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
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June 1971

NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE DIPLOMACY

The North Korean subversive activities in Ceylon and the North Korean involvement in training Mexican guerrillas have served to put the spotlight on other North Korean subversive activities around the world. Last month in Ceylon, Prime Minister Madame Bandaranaike, closed the North Korean Embassy and expelled its staff; this, less than a year after her government had recognized North Korea. Earlier, Mexican authorities rounded up 19 Mexicans who had received financial assistance and guerrilla training from North Korea. The Mexicans had been recruited at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow and had been sent with Soviet assistance to Pyongyang for training. Five Soviet diplomats were expelled from Mexico City because of Soviet complicity in this venture. There is no North Korean diplomatic mission in Mexico.

During India's general elections in March the Indian authorities found it necessary to warn the North Korean mission to cease its interference in the election campaign. And most recently the Indian Government told officials of the North Korean Consulate General that they will be expelled if they persist in the "undersirable activities". These "undesirable activities" include organizing meetings aimed at giving instruction on guerrilla warfare and spending extravagant sums on propaganda.

In mid-April officials of the North Korean Embassy in Bucharest, Rumania made a spectacular attempt to kidnap the Belgian Ambassador in broad daylight. The Belgian managed to escape, as he was helped by the crowd attracted by the struggle between three North Koreans and the Ambassador.

At about the same time the North Korean Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic was forced to close. President Bokassa's suspicions had been aroused because of North Korean diplomats' illegally crossing the border between the Central African Republic and the Congo. Later when the CAR's Ambassador in Pyongyang was subjected to surveillance and harrassment, President Bokassa broke off relations and is now reported to be preparing to recognize South Korea.

Elsewhere in Africa several countries have refused to agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations with North

Korea. Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and Mauritius resisted a major drive for diplomatic recognition by North Korea during 1969. Upper Volta was particularly annoyed when a North Korean delegation refused to leave after having overstayed its visit. And on the island of Mauritius, the North Koreans' heavy-handed attempts to gain recognition visibly annoyed the Prime Minister and other officials. Although Zambia agreed to recognize North Korea, the Zambians have consistently rejected North Korean scholarship offers to young political leaders because they want to avoid extended Communist political indoctrination of these future leaders.

Officials in Ghana broke off relations with North Korea shortly after Nkrumah was ousted in 1966. Also in 1966, Uruguay expelled a North Korean trade mission because of subversive activities. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa claimed on April 7, 1971 that North Korea was now one of the principal centers for training insurgents from Latin America and other countries. Nationals from Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela were all said to have attended guerrilla schools there.

North Korea has maintained close contact with the Palestine guerrillas. George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine visited Pyongyang last September to "learn and assimilate the experience of North Korea's great revolutionary struggle." And just before Habbash's visit, the North Koreans received a special envoy from Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. It was in September that the Palestine guerrillas engineered the mass hijacking of three commercial airliners. At least one of the guerrilla officers responsible for the hijacking had been trained in North Korea.

The Economist magazine in its issue of May 8, 1971 said:

CPYRGHT

"The training of insurgents is probably the most important and certainly the most dangerous aspect of North Korea's revolutionary programme. Since 1966, the Koreans have run a dozen training camps for foreigners: three in Pyongyang, two in Nampo, two in Wonsan and five scattered elsewhere which train North Koreans as well. Rebels from 25 countries are said to have been invited to Korea for courses lasting between six and 18 months; 1,300 from central and south America and 700 from Africa."

All the incidents and activities described above almost defy a rational explanation: Why does North Korea pursue

a worldwide program of support to guerrilla struggles which, in some areas, outdoes similar operations by Moscow and Peking? The explanation is in part ideological and in part emotional. Since 1945 North Korea has moved from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first, an ally of China, next a critic of both the USSR and China, and most recently a wary ally of both Communist powers. Emotionally, the leader of North Korea for the past 25 years, Kim Il Sung, has had one persistent compelling motivation and that is to establish himself as the leader of all Korea. Kim believes that the highest form of struggle for freedom is revolutionary violence. He considers himself the equal of Marx, the ideological successor to Ché Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and the only challenger to Mao. Kim's pursuit of unification and self-reliance is financially supported by both the USSR and China.

There is one interesting angle on the question of Soviet financial sponsorship of the North Korean activity in Asia. According to this theory the Soviet Union reached a conclusion that it could not hope to compete with the image of Mao Tse-tung in Asia and the Middle East and therefore extended aid to the North Koreans so that they could finance local subversive organizations. The Soviets hoped that by backing North Korea they could build up Kim Il Sung's image to the extent that he might somewhat deflect from Mao's appeal. The Soviets believe it is essential to reduce the influence of Mao even if they are unable to make Kim Il Sung support Soviet causes.

In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given moment Kim is swayed by realistic considerations, not by ideological niceties. In other words, Kim's revolutionary facilities are for sale to the highest bidder. Without the financial aid and other assistance received from both Moscow and Peking, Kim cannot maintain North Korea in the Revolutionary vanguard. On the other hand, among the many faces of international Communism, both the Soviets and Chinese clearly welcome, and encourage the fanatic, bruising brand of primitive Communist that Kim Il Sung represents.

ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT
1 May 1971

NORTH KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT

The Ceylon crisis has also served to put the spotlight on the subversive activities of the North Koreans in various parts of the third world. North Korea's mission in Ceylon was closed by Mrs Bandaranaike on 15 April, less than a year after her government had recognised the Pyongyang regime. The North Koreans are unofficially reported to have given lectures to the insurgents and may also have helped to finance the rebellion.

Though it received comparatively little publicity in the world's press, the Mexican Government announced about six weeks ago the capture of a number of guerrillas who had been trained in Pyongyang. Mexican extremists are said to have contacted the North Korean Embassy while in Moscow under a Soviet scholarship scheme. The North Koreans promised to provide financial help and politico-military training; and the first group of Mexicans left for Pyongyang in 1968. Two other groups have followed.

In the Middle East, North Korea has sedulously tried to establish influence in Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, South Yemen and the Lebanon. Friendship societies have been set up, and there have been exchange visits by delegations of trade unionists, journalists, lawyers and health experts as well as politicians and military chiefs. A number of technical co-operation agreements have been signed, one of the most recent being with South Yemen in the field of broadcasting.

North Korea has also shown interest in the Palestinian Liberation movement. **George Habbash**, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, spent some time in Pyongyang last September 'learning and assimilating the experience of your [North Korea's] great revolutionary struggle', according to the North Korean Central News Agency. A few weeks previously the North Koreans received a special envoy from **Yasser Arafat**, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Other contacts included a visit last year by the North Korean deputy chief-of-staff to Al Fatah bases, during which he was reported by the newspaper *Fatah* to have expressed North Korea's full support for the Palestine revolution.

Ceylon's experience with North Korea inevitably raises questions about the extent to which the Pyongyang regime might be using diplomatic activity as a cover for subversion. The North Korean embassy in Tanzania has already provided courses for dissidents from independent African countries such as Kenya, Cameroun and Burundi.

In addition, African 'freedom fighters' from colonial territories are among those who have been trained at North Korean training centres which were placed at the disposal of guerrillas. This followed the decision of the Cuban-sponsored Afro-Asian-Latin American Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO) in 1966 to set up a number of such centres. The Chilean newspaper, *La Prensa*, claimed on 7 April that North Korea was now one of the 'principal centres' for training insurgents from Latin America and other developing countries.

The Economist

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7 May 1971

Kidnapping, spying and organizing guerrilla war in Asia and Latin America

North Korea's diplomatic 'dirty tricks'

The Indian Government have now told officials at the North Korean Consulate-General in Delhi that they will be expelled if they persist in their "undesirable activities". The North Korean mission has been put under watch.

This warning follows by some three weeks the sudden expulsion from Ceylon of the North Korean Ambassador and members of his staff at the height of the left-wing rising. The reasons for their expulsion were not disclosed. The North Koreans were reported to have given lectures to the insurgents and are believed to have helped to finance the rebellion. It was noted that the Chinese Ambassador was at the airport to wish them farewell.

As for "undesirable activities" by North Koreans in India, they have since last autumn spent what were for them inordinately extravagant sums on hostile propaganda in newspaper advertising campaigns—\$54,000 according to a complaint by Mr. Song Choi Woon, the Consular-General of South Korea—and have also organized meetings aimed at giving instruction on guerrilla warfare to those who attended.

These incidents in Ceylon and India have focused attention on North Korean diplomats generally and from a survey of incidents it is clear enough that for the last two years at least North Korea has been working with China, or for China, in subversive activities all over the world. In places where China has no diplo-

matic representation of her own or in some places where she has, notably Ceylon, North Korea has been acting as front-runner or agent for China, on a scale greater than she could have been expected to do on her own and presumably, therefore, with Chinese funds.

That at least is the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from instances of irregular and costly activity by North Korean diplomats in Asia, Africa, Europe or Central and South America.

The "undesirable activities" in which North Korean diplomats have been indulging include the organization of guerrilla training and the financing of guerrilla action, spying and kidnapping. To this may be added the more legitimate tasks of advertising their own brand of revolution and the granting of interest-free loans in politically important and sensitive areas.

The organization of guerrilla training has been going on for at least two years. Clear evidence of this was produced in March this year by the Mexican Government who announced the capture of a number of Mexican guerrillas who had been trained in Pyongyang. Mexican extremists sent to Moscow on Soviet scholarships are said to have contacted the North Korean Embassy there and been promised financial help and politico-military training. The first group of Mexicans left for North Korea in 1968. Two other groups have followed.

The Chilean newspaper *La Prensa* claimed on April 7, 1971 that North Korea was now one of the "principle centres" for training insurgents from Latin America and other developing countries. Nationals from Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela, were all said to have attended in addition to the Mexicans. North Korea also developed close contacts with leaders of the Palestine guerrillas last autumn when the crisis between the guerrillas and the Jordanian Government was coming to a head.

Dr. George Habbash, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was visiting North Korea at the time of the hi-jacking of British, American and Swiss aircraft on September 6. He remained there during the negotiations on the release of the prisoners; was apparently much feted and was reported to be seeking assistance from North Korea, North Vietnam and China. Previously the North Korean deputy chief of staff visited Al-Fatah bases in Jordan.

In Africa the North Korean Embassy in Tanzania has provided courses for dissidents from independent African countries such as Kenya, Cameroon and Burundi and African Freedom Fighters have been trained at the North Korean guerrilla training centres.

Cases of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping by North Korean representatives have been reported over the last two years from Indonesia where the North

Koreans launched an expensive advertising campaign, and from Bucharest where last month the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Adriaenssen, was struck and kicked and nearly abducted after his car had been hemmed in by two unknown vehicles. He managed, however, to escape, taking numbers of the cars concerned which turned out to be North Korean.

Less sensational but perhaps equally bizarre was the North Korean decision last month to join China in an interest-free loan to Mauritania.

In the Middle East North Korea's search for friends has covered Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, U.A.R., South Yemen and Lebanon and has included the establishment of "friendship societies" and the exchanges of numerous delegations (trade unionists, journalists, lawyers and health experts as well as political, economic and military representatives).

In Africa, North Korea has now established diplomatic relations with Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Burundi, Mauritania, the Central African Republic and Somalia, and she is establishing diplomatic relations also with Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and Uganda.

Indeed in the light of North Korea's real current needs her extreme activity in the diplomatic field, if it is for purely legitimate reasons, requires some explaining.

A. M. Rendel

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8 May 1971

North Korea

Revolution as Kim does it

The North Koreans may be the last true revolutionary mavericks. Their involvement in Ceylon's insurgency, which led to their expulsion from Colombo last month, was anything but a one-shot escapade. It was part of a world-wide programme of support for guerrilla struggles which in some areas outdoes similar operations by

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Moscow and Peking. And the Koreans are far less inhibited than either the Russians or the Chinese by commitments to conventional diplomacy. They have fewer diplomatic partners—only 11 non-communist ones—and fewer vested interests. In short, they have less to lose.

What do they have to gain? North Korea's campaign seems fuelled to a large extent by the ego of that "genius of revolution," Kim Il Sung. The cult of Kim in North Korea today far overreaches the diminishing Mao cult in China and even challenges it

last autumn Kim's eulogists were awarding him the very same position, of pre-eminent marxist theoretician that the Chinese have long claimed for Mao, though, perhaps recognising their hubris, they have stopped short of that lately. But they keep on proselytising for Kim well beyond their borders.

The Ceylon government has not come up with real evidence that the North Koreans had given the Ceylonese rebels arms, money or military training. But there is no question that they were distributing vast quantities of the thoughts of Kim, much of which could

pass for manuals in guerrilla warfare. They had set up over 50 branches of so-called Ceylon-Korea friendship societies throughout the island and these served as distribution centres.

The North Koreans now have "friendship associations" in more than 40 countries, all of which presumably perform similar functions. The Indian government protested last week that a Korean "house of culture" in suburban Delhi was serving as a centre of subversion. In the ten months after December, 1969, the North Koreans placed 130 advertisements in Indian newspapers at a cost of some \$500,000. The Indian press has also accused the North Koreans of interfering openly in India's recent general election by doling out another \$500,000 to candidates receptive to the thoughts of Kim.

Two other Asian countries, Malaysia and Indonesia, cracked down on Korean propaganda activities some time ago. And, just before the Ceylon rebellion, the Central African Republic expelled its North Korean embassy and is now reported to be preparing to recognise South Korea. The North Koreans have recently lost face in Latin America too, and there it is for the much more serious offence of training and financing Mexican guerrillas.

The training of insurgents is probably the most important and certainly the most dangerous aspect of North Korea's revolutionary programme. Since 1966, the Koreans have run a dozen training camps for

foreigners: three in Pyongyang, two in Nampo, two in Wonsan and five scattered elsewhere which train North Koreans as well. Rebels from 25 countries are said to have been invited to Korea for courses lasting between six and 18 months; 1,300 from central and south America and 700 from Africa.

The North Koreans also provide some military training abroad: their embassy in Tanzania has provided courses for dissidents from other African countries, including Kenya, Cameroon and Burundi. The Cubans paid Pyongyang to send six instructors in guerrilla warfare to Cuba two years ago and close Cuban-North Korean co-operation is thought to be responsible for the large numbers of Latin Americans undergoing training in Korea. Last month the Chilean newspaper *La Prensa* asserted that North Korea was a "principal centre" for training Latin American insurgents. The Koreans have also lent strong moral and probably material support to the Palestinian guerrillas.

Although the main thrust of North Korean activity has been support for insurgencies, Pyongyang has also spent millions on conventional-seeming aid projects like a match factory in Congo-Brazzaville, tractors for Mauretania and import credits for Syria, Liberia, South Yemen and Egypt. Where does the money come from? The scale of North Korea's international activities has led people to assume that the Koreans must be acting as a conduit for the Chinese. It is possible that the

Chinese do give the Koreans some financial help. But it would be wrong to see the Chinese as the instigators of all Korean actions.

Kim Il Sung is obsessively concerned with proving his independence and he has done so highly successfully before — as when his men captured the *Pueblo* and shot down an American plane to the applause of none of North Korea's allies. The Chinese and Koreans have had a dramatic rapprochement since these episodes. But the interests of Peking and Pyongyang are still not identical. One difference was revealed at the anniversary celebrations of the Indochinese summit conference in Peking last month. The North Koreans pointedly repeated the warning issued by Peking in the heat of the Laos invasion, but the Chinese dropped it completely. And the Pyongyang press has yet to report on the great American ping-pong tour.

One recent escapade of the North Koreans should prove that they are nobody's puppets, least of all Peking's. This was their attempt to kidnap the Belgian ambassador to Rumania — presumably to embarrass the Rumanians in their dealings with the common market. The Chinese, who have very close relations with the Rumanians and are counting on Belgian diplomatic recognition before next autumn's UN vote, could only regard this as a spoiling operation. The North Koreans may be in trouble in another quarter before long.

WASHINGTON POST
17 April 1971

CPYRGHT | **N. Koreans Chase U.S. Courier**

<p>Associated Press</p> <p>Diplomatic sources said yesterday an American embassy car carrying diplomatic pouches was nearly run off the road in Bucharest a week ago by a pair of cars from the North Korean embassy.</p> <p>The same two cars were involved in another incident Sunday, in which the Belgian ambassador to Romania was stopped and dragged from his car to another vehicle. A crowd drawn by the commo-</p>	<p>tion apparently scared the North Koreans away, the sources said.</p> <p>They said the ambassador, J. M. Adriaenssen was driving alone into Bucharest when two cars made several attempts to stop him by criss-crossing in front of his car. Finally halting Adriaenssen, the sources said, the North Koreans dragged him from his car. A third car blocked his auto from the rear and the assailants tried to wrestle him into</p>	<p>the last vehicle.</p> <p>But the gathering of a crowd apparently frightened the agents and they drove off, leaving Adriaenssen.</p> <p>The diplomats said the reason for the two incidents was unclear.</p> <p>The U.S. embassy car was not halted, though it appeared, the sources said, that the North Koreans were attempting to either collide with it or stop it.</p>
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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
17 April 1971

NORTH KOREANS LEAVE CEYLON FOR MOSCOW

CPYRGHT

By IAN WARD in Colombo

THE entire North Korean Embassy staff flew from Ceylon aboard a Russian Aeroflot jet airliner last night—expelled by the Prime Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike, just ten months after Colombo and Pyongyang exchanged full diplomatic recognition.

So far the Ceylonese Government has failed to provide an official reason for their forced departure. But the root cause is the unmistakable hand of North Korea in the "Ché Guevarist" rebellion currently disrupting the island.

CPYRGHT

Ceylonese police have solid evidence linking ideological direction and finance of the youthful movement to the North Korean representation in the capital.

For the past week the North Korean Embassy has been under constant military guard by a detachment of Ceylonese infantrymen.

Led by the Ambassador, Mr Hwang Jong U, the North Koreans arrived at Colombo's international airport three hours before the Ilyushin jet that was taking them to Moscow.

The departing diplomatic group of eight men, four women and six children, was ushered into the airport's VIP lounge, guarded inside by uniformed police and outside by armed troops.

New phase

The Communist Chinese Ambassador and seven of his staff saw them off and observers regarded the presence of the Red Chinese diplomats as a serious snub to Mrs Bandaranaike's Government.

They believe it could usher in a new phase of chilly relations between Peking and Colombo.

Earlier, Russian diplomats paid their final calls at the North Korean Embassy while the officials carried out last-minute packing.

Shortly before the North Koreans left Ceylon last night, the Government issued a brief communiqué. It said: "The Government has decided in its own interest that all Korean staff and their families in the Embassy of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea in Ceylon should leave the country immediately.

"This decision was conveyed to the Ambassador by the Permanent Secretary of Defence and External Affairs on April 13. The Ambassador was requested to wind up the affairs of the mission and arrange for departure of all Korean personnel in the mission by Aeroflot leaving at 7.30 p.m. on April 16."

Serious set-back

The communique added: "This does not imply disruption of diplomatic relations between the two countries which will remain for the present."

Western diplomats expressed scepticism over the phrase "for the present" and privately predicted that relations between Colombo and Pyongyang would soon be severed.

In fact, Ceylon, which restricts overseas diplomatic posts for financial reasons, has no mission in North Korea. Her interests there are handled by the Chinese Communist mission.

Political observers in Colombo regard the expulsion as a serious set back for North Korea which has been engaged in some hard-sell diplomacy throughout Asia.

And, although ordered by her, the expulsion is a deep embarrassment to Mrs Bandaranaike's foreign policy. This has been geared to enhancing Ceylon's "non-alignment" by courting Communist Governments like North Korea, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam's National Liberation Front.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
January-April 1971

Pyongyang's Search for Legitimacy

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By Joungwon A. Kim

A quarter of a century has passed since Kim Il-song returned to Pyongyang with the Soviet occupation forces to become the leader of the northern half of a divided Korea. The long duration of Kim's leadership, the continued Stalinist pattern of the controls he has imposed on North Korean society, and the invariable dullness of the political sloganeering still emanating from Pyongyang twenty-five years later all tend to give the impression of immutability and to obscure the very real changes which have occurred in both the foreign and domestic policies of this isolated half-nation on the eastern fringe of the Communist world.

Externally, North Korea has moved since 1945 from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first an ally of Communist China, next a bitterly antagonistic critic of both the USSR and the CPR, and most recently a wary ally of both Communist giants. Internally, Kim Il-song has relentlessly purged from the Korean Workers' Party and the North Korean government all but those most loyal to him, gradually eliminating the veteran Communist leaders with domestic roots predating Kim's return, as well as the factions with strong ties to either the USSR or the CPR. The North Korean society of some 13 million people has experienced the full effect of social mobilization in the form of agricultural collectivization, rapid industrialization and expanded education, even while the life style of the individual citizen has radically changed as the result of his being inducted into a multitude of state-sponsored unions, associations and groups.

Behind all these changes there lurks a persistent, compelling motivation—the necessity to establish and substantiate Kim Il-song's claim to be the legitimate leader not only of the North, but of all

Korea. The urgency of this aspiration can only be understood in the context of the Korean heritage—the history of a state which enjoyed 13 centuries of undivided, uninterrupted nationhood until subjugated by Japanese imperialism at the outset of the current century. The eclipse of Korean nationhood lasted until the Allies' triumph over Japan in World War II. That victory, however, did not bring unity to the Korean nation; rather it resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel into separate Soviet and US occupation zones in which competing North and South Korean states emerged—creating an unstable situation in which both Korean governments feel their existence threatened by the existence of the other. Each must foster and enhance its own self-image as the legitimate ruler of the Korean people or face the threat of extinction.¹

The legitimacy issue is often overlooked by analysts who view North Korean actions and policies largely in the context of the Sino-Soviet controversy. They tend to see Pyongyang as a victim of geopolitics, caught between two warring Communist giants and forced to frame its policies in response to the vicissitudes of that struggle.² But, while Moscow and Peking hold overwhelming resources of power with which to threaten or seduce Pyongyang, Seoul holds

¹ One need not rely alone on Kim's incessant propaganda to judge the continuing urgency of the legitimacy and unification issues in Korea. As reported in *The Economist* (London) of Dec. 5, 1970, p. 39, President Park's recent suggestion that negotiations on reunification be initiated reflects the aspiration of 90 percent of the South Koreans polled. Full results of this poll, undertaken by the National Unification Board, appeared in the *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Feb. 20, 1970. For an English-language report, see *The Korea Times* (Seoul), of the same date.

² For example, see Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), August 1968, pp. 708-22; Joseph C. Kun, "North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," *The China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1967, pp. 48-58; and Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1965, pp. 30-50.

A Research Fellow in East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard University, Mr. Kim has contributed articles to various scholarly journals, including *Affairs and World Politics*.

UNIFICATION THROUGH REVOLUTION

Comrades, the territorial partition and national split caused by the US Imperialist occupation of South Korea have not only spelled unbearable miseries and sufferings for the South Korean people, but brought great national calamities to the entire Korean people and created a serious obstacle to the coordinated development of Korean society as a whole.

To reunite the divided fatherland is a great national duty of all the Korean people at the present stage. It is our most urgent task, and we cannot forget it even for a moment. The policy of our party for the unification of our fatherland is already known widely throughout the world.

—Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, Radio Pyongyang Domestic Service, Nov. 2, 1970.

The oppressed and exploited popular masses can win freedom and emancipation only through their own revolutionary struggle. Therefore, the South Korean revolution should, in all circumstances, be carried out by the South Korean people on their own initiative. But the people in the northern half, being of the same nation, have the obligation and responsibility to support and actively encourage the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle.

—Summary of Kim Il-song report to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency, Nov. 3, 1970.

a far more vital asset in the Korean scheme of things—a strong alternative claim to be the legitimate government of the Korean people.

Kim Il-song initiated his quest for legitimacy from a most disadvantageous position. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the most prestigious of the nationalist leaders returning to Korea naturally gravitated to Seoul—the national capital—where even the "domestic" Communists (the name generally used to refer to those Communists who had stayed in Korea during Japanese rule) initially endorsed the naming of Syngman Rhee as President of a "People's Republic."⁴ Kim's regime in Pyongyang was clearly a puppet of the Soviet occupation forces, to which it owed its existence. The insecurity of the North Korean government was further demonstrated in 1948 when it refused to permit United Nations supervision of elections north of the 38th parallel. In the same year UN-supervised elections took place

in the South,⁴ and the UN General Assembly recognized Rhee's government in the following words:

There has been established a lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside . . . the only such government in Korea.⁵

Disillusioned with Kim's harsh rule and spurred by the growing awareness that Korea was likely to remain divided indefinitely, North Koreans fled southward, their total number reaching two million or more, some 20 percent of the North Korean population, between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.⁶

Desperate Gamble

In light of this embarrassing mass emigration, Kim Il-song's attempt to unify the country by force in 1950 appears to have been less a reckless venture than an essential gamble to assure the survival of his regime. The result, however, was nearly disastrous. The United Nations labelled North Korea the "aggressor" in the conflict, and 16 nations sent troops to help in the defense of South Korea.⁷ The Pyongyang regime was saved only by the intervention of the Chinese Communist "volunteers," and the war ended in a stalemate.

Rebuffed in its attempt to conquer the South by force, North Korea turned to rebuilding its military

⁴ The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised elections south of the 38th parallel on May 10, 1948, in which 75 percent of the eligible voters and more than 95 percent of the registered voters participated. The Commission resolved that "the results of the ballots . . . are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." (UN Press Release No. 70, June 30, 1948).

⁵ UN Document A806, Dec. 12, 1948.

⁶ US Department of State, *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take Over*, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 12.

⁷ Nations contributing forces to the UN Command, in addition to the Republic of Korea, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, The Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US. India and Norway provided noncombat assistance.

⁸ Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 298.

and economic might, aided generously in the effort by both the USSR and Communist China. Starting with what remained of the impressive pre-World War II Japanese industrial base in the North, Pyongyang undertook to industrialize at a breakneck pace. In 1958, doubtless influenced by the Chinese Great Leap Forward, Kim launched the "Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement." Like its Chinese counterpart, this movement counted on mass enthusiasm to spur production, but unlike Mao's economically disastrous program, the Korean movement also placed heavy reliance on technical expertise, which may explain its superior results.⁸ Successes in internal political mobilization and indoctrination in the North during this period were also impressive. In fact, the gains registered by the North during the second half of the 1950's caused grave concern in Seoul, particularly in view of the difficulties encountered in the last years of the Rhee government.

The 1960's, however, witnessed a shift in the power balance in Korea and a curious countertrend in the legitimacy contest. These developments were triggered by the fall of the government of the aging Syngman Rhee in April 1960—an event which was precipitated by student riots reflecting internal discontent with Rhee's repressive policies, two years of Washington-Seoul friction over these policies, reduction in US aid, and an accompanying sharp downturn in economic growth.⁹ Regardless of the merits or failings of his government, Rhee was the nation's most famous independence leader—the man who had formed a provisional government during the abortive 1919 uprising against the Japanese. Thus, when he fell, the South Korean state lost the key symbol of its continuity with the Korean independence movement.

For a little more than a year the successor civilian regime in Seoul grappled ineptly with its responsibilities. But in 1961, the Army of the Republic of Korea seized power in order to put a stop to the chaos and factional infighting in Seoul, which threatened to weaken further the power of South Korea vis-a-vis

the North. By imposing firm central control and initiating broad reforms (including the introduction of economic planning and reform of the tax structure), the new military regime made substantial strides towards putting the South in a position to compete, both economically and militarily, with the industrial North.¹⁰ However, these gains were achieved at a significant cost, for the coup which brought the regime to power had clearly broken the continuity of "legitimate" government originally established by the UN-sponsored elections of 1948. In addition, the new South Korean leaders bore the stigma of having received their military training under the Japanese.

