscova, les citoyens soviétiques privilégiés lisent sans vergogne des journaux et des revues occidentales. Les jeunes femmes se jettent surtout sur les dernières parutions de mode, venant de France, d'Italie et d'Allemagne. Ces jeunes n'ont plus d'illusions. Ils entendent par communisme autre chose que leurs pères : ils connaissent le mémorandum de l'atomiste Sacharow, qui demandait la liberté d'expression et un système autorisant l'existence de plusieurs partis. Ils savent que le développement économique et culturel de leur patrie stagne. Ils réprouvent la sclérose idéologique du régime. Beaucoup d'entre eux avaient mis leurs espérances dans l'expérience tchécoslovaque. Pour eux, l'incapacité notoire bureaucratique de la planification sociale est incompréhensible.

Ce qui leur pèse de plus, c'est l'isolement de leur pays. Ils veulent voyager, et pas seulement en Crimée ou sur la Baltique. « Je voudrais aller à Rome ou à Londres, ne serait-ce qu'une fois » dit une jeune femme ingénieur en bikini, cadeau de son père qui avait participé à un congrès scientifique à l'étranger. Et elle ajoute: « Mais ce sont des rêves bleus qui ne se réaliseront jamais. Ici, rien ne changera jamais. »

Cette résignation fait que les jeunes gens se désintéressent de la vie politique. Certains d'entre eux n'ont pas lu de journaux soviétiques depuis des années. « On ne fait que mentir dans ces journaux. » L'un d'entre eux m'a dit : « Je ne lirais un journal soviétique que s'il m'apprenait qu'une guerre a éclaté... Non, ça ne serait même pas la peine : j'aurais déjà appris la nouvelle, longtemps avant, par la radio étrangère... »

NEW STATESMAN, 1 January 1971
Moscow
(Excerpts)

Conversations in Russia

By K.S. Karol

Beneath the flat surface of society in Russia, as presented by *Pravda*, a rich and complex life abounds but it totally lacks any means of expression or communication. We are not a 'one-dimensional' society, as Westerners believe; on the contrary we are a fragmented society. Prevented from communicating with each other, we have almost no common criteria. Everyone takes hold of a piece of the truth from his daily experience and interprets it according to his own lights. The same words have a different meaning for each social group, almost for each individual. In such conditions we just can't make a serious analysis of the real state of affairs; so we try to tackle the problem in a pragmatic manner by studying what happens at the different levels of this closed and, up till now, inexplicable society.

The man who put these points to me is no opponent of the Soviet regime. He has an important job in the party apparatus and frequently travels abroad, where we have met many times. He has his own ideas but he doesn't try to impose them on me: he merely offers me a clue that might help me to assess my second homeland after an absence of 25 years.

Since I left Russia after the war I have maintained friendly links with several Russians who travel outside the Soviet Union. This party official is one of them, and we were talking as we strolled along the imposing – and completely new – Kalinin Boulevard in Moscow. I had telephoned him on my arrival, but from a public call-box, saying frankly that I would understand perfectly if he were unable to meet me, in view of his official position.

He laughed at my precautions, but took his own: we rendezvoused in the city for a walk. We talked about everything, from the new buildings to the slow improvements in accommodation in Moscow where, happily, 'communal' flats are now rarely being put up. But whatever topic we touched on my friend always came back to his central theme, the difficulty of grasping Soviet reality. 'Our country has no civil tradition. The taste for association, for organising communal life together, for getting to know each other and taking decisions together, never really existed in Russia. Between the czar and the moujik there was nothing; equally, between one moujik and another there was nothing except for essential personal relationships. We were and we remain a huge body, colossal even, but shapeless and deprived of articulation, of view of justice, our country is more like yours: mostly it is the little men who catch it, the unknown people who don't have protectors, who don't even have the means to slip a bribe in the right quarter. People like you or me or your intellectual friends, relatively well placed on the social ladder, always get off.' . . .

The gulf between supply and demand in consumer goods is vast even in Moscow which, by general agreement, forms a more affluent, micro-society within the country. However, my first impressions about the improvement in the standard of dress is in no way contradicted by what follows. The Russian enigma begins the minute one probes the arithmetic of the 'parallel' shops in which most people buy their smart clothes. How in fact can a secretary, who earns 70 roubles a month, buy Italian knee boots which, even second-hand, cost more than her monthly salary?

Admittedly rents are low in Russia, as is public transport (an underground ticket costs about 6d); and the basic necessities – bread, potatoes and *kasha* flour – are not dear. Theoretically, a couple who earn 200 roubles a month between them should therefore be able to live economically, although only if they are willing to spend a lot of their time queuing and resist the temptation of shopping in the parallel market, where meat costs up to 5 roubles a kilo and a lemon half a rouble. Those couples who are content with the basic necessities, who are willing to wear a coat for 10 years and to buy nothing for their flat or for family celebrations, appear to be very rare citizens. Where then do they find the extra income to eat and dress well and where do they find commodities in short supply?

For someone who has lived a long time in Russia the answer to all these questions isn't really all that difficult to find. In this country two economies have long existed side by side: Economy Number 1, official, as portrayed in the statistics, rigidly controlling wages and prices; and Economy Number 2, which functions according to its own laws and allows people to redistribute both money and consumer goods among themselves according to their needs. This Economy Number 2 is obviously supplied by illicit means, except in the case of the collective farm market, which is subject to separate regulations and, although free in principle, is controlled.

What is surprising, 25 years after the war, and 13 after the great Soviet breakthrough in space, is that not only is Economy Number 2 not dead but it is thriving more than ever. A by-product of scarcity and the rampant inflation, it is built in to modern Soviet life. What is worse, the state distribution system is just as ineffective today as it was in the past. So the individual takes advantage of the modernised transport – which, on top of everything, is very cheap – to carry goods from the areas where they can be found to those where they are in short supply, to the benefit of his own budget. A Georgian knows that by buying a return ticket to Moscow or Leningrad he will earn more from several boxes of lemons than he will make by smashing all the production records in his factory. 'Since the proletarian revolution we've become a nation of merchants,' is the current joke in Russia.

However, there are not only these 'traditional' methods of exploiting Economy Number 2. The managerial classes, feeling themselves safe from official action, often break the economic rules – many collective farm chairmen and bosses of consumer-goods factories sell their products at stiff prices through the Economy Number 2 network. I was told that in certain provincial cities two kinds of goods meant for the state shops go straight into the *tolkutchka* market. The most profitable business is in meat – which is in short supply everywhere – and in fashionable women's clothes. As

they put it in Moscow: 'In Russia we have heroic cities, [illegible] in the butchers' for four years and they still haven't capitulated.'

No one denies the existence of Economy Number 2. The official press is full of reports of misappropriations and the crimes of thieving citizens. The Central Committee and all other levels of the party constantly discuss 'the problem of the struggle against waste and embezzlement'. But these generalities reveal nothing of the mechanics of the Soviet black market. To know them, one must have lived there as a worker or student, that is to say, to have been part of the Russian rank and file, as I once was. This is something you can't learn second-hand in the space of a couple of weeks.

However, I was able to meet more Russians than I had hoped possible when I set off. Everyone I approached, party members or *podpistchiki* intellectuals (those who have signed different protests against government policy) responded as eagerly as my high official. They invited me to their homes or clubs, to the Writers' House, the Press Club or the Actors' Club. But all these people, whatever their age, their situation or their views, belong in fact to Economy Number 3, the only one which allows a man to live honestly in Russia without having too many material worries. Their salaries or their royalties are more than big enough to allow them to buy anything they want in the 'closed shops' – from which ordinary mortals are banned – or in the 'foreign currency shops' where they can spend the dollars they have saved during trips abroad. They also have priority for new housing and are able to get mortgages for flats in the so-called 'cooperative' housing, or to rent *dachas*.

The bulk of those with access to Economy Number 3 belong to the power élite – party and state officials, high-ranking officers of police and army and the economic bosses. But the 'creative intelligentsia', writers, filmmakers, university dons, also benefit to the point of notoriety from the cornucopia of the Third Economy. I met those who were secretly outraged by the situation and spoke indignantly about these *volchebnye magaziny* (magic shops) where you can find anything, but only if you have dollars, after producing a certificate showing where you got them. 'What separates 99 per cent of the Soviet population from communism,' said one of them, 'is this damned certificate which presents them from shopping in these luxury stores.' Another declared: 'Our country humiliates itself by displaying in broad daylight, in full view of foreigners, a whole consumer-goods sector in which our own national currency isn't valid.' But whether the beneficiaries of Economy Number 3 condone it or condemn it, the fact is that its flagrant privileges contribute to the shutting off and fragmentation of Soviet society.

I discussed the problem over dinner with an economist known for his advocacy of 'liberal' reforms. We ate in a popular restaurant where we were unlikely to meet any 'officials' or intellectuals – it was a rather [illegible] we hadn't gone there to gorge ourselves.

'My mistake,' he said, 'was to believe too long that our leaders supported reforms to end Economy Number 2 and tackle the country's economic reality. I thought they understood, from their experience, that repressive measures would never achieve results and that they were therefore ready to employ purely economic tools. Now I see there was nothing in it. The state continues to regard every citizen who earns less than 300 roubles a month – 95 per cent of the population – as a potential crook and is content simply to put some obstacles in his way. This cat-and-mouse game results in a totally deformed manpower structure and a crazy organisation of work. We force our shop assistants and waiters to work ridiculous hours so that a check can be carried out at the end of each shift to see if anything has been stolen. In fact, the "controllers" join in the rackets and the whole system simply increases the number of thieves and lowers productivity.

'That's not all,' he continued. 'Our leaders refuse any kind of economic rationalisation which would hit the interests of the various lobbies of privileged citizens. They deplore the inflation but they refuse to introduce a tax on high incomes: the state takes more from the tax on alcohol (recently raised) than from all taxes on income. We are sadly short of manpower, to the point where we aren't able to finish certain projects, and yet we make millions of our young people do three to five years of a military conscription which is completely irrelevant in the atomic age.

'We still have 44 per cent of the population living in the countryside without the freedom to move about the country and therefore prevented from taking jobs in industry; but all our plans for farm production are systematically undermined by failures from which no one learns any lessons. In my opinion the government accepts this situation because it prefers it to the risk of change. To sum up: the government benefits from this fragmentation of our society because it forces the workers individually to resolve their difficult day-to-day problems and distracts them from politics and from anything touching on public affairs. True, it's a paradox, but the stability of the regime depends precisely on this paradox.'

What astonished me in Russia was that even the regime's opponents seemed to accept quite calmly a 'socialist' society which is split up into classes and in which glaring privileges and contrasting standards of life exist.

'Within the framework of our system,' he replied, 'we can only attempt to influence our leaders by trying to sharpen their sensitivity to certain economic and social problems. It's impossible to organise strikes or to engage in any great doctrinal debate on the nature of our society. We have to tackle the most immediate problems; how to liberate our workers from the degrading necessity to resort to Economy Number 2; [illegible] to their tastes and needs; how to avoid major planning errors etc. That in itself is quite a programme.'

I objected that it is exactly the limited character of this programme which makes it unrealisable because leadership circles rarely yield to the simple advice of experts. He would only admit I was half right: 'Don't be shocked because those students you met the other night asked you about the price of clothes in France and not about the revolutionary movement there. Don't misunderstand these young people because they told you that they had been inoculated against the disease of politics. Until we can get away from shortages our fellow citizens will remain obsessed by the consumer goods they can't get. No one is going to risk the little he has for an uncertain future by doing a Don Quixote. They prefer to wait. The government, for its part, ensures that it will be a long wait.'



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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971

THE REACH OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty received its name at the hands of Western journalists from Brezhnev's speech at the Fifth Polish Communist Party Congress on 12 November 1968, when he declared in obvious reference to Czechoslovakia:

> "It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has done much for the real strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries. However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist contruction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem, a concern for all socialist states.
>
> "It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary, emergency step; it can be sparked only by direct actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism."

Brezhnev's enunciation of the doctrine was preceded by two authoritative statements: The so-called Warsaw Letter of 15 July 1968 signed by the five Warsaw Pact powers who were to invade Czechoslovakia six weeks later, and by a full elaboration of the doctrine in Pravda on 26 September 1968 by Sergei Kovalev (the full text of each is attached). The Warsaw Letter was drafted at one of the pre-invasion emergency meetings of the Warsaw Pact powers (except Czechoslovakia and Romania) as a warning to the Dubcek leadership to halt the liberalization of Czechoslovakia and abandon its program for creating a new socialism, a "socialism with a human face." The Warsaw Letter is probably the frankest Soviet-endorsed statement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It includes the following passages:

> "We did not have and have no intention of interfering in such matters that are purely internal affairs of your party and your state, of violating the principle of respect for independence and equality in relations between communist parties and socialist countries.... We cannot, however, agree that enemy forces should divert your country from the

path of socialism and expose Czechoslovakia to the danger of being torn from the socialist community. This is no longer your affair alone. This is the affair of all communist and workers' parties and all countries which are linked by alliances, cooperation and friendship.... We shall never be resigned to imperialism making a breach in the socialist system, by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from inside or outside, and changing power relations in Europe to its own advantage...

"In your country, a whole series of events in recent months indicates that counterrevolutionary forces supported by imperialist centers, have launched attacks on a broad front against the socialist system.... We are convinced that a situation has arisen which endangers the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia and threatens the vital common interests of the other socialist countries. The peoples of our countries would never forgive us our indifference and carelessness in the face of such danger. Our parties bear the responsibility, not only before their own working class and people but before the entire international working class and the communist world movement, and cannot keep aloof from that obligation. Therefore, we must maintain solidarity and unity in defense of our achievement, our security, and the international positions of the entire socialist community.

"We believe, therefore, that, in the face of the attacks of the anti-communist forces, resolute resistance and determined struggle for the maintenance of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia is not only your task, but ours also." [Emphasis supplied.]

Kovalev produced the most comprehensive statement of what later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. The whole text repays study, but the relevant passage for present purposes reads as follows:

"The peoples of the socialist countries and communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism. This means that each communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire communist movement.... The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interest of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement." [Emphasis supplied.]

Out of the final pre-invasion meeting between the Soviets and the Dubcek leadership in Bratislava 3 August 1968 came a joint communique which contained the most usually expressed version:

> "Support, consolidation, and protection of [a socialist country's] gains ... is a common international duty of all socialist countries." [Emphasis supplied.]

This became Soviet leaders' and propagandists' most frequent way of defining the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Soviet and Soviet-oriented leaders and writers have been consistently careful to use only legalistic and "principled" expressions when discussing the Brezhnev Doctrine and to avoid more frank and brutal statements of its real intent. They do not even recognize the legitimacy of the term, and on the rare occasions when they use it, they sarcastically refer to the "so-called Brezhnev Doctrine."

The mild, invariably innocuous-sounding terms used by the Soviets to describe the Brezhnev Doctrine are intended to veil the fact that its practical application meant a 500,000-man invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and East German troops on the night of 20 August 1968 and can mean a similar invasion anywhere within the reach of Soviet power. Soviet claims that an internal and external "counterrevolutionary" threat existed and that they had been "invited" by "thousands" of Czechoslovak citizens are patently false. The invasion made a mockery of continuing Soviet claims that they respect "the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal state, and of mutual equality and respect between allies."

The fundamental reason for the Soviet invasion was that Czechoslovakia had begun to establish an independent model of socialism that deviated from the Soviet model. The Dubcek regime deviated from the "common laws governing socialist construction" (as defined by the Soviets) in permitting traditional democratic freedoms of speech, press, political organization, etc. and in developing the potential for an independent foreign policy. In a word, the 1968 Czechoslovak leaders sought to exercise the simple right of national sovereignty, a sovereignty they discovered was limited by the Brezhnev Doctrine. As Kovalev explained after the fact:

> "The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, the world revolutionary movement."

Since the Soviets claim to lead and speak for the world socialist movement, Kovalev's statement simply means that a socialist state can

be sovereign only so long as it does not act contrary to the wishes and requirements of the Soviet Union.

The Brezhnev Doctrine has been at the heart of the tumultuous dissension within the Communist world since the invasion. The battle is between those who insist on the primacy of national sovereignty (like Yugoslavia, Romania, and many free world Communist parties) and those who find it necessary or expedient to support the Soviets in their insistence on the primacy of world Communism. Attached are some expressions of Communist opposition to the concepts of the Brezhnev Doctrine, cast again in doctrinal terms, as are the Soviet views cited earlier.

The example of Czechoslovakia raised the question, still unanswered, as to what other deviant socialist states or allies might fall under the purview of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Romania, as a socialist state bordering the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the original deviant, felt (and still feel) justifiably threatened by the doctrine. And the most prodigious deviant of all, Communist China, was the subject of a threatening article (see attached) by Victor Louis, notorious spokesman of the KGB, the vast Soviet security organization charged with the responsibility for worldwide Soviet espionage and subversion. The post-invasion period is replete with examples of the Soviets' punishing and splitting deviant and independent Communist parties of the free world, such as those of Spain, Venezuela, Japan, and Australia, among others. Even non-Communist allies of the USSR like Egypt and Finland cannot rest assured that the Soviet Union will not seek to impose its will on their countries in the name and spirit of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Indeed, Finland on many occasions has undergone the experience of the Soviets' placing limits on her sovereignty.

In the final analysis, Soviet implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine is limited only by the practical matter of how far Soviet power can reach.

PRAVDA
18 July 1968

THE "WARSAW LETTER" TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Dear comrades!

On behalf of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the G.D.R., Poland and the Soviet Union, we send you this letter, which is dictated by sincere friendship based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and by concern for our common tasks and for strengthening the positions of socialism and the security and socialist commonwealth of the peoples.

The developments in your country have aroused profound anxiety among us. The reactionaries' offensive, supported by imperialism, against your party and the foundations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's social system, we are deeply convinced, threatens to push your country off the path of socialism and, consequently, imperils the interests of the entire socialist system.

We expressed these fears at a meeting in Dresden, during several bilateral meetings and in the letters that our parties recently sent to the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.

A short time ago we proposed to the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Committee that a new joint meeting be held on July 14, 1968, to exchange information and opinions on the situation in our countries, including developments in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Committee did not take part in this meeting and did not take advantage of the opportunity for a collective comradely discussion of the situation that has taken shape. Therefore we deemed it necessary to set forth our common opinion to you in this letter with all sincerity and candor. We want you to understand us well and assess our intentions correctly.

We have not had and do not have any intention of interfering in affairs that are purely the internal affairs of your party and your state or of violating the principles of respect, autonomy and equality in relations among Communist Parties and socialist countries.

We do not appear before you as representatives of yesterday who would like to hinder your rectification of errors and shortcomings, including the violations of socialist legality that took place.

We do not interfere with the methods of planning and administration of Czechoslovakia's socialist national economy or with your actions aimed at perfecting the economic structure and developing socialist democracy.

We shall welcome adjustment of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks on the healthy foundations of fraternal cooperation within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

At the same time, we cannot assent to hostile forces pushing your country off the path of socialism and creating the threat that Czechoslovakia may break away from the socialist commonwealth. This is no longer your affair alone. It is the common affair of all Communist and Workers' Parties and states that are united by alliance, cooperation and friendship. It is the common affair of our countries, which have united in the Warsaw Pact to safeguard their independence, peace, and security in Europe and to place an insurmountable barrier in front of the schemes of imperialist forces, aggression and revanche.

At the cost of enormous sacrifices, the peoples of our countries achieved victory over Hitlerian fascism and won freedom and independence and the opportunity to advance along the path of progress and socialism. The frontiers of the socialist world have shifted to the center of Europe, to the Elbe and the Bohemian Forest. And never will we consent to allow these historic gains of socialism and the independence and security of all our peoples to be jeopardized. Never will we consent to allow imperialism, by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from within or without, to make a breach in the socialist system and change the balance of power in Europe in its favor.

The might and solidity of our alliances depend on the internal strength of the socialist system in each of our fraternal countries and on the Marxist-Leninist policies of our parties, which perform a guiding role in the political and social life of their peoples and states. Subversion of the Communist Parties' guiding role leads to liquidation of socialist democracy and the socialist system. This creates a threat to the foundations of our alliance and to the security of our countries' commonwealth.

You know that the fraternal parties showed understanding for the decisions of the C.C.P. Central Committee's January plenary session; they assumed that your party, keeping a firm hold on the levers of power, would direct the whole process in the interests of socialism without allowing anti-Communist reactionaries to exploit it for their own purposes. We were convinced that you would defend the Leninist principle of democratic centralism as the apple of your eye. Disregard for any aspect of this principle both of democracy and of centralism inevitably leads to a weakening of the party and its guiding role and to transformation of the party into either a bureaucratic organization or a discussion club. We have repeatedly spoken about all these questions at our meetings, and we received assurances from you that you were aware of all the dangers and were fully resolved to repulse them.

Unfortunately, events moved along a different channel.

The forces of reaction, taking advantage of the weakening of party leadership in the country and demagogically abusing the slogan of "democratiza-

tion," unleashed a campaign against the C.C.P. and its honest and devoted cadres, with the clear intention of liquidating the party's guiding role, undermining the socialist system and pitting Czechoslovakia against the other socialist countries.

The political organizations and clubs that have cropped up lately outside the framework of the National Front have in essence become headquarters for the forces of reaction. The social democrats persistently seek to create their own party, are organizing underground committees and are attempting to split the workers' movement in Czechoslovakia and to secure leadership of the country so as to restore the bourgeois system. Antisocialist and revisionist forces have taken over the press, radio and television and have turned them into platforms for attacking the Communist Party, for disorienting the working class and all the working people, for carrying out unchecked antisocialist demagoguery and for subverting the friendly relations between the C.S.R. and the other socialist countries. A number of mass news organs are systematically conducting genuine moral terrorism with respect to people who speak out against the forces of reaction or express their anxiety over the course of events.

Despite the decisions of the May plenary sessions of the C.C.P. Central Committee, which pointed out the threat from rightist and anti-Communist forces as the chief danger, the intensified attacks by the reactionaries have met no rebuff. It was precisely this that enabled the reactionaries to appear publicly before the whole country and publish their political platform, entitled "The 2,000 Words," which contains an open appeal for struggle against the Communist Party and against constitutional rule, an appeal for strikes and disorders. This appeal constitutes a serious threat to the party, the National Front and the socialist state and is an attempt to implant anarchy. In essence, this statement is an organizational-political platform of counterrevolution. Let no one be deluded by its authors' assertions that they do not want to overthrow the socialist system, that they do not want to act without Communists, that they do not want to sever the alliances with the socialist countries. These are empty phrases whose aim is to legitimize the platform of counterrevolution and lull the vigilance of the party, the working class and all the working people.

This platform, which was widely circulated in the crucial period prior to the extraordinary congress of the C.C.P., not only was not rejected but even found outright champions within the party and its leadership, champions who support the antisocialist appeals.

Antisocialist and revisionist forces are defaming the entire activity of the Communist Party, waging a slander campaign against its cadres and discrediting honest Communists who are devoted to the party.

Thus, a situation has arisen that is absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country.

In this atmosphere attacks are also being made on the C.S.R.'s socialist foreign policy, and the alliance and friendship with socialist countries is being assailed. Voices are heard demanding a revision of our common coordinated policy with respect to the F.R.G., despite the fact that the West German government invariably pursues a course hostile to the interests of our countries' security. The attempts at flirtation by the F.R.G. authorities and the revanchists have found a response in ruling circles of your country.

The whole course of events in recent months in your country indicates that the forces of counterrevolution, supported by imperialist centers, have launched a broad offensive against the socialist system without encountering the requisite opposition from the party or the people's role. There is no doubt that the centers of international imperialist reaction, which are doing everything possible to inflame and complicate the situation by inspiring antisocialist forces to take action in this direction, have taken a hand in these Czechoslovak developments. Under the guise of extolling the "democratization" and "liberalization" in the C.S.R., the bourgeois press is conducting an incitive campaign against the fraternal socialist countries. F.R.G. ruling circles, which seek to make use of the events in Czechoslovakia to sow discord between the socialist countries, to isolate the G.D.R., and to implement their revanchist schemes, have been especially active in this.

Is it possible, comrades, that you fail to see these dangers? Is it possible to remain passive in this situation and to confine oneself merely to declarations and assurances of fidelity to the cause of socialism and alliance commitments? Is it possible that you fail to see that the counterrevolutionaries have taken one position after another from you and that the party is losing control over the course of events and is retreating more and more under the pressure of anti-Communist forces?

Was it not to sow distrust and hostility toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that your country's press, radio and television unleashed a campaign over the staff exercises of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces? Matters have reached the point where a joint exercise of our troops with the participation of several Soviet army units, something customary for military cooperation, is being used for unfounded charges that the C.S.R.'s sovereignty has been violated. And this is happening in Czechoslovakia, whose people hold sacred the memory of the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the freedom and sovereignty of that country. At the same time, near your country's western borders the military forces of the aggressive NATO bloc are conducting maneuvers in which the army of revanchist West Germany is participating. But not a word is said about this.

As is obvious, the inspirers of this invidious campaign want to confuse the minds of the Czechoslovak people, disorient them and undermine the truism that Czechoslovakia can preserve its independence and sovereignty only as a socialist country, as a member of the socialist commonwealth. And only the enemies of socialism could today exploit the slogan of "defending the sovereignty" of the C.S.R. against the socialist countries, against the countries with which alliance and fraternal cooperation create the most reliable groundwork for the independence and free development of each of our peoples.

We are convinced that a situation has arisen in which the threat to the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia jeopardizes the common vital interests of the rest of the socialist countries. The peoples of our countries would never forgive us for indifference and unconcern before such danger.

We live in a time when peace and the security and freedom of peoples more than ever demand unity among the forces of socialism. International tension is not waning. American imperialism has not renounced its policy of force and open intervention against peoples fighting for their freedom. It continues to

wage a criminal war in Vietnam, support the Israeli aggressors in the Near East and hampers a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The arms race has by no means slowed down. The Federal Republic of Germany, in which the forces of neofascism have swelled, attacks the status quo by demanding a revision of the borders, refuses to renounce its aspirations either to seize the G.D.R. or to secure access to nuclear weapons and opposes disarmament proposals. In Europe, where enormous means of mass destruction have been stockpiled, peace and the security of peoples are maintained primarily thanks to the strength, solidarity and peace-loving policies of the socialist states. We all bear responsibility for this strength and unity of the socialist countries and for the fate of peace.

Our countries are bound to one another by treaties and agreements. These important mutual commitments of states and peoples are founded on a common desire to defend socialism and safeguard the collective security of the socialist countries. Our parties and peoples are entrusted with the historical responsibility of seeing that the revolutionary gains achieved are not forfeited.

Each of our parties bears a responsibility not only to its own working class and its own people but also to the international working class and the world Communist movement and cannot evade the obligations deriving from this. Therefore we must have solidarity and unity in defense of the gains of socialism, our security and the international positions of the entire socialist commonwealth.

This is why we believe that it is not only your task but ours too to deal a resolute rebuff to the anticommunist forces and to wage a resolute struggle for the preservation of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia.

The cause of defending the rule of the working class and all the working people and the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia requires:

a resolute and bold offensive against rightist and antisocialist forces and the mobilization of all means of defense created by the socialist state;

a cessation of the activities of all political organizations that oppose socialism;

the party's assumption of control over the mass news media — the press, radio, and television — and utilization of them in the interests of the working class, all the working people and socialism;

solidarity in the ranks of the party itself on the fundamental basis of Marxism-Leninism, steadfast observance of the principles of democratic centralism and struggle against those who through their activities assist hostile forces.

We know there are forces in Czechoslovakia that are capable of upholding the socialist system and dealing a defeat to the antisocialist elements. The working class, the laboring peasantry and the advanced intelligentsia — the overwhelming majority of the republic's working people — are prepared to do everything necessary in the name of the further development of socialist society. The tasks today are to give these healthy forces a clear perspective, rally them to action and mobilize their energy for a struggle against the forces of counterrevolution in order to preserve and strengthen socialism in Czechoslovakia.

In the face of the threat of counterrevolution, the voice of the working class must resound with full strength to the call of the Communist Party. The working class, together with the laboring peasantry, made enormous efforts in the name of the triumph of the socialist revolution. It is precisely these forces that most cherish the preservation of the gains of socialism.

We express the conviction that the Czechoslovak Communist Party, realizing its responsibility, will take the necessary measures to block the path of reaction. In this struggle you may count on the solidarity and comprehensive assistance of the fraternal socialist countries.

[Signed:] On the instructions of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the B.C.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; Stanko Todorov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee; Boris Velchev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee; Pencho Kubadinsky, member of the Politburo and Vice-Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers.

On the instructions of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee: Janos Kadar, First Secretary of H.S.W.P. Central Committee; Jeno Fock, member of the Politburo of the H.S.W.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.

On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council; Willi Stoph, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of Ministers; Hermann Axen, candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee.

On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the P.U.W.P. Central Committee; Marian Spychalski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Polish People's Republic State Council; Josef Cyrankiewicz, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee.

On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee; N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; A. N. Kosygin, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; P. Ye. Shelest, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee; K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.

Warsaw, July 15, 1968.

PRAVDA
26 September 1968

"SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES."

by Sergei Kovalev

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia the question of the relationship and interconnection between the socialist countries' national interests and their internationalist obligations has assumed particular urgency and sharpness. The measures taken jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous significance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations being heard in some places that the actions of the five socialist countries contradict the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination.

Such arguments are untenable primarily because they are based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination.

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations.

The Marxist dialectic opposes one-sidedness; it requires that every phenomenon be examined in terms of both its specific nature and its overall connection with other phenomena and processes. Just as, in V. I. Lenin's words, someone living in a society cannot be free of that society, so a socialist state that is in a system of other states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be free of the common interests of that commonwealth.

The sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement. V. I. Lenin demanded that all Communists "struggle *against* petty national narrowness, exclusivity and isolation, and for taking into account the whole, the overall situation, for subordinating the interests of the particular to the interests of the general" ("Complete Collected Works" [in Russian], Vol. XXX, p. 45).

Socialist states have respect for the democratic norms of international law. More than once they have proved this in practice by resolutely opposing imperialism's attempts to trample the sovereignty and independence of peoples. From this same standpoint they reject left-wing, adventurist notions of "exporting revolution" and "bringing bliss" to other peoples. However, in the Marxist conception the norms of law, including the norms governing relations among socialist countries, cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal way, outside the general context of the class struggle in the present-day world. Socialist countries resolutely oppose the export and import of counterrevolution.

Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist Party). In concrete terms this means primarily that every Communist Party cannot fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems — capitalism and socialism. This struggle is an objective fact that does not depend on the will of people and is conditioned by the division of the world into two antithetical social systems. "Every person," V. I. Lenin said, "must take either this, our, side or the other side. All attempts to avoid taking sides end in failure and disgrace" (Vol. XLI, p. 401).

It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an "extra-bloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth — and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union — and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent to this. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the C.S.R.'s withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth. But implementation of such "self-determination," i.e., Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, would run counter to Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist countries. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European

socialist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist states, in fulfilling their internationalist duty to the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, had to act and did act in resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.

Comrade W. Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, used a metaphor to illustrate this point: "To those friends and comrades of ours from other countries who believe they are defending the just cause of socialism and the sovereignty of peoples by denouncing and protesting the introduction of our troops in Czechoslovakia, we reply: If the enemy plants dynamite under our house, under the commonwealth of socialist states, our patriotic, national and internationalist duty is to prevent this by using any means that are necessary."

People who "disapprove" of the actions taken by the allied socialist countries ignore the decisive fact that these countries are defending the interests of worldwide socialism and the worldwide revolutionary movement. The socialist system exists in concrete form in individual countries that have their own well-defined state boundaries and develops with regard for the specific attributes of each such country. And no one interferes with concrete measures to perfect the socialist system in various socialist countries. But matters change radically when a danger to socialism itself arises in a country. World socialism as a social system is the common achievement of the working people of all countries, it is indivisible, and its defense is the common cause of all Communists and all progressive people on earth, first and foremost the working people of the socialist countries.

The Bratislava statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties on socialist gains says that "it is the common internationalist duty of all socialist countries to support, strengthen and defend these gains, which were achieved at the cost of every people's heroic efforts and selfless labor."

What the right-wing, antisocialist forces were seeking to achieve in Czechoslovakia in recent months was not a matter of developing socialism in an original way or of applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism to specific conditions in that country, but was an encroachment on the foundations of socialism and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is the "nuance" that is still incomprehensible to people who trusted in the hypocritical cant of the antisocialist and revisionist elements. Under the guise of "democratization" these elements were shattering the socialist state step by step; they sought to demoralize the Communist Party and dull the minds of the masses; they were gradually preparing for a counterrevolutionary coup and at the same time were not being properly rebuffed inside the country.

The Communists of the fraternal countries naturally could not allow the socialist states to remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country was endangered by antisocialist degeneration.

The five allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia are consonant with the fundamental interests of the Czechoslovak people themselves. Obviously it is precisely socialism that, by liberating a nation from the fetters of an exploitative system, ensures the solution of fundamental problems of national development in any country that takes the socialist path. And by encroaching on the foundations of socialism, the counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia were thereby undermining the basis of the country's independence and sovereignty.

The formal observance of freedom of self-determination in the specific situation that had taken shape in Czechoslovakia would signify freedom of "self-determination" not for the people's masses and the working people, but for their enemies. The antisocialist path, the "neutrality" to which the Czechoslovak people were being prodded, would lead the C.S.R. straight into the jaws of the West German revanchists and would lead to the loss of its national independence. World imperialism, for its part, was trying to export counterrevolution to Czechoslovakia by supporting the antisocialist forces there.

The assistance given to the working people of the C.S.R. by the other socialist countries, which prevented the export of counterrevolution from the outside, is in fact a struggle for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's sovereignty against those who would like to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country to the imperialists.

Over a long period of time and with utmost restraint and patience, the fraternal Communist Parties of the socialist countries took political measures to help the Czechoslovak people to halt the antisocialist forces' offensive in Czechoslovakia. And only after exhausting all such measures did they undertake to bring in armed forces.

The allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia are proving in deeds that they have no task other than to defend the socialist gains in that country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs, and they are waging a struggle not in words but in deeds for the principles of self-determination of Czechoslovakia's peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their destiny themselves after profound and careful consideration, without intimidation by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery.

Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such thing as nonclass law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Workers' Parties.

The class approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations. Whoever does so and forfeits the only correct, class-oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms begins to measure events with the yardsticks of bourgeois law. Such an approach to the question of sovereignty means, for example, that the world's progressive forces could not oppose the revival of neo-Nazism in the F.R.G., the butcheries of Franco and Salazar or the reactionary outrages of the "black colonels" in Greece, since these are the "internal affairs" of "sovereign states." It is typical that both the Saigon puppets and their American protectors concur completely in the notion that sover-

eignty forbids supporting the struggle of the progressive forces. After all, they shout from the housetops that the socialist states that are giving aid to the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence and freedom are violating Vietnam's sovereignty. Genuine revolutionaries, as internationalists, cannot fail to support progressive forces in all countries in their just struggle for national and social liberation.

The interests of the socialist commonwealth and the entire revolutionary movement and the interests of socialism in Czechoslovakia demand full exposure and political isolation of the reactionary forces in that country, consolidation of the working people and consistent fulfillment of the Moscow agreement between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.

There is no doubt that the actions taken in Czechoslovakia by the five allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia, actions aimed at defending the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth and primarily at defending Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state, will be increasingly supported by all who really value the interests of the present-day revolutionary movement, the peace and security of peoples, democracy and socialism.

SCINTEIA
22 August 1968

Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party

Dear comrades, citizens of Rumania. In this difficult moment for the situation in Europe and for the fraternal Czechoslovak people, in the name of the Central Committee, of the State Council, and of the government, I wish to address myself to you and express myself to you and express our confidence in our people, who are aspiring to ensure the peaceful construction of socialism.

We know, comrades, that the entry of the forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is a great error and a serious danger to peace in Europe and to the fate of socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in today's world, when the peoples are rising to the struggle to defend their national independence and for equality in rights, that a socialist state, that socialist states, should violate the freedom and the independence of another state. There is no justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state.