Meanwhile, emboldened by North Korea's economic advances in the late 1950's, Kim Il-song moved vigorously during the following decade to demonstrate his independence and to bolster his own claim to leadership of the Korean nation. Although his immediate response to the 1961 coup in the South was to negotiate bilateral mutual-defense treaties with Moscow and Peking, Kim soon showed signs of shifting to a fiercely independent foreign policy, even at the risk of antagonizing both Communist allies and at the cost of losing, at least temporarily, their economic assistance. Pyongyang's assertion of independence first from Moscow and then from Peking, the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and other acts of anti-US belligerency, and the cultivation of an exorbitant cult of Kim Il-song

¹⁰ See Joungwon A. Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as Modernizer," *Journal of Comparative Administration* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), November 1970, pp. 355-71; and Emerson Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1969.

⁸ See the analysis of North Korean economic development during the 1950's and early 1960's in Joungwon A. Kim, *North Korean Economic Progress*, an unpublished monograph reproduced by the US Department of State, 1963; and "The 'Peak of Socialism' in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," in Jan S. Prybyla, *Comparative Economic Systems*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 412-28.

⁹ For studies of the causes of the student revolution, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement," *The Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City), March 1964, pp. 83-92, and Kim Song-t'ae, "Sawol sipkullul simnihak" (*Psychology of April 19*), *Sessangye* (Seoul), April 1961, pp. 80-81.

SOVIET SABOTAGE

The anti-party elements within the party and their supporters abroad, revisionists and great-power chauvinists (i.e., the CPSU—Ed.), lined up as one in opposition to our party and resorted to subversive activities in an attempt to overthrow the leadership of our party and government. . . . The attack of the opportunists on our party became most glaring between 1956 and 1957. . . . The modern revisionists . . . opposed the socialist revolution in our country, prattling that it was as yet premature; they opposed our party's line of socialist industrialization, the line of construction of an independent national economy in particular; and they even brought economic pressure to bear upon us, inflicting tremendous losses upon our socialist construction.

—Kim Il-song, *Selected Works* (English edition), Vol. II, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, pp. 515-16, 579-80.

both at home and abroad all appear to have been a direct outgrowth of the contest for legitimacy and survival.

Pyongyang vs. Its Allies

In dealing with the USSR and Communist China, Kim has had to reckon not only with the diverse efforts of the two to interfere in his policies, but also with the reality that neither of them attaches great significance to Kim's goal of unification. In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given moment, the North Korean leader has been swayed by realistic considerations of self-preservation and not by ideological niceties.

Already in 1951, Pyongyang resented the Soviet decision to bring about early Korean armistice negotiations, feeling that the only likely outcome would be an intolerable recognition of the division of Korea, the very situation which Kim had sought to eliminate by his attack on the South. Subsequently (after the Korean armistice) Kim's regime—evidently convinced that the USSR would not support any further unification efforts—set out to build a strong and independent economic, political and military base which would enable it, at some future time, to launch another unification attempt on its own.¹¹ It was because of these independent policies of North Korea that the Soviet Union in 1956 instigated a "destalinization" campaign in Pyongyang with the goal of undermining Kim's position in the North Korean regime. However, Kim had crushed this challenge by 1958. Because of Kim's insistence on independent policies, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang continued to deteriorate despite the signing of the 1961 mutual assistance pact, and in 1963 the USSR terminated its economic and military assistance to North Korea in retaliation for Kim's independent behavior.

A factor contributing to the Soviet discontent was Kim's growing friendship with Peking. Yet the latter relationship also had its areas of disagreement. Kim Il-song saw the widening Sino-Soviet rift as a threat to the defense capability of the Communist world, and hence of North Korea, and his resentment at Maoist policies grew particularly intense as a consequence of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid shipments to North Vietnam in 1966. Furthermore, China proved unable to fill adequately the aid vacuum left by the Soviet suspension of assistance to North

Korea in 1963—a matter of great concern to Kim as he witnessed the growth of South Korea's military power. Finally, Mao's strident claims to the leadership of the world revolutionary movement conflicted with Kim's own ambitions. When the Soviet Union reversed course in 1965 and restored the flow of economic and military assistance to Pyongyang, the Chinese Communists showed their displeasure by mounting wall posters in Peking denouncing Kim Il-song as a "fat revisionist" (for having sold out to Moscow). By 1966 relations between North Korea and the CPR were so chilly that neither country maintained an ambassador in the other's capital. This estrangement was evident as late as April 1969 when Pyongyang pointedly refused to send a delegate to the Ninth Congress of the CCP.¹²

Since North Korea's troubles with its allies sprang from Soviet or Chinese policies that put restraints on Pyongyang's military and economic capacity, or which cast shadows on Kim's image of independence in formulating foreign policy, and not from basic ideological issues, reconciliation was a relatively simple matter once the objectionable policies were renounced. Thus, when Moscow offered to restore aid to North Korea in 1965, Pyongyang promptly resumed cordial relations with the Soviets. And it was with equal pleasure that Kim accepted China's truce offering when Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April 1970 to assure North Korea:

*In the future, we will, as always, support and assist each other and fight shoulder to shoulder.*¹³

The two countries concluded a trade agreement shortly thereafter. Not to be outdone, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea sought to cement Moscow's renewed ties with Kim by declaring, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in July 1970:

*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, and the entire Soviet people fully support the Korean people in their righteous struggle to chase the US imperialist aggressive troops out of South Korea and to achieve national unification on a democratic basis.*¹⁴

¹¹ A brief summary of the Peking-Pyongyang feud and rapprochement may be found in L. F. Goodstadt, "Patchwork in Pyongyang," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 23, 1970, pp. 6-7, and in Koji Nakamura, "For Chou, a Peking-Pyongyang Detente," *Ibid.*, May 7, 1970, p. 18.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Korean Central News Agency radio broadcast, July 8, 1970.

¹⁴ See Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics* (Princeton), January 1970, pp. 237-54.

Thus, by the end of 1970, relations between Pyongyang and each of its two major Communist allies seemed reasonably amicable. As far as the Sino-Soviet conflict was concerned, Kim Il-song apparently saw no contradiction in maintaining cordial relations with both countries simultaneously. However, Pyongyang saw fit to exercise caution in making sure the visiting delegations from Peking or Moscow did not cross paths while they were in North Korea.¹⁵

Kim welcomes the support of the USSR and the GPR because of a genuine fear for the security of North Korea, which seems to him to be threatened both by an increasingly strong South Korea and by a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. Few Koreans who lived through the trying years of Japanese colonialism and who confronted Japan's highly efficient military rule and (political) "thought" police can dismiss the nagging fear that it could all happen again—however unrealistic this may seem to foreign observers. The recent announcement by the United States of plans to reduce its forces in South Korea has brought forth warnings from Pyongyang that Japan may try to move into the US role in South Korea—warnings which have been sympathetically echoed in Peking.

Kim and World Revolution

While turning to Moscow and Peking to secure his regime against real or imagined enemies, Kim Il-song has not hesitated to challenge the revolutionary leadership of both major Communist centers. As early as 1965 (prior to the resumption of Soviet aid to North Korea), Kim delivered a thinly-veiled attack against Moscow, accusing the Soviet leaders of being "revisionists" bent on preventing North Korea from securing economic independence and on overthrowing his regime.¹⁶ Kim also seems to be trying to outdo Mao in bidding for leadership of the world's revolutionary movements, basing his appeal on a glorification of the tactics of violent revolution. On the 50th anniversary of the unsuccessful nonviolent anti Japanese uprising of 1919, Kim stated:

The greatest lesson of the historic anti-Japanese

¹⁵ The Chinese (and not the Soviets) on July 25, 1970, attended the commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War; the Soviets (and not the Chinese) attended the 25th anniversary of Korean independence from Japan. There was no report of either being represented at the Fifth KWP Congress last autumn.

¹⁶ Kim Il Song, *Selected Works*, English Edition, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, Vol. II, p. 513.

*movement is that the highest form of struggle for freedom is revolutionary violence.*¹⁷

Thus, Kim has identified himself with the movements of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and apparently seeks to promote himself as their ideological successor. The North Korean leader seemingly strikes a responsive chord among some of the world's new revolutionaries—e.g., the American Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver visited Pyongyang in 1969 and voiced praise for Kim's revolutionary leadership.¹⁸

Kim's appeals to revolution are hardly likely to win recognition of North Korea as a member of the established international community. Ever since the Korean War, the Pyongyang regime has been, in effect, an international outlaw. Only 29 nations recognize Kim's state, compared to 93 nations which recognize the government in Seoul.¹⁹ Kim adamantly refuses to recognize the competence of the UN to deal with the Korean problem. This defiance of the international body—to which the USSR is, at least in part, committed—may explain the visit of the Soviet and Czechoslovak UN Ambassadors to Pyongyang in August 1970.²⁰ One may surmise that they went to discuss possible new initiatives on behalf of North Korea at the impending session of the UN General Assembly which opened in September. But it would take extreme changes in the UN's position vis-a-vis North Korea to convince Kim Il-song that he could more effectively gain national and international prestige through the world organization rather than by trying to win a following among revolutionaries everywhere.

Closely related to Kim's efforts to achieve stature both at home and in the world revolutionary movement is the cultivation of an extravagant personality cult of Kim Il-song. Advertisements for a recent English-language version of his official biography presumed to call Kim "the Hero of [the] 20th Century."²¹ The cult seeks to provide Kim with an impressive set of revolutionary credentials—more impressive, in fact, than the facts would support. His father, Kim Hyong-chik, is now credited by the Pyongyang regime with bringing about the 1919 anti-Japanese uprising.²² To those who have observed the rapid rise of Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-

¹⁷ Pyongyang Radio broadcast, April 17, 1969.

¹⁸ A series of articles on Kim Il-song was published in *Black Panther* (New York), Jan. 3, 10, 17, 25, and March 15, 1970.

¹⁹ *The Economist* (London), Dec. 5, 1970, p. 34.

²⁰ Pyongyang Radio broadcast, Aug. 4, 1970.

²¹ *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1969.

FOLLOW COMRADE KIM

The revolutionary ideas of Comrade Kim Il-song, the brilliant Marxist-Leninist, are the great Marxism-Leninism of the present times—an era of great struggle in which a fierce class struggle is being waged on an international scale and all the exploited peoples and oppressed nations on the globe are turning out to participate in the liberation struggle, an era of the great revolutionary storm and an era of the downfall of imperialism and the victory of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale.

—From speech of Comrade Pak Song-chol at the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, broadcast by Pyongyang Radio, Nov. 5, 1970.

chu, in the party hierarchy, this exercise in revolutionary genealogy appears aimed not only at proving the nationalist credentials of Kim Il-song, but also at laying the groundwork for the political succession in North Korea.²³

To explain why the 33-year old Kim deserved to become the leader of North Korea in 1945, the regime has embellished and distorted the record of his prewar exploits against the Japanese in Manchuria, then under Japanese domination as the puppet state of Manchukuo. It is claimed that when Kim moved to Manchuria from Pyongyang at the age of 14, he organized an independence movement among fellow Korean students at his middle school, joined the Korean Communist Party, and helped found numerous independence organizations, e.g., The Kirin Student-Friends Association and the Fatherland Restoration Association. Further, it is implied that the guerrilla band which Kim came to lead was almost singlehandedly responsible for the ultimate liberation of Korea. All evidence of Chinese Communist or Soviet support for Kim and other Korean guerrilla leaders is passed over.²⁴

²³ *Nodong Shinmun* of March 1, 1970, claimed: "With the March First Uprising as the occasion, the seeds of the anti-Japanese patriotic ideas and revolution sown by Mr. Kim Hyong-chik, an anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter and ardent patriot, kindled violent flames everywhere."

²⁴ The possibility that Kim Yong-chu (who is 10 years younger than his brother Kim Il-song) might succeed his brother was suggested by the author in the article, "Divided Korea 1969: Consolidating for Transition," *Asian Survey*, January 1970, p. 41. For Kim Yong-chu's rise through the party ranks, see the charts in Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *loc. cit.*, pp. 252-54. Among those subsequently agreeing with this hypothesis is Yi Tong-jun, a defector from North Korea; see his "Kwolyok l'ujaeng-ui chinsang" (The Real Power Struggle), *Chungang* (Seoul), June 1970, pp. 67-81.

²⁵ Baik Bong, *Kim Il Sung Biography*, Tokyo, Miraisha, 1969.

The true picture of Kim's record emerges in such works as Dae-sook Suh's study of the Korean Communist movement.²⁵ Kim did, indeed, attend middle school in Japanese-controlled Manchuria, but there were hardly enough fellow Koreans in his Chinese-run school to constitute an "independence movement." Organizations which Kim allegedly founded were, in fact, founded by others; his name does not even appear in accounts of such organizations by former participants or in Japanese intelligence and police records. As a matter of fact, the Korean Communist Party had no organization in Manchuria at the time Kim claims to have joined it. Extensive Japanese records show that Kim Il-song and his companions in the present North Korean regime were only minor participants in the Chinese Communist underground resistance movement in Manchuria. Furthermore, Kim's biography completely omits the four-year period (1941-45) which he spent in training in the USSR, emerging as a major in the Soviet Army.²⁶

The fact that his fledgling regime drew insignificant national support in 1945 has also troubled Kim. At the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, held in Pyongyang in 1956, Kim bitterly denounced those Korean Communists who had endorsed the Rhee government in 1945. Immediately prior to the 1956 Congress, Kim purged from the KWP the vast majority of South Korean Communists who had come north prior to and during the Korean conflict (many of whom had joined in the earlier endorsement of Rhee).²⁷ Kim Il-song also has claimed that prominent Korean independence leaders such as Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik had endorsed the Pyongyang regime—significantly, neither man is around to refute it (Kim Ku had shared the limelight with Rhee in Seoul as a leader of the exile Provisional Government estab-

²⁵ Suh, *op. cit.* (Assessment of the Suh and Baik accounts is provided at greater length in B. C. Koh's review of the two volumes on p. 82 of the present issue of *Problems of Communism*.—Ed.)

²⁶ Tsuboe Senji, *Hokusen no kaiho junen* (Ten Years of North Korea's Liberation), Tokyo, Nikkan Todotsushin-sha, 1956, pp. 24-26; Kim Ch'ang-sun, *Yoksaul chungin* (History's Witness), Seoul, Hanguk asepa pankong yonmaeng, 1956; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gendai Toa Jinmei-kan* (Current Biography), Tokyo, Toho Kenkyu-sho 1950, p. 101. Japanese intelligence reports during the war locating Kim's unit (and most of the major current North Korean leaders) in the USSR include "Kyohi Kin Nichisei Kika shiso hanchu no kenkyo" (Arrest of a Group Leader of the Thought Section under the Communist Bandit Kim Il-song), *Tokyo gaiji geppo* (Tokyo), February 1943, and "Habarosuku ya-el gakko no jogyo" (Condition of the Field School in Khabarovsk), *Gaiji geppo* (Tokyo), November 1942, pp. 85-86.

²⁷ *Choson Nodong-dang chaesamcha munhonjip* (Documents of the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party), Pyongyang, Nodong-dang ch'ui'p'an-sa, 1956.

lished in 1919 and was assassinated in 1949; Kim Kyu-sik was apparently abducted by the North Koreans during the Korean War and is presumed dead).²⁸

Entrenched and Isolated

The ability of the North Korean regime to fabricate and propagate such a fulsome cult of Kim Il-song is itself a symptom of the extreme consolidation of power in Kim's hands. This is a far cry from the situation in the early days of the Communist regime, when North Korea was ruled by a coalition of Soviet-Koreans, Yanan-trained Koreans, domestic Korean Communists, and the Manchurian-Korean partisans centered around Kim Il-song.²⁹ Step by step Kim eliminated all competing factions, a process which culminated at a leadership conference of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1966, at which Kim succeeded in placing his own followers in every major KWP post. Party organization work was entrusted to Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-chu. This monolithic control was further tightened in subsequent purges,³⁰ and was most recently confirmed at the Fifth KWP Congress, held November 2-13, 1970. At this congress Kim Yong-chu was elevated to the Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee as the sixth-ranking party official.³¹

²⁸ *Kim Il-song chochak sonjip* (Kim Il-song's Selected Works), Pyongyang, Choson Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1968, pp. 87-88.

²⁹ The Soviet-Koreans were Soviet citizens of Korean descent who had spent the better part of their lives in the USSR, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—an affiliation which some retained even after joining the Korean Workers' Party in North Korea. This group was distinct from the Manchurian-Koreans around Kim Il-song, who had spent most of their lives in Manchuria and only resided in the USSR in the 1941-45 period. The Soviet-Koreans originally endorsed Kim Il-song as leader of the North Korean party, but it was on Soviet orders, and Kim had no control over this group. The Yanan Communists were those who had spent their exile in China, most recently in Mao Tse-tung's Yanan stronghold. The "domestic" Korean Communists were those who had remained in Korea and had suffered persecution and imprisonment under the Japanese—a factor which prevented any effective organizational development. Kim Il-song refuses to credit any of the other three factions for their pre-1945 independence efforts.

³⁰ Among high-ranking party and military leaders purged since the Kim group completed its consolidation have been Pak Kum-ch'ol, Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak, Kim Chong-t'ae, Kim To-man, Yim Ch'un-ch'iu, Ko Hyok, and Ho Sok-san. See Yi Tong-jun, *loc. cit.* For information on earlier purges of the regime, see *Pukhanui papoi t'unaeng-sa* (Factional Struggle in North Korea), Seoul, Naeoe munje yonguso, 1962.

³¹ Members of the new Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee were listed as follows: Kim Il-song, Choe Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Song-chol, Choe Hyon, Kim Yong-chu, O Chin-u, Kim Tong-gyu, So Chol, Kim Chung-nim, and Han Ik-su (North Korean radio broadcast, Nov. 14, 1970).

While consolidating his personal control of the party, Kim Il-song has also tightened the regime's controls over North Korean society to ensure that no voice of dissent can be raised against his leadership. Collectivization of agriculture was completed in 1958. By 1970 nearly 50 percent of the population of 13 million lived in urban areas (compared to about 20 percent in 1945), and illiteracy had been virtually eliminated—both developments facilitating political mobilization of the population. Some 40 percent of the population is employed in the industrial sector of the economy,³² as compared with 12.5 percent at the end of 1946. Through party membership, employment in the bureaucracy, and membership in the many diverse and overlapping state-sponsored mass organizations, a very large proportion of the population has been absorbed into roles which commit the individual to active support of the Kim leadership and thus link his personal destiny with that of the regime. Nearly 14 percent of the population are members of the KWP; 1.3 million citizens serve in the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Guard" (a nationwide mass militia, organized into self-contained armed regiments); and 10 to 15 percent of the working population are bureaucratic employees of the regime.

The Communists have also sought to differentiate and isolate society in the North from that in the South—this despite the professed goal of unification. Nearly three-fourths of the 13 million North Koreans have spent all but perhaps their preschool years under Communist rule and indoctrination. The only information they have about possible alternatives comes covertly from their elders, and as in any society undergoing rapid modernization and change, the relevance of the views of the older generation is generally felt to be marginal. Few people in the North, moreover, have any firsthand knowledge of life below the 38th parallel since 1945—not only has the refugee flow been almost unilaterally toward the South, but most of the South Korean Communists who went to the North prior to or during the Korean War were purged during the 1950's.

In another move clearly designed to ensure that the populace was insulated from undesirable outside influences, Kim eliminated the Chinese writing system soon after gaining power, replacing it with the Korean phonetic alphabet. Consequently, few North Koreans could even read the South Korean

³² See *Pukhan isipnyon* (North Korea's Twenty Years), Seoul, Kongsobu chosaguk, 1965.

press (which employs the mixed Chinese-Korean writing system) if it suddenly were made available.

This insulation of North from South has made it easier for the regime to forge ahead with its policy of giving top priority to heavy industrial development at the expense of consumption. By and large, this policy has produced impressive results, although the temporary suspension of Soviet economic assistance from 1963 to 1965 forced Pyongyang to abandon annual targets of the 1961-1967 Seven Year Plan.

Following the resumption of Soviet aid in 1965, Pyongyang reactivated the plan and extended the target date for its completion to 1970. The recent Fifth KWP Congress announced the successful completion of the plan and promulgated a new Six-Year Plan for the 1971-76 period, with continued emphasis on heavy industry (although there was new emphasis on light industry, mechanization of agriculture and technological development). Despite the dip in performance in the mid-1960's, North Korea has built up a formidable economic potential. It produces most of the rifles, mortars and ammunition required by its army, and it also outproduces the South in electricity, coal, steel, chemical fertilizer, and cement.³³

Two and a half decades after its creation, the Pyongyang regime appears to be politically stable

and militarily and economically strong. Nevertheless, it continues to face the same critical questions of how Korean nationalism, communism, and a divided Korea can be reconciled. How can a viable political system be maintained over 13 million Koreans in the North while the remaining two-thirds of the nation (31 million) continues to flourish under an alternate regime in the South? It is not so much the peculiar personal predilections of North Korea's strong-arm ruler as it is the pressures arising from these ineluctable circumstances that have transformed North Korea into what has appropriately been termed a "garrison state,"³⁴ with its leader advocating revolutionary violence and constantly trumpeting invective against enemies and allies alike. So long as a genuine aura of national and international legitimacy continues to evade Kim Il-song's regime, these pressures will continue.

³³ *Ibid.*; and Kim Un-hwan, "Tongnan ishipyonhuul pukhan silchong: Kyongjeui hyonhang kwa chonmang" (Economic Situation and Prospects: North Korea's Situation Twenty Years after the Korean War), *Chungang*, June 1970, pp. 80-88. Statistics on the economy of South Korea may be found in *Korea Annual 1969*, Seoul, Hapdong News Agency, 1969.

³⁴ See B. C. Koh, "North Korea: Profile of a Garrison State," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1969, pp. 18-27.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
January-April 1971

Cult-ivating Kim

CPYRGHT

By B. C. Koh

BAIK BONG: *Kim Il Sung: Biography* (3 Vols.). Tokyo, Mirai-sha, 1969 and 1970.

DAE-SOOK SUH: *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967.

THE MOST STRIKING feature of contemporary North Korean politics is the all-pervasive personality cult centered about Kim Il-song,¹

¹ Kim Il-song is the romanization of the name according to the McCune-Reischauer system. The North Korean spelling, however, is Kim Il Sung.

the 58-year old Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. In an apparent attempt to establish and enhance the legitimacy of his patently harsh one-man rule, Kim has sought to generate an image of himself as the greatest man Korea has ever produced. Article after article and volume after volume have glorified the "revolutionary accomplishments" and eulogized the "lofty virtues" of the North Korean leader.

The three-volume biography of Kim by Baik Bong, though pub-

lished by a *bona fide* commercial publishing house in Japan, represents an unmistakable attempt to spread the adulatory legend of Kim beyond the borders of North Korea.² Indeed, as the "translation committee" points out in notes appended to each of the three volumes, the book is an English translation of Baik Bong's Korean-language biography, *General Kim Il Sung: the Sun of the Nation*, published in 1968 by Inmun

² It is noteworthy that in June 1970 Yoshio Nishitani, President of Mirai-sha (the Japanese publisher of the biography), and his wife visited North Korea and met Kim. *Chungang*, June 29, 1970.

Kwahak-sa, a North Korean government publishing house. When full-page advertisements of the book appeared in *The New York Times* and *The Times* of London late in 1969, North Korea hastened to claim that the world's press had published laudatory "articles" on Kim.³

Even as an unabashed propaganda document, the book never ceases to amaze the reader with its fantastic claims and fulsome superlatives. For example:

General Kim Il Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander and one of the outstanding leaders of the international Communist movement and working-class movement . . . a legendary hero . . . who is capable of commanding the heavens and earth, an unrivaled brilliant commander who, as it were, can shrink a long range of steep mountains at a stroke and smash the swarming hordes of enemies with one blow.

Kim is portrayed as devoid of human frailties and endowed with every imaginable virtue and strength, a man who was destined by history to save the Korean people from the miseries suffered under Japanese colonial rule as well as under bourgeois and feudalistic exploitation.

Such a Messiah, of course, could only have been born into an uncommon family, and we are told that Kim's was a truly "revolutionary family," studded with pa-

trials and revolutionaries, beginning with the very founder of the clan, Kim Key-sang. Although space does not permit even a brief summary of Kim's feats, narrated with tedious redundancy in 1,800 pages, a few of the astounding allegations merit passing mention. Having "read with great interest many classics of Marxism-Leninism, including *Das Kapital*," by the age of 15, Kim reportedly became a confirmed Communist, revolutionary and organized numerous revolutionary groups and activities among students, peasants, and workers in Manchuria. By the age of 19 his feats had allegedly earned him the title of "General" among his ardent followers, as well as a new name—Il-song (meaning "becoming the Sun") in place of his original name, Song-ju.

After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Kim founded an anti-Japanese guerrilla "army" which is claimed to have waged a "heroic struggle against the Japanese," culminating in the liberation of Korea. The book also states categorically that it was not the United States, but the Soviet Union, together with the guerrilla forces commanded by Kim, that defeated the Japanese in World War II. The book asserts that the Americans and British induced the Soviets to bear the brunt of the fighting, and then "brazenly" tried to claim credit for the victory.

This, however, is the last favorable mention of the Soviet Union one encounters. In its effort to portray Kim Il-song as the greatest figure in all Korean history, the book credits him with all good things that transpired in North Korea since 1945. He almost singlehandedly "won" the Korean War of 1950-53, which allegedly was started by "American imperialistic aggressors and their South Korean lackeys." Conspicuously absent in this chauvinistic account

is any mention of Soviet military assistance or of the "Chinese People's Volunteers" to whom North Korea owes its survival. Likewise it was Kim's "revolutionary ideas" and "ingenious leadership"—not assistance from the Communist bloc—which subsequently transformed the war-devastated country into a "self-reliant" industrial nation.

The volume imputes "epochal" significance to Kim's ideas, of which *juche* constitutes the pivotal concept. Translated as "independent stand," the term is defined to mean "abiding by the principle of solving all problems of the revolution and construction independently, in accordance with the actual conditions of one's own country and primarily by one's own efforts." Having "demonstrated" the inestimable efficacy of *juche* in the North Korean context, the book presumes to apply the concept on a global scale. This entails repudiation of both "the right-wing opportunism" of Moscow and "the left opportunism" of Peking⁴ in favor of forming a united Communist front to crush "American imperialism." Somehow, the author never explains how such a course of action is related to an "independent stand" for North Korea. Nor is there the slightest recognition of the colossal contradiction between the notion of independence and the exhortation not only to the Korean people but to all leaders of the Communist orbit to heed the wisdom of Kim Il-song.

Who is the real Kim, the man behind this image of an omniscient and omnipotent leader of all Korea and the savior of mankind? For the best available clues to his

³ See the lead story in *Nodong Shinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 23, 1969. For the advertisements, see *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1969, and *The Times* (London), Nov. 3, 1969. For a more recent claim in the same vein, see the article entitled "Korea Has Produced [the] Hero of the 20th Century," in *The Pyongyang Times*, June 8, 1972.

⁴ Although neither Moscow nor Peking are explicitly mentioned, Kim's words leave little doubt as to the identity of those whom he is attacking.

true identity, one must turn to Dae-Sook Suh's meticulous study, *The Korean Communist Movement*. Originally prepared as a Ph.D. thesis at Columbia, the study makes extensive use of Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian sources to present an impressively credible picture of the trials and tribulations of Korean Communists who struggled long and hard, only to be eclipsed and then annihilated by Kim Il-sung, a man who had played only a peripheral role in the Korean independence movement. Of particular interest is the last quarter of the book, dealing with the rise of Kim Il-sung. Relying heavily on Japanese police records of the 1930's and 1940's, the author shows that Kim was neither a complete impostor nor a major revolutionary figure of the stature of a Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh.

The available evidence establishes that, prior to World War II, Kim led a Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla force in Manchuria which inflicted sufficient damage to cause the Japanese to initiate a determined campaign to annihilate his forces. On the other hand, Suh makes clear, Kim's force was at this time only part of a Chinese Communist guerrilla army, in which he rose to the rank of division commander. Despite this impressive title, Kim probably never commanded more than 300 men at a time. Nor was he the only Korean to command such a "division." In fact, at least two Koreans rose to the position of "army commander"—a full rank higher

than Kim—in this struggle.⁵

Under stepped-up Japanese pressure, Kim and his surviving comrades-in-arms fled to Siberia in 1941. Whether he subsequently received Soviet military training and served as an officer in the Red Army, as many sources claim, is not verified in Suh's study. What is clear, however, is that he came to North Korea with the Soviet occupation troops after the Japanese surrender in 1945 and, with the apparent blessing of the Soviet Union, began a series of maneuvers culminating in his seizure of power in Pyongyang.

Suh underscores the point that Kim did not owe his rise exclusively to the Kremlin. Of crucial importance were the miscalculations and follies of the "old Communists," such as Pak Hon-yong, who lingered too long in the

American-occupied South, where the chances of a Communist takeover were nil, instead of rushing to the North where establishment of a Communist government was a foregone conclusion. When Pak and his associates finally headed north under duress, Kim was already firmly entrenched and, soon had his rivals exterminated as American spies. Kim's political takeover was due in no small measure to his political acumen and Machiavellian tactics—factors which have been equally instrumental in perpetuating his monolithic political control for the past two decades.

As one leaves the bizarre legend of Kim Il-sung, one wonders why Kim and his sycophants persist in their Herculean efforts to create a mountain out of a molehill. Possibly they believe, with Hitler, the dictum: "the bigger the lie, the better." More probably, Kim may be the unwitting victim of his own personality cult—a man who not only derives satisfaction from the interminable cries of "Long Live Comrade Kim Il-sung" but has really come to believe in his own "unrivalled greatness" and "historic mission" to lead men both in Korea and beyond. One shudders at the thought that Kim, thanks to Moscow and Peking, commands considerable resources to pursue that "mission."

⁵ An important source on Kim's guerrilla activity has recently come to the reviewer's attention: *Manshu ni kansuru yoheitaki kansatsu* (Observations on Military Tactics in Manchuria), Tokyo, Fukuinkyoku Shiryo Seirika, Vol. 12, 1952. The volume comprises recollections by former Japanese Army officers who participated in or had access to classified information about Japanese counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria. While corroborating much of Suh's account of Kim's revolutionary past, this Japanese source links Kim and his guerrillas, not with the Chinese Communists, but with the Soviet Union, from which they are said to have received the bulk of their arms and ammunition, and which provided them with refuge when they fled across the Siberian border under Japanese pursuit. It also includes a number of photographs of Kim Il-sung in guerrilla attire and states that Kim was extremely popular among Koreans in Manchuria, who acclaimed him as a "hero of Korea" and gave him "material and moral support." I am grateful to Mr. Key P. Yang, of the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., for giving me access to this rare source.

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BALTIMORE SUN
12 May 1971

55 More Pathet Lao Defect To Vientiane

CPYRGHT

By a Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon, May 11—Fifty-five members of the 11th Pathet Lao Battalion have defected to the Royal Lao government, according to reliable reports from the Laotian capital of Vientiane.

The defectors, led by their commanding officer, are the third group of Laotian Communist soldiers to defect since March. They said there are more than a thousand other Pathet Lao soldiers in southern Laos ready to join the government.

The Vientiane reports said the 55 soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel, two captains and two first lieutenants in addition to their commander, surrendered yesterday at Ban Itou,

which is about 20 miles east of the southern city of Pakse.

The soldiers turned in their weapons and volunteered to aid government troops in recruiting more defectors and in hunting for supply caches and North Vietnamese base camps in southern Laos.

In March, 150 members of the 25th Pathet Lao Battalion, many with their families, defected to the government side, complaining of oppression by the North Vietnamese.

April Surrender

In April, 18 Pathet Lao soldiers surrendered as a group near the central Laotian town of Paksane, also complaining about their North Vietnamese

advisers.

Diplomatic observers in Vientiane have described the growing Pathet Lao defections as probably the most significant change in recent months in the seesawing war in Laos.

The defection of large numbers of Pathet Lao, Western diplomats assert, will significantly reduce the Communists' influence and undermine their claim to be patriots rather than front men for the North Vietnamese.

Propaganda Is Effective

The latest group of defectors said a major factor in their decision to change sides was the government's propaganda campaign publicizing the other groups of Communist soldiers

who joined the government. That campaign included radio broadcasts, air-dropped leaflets and speeches by earlier defectors broadcast from slow-flying planes over loud-speaker systems.

Observers in Vientiane believe the North Vietnamese are now finding themselves in the position of clamping down upon the Pathet Lao allies in an effort to halt the defections but possibly causing more or of ignoring the situation and risking widespread Lao desertions.

In several cases in the last three months, individual defectors and small groups of Pathet Lao have said they had to fight their way out of North Vietnamese camps to defect.

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BALTIMORE SUN
12 April 1971

Vientiane Says Defections By Pathet Lao Are Mounting

By MICHAEL JANKO

Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos, April 11—Big trouble appears to be brewing between the Communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies here.

Nearly 150 Pathet Lao—a record number—have defected to the neutralist government of Premier Souvanna Phouma in the last month, according to government figures.

Had To Kill Advisers

Some of them said they had to kill their North Vietnamese advisers in order to make their way to government lines. American fighter-bombers were sent last week to aid a battalion of Pathet Lao reportedly trying to fight their way past North Vietnamese units to defect.

"The Pathet Lao have come to realize that they are being used by the North Vietnamese who are out to conquer Laos," Prince Sisouvat, the acting defense minister, said.

"We have had rallies before, but they have come in ones, two and threes. Here we have whole companies, whole battalions coming over en masse. It is the most hopeful sign we have had in years."

Aid In Air Strikes

The defectors have joined government troops around the Bolovens Plateau to guide them to Communist bases and supply depots in the last 10 days. They also have provided information for American and government air strikes.

The immediate cause of the Pathet Lao disaffection seems to be a new hard line taken by the North Vietnamese toward civilians in southern Laos.

Boua Lien, the commander of the 25th Pathet Lao Battalion, the source of most of the defectors, said the North Vietnamese had tripled the taxation of civilians, were restricting civilian trade and travel and were put-

ting increasing numbers of Laotians into forced-labor gangs in the Communist supply network.

A number of Pathet Lao officers who protested this harsh treatment of civilians were executed by their North Vietnamese advisers as "politically unreliable," according to Mr. Lien.

Pathet Lao Commander

Among the reported victims was the widely respected Pathet Lao commander in southern Laos, Gen. Phomma Douangma-la, who the Pathet Lao believe was assassinated late last year. Two Pathet Lao colonels appointed to replace him also were dismissed after protesting North Vietnamese treatment of civilians, the defectors said.

An American official here said it is uncertain whether the general actually was executed. "We had reports three or four times a month all last fall that he had been executed or there," the official said. "Whatever happened, it's appar-

ent the Pathet Lao don't believe the North Vietnamese explanation."

Government officials and other observers here theorize that relations between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese—who outnumber the local Communists by 40,000 to 1,000—began to deteriorate seriously last spring when the Vietnamese began a large drive to expand the Ho Chi Minh trail supply system after the closing of the Cambodian port at Kompong Som and U.S.-South Vietnamese attacks on their Cambodian sanctuaries.

"Until then, the North Vietnamese had generally taken care to pay for what they took, to be honest and fair in their governing and to limit the amount of forced labor required of civilians," one intelligence officer said.

"As a policy, they had been reacting to the reactions of the Laotians and had been guided by the advice of the Pathet Lao.

That seems to have changed when large groups of villagers were abducted last year to work on the trail."

'So far, the feud between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese has been more intense in southern Laos, the area of the trail, than in the north. But individual defectors from around the Plain of Jars reported that disaffection is growing there as well.

Communist sources here acknowledged "a serious morale problem" among the Pathet Lao, but said that dozens of government soldiers defect to the Pathet Lao each week. The Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane. Soth Pethrasy, said steps

were being taken to "reinstill a correct attitude" for relations between the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese.

Independent observers here believe the large-scale defections pose a serious problem for the North Vietnamese in that any reprisals taken against the Pathet Lao to curb further defections will only exacerbate the situation, while if nothing is done, whole Pathet Lao battalions may continue to defect.

Prince Souvanna, meanwhile, has welcomed all Pathet Lao defectors, saying the "door is open in the government" for individuals or the Pathet Lao as a whole.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4

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June 1971

HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE A CONGRESS

From the 24th Congress of the CPSU 30 March - 10 April, one surprise calls for explanation: the uniform silence on the part of visiting delegations speaking at the Congress concerning the Soviet invasion and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia, the major issue (among other, derivative issues) that has given rise to criticism of the Soviet Union by a large number of important and lesser Communist parties of the world. It is hard to find even the word Czechoslovakia mentioned in the speeches of the 101 delegations (some non-Communist) said to have attended the Congress.

Several interrelated issues have been argued and debated more or less heatedly since the invasion (more often for home consumption but also at Soviet-sponsored gatherings of the world's Communists): the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, the primacy of "proletarian internationalism" (read: obedience to Soviet dictates) over the right of national sovereignty of socialist countries and independence of Communist parties, the mandatory subjection to general "laws" of socialism (i.e. the Soviet "model") versus the right of Communist parties to develop their "own road to socialism" based on their national peculiarities.

Suddenly, at the Congress, these issues seem to have disappeared. Reading various versions of the speeches of visiting delegates, one would hardly know that there were such issues of contention in the Communist world -- and perhaps that is precisely the point. Aware of the image of disarray in the world Communist movement (WCM), the Soviets needed desperately to restore at least the appearance of unity in the movement. Hence, they somehow contrived to suppress the voices of dissent and impress the world Communist movement with a picture of harmony and unity restored. Some delegates may even have been convinced there never had been any basic disagreement. It mattered less that one or another delegate returning home might speak to their own countrymen in disapproval of certain Soviet acts or methods -- the important thing was that these disagreements not be given currency or additional momentum in the world Communist movement by being aired at the Congress in Moscow.

There is every reason to believe that the Soviets took special precautions to insure that the views of known dissidents not come before the Congress. Some were no doubt pressured or persuaded to refrain from objectionable comment: the threat of withdrawal of Soviet financial support can be a persuasive weapon to many parties. But special measures to stage-manage a Congress have a well-documented precedent in the case of the 10th Congress of the Communist front IUS (International Union of Students) held last February in the out-of-the-way location of Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. First, it was held behind closed doors; all correspondents but two from the Soviet youth newspaper were excluded from the proceedings. Careful guard checks were made on all those entering the immediate area of the Congress; unauthorized persons were prevented from talking with the delegates. By various devices, objectionable delegates were precluded from expressing their views. Some were refused visas to get there in the first place, others were sent back on arrival, others were harassed by the police. Dissident delegates present could not make their views or protests known. Their proposals were either ignored and passed over in silence, or at one point, the simultaneous translation facilities conveniently broke down. The full range of devices for suppressing dissent, and, more important for the Soviets, ensuring the appearance of complete unity, is described in the account by French delegate Henri Verley as published in the French Communist dissident weekly Politique Hebdo (see attachment).

Judging by scattered accounts from various delegates on their return home, similar measures were taken to stage-manage the 24th CPSU Congress, with the primary aim of preventing delegates from getting a picture of what divides the movement and of presenting the delegates with a picture of monolithic unity. It, too, was a closed session with foreign correspondents excluded. Various measures were taken to isolate visiting delegates known for their dissident views from reporters and from the Soviet population. Dissident delegations had difficulty gaining access to translation facilities and efforts were made to prevent them from distributing their speeches among other delegates. Their speeches, according to some accounts, were submitted to a special bureau which simply deleted or modified highly objectionable passages, so that while a delegate might deliver his own version of the speech in his native language, the Congress would hear in translation only the expurgated version.

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Washington Post Moscow correspondent, Anthony Astrachan, was able to report one example, apparently among many, of the censorship procedure. Chilean Communist delegate Luis Corvalan, speaking in Spanish, at one point proudly announced that his Marxist government has recognized both Cuba and Communist China. Since the simultaneous translation simply omitted mention of China, the delegates

duly applauded Chilean recognition of Cuba. Somewhat puzzled at the response, Corvalan repeated his statement, and this time, for some reason and after a moment's hesitation, the interpreter included mention of China. Dead silence from the audience. Corvalan must still be puzzled at what happened. (See the attached Astrachan article.)

The cynical, methodical planning that went into controlling the expression of deviant views on the part of supposedly fraternal delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress is at once a measure of the erosion of the Soviet ideological position in the WCM and of Soviet fears that the erosion will gather momentum and affect organizational control as well. Hence, the effort not so much to eradicate dissent, but to prevent the World Communist Movement from hearing about it. Strong disapproval of Soviet leadership of the world movement has been expressed, and is still being expressed, in their home environments by Communist parties of Italy, France, Austria, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, India, Venezuela, Mexico, Romania, and Yugoslavia (to mention only some of the better known ones). Yet, the Soviets succeeded in mounting a Congress in which hardly a word of disapproval reached this assembly of the world's Communists. Instead they heard the delegates' paeans of praise for the achievements of the Soviet Union and resounding expressions of their solidarity with an alien power and its leading force, the CPSU.

POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
25 February 1971

BEHIND THE SCENES AT A CONGRESS

Background of the International Union of Students

Little has been said about the 10th Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) held in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia 3-10 February this year, and for good reason. A closed meeting was proclaimed from the very first session, and no journalist was admitted to follow the proceedings. The correspondents of l'Humanité and the l'Unité found no more favor in this respect than representatives of the bourgeois press and only the Komsomolskaya Pravda representative followed the proceedings. The fact is that the Soviet delegation had taken care to include him in its ranks.

It was out of the question to try to approach the delegates. Three successive control points had been arranged: two by the police, one at the entry of the Park of Culture, the other at the entries of the building where the sessions were held. The third control, at the very door of the meeting room, was secured by Czechoslovakia students. The hotels where the delegates were lodged were kept under "very close surveillance." The reasons for such a closed door meeting are clear. The IUS, like other international organizations of the same type, are considered by the Soviet directors as a transmission belt for propagating their slogans, their policies, and their ideology and to insure in return the support of their strategy. Thus it was of extreme importance to them that the IUS should appear to be a bloc without cracks fully ranged behind their line. If confrontations were foreseen --- and they were --- it was necessary to prevent their becoming public. "Unity" reappeared in the sphere of resolutions, which were adopted in a mechanical fashion (there were 125 of them!) by an absolute majority.

Fabricating a Majority

The first task is to insure such a majority. It is an undertaking more and more difficult despite the variety of means employed and the lack of scruples in using them. Thus certain delegations, like that from the Congo-Kinshasa, were turned back on their arrival at the airfield. Others, as was the case of the representative of the Greek students of the interior, were able to get as far as the hotel but were expelled the day before the opening of the proceedings. For others, the UNEF [French Student Union] and the delegations from Guadeloupe and Martinique, entry visas were simply refused by the embassies or consulates. As for the Guatemala and Honduran delegations, the organizers simply "forgot" to send them their air tickets (two fares of each delegation are normally paid for by the IUS).

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Added to these radical measures were police provocations such as those to which two Belgian delegations became victim the very night of their arrival. Arrested at their hotel, then taken to the police station, they were interrogated for four hours continuously on the pretext that an automobile registered in Belgium was supposed to have distributed in the streets of the city pamphlets "hostile to the Czechoslovakia people." Finally released, they escaped from the interrogation only by the threat that their delegation would raise the matter at the Congress itself. The Czechoslovak authorities apologized, and that was that....

Singular Practice

To cap it all, the credentials committee did its job. Thus it classified among the "observers" two delegations which were not only members in good standing of the IUS but actual members of the secretariat: the VVS of Belgium and the FUA of Argentina. It should be added that the executive committee, which had met some weeks before the Congress, had been convoked under totally irregular circumstances: Madagascar, for example, had not been given a chance to attend.

There is nothing surprising in these anti-democratic practices, in these manipulations. The new fact --- and an important one --- is that they met with considerable opposition within the Congress. On the second day, some ten delegations (Argentina, Mexico, Spain, Salvador, Ireland, Belgium (Walloons and Flemish), Federation of Students of Black Africa in France, and Malagasy students in France) protested to the Congress presiding board in a joint resolution. They presented eight questions concerning the facts which we have detailed above, and showed moreover that a quorum had not even been assembled for the Congress to be able to deliberate validly.

The presiding board of the Congress (it was installed without being elected, on the pretext that the directors of the IUS --- Czechoslovakia, Sudan, Iraq --- assume it traditionally) didn't bother to give an answer to these questions. To the contrary, throughout the proceedings the board tried to prevent the dissidents from speaking. It should be added, to understand the attitude of the Iraq and Sudan delegates --- and it is true for the majority of the Arab countries and for a number of African countries --- that this was a matter of students who were studying in the USSR, in the GDR, Poland, Hungary or in Czechoslovakia.

A particularly significant incident took place during the Congress ratification of the Credentials Committee report. The first protest arose concerning the fact that the delegates were confronted with a 50-page Committee report five minutes before the discussion was opened. But the liveliest exchange took place concerning the representativeness of the two opposing Argentine delegations. The 5 December F.U.A. (the date of its Congress) represents 60 university centers out of 69. ~~It is composed, among others, of adherents of the Revolutionary Communist~~

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Party, born of a schism in the Argentine CP. The 15 November F.U.A. represents only nine university centers. But as it is composed of orthodox Communists, it was vehemently supported by the delegations of the East European countries. The discussion of a motion by the Cuban delegation --- providing for sending a committee to Argentina to determine the real representativeness of each of the rival organizations --- was interrupted because the simultaneous translation facility opportunely broke down, and that happened at the level of the Soviet delegation. This "technical accident" was used to advantage for "visits" of the East European delegation to the Cubans. But the latter upheld their motion, which was adopted. Despite this vote a USSR representative saw fit to accuse the F.U.A. of anti-Sovietism. The Argentine delegates in a mark of protest, then left the Congress. But they did it to the applause of a certain number of delegations and were accompanied to the exit by the Spanish delegates.

A Political Battle

Behind these bitter procedural skirmishes, it was evident that a political battle was developing. The divergency appeared with special clarity at the time of the general discussion, and in fact when the order of business was discussed. Thus the Spanish proposal to set up a committee for studying the struggle of students in West Europe and in the higher developed capitalist countries was rejected by the Soviet Bloc.

Similarly rejected was an amendment, also Spanish, proposing the addition, as the first order of business, among the task of the IUS the struggle "for national and social liberation" (the text says merely: "the struggle against imperialism"). In contrast, by a vote of 21 (Spain, Romania, Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, et al.) against 18 (USSR and others), an amendment was adopted affirming international student solidarity with the anti-imperialistic struggle of the Arab peoples and students, and especially with the struggle of the Palestinian people and students. Similarly, the Soviets opposed in vain a Cuban amendment denouncing imperialist penetration of the universities.

Brought for consideration by several delegates in the course of the general discussion --- Romania, Japan (Zengakuren), Spain, Madagascar, Black Students in France, etc. --- was the very nature of the IUS (bureaucratic organization), its policy (the anti-imperialist struggle was defined only in a narrow and superficial way) and its practical activity (solidarity is expressed only in words or telegrams). In place of this concept, the dissidents proposed the IUS as a true center of information and exchange of experience, a center for coordination of struggles and of genuine solidarity.

The unfolding of the proceedings revealed the existence against the Soviet Bloc of a regrouping of several delegations (Spain, Mexico, the two Belgian, Salvador, Bolivia, Federation of Students of Black

Africa in France, Madagascar) supported by Romania, Yugoslavia, North Korea,

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Japan, Venezuela, and, on several occasions in the course of the voting, by Cuba and North Vietnam. The events of the last day -- at the time of the "election" of the directing organs --- demonstrated the gravity of the crisis in the IUS. The single list method of elections provoked lively protest from several delegations (notably Venezuela and the Dominican Republic). It also provoked the spectacular withdrawal of the Spanish delegation from the Congress.

To be sure, a position has been reserved within the Executive Committee to replace People's China (after hard debate), UNIP, Spain ... it remains to be seen how these seats, vacant from now on, will be filled...

Henri Verley

POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
25 February 1971

LES DESSOUS D'UN CONGRÈS

REMOUS A
L'UNION
INTERNATIONALE DES
ETUDIANTS

On a peu parlé du 10^e congrès de l'Union Internationale des Etudiants, qui s'est tenu à Bratislava (Tchécoslovaquie) du 3 au 10 février pour cause. Le huis clos a été proclamé dès la première séance, et aucun journaliste n'a été admis à suivre les travaux. Les correspondants de l'Humanité et de l'Unita n'ont pas plus trouvé grâce que les représentants de la presse bourgeoise, et seul l'envoyé de la Komsomolskaia Pravda a pu assister au congrès : il est vrai que la délégation soviétique avait pris soin de l'inclure dans ses rangs.

logaient les délégations, ils étaient très « étroitement surveillés ».

Les raisons d'un tel huis clos sont évidentes. L'U.I.E. — comme les autres organisations internationales du même type — est considérée par les dirigeants soviétiques comme une courroie de transmission destinée à propager leurs mots d'ordre, leur politique et leur idéologie, et à assurer en retour le soutien de leur stratégie. Il importe donc essentiellement pour eux que l'U.I.E. puisse apparaître comme un bloc sans fissure tout entier rangé derrière leur ligne. Si des affrontements sont prévisibles — et ils l'étaient — il faut empêcher qu'ils soient publics, l'« unité » réapparaissant au niveau des résolutions, adoptées de façon mécanique (il y en a eu 125 !) par une majorité inconditionnelle.

majorité : entreprise de plus en plus difficile, malgré la diversité et le manque de scrupules des moyens employés. C'est ainsi que certaines délégations — comme celle du Congo-Kinshasa — ont été refoulées dès leur arrivée à l'aéroport ; d'autres — c'est le cas du représentant des étudiants grecs de l'intérieur — ont pu arriver jusqu'à leur hôtel, mais ont été expulsées la veille de l'ouverture des travaux. A d'autres — l'UNEF, la Gadeloupe, la Martinique — les visas d'entrée ont tout simplement été refusés par les ambassades ou les consuls tchécoslovaques. Quant aux délégations du Guatemala et du Honduras, on a « omis » de leur faire parvenir les billets d'avion (deux places par délégation sont normalement payées par l'U.I.E.).

amenés au commissariat, ils y furent interrogés quatre heures durant sous le prétexte qu'une voiture immatriculée en Belgique aurait répandu dans les rues de la ville des tracts « hostiles au peuple tchécoslovaque ». Enfin relâchés, ils n'échappèrent à de nouveaux interrogatoires que par la menace de leur délégation de porter l'affaire à la tribune du congrès ; les autorités tchécoslovaques s'excusèrent, et tout en demeura là...

Quant à tenter d'approcher les délégués, il n'en était pas question ; trois contrôles successifs avaient été organisés : deux par la police, l'un à l'entrée du Parc de la Culture, l'autre à l'entrée du bâtiment où se tenaient les séances. Le troisième, à la porte même de la salle, était assuré par des étudiants tchécoslovaques. Quant aux hôtes du

FABRIQUER UNE MAJORITE

A ces mesures radicales se sont ajoutées des provocations policières comme celle dont ont été victimes deux délégués belges la nuit même de leur arrivée. Arrêtés à leur hôtel, puis

SINGULIERES PRATIQUES

Il restait, pour couronner le tout, à la commission des mandats de faire son office. C'est ainsi que cette dernière rangea parmi les « observateurs » deux délégations, non seulement membres de plein droit de

V.V.S. de Belgique et la F.U.A. d'Argentine. Encore faudrait-il ajouter que le Comité exécutif, qui s'était réuni quelques semaines avant le congrès, avait été convoqué dans des conditions tout aussi irrégulières : Madagascar, par exemple, n'avait pas été mis en mesure d'y assister.

Ces pratiques antidémocratiques, ces manipulations n'ont rien pour surprendre. Le fait nouveau — et important — c'est qu'elles ont rencontré, au sein du congrès, une opposition non négligeable. Dès le second jour, une dizaine de délégations (Argentine, Mexique, Espagne, Salvador, Irlande, Belgique (Wallons et Flamands), Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France, et Etudiants malgaches en France), protestaient par une résolution commune auprès de la présidence ; elles posaient huit questions concernant les faits que nous avons relatés, et montrant de surcroît que le quorum n'était même pas atteint pour que le congrès puisse valablement délibérer.

La présidence du congrès — qui s'était installée sans avoir été élue, sous prétexte que c'est traditionnellement la direction de l'U.I.E. (Tchécoslovaquie, Soudan, Irak) qui l'assume — ne daigna apporter aucune réponse à ces questions. Par contre, tout au long du déroulement des travaux, elle s'efforça de couper la parole aux contestataires. Il faut ajouter ici, pour comprendre l'attitude des délégués de l'Irak ou du Soudan, qu'il s'agit — et c'est vrai pour la plupart des pays arabes et pour nombre de pays africains — d'étudiants qui poursuivent leurs études en U.R.S.S., en R.D.A., en Pologne, en Hongrie ou en Tchéco-

slovaquie.

Un incident particulièrement significatif devait se produire au moment de la ratification par le congrès des propositions de la commission des mandats. De premières protestations s'élevèrent à propos du fait que les délégués étaient saisis du rapport de la commission (50 pages) cinq minutes avant l'ouverture de la discussion. Mais les échanges les plus vifs eurent lieu à propos de la représentativité des deux délégations argentines qui s'opposaient. La F.U.A. dite du 5 décembre (date de son congrès) représente 60 centres universitaires sur 69 ; elle est, entre autres, animée par des adhérents du Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire, né d'une scission du P.C. argentin. La F.U.A. dite du 15 novembre ne représente que 9 centres universitaires ; mais comme elle est animée par des communistes orthodoxes, elle a été véhémentement soutenue par les délégations des pays de l'Est.

La discussion d'une motion d'ordre déposée par la délégation cubaine — et visant à l'envoi d'une commission en Argentine pour déterminer la représentativité réelle de chacune des organisations rivales — fut interrompue parce que le câble de traduction fut opportunément rompu, et il le fut à la hauteur des rangs de la délégation soviétique. Cet « incident technique » fut mis à profit pour des « visites » des délégations des pays de l'Est auprès des Cubains.

Mais ces derniers, maintinrent leur motion qui fut adoptée. Malgré ce vote, un représentant de l'U.R.S.S. crut bon d'accuser la F.U.A. d'antisoviétisme. Les délégués argentins, en signe de protestation, quittè-

rent alors le congrès ; mais ils le firent sous les applaudissements d'un certain nombre de délégations, et accompagnés jusqu'à la sortie par les délégués espagnols.

UNE BATAILLE POLITIQUE

Derrière ces âpres escarmouches de procédure, c'est évidemment une bataille politique qui se livrait. Les divergences apparurent avec une particulière netteté lors de la discussion générale, et déjà à propos de la fixation de l'ordre du jour. C'est ainsi que la proposition espagnole de constituer une commission chargée d'étudier la lutte des étudiants en Europe occidentale et dans les pays capitalistes hautement développés fut repoussée par le bloc soviétique.