Our party-state delegation which last week visited Czechoslovakia convinced itself that the Czechoslovak people, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and the Czechoslovak workers' class, old people, women, and young people, unanimously support the party and state leadership in order to put right the negative state of affairs in Czechoslovakia inherited from the past, in order to ensure the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The problem of choosing the ways of socialist construction is a problem of each party, of each state, and of every people, and nobody can set himself up as an adviser and guide for the way in which socialism must be built. It is the affair of every people, and we deem that, in order to place the relations between socialist countries and Communist parties on a truly Marxist-Leninist basis, it is necessary to put an end once and for all to interference in the affairs of other states and other parties.

The measures which the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the State Council have decided to adopt aim at submitting to the Grand National Assembly a declaration in which we would set out clearly the relations we mean to build, our relations with the socialist countries and with all the countries of the world, based on respect for independence and national sovereignty, full equality in rights, and noninterference in internal affairs, and to base these relations on a truly Marxist-Leninist collaboration which would contribute to the triumph of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, to the triumph of communism, and to restoring the authority of and confidence in Marxist-Leninist ideas.

We have today decided to set up armed patriotic guards made up of workers, peasants, and intellectuals: defenders of the independence of our socialist fatherland. We want our people to have their armed units in order to defend their revolutionary achievements and in order to ensure their peaceful work and the independence and the sovereignty of our socialist fatherland.

In our activity, we proceed from the responsibility we have toward the people, toward all the working people regardless of nationality — Rumanians, Hungarians, Germans, and other nationalities; we all — Rumanians, Hungarians, Germans, people of other nationalities — have the same destiny and the same aspiration: the forging of communism in our fatherland. We are determined that in complete unity we shall ensure the attainment of our ideals.

It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was danger of counterrevolution; perhaps tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counterrevolutionary tendencies. If so, we answer to all that all the Rumanian people will not permit anybody to violate the territory of our fatherland. Look comrades: Our whole Central Committee, the State Council, and the Government are here. We are all determined to faithfully serve the people in socialist con-

struction and in the defense of the revolutionary achievements and its independence. Many of those who are here are Communists and antifascists who have faced prisons and death but have not betrayed the interests of the workers' class and our people. Be sure, comrades, be sure, citizens of Rumania, that we shall never betray our fatherland, that we shall not betray our people's interests.

We are confident that the Communist and workers' parties will know how to find the way to put the speediest end to this shameful event in the history of the revolutionary movements. We are convinced that no Communist can be found who can accept this military action in Czechoslovakia, that all the Communists would raise their voices to ensure the triumph of freedom, the triumph of the Marxist-Leninist principles, so that Czechoslovak people, so that the peoples, may be able to build socialist society as they themselves want it.

We are determined to act with all our force and with all our responsibility in order to contribute to the finding of ways for the speediest solution of this situation created by the entry of foreign forces into Czechoslovakia, and so that the Czechoslovak people can carry out their activity in tranquility. We are firmly determined to act so that together with the other socialist countries and with the other Communist and workers' parties we shall contribute to the elimination of the divergencies and to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries and of the Communist parties because we are convinced that only in this way are we serving the interests of the people and the interests of socialism in the whole world.

We ask the citizens of our fatherland that, having complete confidence in the leadership of the party and the state and in our Communist party, they should give proof of complete unity and act calmly and firmly, with everyone at his place of work, to increase his efforts to ensure the implementation of the program for the development of our socialist society, and to be ready, comrades, at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania.

I thank you, all the citizens of the capital and all the citizens of our fatherland for your confidence, for this warm manifestation, and for the attention with which you are watching our party's policy; and we wish you comrades good health and success in your activity for the triumph of socialism in our fatherland.

We request you, comrades, that you return to your work and have confidence that we shall keep you informed regarding the unfolding of events. Good-bye.

SCINTEIA
22 August 1968

OFFICIAL RUMANIAN COMMUNIQUE ON THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 21 AUGUST 1968

On August 21, 1968, a joint session of the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee, of the State Council, and of the government of the Rumanian Socialist Republic was held. In addition to the members of the Central Committee, the State Council, and the government of the Rumanian Socialist Republic, the plenary session was attended by the leaders of the trade unions, youth organization, and other civic organizations, representatives of the press, and activists with responsible state and party jobs.

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu reported about the particularly grave situation created as a consequence of the penetration of the armed forces of some socialist countries into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and presented the conclusions which were reached by the Executive Committee of the party Central Committee and by the Presidium of the Central Committee in this connection.

The Central Committee, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers have unanimously expressed their profound concern in connection with this act, stressing that it represents a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal, socialist, free, and independent state, of the principles on which the relations between socialist countries are based, of the unanimously recognized norms of international law.

Nothing can justify this armed action — the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the troops of these countries. The interference in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak people and of their Communist party, the armed intervention against Czechoslovakia, represents a grave blow for the interests of the unity of the world socialist system, for the international Communist and workers' movement, for the prestige of socialism throughout the world, and for the cause of peace. The party and government, all our people, express their conviction that the only road for the liquidation of the grave consequences created by the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia is the speedy withdrawal of the troops of the five countries and the ensuring of conditions for the Czechoslovak people to solve for themselves their internal affairs without any outside interference. The party and government, all our people, manifest on this occasion, too, all their solidarity with the fraternal Czechoslovak people and with their Communist party and express their conviction that the Czechoslovak workers' class, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, peasantry, the Communist party, and its leadership elected by the party, the legal bodies of leadership of the Czechoslovak state will successfully solve all the problems connected with the march forward of socialist building in the fraternal Czechoslovak republic.

The party Central Committee, the State Council, and the government of the

Rumanian Socialist Republic have unanimously approved the activity of the Presidium and of the Executive Committee of the party Central Committee directed toward the promotion of the principles of independence, sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual respect, the strengthening on this basis of the unity of the socialist countries, of the Communist and workers' parties, and of all anti-imperialist forces.

The measures proposed by the Executive Committee to ensure the peaceful creative work of the Rumanian people, builders of socialism, the independence, and sovereignty of our fatherland, were also approved unanimously.

It has been decided to convoke for tomorrow, 22 August, the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian Socialist Republic in extraordinary session.

BORBA
26 August 1968

EXCERPT FROM THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, 23 AUGUST 1968

The Communists and other citizens of Yugoslavia have in recent days overwhelmingly expressed their deep indignation and protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. They have given full support to the people of Czechoslovakia who under difficult conditions of occupation rallied around their party and state leadership, so unanimously and courageously fighting for the independence and free socialist development of their country.

In endorsing the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), our people have once again declared themselves ready to defend uncompromisingly their independence, their right to determine their own way of internal socialist development and to act freely in international relations. They have taken this stand in line with their internationalist responsibility and in solidarity with socialist and all anti-imperialist and democratic forces in the world, in the interests of peace, independence, and the equality of peoples in the interests of socialism. In the stand taken by our people, the LCY sees an inexhaustible source of strength and encouragement for further efforts in the struggle for the development of socialist, democratic, and humane relations among people and for the resolute support to all the forces fighting for the liberation of man and nations from all forms of repression and hegemony.

Together with all the people of socialist Yugoslavia, the Central Committee (CC) of the LCY has once again expressed its protest against a violent action, the method and aims of which are directly opposed to the essence and interests of socialism.

The CC condemns the policy which attempts to shirk responsibility to the working class and peoples of the whole world, to the interests of peace, progress and socialism. No matter what arguments are used to justify the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the fact remains that the governments of the five Warsaw Treaty countries, by applying brute force, have perpetrated an attack against the independence of a socialist country in order to hinder its independent socialist development and to subject it to their will.

The peoples of our country, led by the LCY, once again raise their voice in protest, as they have been doing in the matters of American aggression in Vietnam, threats to the independence and independent internal development of Cuba, Israeli aggression against Arab countries, or imperialist violence and intervention in various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Viewed historically, the action against Czechoslovakia is all the more grave and far-reaching in its harmful effect on progress, peace, and freedom for having been undertaken by socialist countries ostensibly to protect socialism.

Striking at the working class and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), the forces which alone can ensure the progress of socialism, the intervention against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) can in no way be described as protection of socialism nor as directed against counterrevolution. Neither can the intervention be justified by any strategic interests of the struggle against imperialism because, by weakening the position of the socialist countries and socialism, it is, on the contrary, strengthening the positions of the imperialist forces. Finally, this action can least of all be justified by ideological reasons and arguments drawn from the theory of Marxism-Leninism, because it is flagrantly at odds with the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

PRESS GRAMNA
24 August 1968

EXCERPTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH ON CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION, 23 AUGUST 1968

. . . First of all I wish to state that we considered Czechoslovakia to be heading toward a counterrevolutionary situation, toward capitalism, and into the arms of imperialism.

Thus, this is the operative concept in our first position toward the action carried out by a group of socialist countries. That is, we consider that it was necessary to prevent it from happening at any cost, in one way or another. Let us not become impatient, because we propose to analyze this in line with our ideas.

Discussing the form is not really the most fundamental thing. The essential thing, whether we accept it or not, is whether or not the socialist bloc could permit the development of a political situation which would lead to the breakdown of a socialist country and its fall into the arms of imperialism. From our viewpoint, it is not permissible, and the socialist bloc has the right to prevent it in one way or another. We first wish to begin by establishing what our opinion is about this essential fact.

Now, it is not enough to accept simply that Czechoslovakia was heading toward a counterrevolutionary situation and that it had to be stopped. It is not enough to conclude simply that the only alternative was to prevent it and nothing more. We must analyze the causes and determine the factors which made possible and necessary such a dramatic, drastic, and painful remedy. Those are the factors which required a step unquestionably involving a violation of legal principles and of international standards, which have often served as shields for peoples against injustices and are highly regarded in the world.

What is not appropriate here is to say that in the case of Czechoslovakia the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was not violated. That would be fiction and a lie. The violation was flagrant.

And this is what we will concentrate on: sovereignty and our ideas of legal and political principles. From the legal viewpoint, it cannot be justified. This is quite clear. In our judgment, the decision on Czechoslovakia can be explained only from the political viewpoint and not from a legal viewpoint. Frankly, it has absolutely not one appearance of legality.

What are the circumstances that have permitted a remedy of this nature, a remedy which places in a difficult situation the entire world revolutionary movement, a remedy which constitutes a really traumatic situation for an entire people — as is the present case in Czechoslovakia — a remedy which implies that an entire nation has to pass through the most unpleasant circumstances of seeing the country occupied by armies of other countries, although they are armies of the socialist countries. How did a situation come about in which millions of citizens have to see themselves today in the tragic circumstances of choosing either to be passive toward these circumstances and this event — which so much brings to mind previous episodes — or to struggle in comradeship with pro-Yankee agents and spies, in comradeship with the enemies of socialism, in comradeship with the agents of West Germany, and all that fascist and reactionary rabble that in the heat of these circumstances will try to present themselves as champions of the sovereignty, patriotism, and freedom of Czechoslovakia?

Logically, for the Czechoslovak people this experience and this fact constitute a bitter and tragic situation. Therefore, it is not enough simply to conclude that it has arisen as an inexorable necessity and even, if you wish, as an unquestionable obligation of the socialist countries to prevent such events from happening. [One must inquire] what are the cases, the factors, and the circumstances that made it possible — after twenty years of communism in Czechoslovakia — that a group of persons whose names do not even appear anywhere would have to request other countries of the socialist camp, asking them to send their armies to prevent the triumph of the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia and the triumph of the intrigues and conspiracies of the imperialist countries interested in tearing Czechoslovakia from the community of socialist countries. . . .

The statement by TASS explaining the decision of the governments of the Warsaw Pact says in its final paragraph: "The brother nations firmly and resolutely oppose their unbreakable solidarity against any threat from abroad. They will never permit anyone to snatch away even a single link of the socialist community." We ask: Does this statement include Vietnam? Does this statement include Korea? Does this statement include Cuba? Does it consider Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba as links in the socialist camp that cannot be snatched away by the imperialists or not?

On the basis of this declaration, Warsaw Pact divisions were sent to Czechoslovakia. And we ask: Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Vietnam also if the imperialists increase their aggression against that country and the people of Vietnam ask for this aid? Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to the Korean Democratic Republic if the Yankee imperialists attack that country?

Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack our country, or simply if, in the face of the threat of an attack by the Yankee imperialists, our country requests it?

We accept the bitter necessity which demanded the sending of troops to Czechoslovakia. We do not condemn the socialist countries that adopted this decision; but we, as revolutionaries, and on the basis of principles, have the right to demand that a consistent policy will be adopted in all the other questions that affect the revolutionary movement in the world. . . .

L'UNITA
22 August 1968

COMMUNIQUE OF THE POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY, 22 AUGUST 1968

The Politburo of the PCI met this morning, with the participation of the members of the Directorate present in Rome, to discuss the grave situation that has unexpectedly arisen as a result of the intervention of Soviet troops and of troops from other Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia.

The Čierná-nad-Tisou and Bratislava discussions and agreements were greeted by the leading PCI organs with great satisfaction, as they were considered to be fully consistent with their demands for a political solution of the problems that had arisen in Czechoslovakia and with regard to the relations between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries — a solution that was to be realized with all due respect for the autonomy of every party and country, following the line of development of socialist democracy in the spirit of solidarity with the revival process taking place in Czechoslovakia and in a manner that would effectively strengthen the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement.

In these conditions and given the facts, it is hard to understand how a decision for military intervention could have been taken.

The PCI Politburo therefore considers this decision to be unjustified and incompatible with the principles of the autonomy and independence of every Communist party and socialist state and with the need to defend the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement. In the firmest and most convinced spirit of proletarian internationalism and reaffirming once again the profound, fraternal, and genuine relations that unite the Italian Communists with the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the PCI Politburo considers it to be its duty to immediately express its strong dissent and to reserve the party directorate's right to make a more profound evaluation of the situation and its further developments; to make itself the spokesman of the emotion and deepest concern felt by the workers' movement at this moment; and to reaffirm its solidarity with the action of renovation undertaken by the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

The PCI Politburo expresses its hope that all Italian democratic forces will be able to assume a responsible position and to steer clear of emotionalism; it also commits all Communist organizations to hold to the positions of the party's leading organs and to be firmly vigilant against all anti-Communist speculation and provocation.

L'UNITA
8 September 1968

EXCERPT FROM AN INTERVIEW GRANTED BY LUIGI LONGO SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, TO L'ASTROLABIO

"DEVELOPMENTS IN, LESSONS LEARNED FROM CZECH CRISIS"

L'Astrolabio: Following the disagreements between the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria on the one hand and the Communist party of Czechoslovakia on the other over the "new course" undertaken in Czechoslovakia, there was in May an understood truce with Kosygin's trip to Karlovy Vary; this was followed by the formal accords reached at Čierná and Bratislava. Then came the unexpected military intervention. Why? What do you think of the arguments presented to justify this intervention?

Longo: I do not believe, as I have repeatedly stated in recent months, that the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) was in danger, with the "new course," of falling into the hands of the reformists and that socialist Czechoslovakia could have been overturned by the counterrevolution even if it had tried to attack.

In my opinion, twenty-three years of existence and construction of socialism in Czechoslovakia had already sent down, despite shortcomings and errors, such solid roots throughout Czechoslovak economic, social and political life that the country was in the position of facing with security and tranquility any destructive attacks by rightist domestic forces and imperialist and counterrevolutionary foreign forces.

On the other hand, the "new course" adopted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party proposed precisely to consolidate socialism in Czechoslovakia by overcoming the errors and delays of the past, activating democratic life within the party and the country, and adapting relations between party and state and their relations with the working classes, the popular masses, and public opinion to new requirements.

Moreover, the decisions adopted by the Central Committee in January and April, decisions that inaugurated the "new course," were also welcomed by the responsible organs of the CPSU. It is true that the new CCP leadership was subsequently accused of having inadequately reacted to the social-democratic and counterrevolutionary attacks that were directed against the Communist party itself, the socialist foundations, and the international position of Czechoslovakia.

It is equally true that in that period the CCP was deeply divided, with its foreign activity almost halted, by the divergencies of the past and the disagreements over domestic organizational and leadership problems. But it was to unite again on these matters and rally around the new leaders including Dubček, especially after the encounters at Čierná and Bratislava. It therefore had broad opportunities to defeat rightist and antisocialist forces.

It is my opinion that, following those encounters, there were no facts to indicate that the counterrevolution posed an imminent and inevitable threat and that socialist power was about to disintegrate. I therefore do not believe that military intervention to ward off a hypothetical catastrophe was warranted. And even less do I believe that the situation in Czechoslovakia was such that it warranted that "painful necessity" with which the intervention in Hungary in 1956 had been justified.

Because of this, we immediately expressed our disagreement and disapproval as soon as we heard about the military intervention in Czechoslovakia by the five socialist states, which had sent jointly the so-called July "Warsaw letter." And we expressed our disagreement and disapproval not only for the aforesaid reasons of fact but also for the more general reasons of principle.

In fact, we consider the following reasons of principle to be inviolable: the autonomy, independence, and national sovereignty of every state and the autonomy and sovereignty of every Communist party. We hold that the fate and future of socialism in a country are of interest not only to Communists, democrats, and people of the given country but also to the Communists, democrats, and peoples of all countries. However, this principle, in our view, cannot be understood in any way as the right of intervening militarily in the internal life of another Communist party and another country.

Moreover, this principle was solemnly stated by the government of the Soviet Union itself in a resolution of October 1956 following the Hungarian events. This resolution affirmed clearly that "the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can establish their relations only on positions of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence, and sovereignty, and noninterference in the affairs of others." The resolution also mentioned

that "the Twentieth CPSU Congress has condemned with maximum resolution violations and errors and has posed the task of consistent application by the Soviet Union in its relations with the other socialist countries, of the Leninist principles of equality among peoples."

The same resolution specified in a very concrete way how the Leninist principles of equality among peoples were to be consistently applied. "The deployment of troops of this or that signatory state of the Warsaw Pact on the territory of another signatory country of the Warsaw Pact is effected in agreement with all the signatory states and only with the concurrence of that state on whose territory, through its request, these military units are deployed or are to be deployed."

Radio commentary by Milika Sundic over Zagreb (Yugoslavia) radio on 31 January 1970:

For over a year and a half the Soviet press has been accusing Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement of having invented the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries and, as the organ of the office of the CPSU Central Committee in the RSFSR, Soviet Russia, maintains, of attributing it to the Soviet Union. The facts, however, say exactly the opposite.

The doctrine of limited sovereignty or socialist community was not invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists, but by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, that the sovereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also has a class character. This reference to class character actually represents the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every socialist country which, by their criteria, is building socialism in accordance with its own specific condition and not on the basis of foreign models.

The article in the army paper Red Star which, like Soviet Russia, is dealing with the same problems, is also characteristic. According to that paper, varing models of socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to socialism.

These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous, and the LCY rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist countries and the communist and workers movement. It is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence of the policy. References to the Czechoslovak case, for instance, do not enhance the validity of assertions that Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement have fabricated the doctrine of limited sovereignty and the socialist community. On the contrary, the very fact that the sovereignty of a state is being questioned or the aspect of sovereignty according to international law not recognized refutes the words of the camp press that the doctrine of limited sovereignty was invented by revisionists and imperialists.

This does not, of course, mean that Western imperialism is less dangerous and, even less, that is should appear as some kind of guardian of the independence of small countries. To dispute the

concept of the sovereignty of a country under international law or to make this sovereignty conditional upon the class character of the state represents, in our view, nothing but a modified doctrine of limited sovereignty, the authorship of which is now being denied by the countries of the camp, but so far only by words and not by deeds.

Anyway, what does the assertion that proletarian internationalism has been transformed into socialist internationalism mean? Does it not mean insistence on unity in inequality or on unity of the privileged and the unblemished and of those who are predestined to sin and who have, therefore, to be taught a lesson? The League of Yugoslav Communists does not recognize such internationalism, which demands the renunciation of national sovereignty, because this is not internationalism. Such concepts are no less dangerous when they appear inside a country embracing several nations as, for instance, the Soviet Union or, let us say, our country.

With regard to the repeated insistence that the intervention in Czechoslovakia represented the fulfillment of internationalist duty, it should be noted that this insistence in present circumstances is something other than an expression of a need to repeatedly criticize those who were not in agreement with the intervention. The case of Czechoslovakia, in our view, is being revived as a continuous threat to others, because, otherwise, why should it be talked about in such a manner, when even those who are doing this know full well that this is not at all popular?

* * *

British Communist Party

> "If the right to break this principle [the 'sovereignty' of 'Socialist' States] is conceded, who is to decide when the duty to intervene exists? Who decides whether the situation in a country is endangering Socialism? Has any party or Socialist government the right to intervene in the affairs of another if, in its own opinion, there is such a danger? If such a so-called principle was to be accepted, then it would have universal validity and could be acted upon by any Communist Party and any Socialist government. This is an impossible proposition and one that could never be accepted by the international Communist movement since it could provide a theoretical basis for war between Socialist States. If on the other hand, it is argued that such a right to intervene belongs only to some parties and some Socialist States, then this is equally unacceptable and completely alien to every established principle of the Communist movement". (Comment, 5 October 1968.)

Swiss Communist Party

"The intervention in Czechoslovakia which is qualified as preventative and is claimed to be necessary would be an 'exception' to these principles [of Communist Party 'autonomy' and independence]. But the problem is then to know who has the sovereign right to decide on such as 'exception' so laden with consequences?" (Voix Ouvrière, 4 November 1968.)

Japanese Communist Party

"If this method [i.e. Soviet intervention] could be approved within the Socialist camp, any Socialist country could carry out any kind of armed intervention in another Socialist country by unilaterally deciding that there was a 'danger of counter-revolution' in it. If so, the Socialist 'principle of completely equal rights, respect for territorial integrity and national independence, and non-intervention in each others' domestic affairs' as clearly stated in the Declaration and the Statement [adopted by international Communist conferences in 1957 and 1960], would be an empty statement. As a result, the Socialist camp would lose its raison d'etre". (Akahata, 21 September 1968.)

Australian Communist Party

"We join with others in the international Communist movement who ask: if it is permissible to over-ride the agreed principles of self-determination of nations and of relations between Socialist States, on the ground of duty to prevent counter-revolution, who is to decide when the call of such duty has come?" (Tribune, 18 September 1968.)

Italian Communist Party

"Who will decide the application of this duty to intervene? Who establishes that there is a counter-revolutionary plot and who takes responsibility for the consequences? Pravda does not say". (L'Unità, 3 September 1968.)

French Communist Party

"One cannot invoke proletarian internationalism in order to interfere unduly in the affairs of other parties". (L'Humanité, 23 October 1968.)

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NEW YORK TIMES
2 July 1971

Indonesia, Five Years Out of Deep Instability, Is Finding a New Basis for Hope

By JAMES P. STERBA
Special to The New York Times

JAKARTA, Indonesia, June 26—"I wouldn't have believed it," said an Indonesian student who returned to his country this month after six years of study in Europe. "I got back here, and for the first time I thought to myself that maybe we can make it."

He noted that most children now wore clothes instead of rags, that the roads were less bumpy, that steel-reinforced concrete bridges stood over rivers where wooden ones had washed out annually. Boys carry transistor radios. Airlines run on schedule. Beggars are less noticeable. Some of the new businesses give out free books of matches.

There are still many pessimists in Indonesia—many people who see this nation of islands — the fifth largest nation in the world in area and population — destined to be a crippled, hungry and angry world dependent. Many of the long-range projections are bleak, and one can still find many families in Jakarta living in sewer pipes. Per capita income is still less than $80 a year.

Yet five years after an era of seemingly chronic economic and political instability, long-time observers see more hope now than at any other time since the leaders of Indonesia declared their independence from their Dutch colonial rulers in 1945. Travelers returning after a long absence use words like "miraculous" and "spectacular" in describing the changes they see, although many of the changes are admittedly superficial.

The progress has occurred under the leadership of President Suharto and the group of generals who assumed power after crushing an attempted Communist take-over in 1965. By force — some say by severe repression — they tightened military control and pushed political processes into dormancy in an attempt to create a climate for development in place of a tradition of religious and ideological disputes.

Leaning on the West

This year President Suharto loosened the reins ever so slightly. Under careful stage-managing and an overlay of force, about 57 million Indonesians are to vote on July 3 in the first national election for representatives since 1955. Government officials contend that the election is the first step toward popular democracy and the gradual end of military rule.

Although Indonesia's foreign policy involves active nonalignment and she is seeking renewed friendships with Communist countries, she is also leaning heavily toward the West.

When Richard M. Nixon became the first American President to set foot on Indonesian soil two years ago, he was pinning on the country his hopes for a resurgent non-Communist Asia. Nothing since then appears to have diluted those hopes if anything, economic progress, under capitalist tutelage, has undoubtedly raised them.

Sukarno Spent Heavily

From a period four years ago, when inflation peaked at an astronomical level, Indonesia has settled into economic sobriety. The rupiah inflated last year by less than 8 per cent, a better performance than that of the United States dollar.

In the nineteen-sixties President Suharto's predecessor, Sukarno, spent vast amounts of borrowed money on facades of world leadership like military hardware and giant monuments while roads and irrigation systems disintegrated. Now Indonesia is spending her money on rehabilitating roads and communications networks.

Into the third year of its first Five-Year Plan, the Government is spending more than a third of its budget on development projects and less than 3 per cent on defense — and this in a nation run by the military. In 1963 Mr. Sukarno spent 87 per cent on defense.

Foreign investors, once frightened off by the country's volatility, have been pouring in for three years in a quest for vast untapped resources of oil, minerals and timber. Indonesians who once sent their earnings out as soon as possible are putting them into banks here in record amounts. The gross national product, it is estimated, jumped 7 to 8 per cent last year.

Rice Output Rises

Rice production increased to some 12 million tons last year, surpassing expectations, and Indonesia is looking forward to being self-sufficient in rice by the mid-nineteen-seventies.

Timber production has doubled, and experts say oil production will hit a million barrels a day this year. In the next two years, export earnings from minerals are expected to shoot up after several years of exploration and construction.

Though the economic gains are evident, they do not prevent vocal dissatisfaction in the political arena, where critics of the Government assert that the election is little more than a public-relations stunt to legitimize the military's continued rule in the guise of democracy.

As a Western diplomat commented, "This election is in the great democratic tradition of Taiwan and South Vietnam." But a ranking government official said: "This is an experiment—a small first step. You can't expect us to go from military rule to pure democracy overnight."

'Blatant Propaganda'

Regardless of motives, the Government makes little pretense of staging a "fair" campaign or election. Its banner is being carried by a collection of "functional groups" of laborers, veterans, teachers, civil servants and the like that one critic terms "hollow organizations without significant followings—mostly the products of imagination, wishful thinking and the blatant propaganda of their leaders."

The collection is called the Joint Secretariet of Functional Groups. Its chairman is a lieutenant general and it is divided into four sections, each headed by a general. Its candidates, who fly to rallies on aircraft provided by the air force or by a private airline run by a collection of generals, receive police motorcycle escorts and soldier guards.

Members of the nine opposition parties maintain that the Government has used excessive force and intimidation, ranging from threats to remove village chiefs who do not turn in enough votes to beatings to rumors that the Government has devised a way to tell how each villager votes and will be checking up afterward.

Nervousness Apparent

Despite the heavy-handedness, nervousness was apparent among officials as campaigning came to a close yesterday. President Suharto has warned that if instability threatens, he will quickly tighten controls.

Military dominance stretches from Jakarta to the remotest islands. While only 6 of 22 Cabinet ministers are generals, the President's key decision-makers wear uniforms, and 17 of the 26 provincial governors are military men.

Military commanders run dozens of businesses from airlines to nightclubs and movie houses, in many cases with the entrepreneurial talent of ethnic Chinese, who have dominated commerce since they were invited in by the Dutch to serve as a buffer between them and the Indonesians.

The military men say that with the Government providing less than half the funds needed to run a battalion, they have no alternative but to look elsewhere for funds.

but this is still a country with

President Suharto, who long ago traded his uniform for a business suit, has pledged to reduce the size of the military. Last year he put more than 60 generals on the retirement list, but this is still a ctounry with a state of mind that regards a uniform as a status symbol and requires Adam Malik, Indonesia's most prominent civilian, to salute before shaking hands with local officials.

Yet officials insist that a shot has not been fired in anger in years. "It's just tradition," a young soldier remarked.

The military men argue that they are the only group with the talent and organizational skills to run the country and push development.

"I for one would be more than happy to go back to just being a soldier," said Lieut. Gen. Kemal Idris, military commander for Sulawesi, "but where are the organizations and the qualified civilians to take over our jobs?" He threw up his hands.

Mountain of Debts

While the critics charge that Mr. Suharto's Government is repressive and that some of his aides in uniform are corrupt, it has received good reviews for its performance in picking up the pieces of a shattered nation and slowly pointing it down the road of development under the watchful guidance and advice of international economic specialists from organizations such as the World Bank.

The relative economic stability has been built on a mountain of I.O.U.'s. The Indonesians owe other countries about $4-billion in loans and interest. Until last year they concentrated on holding off the creditors; this year they are scheduled to make their first repayments.

The largest debt is about $2.5-billion that the late Mr. Sukarno ran up like a housewife gone berserk on Fifth Avenue with a fistful of credit cards. More than $1-billion is owed to the Soviet Union, most of it for warplanes, ships and other hardware that now sit idle for lack of spare parts, which the Russians have refused to supply except on a cash-and-carry basis.

Giant Doses of Foreign Aid

The country is also being kep afloat by massive and increasing doses of foreign aid, the bulk of it going into development.

The United States, the major contributor, granted $232.7-million last year, of which nearly $102-million was for food.

As the aid continues to flow, corruption and inefficiency remain as major problems, but on small measure of progress is that officials are less hesitant to talk about them.

Gross misallocations of resources are evident. For example, the dozens of charming old steam locomotives that puff along the Javanese countryside use teak, a rare and expensive hardwoodof which Indonesia has a large marketable supply, for fuel. A third of the annual harvest is burned in the locomotives and for cooking fires.

Schools in Poor Shape

The educational system is in extremely poor condition. With teachers generally earning less than $10 a month—not enough to live on—the quality or education is dismally low. The Department of Education estimates that there are no places for more than six million children aged 7 to 15.

Health care is in about the same state. In Jakarta, the most advanced city in Indonesia, with a population of five million, there is one hospital bed for every 1,200 people.

Those are symptoms of the major problem — overpopulation. Although experts warn that it can overcome the most successful development efforts, birth-control programs are not a major priority and have just gotten under way.

Population Over 115 Million

Estimates of the population range from 115 million to 123 million, although the outer islands lack people — about 1,000 of the 13,667 are populated—some 73 million people are compressed onto the island of Java, which has an area of just under 49,000 square miles, about the size of New York State.

The stability and the economic growth have had little impact on the daily lives of most Indonesians. Observers who say they are better clothed and appear more hopeful about the future, fear that unless their lot steadily improves they will form the grist for a Communist resurgence.

The Indonesian Communist party was crushed in 1965 and subsequently banned. Hundreds of thousand of Communists and innocents, it is estimated, were slaughtered in the nightmare that followed the attempted take-over. It is believed, however, that hundreds of thousands of sympathizers escaped death of arrest.

The status of arrested suspects remains a sensitive issue at home and a source of international embarrassment, and officials remain hesitant to talk about it. It is conservatively estimated that at least 70,000 suspects remain in about 350 prisons and detention camps with little hope of a trial.

The Government has released about 30,000 minor suspects, but at least that many are believed to remain in confinement.

Indonesia earnestly wants to take a place among the important nations of the world, a place many of her young leaders argue is warranted because of size and population alone. Whether she can do so is unclear. She is out of the hospital bed and looking at the sun, and her progress has made her doctors jubilant, but they worry about a relapse.

JAPAN TIMES
4 July 1971

Indonesian Elections

The election held Saturday in Indonesia, the second since the nation won its independence in 1949, is well calculated to produce no surprises. The continuance of President Soeharto's firm control over the government and the nation's destiny is assured.

No one is even pretending that the elections will convert Indonesia instantly into a civilian-led democracy. But they do represent a first step toward parliamentary government. Whether there are further steps in the future will depend on the performance of the legislatures to be established and the progress the country is capable of, both economically and politically.

Between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., an estimated 90 per cent of the nation's 57 million registered voters have filed through polling places and cast ballots for three offices in the lower and upper regional legislatures and in the new House of Representatives. Once the lengthy and complicated vote counting is completed, the 460-seat national parliament will convene October 28. These members will have the added duty of becoming part of the People's Consultative Assembly which will elect a president and vice president late next year or in 1973.

The voters were not casting ballots for individuals. They voted for party or organization slates. According to the percentage of votes won, the representatives will be selected from approved lists for the three levels of government. In addition, approximately one-fifth of the legislators will be appointed by the government and of these the majority will be military officers.

The appointed representatives are to insure a strong voice by President Soeharto and his military government in the legislatures. But the cautious President has also taken out another insurance policy to insure political stability. He organized the Sekber Golkar, Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, whose members are recruited from almost every level of society and from major government and nongovernment organizations. It includes fishermen and students as well as Christian and Moslem organizations among many others. But most important, all civil servants are required to join Sekber Golkar or resign their jobs.

With strong financial backing, the nonpartisan Sekber Golkar is competing against the nine political parties in the election. It has been accused by its opponents of steamroller tactics in bringing in members. However, many people have flocked to Sekber Golkar because they see a sure winner. Everyone from diplomats to opposition party leaders concede that it will probably sweep the elections. In fact, there is now concern that the popularity of the Sekber Golkar may deter the hopes that a multiparty or a two-party system would emerge from the elections, despite Government assurances that it had no intention of establishing a one-party country.

Reports from Indonesia say there are virtually no national issues in the campaign. The only possible one would be the nation's economy. However, President Soeharto and his military and nonmilitary supporters are convinced that their record in rebuilding the economy from the ruins left by the Sukarno [illegible]

Although unemployment and under employment is still a serious problem, inflation is now under control, the budget is balanced, export earnings are climbing and the inflow of foreign capital continues. There is optimism over the economy in Indonesia. The Indonesians are beginning to predict that their country will become the "Japan" of Southeast Asia. The nation always had potential but in the past very little luck.

One interesting question that may or may not be answered in the election is how the underground Communists, still considered a danger, will vote.

But most other questions have been answered already. The outsider—but certainly not the Indonesian—might ask why should elections be called at this time. However, pressure has been mounting within Indonesia for parliamentary government, and President Soeharto has felt it wise to give in to the wishes of his people. His obvious concern, however, is that a parliamentary government might set back, if not destroy, the progress made so far through his policies. After all, political chaos was the result of the only other election in Indonesian history.

In considering the present Indonesian election, it is hard not to recall the late President Sukarno's description of the form of government he sought: "Guided Democracy." Unfortunately under Mr. Sukarno, there was plenty of guiding but no democracy.

Considering the conditions and situation in Indonesia, we are inclined to accept President Soeharto's gesture toward parliamentary government in good faith. We hope it truly is the beginning of representative government which will contribute greatly toward stability and progress in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The decision to hold elections does reflect President Soeharto's confidence in the progress of his nation. It is to be hoped he will not be disappointed.

WASHINGTON POST
5 July 1971

Indonesia Seeking to Slow Population Boom

By Donald Bremner
Los Angeles Times

DJAKARTA — A burgeoning population, scarcely dented by a fledgling birth control program, threatens to undermine the ambitious project to develop Indonesia's economy and ease the widespread poverty.

Much of the increasing output of food, clothing and other goods will be swallowed up by the 3 million persons added to the population each year, leaving little to raise living standards for the country's 120 million inhabitants.

At the present growth rate of nearly 2.8 per cent a year the population will double in a little over 25 years, and the country's economic development program will have to run hard just to keep up in providing schools, jobs and food.

An organized family planning program is just getting under way. Planners hope to have 6 million women practicing birth control by the end of 1975, about 22 per cent of all wives in the child-bearing ages.

Putting the brakes on population growth is especially important for Indonesia, with its combination of low average income, dense population and insufficient rice to feed its people.

High birthrates mean a high proportion of children to be supported by those in the productive ages. Each 100 Indonesians in the working ages of 15 to 64 years must support 100 children and elderly.

In contrast, each 100 working-age Americans support 64 children and elderly, and in Japan, which has an effective birth control program, each 100 in the working ages support only 45 children and elderly. This high dependency burden in Indonesia is a major drag on development and improved living standards.

Indonesia's population — the sixth largest in the world after China, India, the Soviet Union, the United States and Pakistan — might not be such a problem if it were more evenly distributed. But nearly 65 per cent of Indonesians live on the central island of Java, which has less than 7 per cent of the country's area.

The result is some of the most densely populated land in the world — 1,500 persons per square mile on Java — an average of about 10 persons trying to grow food and live on the equivalent of a city block of mountainous and nonarable land.

Little was done about Indonesia's swelling population until recently. The national family planning institute was established in 1968, and government spending for birth control, which was only $80,000 in 1968, has climbed to $4 million for this year. Foreign aid adds another $2 million.

Beginning with 125,000 is to have 6 million women practicing birth control within five years. Nearly 15,000 field workers and 3,000 clinics will be needed to carry out the program, the aim of which is to reduce the population's growth rate from its present level of 2.8 per cent a year to 2.2 per cent.

The tradition of large families — four or more children is the wish of the typical Indonesian couple — and the belief that the Lord will provide for them are major obstacles to slowing population growth.

"People here say that 'when a child is born, its livelihood is assured, or else it wouldn't have been born— it's the will of Allah,'" said one Indonesian. "That attitude will have to change if family planning is to succeed."

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 July 1971

Indonesian Vote to Reshape Parties

By Donald Bremner
Los Angeles Times

HONG KONG, July 6 — Indonesian voters, overwhelmingly endorsing the Suharto government and its economic development program in last week's election, have set the stage for a basic reshaping of the country's system of political problems.

The result is almost certain to be a party system focused less on communal and religious questions, and more on the issues of building Indonesia's economy, educating her people and solving pressing social problems.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik said only four parties will be left of the 10 political groups which ran in the election Saturday. The others will have to merge with the big parties.

Dominating the scene will be Golkar, the government-sponsored organization which swept more than 50 per cent of the votes in preliminary returns. The 200 or more seats Golkar won, added to the 100 to be filled by appointment of President Suharto, assure a powerful pro-government bloc of nearly two-thirds in the new 460-seat parliament.

Golkar, the joint secretariat of functional groups, went into the election as a hastily rejuvenated alliance of more than 200 mass organizations and a nationwide network of government civil servants.

Three other parties emerged from the election as counterweights to Golkar. The main two were Moslem parties, the Moslem Scholars Party (Nahdatul Ulama) and the Indonesian Moslem Party (Parmusi). The third, sharply reduced from its previous strength, was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) founded by former President Sukarno.

Parties surviving the merger will be under heavy pressure to unite or at least cooperate to provide any significant opposition to Golkar.

The election, the first since 1955, gave Indonesian voters their first chance to express opinions on national issues with ballots since the traumatic attempted coup of 1965 and the subsequent decline of the flamboyant Sukarno.

There were heavy pressures to vote for Golkar. But basically, the Indonesian voter was endorsing the sense of stability created by the Suharto government, which first curbed rampant inflation and then set about rehabilitating the country's stagnant, broken-down economy.

Misgivings in some quarters at military influence in government were outweighed by the general belief that Indonesia needs a strong government to maintain stability and carry through the development program.

"I have no objection to a soldier as a government minister or a governor, if he does a good job," said one well-educated Hindu woman on the island of Bali. "There is so much work to do."

Corruption in government, particularly among some army leaders, an issue that brought students into the streets last year, was largely ignored as the election neared. Editors who had pressed the issue earlier found it expedient to soft-pedal it, partly to avoid giving ammunition to Golkar opponents.

The election results may cause a wrench for some of the traditional elements of society. A prominent Jakarta journalist commented on the eve of the voting:

"We're in a period of fundamental change, and it's painful for everybody. But if we can develop Indonesia, we can lift our own people and be of some help to the whole southeast Asian region."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 July 1971

Popular vote backs policies

Malik, Suharto big gainers in Indonesia

By Henry S. Hayward
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Jakarta, Indonesia

Two men likely to come out of the Indonesian election with enhanced stature are President Suharto and Foreign Minister Adam Malik.

For President Suharto, the benefit has been an indirect one. His office was not at stake in the election, which was for national and provincial legislatures.

But the fact that the government-sponsored Sekber Golkar group is conceded to have won a sweeping victory nevertheless [illegible] considerable credit on the President himself.

Compared with his flamboyant predecessor, the late President Sukarno, President Suharto sometimes is described as lacking charisma as far as the Indonesian public is concerned.

Quiet but firm control

But the election outcome demonstrated to the nation at large that General Suharto retains a quiet but firm grasp on the country's affairs.

For fast-moving, versatile Adam Malik, his performance as Golkar's star campaigner demonstrated to ordinary Indonesians and the topmost rulers of the nation that he has impressive political qualifications as well as past experience in leftism, revolution, and foreign affairs.

His performance may well earn him the vice-presidency as a reward, according to informants here.

Especially in his home territory of Sumatra and the outer islands, Mr. Malik proved to be Golkar's foremost speaker during campaign swings. He seemed to have had the right touch for every occasion, shifting his stance easily in different racial or religious areas.

Tireless performer

Golkar sent out 17 troops or "safaris" to cover the provinces. In addition to big Jakarta government or military personalities, the entourages included dancers, singers, and cultural performers. Among those included was "Bing" Slamet, a popular Indonesian entertainer and Golkar candidate for the Jakarta assembly.

The performances proved very popular in small villages and towns where amusement is not easy to find and the election commotion was welcome.

The tireless Malik, meanwhile, often outran his younger colleagues while hopping around the country. He was the ranking civilian in the Golkar organization, yet he managed not to alienate the military machine which was solidly behind Golkar.

"Once the generals tended to mistrust Malik," a Jakarta source said, "but his campaign performance was so effective there are no generals gunning for him at present."

UN presidency likely

The concensus here is that Mr. Malik has the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly next fall just about wrapped up. This will provide him with further international exposure, as well as prestige at home. The assumption is that he can either continue to run the Foreign Ministry by remote control, or temporarily turn over the reins to a deputy.

On the domestic side, the Malik campaign speeches often included scathing denunciations of the present nine political parties for their parochial interests. He did much to mobilize intellectuals behind Golkar as an organization that would deal with national policies and programs, rather than represent political or racial groups only.

Those who feel the military has too much influence on Indonesian life would look to Mr. Malik in the vice-presidential post to dilute or deflect the military influence when necessary. But they concede this would require all the Foreign Minister's tact and persuasiveness.

When Mr. Malik emerged from a post-election luncheon in a Jakarta hotel, an admiring Indonesian whispered to me, "I come from the same place as he does—west Sumatra." Then he bowed as the Foreign Minister, looking small in a white western suit, smiled in return.

The next day (Wednesday) he was off to Romania to renegotiate Indonesian debts. One felt the election must be well and truly over if Adam Malik was away again.

For President Suharto, the Golkar victory practically ensures his own reelection in 1973. He was appointed to a five-year term in 1968. Few expect the Golkar machine to lose its impetus in the next two years after its impressive trial run.

Popular endorsement

The victory also indicates that the basic philosophy of the Suharto government is endorsed by the people. That means resisting pressure to make Indonesia into an Islamic state, remaining nonsecular as the Army prefers, and continuing the dedication to national economic development.

It also ensures the election of cooperative national and provincial legislatures capable of producing legislation desired by the government. This means, especially, financial support for government programs.

Finally, the election should enhance the vested legitimacy of the Suharto government, providing it with a better international image and encouraging those to whom Indonesia owes money.

At home and abroad, it showed the democratic process is gradually being reinstated in this country, although still with careful controls.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 July 1971

Economy improves

Oil finds brighten Indonesia's outlook

By Henry S. Hayward
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Jakarta, Indonesia

Indonesia continues to make encouraging economic progress.

New oil discoveries, just confirmed by the mining minister, make it likely Indonesia will achieve its target of 1.4 million barrels per day by the end of 1972 and 1.5 million in 1973.

The rate of oil production now is 900,000 barrels per day, a sharp increase over the 700,000 produced in 1970.

At a sale price of $2.30 (U.S.) per barrel, oil income will go a long way toward helping Indonesia pay off past indebtedness and build for the future.

Foreign oil companies operating on a cost-plus basis for exploration and production, and sharing profits with the government, also stand to make handsome returns in this area.

Oil wells itemized

The latest oil discovery to be publicized is an onshore strike by Caltex at Riau. Other new discoveries this year and last, as itemized by the mining minister, were:

1. A Pertamina (Indonesian Government oil company) field which will start production by the end of 1972.
2. An offshore well by Iapco in South Sulawesi scheduled to start producing next October.
3. An offshore well by Atlantic Richfield north of Jakarta, also scheduled to start production in October.
4. An offshore well by Yapex Union Oil in the Strait of Makasar, expected to be in operation by the end of 1971.

An earlier discovery by Stanvac in South Sumatra now has started production.

It is no secret that foreign oil companies here have encountered a number of logistical and housekeeping problems, such as shortages of office space, of homes for families, and of schools for children. Welders, drillers, and other trained workers are in short supply.

But prospects for the future are bright enough so that oil company complaints are kept to a minimum. At a recent luncheon, a large group of American businessmen, including American and other oilmen, raised no questions when Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, head of Pertamina, informed them his company now is prepared to provide such services as transportation and communications, and to help with immigration, exports, and even labor relations—all of which the oil companies hitherto have been handling on an individual basis.

One central Indonesian organization to handle such problems, General Sutowo said, would be "cheaper and better." He pointed out that Pertamina has acquired a number of planes and helicopters available to charter not only to oil companies but to other businesses too.

The general expectation was that the Pertamina services would indeed be utilized.

Assets pile up

Some found it interesting that Pertamina should invest some of its oil profits in aircraft, spare parts, communications, etc. Others pointed out Pertamina actually is in a position to provide such services better than individual companies.

Pertamina has accumulated assets of $1 billion in the past 12 years and is regarded here as an example of what good management can achieve. General Wutowo is credited with steering Pertamina to its present eminence, although some of his methods are considered unorthodox.

In addition to oil, other aspects of the Indonesian economy are showing improvement. Exports are increasing. The price index of essential commodities such as kerosene, rice, and textiles is going down. Imports of consumer goods still are rising but not as rapidly as last year, the government says.

Timber shows potential

Gross national product is increasing at over 7 percent this year. Population increase is believed to be a manageable 2 to 2.5 percent, although recent statistics are scarce.

Timber meanwhile is shaping up as almost as rich a potential resource as oil. Half the timber of Southeast Asia is in Indonesia, with 2 million hectares of teak in Java alone. East Kalimantan and Sumatra have huge reserves of hardwood such as meranti and teak.

The value of timber sales in 1970 was $100 million, up from $60 million in 1969. The figure is expected to reach $1 billion in the mid-1970's.

The Japanese, hungry for wood for building and paper supplies, take 80 percent of Indonesian production. Japan is the biggest timber consumer in a timber-short world.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 July 1971

Indonesia moves ahead

Nothing could be more different than the style of Indonesia's present ruler, General Suharto, and that of his predecessor, the flamboyant President Sukarno.

The one depended on excitement. He could not settle down under a placid situation. He saw his mission as nation-building and resorted to foreign adventures with accompanying bombasts while uniting the people of the vast Indonesian archipelago politically. And he sadly neglected the country's economic needs.

By the time of the abortive Communist coup in 1965 and the subsequent downfall of Sukarno, Indonesia had had enough of excitement. And General Suharto, strong but quiet, unemotional, even prosaic compared with his predecessor, was the man of the moment—the man needed to restore the country to a more rational sense of values and priorities.

General Suharto's first priority was to concentrate on economic recovery, and in this he has succeeded to a remarkable extent. Galloping inflation has been brought under control. A sound development program is under way. Foreign investment has responded to the new stability.

Now he has reinforced his success on the economic front with a political victory in the first general elections to be held in Indonesia for 16 years. Full results of the elections will not be known until August, but it is already clear that Golkar, the broadly based political movement backing the government, has won a sweeping victory over the old, traditional political parties still in existence. (The Communist Party was eliminated after the 1965 coup and the intellectually elite Socialist Party was banned by Sukarno.)

Golkar's emergence as a new political force is one of the most significant developments on the Indonesian domestic scene. It is not a political party in the usual sense, but a rather loose federation of "functional" groups from all levels of society. Although it has the support of the military, it is entirely managed by civilians. It was formed to carry the government's program to the people, and in this it has met a need for better communication with the people.

Much credit for Golkar's success must go to the astute and intelligent Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who has played a major role in negotiating foreign aid for Indonesia's economic recovery and in helping rebuild the country's image on the international scene. It is said he may well be rewarded for his part in the election victory by being given the vice-presidency.

The elections represent a first step toward the restoration of democracy in Indonesia. There is still a long way to go before the military step down and hand over power to a civilian government. But under General Suharto Indonesia is settling down, and has made significant progress toward meeting the twin requisites of economic and political stability.

THE ECONOMIST
10 July 1971

One cheer for Suharto's democracy

The Indonesian election wasn't exactly clean, but that's nothing new in Asia, and at least the government was prepared to take a risk

The preliminary results of the elections in Indonesia last Saturday show a clear victory for President Suharto, but they do not justify putting out more flags for democracy in Asia. The government's electoral machine, the Sekber Golkar, may have pulled in as many as 60 per cent of the votes, overshooting the sunniest forecasts of its own leaders. Since 100 seats in parliament are reserved for official appointees, that would mean that the government can count on the backing of more than 300 of the 460 members of the new legislature. It would also mean that, when parliament is called upon to vote for a new president in 1973, the generals will not need their tanks to make sure that their man gets elected.

But General Suharto's victory had its price. The Golkar machine is said to have spent more than $50 million on its caravanserai of charter planes and loudspeaker vans, its pork-barrel politicking and its roving bands of troubadours. Part of that was supplied by the affluent Chinese businessmen who coughed up $500 a head for places at American-style fund-raising banquets. But Golkar's success depended on more than lavish campaigning. The new electoral laws prevented the opposition parties from doing most of the things that an opposition is normally supposed to do. For example, they were not allowed to express criticism of government actions or to discuss "the religious question." And, especially in the villages, officials eager to produce support for the government resorted to strong-arm tactics. There is evidence that some civil servants were threatened with losing their jobs unless they joined Golkar, that some opposition rallies were forcibly dispersed and that peasant voters in the backblocks were herded to the ballot-boxes by military police. Mr Subchan, the leader of the Moslem Scholars' party (one of the largest of the nine authorised opposition groups), claimed this week that on most of the island of Sulawesi there was no pretence of a secret ballot. There will be more complaints. The irony is that the elections were partly designed to win the approval of the outside world as a step towards civilian rule.

But what happened on Saturday must be put into perspective. After all, it is easy enough for westerners (and above all for Anglo-Saxons) to forget that the democratic system is a rarity, and perhaps even a luxury. The copies of Westminster that the British bequeathed to Asia and Africa have had only a precarious existence; most of them have given way to personal dictatorships, one-party rule, or military juntas. The Indonesians' only previous experience of a free election came in 1955, and was soon followed by the chaotic personal autocracy of Sukarno—one of that breed of third-world leaders that a French observer has called "demigods." Sukarno substituted the cult of personality for rational planning and an attack on Malaysia for any attempt to come to grips with the country's economic crisis.

The men who succeeded him are the survivors of the pogrom unleashed against the army high command by the Indonesian communist party on the night of September 30, 1965. That night has rightly been seen as one of the turning-points in recent south-east Asian history. The fact that General Nasution escaped his would-be assassins and was able to rally the armed forces determined that Indonesia would be ruled today by soldiers rather than the communists. That also had its price. It has been claimed that more than 500,000 people died between 1965 and 1967 as the soldiers took their revenge. It will not be easy to bury the enmities of those years, and the men in General Suharto's government who insist that only a new generation will be able to restore the country to full civilian rule may have a point. And who could govern the country now if the generals and Golkar failed? Their main opposition lies in three places: in the suppressed communist party, which still has tenacious grassroots support in eastern and central Java, where land famine and overpopulation are most acute; in the Nationalist party, which seems to be held together only by regional chieftains like those in Bali and by a diffuse sense of nostalgia for its golden days of affluence under Sukarno; and in religious groups like the Scholars' party, and others, whose main appeal is to Moslem chauvinism or Catholic and Protestant fears of Moslem dominance.

General Suharto's real claim to power is that he represents a coalition of interests (the army, the civil servants, the urban professional men) that may be capable, if anybody is, of threading the country's thousands of islands together and getting the economy back on the rails by rational management and by attracting foreign investors. And he has not done badly. The rate of inflation has been pushed down to under 10 per cent, compared with 85 per cent in 1967 and 650 per cent in Sukarno's worst year. The government has coaxed new concessions out of foreign creditors, including the Russians and the east Europeans, and some $640 million is to be poured in as foreign aid this year. Figures like these mask the problems that remain.

There is a gaping trade deficit, and much of the $1¼ billion that was invested by private companies between 1967 and 1970 went into the extractive industries, which do not give jobs to many people. There is an urgent need to accelerate internal migration away from land-hungry Java towards the roomier islands and to create new jobs to soak up the unemployed. If the government did some arm-twisting to get its majority on Saturday, that was partly because there has not been time for the considerable economic progress it has brought about to seep down to the man in the paddyfield.

That is why some sympathetic outsiders have suggested that General Suharto might have done better to put off the election for a year or two until he could count on more genuine public support. But Indonesia will remain a "supervised democracy"—as the official jargon puts it—for a long time to come. General Suharto has at least managed to widen his political base through Golkar. He has shown that power does not rest solely in the barracks by promoting Mr Adam Malik, the civilian foreign minister, as the main government tub-thumper in the electoral campaign. Small changes, perhaps, but Indonesia was unlikely to sprout a stable party system overnight. One forecast of the country's political future is that General Suharto will be replaced by a retired general who will in turn be replaced by a civilian who enjoys the confidence of the high command. This will not happen overnight, but one of the hopeful things is that General Suharto does not look to be the kind of man who becomes addicted to office.

Before passing judgment on the Indonesians, it is worthwhile looking around the region. The two-party system in the Philippines has failed to provide an outlet for some of the explosive social frustrations that undoubtedly exist there. Malaysian democracy is fine if you happen to be born a Malay, but less satisfactory if you are Chinese or Indian. The armed forces and the local oligarchy run Thailand, as they have done for much of its history; and neighbouring Burma is under the slackening thumb of an introverted autocrat who has fallen prey to a morbid fear of assassination. In South Vietnam the politicking for the presidential election scheduled for October 3rd is going on as intensely as ever, despite the war, but then South Vietnam is a very special place because the Americans obliged its leaders to submit themselves to the voters in order to justify their own presence there. No one really believes that it is possible to hold an entirely clean election in time of internal war. But the paradox of South Vietnam's election is that it really is possible for the opposition to overturn the government, however much shady business goes on beside some hamlet polling-booths, whereas the leadership in Hanoi would never contemplate exposing itself to the same risk.

Singapore remains an island, in a political as well as a geographic sense, and even here there has been mounting criticism of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's tough treatment of his critics, and especially the press. Singapore has become a de facto one-party state without any illegal seizure of power; which means that despite its booming economic growth it runs the risk of failing to reflect the divisions of opinion in its society. Against this background, it is possible to see the Indonesian generals for what they are: men who are loosening their grip a little in search of some kind of political legitimacy. Rousseau believed that democracy could exist only in small republics, like his ideal version of Geneva or Corsica. He had a narrow view of democracy, but also a necessary sense of the relativity of political ideals. E. M. Forster thought that democracy was worth two cheers; perhaps the Indonesian generals deserve one.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 July 1971

Indonesia:

Someone Is Doing Something Right

JAKARTA, Indonesia — With so much of Southeast Asia now plagued by war and budding insurgencies, one does not have to look at a map of the area very long to



decide which country seems to be on the up-slope these days. It is Indonesia, which is still tabulating the results of a national election held the week before last.

The election made few headlines, and indeed this necklace of equatorial islands virtually slipped from the headlines altogether a few years ago, possibly because no American troops were stationed here. But among the persons known to be watching this fifth largest country in the world with more than passing interest is Richard M. Nixon. If there is a classroom Nixon Doctrine country, it must be Indonesia, which "beat Communism" without American advisers or American lives.

In 1965, Indonesia took what was believed to have been the third largest Communist party in the world and demolished it — singlehandedly and brutally, but quickly and cleanly enough so that few people now discuss the fact that one of the worst blood baths in history occurred here. When President Nixon visited Indonesia two years ago — he was the first American President to do so — he was reported to have put his arm around President Suharto, the anti-Communist general in charge of this transformation, and said, in effect, "You're our boy."

Because it has a foreign policy of "active nonalignment," the Indonesian Government does not like to consider itself in anyone's pocket. But the fact is that Indonesia has moved ever closer to the non-Communist world.

The major foreign investors in Indonesia are the United States and Japan. Some Eastern European countries are reportedly interested in investing, too, but thus far they have sent only feelers.

Virtually all of Indonesia's enormous aid requirements are met by the West. A consortium of aid-granting nations decides how much to give each year; in 1970, it was about $600-million, and the United States and Japan were the chief contributors.

In 1966, President Suharto turned a bankrupt economy over to a group of Harvard- and Berkeley-educated Indonesian economists and Western advisers who, appraisers like to say, performed miracles. They attracted capital by paying astronomical interest rates (as much as 6 per cent a month) and turned the Indonesian rupiah, inflating at more than 600 per cent in 1966, into a respectable Asian currency.

Foreign investors, who were scared off in the past by the instability of both the country and the late President Sukarno, were lured into exploiting one of the largest natural stores of oil, minerals and timber in the world. Timid at first, they are now coming in faster than Indonesia's archaic and inefficient administrative apparatus can absorb them. By this May, companies from two dozen countries had pledged $1.4-billion for investment in Indonesia, and $20-million more a month was being offered.

Compared to where Indonesia was six years ago, the progress in fundamental development has been enormous, so much so that the Government set out this year to tackle other, more ticklish ills: to reform the political system, to minimize ideological and religious disputes and to to begin an evolution toward modern democratic rule.

On July 3, some 57 million Indonesian voters went to the polls (in the first national election in 16 years) to elect local councils and 360 members of the House of Representatives. The Government-backed party — "Sekber Golkar," a purportedly nonpolitical assemblage of nonpolitical, development-minded professional and labor groups — bulldozed its way through the countryside with as much force, its spokesmen say privately, as was needed to win a large majority. That apparently happened.

It was not a "fair" election. That word has little meaning here. It was portrayed as a controlled first step in which the Government hopes to apply to politics the formula that brought economic stability. Critics charged that it was merely a public relations stunt to preserve military rule.

"We must begin it now, because it is going to take at least 12 years," says one of the Government's chief strategists. "The military has got to be put gradually in its place. The civil service has got to get out of politics. If we don't start on it now, we'll be just like Pakistan, and just when we get going good a few politicans who don't know what they are talking about will ruin it all."

—JAMES P. STERBA

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 July 1971

Indonesian film industry shows signs of growth

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Jakarta, Indonesia

Indonesia's infant film industry is showing lusty signs of growth. After a period of complete standstill under Sukarno, production has risen from three feature films in 1968 to 11 in 1969 to 25 in 1970 and a scheduled 40 in the current year.

But growth has not been without its problems. Indonesian film producers have succeeded in making money and beating foreign competition by the standard formula of sex and violence.

In this predominantly Muslim country, the reaction from the mosque and the press has been predictably critical with much comment against the adoption of Western permissiveness and its effect on the Indonesian personality.

—Asian News Service

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

LE MONDE, Paris
12 May 1971

CUBAN REVOLUTION FOLLOWS 'SOVIET WAY'

by Charles Bettelheim

The author of this article, Charles Bettelheim, is Dean of Studies, at l'Ecole pratique des hautes etudes. Upon Che Guevara's request, and starting in 1961, he has sojourned in Cuba on several occasions as an economic development expert.

Why did the Cuban government, as we have seen, so publicize the Padilla affair and thereby damage its prestige and international authority? Why was that government led to stage such a sinister affair in which a man -- after more than a month's confinement in Cuban jails -- levels charges as contemptible as they are ridiculous, against Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol? Charges drafted in a "style" that makes it obvious that they were not written by Padilla but entirely by the police authorities? We cannot help asking ourselves these questions.

To seek an explanation for this scheme in the Cuban leadership's sensitivity to criticism, does not lead very far. It is true that these leaders do more and more expect to receive only praise and flattering comments from those who know Cuba's situation. Hence they were rankled by the analyses presented in the Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol books on Cuba. Yet this rancor could not be the sole reason for this worldwide campaign of libel. The importance given the Padilla affair, its large-scale dissemination by the Cuban Press Agency, all clearly demonstrate that a political decision was involved, and thus a political explanation is indicated.

That political explanation unfortunately lies in the course taken by the Cuban revolution. After having for several years plotted an ascending curve -- which filled supporters of socialism with hope -- that revolution gradually entered a degenerative phase. The efforts of those early days with their promise of a radical transformation in social relationships, the development of a new type of democracy, and the end to dependence upon foreign markets due to a one-crop economy based on sugar, all progressively gave way to quite different practices. The Cuban government increasingly assigned priority to "productivist" goals. It sought to strengthen sugar's role in the economy, even to the extent of putting off production activities capable of covering the needs of the Cuban people. In so doing, it increased Cuba's de facto dependence upon its principal customer and supplier, the Soviet Union.

These changes multiplied the difficulties besetting the country. These difficulties are not due to the "inexperience" of the Cuban leaders, as the latter so readily claim. Their source lies in a policy [illegible] the revolution's

social foundations and in the weaknesses of the 26th of July Movement's ideology which actually is still the dominant ideology. The influence of these factors could have been diminished bit by bit, but the contrary happened because Soviet policy made this influence even stronger. That policy favored anti-democratic tendencies and also a course of action which closed the door to economic independence for Cuba. The consequences of the course thus taken by the Cuban revolution are now becoming clearer and clearer: despite the heroic and enthusiastic efforts of the Cuban people, despite years of relentless work and considerable investments, the country has seen its 1970 "zafra" (sugar harvest) fail -- a harvest proclaimed as the revolution's number one goal. This course has also resulted in a profoundly deteriorated economic situation, daily difficulties in obtaining food and supplies, and the growing alignment of Cuban foreign policy with Soviet policy, as evidenced, for example, by the official position taken by Cuba on the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russian troops.

Vis a vis this situation, the Cuban people are asking themselves how they ever got into this fix. How can it be that so many years of effort have not produced other results, that so many promises have not been kept?

The Cuban leaders have given no answers to these questions. They have not even explained how they plan to get the country out of its present difficulties. Only a few indications have been given on this second point, but they are contradictory.

On the one hand, in several speeches made last summer, Fidel Castro stressed the need to develop more democratic relations within the country. In fact there was some start made in implementing this new policy line, notably by establishing "production assemblies" at which workers were induced to submit their criticisms and suggestions.

On the other hand, the Cuban leaders were led, not to openly reexamine their policy line and question the one-sided emphasis placed on production, but, on the contrary, to strengthen their "productivist" tendencies, to condemn the "laziness" of those individuals who do not take a sufficiently active part in production efforts -- none of which show evidence of being correctly oriented -- and to proclaim the "virtues" of Taylorism, the system of standards and controls imposed upon the workers, etc.

All indications today point to a sudden change in democratization efforts. In the absence of a radical change in policy line, such a development was inevitable. Democratization does in fact, open the door to criticisms that could be accepted only by a government following an intensely revolutionary policy line.

Allowing the rank and file to question leadership methods, the arbitrary character of decisions, and the increas-

ing social inequalities, cannot be tolerated by a political leadership determined to make no changes in these fields.

Today, Cuban leaders rely upon an administrative apparatus superimposed over the ordinary workers. For years this apparatus has not been accountable to the workers and has been granted minor and major privileges. Challenging such a situation -- which is what development of a real democratization would have led to -- would have upset one of the regime's social bases, and neither the Cuban leadership nor its Soviet "friends" were ready for that kind of upheaval.

Under these circumstances, all that now remains of last summer's bright prospects are "productivism," Taylorism, and discipline imposed from above. These remains are the police line supported by the Soviet "friends" along with their friends, namely the officials of the former people's socialist party (Communist). In this connection, the new political upsurge of this party -- including some of its least popular members, such as Lazaro Pena for instance -- is highly significant.

Thus it is this process of degeneration currently affecting the Cuban revolution, that explains the absurd and disgraceful accusations made against Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol whose books are being circulated sub rosa in Cuba and being read with interest, especially by the revolutionary and student youth who are worried about their country's serious difficulties.

What Cuban readers look for in these books, are not political slogans or keynotes, but those facts and data upon which their national press remains silent, facts which they need to know to prepare andanswer to the questions raised by the country's situation and the revolution's retrogression. And so we can, therefore, understand the eagerness of the Cuban government to discredit such books in the eyes of revolutionaries and young students. Hence that silly charge leveld against Karol and Dumont, claiming that they are "CIA agents." Hence also the stress placed on Rene Dumont's "age"; this angle is directed to the young students. As a matter of fact, it is clear that among the youth a new revolutionary generation is reaching maturity, a generation that is now reappraising the past history of the revolution, the mistakes made, and the reasons behind the appearance of new privileged individuals, notably that "Alfacracy"* whose existence symbolizes the "Soviet way" taken by the Cuban revolution.

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*For several years actually, the Cuban government has been importing Alfa Romeos for its most "deserving" upper level and medium level officials. These imports, made at a time when the country lacks foreign currencies and its public means of transportation are seriously deficient, signal the appearance of a new privileged class.

LE MONDE, Paris
12 May 1971

AMÉRIQUE LATINE

POINT DE VUE

La révolution cubaine sur la «voie soviétique»

Par
CHARLES BETTELHEIM (*)

POURQUOI le gouvernement cubain a-t-il donné la publicité que l'on sait à l'affaire Padilla, portant ainsi préjudice à son prestige et à son autorité internationale ? Pourquoi ce gouvernement a-t-il été conduit à la mise en scène sinistre qui consiste à faire porter par un homme, préalablement détenu pendant plus d'un mois dans ses prisons, des accusations aussi ignobles que ridicules contre René Dumont et K.S. Karol ? Des accusations formulées dans un «style» qui ne doit visiblement rien à Padilla et qui doit tout à la plume des policiers ? On ne peut manquer de se poser ces questions.

Expliquer une telle anticipation par la susceptibilité des dirigeants cubains devant toute critique ne mène pas bien loin. Il est vrai que, de plus en plus, ces dirigeants n'attendent de ceux qui connaissent la situation de leur pays que des éloges et des propos flatteurs. Les analyses que René Dumont et K.S. Karol ont présentées dans leurs livres sur Cuba les ont donc ulcérés ; cela ne saurait, cependant être la seule raison de cette œuvre de diffamation mondiale. L'ampleur donnée à l'affaire Padilla, sa diffusion à grande échelle par l'Agence cubaine de presse, montrent bien qu'il s'agit d'une décision politique, qui appelle donc une explication politique.

CELLE-CI se trouve malheureusement dans le cours suivi par la révolution cubaine. Cette révolution, après avoir tracé, pendant quelques années, une voie originale — qui remplissait d'espoir les partisans du socialisme, — est entrée progressivement dans une phase de dégénérescence. Aux efforts du début, qui laissaient entrevoir une transformation radicale des rapports sociaux, le développement d'une démocratie de type nouveau et la fin de la subordination aux marchés extérieurs, due à la monoproduction sucrière, se sont progressivement substitués des pratiques tout autres. Le gouvernement cubain a de plus en plus donné la priorité à des objectifs «productivistes», il a cherché à renforcer le poids du secteur sucrier, au point de faire reculer les productions susceptibles de couvrir les besoins du peuple cubain ; en agissant de la sorte, il a accru la dépendance de fait de Cuba à l'égard de son principal acheteur et fournisseur : l'Union soviétique.

Ces changements ont multiplié les difficultés auxquelles le pays a eu à faire face. Ces difficultés ne sont pas dues à l'«inexpérience» des dirigeants cubains, comme ces derniers l'affirment volontiers. Elles ont leur origine dans une ligne politique qui s'enracine en partie dans les bases sociales de la révolution et dans les faiblesses de l'idéologie du Mouvement du 26 juillet, qui reste, en fait, l'idéologie dominante. L'influence de ces facteurs, qui aurait pu peu à peu être réduite, s'est trouvée au contraire renforcée par la politique soviétique. Celle-ci a favorisé les tendances antidémocratiques ainsi qu'une politique qui ferma à Cuba la voie de son indépendance économique. Les conséquences du cours ainsi suivi par la révolution cubaine sont aujourd'hui de plus en plus claires : en dépit des efforts héroïques et enthousiastes du peuple cubain, d'années de travail acharné et d'investissements considérables, le pays a connu l'échec de la «zafra» (récolte sucrière) de 1970, proclamée objectif numéro un de la révolution, une situation économique profondément dégradée, des difficultés quotidiennes de ravitaillement, l'alignement croissant de la politique extérieure cubaine sur la politique soviétique, comme l'a montré, par exemple, la prise de position de Cuba lors de l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie par les troupes russes.

FACE à cette situation, le peuple cubain se demande : comment en est-on arrivé là ? Comment se fait-il que tant d'années d'effort n'ont pas porté d'autres fruits, que tant de promesses n'ont pas été tenues ?

A ces questions, les dirigeants cubains n'ont apporté aucune réponse. Ils n'ont même pas précisé comment ils comptaient faire sortir le pays des difficultés qu'il connaît actuellement. Seules quelques indications ont été données sur ce deuxième point, mais celles-ci sont contradictoires.

D'une part, dans plusieurs discours prononcés l'été dernier, Fidel Castro a insisté sur la nécessité de développer des rapports plus démocratiques dans le pays. Cette orientation nouvelle a effectivement donné lieu à un début de réalisation, notamment sous la forme d'«assemblées de production» au cours desquelles les travailleurs ont été amenés à formuler des critiques et des suggestions.

D'autre part, les dirigeants cubains ont été conduits, non pas à réexaminer ouvertement leur ligne politique et à mettre en cause l'accent placé unilatéralement sur la production, mais, au contraire, à renforcer leurs tendances «productivistes», à dénoncer la «paresse» de ceux qui ne participent pas assez activement à des efforts de production dont rien ne démontre qu'ils soient correctement orientés et à proclamer les «vertus» du taylorisme, du système des normes, des contrôles exercés sur les travailleurs, etc.

TOUT indique aujourd'hui que les efforts de démocratisation tournent court. En l'absence d'un changement radical de ligne, il était inévitable qu'il en soit ainsi. La démocratisation ouvre en effet la porte à des critiques que seul un gouvernement suivant une ligne politique profondément révolutionnaire pourrait accepter. La mise en question par la base des méthodes de direction, de l'arbitraire dans les décisions et des inégalités sociales croissantes ne peut être tolérée par une direction politique décidée à ne rien modifier dans ces domaines.

Aujourd'hui, les dirigeants cubains s'appuient sur un appareil administratif placé au-dessus des simples travailleurs, qui pendant des années n'a pas eu de comptes à leur rendre et qui bénéficie d'une série de petits et de grands privilèges. La remise en cause d'une telle situation — ce à quoi aurait conduit le développement d'une démocratisation véritable — aurait bouleversé une des bases sociales du régime : ni la direction cubaine ni ses «amis» soviétiques n'étaient prêts à pareil bouleversement.

Dans ces conditions, des perspectives ouvertes l'été dernier il ne reste plus que le « productivisme », le « taylorisme », la discipline imposée d'enhaut. C'est là l'orientation que soutiennent les « amis » soviétiques et les amis de ces derniers : les cadres de l'ancien parti socialiste populaire (communiste). La remontée de ceux-ci sur la scène politique — y compris des moins populaires, comme Lazaro Peña, par exemple — est à cet égard hautement significative.

C'EST donc le procès de dégénérescence en cours de la révolution cubaine qui explique les accusations absurdes et ignominieuses portées contre René Dumont et K.S. Karol, dont les livres circulent sous le manteau à Cuba et sont lus avec intérêt, notamment par la jeunesse révolutionnaire et étudiante, inquiète des graves difficultés de son pays.