De la même façon fut repoussé un amendement — espagnol également — proposant d'ajouter, au premier point de l'ordre du jour, parmi les tâches de l'U.I.E. la lutte « pour la libération nationale et sociale » (le texte porte seulement : la lutte contre l'impérialisme). Par contre, fut adopté par 21 voix (Espagne, Roumanie, Corée, Cuba, Vietnam du Nord, Yougoslavie, etc.) contre 18 (U.R.S.S. et autres) un amendement affirmant la solidarité étudiante internationale avec la lutte anti-impérialiste des peuples et étudiants arabes, et, spécialement, avec la lutte du peuple et des étudiants palestiniens. De même encore, les Soviétiques s'opposèrent, en vain, à un amendement cubain dénonçant « la pénétration impérialiste dans les universités ».

Ce qui fut mis en cause, au cours de la discussion générale, par plusieurs dé-

légations (Roumanie, Japon (Zengakuren), Espagne, Madagascar, Etudiants noirs en France, etc.) c'est la nature même de l'U.I.E. (organisation bureaucratique), sa politique (la lutte anti-impérialiste n'est définie que de façon étroite et superficielle) et sa pratique (la solidarité affirmée ne s'exprime que par des paroles ou des télégrammes). A cette conception, les contestataires opposaient celle d'une U.I.E., véritable centre d'information et d'échange d'expériences, de coordination des luttes, et de solidarité effective.

Le déroulement des travaux a mis en évidence l'existence, face au bloc soviétique, d'un regroupement de plusieurs délégations (Espagne, Mexique, les deux Belgique, Salvador, Bolivie, Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique noire en France, Madagascar) appuyées du dehors par la Roumanie, la Yougoslavie, la Corée du Nord, le Japon, le Venezuela, et, à plusieurs occasions, au cours des votes, par Cuba et le Vietnam du Nord.

Les incidents du dernier jour — lors de l'« élection » des organismes dirigeants — montrent à l'évidence la gravité de la crise de l'U.I.E. Le mode de scrutin retenu — une seule liste — provoqua les vives protestations de plusieurs délégations (Venezuela et République Dominicaine notamment), et le retrait spectaculaire du congrès de la délégation espagnole.

Certes, un poste a été gardé au sein du Comité Exécutif pour la Chine Populaire (après de durs débats), pour l'UNEF et pour l'Espagne... Reste à savoir si et comment ces sièges désormais vides seront occupés...

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1971

"Animation" But No Thigh-Slapping

A Few Anecdotes Culled From the 24th Party Congress

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MOSCOW—The delegates to the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party heard Leonid Brezhnev's central committee report with "joyful excitement," Sharaf Rashidov of Uzbekistan announced the other day.

Joy, excitement, color, even humor have been hard for Western eyes to find in the excerpts of the congress proceedings, vouchsafed by the press agency Tass, newspapers and Soviet television. They were certainly conspicuous by their absence from the faces of leaders shown on television tapes of Premier Alexei Kosygin delivering his lengthy report on the new five-year plan Tuesday.

Party leader Brezhnev sat writing; ideologist Mikhail Suslov appeared to be reading a magazine; Politburo member Gennady Voronov tapped a pencil; Mstislav Keldysh, president of the Academy of Sciences, gnawed his thumb. When the camera panned over the mass of delegates, several were caught glancing at their watches.

Real emotion was visible, however, in the closing moments of the Congress Friday. Brezhnev choked up while he was still speaking and the television showed tears in his eyes as the delegates sang "The Internationale," which is still the party—though not the state—anthem. Other leaders on the dais were wiping their eyes, too.

EARLIER, Tass seemed to feel an occasional need to try to put some gaiety into its reports.

One congress speaker was a weaver named A. V. Smirnova from the Yakovlevsky flax mill in Ivanova Region, northeast of Moscow. Among other things, she told Soviet writers, painters and film-makers that they should put more textile workers into their creations.

"You know how many good songs have been composed about girl spinners who in olden times worked in small, dark rooms. But now my contemporaries who have clever fingers and ardent hearts, intelligent and beautiful, are not given worthy attention by poets and composers," Mrs. Smirnova said.

Tass reported "animation in the hall." (Old Moscow hands bestirred their mem-

By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

ories; animation, even commotion, in the hall were reported frequently during Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing the crimes of Stalin, at the 20th Party Congress in 1956). Pravda, a more official record than Tass's quick excerpts, reported only applause for Mrs. Smirnova's appeal.

Tass and Pravda both reported "applause and laughter" at a sally by Mikhail Sholokhov, the Soviet establishment novelist, last Saturday.

He denounced the Austrian "right-wing revisionist," Ernst Fischer, as an opponent of Socialist realism in the arts. Tass carefully noted that "Fischer" is the German word for "fisherman" before reporting that Sholokhov said, "This fisherman and other foreign anglers are trying to cast their lines with quite rotten flies, banking on catching as many gullible carp as possible with this bait in the muddy waters of the so-called realism without riverbanks." This, too, produced "animation in the hall."

Sholokhov then added that there were too few gullible carp in the Soviet arts pond, so the "clever" anglers would pull out only small fry. The record then noted both applause and laughter.

SATURDAY was a big day for congressional humor: Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko deadpanned a bureaucrat's joke in his foreign policy speech, unreported by Tass.

After recounting the foreign policy activities of the Politburo, central committee, Supreme Soviet and government, Gromyko said, "Our Soviet diplomacy is also fulfilling its duty as helper of the party and government. I almost said our army of diplomats, but then I remembered that the appropriate personnel offices might pick on it, which might be bad for us guys."

Pravda recorded applause but no laughter at this sly reference to bureaucracy's perennial interest in reducing "surplus" personnel lists.

Significantly, nobody has reported hearing any good "anecdotes" mocking the congress — the true Soviet humor that produced doz-

ens of jokes about Lenin in the preparations for Lenin's centenary a year ago.

TO FOREIGN observers, one of the few truly human moments of the congress in the absence of anecdotes was unintended. Chilean Luis Corvalan, speaking in Spanish, recounted how his Marxist government had reversed a bourgeois practice and recognized "the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of China."

The interpreter put only the mention of Cuba into Russian, and the audience, duly cued to applaud all references to the gallant Caribbean ally, burst out clapping.

Corvalan did not realize that the interpreter had deprived Peking of equal time. He looked surprised, since he knew that many speakers had been applauded for attacking Peking. But in one of the few spontaneous actions by a congress speaker, he decided that if his listeners liked it, he would give it to them again.

He repeated that Santiago had recognized Cuba and China. This time, according to Western Communists who were in the Palace of Congresses, the interpreter slowly included China in his translation. The audience, finally clued in, sat on its hands. Corvalan looked quizzical and continued.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

June 1971

THE TWO FACES OF "DISSIDENT" COMMUNISTS

In commenting on the "negative phenomena" of revisionism and nationalism in the international Communist movement, Brezhnev in his address to the Congress singled out for special censure Roger Garaudy of France, Ernst Fischer of Austria, and Teodoro Petkoff of Venezuela. They have all been read out of their parties. Their sin is not only to speak out against various Soviet faults and malpractices but to do so consistently, regardless of the occasion. In this sense they may be regarded as true dissidents. Brezhnev did not go on to condemn Berlinguer and other Italian Communist leaders, Marchais of the French Communist Party, Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party, Aarons of the Australian CP, and a host of others, who also have from time to time criticized Soviet policies, particularly the invasion and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Such leaders have learned the limits of tolerable criticism of the Soviet Union and deserve to be called pseudo-dissidents, as their behaviour at the 24th CPSU Congress illustrates.

The 24th Party Congress showed that leaders of Communist parties of the world need considerable agility to walk their fine opportunistic line in trying to satisfy two conflicting political requirements, those of their Moscow bosses and those of the home electorate -- they bow to the bosses and try to deceive the homefront. The 24th CPSU Congress, held in Moscow from 30 March to 10 April, heard most foreign party delegates speak in innocuous cliches, concealing far more than they revealed of the divisions they have expressed between themselves and the CPSU. All pledged allegiance to proletarian internationalism (that Communist euphemism for submission to Soviet-dictated policies). Many who have for years vigorously claimed to oppose Soviet foreign policy and Soviet dominance, extolled the virtues of both. After the Congress, the Communist and non-Communist populace may not have noticed the degrading spectacle of some delegations scurrying home to reassert their nationalism, independence, and their anti-Soviet positions which were to prove to local supporters that they didn't really mean what they said at the Congress!

There are two mutually supporting explanations for this paradoxical behaviour. There is good reason to believe that the Soviets used various devices to control the expression of dissent

by delegates to the Congress, including some manner of censorship of "objectionable" passages in the speeches of visiting delegates. But since leaders seem not to have complained about any Soviet tampering with their speeches or about Soviet pressure on them, they in effect acquiesced in Soviet demands that there be no criticism at the Congress. Then, back home, they tried to mend any damage done to the sensibilities of their constituencies by reiterating their earlier "principled" criticism. As a matter of political expediency, they play the game two ways in the face of conflicting political requirements. When in Moscow, that fountain-head of money, organizational support and ideology, each Party makes obeisance to the CPSU. Back home it changes the mask to appear in the guise most pleasing to its supporters who are their only hope of reaching political power. All the brave words about autonomy, separate roads to socialism, and disapproval of Russian militarism are necessary at home in order to reassure any fellow countrymen who may have heard the party leaders in Moscow declaring themselves in liege to a foreign power.

This dichotomy of behaviour, in and out of Moscow, which can be illustrated in numerous instances, is particularly clear in the following three examples:

George Marchais, Acting Deputy Secretary General of the Soviet-line Communist Party of France (PCF), declared in Moscow that "proletarian internationalism... is a sacred duty." Not a word about the political trials in Czechoslovakia which Husak promised not to hold and Marchais promised to denounce. Instead he praised the "constant struggle waged by the CPSU and the Soviet state for the independence of oppressed peoples." Even before the Congress had adjourned he scrambled back on the right side of his own constituency by declaring to the French Communist daily L'Humanité that his delegation "had not thought it wise," as guests of the Soviet leadership, to mention their "well known and unchanged" position toward military "intervention" in Czechoslovakia. In fact, he said, Czech servility at the Congress embarrassed the French Party! Marchais told L'Humanité he "regretted" as "alien" to PCF principles Husak's abject admission to the world Communist movement gathered at the Congress that the Soviet military intervention was after all a fraternal act in response to the "request" of Czechoslovakia. If Marchais' reproach of Husak were anything but an opportunistic tactic, Marchais would have expressed his "regrets" before his world Communist audience at the Congress.

The largest non-ruling Communist Party of them all, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), feels itself closest to that charmed circle of government and is therefore in greatest need of the facade of an independent and truly national party. The PCI has been most

vociferous in denouncing the Czech invasion and occupation and the Stalinist management of Poland which led to the 1970 riots. But all these critical judgments, which have the ring of sincerity in PCI publications, were left outside the door of the 24th Congress. None of the Soviet delegates or the 101 delegations from 99 countries heard a word of disagreement or disapproval from Deputy Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer. He did not mention the fate of Czechoslovakia or the Brezhnev Doctrine which requires Czech-type treatment for any Communist regime which the Soviets deem to be practicing the very reforms that the PCI calls for from the safety of non-Communist Italy.

Berlinguer returned to Rome before the Congress adjourned. There he said defensively in exact if unconscious imitation of Marchais, that the PCI's views on problems due to "Czech events" were "already well known!" He assured his audience also that the PCI is "for a line of complete independence" and then their "path toward socialism... will necessarily be different from those which other socialist countries have pursued..." (L'Unita, 8 April, attached)

The Australian Communist Party (CPA) has been a persistent and outspoken critic of Soviet policies, particularly on Czechoslovakia. It has gone so far as to refuse to sign the June 1969 declaration of the World Communist Conference and has even invited the renegade French Communist Roger Garaudy to address its members. But National Secretary Laurie Aaron's speech to the 24th Congress contained nothing about the Czech tragedy. He mentioned none of the CPA-CPSU differences over the latter's domination in the name of proletarian internationalism, he said nothing of the hated Brezhnev Doctrine which he has frequently criticized. The Soviet Party may have assured his silence by threatening to split the CPA as Aarons himself predicted they might do. Thus, like the other leaders, Aarons seems to have one party line for Moscow and another for the home crowd. But available accounts in the CPA daily (see attached) are equally innocuous and do not reiterate "well-known CPA positions," but do contrast dramatically with Aarons' previous criticisms.

Whether the Communist and non-Communist populace of the various countries is fully aware of the extent of self-serving hypocrisy practiced by their Moscow-ridden CPs is debatable. But it certainly has not escaped Soviet attention. At the opening session of the Congress, Brezhnev expressly warned the Parties against going too far and making too many compromises in order to win parliamentary power. Certain renegades, he said, show themselves as anti-Soviet in order to be declared "real Marxists" and thus fully independent. Although most parties are beyond the reach of Soviet arms and thus of the consequences of the Brezhnev Doctrine, few could survive in

isolation and therefore need to pay attention to such Soviet warnings, at least at international Communist gatherings. (Attached are excerpts from the Congress speeches of Georges Marchais, Acting Secretary General of the PCF, Enrico Berlinguer, Deputy Secretary General of the PCI, and of Laurie Aarons, National Secretary General of the CPA along with their remarks for home consumption, contrasting their fawning praise of the Soviet Union and ambiguous references to independence during the Congress with their more outspoken statements made for home consumption.)

AT THE CONGRESS

Excerpts from speech to the 24th CPSU Congress by Georges Marchais,
Acting Secretary General of the French Communist Party on 31 March 1971:

"Dear comrades, I bring to the 24th CPSU Congress the warm greetings of the PCF and of its general secretary, Comrade Waldeck Rochet. Like every one of your party's congresses, this 24th congress is an important event for the communist and international movement. But it is also an event of great interest for world opinion as a whole. This is so because your party, which has made triumph the ideals of the Paris Commune, whose centenary we have just celebrated, was the first to lead the socialist revolution to victory and to create the first socialist state in history. This is so because since that time the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state has played a determining role in the service of socialism and peace in the evolution of the contemporary world. This role is due first of all to the economic successes and the total achievements whose balance sheet is being convincingly presented at your congress and of which the Communist Party and the Soviet people can be proud. But your congress also attracts attention because it is resolutely turned toward the future. Comrade Brezhnev's report is permeated with the idea that the communists do not and cannot remain in the same place, that it is always necessary to advance with an acute sense of what is new and with creative initiative....

"...anti-Sovietism, no matter in what form it presents itself and no matter where it originates, constitutes a crime against the interest of the working class and the peoples. We are combating it and will continue to combat it with ever increasing vigor....

"Dear comrades, bonds of brotherhood, solidarity, and cooperation have always existed between the PCF and the CPSU, and no trial has ever been able or will ever be able to sever them. We are determined to further consolidate, to consolidate ceaselessly, the relations between our two parties, which are rightly called fraternal parties.... We attach great importance to the principle of the independence and sovereignty of all parties and to our principles being respected in our relations with fraternal parties. But at the same time, we believe that proletarian internationalism, the joint action of all the communist parties on a Marxist-Leninist basis, is a sacred duty and, indeed, the prerequisite for the success of our struggle....

"Long live the 24th CPSU Congress! Long live the friendship, solidarity, and cooperation between the PCF and the CPSU!..."

"Long live the united action of all the workers and peoples struggling against imperialism! Long live communism!"

AT HOME

L'HUMANITE, Paris
2 April 1971

CPYRGHT

[Max Leon interview with Georges Marchais in Moscow on 1 April 1971]

[Text] PCF Deputy Secretary General Georges Marchais, who is leading the French Communist Party delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress, was kind enough to comment for L'HUMANITE on some aspects of the work now in progress at the Palace of Congresses. Here are his answers to our questions:

Question: What are the initial impressions of our party's delegation after the first 3 days of the congress?

Answer: So far we have been mainly impressed by the emphasis put on the prospects for improving the living standard and increasing the prosperity of the Soviet people, an emphasis apparent both in the report submitted by L. Brezhnev and in the speeches of most of the delegates. Obviously this is their main concern and it will leave its mark on the next 5-year period.

L. Brezhnev's report has also stressed that the main activities of the CPSU concerning the organization of society were directed at "developing socialist democracy" in all its aspects.

We have also noted with great interest the new purpose marking the approach to economic and social questions. Of course the production ratios and the economic laws of Soviet society are essentially the same as 40 years ago--that is, of a socialist type--but the standard reached by this socialist society is now considerably higher. This creates new problems which require new solutions. I shall mention only one of these problems as an example, a problem which has justly been described in the report as being of "historic significance." I refer to the question of combining the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system. The opportunities afforded in this sphere are boundless.

What the congress has brought out even now is a clear and passionate reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's will for peace. The proposals formulated or renewed by the Soviet Union in this sphere can only insure the support of all men and women aspiring to peace, security, and disarmament.

And finally, we completely agree with the idea expressed in the report on the activities of the CPSU Central Committee that the cohesion and the unity in action of the world communist movement is a complex but especially imperative task at a time when the imperialists are intensifying their aggressive activities against the freedom-loving peoples.

Question: All observers have noted that the number of foreign delegations participating in the congress has been larger than ever before. Should any special significance be attached to that fact?

Answer: Absolutely. Over 100 delegations from communist parties and patriotic and revolutionary organizations are present.

This representation is due to the great prestige enjoyed by the CPSU among the workers and peoples of all continents.

But we believe that it is also due to the will of the communist parties to present a united front in the struggle against imperialism, irrespective of some differences of opinion.

Well, this is an idea dear to the French communists.

Obviously, we believe that there can be no unity without principles. Our efforts aimed at the unity of the entire world communist movement go hand in hand with our continual struggle on two fronts: against rightist opportunism and against leftist opportunism. We recalled this yesterday in our greetings to the congress.

Having said this, our 19th congress has emphasized that neither any differences in the conditions under which the struggle is waged nor the very existence of differences concerning some problems must weaken or hinder in any way the necessary unity of action of all the communist parties.

It was with this in mind and in order to avoid any polemics that, in accordance with its mandate, our delegation decided to avoid recalling, in its greetings to the congress of a fraternal party of which it is a guest, the well-known and unchanged attitude of the PCF to the August 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Obviously, every delegation says what it wants but our delegation believes it regrettable that the CPCZ delegation has thought fit to devote the main part of its greetings to an expose of its views on this problem, an expose several aspects of which implied criticisms of our own attitude.

I shall add with particular reference to the question of the sovereignty of the socialist state that the thesis formulated by the Czechoslovak delegation seems to us alien to the principles jointly determined by the communist parties in the statement issued by the June 1969 Moscow conference.

For our part, we are firmly adhering to these principles.

Speaking in more general terms, we shall pursue our efforts with perseverance, calm, and patience, efforts aimed at unity of action of all communist parties on the basis both of the independence of every party and of proletarian internationalism.

L'HUMANITE, Paris
2 April 1971

UNE INTERVIEW DE GEORGES MARCHAIS à « L'Humanité »

CPYRGHT

MOSCOU, 1er avril (par telephone). -- Georges Marchais, secrétaire général adjoint du Parti Communiste Français, qui dirige la délégation au 24^e Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique, a bien voulu commenter pour l'Humanité quelques aspects des travaux en cours au Palais des Congrès. Voici les réponses qu'il a faites à nos questions.

QUESTION : Quelles sont les premières impressions de la délégation de notre Parti après trois jours de congrès ?

REPONSE : Ce qui nous frappe le plus pour l'in-

stant, que ce soit dans le rapport présenté par L. Brejnev ou dans les interventions de la plupart des délégués, c'est l'accent mis sur les perspectives de développement du bien-être des Soviétiques. Visi-

blement, c'est le souci dominant qui marquera le prochain quinquennat.

De même, le rapport de L. Brejnev a indiqué fortement la direction principale de l'action du Parti Communiste de

L'Union Soviétique touchant l'organisation de la société était « le développement de la démocratie socialiste » et cela dans tous ses aspects.

Nous relevons également avec un grand intérêt le sens du nouveau qui caractérise l'approche des questions économiques et sociales. Bien entendu, les rapports de production, les lois économiques de la société soviétique sont fondamentalement les mêmes qu'il y a 40 ans, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont de type socialiste. Mais le niveau atteint par cette société socialiste est considérablement plus élevé aujourd'hui. D'où les problèmes nouveaux, qui appellent des solutions nouvelles. Je ne citerai, à titre d'exemple, qu'un seul de ces problèmes, dont le rapport dit avec raison qu'il possède de une « portée historique » : il s'agit de réaliser la jonction de la révolution scientifique et technique avec les avantages du système économique socialiste. Les possibilités offertes dans ce domaine sont immenses.

Ce qui ressort encore dès maintenant du congrès, c'est la réaffirmation claire et passionnée de la volonté de paix de l'Union Soviétique. Les propositions formulées ou renouvelées par le Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique à cet égard ne peuvent qu'entraîner l'adhésion de tous les hommes et les femmes qui aspirent à la paix, à la sécurité, au désarmement.

Enfin, nous sommes profondément d'accord avec l'idée exprimée dans le rapport d'activité du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique que la cohésion, l'unité d'action du mouvement communiste mondial est une tâche complexe, mais particulièrement impérieuse au moment où les impérialistes intensifient leurs activités agressives contre les peuples épris de liberté.

QUESTION : Tous les observateurs ont noté qu'un nombre jamais atteint de délégations étrangères participent au congrès. Doit-on attribuer une signification particulière à ce fait ?

REPONSE : Absolument. Plus de cent délégations de partis communistes et d'organisations patriotiques et révolutionnaires sont présentes.

Cette représentation tient au grand prestige du PCUS parmi les travailleurs, les peuples de tous les continents.

Mais, selon nous, elle tient aussi à la volonté des partis communistes de présenter, par-delà certaines différences d'opinions, un front uni de lutte contre l'impérialisme.

Eh bien, c'est là une idée qui est chère aux communistes français.

Naturellement, pour nous, il ne peut s'agir d'une unité sans principes. Nos efforts en faveur de l'unité de tout le mouvement communiste mondial vont de pair avec une lutte permanente sur les deux fronts, contre l'opportunisme de droite et l'opportunisme de gauche. Nous l'avons rappelé hier dans notre salutation au congrès.

Ceci dit, notre 19^e Congrès a souligné que la diversité des conditions de lutte, l'existence même des divergences sur certaines questions ne doivent en aucun cas affaiblir ou entraver la nécessaire unité d'action de tous les partis communistes.

C'est en partant de ces idées et pour éviter la polémique, que notre délégation, comme elle en avait mandat, n'a pas jugé bon de rappeler, dans sa salutation au congrès d'un parti frère dont elle est l'hôte, la position bien connue — et inchangée — du Parti Communiste Français sur l'intervention militaire d'août 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie.

Evidemment, chaque délégation intervient comme elle l'entend. Cependant, notre délégation juge regrettable que la délégation du Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie ait cru devoir consacrer l'essentiel de sa salutation à l'exposé de sa position sur cette question, exposé dont plusieurs aspects impliquaient une critique de notre propre position.

J'ajoute qu'en ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la question de la souveraineté de l'Etat socialiste, la thèse formulée par la délégation tchécoslovaque nous apparaît étrangère aux principes définis en commun par les partis communistes dans la déclaration de la Conférence de Moscou, en juin 1969.

Pour notre part, nous nous en tenons fermement à ces principes.

Plus généralement, nous poursuivrons avec persévérance, calme et patience, nos efforts en faveur de l'unité d'action de tous les partis communistes sur la double base de l'indépendance de chaque Parti et de l'internationalisme prolétarien.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
3 April 1971

A French rebuke for Czech view of 1968 invasion

CPYRGHT

From ANATOLE SHUB, Paris, April 2

The French Communist Party leader, M. Georges Marchais today rebuked attempts at the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. In an interview with "L'Humanité," he attacked the Czechoslovak leader, Mr Husak, for raising the question at the congress.

M. Marchais said the French delegation at the congress had not thought it wise, as guests of the Soviet leadership, to recall "the well known and unchanged" position of the French party toward the Russian "military intervention." Therefore, French Communists regretted that Mr Husak had devoted most of his speech to the subject.

"Several aspects" of Mr Husak's speech, "implied a criticism of our own position." Furthermore, Mr Husak's justification of the Soviet intervention "appears to us alien to the principles defined together" at the Moscow conference of Communist Parties in June 1969.

The 1969 conference avoided taking a stand on Czechoslovakia in the face of opposition

by the Italian, French, Rumanian and other parties to the Soviet line. — Washington Post.

In Moscow, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, told the congress that the forces of reaction "were preparing to unleash terrible war." But the Soviet Union would win such a war with missiles that could hit anything.

"We are strengthening our army not for attack but for

defence," he said. "However, our armed forces are always ready to chastise the aggressor, and fight on that territory from which he dares violate our borders."

According to UPI, Western analysts thought Marshal Grechko was referring in his warning to the United States, not China. His speech was considered "routine rocket-rattling."

AT THE CONGRESS

Excerpts from speech by Italian Communist Party Deputy Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer at the 1 April session of the 24th CPSU Congress.

"Dear Comrades, I bring you, delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress, and all Soviet comrades, the fraternal greetings of Italian communists and of the Secretary General of our party, Comrade Luigi Longo. To the communists and to all peoples of the Soviet Union, we express the sincere hope that the decisions of this, your congress, may advance in all fields your socialist society and the building of the material and technical basis of communism. It is noteworthy that in the economic 5-year plan which has just begun there is expressed the aim to achieve a substantial increase in the material and cultural living standard of the Soviet peoples. This appears to be an important sign. We know that this effort for a further economic expansion is accompanied by the growing aid of the Soviet Union to all those peoples who are fighting for their own independence and freedom, in the first place to the heroic people of Vietnam and the Arab countries. All this indicates not only the scope and solidarity of the victories already achieved as well as the immense potential of your socialist society, but also the fundamental contribution made by the Soviet Union to the defense of world peace and the building of a world free from imperialism, hunger, and war.

"Our solidarity with your party, with the Soviet Union, with all socialist countries, has always remained alive and active. Our international solidarity does not and cannot mean our full identification with the choices which each socialist country, and more generally each communist and workers party, has made and is making on its own responsibility, but it means a basic solidarity with a country such as your own, with the other socialist countries, with a whole world which, through its own existence and victories, has already changed the fate of mankind.

"Our internationalism is founded on the recognition of the full independence of each country and each party and leaves the way open, as has already happened and as can always happen, to moments and circumstances of dissension and divergence, without in any way, as a result of this, weakening solidarity and duty in the struggle for the great aims which unite us.

"In the course of a long and difficult progress, our party has put down deep roots among the working masses of the Italian people. It has emerged as an important national force. From Lenin, first of all, and then from Gramsci and Togliatti, we have received the teaching which has shown us how to fight to open for our people a path toward socialism which corresponds to the particular historic, social, and political

conditions of our country, as well as the conditions in which there develops concretely the world struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism.

"We are also seeking to state the major outlines of the socialist state which we wish to build in Italy, together with the contribution of the other forces of the working class and the people. It is obvious that even on the general problems of socialism, of socialist thought and of the international workers movement, our party, while it is attentively studying the results of the practical and theoretical work of other parties, is working to make its own specific contributions, arising from its own experience and ideas. At the same time, we firmly reject any solicitations to break or weaken our internationalist duty within the great world revolutionary communist movement of which we are part and of which we will always be part, as a result of a free choice made by us on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles by which we are inspired and on the basis of the deepest interests of the working class and our people. Within this framework, we have fought and we will always fight any manifestation of anti-Sovietism...."