Ce que les lecteurs cubains cherchent dans ces livres, ce ne sont pas des mots d'ordre politiques, mais des faits et des données sur lesquels la presse nationale est muette, et qu'ils ont besoin de connaître pour formuler une réponse aux questions posées par la situation du pays et le reflux de la révolution. Dès lors, on comprend l'acharnement mis par le gouvernement cubain à déconsidérer de tels ouvrages aux yeux des révolutionnaires et de la jeunesse étudiante : d'où l'accusation inepte portée contre Karol et Dumont d'être des « *agents de la C.I.A.* », d'où aussi — à l'adresse de la jeunesse étudiante — l'insistance mise sur l'« âge » de René Dumont. Il est clair, en effet, que c'est au sein de la jeunesse que mûrit une nouvelle génération révolutionnaire, une génération qui s'interroge avec passion sur l'histoire passée de la révolution, sur les erreurs commises et sur les raisons pour lesquelles sont apparus de nouveaux privilégiés, notamment cette « bifacratie » (1) dont l'existence symbolise la « voie soviétique » prise par la révolution cubaine.

(1) Depuis plusieurs années, en effet, le gouvernement cubain importe des Alfa-Romeo destinées aux cadres supérieurs et aux cadres moyens les plus « méritants ». Ces importations, qui ont lieu alors que le pays manque de devises et que les moyens de transport publics sont gravement déficients sont le signe de l'apparition d'une nouvelle classe privilégiée.

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MIAMI HERALD
14 February 1971

Cuban Economy's in Dire Trouble, Experts Say

By FRANK SOLER
Herald Latin American Staff

Twelve years into the Castro regime, Cuba is beset by its gravest economic crisis in history.

The dismal picture of the Cuban economy is drawn by veteran Cuba watchers, recent visitors to the island, economic experts and arriving refugees and is reflected in the statements of the Castro government itself.

There is no relief in sight. By most estimates, the situation will continue to deteriorate for at least one year and perhaps two despite massive doses of Soviet aid.

Consider:

● **INDUSTRIAL** production has been sharply, perhaps irreparably, disrupted by the government's all-out emphasis on agriculture.

● **AGRICULTURAL** output, which should have forged ahead as a result, continues to crawl at a snail's pace.

● **THE 1971 SUGAR HARVEST**, mainstay of Cuba's fragile economy, is not likely to reach 5.5 million tons, the casualty of last year's intensive but unsuccessful effort to harvest 10 million tons.

● **WORKER ABSENTEEISM** and deliberate production slowdown by disgruntled workers is widespread, so much so that the government recently decreed an "anti-vagrancy law" in an effort to deal with the problem. The law provides penalties which include prison terms for troublesome workers.

● **INDICATIONS** of increasing student discontent, as demonstrated recently in Oriente, Cuba's easternmost province, where a group of students is reliably reported to have engaged in an angry debate with Castro.

Specific incidents involving rebellious youth have not been acknowledged by the government, but the seriousness of the situation has.

Government sycophant Guido Garcia Inclan said in a radio commentary last September:

"Dissension, failure to get to work on time, difficulties raised by them (the youths) when they are of military age . . . doing things they should not be doing during class hours. Youths always have a derisive joke to make against our revolution . . ."

In a later commentary, Garcia Inclan said: "The youth refer to our Central Park as Miami. Why? Because they want to be in Miami. That is their environment, so let them go there. It is time we cleaned house!"

Only in limited sectors has the economy made some progress.

The fishing industry continues to grow as does the Cuban merchant marine.

Nickel production reportedly increased during the past year, bringing some badly needed relief in the form of hard currency through exports abroad.

The production of rice also increased and its rationing

was relaxed somewhat.

But the picture was bleak elsewhere.

While the situation is regarded as "critical it is not yet believed critical enough to ignite a popular internal revolt.

Instead, Cuba is seen as becoming even more dependent upon the Soviet Union — which already is pumping more than $1 million a day into the island — during 1971.

Castro's personal intervention in the administration of resources will probably diminish this year, as more collective decisions are made under Soviet pressures.

Responsibility for pumping new life into the wobbly economy likely will fall into experienced hands, such as those of minister without portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, an economist and Old Guard Cuban Communist.

Regarded as the shrewdest official in the Cuban government today, Rodriguez has perceptibly gained in status over the past several months.

EVEN CASTRO admits Cuba's economic woes. In a nationwide speech last July, Castro not only acknowledged his regime's economic failures but also placed the blame on himself and others within the government.

"It would be better to tell the people to look for somebody else," Castro said. "The people can replace us whenever they wish. Right now if they wish."

The Soviet Union very seriously was prompted primarily by Cuba's failure to harvest 10 million tons of sugar from the 1970 crop.

Castro had staked "the honor of the Revolution" on achieving the record 10-million-ton crop. Cuba still produced a record 8.5 million tons, but the massive diversion of workers and equipment for the task caused the crippling disruption of most other sectors of the economy.

Subsequently, several top ministers were summarily replaced by younger Castroites — many of them military officers.

Meat supply, already limited in Cuba, dropped even more. So did that of bread, milk, beer and even tobacco, once the prime ingredient of Cuba's renowned cigar industry.

The availability of shoes and clothes continues to decline.

Quotas for consumer products and raw materials for the island's industries are not being met.

Havana and other cities throughout the island have become increasingly dark at night, as the government shuts off electric power to preserve the little it has. Havana also has several electric blackouts during daylight hours.

There is also an acute water shortage.

While the island's economic picture becomes progressively worse, so does that of the average individual Cuban.

Virtually all consumer goods have been rationed for years, and what wasn't soon disappeared from the shelves. The economic setbacks of recent months have made the shortages more acute.

Long lines of early rising consumers waiting their turn to purchase soap, toothbrushes, eggs, medicines and even toilet paper became longer.

Recently arrived refugees say the ration list includes these principal items:

- Six pounds of rice per month per person.
- One and one quarter ounces of coffee per person each week.
- Five pounds of sugar per person each month.
- One half-pound of lard per person each month, but availability is irregular.
- Two to three eggs per person a week, when they are available.
- One quarter pound of meat per person a week, when available.
- Two small boxes of matches per family each week.
- Two packets of cigarets per person each fifteen days.
- One bar of soap for washing clothes and one bar of bathroom soap a month.

Toothbrushes are distributed when available, as is toothpaste. Clothes are distributed every six months, but underwear is extremely scarce and there are few bedsheets to be found.

A growing amount of medicinal prescriptions go unfilled because there are few medicines at drug stores.

Beer and alcoholic beverages are also rationed. Western visitors tell of seeing long lines at restaurants where these beverages are served and where meals are composed of items other than rice and beans — which most Cubans eat today.

"I've lost 22 pounds within the past few weeks," says a sixtyish-looking housewife from Camaguey Province who arrived in Miami aboard the twice-daily Freedom Flights last week. The woman is 46.

Refusing to give her name, she said doctors had told her before leaving the island that she was physically in good health. But she disagrees.

"I am destroyed," she says.

Many Cubans from small towns in the interior of the island used to supplement their rigid diet by picking fruits from fields outside the towns, says Mario Rodriguez, 47, a storekeeper from a tiny Oriente Province town.

"That is no longer possible. Soldiers have been posted in guardposts on the outskirts of these towns and they confiscate any food being brought in," he said. Rodriguez arrived with his wife and son in Miami last week.

EL SIGLO, Bogota
8 March 1971

CASTRO'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES INCREASE AMID WORLDWIDE CRITICISM

In Havana last week, Fidel Castro brought together representatives of all the provinces of Cuba in order to report to them on the economy. The chief executive had bad news for them. He warned that unless there is a speed-up in 1971 sugar harvest operations, substantial quantities of cane will go unprocessed. "We cannot," Fidel said, "allow ourselves the luxury of failing to export a single pound of sugar."

Recently, the bearded Cuban leader has been engaging in stern exhortations. Two weeks ago he wrote to Regis Debray, the French intellectual who had been captured shortly before the Bolivian troops killed Che Guevara in 1967 and who was released recently. "We are working hard and facing great difficulties," Castro admitted. "It's long road ahead, Debray," he said, "for it is only when we revolutionaries have come to power that we realize we are really only just beginning."

The various criticisms that have been made of Castro for some time now are in agreement that the economy of his regime is in serious difficulty. They point to the serious labor shortage, the excessive absenteeism, the low productivity, and the calamitous shortage of modern machinery. A United States government analyst said last week: "Something is going completely wrong: wrong priorities, emphasis on the wrong things, bad administration. In short: chaos."

Castro admits as much in his speeches. Last year, for example, he told the nation: "Our enemies say that we have problems, and the truth is that they are right." Surprisingly enough, the sharpest criticism of Castro comes from European leftists who have visited Cuba frequently, talked with the Cuban leader, and supported his plans.

One of their number is the Polish journalist K.S. Karol, who writes for Le Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur of Paris and the New Statesman of Great Britain. His books Las Guerrillas en el Poder: el Curso de la Revolucion Cubana (The Guerrillas in Power: the Course of the Cuban Revolution) [plural sic] have been favorite reading among U.S. and Latin American experts.

The French agricultural scientist Rene Dumont also criticizes Castro, in his book Cuba es socialista? (Is Cuba Socialist?).

Both authors contend that one of Castro's biggest mistakes was to have developed plans that were incorrect and implemented than with unsuitable procedures. "A country that is surrounded in the way Cuba is cannot allow herself the luxury of gradual progress," Karol acknowledged. "The sacrifices have gone on (too) long and are becoming unbearable for the people," Dumont commented.

Karol found The Horse (as the farmers affectionately refer to Castro) to be personally sensitive. "Fidel is very restless when he speaks. He is almost constantly in motion. He gets up, takes a few steps, sits down. His heels tapping, he moves back and forth as if each and every one of his arguments were in the nature of a hand-to-hand combat with an astute adversary."

Much of Castro's time is spent playing the role of national political leader -- Karol complains -- constantly touring the country and leaving the business of governing to the bureaucrats. "The new proletarian class," Karol reports, [has found it] somewhat difficult to control and to use bureaucracy for its own ends in the way that the bourgeoisie used to do."

Both observers agree that Castro's worst error in judgment was what Karol calls "his obsession with sugar" as a means of paying for the petroleum and Russian aid that is currently arriving to the tune of 1.5 million dollars every day.

Castro called on Cubans to harvest the unprecedented quantity of 10 million tons of sugar. The entire nation was mobilized for the harvest. The Christmas holiday period in 1969 -- and the New Year's in 1970 -- were postponed until the end of the harvest.

There was a monumental error in calculation, however. Years before, that veteran harvester Nikita Khrushchev had ordered his experts to design a cane cutter. A total of 1,000 of these machines were shipped to Cuba. Whereas the cutters had worked satisfactorily when they were tested in the Ukraine, however, they were a complete failure in Cuba. Karol blames the hilly terrain, while others contend that the Russian machinery overheated in the tropical climate. To cope with the avalanche of sugarcane in 1970, approximately 400,000 Cubans had to cut the cane manually to achieve the maximum harvest -- and the majority of them were inexperienced. Castro himself cut cane, instead of governing. The visitors of the Venceremos Student Brigade, composed of radical American students [one or more lines dropped in Spanish text] of the Soviet defense minister, Andrey Grechko, also went to the cane fields.

A total of 8.5 million tons were eventually harvested. It was an acceptable figure but did not fulfill Castro's plans.

It is Karol's contention that this harvest did more harm than good. Seven million tons of sugar were delivered as part payment on account to the Soviet Union and other communist suppliers. Karol, who was educated at the University of Rostov, served in the Red Army (and served time in Stalinist prisons), and is intensely anti-Russian, writes: "The USSR does not really have the moral right to insist on its contractual rights and on the superhuman sacrifices that this entails for Cuba." Castro remarked angrily to Karol that "they do not give us anything for nothing, and then they act as if they were showering us with gold."

Because other labors were abandoned in order to concentrate on the 1969-1970 cane harvest, the rest of the economy was damaged. Electric power is now in such short supply that blackouts are continually occurring.

"Security patrols composed of small children," [Karol writes], "have been organized to turn off unnecessary lights." Cubans are still having to endure the customary long lines and shortages. In a country that is renowned for its tobacco, Castro warns that smoking is dangerous to health and limits his people to a ration of two packs of cigarettes and two cigars per week. Rents are low, prices are low, and since there is nothing to buy, there is more and more money. The black market prospers, as a result. Rum costs 90 pesos per bottle, and cigareetes 5 dollars a pack. In the black market the exchange rate is 7 pesos for a dollar. Consequently, there are many buyers. Other Cubans stand in line to get into Havana restaurants such as the Monseigneur, La Torre, and Floridita in order to pay 40 pesos for a meal for two.

Castro has apparently read his critics. He has referred to them as "these little leftist writers" and as people who "hypothetically construct imiaginary worlds." At the same time, however, he has been making some of the suggested changes. One of these changes was to allow the workers more power to make decisions. Cuba has carried out a number of "elections" in labor unions in which a total of 2 million workers elected 148,000 union representatives. These representatives will supposedly be the channel through which workers will be able to transmit their complaints or to make suggestions.

In the meanstime, the government is putting pressure on the lazy. This year has been called the Year of Productivity. New regulations to control vagrants have been introduced. Cuban men between 17 and 60 years of age who chronically absent themselves from work will have to spend 2 years on State farms. Women are exempt, however. "Our people would not understand if we treated women and men alike," explains Minister of Labor Jorge Risquet. Meanwhile, Castro is purging his cabinet of all those who -- as he states -- "have exhausted themselves in the revolution."

Ominously, every change seems to bring more army officers into civilian ministries. Of the 20 ministries, 11 are now headed by captains and majors.

No one is suggesting that Castro will soon be overthrown. Most of those who might have opposed him have either left Cuba or hope to on one of the flights that are made 10 times a week from Varadero to Miami. Even though no exit permits have been granted since 1966, some 130,000 persons who obtained their visa before that date are still hoping to join the 600,000 Cubans who left for what Castro scornfully calls "easy living and a consumer society." These critics are in agreement that socialist Cuba is in deplorable danger. They argue that Castro's charisma has lessened and that Russian aid will not solve the problems. "One wonders," says Karol openly, "if he has not perhaps mortgaged the entire future of the revolution."

EL SIGLO, Bogota
8 March 1971

Cuba, Isla Hipotecada

Por Carlos Cienfuegos

Fidel Castro reunió en La Habana la semana pasada a los representantes de todas las provincias de Cuba para presentarles un balance económico. El jefe máximo les tenía malas noticias; a menos que el ritmo de la zafra de 1971, o la cosecha de azúcar aumente, advirtió, quedarán sin procesar considerables cantidades de caña dijo Fidel, "Nosotros no podemos permitirnos el lujo de dejar sin exportar una sola libra de azúcar".

Ultimamente, el barbudo líder cubano se ha entregado a severas exhortaciones. Hace 2 semanas escribió a Regis Debray, el intelectual francés capturado poco antes de que los soldados bolivianos mataran al "Che" Guevara en 1967 y recientemente le concedieron libertad. "Estamos trabajando duro y haciendo frente a grandes dificultades", confesó Castro "La marcha es verdaderamente larga, Debray, porque es cuando se ha tomado el poder que nosotros los revolucionarios comprendemos que apenas estamos comenzando".

Las críticas que desde hace tiempo se vienen haciendo a Castro están de acuerdo en que la economía del régimen está en serias dificultades. Señalando la gravo escasez de mano de obra, el excesivo ausentismo la baja productividad y la calamitosa escasez de maquinaria moderna, un analista del gobierno de los Estados Unidos dijo la semana pasada: "algo anda completamente mal —malas prioridades, malos énfasis mala administración— en resumen, caos".

Castro admite un tanto en sus discursos. Por ejemplo, el año pasado manifestó a la nación: "Nuestros enemigos dicen que tenemos problemas y en realidad tienen razón. Dicen que hay irritaciones y tienen razón" Sorprendentemente, las más agudas críticas a Castro provie-

nen de europeos izquierdistas que han visitado Cuba recientemente, hablado con el líder cubano y apoyado sus planes.

Uno de ellos es el periodista polaco K. S. Karol, quien escribe para Le Monde y Le Nouvel Observateur de París y New Statesman de Gran Bretaña. Sus libros: Las Guerrillas en el Poder: el Curso de la Revolución Cubana, han sido lectura favorita de los especialistas norteamericanos y latinoamericanos.

El agrónomo francés René Dumont también culpa a Castro en su obra: ¿Cuba es socialista?

Ambos autores sostienen que uno de los principales errores de Castro fue haber fijado planes incorrectos con impropios procedimientos "un país rodeado como Cuba no se debería permitir el lujo de progresos graduales", admite Karol. "Los sacrificios que han sido (demasiado) prolongados se están haciendo insoportables para el pueblo", comenta Dumont.

Karol encontró al Caballo —como los campesinos se refieren afectuosamente a Castro— personalmente vibrante. "Mídel se muestra muy inquieto cuando habla. Se mueve casi todo el tiempo, se levanta, da unos pocos pasos se sienta, tamborilea para atrás y adelante como si cada argumento fuera una especie de lucha mano a mano con un astuto oponente".

Castro ha pasado tiempo sirviendo como líder nacional, se queja Karol: siempre de giras por el país y dejando el gobierno a los burócratas. "La nueva clase proletaria", reporta Karol "es un poco difícil de controlar y usar la burocracia para sus propios fines como anteriormente lo hacía la burguesía".

Ambos observadores concuerdan en que el más grande error en el juicio de Castro, fue lo que Karol llama "su obsesión del azúcar" para pagar por el petróleo y la ayuda rusa que [illegible] de millón y medio de dólares diarios.

Castro llamó a los cubanos para cosechar la no revelada cantidad de 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar. Toda la isla se movilizó para la cosecha. Las fiestas de navidad de 1969 y año nuevo de 1970 se aplazaron hasta que se terminara.

Pero hubo un tremendo error de cálculo: años antes, ese viejo cosechador Nikita Khrushchev había ordenado a sus expertos, diseñar una cortadora de caña. 1.000 de estas máquinas se embarcaron a Cuba. Pero mientras las cortadoras trabajaban adecuadamente cuando se ensayaron en Ucrania, fallaron completamente en Cuba. Karol culpa al suelo montañoso, mientras otros sostienen que la maquinaria rusa se recalentaba en el clima tropical. Frente a la avalancha de caña de azúcar de 1970, tuvieron que cortar caña a mano unos 400.000 cubanos y en su mayoría sin experiencia, para lograr la máxima cosecha. El mismo Castro cortó caña en vez de administrar. Los visitantes procedentes de la Brigada de Estudiantes radica los americanos "Venceremos" del ministro soviético de defensa, Andrei Grechko también fueron a los campos de caña.

Eventualmente, fueron cosechadas ocho millones quinientas mil toneladas, cifra aceptable pero que no llegó a los planes de Castro.

Tal cosecha, sostiene Karol dió más perjuicios que beneficios. Siete millones de toneladas de azúcar fueron entregadas a buena cuenta a la Unión Soviética y otros proveedores comunistas. Escribe Karol, quien fue educado en la Universidad de Rostov, estuvo en el Ejército Rojo (y en las prisiones stalinistas) y es virulentamente antirruso: "La U. R. S. S., no tiene realmente el derecho moral para insistir en sus derechos contractuales y en los [illegible] por esto acarreo para Cuba". Castro comentó enojadamente a Karol: "ellos nos dan nada por nada y luego actúan como si estuvieran encantándonos con oro".

Como por dedicarse al corte de caña 1969-1970, se abandonaron otros trabajos, se perjudicó el resto de la economía. La energía es ahora tan baja que hay continuos apagones.

"Patrullas de seguridad de pequeños niños se han movilizado para apagar luces innecesarias. Los cubanos continúan soportando las rutinarias largas colas y la escasez. El país famoso por su tabaco. Castro advierte que el fumar es perjudicial para la salud y racionan a su pueblo con dos paquetes de cigarrillos y dos cigarros cada semana. Los arrendamientos son baratos, los precios son bajos, y como casi no hay que comprar, crece el dinero. Como resultado, prospera el mercado negro. El ron cuesta $ 60.00 la botella, los cigarrillos $ 5.00 el paquete (en el mercado negro se dan siete pesos por un dólar) por eso hay muchos compradores. Otros cubanos hacen cola para ir a restaurantes de La Habana tales como Monseigneur, La Torre y Floridita a gastar $ 40.00 por una comida para dos personas.

Castro aparentemente ha oído de sus críticas, se ha referido a ellas como, "estos pequeños escritores izquierdistas y como gente que "construye hipotéticamente mundos imaginarios". No obstante, ha estado efectuando al mismo tiempo algunos de los cambios sugeridos. Uno de ellos fue permitir a los trabajadores más poder de decisión. Cuba ha realizado series de "elecciones" de uniones de trabajadores en las cuales dos millones de ellos aprobaron 140.000 representantes de los sindicatos. Supuestamente, estos representantes son el canal a través del cual los trabajadores podrán transmitir sus quejas o hacer sugerencias.

Mientras tanto, el gobierno está apretando los tornillos a los perezosos. Este año ha sido denominado "El año de la productividad". Se han introducido nuevas regulaciones contra los vagos. Los hombres cubanos de 17 hasta 60 años que crónicamente se ausenten del trabajo tendrán que ir durante dos años a las granjas del Estado. Sin embargo las mujeres están exentas. "Nuestro pueblo no comprendería si tratáramos a las mujeres y a los hombres por igual", explica el ministro de Trabajo, Jorge Risquet. Mientras tanto Castro está sancando su gabinete de aquellos que, como él lo señala, "se han agotado en la revolución".

Ominosamente, cada cambio parece traer más oficiales del ejército en ministerios civiles. De 20 ministerios, 11 están ahora dirigidos por capitanes y mayores.

Nada sugiere que Castro sea pronto derrocado. En la mayoría aquellos que se pudieron haber opuesto a él, han dejado a Cuba o esperan hacerlo en uno de los vuelos que se realizan 18 veces por semana de Varadero a Miami. Aunque no se han concedido permisos de salida desde 1966, algunas 130.000 personas que obtuvieron visa antes de ese tiempo, aún esperan unirse a los 600.000 cubanos que salieron hacia lo que Castro desdeñosamente llama "La dulce vida y la sociedad consumidora". Los críticos concuerdan en que la socialista Cuba está en deplorable peligro. Argumentan que la carisma de Castro se ha debilitado y su seguridad en la ayuda rusa no resolverá problemas. "Uno se pregunta", dice Karol abiertamente, "si acaso él no habrá hipotecado todo el futuro de la revolución".

THE NATIONAL OBSERVER
26 April 1971

Allende Steals His Thunder

For Cuba's Castro: Memories, Si! Successes, No!

By Jude Wanniski

For a few hours last week, Fidel Castro was in his glory again. It was the 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban premier, who never tires of recounting how the nation's heroes squashed the *Yanqui* mercenaries, told the whole blow-by-blow story again in a three-hour radio address.

As usual, it was a fascinating, colorful account that could not have failed to momentarily stir the pride and passion of the 8,500,000 Cubans, at least those who bothered to turn on their radios. Yet these remembered glories are about all the new *Caudillo* can offer his people these days. The decade has not been kind to Cuba or Castro. While he remains a folk hero, his charisma tarnished but intact, his back is getting closer to the wall.

The Cuban economy is in disarray barely held from collapse by ever-increasing injections of Soviet aid. And the Russians, more and more, are elbowing their way into the direction of economic planning, understandably appalled at how easily the Havana government has managed to waste the $5 billion in Soviet aid already supplied.

Spotlight on Chile

Concurrently, Castro's pre-eminence as the spiritual leader of the Latin American left has been rapidly declining. Since Che Guevara's death in Bolivia in 1967, the Russians have been restraining Castro's more impetuous revolutionary impulses. Now, with Castro-style communism hardly a model for Latin revolutionaries, Castro himself seems to be becoming an embarrassment to the movement. The spotlight belongs to Chile's newly elected Marxist president, Salvador Allende, who not only has shown the way to peaceful revolution, via the ballot box, but who also pledges that his government will not interfere in the internal affairs of its Latin neighbors. "Chile will not become the Sierra Maestras of the Andes," he declares, the Sierra Maestras being the hills from which Castro conducted his Cuban revolution in 1957-1959.

Then, too, Castro finds himself being overwhelmed by the pace of global events. At a time of severe economic privation for Cuba, all he has left to hold the Cuban people together is the hatred of Richard Nixon and *Yanqui* imperialism. Yet here is his friend, Allende, still getting along in a fashion with Washington. And here is the People's Republic of China playing Ping-pong with the United States, even while "that monstrous war" in Vietnam continues.

It seems reasonable to speculate, as specialists in the State Department have, that Mr. Nixon's comments this month caused Casro additional distress. Certainly he reacted furiously.

Mr. Nixon, asked in a radio interview if he is thinking of "normalizing" relations with Cuba, as he is in "the long term" with China, replied that Castro has drawn the line. "He's exporting revolution all over the hemisphere. . . . As long as Castro is adopting an antagonistic, anti-American line, we are certainly not going to normalize our relations with Castro. As soon as he changes his line toward us, we might consider it. But it's his move."

Given the fresh currents of coexistence around the globe, it seems likely the people of Cuba are not repelled by the notion of normalization. In fact, they probably yearn for it. It would be difficult to exaggerate the current economic plight. Castro himself admitted last year, in the most despondent message he has yet delivered, that privation would remain until at least 1975.

Nylons: $150 a Pair

Not that there is any starvation. There is a basic ration of beans and rice, and about three-quarters of a pound of meat per person per week. But there is no fresh milk for persons over 7 years of age and fresh vegetables are rare. And there is almost a total absence of consumer goods, including clothing. Except for 1,500 Alfa Romeos bought by Castro for his senior government officials, the only automobiles in Cuba are those imported before the 1959 revolution. One visitor reported that a pack of American chewing gum was being sold on the black market for $5, a pair of nylon stockings for $150. Cuban rum is almost impossible to buy in Cuba at any price.

Housing, medical services, education, and utilities are free, or almost free, but this only completes the cycle of Castro's economic problem. Because what is not free is rationed, or unavailable, money has little value and there is no incentive to work. Productivity plummets. The regime produces fewer goods with which to earn foreign exchange, hence less capacity to buy consumer goods. The Russians, locked into their political commitment, now take up the slack at the rate of $1,400,000 in aid per day.

To normalize relations with the United States, which would open economic opportunities for Cuba throughout the hemisphere, Castro would simply have to renounce the export of revolution. But for him, a compulsive revolutionary, this would mean admission of humiliating defeat. He said last week, "such a gesture, Mr. Nixon—and we say this with all the honesty which characterizes this revolution and its statements—will never be made."

Castro also had some unequivocal remarks about the Organization of American States (OAS), which coincidentally met in San Jose, Costa Rica, last week. In 1962, and in 1964 after Castro stirred up insurgency in Venezuela, the OAS passed resolutions excluding Cuba from its activities. Almost all of the 23 member states broke trade and diplomatic ties with Castro. But now Castro is so weakened domestically that his revolutionary exports are almost limited to rhetoric and several of the Latin governments, led by Chile, seem prepared to take Castro back. But that, too, would be a humiliating admission of defeat for Castro, as if the OAS was taking pity on the broken-down Cuban revolution. He reacted fiercely:

"We feel better outside than inside the OAS . . . How are they going to allow us into the OAS when we say we are on the side of the revolutionary governments? How, when we say the OAS is a filthy, rotten bilge with no honor? How, when we say that the OAS causes fits of vomiting in our country—the name of the OAS, that is."

Russia Grows Weary

If that wasn't clear enough, Castro went further than he has for years, since Moscow put a leash on him, in pledging direct support of armed revolution. "At the hour and moment that the other brother revolutionary countries request technical assistance, such as technicians or soldiers, as soldiers and combatants, as our most sacred duty we shall furnish them."

Chances are Moscow was irked by these remarks. In pursuit of their own national interests, the Russians have been conducting a gentlemanly diplomacy throughout Latin America — hobnobbing even with those rightist governments, such as Brazil's and Argentina's, that have been going to extremes to stamp out radical leftists. Further, the prevailing school of thought in the State Department is that the Russians are getting

weary of pumping money into a losing proposition like Cuba, and would prefer to see Castro get along at least with his Latin neighbors.

Certainly the Kremlin enjoys having Cuba as a pressure-point in its big-power relationship with the United States. Every time it sends a nuclear submarine into Cuban waters the U.S. Government shudders. But otherwise, it seems likely that Castro could become increasingly embarrassing to Moscow.

Since he has foreclosed all his other options, Castro can only straighten out the economic mess he has created by stepping up the militarism of his regime.

As it is, 11 of the 24 cabinet posts in his government are held by soldiers; military organization, he seems to feel, is the only way to discipline the indolent work force. Last year Castro put the military in the vanguard of his attempt to harvest 10,000,000 tons of sugar. And then the effort was a crushing failure; workers from all sectors of the economy were sent into the fields and still the harvest fell short by 1,500,000 tons. This year he can not even make his goal of 7,000,000 tons.

In recent months, Castro has been turning the screws tighter. On April 1, an "anti-loafing" law, probably the most repressive in the hemisphere, was put into effect. "Loafing," or vagrancy, has been made a crime punishable by six months to two years in a "rehabilitation center," a forced-labor camp.

'Stalinization' Under Way?

In February, the French press reported that Heberto Padilla, a 39-year-old Communist poet, was arrested in Havana. Mr. Padilla supposedly had given manuscripts critical of the Castro regime to a French photographer, who was also arrested as he was about to leave for Paris with the documents. There have been other reports that Castro recently closed the University of Oriente after students there publicly called him "an autocrat." At the University of Havana, the French press also reported, Castro told a student assembly in March that no intellectual who engages in counter-revolutionary activities will escape the sanctions he deserves, and that it does not matter what intellectual repercussions are released by the case. The Cuban armed-forces magazine, Verde Olivo, has taken to condemning specific "counter-revolutionary" Cuban literary efforts. Exiled Cuban intellectuals in the United States have been convinced a "Stalinization" of Cuba is well under way.

One semiofficial view of "what's wrong with Cuba" was offered last November by Castro's minister-without-portfolio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who represented Castro at the Allende inauguration in Chile.

At a press conference in Santiago, Rodriguez tendered some free advice to the Chileans: "We must not be benevolent toward our enemies—tolerant toward our enemies. The Cuban revolution, which has been so talked about in Chile, especially by mention of the firing squads, sinned in its early days not by excessive executions, but by being too generous with certain elements that had attached themselves to the revolution." There were 700 executions.

THE MIAMI HERALD
14 April 1971

Soviet Technicians Spread Over Cuba

Compiled by Our Latin America Staff

WASHINGTON — Soviet technicians are being sent to towns and cities all over Cuba in what U.S. officials regard as a novel attempt to revitalize the island's sagging economy.

"They're actually being incorporated into relatively low-level positions," said one U.S. official noting the move is one of several examples of a growing Soviet role in the Cuban economic structure.

Officials say the Soviet Union began taking a more active role in Cuba following Premier Fidel Castro's admission last year that his economic policies had not worked.

There is official speculation here that assignment of Soviet technicians to areas far removed from Havana may be linked to what U.S. officials see as an effort to restructure the Cuban economy.

These officials say the effort involves tailoring the Cuban economy to complement economies of the Soviet Union and of Communist East Europe.

Another element of the close cooperation between the Kremlin and Havana was the signing late last year of a bilateral economic cooperation agreement, effective 1971 through 1975.

The agreement, according to U.S. officials provides for a more active role in Cuban economic planning and for continued economic assistance. Estimates of this assistance range between $380 million and $500 million annually.

The Kremlin's aid to Cuba's eight million people over the past several years has exceeded the entire U.S. development loan program for Latin America's 280 million people.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
23 March 1971

THREAT OF FORCED LABOR BY FIDEL CASTRO
IDLENESS AND ABSENTEEISM ON ALARMING RISE IN CUBA

In recent weeks Fidel Castro has launched a new campaign. All over Cuba company meetings are being held. The subjects under discussion are: "Fight for Increased Production, Fight for Maximum Utilization of the Workday," and "Fight Against Vagabondism." The lider maximo (supreme leader) finds these measures necessary because incidents of idleness and absenteeism throughout the Cuban economy have reached such proportions that their effects -- according to the official version -- "seriously disrupt the national economy."

The mandatory "debates" center around the bill which provides stringent measures against persons who systematically and stubbornly attempt to dodge regular work. The bill is aimed at two groups. The first group encompasses the socalled vagos or vagabonds, able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 60 years who are neither in any type of training nor gainfully employed. The second group comprises persons guilty of a socalled "offense antecedent to vagabondism," that is absence from work without valid reasons over a period exceeding two weeks, or continued work slowdowns following two unheeded warnings. According to the Cuban press there are few true vagos as defined by the law; however, the second group continues to grow. It is officially admitted that work loss resulting from this type of absenteeism generally amounts to 20 percent. Not included in this figure is the widespread shorter absenteeism on the part of persons taking off from work now and then at irregular intervals.

As motivation for the new bill and explanation of the causes underlying the growing spread of "antisocial conduct" in Cuba, the regime is holding moral and ideological admonitions in readiness. First of all, it would not do for a minority of the population to partake of all the achievements the socialist state has to offer without, in its turn, making at least some modest or partial contribution. Like the arguments formerly advanced by the Soviet Union to explain anti-socialist social phenomena -- the reason why such strange incidents could occur at all in a socialist social order allegedly liberated from oppression, exploitation, and alienation, are sought in harmful traditions from Cuba's semicolonial and bourgeois era, which must be overcome.

Since officially the problem is thus viewed as purely political and ideological, the conclusion drawn is that it can only be overcome through patience and persuasion. Mass meetings, political education, and prepared "discussions" seem indicated. Also, the bill for punish-

ment of "asocial elements" is so far preventive in character. Forced labor -- prettified as "work duty in retraining institutions" -- of up to two years is provided for vagos, and up to one year for those guilty of "offenses antecedent to vagabondism." Initially, all sentences are to be suspended. They will be set aside in cases where the perpetrator mends his ways or shows remorse.

Yet, in view of the realities of the Cuban situation, the line of reasoning followed by the Castroites in Havanna is nothing but ideological embellishment. The causes for the growing idleness and diminishing productivity in Cuba can by no means be sought in supposedly degenerate habits and traditions. They are rooted in economic realities. During the early years of Fidel Castro's reign revolutionary enthusiasm could still move mountains. The people accepted a radical sacrifice of consumer goods and were sustained by the hope that powerful efforts would soon enable them to attain a higher state of development and drastically improved living conditions. Instead, the economic situation continued to deteriorate. Today, there is nothing to buy except rationed goods. Life has become bleak and dreary. That there are no longer any taxes, nor medical or telephone bills to be paid does not alter this fact.

Every worker can figure out for himself that he need only work one week each month to have the sum needed to buy the rationed goods. Why, then, work longer and harder if the additional wages cannot buy anything, anyway? Absenteeism in places of business and factories has become the rule. Faded is Castro's vision of a "new man in a new society," a man whose values are not based on money and material wealth but on the criteria of a revolutionary Utopia.

The cautious approach used by the government to combat the waning productivity is indicative of the advanced state of lethargy and idleness prevailing throughout the nation. Though Castro evidently still believes his charisma and continuous propaganda can once more make him master of the situation, the question is whether the people's disillusionment over Cuba's economic decline has not already reached such proportions as to render campaigns and threats useless. If that is the case, forced labor may be the last resort. All that would remain of the Utopia of a new, liberal, socialist society would be a heap of rubble.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
23 March 1971

Fidel Castro droht mit Zwangsarbeit

Arbeitsunlust und Absentismus nehmen auf Kuba bedrohliche Formen an / Von Harry Hamm

Fidel Castro hat in diesen Wochen eine neue Kampagne begonnen. Auf ganz Kuba finden Betriebsversammlungen statt. Zur Diskussion stehen die Themen: Kampf um die Erhöhung der Arbeitsproduktivität", „Kampf um die volle Ausnutzung des Arbeitstages" und „Kampf gegen das Vagabundentum". Der „lider maximo" sieht sich zu diesen Maßnahmen gezwungen, weil die Arbeitsunlust und der Absentismus in der kubanischen Wirtschaft in einem solchen Umfange zugenommen haben, daß sich die Phänomene — nach amtlicher Version — in „bedenklichem Maße desorganisierend auf die Volkswirtschaft auswirken".

Im Mittelpunkt der angeordneten „Debatten" steht ein Gesetzentwurf, der harte Sanktionen gegen diejenigen vorsieht, die sich systematisch und hartnäckig einer geregelten Arbeit zu entziehen suchen. Von dem vorgesehenen Gesetz sind zwei Gruppen betroffen. Einmal die sogenannten „vagos" oder Vagabunden, arbeitsfähige Männer im Alter zwischen 17 und 60 Jahren, die weder in irgendeiner Ausbildung noch in einem Arbeitsverhältnis stehen. Die zweite Gruppe von Personen umfaßt jene, die ein sogenanntes „Vordelikt des Vagabundentums" begehen. Darunter versteht man das unbegründete Fernbleiben von der Arbeit über einen Zeitraum von mehr als zwei Wochen oder, nach zweimaliger erfolgloser Verwarnung, fortgesetzte Bummelschichten. Wirklich „vagos" im Sinne des Gesetzes soll es nach Angaben in der kubanischen Presse nur wenige geben. Die zweite Gruppe sei jedoch immer größer geworden. Offiziell wird zugegeben, daß der Arbeitsausfall durch diese Art von Absentismus in der Regel 20 Prozent beträgt. Nicht dazu gezählt sind all die Fälle eines weitverbreiteten zeitlich beschränkteren Arbeitsabsentismus von Leuten, die hier und da in unregelmäßiger Folge blau machen.

Zur Motivierung des neuen Gesetzes und zur Erklärung der Ursachen der immer stärker um sich greifenden „antisozialen Verhaltensweise" auf Kuba hält das Regime moralische und ideologische Ermahnungen bereit. Zunächst einmal ginge es nicht an, daß eine Minderheit in der Bevölkerung alle Leistungen des sozialistischen Staates mit in Anspruch nehme, ohne selbst entweder auch nur den geringsten oder nur einen unvollständigen Beitrag dazu beizusteuern. Die Gründe, warum es überhaupt in einer sozialistischen, von Unterdrükkung, Ausbeutung und Entfremdung angeblich befreiten Gesellschaftsordnung zu solch merkwürdigen Erscheinungen kommen konnte, werden — mit Argumenten, wie sie früher auch in der Sowjetunion zur Erklärung asozialistischer gesellschaftlicher Phänomene angeführt wurden — in schädlichen Traditionen aus der halbkolonialen und bürgerlichen Ära Kubas gesucht, die es zu überwinden gelte.

Da es sich somit aus offizieller Sicht um ein rein politisches und ideologisches Problem handelt, zieht man daraus den Schluß, es könne nur mit Geduld und Überredungskraft überwunden werden: Massenversammlungen, Politunterricht und vorgeprägte „Diskussionen" erscheinen als der gegebene Weg. Auch der Gesetzentwurf zur Bestrafung der „Asozialen" hat zunächst Präventivcharakter. Zwangsarbeit — verniedlichend als „Arbeitspflicht in Umerziehungseinrichtungen" bezeichnet — bis zu zwei Jahren ist für die „vagos" vorgesehen, für diejenigen, die das „Vordelikt zum Vagabundentum" begehen, bis zu einem Jahr. Alle Strafen sollen vorerst bedingt verhängt werden. Sie werden ausgesetzt, wenn der Übeltäter sich bessert oder seine Fehler einsieht.

Zieht man allerdings die Realitäten der kubanischen Situation in Betracht, erweist sich die Argumentation der Fidelisten in Havanna als eine ideologische Verbrämung. Die Ursachen der um sich greifenden Arbeitsunlust und absinkenden Produktivität auf Kuba sind keineswegs in angeblich verderblichen Gewohnheiten und Traditionen zu suchen. Sie liegen in der ökonomischen Wirklichkeit begründet. In den Anfangsjahren der Herrschaft Fidel Castros vermochte revolutionäre Begeisterung noch Berge zu versetzen. Das Volk nahm einen radikalen Konsumverzicht in Kauf in der Hoffnung, bald durch eine gewaltige Kraftanstrengung eine höhere Stufe der Entwicklung erklimmen und die Lebensverhältnisse drastisch verbessern zu können. Statt dessen wurde die wirtschaftliche Lage immer schlechter. Heute gibt es abgesehen von den rationierten Waren nichts mehr zu kaufen. Das Leben ist öde und trist geworden. Daß keine Steuern, keine Arzt- und keine Telefonkosten mehr bezahlt werden müssen, ändert nichts an dieser Tatsache.

Jeder Arbeiter kann sich ausrechnen, daß er nur eine Woche im Monat zu arbeiten braucht, um die Summe zu verdienen, die für den Ankauf der zugeteilten Waren notwendig ist. Wozu also länger und mehr arbeiten, wenn der zusätzliche Verdienst doch nicht umgesetzt werden kann? Absentismus in den Betrieben und Fabriken wurde zur Regel. Castros Vision vom „neuen Menschen in einer neuen Gesellschaft", für den nicht Geld und materieller Wohlstand, sondern die Kriterien einer revolutionären Utopie Maßstäbe setzen, erlosch.

Die Behutsamkeit, mit der das Regime dem Übel der absinkenden Produktivität zu Leibe rückt, läßt das Ausmaß der Lethargie und Arbeitsunlust im Volke erkennen. Zwar glaubt Castro offenbar, mit seinem Charisma und permamenter Propaganda die Lage noch einmal meistern zu können. Doch fragt sich, ob die Enttäuschung über den wirtschaftlichen Niedergang Kubas in der Bevölkerung nicht bereits ein solches Maß erreicht hat, daß Kampagnen und Drohungen nichts mehr bewirken. Dann mag Zwangsarbeit der letzte Ausweg sein. Von der Utopie einer neuen, freiheitlichen, sozialistischen Gesellschaft bliebe nur noch ein Scherbenhaufen übrig.

PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS
19 May 1971

Washington: Robert S. Allen & John Goldsmith

New Draft Law in Cuba Aimed at Grabbing Work-Dodgers

The media are saying nothing about it, but Washington and Havana are currently the scenes of dramatic and profoundly significant contrasts on the draft issue.

In Washington, still in the process of recovering from extensive battering and soiling of the communist-instigated and directed "anti-war" disturbances and disorders, a bitter fight is being waged in the Senate against continuance of the draft. An assortment of anti-Vietnam doves, pacifists, ultra-liberals and other militants are furiously filibustering to defeat the House-passed bill extending the draft two more years.

Outcome of this fateful struggle is uncertain. The existing Selective Service Act expires June 30.

Meanwhile in Cuba where, as in all Iron Curtain countries, universal military training is permanent and mandatory, dictator Fidel Castro, the idol of radical U. S. youth, has put into effect still another draft system.

By arbitrary edict—with no debate, consultation or anything else—the bulky despot has proclaimed a so-called "anti-loafer draft."

Aimed at work shirkers and similar "social criminals," as they are officially branded, the purpose of this latest terrorism is to strike at the widespread and increasing absenteeism and idleness among workers.

That's nothing new in Red-ruled Cuba, but it is the first time Castro has attempted to cope with it by a so-called law.

UNDER THIS new "law," violators are punished by being drafted for forced labor for periods of from six months to two years.

During this time they will be required to "do productive work"—as decided by the communist state. Currently, that means being sent into the sugar fields to cut cane.

Right now, that is admittedly particularly urgent because the sugar crop is running seriously behind schedule. In a May Day speech, Castro conceded this year's crop is likely to be 800,000 tons less than his loudly fanfared goal of 7.5 million tons.

That goal in itself was an acknowledgment of a major setback.

LAST YEAR the bombastic Cuban dictator vainglorously announced a 10 million ton record. Somewhere between 6 and 7 million tons was finally squeezed out.

Sugar experts say Castro will be lucky to wind up with that much this year. Untimely heavy rains and mounting labor and mechanical difficulties are severely curtailing production.

Apparently there are a lot of "social criminals" who have run afoul of Castro's new draft.

In a May Day speech, Labor Minister Jorge Risquet declared that in the short time the edict has been in effect, more than 100,000 Cuban workers have been arrested and sentenced under it to "rehabilitation centers."

RISQUET MADE another equally revealing disclosure—that these culprits "represent only about one-third of suspected violators."

The Castro henchman warned that no mercy will be shown those deemed guilty. Menacingly, Risquet declared the government intends to rigidly enforce the new draft regardless of how many are seized and sent to labor camps.

Representative Richard Ichord (D., Mo.) chairman of the Internal Security Committee, commenting on this matter, noted that recently several large groups of radical U. S. youths went to Cuba to cut cane. He cited these so-called "Venceremos Brigades" as graphic examples of "mindless absurdity."

"While these American youths are voluntarily going to a communist police state," said Ichord, "the terrorist rulers of that state have prescribed a new law that says in effect their workers have no rights, not even the right to decline to toil for little pay and comforts."

KEY PROVISIONS of Castro's new anti-loafing draft act are:

"In the new society, work is a social duty for all able-bodied men and women.

"Loafing may take different forms, running from those who have no work connections and are dedicated to a life of idleness and crime, to those who try to disguise their lazy ways with occasional work, quitting one job after another, to those having work but repeatedly absent.

"It is the duty of the Revolutionary Government to denounce and fight such manifestations, and to adopt measures leading to the eradication of loafing and parasitism.

"The guilty will be sent to rehabilitation centers for a period of from six months to two years, during which time they will do productive work.

"The Ministers of Labor and the Interior are authorized to take all necessary measures to guarantee the fulfillment of this law.

"All legal measures which, in whole or in part, block the fulfillment of this law are declared null and void. The law will go into effect as soon as it is published in the Official Gazette."

THE GUARDIAN
11 June 1971

Hard labour for Cuban layabouts

By RICHARD EVANS

"There is no racial discrimination in Cuba, but I would say there is social discrimination. We discriminate against people who do not want to work. We call them worms, or parasites, and we cannot understand how there can be people like that when there is so much to be done."

He was a German-language student at the University of Havana, but he got his message across pretty succinctly in English, too. At 23, he is of the age-group that grew up with the romantic euphoria which surrounded Fidel Castro's emergence from the Sierra Maestra. Their sincere belief in the ideals of the revolution has survived the setbacks of the past twelve years, and Castro can count on their continuing support. The next generation may be harder to please.

We were discussing the anti-loafing law which was eventually brought into effect during my three week stay in Cuba — a law that now makes it an offence, punishable by a year's forced labour, to be out of work or to be absent from one's job for more than 15 days without a doctor's certificate.

The law reflects both the strength and the weakness of Castro's Cuba 10 years after Cubans with a different set of priorities tried to overthrow his regime at the Bay of Pigs. Its strength is made obvious by its very nature. There is more than enough work for everyone. No unemployment and, incidentally, no illiteracy; sufficient food for all; compulsory free education for all children, voluntary free education for all adults — these are achievements no other Latin-American country can claim. Nor, indeed, the United States itself.

But the very existence of an anti-loafing law is an admission of a certain cooling of revolutionary fervour in some segments of society. Twelve years on and just nine months after the failure to produce the projected goal of 10 million tons of sugar for 1970, that is not surprising. Like many peoples of similar temperament, the Cubans are not about to break their backs while the sun still shines and the food manages somehow to find its way to the table.

In Havana, where the quality of life is almost as bad as the American Right-wing would have you believe, political apathy has set in and it is largely at the indolent and discontented city dweller that the anti-loafing law is aimed. But it was never Castro's intention to sow the seeds of his revolution in Havana.

With its cracked and peeling buildings, its spluttering fleet of patched-up American sedans, shops devoid of all luxury consumer goods and queues for just about everything that isn't rationed, the capital looks like a bad print of a Second World War film. If one took Havana as a yardstick, one could be lulled into believing that Cuba was ripe for another Bay of Pigs.

Twice last year, in April and September, the counter-revolutionaries in Miami sent over miniature invasion forces. The second group was told that it would link up with the first which had supposedly gained local support in Oriente Province. The true results of those expeditions were shown in a television documentary broadcast for the first time during my visit. It took the form of a trial of the survivors. All were either sentenced to death or 30 years' imprisonment.

They failed for lack of what made Castro succeed — the peasant support which propelled the original guerrillas into power. Today one does not even bother to ask the peasants, farmers and cane-cutters one meets if they still believe in Fidel Castro. It was for them that the revolution was fought and the question seems absurdly irrelevant when one is invited into a house like that belonging to Nicomedes Belen in the San Andreas district of Pinar del Rio Province.

Belen, a 50-year-old black farmer, was telling me how he had lived all his life in a house with palm leaves for a roof and mud for a floor. "I never dreamed that one day I would own all this," he said. "All this," comprised a two-bedroomed house, a new television set, radio, and 'fridge. It had not cost him a cent.

Every family in this half-completed new town of some 300 people had also been given television sets, primarily as a reward for being the first to join in the new collectivity farming plan. If few other houses in various other towns I visited during a four-day tour of Pinar del Rio were quite so well equipped, the people had little to complain about.

No one I met was earning less than 100 pesos a month. Some workers' wages go as high as 210. With medical care, education, rents, children's meals at school, and some workers' lunches all free, it was difficult to see how they could spend more than half their salary.

"This is one of the problems," one Communist party official told me at Sandino, another new town. "We are building a night-club with cabaret and first-class restaurant here so that people can have somewhere to spend their money."

It is that kind of openly pragmatic attitude that makes Cuban Communism a little less doctrinaire than in Eastern Europe. I even found a taxi driver in Vinales who was allowed to operate his cab on a free enterprise basis. Sometimes he earned as much as 300 pesos a month. But in return he had to work one day a week in the local hospital for nothing.

Were it not for the chronic distribution of food — a surplus of cabbages or whatever one week, none the next — one could not help but be tremendously impressed with the progress in the countryside. Apart from the building boom, much agricultural planning that was started two or three years ago now seems near completion. On the perimeter of the newly-developed green belt around Havana, two huge dams are under construction and the largest, the Mamposton, containing 151 million cubic metres of water, will be finished later this year, as will the £16 million British-built fertiliser plant at Cienfuegos.

This may ultimately have a beneficial effect on life in poor, neglected Havana, but more direct help will also be needed. Castro's life-style is still simplicity itself. But the fact remains that Cubans "developed a taste for superfluous wants" and in Havana, at least, they will not tolerate the total absence of luxury items for ever.

The hand of friendship stretched across a continent from Chile has helped enormously to boost morale and, coupled with other Left-wing rumblings throughout Latin America, may prove to be of considerable significance to Cuba's future. An airline service between Santiago and Havana has been inaugurated and there are rumours that Castro may seize the opportunity to visit President Allende. On the art of survival, if nothing else, Fidel could teach his new friend a lot.

THE MIAMI HERALD
9 May 1971

Recantations in Cuba Recall Soviet Purges

By DON BOHNING
Herald Latin American Editor

Cuba's intellectuals, under fire for their lack of revolutionary zeal, are confronted with growing pressures reminiscent of the Soviet Union under Stalin immediately following World War II.

Government concern with intellectual dissidence and efforts to counteract it are best dramatized by the case of Heberto Padilla, the prize winning poet and novelist arrested March 20 by Cuban authorities.

Subsequent events, including Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro's own remarks, make it clear that the problem goes far beyond Padilla, however.

Padilla, 39, was released April 26 and the next night he appeared before 100 of his intellectual colleagues in Havana.

THERE, in a remarkable performance, Padilla presented a lengthy monologue of self-criticism in which he also chastised several other Cuban intellectuals — including his wife — for their failure to adopt a proper revolutionary attitude.

A partial transcript of the monologue and Padilla's later exchange with his audience has been made public by Prensa Latina, the semi-official Cuban news agency.

"It all reminds me so much of my first period in Moscow when Stalin cracked down on the intellectuals," says Foy Kohler, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union now associated with the University of Miami's Center for International Studies.

KOHLER, in his recent book "Understanding the Russians," describes the intellectual crackdown in the late 1940s, as follows:

"In the press and in public meetings, writers, authors, dramatists, actors, composers, were accused of 'formalism' or 'cosmopolitanism' or 'bourgeois tendencies.' The victims either groveled and recanted publicly or they disappeared into the Siberian labor camps."

Padilla chose to recant and at the same time was used as a tool against others whose revolutionary credentials were being questioned.

Kohler regards as particularly revealing in the Padilla "confession" the references to state security — suggesting he was subjected to strong pyschological pressures — and his "reporting conversations with colleagues."

"UNDER THE GUISE of the rebel writer," said Padilla in his self-criticism, "I merely concealed my discontent with the revolution. But I asked: Was this really discontent, disaffection?

"I discussed this with state security. And when I saw the number of activities, opinions and judgments that I had engaged in among both Cubans and foreigners, and the number of insults and defamations, I stopped in my tracks and had to say sincerely: This is my truth, this is my true size, this is the man I really was, this is the man who committed these errors, this is the man who objectively worked against the revolution, not for it.

"And if I say this here before you," Padilla told his colleagues, "it is because I see in many of the comrades present here errors very similar to those I committed."

Padilla, near the end of his monologue, reflected what appeared to be the growing Cuban concern over intellectual dissent.

"IT IS MY DUTY to tell you that I came to this conclusion as I thought about the cultural field," said Padilla. "That if there is—with exceptions, as there always are — a sector that drags its heels behind the revolution in a political sense, it is art and culture. We have not been worthy of this revolution, despite the 12 or 13 dramatic years we have lived with it."

Two nights later, Castro himself reflected the same concern in a speech closing a national congress of education and culture with his reference to "some writers who are influenced by certain tendencies and who want to become famous — not by writing something useful for the country but by serving imperialist ideological movements.

"How many times these gentlemen, these writers of trash, have won prizes," declared Castro. "Regardless of the technical level, regardless of the imagination required, we as revolutionaries evaluate cultural works according to how valuable they are to the people . . .

"Our evaluation is political."

THE MANILA CHRONICLE
17 May 1971

Castro's Political Prisoners

FIDEL Castro has always been a believer in "revolutionary justice", and over the years it has become increasingly clear just what that ambiguous phrase means.

According to Amnesty International, there are around 30,000 political prisoners in Cuba — a figure that can be compared with Castro's own admission that there were at least 20,000 in 1965. Many of these prisoners are being held for offences that would not be considered "political" in the West. Political prisoners include people who have tried to leave Cuba in secret, people who have traded money on the black market, and even people who have sold places in restaurant queues.

They also include some of Castro's oldest personal enemies. Major Huber Matos has been serving a 20-year sentence since December 1959. He was not one of Castro's earliest comrades (the barbudos or "bearded ones" who joined in the attack on the Moncada barracks or sailed on the Granma) but he played an important role in the later stages of the Cuban revolution as the leader of an armed column. He was always suspect to Castro's intimates as a bourgeois liberal with a doctorate in education, and he earned Castro's own distrust when he made a speech in June 1959 attacking the rising influence of Communists over the new regime. He finally fell victim to the purge that followed the appointment of Raul Castro as Minister of Defence in October that year, and was locked up after a hasty and melodramatic trial in which Castro himself spoke as a witness for the prosecution.

Now Major Matos' wife, Maria Luisa, has put her name to an appeal sponsored by the American branch of Amnesty International that calls on five governments that have diplomatic relations with Cuba (including Britain) to intercede on behalf of the country's political prisoners. How much Amnesty will be able to achieve is debatable. That organization has been attacked from the right and from the left, and the Russian paper Izvestiya lammed into it recently on the grounds that "all its frantic activity for the protection of human rights amounts to stereotype anti-Communist outbursts."

But Amnesty's campaign is bound to deepen the mood of despondency amongst those who started out as early admirers of Castro's revolution and have since been disillusioned by the Government's economic blunders and use of repression. In Paris, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir have just put their names to a petition that condemns the arrest of Heberto Padilla, the celebrated Cuban poet who is rapidly becoming the Solzhenitsyn of his country. He gave vent to his disappointments in a series of poems criticising Russia and the local regime, and tried to have some of them smuggled out of the country. Now it is on the cards that he will be charged with being a CIA agent, like other writers and journalists who have been locked up by Castro's police.

Mario Rivadulla was one newspaperman who was gaoled precisely on those grounds and was finally allowed to leave Cuba last year. In exile, he spoke freely about the conditions that prisoners have to face in Cuba. He claimed that the institution of habeas corpus had been entirely suppressed, that men were held indefinitely without trial, and that prisoners were subjected to "cruel and intolerable agricultural work." He claimed that his own trial had lasted 25 minutes, and that he had been allowed only five minutes in which to defend himself. That is not an isolated story.

Broadly speaking, Cuban political prisoners are divided into two categories. The "irredeemables" are those who are considered unregenerate and held in close confinement without privileges — they were sent to Batista's prison-island, the Isla das Pinas, until 1967, then to La Cabana fortress outside the capital. Prisoners who are locked up on lesser charges, or considered amenable to political "re-education", are classified as rehabilitades and allowed to work their way to freedom through a system of minor privileges and incentives. These prisoners are sent to agricultural work camps, allowed regular visits from their wives, and permitted to go home on parole at increasingly frequent intervals.

Despite repeated offers from the Americans to grant asylum for Cuban exiles and deported prisoners, the Cubans have shown no willingness so far either to loosen up the emigration controls or to barter prisoners. One penal official has said that the American offers "merely encourage counter-revolutionary prisoners who decline to join the rehabilitation programme." But, at least in theory, the Cubans have been stressing the need to liberalise the present prison system — mainly through more intensive "re-education" courses. At the inauguration of a new training course for prison officials, the Minister for the Interior, del Valle, said that "by the quality of our penitentiary system, by the flexibility with which we face differing situations, we will bring those who have strayed from the straight path back to the revolution." The Cubans are relying more heavily on psychological techniques.

The system of "revolutionary justice" identifies social, as well as political, criminals. Under the terms of the new Anti-Shirkers Law, for instance, males between 17 and 60 years of age are considered guilty of delinquency if they (a) abandon their place of work for 15 days without good cause; or (b) receive two reprimands from their Work Council, composed of loyal party members. This law was designed to curb absenteeism and low productivity among Cuban workers.

The scale of the problem can be grasped when one learns that by April 1, when the law took force, some 90,000 men had signed on for new jobs. The sanctions against those who refuse to go out into the sugar-fields (which is where almost half those 90,000 were sent) are weighty. Persons found guilty under the Anti-Shirkers Law are either put in rehabilitation centers or placed under close supervision. And they can be denounced by anyone.

Legislation of this kind is clearly designed to act as a kind of moral corset to hold Cuban society together. The material incentives that are lacking are replaced by negative compulsions to work. . .

Is Castro giving the donkey too much of the stick and too little of the carrot? Economic recovery is a long way off. And in the meantime, Castro's honeymoon with his intellectual admirers appears to have clouded over.

PARIS MATCH, Paris
12 June 1971

DEATH CAMPS IN CUBA

The Revelations of Two Escapees from Castro's Prisons Confirm the Terrible Accusations Leveled against the Island's Regime

by Jean Cau

Research by Jerome Duhamel

Think back. It was only a few years ago. The wind of great libertarian revolutions was uprooting the rotten trees of the Old World and sweeping up Cuba in a heady whirl. There was passion and style. Berets. Heroic beards. The romanticism of brandished weapons. Power and government were both in the streets. The word was "hope." Cuba and her "lider maximo" [supreme leader], Fidel Castro, had invented a new way for men to be free. Posted on the walls of students' rooms all over the world, the picture of the bearded chieftain, cigar in mouth, excited the dreams of students and the heartbeats of the radicals.

Today, Cuba is enveloped in silence and terror. In the past few years, in the past few months, the revolution has been giving the image of the inescapable cog-wheels, of the dizzy historical fatality which follows days of celebration with days of terror. Castroism has become another Stalinism.

My purpose here is not to retrace how this terrible evolution took place, but to lift the veil which hides the hells of Cuba by producing some testimony.

The Prisoners are used as Guinea-Pigs by newly trained Doctors

It was not in a "reactionary" newspaper, but rather in REGENERACION, the organ of the Cuban libertarian movement, that we read of the recent sub-machine execution of twenty-two political prisoners. The text adds, "Communist civilization has invented the "gavetas" (literally, "drawer"), a cell 70 centimeters wide, 1.8 meters long and two meters high. Three men are piled inside without any room to move, and forced to relieve themselves in the cell.... At Prince Hospital, they use sick prisoners in operations performed by surgical students. Prisoners who are executed by firing squad see their own blood drawn out to be sent as humanitarian gifts from the

Cuban government to Vietnam and Laos. Women suffer the same treatment..." Similarly, the bulletin of "Democratic University Students," published by Cuban refugees in Argentina, reports the testimony which forty-eight political prisoners in Cabana prison sent to the Commission on Human Rights. What do they say? They say that on the Isle of Pines (in the bay east of the island), over 7,000 prisoners are "concentrated" in four circular buildings, each with a "capacity" of 870 men. They say that life in the prisons and camps of Cuba consists of beatings, torture, harassment, constant searches, punishments which last for weeks or months, forced labor from five o'clock in the morning until seven or ten in the evening, depending on the season. Exhausted, starving, decalcified, toothless, the prisoners serve as guinea pigs for newly certified "doctors." The same report gives a long list of prisoners killed for no reason or dragged from their cells to be tried. The sentence is always the same: death. Recently, eight hundred prisoners went on strike out of hunger and despair. The account states, "It was a horrible sight to see 800 men (on a hunger strike) in a state of total starvation, lying on beds, at the mercy of the unleashed passions of our jailers.... Is this the country, we sufferers cry, which is so admired today by young people all over the world?"

On 20 March 1971, the poet Herberto Padilla, winner of the National Poetry Award for 1968, was arrested. Fidel Castro announced that the arrest was his personal decision, and that other intellectuals would suffer the same fate "if they do not fall into line." When students organized readings of Padilla's poems, Castro immediately ordered the closing of the University of the East and shipped the students off to disciplinary farms. A group of French personalities (Marguerite Duras, Simone de Beauvoir, Anne Philipe, Claude Roy, Jean-Paul Satre, Jean Daniel, Alain Jouffroy, P. de Mandiargues and Maurice Nadeau) sent Castro a letter expressing their concern over "the suppression of the right of criticism within the Revolution." But on 27 April before the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, Herberto Padilla read a confession written and signed in prison, a confession of which Castro already held a copy. In it, he accused himself of "revolutionary errors," and exhorted his colleagues present to "overcome their weaknesses" which were leading them to "political and moral degeneration." At his example, other writers soon made their own confessions. Then on 21 May, sixty-one Western intellectuals and artists wrote a letter to Fidel Castro expressing their "shame and anger" at the methods used by Havana to force Padilla to make his confession. This time, they received a reply from Padilla himself. It was a volley of insults launched by the poet in the faces of those who had tried to defend him: "defeatist philosophers"..."reactionaries"..."fierce enemies of Socialism" whose only concerns are "aesthetics, Paris gossip, honors, and theories, which were my most odious faults and which you represent in the highest degree." In conclusion, Padilla accused his defenders, "buffoons of the bourgeoisie", of serving "the C.I.A., Imperialism, and international reactionaries".

More than twenty years after the Moscow trials and the "confessions" of Boukharine, for example, it is clear that nothing has changed.

Here are two documents of the totalitarian repression which is strangling Cuba under its yoke. Two eye-witness reports. Their authors have allowed us to use their names.

"The guards made us dig our graves and forced us to lie in them."

'My name is Antonio Borro. I am sixty-four years old. I was born in Santiago de Cuba. At present I am living in exile in New York. I was a teacher in what corresponds to your primary school, that is to say, of children from seven to eleven years of age. I was anti-Castro, and my opinions were soon discovered. One morning, the police came to arrest me right in my classroom, in front of the children, to whom the thing was undoubtedly even more overwhelming than to myself. The unforgiveable thing is not that I was arrested for my opinions, but the fact that I was arrested in front of my students! I was taken directly to a cell in the central prison of Santiago de Cuba. There was not even enough room to stand up, although I am not tall. Width: 1.5 meters. I crouched there for nine hours. I suffered agonies. Finally two guards came and pulled me brutally out of the cell by my feet. My muscles stretched all at once, and I screamed. They made me stand, but I fell down. So they supported me and dragged me into the office of one of the regime's feared inspectors, a sort of sadistic twentieth-century inquisitor. He came up to me and struck me in the face with a little leather whip, three times. I felt blood run down my cheek. He insulted me, called me a traitor, a slave of filthy American capitalism, I don't know what else -- he said anything he wanted to. Then he sat down at his desk for an interrogation which lasted for nearly four hours. I was standing all this time, and receiving whiplashes right in the face when my answers were too slow in coming. Behind me, the two guards made sure to stab me in the sides with the butt of their submachine guns. Finally, in the midst of a fog of words, I heard the charge. I almost laughed: the official reports stated that I was under arrest for "offenses against morality." What a grotesque comedy! This interrogation was my only trial, a seedy-looking sergeant my only tribunal. I was handcuffed and led into another cell, slightly larger than the other, in which two men were already rotting. They greeted me with joy. They had been together, face to face, for two months. The explained to me the horrible life they led there.

The cell was big enough to stand up in, but hardly wide enough to take four steps. There was no ventilation except through the bars which opened onto the corridor. No sink, no water and no toilet. The prisoners were forced to relieve themselves in the cell. At the end of the day, a prisoner chosen according to the cruel whim of the guards had to go along with a huge washpail collecting all this filth with his hands. Many times I saw the guards push the man and bury his head in the pail of excrement.

We were not able to shave either. Once every two weeks we were dragged into the big collective shower rooms and piled in fifty at a time. At the entrance we were to undress, put our prisoner's outfit in the box, and take a handful of harsh lye-wash to wash ourselves with. The guards had two favorite games when we were in the water. One rather tame one consisted of turning on freezing cold and boiling water alternately. The other, frankly horrible trick was to throw large handfuls of sulphur on us. When we came out of the showers, our skin was raw. Then we put on new uniforms, only slightly less dirty than those we had just taken off, which were made of a sackcloth similar to that used for grain bags.

The food was also inhuman. Once a day -- one single time -- the guards threw a few handfuls of poorly cooked, pebbly rice through the bars right onto the ground, with the dust and filth. This rotten stuff had to be shared by

all three of us, eating with our hands. Personally, I was fortunate enough to have as cellmates two admirable men, both former officials. But we could hear terrible arguments provoked by each food distribution, which were savagely encouraged by the guards. There were cries, screams and blows. You had to understand these men -- they had been reduced to the state of animals.

One day in the cell next to mine, a man died, killed by his companion, strangled. The guards watched it without saying a word. When it was all over, I heard them say, "Well, there's some more meat for the doctors!" Later I understood what they meant by that.

I understood during my second interrogation. To force me to sign a statement that I was indeed an American agent sent to sabotage the Cuban revolution, the sergeant-judge threatened me with all the atrocities of which he and his stooges were capable. Nameless atrocities which were nothing short of the best efforts of the German concentration camps. Here is a rough account of the list they gave me: an acid bath; tattooing a hammer and sickle with a red-hot iron; methodical plucking of the hairs of the crotch; stuffing the stomach with pieces of cotton soaked in waste [used] oil; plunging the head into a box filled with bees. What the sergeant told me next, I remember exactly. I do not think I shall ever be able to forget his words! "In any case, even if you refuse to give us a little signature, you will participate anyway in the training of our young doctors. Now, I can already give you an idea of what lies ahead for you." He opened a large bound dossier. Inside were photographs -- terrible photographs. Horrifying documents. They showed yound medical students, wearing the traditional white coat, performing dissections on the corpses of prisoners. Corpses? What am I saying? They were the living dead, the suffering, and sometimes even men who were only wounded. I remember one close-up color photo in which you could see the expression of the man lying strapped to the table, his stomach cut open. In this living stare one could read all the horror in the world -- yes, all the horror in the world.

For my part, I admit that I broke down. I signed the statement which the sergeant handed me. I admitted everything they wanted.

This cowardice saved me. Two weeks later, I and five other prisoners were freed and put on a plane bound for Honduras. We were given no explanation. Thus, I left my country forever. Thank God, I did not leave anyone behind, since my parents died when I was young and I had never married. A few months later, I heard that our release had been in exchange for pro-Castro Cubans imprisoned in the U.S. But why me especially, who had actually never had any connections with the United States? I believe that it was by chance."

The second eye-witness account is from Mr. Jose-Antonio Perera, born in Bayamo, Cuba in October 1923. I collected this testimony somewhere in France.

"I am an agricultural engineer, and my underground activities before the Revolution won me one of the most important posts in the Castro regime, if you know the importance of agriculture, primarily sugar cane, in Cuba. I helped to develop the agricultural plan. I traveled all over the country, explaining and convincing the people. I joined in the harvest, as did Castro himself. And believe me, if Castro did so, it was not out of demagogy, but because Cubans are like Doubting Thomas: they only believe what they can see and touch.

I worked enthusiastically for two main reasons. Because I was moving along the path of Socialism which we had so longed for, but also and primarily because we were beginning to see results. The future might be far away, but it seemed open.

This lasted until 1967, for me at least. That year, the country hit a slump. After eight years of unstinting effort, the government and the people were exhausted. Nobody was discouraged, far from it! But everyone needed to catch their breath. It was time for a respite.

There was only one person who did not understand this at the time: Fidel Castro himself. He didn't understand weariness and fatigue. He was a charger, and he wanted to keep charging. Reservations began to appear among the governing group which reflected the feelings of the population. I was one of those who tried to reason with Castro, but in vain. He would not listen. He hardened his position, gave orders without asking anyone's advice, and imposed laws. However, we did not give up hope of convincing him.

We tried seeing him one at a time: no result. We came as a group: again, no result. Finally we gave him an ultimatum: to agree to the reforms which were necessary, or to find himself in total isolation which could only lead to his removal. This was on the morning of 16 September 1967. During the night, at two o'clock exactly (I remember I looked at my alarm clock), I heard violent knocks against my door downstairs. Before I had time to put on a bathrobe and go downstairs, the door gave way and men burst into the living room: ten uniformed soldiers, two of them high-ranking officers. I understood at once, and I felt fear -- real fear, for the first time in my life. For a few seconds I stood face to face with these men, without saying a word. I was surprised not to receive a bullet. They said, "You have ten minutes to get ready, you, your wife and your two children. (At that time my two children, Miguel and Antonio, were thirteen and fifteen years old.) Bring as little as possible. Hurry up!" I knew that it was best not to argue with these men. My wife remained very dignified.

We did not speak, but our eyes exchanged all the feelings of two people who love each other and sense impending misfortune. My wife went upstairs to wake the children. She explained to them just what was going on, without hiding anything. Fifteen minutes later, we left, in a powerful black American car driven by one of the N.C.O.'s. There were eight of us in the car. We must have driven for nearly four hours. They had taken away our watches.

Dawn was breaking as we arrived at the gates of a sort of gigantic village made up of small, low pavilions with greyish-white walls, laid out in impeccable geometric order over an area about one kilometer long and nearly a wide. I had never seen such a thing in my country. The spectacle which presented itself to our eyes astonished us as much as it frightened us. A red sun rose over the roofs. I shall remember the sight for the rest of my life.

At the gates of the camp, four guards stood with submachine guns slung on their hip. Our car entered without stopping, drove another hundred meters and stopped before a pavilion indistinguishable from the others. Steel bars at the windows. Walls of poured concrete nearly thirty centimeters thick. A single door of metal, barred from the outside by a heavy steel shutter. We were pushed inside. Only then did my wife give way to tears.

The hut in which we found outselves was divided into three small square rooms, each three by three meters, with doorless partitions. The ceiling was hardly more than two meters high; I could easily touch it with my hand. The furniture consisted of a basin of water, four camp beds (we must have been expected) and a faucet above a hole. That was all!

The door closed. We were exhausted from emotion and from the trip; we fell asleep on the camp beds. For my part, I only slept for a short hour.

When I awoke, I forced myself to take stock of the situation. It did not look promising. I knew only too well the intransigence of Castro. This arrest was no mistake, and I guessed that a good number of my friends must have shared the same adventure at the same time as I, or else would do so soon.

My only thought, if I had a chance to meet with someone to explain my situation or to hear the reason for my arrest, was first and above all to get my wife and children out of this trap. That was to me the only real matter of urgency. There would be plenty of time later to worry about my own fate.

It seemed to me that we were isolated. We heard no noise from the neighboring pavilions, and nobody passed in front of our two windows. The only sounds we heard were far off, muffled by distance: a motor, a voice, sometimes cries.