AT HOME

L'UNITA, Rome
8 April 1971

CPYRGHT

PCI Deputy General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer statement on CPSU congress

....At the congress, Berlinguer added, we had the opportunity of noting once again the existence of assessments which were different from our own on certain important questions concerning the international workers movement, relations between communist parties, and the development of socialist thought. It is not only a matter of problems raised by the Czechoslovak events, our positions on those are already well known, but also of more general questions like, for example, the one relating to the necessity of full respect for the independence of every party, every state, and every socialist state, which remains a fundamental question for us.

"Our line is clear, and we have confirmed it at every point: We are in favor of a strong internationalist commitment, side by side with all the socialist countries, communist parties, and anti-imperialist forces.

"At the same time, we are for a line of complete independence both with regard to the struggle and the quest which we are conducting in Italy for a path toward socialism and for a socialist building -- which

are and will necessarily be different from those which other socialist countries have pursued and are pursuing -- and with regard to the judgment of and the way in which we are operating within the great international alinement to which we belong.

"This remains the substance of our position. We are aware that our enemies would prefer to be faced by a PCI which is a servile imitator of other models and devoid of the capacity to autonomously formulate and defend a policy of its own or else by a PCI which has ceased to be an internationalist force.

"Instead, autonomy and internationalism are and will remain inseparable aspects of our way of operating within the reality of our country and of the international workers movement. Whoever hopes that we will deviate from this line in one direction or another will always be deluded.

"Regarding the speculations and falsifications made recently, it is only necessary to repeat that we communists are certainly not seeking the applause or recognition of our opponents: What we are interested in is that the substance of our positions should be understood by the workers, the democratic forces, and all earnest people."

L'UNITA, Rome
18 April 1971

L'UNITA interview with PCI Politburo member Gian-Carlo Pajetta on 24th CPSU Congress.

"Comrade Gian-Carlo Pajetta, who was a member of the PCI delegation which attended the 24th CPSU Congress, has granted us the following interview on its proceedings and results.

"Question: Would you first give us a general opinion on the congress?

"...Comrade Berlinguer has already expressed a first opinion in his interview on returning from Moscow. We have had a report in the party directorate, we will widely disseminate the documents which have been published recently, and we will continue the debate and the study at party meetings and in confrontations with others. Ours is a positive opinion, at the same time, it also aims at a critical examination of a fundamental experience. We do not want a description or an advertisement of some kind of a 'model,' as if we had attended an international exhibition and as if we were faced with the problem of importing a finished product to be used here in our country.

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"Question: 'Returns' and 'rehabilitations' had been expected. Have these forecasts been confirmed?"

"Answer: I believe that for an opinion on the congress and on the prospects which it opens it is necessary to go back to the debate which has been going on almost everywhere in recent months and to which such a great amount of space has been devoted in the international press. We remember, for example, the reverberations caused by a question put to a West European communist party leader about his reaction were the 24th congress 'to disavow the 20th' and how his answer that 'in this case, his party would not approve it' seemed courageous and aroused sensation.

"Question: Could you tell us something about the way in which the problems of the articulation of society and of the economic and social development were presented?"

"Answer: A Central Committee document appeared on the eve of the congress which stresses the function of the Soviets and provides a more specific base to their greater autonomy by means of greater powers in the economic field and by means of more conspicuously autonomous budgets. At the congress, and particularly in Brezhnev's and Kosygin's reports, there was no lack of references for workers' participation and democratic life, also seen as prerequisites for greater efficiency, references which were intentionally accompanied by appeals for discipline and organizational efficiency. Thus, although the theme of the trade unions was certainly not a central one, the reference made to them did not stop -- as some people believed they could simplify it -- at the 'transmission belt' formula but stressed their duty to represent and to defend the interests of the workers.

"It is not possible to speak about a turn and perhaps not even about a deepening in connection with the themes of democracy and of the institutions. The intention here was to stress the continuity, but recalling that this means a condemnation of the illegalities of the 'personality cult' period and a desire to overcome what was arbitrary, improvised, and personal during the period of 'subjectivism.'

"I intentionally refer to the two terms in quotation marks because the fact that complicated phenomena are being schematized and almost concealed by a label appears to us as a limitation of research and political debate and therefore as a limitation of the congress. It is as if a kind of modesty (a dangerous political modesty, we believe) prevented a more open political debate which would certainly be fruitful and would take place in the direction in which it was intended to move and in which things were moving. When a congress seems as if it were dominated by the concern for unanimity and for the proclamation of monolithism, a part of its effectiveness seems to become lost, as if the

meeting of experiences and the recognition of the problems were being tarnished by elements of liturgy.

"This was felt perhaps in more than one speech, but it must be stated clearly that it was not a characteristic of the reports. At this point we must ask the reader to show an attentiveness which political observers seem to have lacked, particularly those who were concerned with providing a daily comment aimed at serving preconceived theses rather than providing information....

"The profound disagreement between the Soviet Union and China remains like a painful wound in the international workers movement, and the polemical positions of the CCP also remain acute. The polemic was taken up again on the eve of the congress, and no one could hope for sensational gestures of pacification. Now then, if there was an echo of the polemic and a sharp answer to the attacks at the CPSU congress and if the positive, albeit limited results in interstate relations were stressed, here also, although no progress was made, there was no move backward, nor has the conflict sharpened....

"The theme of the defense of the socialist countries was stressed, and there was a return -- and no one could expect things to happen differently -- to insisting, even quite strongly, on the justification of Czechoslovakia's occupation. We have maintained and have declared and recalled in this respect a view point which did not come close to or offer any rapprochement.

"Question: We would like you to examine finally the meaning and the value of the international representations at the 24th congress.

"Well, we must say that the presence of 101 delegations provides the answer, and in a direction which appears to us to be the right one. There were not only different organizations and countries with absolutely different circumstances but also voices which, because they represented different situations and conditions, could not all have the same accent. We Italians stressed this in Berlinguer's speech and we spoke clearly, in our own way, and in our own style: That is, Italian and internationalist at the same time. There was no lack of attention at the congress, nor of stimulation for the debate and the confrontation, even in the many meetings which took place between various delegations....

"When we were among Soviet workers and soldiers, even with other delegations, one thing always seemed clear to everyone: It was useless to ask us to be different from what we are, but it was impossible to doubt the internationalism of the Italian communists. Unity in diversity: Perhaps not everyone says it and admits it, but for everyone this is a fact to be accepted. When I was asked to speak about our party's policy to students from every part of the world who were gathered in their university, no one thought that a voice which, perhaps, would not repeat the same words included in their textbooks could be inopportune.

And when a written question in Arabic, and another one in Spanish, both of them interested and polemical in connection with our position with our position on Czechoslovakia, were handed to the rostrum, it appeared to me that speaking to those 500 young people and calling things by their name was the most natural thing in the world. It was also natural for them to listen and to seek to understand although they did not all reply with applause, but this is no less natural."

AT THE CONGRESS

PRAVDA, Moscow
9 April 1971

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[Australian Communist Party National Secretary Laurie Aaron's greetings speech, date unspecified]

[Text] Dear comrades: Australia's communists greet the working people of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 24th CPSU Congress, an important event in the life of your country. (applause) We wish great successes to the congress and to all the workers, kolkhoz members, and representatives of the intelligentsia, who, at the price of their heroic labor and privations over the past 53 years, have transformed their motherland, despite the embittered hostility of imperialism and some aggressive wars. (applause)

At the 24th CPSU Congress plans are being discussed which provide for new achievements in the sphere of industry, agriculture, science, and culture, the raising of the living standard of the working people, and for the development of socialist democracy.

Following Lenin's traditions of proletarian internationalism, the 24th CPSU Congress has again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet people to give support to the national liberation struggle of all peoples of the world against American imperialism. The peoples of Indochina, who are heroically resisting the U.S. imperialists and its puppets and satellites, are in the vanguard of this worldwide movement. (applause) The remarkable victories won by the peoples of Indochina in the struggle against all the military and technical might of the United States immeasurably strengthen the struggle of all the peoples for liberty. (applause)

The Australian Communist Party opposes the capitalist class of its own country, which is willingly playing the role of confederate of the United States in its aggressive war against the peoples of Indochina. This is our international duty and, at the same time, a main factor in the preparation for revolutionary actions against Australian monopoly capitalism and against American domination of the economy, political life, and foreign policy of Australia.

The Australian communists are actively participating in the broad and ever growing antiwar movement. This coalition of different social and political forces is opposing war, demanding the withdrawal of all Australian and American forces and of military equipment from Indochina, and is striving to prevent the drafting of young Australians into the army to wage this unjust war. (applause) At the same time, the Australian Communist Party is conducting its independent campaign by exposing imperialism as the culprit for war and is supporting all popular forces fighting in Indochina. The communists support the proposals advanced by the DRV and the PRGRSV. (applause)

Certain groups of more conscious Australian workers are already waging strikes under the slogan, "No normal business life while the war lasts." In May and September 1970 more than 120,000 people who went out onto the streets of the country's chief cities participated in mighty protest demonstrations against the war. Together with other peace-loving forces, the communists will do everything to involve as many people as possible in the most active forms of the antiwar actions.

We consider it our duty to oppose primarily "our own" capitalism. (applause) We also consider the struggle against Australia's colonial pressure against the developing national liberation struggle in New Guinea and support for the demands of the oppressed indigenous population of Australia to be our prime international task. We are participating in the movement of solidarity with the peoples of South Africa and Greece.

In Australia we are striving to struggle against such ideas engineered by the capitalist system as racism, militarism, the sense of hopelessness and alienation, and against false moral values. Such ideas are the unseen force which cements the system of oppression in the developed capitalist countries. The theoretical and practical struggle against these bourgeois ideas is the main task of the Australian revolutionary movement.

The workers movement in Australia is putting forward new demands and is devising new methods of waging a struggle against the monopolies and for their economic, social, and political demands. The growth of resistance to the attempts to transfer the burden of inflation and other difficulties of the capitalist economy to the shoulders of the workers and poorest strata of the population and also the growth of the movement of democratic rights to counteract the aspiration of the ruling classes to limit democracy even further are of particular significance. Reaction is preparing for an offensive for the purpose of stopping the strike movement of the workers, fettering the trade unions, disrupting demonstrations, and crushing the protest movement against war and military service.

We consider that there are prospects in Australia for developing the class struggle and for even greater fusion of the workers movement with the antiwar movement and the movement for new moral values, in a word, with those movements which are fundamentally anticapitalist and can issue a socialist challenge to capitalist domination in Australia.

Comrades: The policy and practical activity of the CPSU are of enormous significance for the world revolutionary process and have a positive influence on the forward movement of all mankind. We once again wish the congress success in all spheres. (Stormy applause)

TRIBUNE, Sydney
21 April 1971

CPA MAN REPORTS

ON CPSU CONGRESS

(From Laurie Avrons in Moscow)

THE 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ended on April 10 with the unanimous election of a new Central Committee of 245 members, with 150 alternate members. The old Central Committee had 189 members.

The new Political Bureau has 15 members, with four alternates as against 11 members with four alternates on the previous Political Bureau. All the previous 11 members were re-elected.

Western press speculation about major changes in the Soviet party leadership, and a power struggle within the leadership, have proved false, as the report of the Congress would "rehabilitate" Stalin.

Brezhnev's report said that the Chinese leaders "demanded that we should abandon the line of the 20th Congress and the program of the CPSU."

He also dealt with art and literature, saying: "In the development of our art there were complicating factors of another order. There were some people who sought to reduce the diversity of present-day Soviet reality to problems that have irreversibly receded into the past as a result of the work done by the party to surmount the consequences of the personality cult."

"Another extreme was the attempt to whitewash past phenomena which the party had subjected to emphatic and principled criticism, creative elements which the party has introduced into its political and theoretical work in recent years."

The Congress devoted its

main attention to the economy, and the planned development of industry and agriculture, with large capital investments and extensive application of science and technology. It decided that the growth rate of industries producing consumer goods would be faster than that of heavy industry.

The Congress decided that by 1975 "the average monthly wage of workers and office employees will rise to 146-149 rubles, and the remuneration of collective farmers' labor to 98 rubles." The minimum wage is to rise to 70 rubles.

The 1970 harvest was a record 136 million tons, and the plan calls for an average grain output of 195 million tons.

In the last five years, 500 million square metres of new land has been brought into cultivation in the Soviet Union. The plan calls for 670 million square

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...over the last few years.

The improvement in living standards is quite observable in Moscow, especially in clothing, but shortages of some goods are admitted.

The Congress indicated no substantial changes in Soviet foreign policy. Stress was laid on the peaceful aims of this policy. Congress adopted statements on Indochina and the Middle East, declaring support for the Indochinese and Arab peoples against imperialism.

On relations with the USA, Brezhnev said: "In the recent period, the US Administration has taken a more rigid stance on a number of international issues, including some which have a bearing on the interests of the Soviet Union."

Suggesting that changes in US policy are connected with domestic political moves, Brezhnev said: "We proceed from the assumption that it is possible to improve relations between the USSR and the USA, but we have to consider whether we are dealing with a real desire to settle outstanding issues at the negotiating table."

Brezhnev's report justified the August 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, quoting from a recent document of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In his final speech he said that Congress had seen that fraternal parties unanimously approved the CPSU line.

Besides the statement by French communist leader Georges Marchais disassociating the French party from the Czechoslovak intervention, Italian communist spokesman Enrico Berlinguer gave an interview in Rome clearly stating the Italian Communist Party's critical views on this and other issues.

Very few of the speeches delivered at the Congress referred to Czechoslovakia and not many were critical of China.

Australian communist delegates had discussions with other delegations, including the Vietnam Workers' Party and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. We informed the Vietnamese of anti-war actions in Australia, and handed over money collected on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Viet-

nam last September 2 as a token of solidarity. After the talks, the Vietnam Workers' Party sent a letter to the Australian delegation saying "Your delegation's speech at the 24th Congress of the CPSU has once again shown the militant solidarity of your party with our just struggle, and your resolute action against the American imperialists for the withdrawal, without any conditions, of all US and satellite forces from Indochina."

The Australian delegation also had talks with the delegates of the Communist Party of Japan. They estimated the recent municipal election as a big advance for the party. (See report, p. 9).

TRIBUNE, Sydney
20 January 1971

Aarons message on Czech plight

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A message sent by Mr Laurie Aarons, national secretary of the Communist Party of Australia, to a meeting of solidarity with Czechoslovakia held in Paris on November 26, 1970, was adopted as a resolution by the meeting.

A delayed report from Paris said this last week. The meeting, called by the January 5 Committee which embraces various French Left tendencies, was attended by more than 2000 people.

It was addressed by former leading members of the French Communist Party, Roger Garaudy and Charles Tillon, and by the well-known Czechoslovak communist leader Jiri Pelikan, now in exile.

Another exiled Czechoslovak communist, Eduard Goldstucker, sent a message from London, where he is now living.

Mr. Aarons' message said: "The Communist Party of Australia maintains unequivocally its stand of August 21, 1968, that the occupation of Czechoslovakia by armed forces of the USSR and four other Warsaw Pact powers was unjustified and indefensible. Our 22nd Congress, held in March, 1970, over-

whelmingly reaffirmed this stand.

"The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on January 5, 1968, set out on a new course for socialist democracy and workers' self-management. This course won great popular support from workers, peasants, intellectuals and students in the Czech lands and Slovakia. The CPA welcomed it as a most important development for the international communist movement and for the world revolutionary process.

"The justifications attempted for the occupation were false and without foundation. The occupation damaged the socialist cause in Czechoslovakia itself, and all over the world, and, indeed, harmed the prestige of the USSR itself and the other countries involved.

"Subsequent events in Czechoslovakia have not come of even intended damage done, but rather les-

choslovakia by the occupation is striving the break the resistance of the broad masses by telling them they are isolated and abandoned, and that there is nothing for them to do but resign themselves to this so-called new reality. As if they have forgotten that we became communists and socialists not in order to accept 'reality' but precisely in order to change it.

"Your action is all the more important since our people are noting with some alarm and bitterness the confusion and the discouraging silence of many of those to whom we are bound by the same socialist purpose and who, although they condemned the military intervention in August 1968, are beginning little by little to accommodate themselves to its consequences."

"The only possible course is that which adheres to socialist principles of international relations, first stated by Marx and developed by Lenin: the immediate withdrawal of all occupying troops, restoring national independence and self-determination to the Czech and Slovak nations, to their Communist Party, trade union movement and all popular organisations, for return to the path of socialist renewal and democratic advance."

Mr. Pelikan told the meeting: "Your action is all the more important since the present regime imposed on Cze-

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relations began warming. The Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1967 again brought Moscow and Belgrade closer together. A year later, events in East Europe once more destroyed the tenuous Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.

5. The Dubcek regime in Prague made no secret of the fact that much of its inspiration came from the successes achieved in Belgrade with the Yugoslav brand of independent Communism. The Yugoslav press bespoke Belgrade's pleasure with developments in Czechoslovakia and many Yugoslav officials privately commented that the Czech experiment might even eclipse the accomplishments of Yugoslavia's self-management program which Prague was using as its model. In contrast to growing criticism of Dubcek's domestic reforms coming from Soviet, East German, and Polish media, in April 1968, Yugoslavia's Borba commented that "The process of democratization unfolding in Czechoslovakia offers sufficient guarantee that its aims can be realized."

Sovereignty Denied

6. All indications are that the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia caught the Yugoslavs by complete surprise and in Yugoslav eyes, the Kremlin had again reverted to Stalinism and big-power chauvinism. Yugoslavia saw an even more sinister threat in the post-invasion enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. This Soviet statement that the internal affairs of each member of the socialist fraternity were the direct concern of all other members, implied possible action against Romania, Yugoslavia's neighbor and the only Soviet bloc nation that supported Czechoslovakia and refused to participate in the invasion. Immediately after the occupation, there was a sudden increase in the number of East European "tourists" who cropped up in Yugoslavia. According to Belgrade these "tourists" were visiting for one purpose --- to collect intelligence on Yugoslav military preparedness, particularly in Macedonia.

7. Adding to Yugoslav apprehensions were rumors of Soviet military maneuvers held during late August and early September along the Romanian border. At the same time, Bulgarian media began intensifying their agitation over the Macedonian question and the Bulgarian military newspaper echoed the Brezhnev doctrine with a warning by a Bulgarian deputy defense minister that Bulgaria was ready to go "anywhere else" to rescue socialism. The Soviet, East German, Polish and Bulgarian press launched bitter attacks against Yugoslavia and against Tito personally, accusing him of having inspired the "revisionist" activity which had made the intervention in Czechoslovakia necessary.

8. By a series of actions --- some clandestine and some quite open --- the Soviets have continued since August 1968 to bring pressure on Belgrade and to remind the Yugoslavs of their vulnerability. The resultant Yugoslav antipathy for the Soviets has not abated and is still a prominent factor in Yugoslav thinking. In March 1969, President Tito had set the tone for the 9th Yugoslav Party Congress by reviewing the history of Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs. By 1971, the atmosphere remained unchanged as Tito's May Day speech constantly harked back to danger from external enemies and several times cited foreign intelligence activities, noting that "especially recently we have felt incredible pressure."

The Incredible Pressures

9. Fresh instances of foreign meddling in internal Yugoslav affairs have come to light in the past few months. First, a new species of Soviet-Yugoslav-agent emerged in the form of expatriates who had been studying in Soviet military academies at the time of the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rupture and who chose or were persuaded to stay on in the USSR. Many have reached the rank of major or colonel in the Soviet forces. One such was retired Soviet army colonel Nikola Grujic who was arrested in Belgrade in February 1970 and charged with spreading propaganda hostile to the Yugoslav government. Grujic had previously been in and out of Yugoslavia on visits; he had been warned about making anti-regime statements, but refused to be muzzled. According to Tanjug and other Yugoslav press accounts of this incident, the Grujic case is far from being an isolated one. According to some Belgrade sources, a number of these military expatriate tourists have been caught trying to recruit Yugoslavs for the Soviet secret service (KGB).

10. Yugoslav apprehensions were further sharpened in 1970 with the exposure of a worrisome espionage case. In March, Hans Peter Ruhlmann a correspondent of the West German weekly, Der Spiegel, was arrested with two Yugoslavs and accused of a "criminal act of espionage." The foreign country involved was not named, but informed Yugoslav officials say that the case was run by East German intelligence with the undoubted complicity of the Soviet Union. Charged with Ruhlmann were Hilmi Taci, Belgrade correspondent of Rilindija, an Albanian-language paper published in the traditionally nationalist region of Kosovo, and Jovan Turkulja, described as a "functionary of the military establishment." Immediately after the arrests, the East German embassy's press attaché was suddenly called home.

11. The Ruhlmann investigation and trial, which lasted almost a year, culminated in a six-year sentence for Ruhlmann who was convicted of having procured from his Yugoslav collaborator highly secret materials which he then passed on to a "foreign government and a foreign organization as well as to two representatives of a foreign state." In late April 1971, the Yugoslav Supreme Military Court apparently decided the sentence, as it read, was far too ambiguous. The Supreme Court rejected the conviction handed down by the lower military court and returned the case with a demand for additional evidence and for the name of the foreign power involved.

12. The Ruhlmann case had several ominous implications for Yugoslav officials in addition to simply raising questions about domestic loyalties in the face of apparent renewed Soviet-directed subversion. For one, the fact that an Albanian was involved with Ruhlmann added weight to Yugoslav charges that the 1968 Kosovo riots were partially brought on by foreign meddling. The part played by Albanian propaganda in stirring up troubles was obvious, but even in 1968 Belgrade was insisting that "other intelligence agencies" were behind the disorders. Since the 1968 riots, Kosovo, where economic depression and backwardness make the area easy prey for subversion, has been singled out for special attention in the current five-year plan.

13. The Yugoslav leadership is not unaware of the close ties between East German intelligence and the Soviet KGB and assumes that even if Ruhlmann had not been working directly for the USSR, everything he got eventually ended up in Moscow. For the past two years, the Yugoslav press has repeatedly charged Moscow with meddling in her internal affairs. Official statements repeatedly imply that "hostile activity" is being carried out by those who most oppose Yugoslav self-management (the Soviets and the East Germans) and that the foreign adversaries involved are those most concerned about Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy (the Soviets and the East Germans). There has been press speculation that, by using the Ruhlmann case, the Yugoslav courts plan to bring matters into the open and to document Soviet involvement in this and other espionage cases.

Following the Fascists

14. As noted in a recent article by Paul Lendvai, Vienna correspondent for the Financial Times of London: "It is an ominous sign that the extreme nationalist Croat exiles in the West now claim Soviet support and in their publications offered the Russians airports and harbor facilities on condition that Moscow guarantees an independent Croatia. If one adds the intense activity of Soviet agents in Serbia and Bosnia, it becomes clear that the Soviets are following in the footsteps of Mussolini's Fascist Italy, which successfully used Croatian separatism to destroy Yugoslavia."

15. The Yugoslavs are convinced, and there is evidence to support their convictions, that Soviet duplicity is behind the recent activation of Croat chauvinism, especially abroad. Two public denials by Soviet spokesmen of Yugoslav allegations that the USSR was encouraging if not helping emigré anti-Communist Croatian separatists are indicative of Soviet sensitivity to these charges. Early in 1970, the Italian right-wing Borghese reported that Dr. Branko Jelic, a West Berlin physician and leader of the extremist Croat "Council in Exile," had secretly conferred in West Germany with several top level Soviets, an allegation officially denied by Moscow Pravda. It was, however, shortly after this alleged meeting that Jelic's newspaper began shifting from a staunchly anti-Communist, anti-Soviet line to one favoring accommodation with the Soviet Union.

16. Then, in April this year the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm protested against a report published in the Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter concerning Moscow support given to the Ustashi. This is the Croatian extremist group that is held responsible for the 7 April murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic. Ironically, before he was appointed to Stockholm, Rolovic was the assistant state secretary for foreign affairs whose job it was to prevent emigré terrorism and anti-Yugoslav propaganda abroad. All of which leads to the assumption that Rolovic's assassination was a well calculated affair.*

17. Dagens Nyheter's Zagreb correspondent, Lars Ake Berling, had referred in a 14 April story to rumors in Yugoslavia that the Soviets were supporting the Ustashi with the aim of causing enough trouble in Yugoslavia to give Moscow a pretext for invading the country after Tito's death. The Soviet Embassy said that "no honest person can entertain any doubts about the Soviet attitude toward the fascist terrorist organization Ustashi, whose members were in the service of the Hitlerite aggressors during World War II." According to some Belgrade sources, however, even within Yugoslavia the Soviets maintain contact with well-placed Ustashi elements. Reportedly, after World War II the Soviets got the names of former Gestapo confidants, a few of whom now hold key posts in the government and whom the Soviets control by threat of blackmail.

* The Western press has reported that the assassins of Rolovic were two Croat exiles. In fact, according to the Belgrade weekly, Nedeljne Informativne Novine (NIN), neither was an exile. Both Brajkovic and Barisic were born in Croatia, were traveling on Yugoslav passports, and both had arrived in Sweden as workers in January 1970.

18. What the Soviets have not officially denied is their possible role in the complete change of mind on the part of Dr. Branko Jelic who in the past twelve months has become an ardent supporter of Moscow's policies. It is from the tenor of articles published during the past year in Jelic's newspaper Hrvatska Drzava (Croatian State) that evidence comes. In the latest, February-March 1971, issue of Jelic's paper, its ostensible Moscow correspondent, Slavko Novak, reported on a "recent" Warsaw Pact meeting which had confirmed "the Croatian area as an exceptionally important factor in the Warsaw Pact defense concept." Novak also reported a meeting of pro-Soviet Croat exiles in the USSR at which it was decided to "organize propaganda among the Croatian workers in Europe." According to Novak, Tito is being attacked by Moscow for trying to undermine its efforts in Egypt, for "whispering to Enver Hoxha not to accept the Soviet offer to normalize Soviet-Albanian relations," and for making efforts to persuade Romania to abandon its policy of solidarity of the socialist bloc. Another article in the same issue promotes the concept of "Soviet Croatia" and a third is a piece designed to persuade Albania to accept Moscow's offers for normalization.

19. As sources in Zagreb point out, not all Croat emigrés support Jelic's new pro-Soviet line; Croat Communists within the country are unalterably opposed to it. They see in Jelic's activities a dangerous game played against them; the strongest point of the Croat Communists has been their anti-Soviet line. It appears that the Soviets have not been able to infiltrate the Croat Communist Party and are therefore trying to find their allies among the Croat extremists abroad. In so doing Moscow seems to be following in Mussolini's footsteps, whose tactic was to use extreme Croat nationalism to destroy Yugoslavia and defeat the Serbs. In this instance, the Soviets would attempt to defeat the Croats and then support the Serbs against the Croats.

Alarmism in the Press

20. Derogatory statements by Soviet and some East European officials about "separate roads to socialism" in terms applicable to Yugoslavia have done little to calm Belgrade's nerves. Equally disquieting have been the most recent reflections in media of the Soviet Union and her "allies" which seem to presage a propaganda buildup stressing that Yugoslav socialism is in danger. For example, the 2 May issue of the Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy claimed there were "alarming signs" regarding developments in Yugoslavia: "For some time now Yugoslavia's friends, concerned with the development of socialism, prosperity, and progress in that country, have watched with apprehension more and more frequent alarming signs."

It went on to blame the "Western press" for suggesting that the worsening situation would push Yugoslavia from its present road and "open the door to penetration not only of revisionist but of openly capitalist forces."


21. During late April, Radio Zagreb Commentator Milika Sundic had cause to criticize both the Soviet and Polish press for their distorted reporting of Yugoslav affairs. The Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda was accused of slanted reporting in its coverage of President Tito's speech in which he had announced an impending high-level meeting at which party unity and economic problems were to be discussed. Tito had said the meeting would not adjourn until matters had been settled. This was the end-of-April special Presidium session in Brioni out of which came agreement to maintain an ideologically unified Communist Party while going ahead with the formation of a radically decentralized government.