Another day passed, during which I tried to talk to a guard through the window. He did not even turn around! I was crushed by a growing throb of fear deep within myself. In front of the children I pretended to believe that we would be rescued soon. But they were not fooled, and they showed me so. "Don't worry, papa, we can hold out as long as you!" I took them in my arms and I began to cry for the first time.

It was not until dawn after a second night, more than forty-eight hours after our arrival, that the door opened again. A man dressed in civilian clothes entered. He ordered his two assistants to stand guard outside the door, and he entered our quarters alone. He remained standing before me and said only a few words in a monotone: "Sir (he deliberately stressed the "Sir"), you have conspired against the head of the Cuban revolution, and therefore you have committed an offense against the national security and the will of the people. You are under arrest and you will remain so for as long as we see fit. You will remain here until you are transported to one of the labor camps reserved for traitors of your species. Since you may be away for a long time, your wife will resume the work she did before your marriage. We will find her a position. Your children will be sent to one of our educational centers, where they will learn a man's trade. They will leave this evening. Have you any questions?"

"We would like something to eat, and some fresh water to drink!" was my only answer. The man turned on his heel and left. An hour later, we finally ate -- copiously. Then I gave my wife instructions for the time when we would be separated. I particularly warned her against the temptation she might feel once she was out of the camp to cry out her indignation, to alert our friends, or to try to arouse public opinion.

Her silence and docility were our only chance -- if we still had one! I also told her to stand frequently in front of a statue of Lenin in the center of our town, which would be our rendezvous place. That evening we were separated.

My wife was taken away in the same car that had brought us. My two sons were driven off in an old jeep. We said our goodbyes without tears, with an enormous amount of dignity and courage, even if each of us gave way to despair as soon as we were alone.

I was never to see my wife again. I learned of her death -- that is to say, I guessed her murder -- from a note which I received one morning: "Mrs. J.-A. Perera died suddenly." Two years later, my children escaped from their educational center, and three of my friends took them to the United States. I was reunited with them there after I escaped in my turn, with -- extraordinary fact -- the help of a guard, a former engineer like myself. Twenty-four hours in a tank truck and four days in the hold of an old tub of a ship got me out of Cuba and into Honduras.

An hour after my family left, I was taken to another barracks already jammed with about fifty men. The guard pointed to a straw pallet. I was to remain in this hut for the whole time of my imprisonment, that is, nearly four years.

After this, our life was marked only by the increasingly violent and frenzied rhythm of the mental and physical tortures which were inflicted upon is. We lived in the close, stale air of the dormitory-hut. There were only three small ventilators in the roof. There was one toilet in a corner behind a partition. There was always a line there. Fortunately work was organized in the camp. I say fortunately, but believe me that in the long run, it was not a blessing in disguise. The work I did for four years consisted of digging huge pits, then filling them up, directly under a fiery sun.

One of the favorite games of the guards was to have each prisoner dig his own grave and carve his name and birth date on a white stone. We were all forced to obey this macabre order. Even more macabre, once the graves were dug, the guards forced us to lie down in them. One day we were forced to remain there for four hours in a burning heat. The result: one dead. The comment of the guard: "He won't have worked for nothing!" His friends filled the earth in over him.

As far as food was concerned, we were treated as pigs, which, all things considered seemed like special treatment. There were two large troughs at either end of the barracks. Every morning at six o'clock the guards slopped into them a kind of porridge made of partly ground corn, broken rice and a little milk, without salt, sugar or any seasonings. In the evening, around 2100 hours, we ate mash of old meat scraps, corn and sugar. Unspeakable! For a whole month I was sick every day.

But to speak of that camp is above all to speak of all the horrors that went on there. "Sexual" torture was one of the favorites at the camp. It was undoubtedly intended to arouse and satisfy the sadistic, perverse instincts of the camp directors, of which there were three. One evening they brought a partially undressed woman into the men's dormitory, and left her there. But their hopes were disappointed, the thing failed. Not one of the fifty men in there approached the woman, not one of them touched her. It was one of our greatest victories.

But God knows how much fifty men between eighteen and fifty years of age suffered from such a lack, to the point where I believe that a good third of the men had homosexual relations. After a time, they did not even bother to hide it.

I also saw this horrible sight. Two prisoners were working on the construction of a new barracks. Suddenly I saw with my own eyes the bulldozer head towards those two men, corner them and run over their bodies. I saw it with my own eyes.

But I saw something even more horrible when the camp doctor (but did he have the slightest knowledge of medicine?) set up his operating table in our midst, place on it a man probably suffering from acute peritonitis, and operate on him without an anesthetic, inspite of the horrible cries of the patient and the uproar this created among us. The commander of the camp apparently became frightened and ordered the guards to fire. Three of our comrades were shot, two of whom died at once. Then the commandant said, "Since these gentlemen do not wish to learn, get it over with." And he himself fired a bullet into the mangled body of the operating table victim.

This is what I saw!"

No comment needed. Cuba, no!

PARIS MATCH, Paris
12 June 1971

CUBA A SES CAMPS DE LA MORT

Les révélations de deux témoins rescapés des prisons de Castro confirment les accusations terribles portées contre le régime de l'île

PAR JEAN CAU

Souvenons-nous. C'était il y a quelques années à peine. Le souffle des grandes révolutions libertaires déracinait les arbres vermoulus de « l'Ancien Monde » et entraînait Cuba dans une ronde ivre. Il y avait une émotion et un style. Les bérets. Les barbes héroïques. Le romantisme des armes brandies. L'autorité était dans la rue et le gouvernement aussi. C'était « l'espoir ». Cuba et son « lider maximo », Fidel Castro, avaient inventé

pour les hommes une nouvelle manière d'être libres. Cloué au mur des chambres d'étudiants, dans tous les pays du monde, le portrait du chef barbu, cigare aux lèvres, donnait à rêver aux étudiants et faisait battre le cœur des militantes.

Aujourd'hui, Cuba s'enveloppe plus de silence et de terreur. Ces dernières années, ces derniers mois, la révolution est en train de donner l'image de l'engrenage inéluctable, de la vertigineuse fatalité historique qui fait succéder aux jours de fête les lendemains de la terreur. Le castrisme est devenu un stalinisme.

Mon propos n'est pas ici de retracer comment la terrible évolution s'est opérée mais de lever un voile sur les enfers cubains et de produire quelques témoignages.

Ainsi, ce n'est pas dans un journal « réactionnaire » mais dans « Regeneracion » (organe du mouvement libertaire cubain) que nous apprenons l'exécution récente, à la mitraillette, de 22 prisonniers politiques. Et le texte ajoute : « La civilisation communiste a inventé les « gavetas » (en français « les tiroirs »), qui sont des cellules de 70 centimètres de large, 1,80 mètre de long et 2 mètres de haut, dans lesquelles on entasse trois hommes, sans la moindre place pour bouger, obligés de faire leurs besoins dans la cellule... A l'hôpital du Prince, on utilise les détenus malades pour les faire opérer par des étudiants en chirurgie. Ceux qui sont fusillés voient leur sang extrait pour que le gouvernement fasse des dons humanitaires au Viet-Nam et au Laos. Les mêmes traitements sont infligés aux femmes... »

Ainsi, c'est le bulletin des « Universitaires démocrates » (publié par les réfugiés cubains en Argentine) qui fait état du témoignage de 48 détenus politiques de la prison de la Cabana envoyé à la Commission des Droits de l'homme. Que disent-ils ? Ils disent que dans l'île des Pins (dans la baie à l'est de l'île) sont « concentrés » plus de 7 000 prisonniers répartis dans quatre bâtiments circulaires ayant une « capacité » de 870 hommes chacun. Ils disent que dans toutes les prisons et dans tous les camps de Cuba ce ne sont que coups, tortures, vexations, perquisitions constantes, punitions qui durent des semaines et des mois, travaux forcés de 5 h du matin à 19 ou 22 h le soir suivant la saison. Epuisés, affamés, décalcifiés, édentés, les prisonniers servent de cobayes aux « médecins » fraîchement diplômés. Le même rapport donne la longue liste des prisonniers abattus sans motifs ou arrachés de leur cellule pour passer en jugement. La sanction — toujours la même — est la mort. Huit cents prisonniers, ces derniers mois, entreprirent une grève de la faim et du désespoir. Le rapport déclare: « C'était une vision d'horreur que de contempler 800 hommes (en grève de la faim) en état total d'inanition, sur des lits, à la merci des instincts déchaînés de nos geôliers... Est-ce le pays, demandons-nous angoissés, qu'admire tant aujourd'hui de par le monde toute une jeunesse? »

Le 20 mars 1971, le poète Herberto Padilla (Prix national de Poésie 1968) est arrêté. Fidel Castro précise que cette arrestation a été décidée sous sa responsabilité personnelle et que d'autres intellectuels subiront le même sort « s'ils ne s'alignent pas ». Des étudiants ayant organisé des lectures de poèmes de Padilla, Castro ordonne aussitôt la fermeture de l'université d'Oriente et expédie les jeunes gens dans des fermes disciplinaires. En France un groupe de personnalités (Mmes Marguerite Duras, S. de Beauvoir, Anne Philipe et MM. Claude Roy, Sartre, Jean Daniel, Alain Jouffroy, P. de Mandiargues et Maurice Nadeau) adressent à Castro une lettre où ils s'inquiètent de

« la suppression du droit de critique au sein de la Révolution ».

Mais, le 27 avril, Herberto Padilla devant « l'Union des Ecrivains et Artistes de Cuba », lit une autocritique rédigée et signée en prison et dont Castro possède déjà un double. Il s'y accuse « d'erreurs révolutionnaires » et exhorte ses confrères présents à « surmonter leurs faiblesses » qui les conduisent à la « dégradation politique et morale ». A son exemple, d'autres écrivains se livrent aussitôt à leur propre autocritique. Soixante et un intellectuels et artistes occidentaux écrivent alors, le 21 mai, une lettre à Fidel Castro et y expriment « leur honte et leur colère » devant les méthodes employées à La Havane pour amener Padilla à faire son autocritique. Cette fois, ils reçoivent une réponse de Padilla lui-même. C'est une volée d'injures que lance le poète au visage de ceux qui se voulaient ses défenseurs : « Philosophes défaitistes »... « réactionnaires »... « ennemis féroces du socialisme » dont les préoccupations ne sont que « l'esthétique, les potins parisiens, les honneurs, les théories qui furent mes défauts les plus odieux et que vous représentez au plus haut degré ». En terminant, Padilla accuse ses défenseurs, « bouffons de la bourgeoisie », de servir « la C.I.a., l'impérialisme et la réaction internationale. »

Plus de trente ans après les procès de Moscou et les « aveux » de Boukharine (par exemple), rien — on le voit — n'a changé.

Au dossier de la répression totalitaire qui étrangle Cuba dans son carcan, voici deux pièces que nous versons. Deux témoignages. Leurs auteurs nous ont autorisés à citer leurs noms.

« Je m'appelle Antonio Borro. J'ai 61 ans. Je suis né à Santiago de Cuba. Je vis en ce moment en exil à New York. J'étais enseignant dans ce qui correspond chez vous au secteur primaire, c'est-à-dire les enfants de sept à onze ans. Et j'étais anticastriste. Mes positions furent vite connues. Un matin, des policiers vinrent m'arrêter dans ma classe même, devant les enfants pour qui la chose fut sans doute encore plus bouleversante que pour moi-même. Le plus inadmissible n'était pas le fait que je sois arrêté pour mes opinions, *mais le fait que je sois arrêté devant mes élèves!* J'ai été conduit directement dans une cellule de la prison centrale de Santiago de Cuba. C'était une pièce où, moi qui ne suis pas grand, je ne pouvais tenir debout. Largeur: 1,50 m. J'y suis resté accroupi durant neuf heures. Je souffrais le martyre. Enfin, deux gardes sont venus, ils m'ont tiré brutalement par les pieds pour m'extirper du cachot. Mes muscles se sont détendus d'un seul coup: j'ai hurlé. Ils m'ont fait lever, je suis tombé. Ils m'ont alors soutenu pour me traîner dans le bureau d'un des redoutables inspecteurs du régime, sorte d'inquisiteur sadique du XX^e siècle. Il s'est approché de moi et m'a frappé au visage avec une sorte de petit fouet de cuir. A trois reprises. Je sentais le sang couler de ma joue. Il m'a insulté, m'a qualifié de traître, d'esclave du sale capitalisme américain, que sais-je encore... Il disait n'importe quoi.

Puis il s'assit à son bureau pour un interrogatoire qui devait durer près de quatre heures. Tout cela debout, et recevant des lanières de fouet en plein visage quand mes réponses tardaient à venir. Derrière moi, les deux gardiens ne se privaient pas de me labourer les côtes avec la crosse de leurs mitraillettes. Enfin, dans un brouillard de mots, j'entendis le motif d'accusation. Je faillis en rire : les rapports officiels me déclaraient en état d'arrestation pour « atteinte aux bonnes mœurs ». Quelle grotesque comédie ! Cet interrogatoire fut mon seul jugement. Un petit adjudant minable fut mon seul tribunal. On me passa les menottes, et je fus conduit dans une autre cellule, légèrement plus grande, dans laquelle deux hommes pourrissaient déjà. Ils m'accueillirent avec joie. En effet, ils étaient ensemble, face à face, depuis deux mois. Ils m'expliquèrent l'horrible vie qu'ils menaient là...

Il était possible de se tenir debout dans la pièce, mais difficile d'y faire plus de quatre pas. Il n'y avait pas d'aération, si ce n'est par la grille qui donnait dans le couloir. Pas de lavabo, pas d'eau. Pas de water non plus. Quand ils avaient des besoins, les prisonniers étaient obligés de se satisfaire dans leurs cellules. En fin de journée, un détenu, choisi selon la cruelle fantaisie des gardiens, devait passer avec une énorme lessiveuse pour collecter tous ces immondices avec ses mains. Combien de fois ai-je vu les gardiens pousser cet homme et lui enfouir la tête dans le récipient d'excréments...

Nous ne pouvions pas non plus nous raser. Une fois tous les quinze jours, nous étions traînés dans des grandes salles de douches collectives, entassés à cinquante. A l'entrée, nous devions nous déshabiller, déposer notre vêtement pénitentiaire dans des caisses, saisir une poignée de lessive rugueuse pour nous laver. Quand nous étions sous l'eau, les gardiens avaient deux distractions favorites : l'une assez banale qui consistait à envoyer successivement de l'eau glacée puis de l'eau bouillante; l'autre, carrément horrible, qui était de lancer sur nous de grosses poignées de soufre. En sortant de là, nous avions la peau à vif. Il nous fallait ensuite enfiler de nouvelles tenues, à peine moins sales que celles que nous venions de quitter, taillées dans une toile semblable à celle des sacs de céréales.

La nourriture aussi était inhumaine. Une fois par jour — une seule — les gardiens nous jetaient à travers les grilles quelques poignées d'un riz mal cuit et caillouteux qui tombait à même le sol, dans la crasse et la poussière. Nous devions partager cette pourriture à trois. La manger avec nos mains : personnellement, j'avais encore eu la chance d'avoir comme compagnons de cellule deux hommes admirables, tous deux an-

ciens fonctionnaires. Mais nous entendions les disputes horribles provoquées par chaque distribution de nourriture, et encouragées sauvagement par les gardiens. Il y avait des cris, des hurlements, des coups. Il fallait comprendre ces hommes : ils étaient réduits à l'état de bêtes.

Un jour, dans la cellule voisine de la mienne, un homme est mort, tué par son compagnon. Etranglé. Les gardiens l'ont regardé faire sans dire un mot. Quand tout fut fait, je les ai entendus dire: « Allez, encore de la viande pour les dpeteurs! »

Je compris plus tard ce qu'ils entendaient par là...

Je le compris lors d'un second interrogatoire. Pour me contraindre à signer une déclaration selon laquelle j'étais bel et bien un agent américain envoyé pour saborder l'œuvre de la révolution cubaine, l'adjudant-juge me menaça de toutes les atrocités dont lui et ses acolytes étaient capables. Atrocités sans nom, qui n'avaient rien à envier à ce qui se fit de mieux dans les camps de concentration allemands. Je vous donne à peu près exactement l'énumération qu'il me fit : bain d'acide; tatouage au fer rouge d'une faucille et d'un marteau; épilage méthodique de l'entrejambe; gavage de l'estomac au moyen de petits bouts de coton trempés dans l'huile de vidange; tête plongée dans une boite emplie d'abeilles.

Ensuite, je me souviens avec précision de ce qu'a déclaré l'adjudant. Je crois que je ne pourrai jamais oublier ses mots: « De toutes façons, même si vous refusez de nous donner une petite signature, vous participerez quand même à la formation de nos jeunes médecins. D'ailleurs, je peux déjà vous donner une idée de ce qui vous attend. » Il ouvrit un gros dossier cartonné. A l'intérieur, des photos. Des photos terribles. Des documents épouvantables. On y voyait de jeunes étudiants en médecine, revêtus de la traditionnelle blouse blanche, se livrer à des dissections sur des cadavres de détenus. Des cadavres, que dis-je ? Des morts-vivants, des agonisants, et parfois même des types qui n'étaient que blessés. Je me souviens d'une photo (couleur) prise de très près, où l'on voyait le regard de l'homme éventré sanglé sur une table. Un regard vivant où se lisait toute l'horreur du monde. Oui, toute l'horreur du monde !

Alors, pour ma part, je reconnais avoir flanché. J'ai signé la déclaration que l'adjudant me tendait. J'ai reconnu tout ce qu'il désirait.

Cette lâcheté m'a sauvé. Quinze jours plus tard, avec cinq autres détenus, nous fûmes libérés et mis dans un avion à destination du Honduras. Aucune explication ne nous fût donnée.

C'est ainsi que j'ai quitté définitivement mon pays. Dieu merci, je ne laissais personne derrière moi, ayant perdu mes parents assez jeune, et ne m'étant jamais marié. Je crus comprendre quelques mois plus tard que notre liberté avait été monnayée contre des Cubains pro-castristes détenus aux U.s.a. Mais pourquoi spécialement moi, qui n'avais effectivement jamais eu de lien avec les Etats-Unis ? Je crois que ce fut le hasard. »

Le deuxième témoignage est de M. José-Antonio Perera, né à Bayamo (Cuba) en octobre 1923. J'ai recueilli ce témoignage quelque part en France.

« Je suis ingénieur agricole et mes activités clandestines d'avant la Révolution me valurent d'obtenir, sous Castro, un des postes les plus importants dans le régime, si l'on sait la place tenue par l'agriculture (canne à sucre principalement) dans ce pays. J'ai participé à l'élaboration du plan. J'ai sillonné le pays en tous sens pour expliquer, pour convaincre. J'ai participé aux récoltes, comme Castro le faisait lui-même : et croyez bien que s'il le faisait, ce n'était guère par démagogie, mais parce que dans nos pays les gens sont comme saint Thomas ; ils ne croient que ce qu'ils voient, ce qu'ils peuvent toucher.

Je faisais un travail enthousiasmant pour deux raisons principales : parce que j'allais enfin dans la voie du socialisme que nous avions tant espéré, mais aussi et surtout parce que les résultats se faisaient sentir. L'avenir était peut-être encore loin, mais il semblait dégagé.

Cela jusqu'en 1967. Pour moi du moins. A cette époque, le pays eut un passage à vide. Le gouvernement et le peuple, au terme de huit ans d'efforts incessants, se retrouvaient épuisés. Personne n'était découragé, non ! mais tout le monde avait besoin de reprendre son souffle. Il fallait marquer un temps d'arrêt.

A l'époque, une seule personne n'a pas compris cela : Fidel Castro lui-même. Il n'a pas compris le malaise et la fatigue. C'était un fonceur, il a voulu continuer à foncer. Alors des réticences se sont fait sentir au sein de l'équipe dirigeante et ces réticences traduisaient la volonté du peuple. Je fus l'un de ceux qui essayèrent, mais en vain, de raisonner Castro. Celui-ci ne voulut rien entendre. Il durcit sa position, dicta des ordres sans prendre l'avis de personne, imposa des lois. Cependant, nous n'avions pas renoncé à le convaincre.

Nous avons tâché de le voir un par un : aucun résultat. En groupe : idem. Alors, nous avons haussé la voix : rien ! Finalement, nous lui avons posé un ultimatum : accepter de faire les réformes qui s'imposaient, ou se retrouver dans un isolement total qui ne pouvait conduire qu'à sa destitution. Ceci se passait au matin du 16 septembre 1967. Dans le courant de la nuit suivante, à deux heures du matin exactement (je me souviens d'avoir regardé mon réveil), j'entendis des coups violents frappés contre ma porte, au rez-de-chaussée. Avant d'avoir le temps d'enfiler une robe de chambre et de descendre l'escalier, la porte avait cédé, des hommes envahissaient le salon : dix militaires en uniforme, dont deux haut gradés. Je compris aussitôt, et j'eus peur. Vraiment peur, pour la première fois de ma vie. Je suis resté quelques secondes face à ces hommes, sans dire un mot. J'étais étonné de n'avoir pas encore reçu une balle. Ils me dirent : « Vous avez dix minutes pour vous préparer, vous, votre femme et vos deux gosses (à cette époque, mes deux enfants, Miguel et Antonio, avaient respectivement 13 et 15 ans). N'emportez que le minimum. Vite ! » Je savais qu'avec ces gens-là, il valait mieux ne pas discuter. Ma femme était restée très digne.

Nous ne nous sommes pas dit un mot, mais dans nos regards est passé tout ce qu'il peut y avoir entre deux êtres qui s'aiment et sentent venir le malheur proche. Elle est montée réveiller les enfants, leur a expliqué exactement ce qui se passait, ne leur cachant rien. Un quart d'heure plus tard, nous partions, emmenés dans une puissante voiture américaine noire conduite par l'un des gradés. Nous étions huit dans la voiture. Nous avons dû rouler près de quatre heures. Ils nous avaient retiré nos montres.

Le jour se levait quand nous sommes arrivés aux portes d'une sorte de gigantesque village de petits pavillons bas aux murs blanc-gris, alignés sur près d'un kilomètre de long et presque autant de large, dans un ordre géométrique impeccable. Je n'avais encore jamais vu une telle chose dans mon pays. Le spectacle qui s'offrait à nos yeux nous étonnait autant qu'il nous inquiétait. Un soleil rose se levait sur les toits. Je me souviendrai toute ma vie de ce spectacle.

Aux portes du camp, quatre gardes, mitraillettes appuyées sur la hanche. Notre voiture pénètre sans s'arrêter, roule encore une centaine de mètres et s'immobilise devant un pavillon anonyme parmi tant d'autres. Aux fenêtres, des barreaux d'acier. Les murs : du béton coulé sur près de 30 centimètres d'épaisseur. La porte, unique, est en métal et se bloque de l'extérieur par un lourd battant d'acier. Nous sommes poussés à l'intérieur. Alors, seulement, ma femme se laisse aller à pleurer.

La baraque où nous étions se divisait en trois petites pièces carrées de trois mètres sur trois, aux cloisons sans portes. Le plafond n'était guère à plus de deux mètres ; je le touchais de la main sans difficulté. Le mobilier ? Une cuvette de water, quatre lits de camp (nous devions être attendus...), un robinet au-dessus d'un trou. Rien de plus !

La porte se referma. L'émotion et le voyage nous avaient épuisés: nous nous sommes endormis sur les lits de camp. Pour ma part, je ne dormis qu'une petite heure.

Une fois réveillé, je m'efforçai de faire le point de la situation : elle n'était pas brillante. Je connaissais trop bien le caractère intransigeant de Castro : cette arrestation n'était pas une erreur, et je devinais que bon nombre de mes amis avait dû connaître la même aventure aux mêmes heures que moi, ou qu'ils ne tarderaient pas à la connaître.

Ma seule pensée (si j'avais le loisir de rencontrer quelqu'un pour m'expliquer ou pour m'entendre signifier les motifs de mon arrestation) était d'abord et surtout de sortir ma femme et mes enfants de ce guêpier. C'était à mon avis la seule véritable urgence. Il serait bien temps plus tard de me préoccuper de mon propre sort.

Il me semblait que nous étions isolés. En effet, aucun bruit ne venait des pavillons voisins, personne ne passait devant nos

deux fenêtres. Les seuls bruits que nous entendions étaient lointains, étouffés par la distance : un moteur, une voix, des cris parfois.

Une nouvelle journée se passa, durant laquelle je parvins à interpeller un garde par la fenêtre. Il ne se retourna même pas ! J'étais anéanti, avec une peur de plus en plus lancinante au fond de moi-même. Devant mes enfants, j'affectais de croire à une délivrance prochaine. Mais ils n'étaient pas dupes, et me le firent d'ailleurs comprendre. « Ne t'inquiète pas, papa, nous tiendrons aussi longtemps que toi ! » Je les ai embrassés, et je me suis mis à pleurer. Pour la première fois.

Ce n'est qu'à l'aube d'une seconde nuit, après plus de quarante-huit heures, que la porte s'ouvrit à nouveau...

Un homme entra, vêtu d'habits civils. Il pénétra seul dans le baraquement, ordonnant à ses deux acolytes de monter la garde devant la porte. Il resta debout devant moi et ne me dit que quelques mots d'une voix monocorde : « Monsieur (il insista à dessein sur le « Monsieur »), vous avez comploté contre le chef de la Révolution cubaine, vous avez donc attenté à la sûreté de l'Etat et à la volonté du peuple : vous êtes en état d'arrestation, et le resterez aussi longtemps que nous le désirerons. Vous demeurerez ici avant d'être transporté dans un des camps de travail réservés aux traîtres de votre espèce. Comme votre absence risque d'être longue, votre femme reprendra le travail qu'elle faisait avant votre mariage. Nous nous occuperons de la placer. Vos enfants, eux, iront dans un de nos centres éducatifs. Nous leur apprendrons un métier d'hommes. Leur départ aura lieu ce soir. Avez-vous des questions à poser? »

« Nous aimerions manger, et boire de l'eau fraîche ! » Ce fut ma seule réponse. L'homme tourna les talons et sortit. Une heure plus tard, nous mangions enfin. Copieusement. Ensuite je donnai quelques consignes à ma femme pour le temps que durerait notre séparation. Je la mettais surtout en garde contre la tentation qu'elle aurait pu avoir, une fois sortie du camp, de crier son indignation, d'avertir nos amis, ou de tenter d'alerter l'opinion publique.

Son silence et sa docilité étaient notre seule chance — si nous en avions encore une! Je lui demandai aussi de se rendre régulièrement devant une statue de Lénine édifiée au centre de notre ville, ce serait notre lieu de rendez-vous. Le soir même nous fûmes effectivement séparés. Ma femme fut emmenée dans la même voiture qui nous avait amenés. Mes deux fils furent embarqués dans une vieille jeep. Nos adieux s'étaient faits sans larmes. Avec énormément de dignité et de courage, même si, une fois seul, chacun de nous s'est laissé aller au désespoir.

Je ne devais jamais revoir ma femme. J'appris sa mort, c'est-à-dire je devinais son assassinat, dans une note que je reçus un matin: « Mme J.-A. Perera décédée subitement. » Deux ans plus tard, mes enfants, eux, réussirent à s'enfuir de leur centre éducatif. Trois de mes amis les conduisirent aux U.s.a. Je les y ai retrouvés quand j'ai pu m'échapper à mon tour, avec — fait extraordinaire — la complicité d'un gardien, ancien ingénieur comme moi. Vingt-quatre heures dans un camion-citerne et quatre jours couché au fond de la cale d'une vieille barcasse pour quitter Cuba et gagner le Honduras.

Une heure après notre séparation, je fus conduit dans un baraquement où s'entassaient déjà une cinquantaine d'hommes. Un garde me désigna une paillasse. Je devais rester dans ce baraquement tout le temps de ma détention, c'est-à-dire près de quatre ans.

Par la suite, notre vie ne fut marquée que par le rythme de plus en plus violent, de plus en plus fou des tortures morales et physiques qui nous furent infligées. Nous vivions dans l'air confiné et vicié du dortoir-baraquement. Il n'y avait que trois petits vasistas dans le toit. Un water était aménagé dans un coin derrière une cloison. La queue y était incessante. Heureusement, des travaux étaient organisés dans le camp. Je dis « heureusement » mais croyez bien que finalement ce n'était pas un bien pour un mal. Les travaux consistèrent durant quatre ans à creuser d'énormes fosses puis à les reboucher. Tout cela sous un soleil de plomb.

Un des plaisirs de nos gardiens consistait à faire creuser sa propre tombe à chaque prisonnier, puis à graver sur une pierre blanche son nom et sa date de naissance. Nous fûmes tous obligés d'obéir à cet ordre macabre. D'autant plus macabre qu'une fois ce travail achevé, les gardiens nous obligeaient à nous allonger dans ces fosses. Un jour, nous avons été contraints d'y demeurer quatre heures. Par une chaleur torride. Résultat: un mort. Réflexion du gardien: « Il n'aura pas travaillé pour rien ! » Ses amis le recouvrirent de terre.

Pour la nourriture, nous étions traités comme des cochons, ce qui à tout prendre semblait un régime de faveur ! Aux deux extrémités du baraquement étaient disposées deux grandes auges. Le matin, vers six heures, nos gardiens y versaient une espèce de bouillie composée de maïs plus ou moins pilé, des brisures de riz et du petit lait sans sel ni sucre, ni aucun assaisonnement. Le soir, vers 21 heures, c'était une pâtée faite de vieux abats de viande, de maïs et de sucre. Innommable ! Pendant près d'un mois je fus malade tous les jours.

Mais parler de ce camp, c'est surtout parler de toutes les horreurs qui s'y déroulèrent. La torture « sexuelle » fut une des plus employées au camp. Sans doute avait-elle pour but d'exciter et de satisfaire les instincts sadiques et pervers des dirigeants de ce camp qui étaient au nombre de trois. Ainsi ils amenèrent un soir une femme quelque peu dévêtue dans le dortoir des hommes. Puis ils sortirent. Leur espoir dut être déçu, ce fut un échec. Aucun des cinquante hommes qui se trouvaient là ne s'approcha de cette femme, aucun ne la toucha. Ce fut une de nos plus belles victoires.

Dieu sait pourtant si une cinquantaine d'hommes âgés de dix-huit à cinquante ans souffrent d'une telle absence. A tel point que je crois qu'un bon tiers des hommes avaient entre eux des rapports d'homosexualité. Au bout de quelque temps, ils ne s'en cachaient même plus.

J'ai vu aussi ce spectacle horrible : deux prisonniers travaillaient à la construction d'un nouveau baraquement. Non loin de là un bulldozer creusait la terre. J'ai vu soudain de mes propres yeux, le bulldozer se diriger vers les deux hommes, les acculer et leur passer sur le corps. J'ai vu cela.

Mais j'ai vu plus horrible encore quand le médecin du camp (mais avait-il la moindre connaissance médicale ?) a dressé sa table d'opération au milieu de nous, y a fait allonger un homme atteint vraisemblablement d'une péritonite aiguë, l'a opéré sans anesthésie, malgré les cris d'horreur du malade et la tempête qui s'est soulevée parmi nous. Le commandant du camp, alors, sans doute pris de peur, a ordonné à ses gardes de tirer. Trois de nos camarades sont tombés. Deux morts sur le coup. Puis il a dit : « Puisque ces messieurs ne veulent pas s'instruire, finissons-en. » Et il a tiré lui-même une balle dans le corps déchiqueté du malheureux opéré.

Voilà ce que j'ai vu ! »

Sans commentaires. Cubanacan

LA PRENSA, Lima
10 June 1971

PARIS-MATCH DENOUNCES EXISTENCE OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN CUBA

The habitual readers of French magazine PARIS-MATCH must have been surprised on reading in its pages the documented charge by writer Jean Cau, Goncourt Prize winner and former private secretary of Jean Paul Sartre, concerning the horrors being committed in the concentration camps maintained by the Cuban communist regime.

Cau has charged--on the basis of a great deal of testimony--the existence, first of all, of concentration camps "that are just as bad as those ... invented by Naziism." He has also denounced some aspects of the existence in these concentration camps--aspects that contradict the exaggerated "humanism" voiced by the Cuban communists and that match the horrors that came to light with the end of World War Two.

Thousands of political prisoners are piled in these camps, in cells especially designed to torture the inmates because of their narrowness: hardly 70 centimeters wide and 1.80 meters long in which three prisoners are lodged. The use of the body and life of the inmates for medical experiments is also customary. Inexperienced doctors thus find in communist prisons a free, inhuman, and unmentionable availability of human guinea-pigs for their experiments.

The case related by PARIS-MATCH of an operation for peritonitis practiced in the presence of all the inmates and without any anaesthesia of any kind must bring to mind--as it has happened--the horrors that the world thought had come to an end. The riot that followed as a reaction to this barbaric spectacle was put down by the guards of the Cuban communist prisons with bullets with the resulting death of three prisoners.

LA PRENSA, Lima
10 June 1971

LA PRENSA
Lima, Jueves 10 de Junio de 1971

Campos de Concentración en Cuba Denuncia "Paris Match"

Los lectores habituales de la revista francesa "Paris-Match" deben de haberse sorprendido al encontrar en sus páginas la documentada denuncia del escritor Jean Cau, Premio Goncourt y ex Secretario privado de Jean-Paul Sartre, respecto de los horrores que se están cometiendo en los campos de concentración que mantiene el régimen comunista cubano.

Cau ha denunciado, a base de numerosos testimonios, en primer término la existencia de campos de concentración "que no tienen nada que envidiar a los que inventó el nazismo". Ha denunciado, asimismo, algunos detalles de la vida en estos campos de concentración que contradicen el decantado "humanismo" de los comunistas cubanos y que rivalizan en horror con los que se conocieron al término de la segunda guerra mundial.

Millares de presos políticos se hacinan en estos penales, celdas especialmente diseñadas para torturar a los prisioneros de manera [illegible]

apenas 70 centímetros de ancho y 1.80 m. de largo para albergar a tres reclusos; y es habitual la utilización de la vida y el cuerpo de los reclusos con finalidades de experimentación para médicos inexpertos que encuentran así en los penales comunistas una gratuita, inhumana e incalificable disponibilidad de cobayos humanos para sus experimentos.

El caso relatado por "Paris Match" de una operación de peritonitis practicada en presencia de todos los reclusos y sin anestesia de ninguna naturaleza, tiene que provocar —como ha ocurrido— el recuerdo de horrores que se creían ya superados en todo el mundo.

El motín que se produjo como reacción ante este bárbaro espectáculo fue respondido con balas por los guardias de los penales comunistas de Cuba, dando muerte a tres reclusos.

Todos estos detalles, y otros más, revelan la naturaleza de la represión política asumida por el régimen de Castro, la ausencia de libertad alguna y la índole inhumana de muchos de sus funcionarios oficiales y hasta del mismo sistema que los acoge. La denuncia se produce al poco tiempo de que un grupo de intelectuales izquierdistas denunció, igualmente, la condición de colonia soviética de la isla y la entraña "stalinista" del régimen de Castro.

TIEMPO, Lima
17 May 1971

A "DAUPHIN" FOR CASTRO?

The thesis presented by Georgie Anne Geyer (the translation of which we published in our edition yesterday) to the effect that the Russians could be grooming Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as the eventual successor of Fidel Castro seems to have a sub-basis of apparent logic. Rodriguez is a well-structured communist, who has pursued patiently his political career, without burning the bridges after him and whose prestige in the island is increasing.

Some aspects of this "march to power," as far as the planners and cautious individuals are concerned, are the result of the best Marxist inspiration. Rodriguez would not replace Castro but, as President of the Republic, he could liquidate the current Prime Minister little by little. The plan, as one can see, finds its inspiration in the best traditions of communism. Without forcing matters and acting as though they are forcedly imposing themselves and without precipitating a crisis, Castro could be overtaken and obviously left behind by Rodriguez, the man who, as we know, knows how to wait. This is very important for a communist who, moreover, has a better credit and image in Moscow than the very Prime Minister.

Naturally, it is but a matter of supposition, but of supposition that has a basis. The Russians are not eager to decapitate Castro with a single blow. They are more interested in strengthening Rodriguez' hand, gradually, as they undermine Castro. By using this method, they win on every front, especially by saving face and washing their hands of the whole thing. The important thing is to make sure of the relief when the time comes. And this may be the step that has already been started or that may be on the point of reaching its climax, thus leaving Castro a mere legend and replacing him in the government with a better structured communist, ideologically.

TIEMPO, Lima
17 May 1971

¿Un "delfín" para Castro?

No dejan de tener un subfondo de evidente lógica las tesis expuestas por Georgie Anne Geyer, (y cuya traducción publicamos en nuestra edición de ayer), relativas al hecho de que los rusos podrían estar preparándole un eventual sucesor a Fidel Castro, en la persona de Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, un comunista estructurado que pacientemente ha hecho su carrera política sin quemar las etapas y cuyo prestigio en la isla es creciente.

Algunos aspectos de esta "marcha hacia el poder", por lo calculados y cautelosos, derivan de la mejor inspiración marxista: Rodríguez no reemplazaría a Castro sino que, por la vía de la Presidencia de la República, podría llegar a liquidar poco a poco al actual primer ministro. El diseño, como puede ver-

se, se inscribe en la mejor tradición del comunismo. Sin violentar las cosas, haciendo como que ellas se imponen forzosamente, por etapas y sin precipitar crisis. Castro podría ser alcanzado y obviamente dejado atrás por Rodríguez, "el hombre que, también se ha visto, sabe esperar. Lo cual es muy importante para un comunista que además tiene más crédito y mejor imagen en Moscú que el propio primer ministro.

Se trata naturalmente, de suposiciones. Pero de suposiciones con fundamentos. Los rusos no tienen afán en decapitar a Castro de un solo tajo. Más interés tienen en fortalecer el piso de Rodríguez con la tierra que poco a poco le quitan a aquel. Con ello ganan en todos los frentes y en especial en los de salvar la fachada y lavarse las manos. Lo esencial es asegurar el relevo para cuando llegue el caso. Que posiblemente sea lo que ya haya empezado a hacerse —o que esté a punto de culminar— para dejar a Castro en calidad de leyenda, pero para implantar en el gobierno a un comunista más estructurado ideológicamente.

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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971

THE EUROPEAN-COMMUNITY CHALLENGE AND SOVIET RESPONSE

The concept of European unity is closer to realization today than at any time since the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. British entry into the EEC has been accepted and a further increase in membership is likely. Beginning in January 1973, the EEC Commission will conduct a common commercial policy on behalf of its members. From then on, bilateral trade agreements between members of the Community and countries which do not recognize the Community will be prohibited. Consultation on foreign policy has begun and closer military cooperation is in prospect.

In theory, and in its propaganda output, the Soviet Union has remained uncompromisingly hostile to West European integration which it regards as a barrier to its own ambitions in Europe and an irresistible attraction to its East European protectorates. Consequently, Soviet propaganda--particularly during the first decade of the Community's development--has consistently condemned European integration as the economic corollary of NATO. At the same time, Soviet official reaction has been defensive and uncertain in many respects, since the Community can work for, as well as against, Soviet interests. Symptomatic of this vacillation have been Soviet proposals for a pan-European security conference which since the nineteen-fifties have been refurbished each time Moscow felt that West European integration constituted a threat to its interests. Such proposals are considered to be defensive and disruptive, aimed at neutralizing the Community rather than offering serious substantive alternatives. However, beneath its transparent efforts to raise the spectre of West German revanchism and to play on traditional European nationalist rivalries, Moscow has adopted a pragmatic attitude and has gone so far as to make unofficial contacts with Community headquarters in Brussels. Thus, there are indications that, faced with the reality of European integration, Moscow may be preparing to cooperate with the inevitable.

On one hand, Moscow exerts pressure on those West European countries that remain outside the Community to keep them from establishing closer relations with it. Sweden and Finland are constantly reminded that Moscow would consider their entrance into the Community incompatible with their neutrality. Austria has been warned that Moscow would consider a relationship with the Community to be a political rather than an economic matter and therefore incompatible with Austria's neutrality as defined in the State treaty of 1955.

On the other hand, while condemning the Community as a monopolistic bloc, the Soviet Union--and East Europe in particular--does not hesitate to do business with it and to make unofficial contacts with it. Actually, East bloc trade with the Community has continued to expand much faster than that with the seven countries of the European Free Trade Association.

Since the consequences of West European trade barriers are much more serious for East Europe than for the USSR (which is probably more concerned with the political implications of European unity), East European reaction to the Community has been tempered with considerable realism and circumspection. Basically, the countries of East Europe fear that a united and viable West Europe would cause the USSR to tighten its grip and solidify the bloc structure. However, for practical reasons involving their need for Western technology and a market for their agricultural products, they are prepared to expand their commercial contacts with the European Community. Although no East European country, with the exception of Yugoslavia, has formally recognized the Community (this being a major Soviet foreign policy issue on which it is prudent to follow the Soviet lead), several have indicated that they are more than prepared to do business with the Community. Thus, although Romania is an outspoken opponent of any bloc structure in East or West Europe, Premier Maurer stated at a press conference in the summer of 1968 that his country did not share Moscow's aversion to direct contacts with the European Community. Polish and Hungarian leaders have also indicated their willingness to deal pragmatically with the Community. In the period before the Soviet invasion, Czechoslovakia had expressed great interest in expanding trade with the Community.

The Communist parties of the six European Community countries have been even more flexible in their reactions. As early as 1962, Italian Communist leaders were telling the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist Parties that the European Economic Community had brought much prosperity to Western Europe. And by mid-1965, the French Communist Party was urging the participation of the Communist-dominated CGT labor union in the work of Community institutions. Its Italian counterpart, the CGIL, persuaded the CGT to establish a joint office in Brussels. On the other hand, European Communist parties outside the Community have generally remained opposed.

Although the Soviet Union has been calling for a conference on European security at various times since 1950, their more recent efforts in this direction date from 1969. A meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Prague on 30-31 October 1969 called for a European security conference to negotiate pan-European economic and political arrangements. In June 1970, a Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest reiterated proposals for a Europe-wide settlement to be negotiated at a conference on European security. The call went out again from the Pact countries in December 1970.

Western Europe and the United States view a conference on European security and any pan-European organization which might emerge as operating parallel with and re-enforcing the European Community. West European leaders have pointed out that the key issues involved in a East-West detente, such as the questions of Berlin and arms reduction, are already being negotiated and that until these key issues have been successfully resolved it would be premature to enter into more general negotiations. In December 1970 the NATO Foreign Ministers collectively affirmed the "readiness of their governments, as soon as the Berlin Talks reached a satisfactory conclusion ... to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments to explore when it would be possible to convene a conference or a series of conferences, on security and cooperation in Europe." Again in June 1971, the NATO Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance they attach to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Berlin. They expressed the hope that before their next meeting in December 1971 the Berlin negotiations "will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and cooperation in Europe may then be undertaken."

With the strictures of the Brezhnev doctrine in mind, NATO communiques have also emphasized that improvements in East-West relations must be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of each European state "regardless of its political or social system"; and the right of the people of each European state to shape their own destiny free of external constraint.

The members of the EEC believe their organization has evolved far from its cold-war origins and see the Community as no obstacle to a general European detente. However, before the EEC can serve to promote an East-West rapprochement the Soviet Union must recognize the Community as a reality of European politics. There are indications (including most recently the trade accords signed with the Benelux countries which represent the first time the Soviet Union has recognized a multinational unit) that Moscow may be prepared to accept this reality.

THE ECONOMIST
19 June 1971

POLITYKA An argument about Europe

A debate between *The Economist* and the Polish paper *Polityka* about the division between their Europe and our Europe, and whether that "security conference" the Russians and their allies want is the best way to set about demolishing the barriers. First, the editor of *Polityka*:

In Polish political circles there exists a deep conviction that the calling of an all-European conference on security and co-operation is today the most important political question in Europe. We are not alone in this conviction. It is shared by many politicians of European countries, whether they belong to Nato, to the Warsaw pact or are neutral.

So far the results of the exchange of views between east and west regarding the time when the conference should be called and concerning the questions to be discussed there show one thing very clearly: thanks to the initiative of the socialist countries, many ideas which will benefit the future of our continent have been moved off dead-centre. Discussions on European questions have demonstrated that the division of Europe has destroyed many traditional and very important economic and cultural links; it encouraged thinking in terms of "blocks" and created many artificial and unnecessary barriers. The political and economic development of our continent now demands the restoration of the above-mentioned links and the forging of new forms of mutual co-operation between nations living in different social, political and economic structures.

In Warsaw the dominant conviction is that the changes which are now taking place in the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries are putting an end to the causes which in the past made it difficult to call an all-European conference. Up to now the initiatives taken to improve the political climate in Europe and the transition to wider and richer forms of co-operation have been frustrated by the German problem. The official attitude of the previous west German governments froze every, even the most sensible, proposal. By starting the process of normalising relations with the east European countries, by acknowledging the postwar state of affairs in Europe, the Brandt-Scheel government has had a decisive influence in bringing about a complete change in the whole situation on our continent. For almost a quarter of a century all political ideas, both in the east and in the west, were conceived in the shadow of the German problem. Now, as a result of the agreements already concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and with Poland, the source of countless political conflicts between east and west is drying up.

The visible improvement in the political climate between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries is an excellent confirmation of our oft-repeated thesis that the acknowledgment by west Germany of the postwar state of affairs in Europe is essential for the strengthening of peace on our continent. Speaking realistically, the improvements already attained between Bonn and the capitals of the socialist countries, and the further steps still to come, are demolishing the last barrier on the road to an all-European conference. We have, therefore, a new situation in Europe. A new page is opening in the history of postwar Europe. The essence of the matter now is to note on this page such facts and events as will strengthen the feeling of security and will begin to create situations which will counteract the further division of Europe.

Truly, we are now entering a period when Europe will be divided only by structural and ideological differences. These differences are, as we know, the result of objectively existing and developing laws of society. This is a natural division which must not necessarily exercise a negative influence on progress in Europe. Studying the postwar history of our continent, it is not difficult to observe that the social, economic and ideological rivalry between the two systems has been ever since the war, and still is, one of the main driving forces of development in all countries of Europe. This fact plays an important role in the shaping of the political situation in Europe. At the same time the social, economic and ideological rivalry has been supplemented with a military-political rivalry which became the source of fierce tensions between socialism and capitalism. The creation of Nato and later the Warsaw pact divided Europe into two closed military groupings. The armaments race has become an element of the postwar European reality. The tendency to create closed groupings showed itself also in other spheres, for example in the economic sphere.

All these phenomena developed in the years which have been called the period of the "cold war." On both sides of the demarcation line this period created a climate of suspicion and mistrust in international relations. Today the whole subject is concentrated in the question: What is to be the future of Europe? What will dominate its destiny?

What the argument's about

Ever since 1966 the Russians and their allies have been calling for a "European security conference," as they call it; the reaction of most western governments is that they still have to be convinced that such a conference would do more good than harm. The subject will undoubtedly come up in Cambridge next weekend when a delegation from Poland—politicians, economists, journalists and others—meets a group of similar people from Britain at St Catharine's College to talk about the future of Europe.

The four-power negotiations about Berlin, and the idea of talks about troop cuts in Europe, are all part of the same great debate. This week the editor of *Polityka*, the weekly paper which is our nearest equivalent in Poland, sets out his views; the editor of *The Economist* replies. This continues a practice that started in 1965 when the two papers argued with each other, in each other's pages, about Vietnam; they have kept up the relationship since then, and send members of their staff to visit each other. This week's pair of articles is being printed simultaneously in both papers.

Further continuation of armaments, further deepening of the division, or the removal of these forms of rivalry which are sources of the arms race and potential conflicts ? Poles would vote for the latter solution, for the removal of these forms of rivalry, although we understand that this is not an easy feat to achieve.

We believe that a European conference will be a first and important step towards the common aim, that is, towards the strengthening of the foundations of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. It is not written in any history book that our continent must develop in conditions of a fierce armaments race and in an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. These are phenomena which can be eliminated from European reality. Listening to the voices of the opponents of an all-European conference it is impossible not to gain the impression that they are extremely closely tied to the ideas held during the years of the cold war. They acclaim the vast social, economic, cultural and moral changes in our continent, but at the same time, when they analyse the future of Europe, they use old, threadbare blueprints. One of these blueprints considers the present and future situation exclusively, or almost exclusively, from the angle of military strategy. We think that the time has come to break with this way of thinking. Another anachronism is to see the future of the territory of Europe exclusively as an arena of the play and influence of two superpowers. The role of medium and small nations, though a lot is said about it, is thus in fact reduced to nothing.

From such a traditional way of thinking come also the reservations which see the European conference as a device of the Soviet Union to seek to gain military and economic supremacy in Europe—as Signor Brosio has said. The west is, however, well acquainted not only with the achievements of the socialist countries but also with their weaknesses. What, then, is the aim of scaring the world with the idea of "Soviet domination" ? I am afraid there is in it more anxiety for American interests than for the interests of European nations. It is, however, well known that we assume that the United States and Canada will take part in the conference.

It would be difficult not to call these "schools of thought" traditional. It is not impossible that this way of thinking arises simply from the fact that the opponents of the conference have no convincing counter-arguments. It sticks out a mile that the opponents of the European conference are hidebound by a static and traditional way of thinking.

Let us take a look now at some other reservations made recently. It is rare for a western politician nowadays to express outright rejection of the idea of a European conference. Most frequently they take up a position which can be described in the words "yes—but." We are for the conference, they say, but it will have to be linked with a reduction of military forces. The intention is to insist that the conference and the question of the reduction of military forces should run parallel with each other. We regard this point of view as false. In existing reality, reduction of armaments cannot be a condition but has to be a result of the conference, or, maybe, of several conferences.

Great solutions have to be approached by small steps. It is necessary to prepare the ground. Does anyone in the west seriously think that after so many years of suspicions and mistrust conditions in Europe are now ripe for global solutions ? It is amazing that people who as a rule are for evolutionary progress are presenting themselves in this case as almost radically minded revolutionaries.

One can also see as a subterfuge the suggestion that the settlement of European matters should be made dependent on progress in relieving the tension in the Middle East. We are not belittling the dangers to world peace which are created by the situation which exists there, but if one truly has the desire to relieve tension he must implement this desire in the place where that is feasible. It is difficult to deny that Europe is the continent where conditions are ripe for strengthening the detente. Given general agreement, this process of detente in Europe could open the way to positive solutions of the confrontations elsewhere.

Mr Heath said not long ago that he was not interested in pious declarations of intent. In matters of European security, as in other affairs, he is interested in definite moves towards an improvement in the situation. One can underwrite this statement without hesitation. It depends, however, what one understands by "a definite move." We believe that quite enough has been said on the subject of conditions, promises, and so on. It is high time now for definite, multilateral consultations and meetings to set up the agenda of the proposed conference, and the place and time at which it should take place. Continuous expression of new reservations must awaken the suspicion that there are forces in Europe who find it comfortable to live with the prospect that the two parts of our continent are constantly drifting apart.

The editor of The Economist replies :

You had better count me among the "yes, if" people ; but the questions I want to see answered before that conference takes place are not the ones you think they are. Since you have gone to some pains to set out the arguments in favour of a conference, I owe it to you to be equally clear in explaining why many of us in the western half of Europe still have serious doubts about it. It would be easy enough for me to give you the formal reply of our governments, which is that there is no point in holding a conference until the Russians have agreed to guarantee the security of west Berlin ; and indeed that is part of the explanation. But the questions we ask ourselves go deeper than that, and I would like you to understand what they are.

Your article contains three propositions. You say that it is desirable to break down some of the barriers that have grown up between the two parts of Europe since 1945 ; you argue that a grand conference of all the European countries plus the United States and Canada is a necessary first step towards that end ; and you claim that the treaties which Herr Brandt's government signed with Russia and Poland last year have opened the way to such a conference.

With the first of these propositions I have no quarrel: the division of Europe has long seemed to me to be one of the most preposterous of the distortions which our century has imposed on history. It is the other two I have doubts about. It is by no means clear to me that the sort of conference you are proposing has anything very much to do with the practical, detailed and often rather technical matters that we mean when we talk about demolishing the barriers between the two parts of Europe. And certainly, if you go to Bonn, you will find that many people there—including many members of Herr Brandt's government—are increasingly coming to wonder whether the treaties that west Germany has signed with Russia and Poland are going to produce the results they were hoping for.

It would help if your government would spell out the practical improvements in the situation—the actual ways of bringing us closer together—which it thinks a conference might lead to. The conference itself, after all, is liable to be a pretty predictable affair. Even if we tell the delegates that they cannot speak for more than an hour apiece, which will be a shock for some of them, and even assuming that there is simultaneous translation, it will take a week for the 30 or so foreign ministers to have one turn at the rostrum each; and anyone who has sat through the exhausting procedure known as the general debate at each year's meeting of the United Nations knows the sort of speeches we are likely to hear. I can see very little point in a conference held for the sake of holding a conference; and none at all in a conference which is designed to create the impression that we are getting on better with each other without actually doing anything to bring such an improvement about. The trouble is that some people may be chiefly interested in such an illusionist conference; I mean the governments of the Soviet Union and east Germany, whose interests in this matter seem to be rather different from those of the other countries of eastern Europe. That is why we should like you to tell us what real breaking down of barriers we can hope for as one of the consequences of getting together around a table.

More travel between the two parts of Europe, some people suggest. Well, I am not going to deny that our authorities are sometimes as slow-moving and bureaucratic as yours in issuing entry visas; but the basic difference between the two sides, surely, is that it is much more difficult for a Russian or a Czech or an east German—or a Pole—to get a passport to take his family on a visit to the west than it is for most west Europeans to do the same thing the other way round. More trade, then? Here again, it is true that the attitudes of the past may be one reason why we do less trade with each other than we might like; but I am afraid the main reason is that, with certain exceptions, you do not produce enough goods that we cannot buy cheaper, or better, elsewhere. Until you become really competitive in western markets—or until you belong to a multilateral payments system that would enable you to absorb your deficits with us—this is bound to impose a limitation on the expansion of trade. No doubt there are some matters in which we might usefully co-operate with each other rather more than we do at the moment: the exchange of electric power is one that is often suggested. But that is something for the technicians to work out, not the politicians; and anyway I do not think anyone would claim it was going to have a major effect on our economic relationship.

I hope you will not say that these are "cold war arguments." They are not. What I am saying is that real, as distinct from apparent, improvements in the relationship between us require some major changes in the objective situation; and these changes are not going to come about just by putting 30-odd overworked prime ministers or foreign ministers around a table for a couple of weeks. In fact, the one subject that such a conference might usefully discuss is a mutual reduction of the armies facing each other in Europe—and Mr Brezhnev is now apparently suggesting that we do not need an all-European conference to start talking about that.

This is why we attach so much importance to the question of Berlin. We would feel more confident about the usefulness of such a conference if the steps leading up to it brought equal benefit to both sides; and I do not think that will have happened until an agreement has been reached about Berlin. After all, you say in your article that the process of normalising relations means "acknowledging the postwar state of affairs in Europe." The Soviet government seems to have the same thing in mind when it urges us to accept "the situation as it is." But those phrases must mean the same to both sides. The treaty which west Germany signed with Poland in November acknowledged the postwar state of affairs in Europe by accepting the Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of your country. Good. The treaty the Germans signed with the Soviet Union in August was another ratification of the status quo. But the process will not be complete until the Russians show that they have accepted "the situation as it is" in west Berlin too. That means not only a Russian guarantee of the security of the routes which physically link Berlin to the west, but also Russia's acceptance of the existing political connections between west Berlin and west Germany.

We are still waiting for that to happen. Last August, when the west Germans were negotiating their non-aggression treaty with the Russians, they believed they had reached an understanding that the signing of the treaty would be followed fairly rapidly by a Berlin settlement. Now another summer is here, and there is still no settlement. I have no doubt about the sincerity of your desire to start demolishing the division of Europe, and I can well understand your reasons for wanting to do so. It is the Russians I am not so sure about; and Berlin is one test of their intentions.

Anyway, I have a feeling that when you and I talk about a security conference, and a new page in the history of Europe, and the rest of it, we are using a kind of shorthand. What we are really thinking about is the relationship between the smaller countries of Europe, on the one hand, and the two superpowers which stand on either side of us. Heaven knows, we have our problems with the United States. You have recently been watching two of them: the row about the value of the dollar, and the curious affair in which most west Europeans have been urging the United States to keep more troops in Europe than many American senators want to keep here. You also live with the problem of being the ally of a much bigger power, and I think your problem is in a different category from ours. After all, no American president has ever tried to argue that the Nato [illegible] one of their

number from [illegible] regularly change our governments in western Europe, sometimes with results that cause a good deal of trouble to the Americans, without having to worry about American and other foreign troops coming and telling us to stop it. We cannot help remembering what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Soviet Union's attempts later that year to provide a justification for it ; and we reflect on the difference between your position and ours.

The point is that each of us—you in eastern Europe and we in western Europe—have to deal with the problem in our own way. In western Europe we are trying to establish a more equal relationship with the United States by the [illegible] on the basis of the ideas which the members of that community share about post-Keynesian capitalism in economics and pluralist democracy in politics. I do not suggest that this is, or can be, a model for the way you will want to deal with your relationship with the Soviet Union. You will have to work that out within the context of your own political and economic system. Certainly we can help each other by opening up new points of contact and co-operation between the two systems, provided that the mechanisms we set up bring real changes and not just apparent ones. But at bottom each of us has to solve our problems of independence by our own will to be independent.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
9 July 1971

Communist block in two minds

By JONATHAN STEELE

Muffled and muted it may be, but all the signs are that Moscow and the East European capitals are also having their "great debate" on the Common Market. Since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, the Soviet Union has rigidly refused to recognise the existence of the European Economic Community officially. But now that the EEC is not only here to stay but apparently on the verge of expansion, the mood in Eastern Europe has shifted.

Poland is shortly to send three senior diplomats to Brussels to make new contacts with the Commission's headquarters. Although both Hungary and Poland have had technical contacts with the Community on the question of their agricultural exports, the new Polish team will be dealing at a higher level.

It is known that the Poles are envious of the special trade agreement which Yugoslavia made with the EEC last year. Both they and the Rumanians would probably like to follow suit so as to safeguard their national economic interests as soon as they can.

The Rumanians have been quietly pressing the EEC to declare their country a developing area to enable it to get concessions from the EEC. But the Commission in Brussels insists that the EEC must first be recognised diplomatically. This is something which neither the Rumanians nor the Poles would willingly do before the Soviet Union does so itself.

Moscow is still not ready to take such a step, though it is taking a more realistic attitude compared with the days when it thought the EEC would collapse. There have been several changes of attitudes. At first in 1957, the Russians published a series of 17 theses saying that the EEC was doomed to fail. Then in 1962 the pendulum swung and a new series of 32 theses was formulated by Mr Khrushchev.

These saw the EEC as a new "centre of attraction" capable of rivalling the United States. It looked almost as though the Soviet Union would take the step of recognition, but then came the Gaullist period. The Russians began to emphasise similar doubts as de Gaulle about the danger the EEC posed to national sovereignty. The 1965 crisis in the Common Market was greeted with triumph.

Now we are in the latest phase, which has clearly left Eastern Europe in two minds. The mass media has carried little about the British entry negotiations, including the Heath-Pompidou meeting. What has been carried has often been contradictory.

The point has been made that British entry is a Trojan horse for the further penetration of American capital into Europe. The clearest expression of this came in an article in "Izvestia" by Vladimir Osipov, who wrote in May that the Six were yearly becoming more independent and less inclined to accept American-British patronage.

"Washington and London obviously fear the West European states' urge to be independent in shaping their policies. Precisely for this reason the British leaders, linked with the US by bonds of their notorious 'special relationship' are striving for an early invasion of the Continent to interfere with the trend towards relaxation, to restore the erstwhile Anglo-Saxon influence, to preserve the Atlantic orientation of capitalist Europe, and to perpetuate the East-West confrontation in our continent."

A Hungarian broadcast sees the Trojan horse full of Germans rather than Americans. In May a Budapest commentator was saying that Bonn welcomed British entry because it would "help West German capital to make large investments in Britain and cooperate with British monopolies against the really dangerous adversary, the American monopolies.

So the East is undecided. Is the Common Market going to be independent of the Americans, or a Trojan horse for them ? If it is independent, who is going to dominate it, the West Germans or the British ?

If the ideological and geopolitical issues which the EEC poses are still uncertain in Moscow's eyes, the economic ones are not. Although the total trade conducted between the EEC and the Eastern countries is small (less than 10 per cent of the EEC's world trade), this proportion is declining.

The Comecon countries already find it hard to sell their agricultural produce through the wall of the Common Market's common agricultural policy. An enlargement of the Market will only make things harder. At the same time the Russians have set their eyes, as have the Poles and the Rumanians, on importing advanced technology from Western Europe. Moscow has been stepping up its large-scale cooperation deals such as the Fiat deal with Italy, or the lorry deal with the West Germans.

Moscow's other defence mechanism has been to promote its own form of integration through Comecon. The last two years have produced a marked quickening of the drive towards so-called Socialist integration, with the Comecon countries moving towards a system of coordinated national economic planning that will one day become supranational planning. Clearly the Russians will hold the whip-hand within this economic alliance.

In March the Hungarian leader, Mr Kadar, said that direct cooperation could be expected between the two groupings, the EEC and Comecon. "Both these groups are a reality and obviously will remain so." That is the most realistic statement on the Common Market to come from Eastern Europe. Yet one result of the expansion of these two European bureaucracies is likely to be a further erosion of the tenuous independence of Russia's smaller allies.

LE MONDE, Paris
July 1971

L'AJUSTEMENT DES POLITIQUES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'EUROPE

La dimension anglaise

Par RENÉ DABERNAT

Pour la première fois depuis le début du Marché commun, la France va bientôt cesser d'être le seul Etat membre des communautés ayant une vocation mondiale en même temps qu'européenne. Si, comme on le prévoit, la chambre des Communes approuve finalement l'adhésion, Londres nétaires du général de Gaulle ni la responsabilité et les tentations de cette double appartenance. Situation, de toute évidence, fort différente de celle qui existait lorsque la France vivait avec cinq partenaires dont l'héritage extra-européen était mince comparativement au sien, ou nul.

A l'époque de la « *Petite Europe* », jamais les foucades planétaires du général de Gaulle ni même la guerre d'Indochine où l'affaire d'Algérie n'ont vraiment menacé la Communauté. La réconciliation franco-allemande, la coopération étroite avec l'Italie et le Benelux dépendaient essentiellement, au départ, d'un accord sur les problèmes internes du continent. Les prolongements internationaux, par exemple monétaires, ont été la conséquence de dix ans de développement communautaire, non leur condition première.

Avec Londres, au contraire, un accord limité à l'Europe ne suffira pas. Il faudra l'étendre très vite à ces parties du globe où la France et l'Angleterre ont été si longtemps opposées et le sont encore, parfois, aujourd'hui. A défaut, l'on risquerait de contredire ou de défaire, au plan mondial, en particulier dans les votes des Nations unies, ce que les Dix auraient pu faire à Bruxelles, au plan européen.

Après des années de péripéties, le succès de Luxembourg a créé un tel soulagement que ces réalités nouvelles semblent reléguées derrière l'écran des satisfactions officielles. Comment ne pas voir, pourtant, que la participation britannique appellera un ajustement progressif des politiques étrangères ? Une querelle entre Paris et Londres du genre de celles du Biafra, du Québec libre, des livraisons d'avions français à la Libye, affaiblirait fatalement l'Europe élargie. A l'inverse, celle-ci tirerait une vaste audience internationale d'un solide accord des deux gouvernements sur leur héritage d'au-delà des mers. Et il ne manque pas de points sur lesquels il se révèle nécessaire : Afrique, où francophones et anglophones s'opposent souvent ; rapports avec les Etats-Unis et le Canada, [illegible] qui, chacun à sa manière assez différente de part et d'autre de la Manche ; Proche-Orient et Méditerranée, théâtre de drames franco-anglais durant la seconde guerre mondiale.

Une réconciliation des deux pays montrerait également, sans tarder, que l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans le Marché commun porte en germe le retour de l'Europe en Asie. Dans cette région, la caution anglaise sera, en effet, pour les Dix, aussi importante que le fut, pour les Six, la caution française dans une large partie du continent noir.

* * *

Théoriquement, la Communauté élargie aux Anglais, aux Danois, aux Norvégiens, aux Irlandais, revêt, face aux super-puissances, l'apparence d'un nouveau géant, par sa population, son poids économique, sa valeur technique, ses richesses culturelles. En fait, elle restera sans influence mondiale déterminante aussi longtemps que survivront entre Français et Britanniques des séquelles du passé, ou bien telle ou telle contradiction actuelle.

Dans le processus européen, chaque décision d'approfondissement ou d'élargissement constitue une plate-forme provisoire à partir de laquelle il faut, tôt ou tard, aller plus loin, sous peine de retomber.

De même que la controverse franco-allemande sur le mark peut, selon son évolution, imposer ou tuer dans l'œuf l'union économique et monétaire, de même les vieilles rivalités franco-britanniques peuvent-elles soit favoriser une confédération politique si elles disparaissent, soit la rendre impossible si elles subsistent.

A-t-on oublié que le pool charbon-acier n'aurait pas survécu sans la dimension que lui apporta le traité de Rome ? M. Heath aura hautement servi l'Europe si la dimension anglaise signifie entre autre une coopération dans les domaines jusqu'ici délaissés, tels que la politique étrangère, ou, plus tard, la défense.

Edouard VII et Delcassé furent les premiers à lier un accord sur les affaires européennes au règlement de certains différends d'outre-mer. « *L'achèvement de notre œuvre coloniale,* disait alors le ministre français des affaires étrangères, *dépend de notre entente avec l'Angleterre.* »

En 1898, l'incident de Fachoda [illegible] [illegible] été de la Manche, des passions dont même la tragédie de Mers-El-Kébir, en 1940, ne donne qu'une idée incomplète. Pourtant, dès 1904, l'entente cordiale était conclue ; quinze ans plus tard, elle devait permettre aux démocraties de sauver la liberté sur les champs de bataille du continent. Quoiqu'elle ait rapproché les gouvernements plus que les nations, elle montre que la France et la Grande-Bretagne savent se retrouver au coude-à-coude quand des motifs supérieurs entrent en jeu. Un mécanisme comparable peut donc être mis en route aujourd'hui.

Il existe, au demeurant, des facteurs favorables. Sur Israël, Paris et Londres ont rapproché leurs vues. Quant aux Six, ils parlent pratiquement d'une même voix avec l'Angleterre, en ce qui concerne l'Ostpolitik. Mais, surtout, l'Allemagne, la Grande-Bretagne et la France ont renoncé l'une après l'autre, à jouer isolément un rôle mondial. Autant de Gaulle posait avec force le postulat de l'ambition et de la grandeur nationales, autant MM. Pompidou, Heath et Brandt admettent qu'ils doivent s'unir pour agir utilement sur la scène internationale. A trop regarder vers l'Oural et le fleuve Jaune, le général avait fini par négliger l'Hexagone, le Rhin, les Alpes et la Manche.

On aperçoit, plus que jamais, après la déception du dernier « sommet » franco-allemand, les conséquences de cette tendance à placer l'univers avant l'Europe. Pour se limiter aux questions monétaires, on rappellera que les plus vives attaques contre la politique américaine sont venues, à Paris, de ceux qui refusèrent longtemps la participation britannique au Marché commun. Or l'une des conditions, non pas suffisante, mais nécessaire, d'une riposte de l'Europe aux Etats-Unis consiste à dissocier le couple livre-dollar, base du système monétaire international actuel qu'il s'agit de réformer. Tâche qui suppose évidemment le concours des Anglais, donc leur présence dans le Marché commun.

Avant de le recevoir à l'Elysée, M. Pompidou avait demandé à M. Heath l'engagement préalable de faire passer progressivement la livre du monde du dollar dans celui des monnaies européennes. Il l'a obtenu. Cela ne garantit nullement des solutions rapides, ni même satisfaisantes pour la France, surtout tant que persiste l'échec gouvernemental et présidentiel sur le front des prix. Toutefois, une chance se présente, qui n'existait pas auparavant.

Comme pour la politique étrangère, une action monétaire efficace des Dix impliquera davantage d'intégration et non pas moins. L'Europe élargie, si elle veut s'imposer, devra non seulement préserver les réalisations des Six — sous peine de provoquer une crise majeure dommageable aux membres anciens et nouveaux, — mais, contrairement aux apparences, aller plus loin.

RENÉ DABERNAT.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

August 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

August 13	Germany	10th anniversary of the Berlin Wall, built by East Germany to seal the border against the flight of East Germans to the West. (In July 1961 alone, a total of 30,444 refugees were registered at the West Berlin receiving center.)
August 19-24	USSR	35th anniversary of the Moscow Show Trial of the "16 Old Bolsheviks" -- a landmark in Stalin's Great Purge. The trial set in motion a mass witch-hunt for "Trotskyite traitors" in the USSR, which Stalin used to eliminate all rivals and consolidate his absolute power. Chief defendants at the trial, Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, had been co-members with Stalin in the triumvirate that ruled Russia during Lenin's illness. They were accused of having plotted the assassination of Sergey Kirov, a key Soviet leader killed in December 1934, and of being members of an international Trotskyite conspiracy that was planning to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders. In fact, it is now widely acknowledged that the real conspirators in Kirov's assassination were probably Stalin and members of the Soviet secret police.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	Anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, to put

		an end to Czechoslovak internal reform in 1968. Explaining the Soviet Union's "necessity" for invading a small neighboring country, Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev announced Communist countries reserve the right to invade other Communist countries to maintain Communist rule.
August 21	China	5th anniversary of the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1966 when Chinese teenagers called "Red Guards" entered Peking in a nationwide ideological campaign that brought education to a halt, disrupted industry, revived outmoded forms of medicine, and persecuted the intelligentsia.
August 21-25	Santiago	Latin American conference on Agrarian Reform sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions. The holding of the meeting in Santiago seems significant, but otherwise the meeting itself is likely to be far less important than Communist publicists will try to make it appear.
August 29-September 4	Sinaia, Romania	Annual Pugwash Conference of scientists from the Communist countries and the West.
August 31-September 3	Santiago	Meeting of North American and Latin American Youth and Students in solidarity with Vietnam, Cuba and Chile. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Demorcratic Youth and International Union of Students. The holding of the meeting in Santiago seems significant, but otherwise the

		meeting itself is likely to be far less important than Communist publicists will try to make it appear.
September 4-5 September 15	East Germany West Germany	The (Communist) World Peace Council is to hold two symposiums on European Security, the first in the GDR and the second in the Federal Republic. The WPC is currently trying to publicize a people-to-people approach to European Security so as to create public opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a governmental Conference on European Security "without prior conditions."
September 12-18	Dublin	38th International Congress of PEN, the respected writers organization. Representatives from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have sometimes attended previous congresses. However, the Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi M. Markov, told the 5th Soviet Writers Congress in Moscow on June 29th that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott PEN congresses, as it has done in recent years, because of Western criticism of Soviet literary policies, including the imprisonment of unorthodox writers in the Soviet Union.
September 13-24	New York	UN Preparatory Committee meets for the 1972 World Conference on Environmental Problems.
September 15	Bulgaria	25th anniversary of the Bulgarian Peoples Republic.
September 21	New York	United Nations General Assembly 26th session opens.

September 23-25	Santiago	1st Latin American Journalists Conference of the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists. The main objective of the conference is to establish a Latin American Journalists Federation affiliated to the IOJ. The conference is also to discuss "freedom of the press" -- although the main organizers of this conference come from Communist countries where freedom of the press is not tolerated (e.g., the beginning of a free press in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union invaded that country).
September 27-October 13	Japan Europe	Emperor Hirohito is to visit Belgium, the UK, West Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. It will be the first trip abroad for a reigning Emperor of Japan.
October 30	USSR	150th anniversary of the birth of Fyodor Dostoevski.

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LONDON OBSERVER
18 July 1971

THE EXIT DOSSIER

DR ZHORES MEDVEDEV is a distinguished Soviet biochemist who by 1960, at the age of 35, had made an international reputation through his pioneering work in gerontology, the science of biological ageing. As a consequence he began to receive invitations to attend international congresses, deliver important lectures in America, England and elsewhere, work alongside American colleagues. All these invitations came to nothing: the Soviet authorities refused to let him travel.