22. Pravda's coverage of the Tito speech omitted all passages indicative of optimism and left the impression that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had no prospects of success. "We are not so myopic," Sundic said, "that we cannot see that through its narrow selection of information, Pravda wanted to suggest that socialism in our country is facing a major crisis and that it should be saved as it was in some other country." Sundic also denounced as fabrication an article in the Polish trade union daily, Glos Pracy, which said that separatist trends were on the increase in Croatia and noted that this was the same argument being used by other supporters of a "doctrine of limited sovereignty."

23. By way of contrast, "Western press alarmism" is almost unanimous in its expression of faith that Tito can successfully manage a genuine succession and that in so doing, he will have made another great stride toward achieving a reasonably democratic Marxist society. As noted by The Economist of London (1 May): "...Tito will probably get his constitutional reform...If he does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The Russian leaders have long hoped to increase their influence in a weakened Yugoslavia after his death or retirement; and they have long feared the effect on their own subjects of liberalising moves in other communist states. But his success will be very welcome everywhere else. President Nixon has recently shown his concern about Yugoslavia's future and his readiness to help it get over these difficult months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt. They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a capitalist Yugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because there is no visible and attractive alternative to his kind of reasonably stable, genuinely non-aligned Yugoslavia in that turbulent part of the world."

CURRENT HISTORY
April 1969

YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS PROVINCES



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WASHINGTON STAR
15 October 1970

MILTON VIORST

CPYRGHT *Yugoslavs Watch Russia Warily* CPYRGHT

BELGRADE — In Yugoslavia, the Russians are an obsession. The newspapers analyze them, the people think about them, the ruling circles try to anticipate what they will do.

Perhaps this would be considered a national psychoneurosis — except that the Russians' brutal occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 raised the perfectly reasonable question of whether Yugoslavia would be next.

The Yugoslavs are not sure what the Russians are up to in the Mediterranean, but they have a frightening theory.

The theory spreading through ruling circles holds that the longer the Russians remain a dominating naval presence in the Mediterranean, the surer they are to insist on bases on the northern shore of the sea.

The Yugoslavs reason that the Russians, through centuries of experience, are oriented in their strategic thinking to the land, even when their objectives are maritime. Thus, they will never be satisfied to depend on naval bases in Egypt.

Ultimately, they will be looking for bases easily reached by land. To Yugoslavia this means one thing: The Rus-

sians will, at a minimum, be demanding a port and transit rights to reach it.

Furthermore, they don't really believe the demands will stop there. They are suspicious enough to think that, sooner or later, the Russians will count on swallowing up the whole country.

So the Tito government expects, when the time comes, to make clear that not a single Russian soldier will set foot on Yugoslav territory. If that means the Russians will respond as they did in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs will take the chance.

And the thinking of Yugoslav ruling circles on Russian designs doesn't end there. This is a subject on which they are rich in explanations and interpretations.

They cite, for example, the Russian drive that dates from the early Czars to reach warm waters. Russia's attempts to reach the Adriatic through territory that is now Yugoslavia were, in fact, among the provocations of World War I.

They cite also Russia's sense of military insecurity, which carries with it a need to dominate more and more surrounding territory. At the same time they point out that

Moscow, which thinks of itself as leader of the world communist community, has not adjusted to Belgrade's course of independence.

The Yugoslavs say it is naive to believe that current Russian leadership finds Tito's state less of an affront than Stalin did 20 years ago. If anything, the Brezhnev doctrine which exalts Russia's right to intervene in the internal affairs of any communist country is more threatening than anything Stalin ever devised.

Within the past year or two intelligent Yugoslavs have seen even further reason to beware of the Soviet threat.

This begins with the observation that beneath the surface, there is growing ferment within the Soviet Union, the consequence of diversion of massive funds from civilian to military purposes.

The Russians have extravagant programs for building a fleet, supplying the Egyptians, aiding the Cubans and maintaining a front in Siberia, in addition to the normal expense of keeping a huge army, a modern air force and a decent space program.

Only by closing its society to outside influences can Russia

continue these practices, the Yugoslavs say. Nonetheless, disturbing ideas inevitably seep in.

Until 1968, many of these ideas seeped in from Czechoslovakia—but the Czechs got most of them directly from Yugoslavia. In the year or so before the occupation, Yugoslav-Czech relations had become exceedingly close.

Tito's Yugoslavia may be no paradise, say candid members of its ruling circle, but it provides its people with far more gratification, both economic and political, than the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia is farther from Russia than Czechoslovakia, but as a communist state it remains a danger to Soviet stability. As this theory has it, Russia ultimately will have to reform — or decide what it will do about—the Yugoslavs.

By one explanation or another, Yugoslavs think of the Soviet drive for domination as all but inexorable. By nature not an optimistic people, they do not regard their freedom as permanently assured. On the other hand, they are determined not to be taken by surprise, if and when the Russians begin to move.

THE ECONOMIST
1 May 1971

Will he make it?

CPYRGHT President Tito is fighting hard against his conservatives for
~~a reform that could change the future of Yugoslavia~~

These are make-or-break days for President Tito's regime. If the constitutional reform which is now being debated gets by without a last-minute hitch, Yugoslavia will become freer than it or any other communist country has ever been before. Its ruling party will be able to claim, with as much justification as Mr Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 1968, that it is a reasonably faithful mirror of its people's aspirations. And President Tito will go down in history as the first communist leader to have reversed a trend which, for over half a century, has seemed to be going in one direction only—and to have done so without sacrificing his country's independence or handing back the factories to the capitalists.

The whole venture may still fail, though failure is less likely to take a dramatic form than to come by slow stages of demoralising delay and postponement. For these reforms, which aim at giving greater autonomy to Yugoslavia's six federal republics and two autonomous provinces and, within them, to individual people and firms, have met powerful opposition within the communist party, just as the previous round of reforms did in 1965 and 1966. No wonder that many Yugoslavs are holding their breath as they watch their leaders prepare for the showdown. Even President Tito appears to be nervous; he has recently made some grumpy speeches in which he complained of indiscipline in the party and hinted that some top people may be sacked if they go on resisting policies on which agreement has been reached.

Last January he had summoned leaders from all the republics and autonomous provinces to Brioni, his island home in the Adriatic, for talks about the future of the country's economic and political system. He made it clear that he would not let them leave Brioni until they had reached agreement on all the major issues. After two weeks he was able to announce an apparent agreement, and to publish 21 draft constitutional amendments embodying all the major proposals for reform. But only a few days later it became clear that his attempt to knock the leaders' heads together had failed. A Croat party leader, Mr Miko Tripalo, accused the Serbs of trying to wriggle out of firm commitments given at Brioni. One of these was a promise of more independence for the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are a part of the Serbian republic. Albanian leaders in Kosovo, where the majority of Yugoslavia's million-odd Albanians live, have been pressing for this for a long time. Some Serbian leaders angrily retorted that Mr Tripalo was

interfering in Serbia's internal affairs. Since then, Croatia's leaders have caused a sensation by demanding an official investigation of their complaint that "certain federal organs" (presumably the security service) had tried to discredit them by forging evidence which seemed to link them with extremist Croat groups abroad that are opposed to the very existence of Yugoslavia. One of these emigré groups was responsible for the recent murder of the Yugoslav ambassador in Sweden. Another, with its headquarters in west Berlin, has close links with Moscow and advocates Croatia's "liberation" with Soviet help.

These polemics have shown that the harmony achieved at Brioni was short-lived. But President Tito is not giving up. This week he has called another party meeting at which he will again try to secure the leaders' support for changes in the constitution. Why is he so determined to push the reform through? It is most unlikely that he is doing it out of any attachment to the idea of liberalisation. He is a man whose main concern has always been with power and how to keep it, and he has not changed now. But the president's wary instincts told him a long time ago that Yugoslavia would, once he is gone, be exposed to new pressures from Russia and its allies. And its most vulnerable point would be its multinational composition. He sees that it will not be able to withstand these pressures unless all its nationalities have a clear stake in the continued existence of the Yugoslav federal state. Until very recently the Croats, the Slovenes and the Albanians have all felt that they were discriminated against by the central government, particularly in the fields of foreign trade and domestic capital investment. By introducing a new system that would make the federal government responsible only for defence, foreign affairs, broad economic policies and development aid for areas like Kosovo, President Tito hopes to give the non-Serbs a new interest in Yugoslavia. And the preservation of the federal state seems to be his overriding concern as he prepares for his inevitable departure from the leadership. But although the old system was as inefficient as it was unpopular, its abolition is not proving easy. In Serbia, in particular, the men in favour of change are having a hard time trying to carry their more conservative and nationalist party colleagues with them. And there are many party officials elsewhere who mistrust the constitutional reform and are quietly trying to torpedo it because they see it as a threat to their own power. The anger the president has voiced in his recent speeches

CPYRGHT

is said to be directed primarily at these people, and these calculations of self-interest.

To organise a really effective conservative opposition to the reforms would, however, involve making a direct challenge to President Tito's still enormous authority. A military coup would be remarkably difficult to bring off in a country as decentralised as Yugoslavia. But the greatest obstacle to any conservative attempt to put the clock back is the unprecedented wave of democratic enthusiasm that is now visible in the country. This seems to be particularly strong in Croatia, whose relatively liberal leaders appear to enjoy genuine popularity. A straw in the wind was the recent election at Zagreb university, where the student assembly installed a new leadership which includes non-party members and even practising Catholics. Croatia also seems to have something almost approaching a free press at the moment. And in other republics, notably Slovenia and Serbia, there is a new toleration of opposition views, including extreme left-wing ones.

So President Tito will probably get his constitutional

reform before his recently extended presidential term expires on August 17th, because there is no alternative to agreement for any except a small minority of pro-Moscow communists. He will be helped by Yugoslavia's precarious economic situation, which demands that the uncertainties surrounding the future of the country's banking and foreign trade system be resolved as quickly as possible. If he does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The Russian leaders have long hoped to increase their influence in a weakened Yugoslavia after his death or retirement; and they have long feared the effect on their own subjects of liberalising moves in other communist states. But his success will be very welcome everywhere else. President Nixon has recently shown his concern about Yugoslavia's future and his readiness to help it get over these difficult months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt. They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a capitalist Yugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because there is no visible and attractive alternative to his kind of reasonably stable, genuinely non-aligned Yugoslavia in that turbulent part of the world.

TIME

17 May 1971

YUGOSLAVIA

Working Against Time

CPYRGHT

When Yugoslavia's President Tito entered Sarajevo's magnificent new cultural and sports center last week, the 2,300 delegates to an economic conference cheered wildly and gave him a standing ovation. Then, as he strode to the rostrum beneath portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and himself, the throng broke into the wartime song of the Yugoslav partisans, "Comrade Tito, we give you our word, we shall follow you."

But will they follow anybody else? Tito, who will be 79 on May 25, is given full credit for making Yugoslavia the most democratic of all the Communist states as well as the one with the highest standard of living. Almost all Yugoslavs still support the system of "self-management" that Tito introduced 21 years ago, rejecting Soviet-style planning and central control in favor of economic decentralization, which makes managers of factories directly responsible to the workers.

Into the Open. Tito, however, may well be the only man who can command the allegiance of the disparate peoples of Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces. A Croat in a country dominated numerically by Serbs, Tito has been trying for decades to groom a suitable successor. His first

candidate, Milovan Djilas, wound up in jail after criticizing some of Tito's methods in the 1950s; his second, Aleksander Ranković, was banished from the party in 1966 when he opposed Tito's policies of decentralization and liberalization. Both men are free today and live comfortably in Belgrade.

Last fall, the aging Tito faced up to the fact that something would have to be done soon. "We have entered a stage now where we have no time," he told a party meeting in Zagreb. "Time works not for us but against us." To solve the problem of the succession, he proposed the creation of a collective presidency made up of two or three leaders elected by the assemblies of each republic and one or two by each province. Ironically, the national debate over Tito's proposals merely brought the country's separatist tendencies into the open.

Deep Resentments. To stem the discontent, Tito began stumping the country and threatened a party purge and "administrative measures"—a Communist euphemism meaning summary police action—for enemies of the federal system. Two weeks ago, he summoned party leaders to his Brioni Island retreat in the Adriatic Sea and scheduled a special party conference to convene

this summer. Last week he stepped up his warnings against "those who cannot be convinced," including "some generals who sit around the cafés," "megalomaniacs who want to become President," and intellectuals who have opposed his recent proposals.

Few nations are as vulnerable to internal division as Yugoslavia. Two of its republics, Slovenia and Croatia, were once linked to the Habsburg empire and developed as part of the West; the others stagnated for centuries under Turkish rule. The cultured Slovene has neither language nor heritage in common with the illiterate Montenegrin. The independent, expansionist Serbs have dreamed of a true nation of Yugoslavs (literally "southern Slavs"). They formed the backbone of the wartime resistance; to this day, they accuse the Croats of having collaborated with the Germans. Resentments run so deep that the Yugoslavs have never chosen a national anthem.

Unbelievable Pressure. Tito's task of maintaining unity while solving the problem of succession is made even more difficult by the fact that the economy is in bad shape because the Yugoslavs have been living beyond their means. Despite a 15% devaluation of the dinar last fall, Yugoslavia's trade deficit rose

62% in the first quarter of the year, while retail prices soared 12% and the cost of living 13%.

Two weeks ago, Tito warned his countrymen that foreign agents (meaning primarily Soviet secret police) had been exerting "unbelievable pressure" on the government. "We should allow no sixth column to penetrate our country," he said. It is possible, of course, that he had chosen to fight the drift toward sep-

aratism by raising the specter of Soviet troublemaking. But there is no doubt that the Soviets would like to see Yugoslavia disintegrate. If Tito manages to arrange a genuine succession, he will have made another great stride toward achieving a reasonably democratic Marxist society. If he fails, Yugoslavia could splinter under the weight of separatist feeling and Soviet meddling.

IL FIORINO, Rome
14 May 1971

THE GERMAN JOURNALIST WAS A SOVIET SPY

CPYRGHT

Background on the Ruhlmann case in Yugoslavia: THE GERMAN JOURNALIST WAS A SOVIET SPY.

Vienna, 13 May. According to word reaching here from Belgrade, details revealing of the Soviet hand in espionage activities in Yugoslavia may soon be forthcoming. Well informed Yugoslav officials have long admitted privately their strong suspicions that Der Spiegel correspondent Hans Peter Ruhlmann, convicted last January on charges of espionage involving passage of Yugoslav military secrets to a "foreign power", was an agent of East German intelligence on behalf of the Soviets.

Ruhlmann and two Yugoslav collaborators were arrested in March last year and have been held in custody since. Following an extensive investigation their trial opened in September, almost immediately went into secret sessions, and since then, only brief press accounts have given clues of the trial's progress. In January, Ruhlmann was given a six-year sentence and convicted for having obtained from his Yugoslav codefendants highly classified military and official information for a period of two years and of having passed this information to a "foreign government and a foreign organization as well as giving part of it to two representatives of a foreign state." One charge brought out was that Ruhlmann sought and got details during September 1968 concerning "Yugoslav defense preparations and the military-political situation during the month of August 1968" (the month during which the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia). It also appears that Ruhlmann was to concentrate on the political military situation in Croatia and on the unpublicized conflict between Croatia and Serbian interests.

Last month, according to the Yugoslav news service Tanjug (28 April) the Supreme Military Court over-ruled the conviction handed down by the lower court and returned the case with a request for more evidence and the name (or names) of the foreign power involved. In line with oft-expressed Yugoslav suspicions that Ruhlmann was a Soviet agent, whether directly or indirectly controlled by Moscow, the Supreme Court now apparently wants the facts brought out into the open. And there is no doubt that all this ties in with Yugoslavia's convictions that Moscow's ulterior motive is a Balkanized Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.

IL FIORINO
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RETROSCENA DEL CASO RUHLMANN
IN JUGOSLAVIA

Era una spia sovietica il giornalista tedesco

VIENNA, 13 maggio. Secondo voci giunte da Belgrado sarebbe imminente la rivelazione di particolari sulla funzione preminente dei sovietici nelle attività spionistiche in Jugoslavia. Alcuni funzionari jugoslavi ben informati hanno ammesso da tempo, in privato, di sospettare fortemente che il corrispondente dello "Spiegel" Hans Peter Ruhlmann, condannato nel gennaio scorso per un caso di spionaggio consistente nella trasmissione di segreti militari jugoslavi a una "potenza straniera" fosse un agente dei servizi d'informazione della Germania orientale con incarichi per conto dei sovietici. Ruhlmann e due suoi

collaboratori jugoslavi furono arrestati l'anno passato e da allora detenuti. In seguito a una vasta indagine il processo si aprì in settembre, quasi subito cominciò a svolgersi a porte chiuse, e dei suoi sviluppi si ebbero sulla stampa solo pochi accenni. In gennaio Ruhlmann fu condannato a sei anni per aver ottenuto dai computerati jugoslavi, nel corso di due anni, importantissime informazioni di natura militare e amministrativa e per averle trasmesse a un "governo straniero e a una organizzazione straniera come pure a due rappresentanti di uno stato straniero". Una delle accuse era

che Ruhlmann aveva cercato e ottenuto nel settembre 1968 particolari informazioni riguardanti "i preparativi di difesa e la situazione militare-politica della Jugoslavia durante l'agosto 1968" (il mese in cui le truppe del Patto di Varsavia invasero la Cecoslovacchia). Risulta anche che Ruhlmann avrebbe concentrato la propria attenzione sulla situazione politico-militare in Croazia e sui contrasti, passati sotto silenzio, tra gli interessi croati e serbi.

Qualche settimana fa, come ha riferito l'agenzia di stampa jugoslava Tanjug (28 aprile), la Suprema corte militare ha annullato la condanna inflitta nel giudizio di


primo grado e ha disposto la riapertura dell'istruttoria con la richiesta di maggiori prove e del nome (o dei nomi) della potenza straniera coinvolta. In accordo con i sospetti jugoslavi, ricorrentemente espressi, che Ruhlmann sia un agente sovietico direttamente o indirettamente controllato da Mosca, la Suprema corte appare decisa a rendere i fatti di pubblico dominio. E non c'è dubbio che tutto questo è connesso alla convizione jugoslava che lo scopo recondito di Mosca è una Jugoslavia balcanizzata nel periodo dopo Tito.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 May 1971

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Drama in the Balkans

By Joseph C. Harsch



It will take a future historian to get at the details and a novelist to put them into proper form, but the bare outlines are now distinguishable of a major political drama in the Balkans.

Some of the elements are as follows:

Josip Broz Tito is 79 years of age.

He is doing his best to give his country, Yugoslavia, a constitution which can hold it together after his strong hand and his remarkable qualities of leadership are no longer there.

Old friction

His efforts have been impeded at every turn by forces arising from the country's history and perhaps abetted by outside interests. That "perhaps" is where the plot gets complicated.

The task of welding the south Slavs into a single nation would not be easy even without any outside interests.

Serbia was the original

goslavia. The Serbs are a proud and warlike people who consider themselves superior to the neighboring Slavic tribes. The friction is greatest between the Serbs, who were until recently mountaineers, and the Croats, who were the first of the south Slavs to adjust to urban and industrial society. It's the old friction between mountain herdsmen and the farmers and artisans of the plains.

ern times by entirely different cultural routes. Serbia was for long a conquered province in the Turkish Empire. Croatia was for long a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hence the first is overlaid heavily by the culture of the eastern Mediterranean. Croatia's cultural background is Germanic and central European.

Split Yugoslavia

Belgrade, the capital of Serbia as well as of the federation, still has the feel of

an eastern city. Zagreb looks and feels like any city in Austria or southern Germany.

Here of course is fertile soil for outsiders desiring to break up the Yugoslav federation.

The Germans played upon the natural and inherited friction between Serb and Croat when they were building Hitler's "Third Reich." Naturally, they played to the Croats with the Germanic cultural background against the Serbs. Russians have traditionally tried to exploit Serbian hostilities.

During the month of April, Tito's spokesmen in Belgrade accused the Russians and Poles of trying to interfere in domestic Yugoslav politics. Specifically,

it was alleged that the Yugoslav émigré colony in West Germany had now been taken over by the Russians and was being used by the Russians in an effort to split Yugoslavia apart.

This, if true, would be both logical and illogical.

The émigré Croats in West Germany are left over from the Ustachi movement of World War II. The Ustachis sided with the German occupiers of Yugoslavia. They are conservatives according to World War II standards. After all, they fought Tito's Communist partisans during the civil war in Yugoslavia.

But Croat separatism is the easiest emotion for any outsider to exploit. Croats

resent being under Serbian rule. Granted, Tito himself is a Croat, not a Serb, yet there is a tendency which even he has been unable to break for Serbs to dominate the bureaucracy of the federation, particularly the secret police.

Even the score

The Russians would, obviously, like to break up the Yugoslav federation. It has been a thorn in their side — an East European Communist country which refuses to bend the knee to Moscow, or follow the line of Kremlin orthodoxy!

It would be reasonable to expect the Kremlin to consider this moment in history as their last best chance to

even the score with Tito and wreck his great plan for a lasting constitution which will bind his various peoples together.

In the West we have no way of knowing whether the Kremlin has actually picked up the old Ustachi outfit as an instrument of its modern purposes. We do know that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm was fatally shot five weeks ago by persons presumed to be members of the old Ustachi underground.

And we do know that the Kremlin regards Tito's Yugoslavia as an affront to its prestige and a danger to its control over the rest of its "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe.

EVENING STAR, Washington

26 April 1971

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Yugoslav Unity

President Tito's hints of the need for a purge of separatist elements in his own Yugoslavian Communist party can only be disturbing to Western observers. The disquieting thought is that any such purge might just postpone the ultimate showdown among the various nationalistic interests in the country, leaving new scores to be settled after Tito's departure.

Tito, leader of the surviving partisan movement of World War II, is the main ingredient of the cement that holds together this collection of territories of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, now in the form of six republics and a couple of autonomous provinces, with four official languages and three religions. But Tito, 78, cannot be expected to perform this adhesive function for too many more years. His announcement last year of plans for a collective presidency, after he leaves, was an attempt to impose a posthumous unity on the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrans and other countrymen who would survive him.

Among recent events that have created a crisis for Yugoslav unity was the

assassination of the country's ambassador to Sweden by Croatian separatists. A continuing source of disunity are the economic disparities among various parts of Yugoslavia, with the industrialized north resentful about its role in propping up less developed parts of the country.

Tito has our best wishes in his effort to keep his nation together. The main beneficiary of a Yugoslav split-up would be the Soviet Union. For the Russians, an independent and strong Yugoslavia, ready to put up a bruising fight if threatened with the fate of Hungary or Czechoslovakia, has represented a barely tolerable insult to Soviet dominance in Communist Eastern Europe. But a Yugoslavia once again Balkanized, with all that term implies in the way of political chaos and weakness, would be easy picking for the guardians of Soviet Communist ascendancy.

The Yugoslavs, who were able to raise their heads after centuries of tyranny, should understand this better than anyone. Let's hope they decide to hang together, rather than go separately to the Soviet gibbets.

WASHINGTON POST
 CPYRGH 2 May 1971

Tito Says Party Will Keep Unity

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, May 1—President Tito today indicated that the Yugoslav League of Communists has no intention of giving up its dominant role during the current period of political decentralization.

The 78-year-old leader neither dramatized nor minimized the country's difficulties. Instead, as he has done so often during tough times in the past, he soberly emphasized that Yugoslavia's problems were solvable and appealed for national unity.

Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs listened to the president's May Day speech on radio and television. It was

broadcast live from Labir, near the Italian border, which is celebrating the 50th anniversary of a brief workers uprising in 1921.

Tito arrived in the small coal-mining center fresh from a three-day meeting with about 80 top Communist leaders from all over the country convened by him personally to try to put an end to regional quarrels that have marred the country's unity in recent weeks.

He was applauded warmly and often by a large audience as he read from notes.

The rivalries between the regions have sharpened in recent months as a major constitutional reorganization that will give much more say to the six Yugoslav republics and reduce the power of the central government nears completion.

The various local leaderships are now arguing over such complex questions as the allocation of former federal funds, the financing of major regional projects once subsidized by Belgrade, and other

complex issues.

Tito singled out the Yugoslav press and television, university professors, and managers of banks as those who were sharpening local rivalries or failing to heed the line laid down by the Yugoslav League of Communists, which he heads.

He said that the league would be "merciless, in eliminating the deformations in its own ranks."

In the present decentralization some have raised the question whether Yugoslavia's Communists Party is breaking down into regional parties. President Tito's answer to that question today seemed to be a stern "no."

He said there had been agreement that the League of Communists was "the force to overcome the difficulties which are not so big."

"We should be merciless to all deformations in the league and also to those from outside who wish to introduce splits in our society, in our masses. We have placed democracy on a very high level, on a strong basis, but there can be no de-

mocracy for the enemies of our Socialist society."

There was applause when he criticized the Yugoslav press for carrying "slander" and inaccuracies.

In the past few months, newspapers in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, and those in Zagreb in Croatia have exchanged salvos, and have printed statements and interviews from persons favoring a much more radical decentralization of Yugoslav life.

In the economy, Tito complained about "megalomaniac" development plans that could not be realized, and warned bank managers to stop making policy on their own or face expulsion not only from the Communist Party but also from their positions.

The semi-independent banks, which are playing an ever larger role in financing Yugoslavia's industrial development, have been criticized by some party officials for usurping the party's role in planning the national development.

NEW YORK TIMES
 2 May 1971

Yugoslavia: All Tito Wants Is A Little Bit of Unity

CPYRGH

BELGRADE—Nationalistic rivalries, the oldest problem in the Balkans, have risen again to haunt the present and endanger the future of Yugoslavia and her brand of Communism.

In an area whose bloody history has given its inhabitants scores of reasons to mistrust their neighbors, the World War II partisan movement headed by

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President Tito was the first successful effort to rally Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins to a common cause. Now, 26 years after the victory that made the movement into a government, the Yugoslav Communist party that President Tito heads appears to have lost its unity.

Characteristically, the first person to acknowledge the crisis publicly and seek remedies for it was President Tito himself. Toward the end of a fatiguing tour of the nation's underdeveloped southern regions two weeks ago, the 79-year-old Tito began talking about selfish, irresponsible people whose failure to look beyond their immediate interests was endangering the success of the whole community.

The worst offenders, he conceded, were party leaders, and he promised to pull them quickly into line or remove those who had slid too far. Yugoslavs are still waiting to see how successful he will be.

Last week, at the end of a three-day meeting of the party's 11-man Presidium, as well as top Federal and republic politicians, at President Tito's island retreat of Brioni, the situation appeared no clearer. A lengthy communiqué issued on Friday night, as Yugoslavs scattered to the beaches and countryside for their three-day May 1 weekend, only restated the party's unified backing for the process of administrative decentralization and measures to stabilize the economy. It did not say what new approaches would or could be taken to achieve these goals and calm regional in-fighting.

The communiqué did ask full support from party members for the economic stabilization measures adopted several months ago. The measures, including theoretical but ineffective limits on salaries, wages and investments, have not been respected, but the communiqué only urged the "creation of a social climate for speedier agreement" on vital social and economic questions.

Beyond that, the communiqué blamed unnamed Yugoslav press and information media for "opposing" the party's course, and ordered Communists to be more vigilant against such activity; said that "increased foreign, hostile, subversive activity has arisen" and has profited by Yugoslavia's internal troubles to spread mistrust, and disclosed that party leaders would formulate a new platform and convene a conference, similar to one held here last summer, to review the party's role.