But Medvedev would not take the ban lying down. Between 1960 and 1967, in face of mounting official displeasure, he stubbornly argued the case for scientific co-operation between the Soviet Union and the outside world, carrying the struggle to the highest level—the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party—while, from outside, Western scientists of the highest repute pleaded on his behalf.

It seems likely that Medvedev was first frowned on by officialdom (abetted by sycophantic elements of the Soviet scientific establishment) because of his known opposition to the cult of T. D. Lysenko, the charlatan geneticist who became a sort of dictator of Soviet biology, set it back many years, and caused the physical destruction of the great geneticist, N. I. Vavilov, and others. But he did not begin his book on the history of Lysenkoism until 1961, and he did not attempt (in vain) to publish it in Russia until 1967. But in 1969 it was published in America. Soon afterwards Medvedev was dismissed from his post, and in the following year forcibly incarcerated for some months in one of those notorious mental hospitals which, in the last decade, have been a standing threat to all critics of any aspect of the Soviet system. He was released only after vigorous and persistent protests by a formidable array of fellow scientists and scholars, including the celebrated physicist, Peter Kapitsa.

Before this climacteric, Medvedev had written the book now offered in English as 'The Medvedev Papers.' It consists of detailed accounts of his own brushes with officialdom arising from the ban on his projected journeys, together with the no less lamentable experiences of others, closely argued chapters critical of the situation exposed by these encounters, and a very remarkable section in which the scientist sets himself to work, using the investigative techniques employed in the laboratory, to establish the nature of the Soviet postal censorship and precisely how it works.

Although the book is written dead-pan, its neutral tones relieved by the most good-humoured irony, often extremely funny, it is sustained by a passionate conviction that science must die unless nourished by the free exchange of ideas and the results of original research—and haunted by shame at the ignominy into which obscurantist policies have plunged the author's beloved land.

An invaluable aspect of the book is the view it provides of the Soviet bureaucracy at work in its innermost recesses, and, in particular, of the extraordinary series of Chinese walls raised up to restrict intercourse with the outside world. The following very limited extracts give the answer to all those of us who have wondered at the eccentric attitudes that govern the appearance—or non-appearance—of Soviet delegates at international gatherings. Replies to invitations are slow in coming, or do not come at all. Belated acceptances are cancelled with implausible excuses, or none at all. Concerts are cancelled, performers changed without notice. Lecturers are substituted. Medvedev tells us the sort of thing that happens behind the scenes of these imbroglios.

* * *

In April 1960 *Dr Medvedev received an invitation to the Fifth International Congress of Gerontologists to be held in San Francisco in the following August. He obtained permission to accept and at once set about obtaining the necessary papers:*

'An "exit dossier" for a trip to capitalist countries . . . consists of course, of a series of long forms similar to the "security forms" for those about to work in a secret establishment. These forms include the usual questions on near relatives, any terms of imprisonment, and a description of all posts which the intending traveller has held in his entire life. In addition the "exit dossier" includes a detailed autobiography, copies of birth certificates of children, a copy of the marriage certificate, medical report, itinerary of the journey indicating the duration and the purpose of the visit, and a character reference.

'All the papers are made out in duplicate, and to them must be affixed 12 photographs. The character references, which must indicate political maturity and moral stability, must be endorsed in triplicate by all one's immediate public and administrative superiors and confirmed at a meeting of the [local] Party Bureau or Party Committee and then at a meeting of the Bureau of the Regional Party Committee. . . . After this it is endorsed with the Regional Committee seal. It must then be forwarded to the Ministry [*in Medvedev's case at that time the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education*] and then to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.'

Later in his account, Medvedev gives more detail about the questionnaire:—

The close relatives have to be listed 'not merely by name, but giving the dates of their birth and death, where they worked or work, home address and degree of kinship. This is a considerable task for those with a large family, or born into one. . . . One must list every place of employment during one's whole life and all the jobs held in those places, answer the question as to whether one was oneself—or one's close relatives were—taken prisoner or interned during the Second World War, indicate the number of scientific papers or inventions, place of study, and much other information about prizes, elective posts, etc.'

The marriage certificate and *two* copies of the birth certificates of any children are required 'not, of course, because one is travelling with one's family. It is simply that the higher authorities must have proof that the candidate . . . is a respectable father of a family, that is, a man bound to his fatherland not only by love of his country but also by family ties.'

Finally: 'Into the "exit dossier" also goes a health certificate in a special form and made out from careful observation (X-ray, cardiogram, blood-pressure, general and cerebral, neuropathological analysis of blood and urine). . . . The most important thing is to make sure that the tourist will not die in the next 10 days due to change of climate! But the certificate is issued four to five months before departure, and no one examines the travellers just before they leave!'

By the end of May the Minister had formally approved the trip, and Medvedev thought he was home and dry. He soon discovered that yet another hurdle, the most formidable of all, still lay ahead. This was the 'Exit Commission.'

'Only the "Exit Commission" could consider the information about the would-be traveller from his "file" in the

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This article is based on 'The Medvedev Papers,' to be published on 29 July by Macmillan, price £4.95.

organs of State security. And only after this stage had gone through did the "exit dossier" go to the Ministry of External Affairs, where a foreign passport was prepared for the traveller and a visa sought for him from the appropriate embassy.'

It was at this stage that Medvedev's application came to grief. Later he elaborates on the process in the 'Exit Commission' where the quasi-public information in the 'exit dossier' is married with the secret files of the KGB.

'. . . in these files are concealed all the secret faults and shortcomings of the candidate, everything that has been written about him by informers and intelligence men during the whole of his life. The KGB does not open its "files" to elected Party workers. It only gives a special certificate, objecting or approving. . . . But, by its very nature, only negative information goes into the "files." Intelligence men do not waste time recording the creditable events in people's lives.'

Medvedev received no explanation of the adverse decision. He was simply told that he must write to America at once excusing himself on the grounds of pressure of work or illness or 'family commitments.' He demanded an interview and, in due course, was received by the Minister's deputy, a Professor Prokofiev, who said it would be best if he pleaded ill-health :—

'The discussion began to get heated. I said that I should write the real reason—the fact that the Ministry had refused me the trip. Prokofiev became indignant and accused me of lack of patriotism. According to him an honourable Soviet citizen would never blame any Government department to foreigners. With this we parted, but, as I found out, he at once rang up the Rector of the Timirazev Academy and recommended that educational [*i.e., disciplinary*] measures should be applied to me.'

Despite the ban, Medvedev telegraphed to America that the Ministry 'could not approve' his trip and then addressed a memorandum (fortified by strong appeals to the Ministry by American colleagues) direct to the mysterious head of the 'Exit Commission.' This, he discovered, was none other than the veteran Party Secretary and Presidium member, our old friend Mikhail Suslov, one of the dozen or so top men in the USSR. Such is the remarkable degree of centralisation achieved by the Soviet bureaucracy, such the fearful importance attached to the problem whether Comrade X or Comrade Y should be allowed to set foot outside the Soviet Union. In Suslov's office he was received by an 'elderly and imposing woman' called Fillipovna, who opened the bowling :—

'"Comrade Medvedev, do you read the papers?"

'"Of course I read them."

'"Obviously you do not read them very well. You ought to know that they are sending U-2 planes over, and dropping spies by parachute. And you've been getting ready to visit them!"

'"It's not going visiting, it's a congress, and anyway, it's an international congress, not an American one."

'"Well, so it's international, but if this international congress were in West Germany, would you still want to go?"

'A conversation begun in this style was no good omen. To all my arguments, Fillipovna brought out the standard demagogic answers. When I tried to show that if Soviet scientists took part in international congresses it would help to raise the prestige of Soviet science, Fillipovna at once rejected my arguments: "We don't need the recognition of American pseudo-scientists, we got our sputniks up first. . . ." When I reminded her that the trip was being paid for by the Organising Committee of the Congress, her reaction was no less swift: "We don't need charity from American capitalists." When I asked her why this had happened in my particular case, although a delegation from the USSR was going to take part in the Congress [*he had lately discovered this*] Fillipovna beamed: "Good, so they're going! They'll come back and tell you what went on. They'll bring you the materials you're worrying about. The Central Committee knows who needs to be sent. . . ." When I tried to show the need for greater progress in gerontology in the USSR she reacted in just the same manner. "That's not your worry. When it's necessary, we of the Central Committee will worry about it! . . ."

That was in 1960. In subsequent years Dr Medvedev tried to accept three more invitations. On one occasion he discovered that the invitation from the famous Hungarian scientist, Professor Verzar, to the Seventh International Congress of Gerontology in Vienna, had been declined on his behalf, and without a word to him, by both the Academy of Medical Science and the Ministry of Health. Both said he would be too busy a year from then. On another, an invitation to work for a year in America with his American opposite number came to grief partly because of Medvedev's activity on behalf of the wife of the great novelist, Solzhenitsyn, a fellow scientist (a hair-raising tale of viciousness in itself), partly because he refused to act as an informer for the KGB.

The third was an invitation to give a lecture in Sheffield sponsored by the Ciba Foundation, designed to promote international co-operation in medical and chemical research.

This time the Soviet Ministry of Health seemed incapable of understanding that the Foundation was not a commercial enterprise, and Medvedev was sharply reprimanded 'for breaking the regulations about correspondence with foreign firms.' Only when backed by urgent appeals to the Minister and the State Committee on Science and Technology from Ciba's director and a number of his most respected Soviet colleagues was he able to tackle the Central Committee on a higher level than before. At first he was encouraged by the response. All would be well, he was assured, but this time a different technique was used. Instead of committing itself to an outright refusal the relevant section of the Central Committee simply delayed matters until it was too late to act. But Medvedev had managed to get his lecture to Sheffield to be read there, and with it a brave letter which ran, in part :—

'Dear Colleagues and Friends,

'It is a great disappointment for me not to be able to come to your country and to participate personally in the very important and interesting symposium. The preparation of this lecture occupied all my thoughts, my time and my hopes these last several months, and this work gave me great pleasure and satisfaction. . . .

'The Ciba Foundation, the British Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR, my friends here and myself all did our best to arrange the trip to Sheffield, but the stupidity of the whole arrangement system here, based on the law of counter-action much more than the laws of co-operation, was stronger. This 15-stage system from low to top level is the most shameful survival of past distrust in people and I hope very much that this system, as any other thing in this world, ages and will die with time. . . .

Medvedev had regarded this occasion as the crowning moment of his career. Instead it so happened that on that very day in September 1966 he was due to start his stint of potato harvesting, in accordance with an old Soviet custom—now being followed in Mao's China—whereby all urban brainworkers (but not politicians) are required to show their solidarity with the masses by doing manual labour :—

'Early in the morning, I set my watch to British time. My lecture was to take place at the evening session. The morning was given over to two sessions on problems of the ageing of plants. I was listed as chairman of one of them. In Obninsk, however, a sterner task awaited me. . . .

'That morning, with my colleagues from our laboratory, I travelled 25 kilometres by bus, out to the State farm. In Sheffield they were just getting ready for the first morning session, someone else was in the chairman's seat instead of me, while we were carrying baskets and starting to sort the potatoes, moving back and forth along the furrows. . . . The potatoes had to be collected, sorted into large and small, and the large ones loaded into the backs of the lorries. The small ones went to the farmyard. We finished our working day at around 4 o'clock. By this time the second morning session in Sheffield was over.

'The dinner in Sheffield was at 18.30 British Summer Time. In Obninsk, I had a few of my friends coming to my home at this time. The dinner in Sheffield did not last long, the lecture followed it. But we in Obninsk had no need to hurry, and we sat over it talking. When by my reckoning my explanation might well be

being read in Sheffield, I too read it aloud to my own guests.

'"Dear Colleagues and Friends.

'"It is a great disappointment for me . . ."'

It was a great disappointment for his English colleagues too, who had been kept in uncertainty for months while the great Soviet machine laboured and finally shuddered to a standstill. Almost the very next day Medvedev was interested to read in Pravda *an ecstatic account of the 'fruitful meetings between scientists of the world,' promoted by, in its wisdom, the Soviet Government.*

WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1971

'Bourgeois' Influences Hit by Romania

From News Dispatches

VIENNA, July 7—The Romanian Communist Party, in a sweeping ideological proclamation, today ordered a crackdown on "bourgeois" influences in art and education and on laziness on the job.

The nine-page, 17-point proclamation, unanimously endorsed by the party's central committee on Monday and published today, called for strict Marxist-Leninist guidelines on everything from television and ballet to dinner music in restaurants. In the process, it reinforced Romania's reputation as one of the most rigid East European nations.

The official news agency Agerpress said the proclamation was proposed personally by President Nicolae Ceausescu, who visited China last month.

The directive will probably come as a blow to younger Romanians, who have been increasingly fascinated by Western culture in recent years. It may also spell the end of such American television programs as "Dr. Kildare" and "The Untouchables," which have been appearing regularly on Romanian television.

Ceausescu said that Romanian television should portray peasants more often, and that the educational and socialist role of radio and TV programs must be enhanced.

"Arts must serve the people, the homeland, the socialist society," he said. Films, plays, operas, operettas and ballets that are inspired by the Romanian people's fight for socialism must find more room in the national repertory, he said.

A principal target will be youth, especially "parasites"—a Communist term for dropouts who live off their parents. The party must encourage them to work on building sites and public utility work, the president decreed.

Political training in colleges and schools is to be intensified, and the ministry of education was instructed to inject ideological training into the curriculum and to staff educational departments with party activists.

In recent months, Ceausescu stepped up economic and military cooperation with the rest of the Eastern bloc, proclaimed his independence at the Soviet Party congress, made a well-publicized state visit to China, signed a transportation agreement with the United States and business deals with U.S. firms; and sent his foreign minister to such diverse destinations as Canada, Finland and Poland.

An editorial today in the official party newspaper Scinteia praised the year-old Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty and promised to come to the aid of the Soviet Union if it is attacked.

WASHINGTON POST
23 July 1971

Romania Praising Soviet Peace Move

VIENNA, July 22 (UPI)—Romania kept up its delicate balancing act between Soviet Union, the United States and China today by publishing lavish praise for Soviet diplomacy.

The lengthy article in the Communist party newspaper Scinteia followed by one day another Scinteia article which could be construed as hinting confirmation of reports that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu had played a role in the Chinese invitation to President Nixon.

The article today said the letter which Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko sent of the United Nations "reflects the outstandingly important role the Soviet Union . . . plays in international life, in the struggle for detente and peace."

The article appeared to be an attempt to placate the Soviets after the recent burst of Romanian praise for the Chinese-American rapprochment.

TIEMPO, Montevideo
25 June 1971

Historia, presente y porvenir

Las Víctimas de los "Frentes Amplios"

Las alianzas, los pactos, los compromisos se consagran para cumplirlos. Un acuerdo político, en nuestras reglas morales, tiene por objeto, sí, extraer beneficios del mismo a los fines establecidos en él. Pero esos beneficios son comunes a los concertantes de los mismos, lo que importa un límite para ese provecho: la utilidad común. Cuando existen renuncios, los pactos se denuncian o a lo sumo los pactos se violan. Y uno de los firmantes, como máximo, no cumple lo estipulado. Le niega posiciones de gobierno al otro; se niega a cumplir determinados puntos programáticos; actúa aisladamente o concerta pactos con el adversario. Pero no pasan de ser maniobras de carácter político. Censurables, reprobables, pero generalmente limitadas a ese nivel.

Con los comunistas, históricamente, universalmente, doctrinariamente, la situación es distinta. Los partidos comunistas buscan alianzas, pactos y compromisos, pero su objetivo no es cumplir con su palabra. Es mantenerlos vigentes mientras les conviene, y, una vez consolidada su situación, traicionar a sus aliados de la víspera, que son, una vez alcanzado el poder, las primeras víctimas. No se trata de medidas estrictamente políticas. O, por ejemplo, de actuar separadamente, pero por medios legítimos, para cumplir con sus propósitos específicos, sectarios, de partido, que fueren más allá de lo acordado. Se trata de la traición física, del acto de asesinar, secuestrar, desterrar, encarcelar o hacer desaparecer a sus "compañeros de ruta".

En Chile el Partido Comunista muestra, a esta altura, una cautelosa tranquilidad que no es un producto, por cierto, de su lealtad hacia sus aliados. Lo que ocurre es que esta no es la primera vez que en Chile gana un candidato producto de un Frente común: En 1946 fue electo el candidato radical, Gabriel González Videla, integrado su gabinete ministerial con tres comunistas. Los ministros del Partido Comunista, en los cinco meses de su gestión, no cumplieron con sus fines programáticos: por el contrario aprovecharon de su influencia gubernamental para intentar debilitar a los demás partidos y a los sindicatos que no se dejaban dominar por los comunistas. El Presidente hizo renunciar a sus ministros comunistas y estos contestaron con una ofensiva sindical en gran escala. El gobierno hubo de disponer la ilegalidad del partido comunista, no así del partido socialista, lo que señala un distingo elocuente.

Hoy el partido comunista no es la mayoría centro del frente común chileno; hay una mayoría socialista, y la experiencia de 1946 hace más cautos a los comunistas.

Por otra parte, si trataran de "copar" el gobierno, traicionando a sus aliados y usurpando el poder, si ganan, a lo suma, ganan Chile, pero se cierran automáticamente las perspectivas de participar en otros Frentes, particularmente en nuestro país, que es el único donde éste se ha materializado, aparte de Chile, en el curso de la historia.

Pero, dejando de lado esas consideraciones tácticas que por tales son momentáneas, la finalidad de "utilizar" a los restantes grupos —como señalaba Lenin en 1899, criticando al socialista Pablo Axelrod— en lugar de usar los "términos 'apoyar' o 'alianza'"— sigue siendo la misma.

Todos los partidos comunistas, incluído el nuestro, apoyaron la traición de Castro a los partidos, sectores y líderes aliados en la lucha contra Batista una vez alcanzado el poder: desde compañeros de su propio Movimiento "26 de Julio", hasta los Partidos "Auténtico" e incluso "Ortodoxo" al que decía ser fiel, pasando por el "Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano" M.O.L. hasta llegar a la Masonería de Cuba tanto como al Obispo Doza Masvidal —expulsados por igual— e incluyendo el mismísimo Presidente por él designado, el Dr. Manuel Urrutia y su primer Primer Ministro Dr. Miró Cardona, (dos hombres que revisten una peculiar analogía con los Sres. Seregni y Crotoggini) hoy en el destierro.

La "unidad" de los Partidos Comunistas con [illegible] movimientos [illegible] partidos [illegible]

res, a quienes, como decía Lenin, se debe "utilizar" (aunque sea un "aliado temporal, vacilante, inestable, condicional y poco digno de confianza") para obtener "a través de todos los compromisos, cuando éstos son inevitables, permanecer fiel a sus... objetivos, a su tarea de preparar el camino para la revolución bajo el principio moral de "recurrir a toda clase de estratagemas, maniobras y métodos ilegales, a evasiones y subterfugios", desde que "moral es todo lo que favorece a la revolución e inmoral todo lo que la perjudica": esa "unidad", repetimos, no tiene ningún halo romántico ni está revestida de la marca de la lealtad y fidelidad, sino cargada no sólo del peligro sino de la certeza de la traición. Esta puede producirse más tarde o más temprano, conforme a la táctica a utilizarse, pero es tan inevitable como la lucha final que informa la existencia misma del movimiento comunista: hacer la revolución comunista.

No es la primera vez en la historia que los comunistas operan en unidad de acción o unidad orgánica con sectores no comunistas. En España, Francia, Chile, China, la propia U. Soviética, el frentismo es una táctica tan vieja como el comunismo. El saldo ha sido aleccionador. Sólo la pasión de momento o la "arrogancia ideológica" de la "izquierda" no comunista, que disfruta más del placer de posar de exentos de "prejuicios" en su ignara postura presuntuosamente "antirreaccionaria", cuidadosamente atildada, que puede pasar por alto esta realidad incontrovertible. Para quienes cuidan más su "prestancia ideológica" y "independencia de criterio", antes que [illegible] las [illegible] doctrinarias, sino

la existencia misma de sus propios partidos políticos, les dedicamos una entrega informativa, sobre qué ha ocurrido con los Michelini, Rodríguez Camusso, Roballo, Seregni, Crottogini, Villar, Juan Pablo Terra, José Pedro Cardoso, Vivián Trías y otros etcéteras que hicieron alianzas con los comunistas, así como cuál fue el destino de sus Partidos Políticos una vez alcanzado el poder.

Líderes Políticos no Comunistas

POLONIA

	Función en el Frente	Destino
S. MIKOLAYSZYK Partido Campesino Polaco	Vicepresidente del Consejo Dirigente del Partido	Refugiado en Occidente
KAROL POPIEL Demócrata Cristino	Presidente del Partido	Desterrado

HUNGRIA

FERENC NAGY P. Pequeños Propietarios		Desterrado
BELA KOVACS P. Pequeños Propietarios	Secretario General del Partido.	Preso por los rusos. Luego desaparecido
ANTAL BEN Social Demócrata	Ministro de Industria	Muerto en el destierro
ANNA KETHLY Social Demócrata	Vicepresidente del Partido	Apresado. Más tarde libre.
AGOSTON VALENTINY Social Demócrata	Ministro de Justicia	Preso.
ODON HISHAZY Social Demócrata	Presidente sindicato.	Preso.

CHECOSLOVAQUIA

JAN MASARYK [illegible] Checo	Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.	Suicidado o asesinado.
Dr. ZENKY P. Socialista Checo	Presidente del Partido. Vicepresidente del Consejo.	Refugiado en Occidente.
Dr. RIPKA P. Socialista Checo	Ministro de Comercio.	Refugiado en Occidente.
Dr. DRTINA P. Socialista Checo	Ministro de Justicia.	Tentativa de suicidio. Encarcelado.
Dr. STRANSKY P. Socialista Checo	Ministro de Educación.	Refugiado en Occidente.
JAN SRAMEK Partido Popular	Presidente del Partido. Vice Presidente del Consejo.	Encarcelado.
Dr. PROCHAZKA Partido Popular	Ministro de Salud.	Refugiado en EE.UU.
FRANTISEK HALA Partido Popular	Ministro de Comunicaciones.	Muerto en prisión.
VACLAC MAJER Partido Social Demócrata	Ministro de Abastecimientos.	Refugiado en Occidente.
VOJTECH DUNDR Social Demócrata	Secretario del Partido.	Encarcelado.
Dr. LETTRICH Demócrata Eslovaco	Presidente del Partido.	Refugiado en Occidente.

BULGARIA

NIKOLAS PETKOV Nacional Campesino	Jefe del Partido. Vicepresidente del Consejo.	Ahorcado.
ANGEL DERZANSKI Partido Agrario	Ministro de Ferrocarriles.	Encarcelado.
BORIS BUMBAROV Partido Agrario	Ministro de Obras Públicas.	Encarcelado.
PETKO STOYANOV Independiente	Ministerio de Hacienda.	Encarcelado.
KOSTA LOULTCHEV Socialista Demócrata	Secretario del Partido.	Encarcelado.
DAMIAN VELTCHEV Prof. VENELINES GAVNEV	Ministro de Guerra. Jefe de Estado.	Muerto en el destierro. Encarcelado.

RUMANIA

IULIU MANIU Partido Nacional Campesino	Jefe de Partido.	Encarcelado.
EMILIO HATIEGANU Partido Nacional Campesino	Ministro de Justicia.	Encarcelado.
ION MIHALACHE Partido Nacional Campesino	Vicepresidente del Partido.	Encarcelado.
TITEL PETRESCU Partido Social Demócrata	Vicepresidente del Consejo. Secretario del Partido.	Encarcelado.
DINO BRTIANU Partido Liberal.	Ministro de Producción de Guerra. Secretario General del Partido.	Encarcelado.
General NIC RADECU Partido Nacional Campesino	Primer Ministro.	Muerto en el destierro.
NICOLAS PENESCU Partido Nacional Campesino	Ministro del Interior. Secretario General del Partido.	Encarcelado.

ALEMANIA DEL ESTE

JACOBO KREISER Partido Demócrata Cristiano	Presidente del Partido.	Refugiado en Occidente.
ERNST LEMMER Partido Demócrata Cristiano	Vice Presidente del Partido.	Refugiado en Occidente.

DIRIGENTES POLITICOS PRO MARXISTAS, MARXISTAS Y/O OPORTUNISTAS, DE PARTIDOS NO COMUNISTAS DEL "FRENTE"

POLONIA

E. OSOBKA - MORAWSKI Partido Socialista.	Primer Ministro.	Emigrado (1947, expulsado del Partido) 1949 encarcelado.
W. RZYMOWSKI Partido Demócrata	Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.	Eliminado (1947).
Dr. F. LITWIN Partido Campesino	Ministro de Salud.	Eliminado (1947).
W. WIDI - WIRSKI Partido Cristiano Obrero	Dirigente del Partido. Miembro de Presidencia.	Dimitió (1947).
J. STANCZKY Partido Socialista	Ministro de Asuntos Sociales.	Eliminado (1946).
M. ROLA - ZYMIERSKI	Mariscal de Polonia. Ministro de Defensa.	Eliminado (1949). Reemplazado por el Mariscal Soviético Rakosovski (1951). Encarcelado.

HUNGRIA

ZOLTAN TILDY Partido Pequeños Propietarios	Primer Ministro. Presidente de la República.	Encarcelado.
LAJOS DIDIYES Partido Pequeños Propietarios	Ministro de Defensa.	Rebajado a Presidente del Instituto Agrícola Experimental (1948).
A. SZAKASITS Ex Social Demócrata	Presidente del Partido Obrero. Vicepresidente del Consejo de la República.	Encarcelado.
ISTVAN RIESZ Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Justicia.	Encarcelado. Muerto en prisión.
GYORGY MAPOSAN Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Industria.	Encarcelado.

BULGARIA

ALEX OBBOV Partido Agrario	Vicepresidente del Consejo	Purgado.
STEFAN TONTCHEV Partido Agrario	Ministro de Comunicaciones.	Purgado. Encarcelado.
PETER KAMENOV Partido Agrario	Ministro de Obras Públicas.	Encarcelado.
M. GENOVSKI Partido Agrario	Ministro de Agricultura.	Eliminado.
D. NEIKOV Partido Social Demócrata	Ministro de Comercio.	Eliminado. Desaparecido.
G. POPOV Partido Social Demócrata	Vice Primer Ministro.	Eliminado.

RUMANIA

S. VOITEC Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Educación.	Rebajado y eliminado de la Dirección del Partido.
L. RADECEANU Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Trabajo.	Rebajado y descartado en la Dirección del Partido.
T. IONESCU Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Minas.	Rebajado. Sin novedad.
G. TORDACHESCU Ex Social Demócrata	Ministro de Obras Públicas.	Descartado del Gabinete y dirección del Partido.
G. TIATARESCU Liberal disidente	Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Dirigente del Partido.	Encarcelado.
A. ALEXANDRINI Liberal disidente	Ministro de Hacienda.	Encarcelado.

ALEMANIA DEL ESTE

G. DERTINGER Demócrata Cristiano	Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.	Encarcelado.
K. HAMANN P. Demócrata Liberal	Ministro de Comercio.	Encarcelado.
H. KASTNER Demócrata Liberal	Vice Presidente del Consejo.	Suspendido.
M. PESHNER Ex Demócrata Social	Ministro de Justicia.	Eliminado. Fuera del Partido.

SUERTE DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN LOS FRENTES AMPLIOS

CON LOS COMUNISTAS

Como en el caso de los líderes políticos, los Partidos Comunistas no fueron más benignos con los partidos auténticos que con los mismos "partidos de fachada" por ellos inspirados para ensanchar la imagen de "amplitud" suprepartidaria del frente. Damos, en primer lugar, lo que ocurrió con los partidos políticos independientes que aceptaron actuar en común con los Partidos Comunistas. Luego agregamos la suerte corrida por partidos paralelos, más o menos controlados por los comunistas, pero que no constituían el Partido Comunista propiamente dicho, lo cual les depara, por sí mismo, un destino no menos desdichado que los restantes movimientos y partidos no comunistas o, incluso, no marxistas.

Partidos Auténticos

POLONIA

Partido Campesino Polaco
Barrido por arrestos y purgas. Sus dirigentes obligados a huir del país en 1947.
Nueva dirección títere impuesta por la fuerza.
Unido al partido títere en 1947.
El partido títere es hoy día poco numeroso, carece de fuerza; no posee prensa diaria.

Partido Cristiano Laborista
Partido disuelto por los dirigentes que partieron al destierro (1946). Reconstituído como partido títere. Fusionado luego.

HUNGRIA

Partido de los Pequeños Propietarios
Purgado en reiteradas ocasiones (1946-1947) Dirigentes arrestados o desterrados (1946-1947). Actualmente es un partido comparsa sin organización ni prensa.

Partido Social Demócrata
Purgado repetidas veces en 1948. Sus restos fusionados con los comunistas (1948).

Partido Nacional Campesino
Aniquilado por los comunistas, hoy día no tiene ninguna importancia. Sin organización, ni prensa, es un partido-comparsa.

Partido Demócrata Burgués
Fusionado con el partido radical, antes de oposición, en 1949. Virtualmente inexistente.

BULGARIA

Partido Agrario
Dirección títere impuesta en 1945. Verdadero partido reconstituído en la oposición en 1945. Partido suprimido en 1947; dirigentes ahorcados y encarcelados en 1947-50.

Partido Social Demócrata
Dirección títere impuesta en 1945. Verdadero partido reconstituído en la oposición en 1945. Partido suprimido en 1948; dirigentes en prisión (1949).

Partido Republicano
Reclutamiento [illegible] "unitariamente" en el Frente (1949).

RUMANIA

Partido Nacional Campesino
Reemplazado por el grupo títere en 1945. Dirigentes encarcelados en 1947. Partido suprimido el mismo año.

Partido Liberal
Sustituído por un grupo títere en 1945. Dirigentes encarcelados en 1947. Partido suprimido el mismo año.

Partido Social Demócrata
Dirección títere impuesta en 1945. Partido auténtico, probó sin resultado reconstituirse en la oposición 1945-46.

CHECOSLOVAQUIA

Partido Socialista Checo
Purgado y dirección títere impuesta en 1948. Partido reducido a cero.

Partido Social Demócrata
Purgado. Dirección títere impuesta en 1948. Fusionado con los comunistas en 1948.

Partido Popular
Dirección títere impuesta en 1948; purgado; partido reducido a cero.

Partido Laborista Eslovaco
Fusionado por la fuerza con los comunistas en 1948.

Partido Demócrata Eslovaco
Dirección títere impuesta. Purgado. Rebautizado como Partido del Renacimiento Eslovaco en 1948, reducido a cero.

Partido Eslovaco de la Libertad
Purgado en 1948. Reducido a cero.

ALEMANIA DEL ESTE

Partido Social Demócrata
Fusionado por la fuerza con los comunistas en el S.E.D. (Partido Socialista Unificado) en 1946.

Partido Demócrata Cristiano
Dirección y miembros purgados en 1946-53, reducido a partido títere asociado.

Partido Demócrata Liberal
Dirección y miembros purgados en 1946-53. Reducido a partido títere asociado.

Partidos Laterales o Títeres

POLONIA

Partido Socialista Polaco
Purgado en 1947-48. Fusionado con los comunistas este último año.

Partido Campesino: Nuevo Partido Campesino Polaco de la Libertad
Títeres equivalentes al Partido Campesino Polaco. Fusionados en un "nuevo Partido Campesino 'Unificado'". Hoy constituye un vestigio sin importancia.

Partido Demócrata
Fusionado con el aliado títere del Partido Cristiano Laborista. Restos sin fuerza.

HUNGRIA

Partido Demócrata Independiente Húngaro
Primer Partido auténtico fuera del frente. Purgado, reemplazado por títere. Disuelto por el Frente en 1949. Restos sin importancia.

BULGARIA

Partido Agrario (Fracción gubernamental)
Continuamente purgado. Hoy día es un pequeño grupo; Unico partido "no comunista" sobreviviendo oficialmente en Bulgaria.

Partido Social Demócrata (Fracción gubernamental)
Purgado. Fusionado con los comunistas en 1948.

RUMANIA

Partido Social Demócrata (Fracción gubernamental)
Purgado. Fusionado con los comunistas en 1948.

Frente de los Trabajadores
Purgado; reducido a cero. Unico partido "no comunista" sobreviviente.

Partido Liberal (Fracción gubernamental)
Dirigentes arrestados. Partido abolido.

Partido Demócrata Cristiano
Ya no se menciona.

Partido Nacional Popular
Disuelto en 1949.

ALEMANIA DEL ESTE

Partido Demócrata Nacional
Dirigido por comunistas conocidos. Insignificante.

Partido Demócrata Campesino
Purgado. Algunos dirigentes refugiados en Occidente. Perdió la única cartera ministerial que tenía. Purgado y dirección títere impuesta en 1948.

(*) "Estudios sobre el comunismo". Año IV. Nº 12. Santiago de Chile. — Chile.

No poseemos, precisamente gracias a la libertad de que gozan partidos y líderes no comunistas para elegir celda o nicho, información más actualizada que las emergentes de la transcripción realizada.

Obsérvese que nos hemos limitado a exponer los hechos ocurridos. Excluímos, también, otras cuantiosas vertientes temáticas —el exilio masivo de voluminosos contingentes de ciudadanos opositores a los nuevos regímenes comunistas— ya que de alguna forma, en esta nota, deseábamos dirigirnos hacia una zona determinada del fenómeno frentista: los resultados de la sistemática traición comunista a los aliados de la víspera.

El argumento de que el Partido Comunista en el Uruguay no es partidario de la violencia lo pueden esgrimir los ancestralmente masoquistas políticos de origen liberal, democristiano o socialista, pero ni siquiera lo aceptan los propios comunistas: ellos no rechazan la vía revolucionaria, sino que la apiazan, sosteniendo, como cuestión de táctica, y no de principios, que "las condiciones" no están dadas [illegible] lo subjetivo del tema tanto como en lo dúctil de las circuns-

tancias está el brusco cambio de línea que adoptará inevitablemente el Partido Comunista en el Uruguay cuando se sienta en situación de "copar" el proceso y recién entonces despertarán de su largo sueño sus petulantes cómplices de hoy, acostados en la cucheta de una celda... o dormidos para siempre.

Lo que ocurrirá si el país cree en ellos; que marchan hacia su propio suicidio, como ellos confían en la cobra que hipnotiza a la alimaña.

Pero no ocurrirá eso, ya que el nuestro no es un pueblo compuesto de alimañas, ni la pasión, como tampoco las invenciones de fachada son capaces de producir en nuestras gentes ni confusiones ni falsos espejismos.

JUVENAL

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Draft Dodging In North Vietnam

SAIGON (WFS)—Deserting North Vietnamese soldiers, who have gone over to the side of the South Vietnam Government, say that draft dodging to avoid fighting is on the increase in North Vietnam.

The local population in North Vietnam has shown increasing signs of resistance to official efforts to draft young men into the army by sheltering those who try to avoid a call-up by moving away from their native villages.

In one village in Thanh Ha District, Hai Duong Province, some 20 out of 37 young men called up for service last year fled to other villages. There they avoided applying for a residence permit and so avoided being called up a second time.

Parents and friends tell the security police who come looking for a draftee who has failed to report that they do not know his whereabouts. Friends in the village to which he flees help support the youth and do not report his presence to the local police.

It is estimated that because of the sympathetic attitude shown to draft dodgers by many people, less than half are eventually caught. When this happens they are liable to be sentenced to three to six months' imprisonment, after which they are drafted into the forces. Should a draft dodger resist arrest, he is liable to a far heavier prison sentence.

The rate of desertion of young recruits put as high as 40 per cent in some units, is also causing the authorities concern.

Forty out of 100 men ordered from one unit to report to a communications school in Haiphong for training being sent to South Vietnam last year failed to turn up and all trace was lost of them.

Likewise, 30 out of 150 men from another unit based in the same province had deserted by the beginning of the course at the same training school.

Regular infantry training units face the same problem, so much so that the commander of one training battalion told the assembled trainees last July, at a training school in Quang Hinh province, that because of the increased rate of desertion—he gave no figures—they would be obliged to spend an extra four months in the unit studying military law and Ho Chi Minh's testament.

In spite of this, nine men were discharged from the same unit in December and sent to their home districts for thought reform because they were alleged to have contemplated deserting and to have asked other recruits to join them.