Before what had appeared to be a showdown session, frictions between Serbs and Croats, particularly, had become so intense that their disagreements were imperiling plans to restructure the Yugoslav Federation into a looser amalgam of sovereign republics bound to each other by acknowledged common interests and common allegiance to Communism. The gathering momentum of change had brought to the surface old feuds and grievances from the practical to the preposterous.

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In the latter category—lumped under the classification of “romantic nationalism” — intellectuals in Serbia and Croatia tangled with each other over a variety of issues. Language was one, and Croats claimed that the individuality of their dialect was in danger of being submerged by efforts to promote a common speech.

Behind this emotional smoke-screen, the real efforts to assert Croatian independence lie in the

economic field. Years of central control, the Croats maintain, have meant the channeling, by Serbian officials, of Yugoslav resources into Serbian projects for the exclusive benefit of Serbia.

With taxing power and investment decision-making scheduled to be transferred largely to the republics, the Croats also demanded an end to Federal subsidy programs that do not benefit them but do aid agricultural

Serbia, and a new foreign currency regime that would permit Croatian exporters to retain the dollars they earn. Serbs responded by arguing that it would be disastrous to strip Federal economic institutions of their leverage when the country is deep in a serious inflation.

The careers of many prominent party men are now deeply entwined with these contradictory positions. Getting Serbian and Croatian leaders back on co-

operative terms will be no easy matter.

The only figure whose prestige remains unblemished is Marshal Tito. But having moved to establish a collective Presidency to succeed him eventually, he must now work hard to promote the consensus that will give such a body an all-Yugoslav outlook, rather than allow it to become a forum for republic rivals.

—ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.

VALEURS ACTUELLES, Paris
26 April 1971

LES AUTONOMISTES DE TITO

Le nationalisme renaît en Croatie.

Tito a peur : les Oustachis n'ont pas oublié les massacres de 1944 et réclament le soutien de l'URSS.

CPYRGHT

Une purge se prépare en Yougoslavie. Elle frappera parmi le million de membres de la Ligue des communistes, et même au sein de son bureau exécutif.

L'autre vendredi, le 16 avril, Tito réclamait la vigilance contre les ennemis de l'intérieur qui, aidés de l'étranger, cherchaient à semer la discorde entre les rations yougoslaves. Le 14 avril, il avait demandé l'expulsion des communistes qui agissaient contre l'unité de la Yougoslavie, fédération de six républiques rassemblant près de 20 millions d'habitants.

Au cours des deux dernières années, Tito a accumulé les mises en garde.

La Croatie semble la plus visée. On observe en effet parmi les Croates deux phénomènes de résurgence nationaliste apparemment distincts.

L'un concerne la fraction politisée des 450 000 travailleurs croates expatriés dans les pays occidentaux. L'autre, les 4 800 000 Croates, en majorité catholiques, de la fédération yougoslave.

A l'étranger, le « Mouvement de libération croate » et la « Fraternité révolutionnaire croate » militent pour l'indépendance de la Croatie. Ils se réfèrent à Ante Pavelitch, fondateur en 1929 des Oustachis, qui restaura le 10 avril 1941, avec la bienveillance du IIIe Reich, l'Etat indépendant de Croatie, avant de mourir à Madrid, le 28 décembre 1959, des suites, dit-on, d'un attentat qui eut lieu à Buenos Aires le 10 avril 1957.

Le trentième anniversaire de la République de Croatie a été célébré l'autre samedi, à Munich, au cours d'un banquet organisé par le « Comité national croate » que préside Branko Jelic, ancien compagnon d'Ante Pavelitch.

Les Oustachis n'ont jamais pardonné à Tito les massacres massifs de 1944 et de 1945. Ils l'accusent d'avoir liquidé 600 000 soldats et civils croates.

La devise des Oustachis : « Dieu au ciel, les Croates sur terre ». Leurs armes : la propagande, le terrorisme.

Ambassadeur de Yougoslavie à Stockholm, Vladimir Rolovitch a succombé le 15 avril à ses blessures. Ses obsèques solennelles se sont déroulées à Belgrade le samedi 17 avril. L'ambassadeur avait été blessé mortellement le 7 avril, à Stockholm, par deux Oustachis.

Le 10 avril, deux autres Oustachis ont occupé le consulat yougoslave à Göteborg. Avant de se rendre à la police suédoise, ils avaient menacé d'exécuter trois otages si Tito ne libérait pas l'un des leurs, condamné à mort à Belgrade le 7 décembre 1970.

Celui-ci, Miljenko Hrkac, vingt-deux ans, avait déposé le 13 juillet et le 25 septembre 1968 des bombes à la gare centrale et dans un cinéma de Belgrade. Bilan : 1 mort et 60 blessés. Le sort de Miljenko Hrkac reste en suspens. L'appel devait être remis en jugement le 21 avril, mercredi dernier.

Auteurs le 9 octobre 1934 à Marseille du spectaculaire attentat contre le roi Alexandre de Yougoslavie, les Oustachis se manifestèrent à maintes reprises après la guerre, surtout en Allemagne de l'Ouest.

A Paris, une bombe éclata le 18 février 1968, boulevard Delessert, au club de l'ambassade de Yougoslavie. Il y eut 1 mort et 19 blessés. Le 26 novembre 1966, une bombe placée par deux Oustachis avait fait long feu dans ce même club.

Téléguidage soviétique

En revanche, les attentats du 29 janvier 1967 contre deux ambassades et quatre consulats de Yougoslavie, aux Etats-Unis et au Canada, ne semblent pas engager la responsabilité des Oustachis mais celle d'anciens « Tchethniks » de Draja Mihailovitch, le chef des partisans serbes fusillé en juillet 1946, sur l'ordre de Tito.

C'est la renaissance du sentiment nationaliste en Croatie même qui inquiète Tito.

Economiste et secrétaire de la Ligue des communistes en Croatie, Vladimir Bakaritch donna le 10 mars 1964 une interview remarquée à « Nin », le plus grand hebdomadaire de Belgrade. Il déclarait que l'économie était en pleine forme s'im-

Il réclamait aussi le droit pour chaque république de participer à l'élaboration de la politique étrangère du gouvernement fédéral de Belgrade.

En mars 1967, l'écrivain croate Miroslav Krleža et d'éminents intellectuels de Zagreb signèrent un manifeste pour l'égalité entre la langue croato-serbe, écrite en caractères latins, et le serbo-croate, écrit en caractères cyrilliques, qui ne se distinguent pourtant que très peu.

Député de Livno, en Bosnie; Jure Galitch ne s'y trompa pas. Il nota qu'il existait une analogie entre ce manifeste et les thèses linguistiques prônées en 1941 par « Hrvastki Narod », l'organe officiel de l'Etat croate indépendant d'Ante Pavelitch. Cette affaire entraîna l'exclusion du parti de Vlatko Pavletitch, le président des écrivains de Croatie.

En mai 1970, « Vus », l'édition hebdomadaire de l'organe de l'Alliance socialiste de Croatie, publiait en feuilleton les Mémoires à peine expurgés d'Ante Pavelitch, le chef des Oustachis.

Représentant de la Croatie au gouvernement fédéral, le Dr Nikla Miljanic démissionnait en novembre. Pour protester contre l'opposition des Serbes à la mise en œuvre du programme de stabilisation économique adopté en décembre 1969.

Précédemment, en septembre, le Croate Mika Tripalo, membre du bureau exécutif de la Ligue des communistes yougoslaves, avait été plus loin.

Il proposait la nationalisation par la République de Croatie des banques fédérales et des entreprises du commerce extérieur implantées en territoire croate. De même, il invitait à la confiscation des investissements réalisés sur le littoral adriatique de la Croatie par des banques de Belgrade dirigées par des Serbes. Le 16 avril, Mika Tripalo affirmait que les Croates étaient insuffisamment représentés dans l'armée.

Les cadres de Croatie constatent que leur république se dépeuple (le taux de natalité y est le plus faible de la Yougoslavie) et que l'émigration entraîne le départ définitif de plusieurs centaines de milliers d'ouvriers. Ils relèvent que les

emplois laissés vacants sont pris par des Serbes.

Ils s'insurgent aussi contre les prêts usuraires accordés aux entreprises croates par les banquiers fédéraux de Belgrade, et voudraient que Zagreb, capitale de la Croatie, puisse disposer de la totalité des devises procurées par le tourisme et les exportations.

Existe-t-il un lien entre les actions des Oustachis à l'étranger et les aspirations à une plus grande autonomie, voire à l'indépendance, des cadres communistes de Croatie ?

La question a été posée. Par des Serbes qui soutiennent qu'il y a une liaison entre la direction de la République socialiste de Croatie et l'émigration oustachi.

Le comité central de la Ligue des communistes de Croatie s'élève contre cette accusation. Le 14 avril, une commission d'enquête a été instituée à Belgrade.

A Munich, il y a une semaine, le Dr Branko Jelic affirmait que sa « République de Croatie » aurait le soutien de l'Union soviétique. GILLES MERMOZ

NEW YORK TIMES
2 May 1971

CPYRGHT Tito Assails Critics at Home and Abroad

By ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, May 1—President Tito today placed much of the blame for Yugoslavia's current political crisis on opponents abroad but also intimated that he would crack down on domestic dissent and probably shuffle both the Government and Communist party.

In a rambling, 40-minute May Day address, broadcast on radio and television from the town of Labin near the Italian border, the 78-year-old leader reserved his sharpest remarks for Yugoslav newspaper and television journalists, university students and professors and "megalomaniac" investors. These groups have often been targets for his wrath.

But the speech, which revealed few details of the three-day leadership meeting President Tito held this week, had

a new tone of harshness toward critics at home and abroad.

"We have placed democracy on a very high level, on a strong foundation," the President said in a reference to the open discussion that makes Yugoslavia unusual among Communist nations. "But there cannot be democracy for the enemies of our social system who fight against everything we wish to achieve."

"Up until now we have tolerated too much," he said as applause from the well-dressed crowd in the coal-mining town interrupted him. "We have tolerated such enemies and their actions too much, and they are at work in many areas."

The President, who will be 79 on May 25, said that the mass of Yugoslavs still gave him and his associates in the party full support. On a recent trip through backward areas in the south, he said, he had been received "with the same faith" as was shown him in after World War II, when he turned his victorious Partisan move-

ment into a government.

Toward the end of that trip, Marshall Tito made several angry speeches indicating that nationalist rivalries among leaders of the country's six republics were becoming a danger to Yugoslavia's development and unity. It was then that he announced this week's leadership meeting, which observers thought would be a major showdown on economic and political issues.

In discussing the meeting on his island retreat of Brioni, however, the President said only that "very sharp discussion" had ended in unanimity. He did not say how outstanding economic questions had been reconciled nor did he point to any change in existing policy beyond "more energetic" application of party and governmental discipline.

Greater Autonomy for Republics
Stating that Yugoslavia was not in danger of disintegration, he said the current reorgani-

zation giving greater autonomy to the governments of the six republics would strengthen the nation.

"We have settled the national question, not only in theory," he maintained. "All that remains is to implement our decisions. There is no nationality in Yugoslavia that wants to be outside Yugoslavia."

Part of the reorganization, he added, would probably be a shuffle of federal posts, which many expect this summer. Beyond that, President Tito said, it may prove necessary to remove prominent party members from posts that they have become "too weak" to occupy.

As for bankers, business managers and others who follow policies opposed by the Government's economic stabilization measures, he declared, "They will not only be expelled from the party but also from their jobs."

THE WASHINGTON POST
24 April 1971

Yugoslav Census Reflects Nationality Split

CPYRGHT

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE—How many Yugoslavs are there in Yugoslavia?

The answer emerging from preliminary returns in the country's 1971 population census is: probably not too many.

For the purposes of the census—and to the anger of many people who identify themselves with the country as a whole rather than with one of the five national groups composing it—"Yugoslav" is no nationality at all.

Nevertheless, an undisclosed number of respondents to the survey questionnaires who consider themselves to be Yugoslavs have registered under the category for those of "undeclared" nationality.

A period of economic and political decentralization has rekindled rivalries among the country's five national groups—the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians—and the census has become embroiled in the controversy over national identity.

Furthermore, the census is coming at a time of major constitutional reorganization, in which the federal government is losing many of its powers, and there is fear in some quarters that the concept of the Yugoslav multinational state could be put in question.

In protest against the census's emphasis on identification with national groups, some students at Belgrade University reportedly have listed themselves as Eskimos.

One Belgrade woman, a Serb, received a visit from a census taker who had been

band, also a Serb, was absent. She listed herself and their two children as "undeclared." The husband became furious when he heard this, telling her hotly, "How could you do it? You gave birth to two fine Serbs, and you call them undeclareds."

The drafting of the census questionnaire was a one-year process, filled with political controversy involving representatives of the country's largest national groups, the Serbs (42 per cent of the population) and the Croats. (24 per cent).

The Croats resisted efforts to permit purely regional identifications in the census, but in the end three regional groupings were allowed—those of Dalmatia, Kordun and Lika. All are in

Croatia, but an estimated half-million Serbs live in those regions.

One Croat from Dalmatia, the Adriatic coastal region between Dubrovnik and Rijeka, said he had passed up a chance to declare himself as a Dalmatian "because I didn't want to throw away my vote."

Some persons are unsure what they are. These are the children from "mixed" nationality marriages, which make up 12 per cent of the total.

The Yugoslav authorities want to encourage the trend toward decentralization, but to check it before it turns into regional chauvinism. They are frankly no encouraging any movement toward Yugoslav nationality.

Laszlo Varga, a federal official in charge of relations among national groups, said: "Yugoslavia is not a unified national group. It is a romantic concept, and there

are some who think of Yugoslavia concept as an excuse for a new hegemony."

After World War II, the newly installed Communist government under President Tito consolidated power in a rigidly controlled, centralized system under the banner of a unified Yugoslavia.

The decentralization process started soon afterward has now reached new dimensions. So, apparently, has the fervor of the country's national groups.

One indication of this is the outpouring of volunteer support in Serbia and Montenegro for the building of a railway between Belgrade and Bar, a small town on the Adriatic near the Albanian border. Bar is now earmarked for development as a major port to compete with Rijeka, in Croatia.

In the first week of a campaign to raise money for the project, \$20 million has poured in from individuals and enterprises. Some school children in Serbia have given up milk and cookies to support the drive, and some individuals have taken out bonds for as much as \$1,000.

The project would fulfill an ancient dream of linking Belgrade and Serbia with the Mediterranean. The appeal for funds, similar to the volunteer fund drive launched in Poland for rebuilding the royal palace in Warsaw, has caused Serbian patriotism to well up.

The plans for the railroad and port were stalled for years because of Croatia and Slovenia's reluctance to contribute massively to a project that would benefit mainly Serbia.

Finally in 1966, the \$200-

proved, with 85 per cent of the funds covered by the federal government's fund for development of tourism and shipbuilding.

Two factors have caused the Serbs to turn now to their own devices to complete the project. The first

was a cost overrun of some \$80 million which the federal authorities said they would not make up; the railroad bond issue will cover that amount. The second was the trend toward decentralization and regional responsibility in carrying out investment projects.

Serbia, which for years opposed decentralization, has dramatically changed its policy in the last three years, and it is now pressing for greater local autonomy.

Petar Jovanovic, a leading engineer on the Belgrade-Bar commerce consortium, says that if the federal role in financing the projects ends, "Serbia has assumed the obligation to continue."

Negotiations are now underway on the future of the federal government financing of this and other major Yugoslav projects which Belgrade undertook before the movement to reduce the federal role in the economy got started.

CURRENT HISTORY
May 1971

"... the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political secession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future. . . ."

Yugoslavia's Future

BY STEPHEN S. ANDERSON

Associate Professor of Government, Windham College

CPYRGHT

AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT in Yugoslavia's development it seems appropriate to focus attention upon her internal affairs. This is not because foreign relations are currently stagnant or uninteresting—indeed some rather significant initiatives and successes have occurred in the past year or so—but rather because domestic affairs appear to be moving toward a severe test of the edifice of Yugoslav nationalism so painstakingly constructed during the postwar era. More specifically, the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political succession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future among both Yugoslavs and students of Yugoslav affairs.

ETHNIC BACKGROUND

Although composed of elements of several long-established cultures and politics, Yugoslavia is a relatively young nation. It was formed in 1919, in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Its formation was due largely to the efforts of the Serbs, a numerous and dynamic Balkan people who had enjoyed national independence since the early nineteenth century. The other major group in that original Yugoslav state was the Croat nation, which had existed for many centuries to the northeast of the Serbs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Catholicism and Western (if not Germanic) orientation of the Croats distinguished them

sharply from the Orthodox and Russian-oriented Serbs, even though both spoke much the same language. In addition to Serbs and Croats, Yugoslavia also embraced several smaller Balkan Slavic groups: the Slovenes of the northern alpine regions; the Macedonians of the extreme south, closely related, historically and culturally, to the Bulgarians; the Montenegrins, a mountainous offshoot of the Serbian nation; and the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who comprised an uneasy mixture of Serbian, Croatian and Turkish elements, the last a consequence of centuries-long inclusion in the Turkish empire, an experience shared by the Serbs and Macedonians. Besides these Slavic groups there were the Shiptars, closely related to the Albanians and inhabiting a region, now known as Kosmet, bordering Albania, as well as a mélange of Hungarian, Rumanian and Germanic groups spread across the Voivodina, a plains region to the northwest.

These ethnic patterns have persisted, and it is impossible to comprehend contemporary Yugoslavia without an awareness of their existence. The frictions they produced were a major cause of Yugoslav impotence during the interwar period. They deeply influenced the character of the anti-Nazi partisan movement which Josip Tito created during World War II. They present perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the development of a stable Yugoslav nation-state today.

In considering the problem of regional rivalry in Yugoslavia, it is well to distinguish

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between two rather different sources of tension, one specifically ethnic and the other essentially political. Ethnic tensions arise from long-standing prejudices ("Montenegrins are lazy," "Serbs are arrogant," "Slovenes are chiselers") and misunderstandings among the various ethnic groups. In most, although by no means all, cases these are directed against the Serbs by the other nationalities, and vice versa. Political tensions have to do with the issue of power: should power be centralized in the federal government or in the republican and other constituent governments? This issue is, of course, enormously complicated by the fact that the seat of federal power, Belgrade, is also the capital of Serbia, and has traditionally been staffed largely by Serbs even when upper-echelon positions have been distributed among the various ethnic groups.

In the early postwar years, the newly-installed Communist regime's approach to this problem of regional rivalry was a centralist one: political and economic control was concentrated heavily in Belgrade, and the party itself was organized in a way that permitted little autonomy to its republican (i.e. ethnic) subdivisions. Following the 1948 break with Moscow, for reasons of both political and economic expediency, this centralized power structure was gradually modified to the point where today it is clear that both the party and governmental organizations at the republican level are beginning to rival the authority of the central government in Belgrade.

For example, in the summer of 1969, a bitter controversy broke out between Slovenia and the federal government over the allocation of highway construction funds. At one point, the Slovene Premier and most of his Cabinet threatened to resign if Slovene demands were not met, and the personal intervention of President Tito was required even to reach a highly unsatisfactory compromise. In Kosmet, matters took a still more ominous turn during 1968-1969 with the surfacing of

widespread anti-Serb demonstrations and agitation for Republic status for Kosmet, instead of its present position as an autonomous region *within* Serbia. This demand was flatly denied and some 30 Shiptars were tried and sentenced for "fomenting national hatred." At the same time, however, the federal government took significant steps to improve economic conditions in Kosmet (its per capita income of \$250 is the lowest in Yugoslavia) and to place more Shiptars in positions of authority within the region.¹

It is in Croatia, however, that ethnic and political tensions most strongly reinforce each other and where the most troubling situation is developing. The Croats have always chafed at what they consider to be exploitation by the poorer and more backward regions of Yugoslavia—i.e., Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is only since the mid-1960's, however, that the political system has been sufficiently liberalized to allow relatively free expression of these sentiments, not only in public forums but within the party organization itself. The gist of the complaint is that Croatia, together with Slovenia (which is also quite advanced economically), is being held back in economic development by grandiose development plans for the southern parts of the country, financed by federal taxes which drain off capital from the north. The two northern republics, with only a little over a quarter of the population, account for almost seventy per cent of Yugoslavia's industrial production and a like proportion of its foreign trade earnings.

At the end of 1969 a Plenary Session of the Croatian League of Communists sharply condemned the view expressed by certain Belgrade "hardliners" that "Croatism" (regional nationalism) had developed to the point where some sort of central discipline was needed. The Plenum asserted Croatia's right to manage her internal affairs as she saw fit.² During 1970, demands were voiced by highly placed Croatian leaders for further decentralization of the banking system in order to give each republic full control of all capital resources created within its bounds.

¹ M. Djekic, "Troubles of Kosovo," *Yugoslav Life*, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 3, and *The Economist* (London), May 2, 1970, p. 44.

² *The New York Times*, February 5, 1970, p. 2.

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This political self-assertiveness in Croatia has been paralleled by ethnic self-assertion, centered particularly on the delicate matter of language. Serbian and Croatian are very similar, differing mainly in alphabet (Roman for Croatian, Cyrillic for Serbian), the pronunciation of certain vowels, and vocabulary. During the postwar era, the official view has been that they are dialects of the same language designated, rather awkwardly, "Serbo-Croatian." In 1954, the task of producing a definitive dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian language was undertaken jointly by the official Croatian and Serbian cultural organizations.

The project never generated great enthusiasm, and as regional rivalry began to intensify in the 1960's, it clearly began to waver. In 1967, furor was touched off when a group of Croatian intellectuals demanded that Croatian be recognized as a separate language, equal to Serbian in legal and cultural status. Serb intellectuals responded by demanding that all Serbs living in Croatia (about 160,000 persons) should be entitled to learn and write their language in the Cyrillic alphabet. At that time, the party stepped in, with Tito publicly rebuking both sides, but the tension continued to grow until finally, in early 1971, the Croatian organization announced that it was terminating the joint dictionary project, because of Serbian uncooperativeness.³

THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

Taken by itself, this linguistic controversy might seem trivial, even ludicrous, but as an important element in a larger pattern of growing Croat-Serbian animosity it is indeed disquieting. That pattern is undoubtedly one of the reasons that President Tito has openly tried, over the past two years, to create machinery for political succession capable of weathering the situation his departure will create. For there is no doubt that the aging leader (he will be 79 this year) is one of the most important factors of cohesion in Yugoslavia today. His personal intervention in

the Slovene and Croatian episodes has already been mentioned, and there have been many similar situations over the years. Born a Croat, his career has transcended regional rivalries, and he holds the respect of at least sizable segments of the general public and the leadership strata in all parts of Yugoslavia.

His effort to prepare for the inevitable—his own departure from the scene—has proceeded on two levels: party and governmental. At each level it has taken the form of arrangements designed to insure (so far as such things can be assured) a regionally-balanced, post-Tito collective leadership.

The Yugoslav League of Communists (the official name of the ruling Communist party) held its ninth congress in March, 1969. At this congress, Tito proposed several structural changes, which were subsequently adopted. The existing eleven-man Executive Committee was replaced by a fifteen-man Executive Bureau, composed by statute of two top party leaders from each of the six republics, one from each of the two autonomous regions, and Tito. His position in the Bureau was designated as unique and will cease to exist after his retirement or death. Other changes included the expansion of the next-lower body from 35 to 52 members, with representation on a demographic basis, and elimination of the 154-member Central Committee entirely, in favor of an Annual League Conference of approximately 200 party notables.

All this may seem a mere numbers and semantics game, but there is a clear intent: to create an ethnically-balanced, collective party executive, checked by a demographically-apportioned referent body. About a year and a half later, September, 1970, President Tito turned his attention to reforming Yugoslavia's governmental structure at the federal level. Actually, there had been many earlier governmental reorganizations, the most recent example of which was the creation, in 1968, of a Federal Executive Council. This 17-man body corresponded to the Cabinet of Western parliamentary systems and was headed by a Premier, initially Mika

³ *The New York Times*, January 29, 1971, p. 8.

Spiljak, a Croat, and subsequently Mitja Ribicic, a Slovene. In addition to this Council, in 1968, there was also created a Presidency (but no Vice Presidency) which was filled by Tito himself. While the exact role and powers of the Presidency were not precisely clarified, it seemed to serve primarily as a position from which Tito could survey the operations of the federal government and intervene in politics when necessary, as in the 1968 Belgrade University student strike.

Tito's September, 1970, proposal was to make this Presidency into a collective body composed of two or three representatives from each republic from "the main social-political groups, including, of course, the Communist party."⁴ Inasmuch as Tito, in the same speech, criticized the work of the Federal Executive Council, it seemed likely that his intention was to reduce the political role of the Council and make the new collective Presidency the real locus of power at the federal level, together with the Federal Assembly (Parliament). As public discussion of his proposal developed during the fall and winter, this supposition received further confirmation. Draft constitutional amendments published in February, 1971, described a fourteen-man Presidential Council consisting, like the party's Executive Bureau, of two representatives from each republic and one from each autonomous region, all elected for five-year terms. This body would choose a President and Vice President, but for a one-year term only, with the two offices apparently being rotated among new republics each year. This Presidential Council would have the power to propose legislation to the Federal Assembly, but if the two bodies could not reconcile any differences within nine months, both must be dissolved. The Federal Executive Council, conversely, would become a strictly administrative organ, charged only with carrying out policy. Tito would continue as President of the Republic and in that capacity would join and head the new Presi-

dential Council, but upon his retirement that office would cease to exist.⁵

These top-level reorganizations, which are still only in the discussion stage, will probably not be promulgated until the summer of 1971; they represent only one side of the effort to deal with impending post-Tito regional problems. Included in the same package of proposed constitutional amendments are several whose purpose is clearly to carry the process of political and economic decentralization still further and thereby to placate anti-centralist (and anti-Serb?) sentiments in the republics. These amendments would leave the federal government with full power only over foreign affairs, defense, and certain aspects of the economy, such as the currency system and the regulation of the unitary market. The only investment capital remaining in federal hands, for example, would be a special fund for the use of underdeveloped areas, on a revolving credit basis, to be raised by income taxes levied on all Yugoslavs. Most federal laws and regulations, particularly in the field of economics, would require the assent of the republics before they could take effect.

Tito's strategy for dealing with the problem of succession may now be summarized as follows: improved consensus-building organs at the federal level (Presidential Council and Party Executive Bureau) in combination with increased autonomy at the republic level. While on first glance this may seem to be a bold strategy, it is very likely the only one available at the moment, for no one, not even Tito, has the stature or authority to deal with the problem by the alternative path of political recentralization.

Will it work? No one can say for sure at this point. Edward Kardelj, Tito's closest political associate, has said that:

the collective presidency will not be a magic wand to solve all the controversies and problems that time brings, but it should certainly speed up the discussion and settlement of such disputes. . . . Should the presidency be incapable of such initiatives, it would certainly mean that it was not performing its duty. This would mean not only that this organ is in crisis, but that the whole society is in crisis. But our society is not in

⁴ *The New York Times*, September 22, 1970, p. 7.

⁵ *The New York Times*, February 28, 1971; and conversation with Maldin Soic, Director, Yugoslav Information Center, New York.

crisis and we have no reason to doubt that the presidency will perform its positive role in overcoming social problems and conflicts.⁶

Not so sure was Milovan Djilas, a former member of the party inner circle long in disfavor for his outspokenly critical views. Writing last October in *The New York Times* he asserted that:

the economic and ideological crisis has transformed itself into a governmental crisis. Because of this the proposed reorganization of the apex of the government—a "collective" presidency instead of a president, will aggravate rather than lessen the inefficiency of the administration and the bickering of the already disassociated chiefs.⁷

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Djilas' remark brings up the third critical problem mentioned at the beginning of this article, but so far alluded to only in passing: the problem of unbalanced economic development. This problem has many facets, including of course the serious disparity between the more and less developed regions, but in recent years the salient fact has been that both producer and consumer demand has grown throughout most of the country much faster than the economy's ability to satisfy it. One consequence of this was a strong inflationary trend which shot the cost of living up by 11 per cent in each of the past two years.⁸ Another was the huge and growing foreign trade deficit (excess of imports over exports) which reached the staggering figure of \$1.2 billion in 1970. Foreign currency receipts from tourists and from Yugoslavs working abroad reduced this to a balance-of-payments deficit of "only" \$370 million, but the fact remained that even such a deficit indicated a serious shortcoming.

Under a more dogmatic and authoritarian

regime, central controls over wages, prices, investments, exports and imports would have been imposed long ago, in the face of such trends. Yugoslav central planners hesitated, and in fact they lacked the authority to tamper in such a way with the market-centered economy established by the 1965 reforms. Instead, they attempted to apply a number of indirect solutions to the problem, such as negotiations for special trade agreements with the European Common Market (successfully concluded in early 1970); encouragement of foreign investment in Yugoslavia through partnerships with Yugoslav firms (enacted in 1967 but disappointing in results);⁹ toleration of high levels of migration of both unemployed and skilled workers (over 850,000 were abroad during 1970, mostly in West Europe, contributing some \$450 million in remittances to Yugoslavia);¹⁰ and expanded tourism (foreign tourists brought in \$350 million during 1970).¹¹

Toward the end of 1970, however, it was clear that more drastic steps would be required at the federal level. With the approval of the Federal Assembly, an import surtax was established, followed in October by a temporary price freeze and additional import restrictions. December saw the setting of an 11 per cent ceiling on wage increases to last until April 30, 1971, at which time the federal government expected to institute, in cooperation with the republics, a "comprehensive stabilization program" of an as yet unspecified nature. Then, in mid-January, 1971, the dinar was devaluated by one-quarter of its value (from 12.50 dinars/dollar to 15.00), a move designed simultaneously to improve the position of Yugoslav tourism and exports, and to discourage the import of foreign goods.¹²

These are short-term solutions, however, capable only of providing a breathing spell in which to deal with the underlying problem. It is by no means clear at this writing how the Yugoslavs intend to do this, but one thing is reasonably certain; the solution will not involve a recentralization of economic power in Belgrade. The proposed constitutional reforms mentioned earlier have as their

⁶ *The New York Times*, October 5, 1970, p. 11.

⁷ *The New York Times*, October 30, 1970, p. 41.

⁸ *The New York Times*, January 23, 1971, p. 6.

⁹ Anthony Silvester, "Yugoslavia's Consumers Call the Shots," *East Europe*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January, 1971), pp. 23-27, see especially pp. 25-26.

¹⁰ *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, No. 468, January 27, 1971, p. 1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *The New York Times*, January 24, 1971, p. 14, and *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, No. 468, January 27, 1971, pp. 2-4.

central purpose the expansion of the economic as well as the political autonomy of the constituent republics. Here is one Yugoslav commentary on the proposals from an official publication:

The most substantive purpose of the reorganization is to deprive the federal state organs of the right arbitrarily to appropriate to themselves the social capital accumulation, and to distribute it themselves, and to play the role of investor and carrier of enlarged economic reproduction. . . . By abolishing the elements of economic statist domination over the republics, it is held, not only will the social relations of self-management be fortified, but the equality and sovereignty of the republics will gain fresh meaning.¹³

Assuming these reforms do go through without major modification, economic development and balance will become the primary responsibility of the republics, rather than the federal government. The knotty and potentially disruptive issue of the north-south development gap is to be dealt with apparently by placing even more responsibility upon the underdeveloped republics themselves, although long-term development financing will continue to be available, on a loan basis, through the Federal Fund for the Underdeveloped Regions. In effect, these reforms signal the final demise of centrally-imposed egalitarianism in economic development and living standards and will institutionalize the development gap for many years to come. As such, they run counter to a significant body of opinion among the older (and now largely discredited) members of the party, as well as some idealistic young people.

Perhaps there is no other choice. If Yugoslavia is to remain competitive in the world market (and thereby steadily to improve her overall standard of living) she must continue to release and encourage those sectors of her economy that can best compete in the world market. If these sectors happen to be located for the most part in the more developed regions of Yugoslavia, so be it. Perhaps this harsh policy will somehow stimulate the remaining regions to make the efforts and sacrifices necessary to "catch up." But one is

¹³ B. Savic, "Self-Governed Federalism," *Yugoslav Life*, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 2.

entitled to wonder if there will continue to be a Yugoslavia within which to catch up.

Ultimately the key to Yugoslavia's future may lie in the realm of foreign relations, which have not been the focus of this article, but which may nonetheless provide a concluding thought. For all the prejudices and resentments which set apart Yugoslavs of differing nationalities, there is still a strong loyalty to the "New Yugoslavia" as a polity that has succeeded in maintaining, over the past quarter-century, a precarious existence between East and West. The Yugoslav strategy of "active non-alignment," while it has fallen far short of its purpose of creating a coherent third world force in international politics, has still established an image of a unique Yugoslav role in world affairs. Recent successful trade negotiations with both the European Common Market and Comecon (the Soviet-bloc counterpart of E.E.C.) have further enhanced this image, as did the state visit of United States President Richard Nixon last fall. The restoration of full diplomatic relations with Communist China, on the one hand, and the Vatican, on the other, were two very impressive Yugoslav initiatives on the 1970 diplomatic calendar. President Tito played a central role in the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in September in Zambia. Yugoslavia has clearly "arrived" as a medium power.

The loyalty which Yugoslavs feel for contemporary Yugoslavia is difficult to gauge. It certainly is not strong enough to prevent internal bickering. On the other hand, should foreign powers, or power blocs, attempt to take advantage of the internal strains that surely lie ahead for Yugoslavia, there would probably be a compensatory reconciliation among the feuding nationalities. In the last analysis, the future of the new Yugoslav nation-state may depend more on its environment than its internal workings.

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June 1971

THE COMMON FACTORS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM

1. Political terror has different roots in different places, but whether in Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, it has some common factors:

a. Unquestionably, the most fertile soil for its growth is in those countries where not only the possibilities of peaceful and legal change within the national system appear to be blocked, but also where the government shows itself unable to cope with elements of change and unrest which emerge within the country.


b. In recent years, and particularly following the failure and death of Ché Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967, rural insurgency has become discredited as the most effective means of revolution, and there has been a corresponding rise in urban terrorism. In Uruguay and Guatemala especially, and elsewhere, as in Ceylon and Turkey, urban guerrillas are severely straining the political and social fabric of the nation.

c. A third noteworthy and common phenomenon is the increased student participation in urban terrorist activities. In Turkey, for example, terrorist action has stemmed in large part from an offshoot of Dev Genc (Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation). The moderate leaders of Dev Genc have been replaced by advocates of militant revolution calling themselves the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army. It was the activities of this group early this year which brought about the resignation of the government in March, and this same group is responsible for the kidnapping and assassination of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul.


d. The most significant common factor to the majority of these urban guerrilla groups is the support and training provided by established Communist powers. In Latin America, Cuba, and therefore by extension the Soviet Union, provides funds, training and propaganda support, and has even occasionally assigned its own experts to assist guerrilla groups. The Soviet Union and, as more recently revealed, North Korea, and possibly East Germany, have also given training in subversion and armed violence to Latin American students. In Africa, the Cubans, Chinese Communists and the North Koreans have all been involved in providing support and training to members of insurgent groups. In the Middle East, the Soviets and Chinese Communists have supported and trained Arab commando groups, while North Korean activity has recently been uncovered in Ceylon also. (For further information on recent North Korean activity,

see the article in this issue entitled, "North Korean Subversive
Diplomacy.") 25X1C3b1

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 May 1971

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The politics of frustration and fury

By Priscilla Clapp

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

THE PERSISTENCE OF ARMED political dissent testifies to the inadequacy of many Latin-American political systems. They appear incapable of dealing with basic national concerns beyond the minority interests of entrenched ruling groups.

Economic and political power in Latin America have been concentrated traditionally in a very small percentage of the population—anywhere from 2 to 20 percent. The majority of the population often finds itself excluded almost entirely from existing political processes.

In many of these countries, political opposition has met with brutal retaliation—long imprisonment without fair trial, torture, or death.

Thus, the transition from mere dissatisfaction with existing social conditions to association with underground political movements is not as difficult to make in South America as it is in the north.

In general, the political systems ruled from the top have choked off a large bottom layer of political and social fermentation whose more radical factions frequently erupt in various forms of armed protest.

Contrary to popular belief in North America, most Latin-American Communist Parties are aloof from today's insurgent movements, opting instead for working within the legal national frameworks. Moscow usually frowns on armed Communist resistance in Latin America.

Also, the role of ideology—as previously understood—has diminished greatly among insurgent groups. Now, the trend is toward a wide and very confusing array of terrorist groups usually made up of relatively small numbers of people and motivated by ideologies and goals much less subject to clear definition than before. Some see the essential purpose of these groups as simply evoking an unpopular terroristic response from government forces.

Latin America's new urban insurgent groups, such as Uruguay's Tupamaros, move carefully and quickly to gain maximum advantage against the political estab-

lishment. Whether it is robbing banks, stalking the police, or sabotaging symbols of power—both foreign and domestic—the tactics generally are well conceived and sophisticated.

The most highly visible tactic of the urban insurgents has been kidnapping foreign diplomats to demand release of political prisoners or to extort ransom money. In a way, this forces external sources of influence to become concerned directly with local political problems. It also gains maximum immediate publicity for an insurgent group. But unless the government is especially inept, the political returns are negligible.

Urban terrorism demands an anonymity that does little to establish a leadership and political force capable of seriously challenging existing political structures. In addition, the methods eventually tend to defy public appeal, especially in the cities.

The shift of insurgency from rural to urban setting, seen as probably indicating armed revolution on a massive scale, has been abandoned for the present. This is not to say that rural insurgency is dead, but extended, large-scale antigovernment activity has become much more difficult over the last few years as the Latin-American government forces have improved their capabilities to deal with it. Furthermore, during the last few years many South American governments have been trying to cope with the social and economic problems that spawn the unrest.

Currently, the most significant terrorist activity is in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Uruguay. But Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Venezuela also have been dealing with insurgent threats.

Argentina

Urban terrorism in Argentina rose considerably in the six months preceding Gen. Alejandro Augustin Lanusse's take-over. Four distinct leftist groups of various shades have been identified, although Argentine authorities at times suggest terrorist activities are part of a unified subversive conspiracy.

CPYRGHT

BALTIMORE SUN
4 March 1971

Analysis

Rural-Revolt Plan Fails In South America

By ROBERT A. ERLANDSON

Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro, March 3—The increasing emphasis on urban terrorism by South American guerrillas has made it clear that their pretensions to classic rural guerrilla struggle as the road to power have failed.

One of the vital elements for successful rural operations—peasant support—has simply not materialized.

Various reasons have been cited for this but the most convincing is that the majority of campesinos are not politicized and are so desperately engaged in grubbing out a living that they have no time for causes except their own survival.

Nothing In Common

And in countries like Chile and Colombia they are becoming a political force in their own right, by sheer weight of numbers.

The majority of young revolutionaries are educated, from well-to-do families and fully imbued with revolutionary theory. Thus, they have nothing in common with the people they have come to "save." are unfamiliar with the peasant mentality and there is a built-in communications gap.

More Repression

While the terrorists have kept governments off balance and in a state of constant alert with their bombings, robberies, airplane hijackings and diplomatic kidnappings, nowhere can they really show any major success to merit plaudits from their idols, Fidel Castro of Cuba and Mao Tse-tung of China.

What they have done, in many cases, is bring increased repression to their coun-

trymen, the people they claim to want to free from whatever regime is in power at the moment.

Certainly in Brazil there has been no visible swell of public response in the guerrillas' favor.

When C. Burke Elbrick, the United States ambassador to Brazil, was abducted in September, 1969, the terrorists left a note saying they would launch a rural guerrilla campaign while intensifying urban operations.

Allegations Of Torture

There was an upsurge in urban terrorism which the regime countered with brutal repression that resulted in the long, detailed allegations of torture of political prisoners.

The most famous guerrilla failure, of course, was Ernesto (Che) Guevara, who helped Mr. Castro to power in Cuba and then expected to show the way on the continent.

He was captured and executed in Bolivia in 1967.

Bolivia is the outstanding example of a country where the peasants are desperately poor and have no time to engage in anything beyond the battle to survive.

Pacification Policy

President Rafael Caldera's pacification policy has substantially reduced Venezuela's guerrilla threat, although former President Raul Leonl, in the wake of the second abduction of a millionaire's son, criticized the policy as giving terrorists time to regain their forces "and re-enter, with greater vigor, the subversive battle."

In neighboring Colombia persistent Army pressure has forced the guerrillas

into mountain hideouts from which they can mount only sporadic urban attacks, without gaining any broad popular support.

The leftist national military government of Peru has managed to stay on top of its guerrilla problem. While Ecuador has not really had one yet.

Serious In Argentina

Argentina has one of the more serious problems on the continent and urban terrorism has been of mounting concern since the abduction and murder of former President Pedro E. Aramburu last May.

But again, the problem has been in the cities and not in the rural areas where the population is widely distributed.

The same situation applies in Uruguay where the Tupamaros shed their long-held "Robin Hood" role, which had won them more public support than their counterparts in other countries, and showed themselves as nothing more than extreme leftist gangsters who would not hesitate to murder innocent hostages.

No Great Uprising

Premier Castro is the man usually blamed for stirring up the unrest by exporting violent revolution. But what was good for Mr. Castro in Cuba, fighting from the mountains to the cities to win control, is apparently not good for the rest of Latin America.

After 10 years of trying, Castro-style guerrillas have not overturned any governments.

The Castro-Guevara-Mao plan for seizing power based on a great rural uprising has failed on the continent. But whether the tactic of urban struggle will be more effective remains to be seen.

exist in Chile. It may be a branch of the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR), a student group with terrorist tendencies. There are undoubtedly a number of other insurgent groups, both urban and rural, but the only visible gunfighting recently has been between the MIR and progovernment Communist students within the confines of the University of Concepción.

In recent months the MIR has come out against the Unidad Popular, a left-wing political coalition supporting the Allende government. Even more recently, though, the Allende government appointed two MIR leaders to its internal-security force, a move that is expected to have a significant impact on the direction the MIR will take toward the government in the future.

Chile's main contribution to insurgency in Latin America may well be the success or failure of the Allende government to carry out its promised socialistic reforms. If it succeeds, it will prove the viability of progress through legal political channels; if it fails, advocates of violent revolution will have new ammunition for their cause.

Colombia

Three separate left-wing insurgent groups have been identified recently in Colombia: the pro-Peking Ejército Popular de Liberación, the pro-Castro Ejército de Liberación Nacional, and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas. Unlike the rest of Latin America, insurgency in Colombia has remained largely a rural problem, which the Army has been trying to combat through civic action and rural-development programs. In many cases, insurgency in Colombia has disintegrated into pure banditry.

Dominican Republic

Dominican insurgency is still thought to receive substantial support from Cuba, and perhaps China. A number of groups, chief among them the Dominican Popular Movement, joined together to form the Antire-election Command in early 1970, to block the candidacy of Dr. Joaquín Balaguer in the elections that year. In addition to other acts of urban insurgency, the Anti-reelection Command was responsible for kidnapping a U.S. diplomat in early 1970 to obtain the release of the leftist leader Maximiliano Gómez.

Guatemala

Since its rise in the cities of Guatemala, guerrilla activity has been a particularly violent form of urban insurgency. Diplo-

matic kidnappings and killings have been numerous. There appear to be three main groups at present: the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, and the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (M-13). However, terrorism has long been the modus operandi of extralegal right-wing organizations who support the government. With the increased activity of the leftist groups in the cities, and the consequent retaliation in kind from the extreme right, Guatemala is beset by almost open warfare between the two.

Uruguay

A very effective group of urban guerrillas, called the Tupamaros (formerly the National Liberation Movement), has been active in Uruguay since about 1963. Drawing mainly on students and workers for its membership, the Tupamaros have staged impressive bank robberies — they are credited with the world's largest—diplomatic kidnappings, bombings, and numerous pranks on the Uruguayan police.

Having cultivated a Robin Hood image in their early years, the Tupamaros seem to have become involved in a more violent and less popular form of activity in the last two years. However, the Uruguayan Government has been adamant in its refusal to deal with them even at the cost of human life, and the Tupamaros have relented in their demands and released two kidnap victims recently for little or no ransom.

The ideology of the Tupamaros has been described as basically ultranationalistic and convinced of the need for drastic change, but it cannot be identified with any particular strain of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

The Tupamaros were at one time held as the model for urban insurgency, especially in Argentina and Brazil. But other activist groups are becoming a bit scornful of what they feel are establishment tendencies among Tupamaros. For example, the Tupamaros intend to support certain candidates in the next elections.

Venezuela

Guerrilla activity in Venezuela has decreased drastically in recent years, especially since the government offered amnesty to those who would renounce violence, in an attempt to bring them into the legal framework of Venezuelan politics. Having at one time mounted a very strong threat to the government in the rural areas, Venezuelan insurgents have apparently not found new life in the cities.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 May 1971

The Guerrillas in Jordan: Defeated and Quarreling

CPYRGHT

By DREW MIDDLETON
Special to The New York Times

AMMAN, Jordan, May 13— Only nine months ago the Palestinian guerrillas, apparently secure in their Jordanian stronghold, were widely regarded as a powerful element in the affairs of the Middle East.

Today, defeated, divided and quarreling over their future role and strategy, they appear, for the moment at least, to be a spent force.

Under firm, constant pressure from the Jordanian Army, 2,500 to 3,000 of them have moved into the Dibbin woods of the Ojlun heights, 35 miles northeast of this now peaceful capital.

Northwest of the heights, along the Syrian frontier, 1,000 or more others live precariously under army surveillance.

Syrian Government assistance has been cut. Money and supplies are running low.

According to furtive and anonymous spokesmen in Amman and the northern hill towns, the guerrilla leaders are considering a political role instead of a military role for the movement, which numbered about 10,000 men last year.

No agreed political strategy has yet emerged, and, in fact, some spokesmen talk of going underground and waging a war of assassination, sabotage and terror against King Hussein's moderate Government.

But, on the basis of comments by others and the assessments of the Jordanian Government, the expectations are that the guerrillas, or fedayeen while maintaining a semblance of belligerence toward Israel, may move toward forming a political opposition.

Insist on Free Hand

The commandos' basic quarrel with the Government has been over their insistence on a free hand to conduct military forays against the Israelis.

The Government, fearful of Israeli countermeasures in Jordan, has insisted on the right to control the guerrillas' activities.

It has also long been apprehensive about the presence of a strong military force within its borders that traditionally has had no allegiance to the Jordanian monarchy.

A guerrilla spokesman, whispering in the dim back room of a coffeehouse, said the fedayeen wanted "a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian state." Palestinians throughout Jordan would support this, he said.

King Hussein is already pledged to self-determination for Palestinians, but for "real Palestinians" not those who in his view hide behind foreign ideologies. Jordanian Cabinet Ministers do not regard Palestinian nationalism as a credible political platform in Jordan.

Palestine, which had been under British mandate, ceased to exist as a political entity in 1948, with the establishment of Israel. Most of the area that did not come under Israeli control was annexed by the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan, which later became known as Jordan. In the 1967 war, that part of Jordan on the west bank of the Jordan River, was occupied by Israel.

"Certainly there is a legitimate demand in Jordan to recover our lands from the Israelis," a high official said. "but this is not the same, as demanding a Palestinian state."

Integration Is Cited

Jordanians and Palestinians, he said, have integrated in the 23 years since the first influx of Palestinian exiles after Israel won independence. Eight of Jordan's 18 Cabinet Ministers are Palestinians. The official himself was from Nablus, now an Israeli-occupied town, while his wife is a Jordanian. "Palestinians and Jordanians have discovered mutual interests," he said. "We want to hold Jordan together,

"The army is more than 50 per cent Palestinian," the official pointed out, "perhaps more, but when the fighting came against the guerrillas there were few defections. When the Syrians attacked, all fought together as Jordanians." He was referring to the civil war last September between the army and the fedayeen.

Government officials fear that the fedayeen, when they find political opposition unproductive, will turn to arson, sabotage and assassination. But they are confident that the army and the police can deal with terror and that it will have no popular support.

Jordanian and foreign sources agree that a breakdown of Arab-Israeli peace talks and the consequent failure to recover the lands lost to Israel in 1967 by negotiation could strengthen the guerrillas' position.

Until last September, an Arab world smarting from defeat in the war with Israel in 1967 took pride in the military activities of the guerrilla movement. From Morocco to Saudi Arabia, market places were plastered with posters depicting the deeds of the irregulars in their attacks on the Israelis.

Money and supplies flowed in from the rich states of the Arab world and from the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries seeking a revolutionary situation in the Middle East. At the moment, the movement still receives significant financial aid from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and from prosperous Palestinians in Arab countries.

Turning Point Arrives

The turning point in the guerrillas' fortunes, it appears, came the moment they scored what they regarded as their greatest success — the hijacking of four international airliners last September, three of them to Jordan.

The Jordanian Government and Army fumed while guerrilla leaders dealt almost as a sovereign power with airlines

and the International Committee of the Red Cross, dictating terms for evacuating passengers.

"Their arrogance, their assumption of sovereignty, forced the King to move," an American diplomat said.

Shortly afterwards, the army struck the guerrilla strongholds in the north. In the fighting there and elsewhere, between 5,000 and 7,000 people were estimated to have been killed.

The second and perhaps final blow to guerrilla power occurred in the first weeks of last month and was almost bloodless. The army ringed Amman and said it was going into the capital to attack the guerrillas unless they left peacefully.

The guerrillas left. The troops entered, set up strongpoints in guerrilla-held sections and combed them for arms. Large caches are still being discovered.

Movement Hurt by Disunity

From the outset, disunity has crippled the guerrilla movement. The Central Committee set up in June, 1970, was a coordinating body that, in the words of a former Jordanian intelligence officer, "never coordinated."

There is strong evidence that Jordanian intelligence penetrated every guerrilla group and that defection and informing were rampant.

Asserting that "revolution in the Arab world" was more vital than "revolution in Palestine," the six-man executive council of the Central Committee leaned more toward its Marxist and Maoist opposition to moderate Arab governments and away from the original goal of eliminating the state of Israel. Yasir Arafat, leader of Al Fatah, the largest in the 10 or more guerrilla groups, and titular head of all guerrillas, primarily sought the destruction of Israel, but his leadership has not extended to the entire movement.

Experts on the movement give Mr. Arafat little chance of controlling the left-wing groups. Chief among the left-wing groups are the Maoist Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Dr. George Habash.

BALTIMORE SUN
24 May 1971

Turkish Peoples Army Is Few In Number But Loud In Deeds

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Istanbul, Turkey, May 22

(AP)—The Turkish People Liberation Army, which claims responsibility for the kidnap-murder of the Israeli consul-general, Ephraim Elrom, is a small band of leftist urban terrorists.

Although a tiny fish in a big pond, the Liberation Army in the past five months has made big waves in disrupting Turkey by killing, kidnaping, robbing and bombing.

Terrorists' Support

According to officials, the terrorists are mostly university students, organized into cells and led by a cadre trained and armed by radical Palestinian Arab guerrilla groups in Syria.

But many students and moderate leftists—mostly intellectuals—are sympathetic to the terrorists' views, if not their methods.

Liberation Army members, many of whom are fugitives known to police, have been active for two years in the student violence and anti-American protests that have paralyzed Turkish universities and led to a cutback in the sizable American presence in Turkey.

On the night of December 29, 1970, a car eased up to a police post guarding the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Submachinegun fire shattered the quiet. The car sped away, leaving two Turkish policemen seriously wounded.

Bank Robbery

This was the first urban terrorist act claimed by the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army.

Armed youths robbed a bank in Ankara January 11, the first of seven such robberies linked to the Liberation

Army. A bank employee was killed in one robbery.

In February, an American airman was kidnaped from his base outside Ankara by night raiders. The driver of a taxi believed to have been used by the kidnapers was killed.

Early in March, four American airmen were seized as they left a radar base outside Ankara, and the Liberation Army, in a note, demanded \$400,000 in ransom.

The Americans were released, although no money changed hands. But the incident is believed to have been a major factor in the armed forces ouster, March 12, of the conservative government of Suleyman Demirel.

More Terrorism

The military demanded a "strong and respected government" to bring law and order and make reforms.

The new military-supported government of Premier Nihat Erim, which took over March 26, won no expressions of support from the Liberation Army despite a Cabinet that included several moderate leftists.

In April, Liberation Army "warriors" kidnaped the sons of two wealthy Istanbul families and successfully extorted ransom from both. They robbed another bank, and dynamite bombings continued.

The Erim government proclaimed martial law in 11 provinces April 26, citing as a major factor a "Maoist" uprising against the state.

But martial law has not stopped the Liberation Army. Its members defied it and robbed another bank in Istanbul, and last Monday they kidnaped Mr. Elrom.

The government reacted by starting a nationwide crack-

down on known leftists, taking nearly 1,000 into custody, including prominent professors, writers and Marxist politicians.

"Militant extremists have turned this country into a nest of anarchists," Mr. Erim said.

"This is just what the (Liberation Army) wants," said a knowledgeable source here. "they are trying to push the government into repression and full military rule and eventually civil war."

Several Liberation Army members have been captured. They defiantly admit their acts and membership in the group, although they face the death penalty.

"What is your profession?" a judge asked Deniz Gezmis, the self-admitted abductor of the Americans.

"I am a revolutionary," Gezmis replied.

The professional skill of the terrorists has been acknowledged by experts. An Israeli official said of Mr. Elrom's kidnapers: "They were very young, very cool and very well-organized." Their publications are in rabid Maoist style.

"Fascist Dictatorship"

"The Erim government is the slave of American capital, and a handful of Fascist generals backing him have forced a Fascist dictatorship of imperialists, collaborators, evil landowners and blood-sucking moneylenders on the people," said one recent underground handout.

Officials say the Army and security forces will smash the Turkish People Liberation Army without matching the unconstitutional methods used by the group in its recent exploits. One policeman used a Turkish proverb: "A dying dog will even foul the mosque wall."

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
11 March 1971

Foreign Report

Published by The Economist Newspaper Limited
25 St James's Street, London, SW1
1190, 11 March 1971

CPYRGHT

Turkey's urban guerrillas

The Turkish 'People's Liberation Army' (TPLA), which hit the headlines last week with the abduction of four American airmen in Ankara, has affinities with both the urban guerrilla movements of Latin America and the Palestinian commandos. It is also more sophisticated and better organised than the Turkish authorities realised; and the military chiefs in the National Security Council are deeply concerned about it. **Mr Demirel**, the Prime Minister, has admitted that the 'situation is now more grave than in the past'.

But paradoxically last week's terrorist outrages may serve to strengthen Demirel's hand. Many members of the opposition parties, and some members of his own (the Justice Party), who were critical of his series of law-and-order measures, are coming round to the view that these may now be necessary. The vigorous condemnation of the TPLA by **Ismet Inonu**, the veteran leader of the Republican People's Party, was a highly significant development. And, despite their mounting concern, the military leaders are still reluctant to intervene directly; though some middle-rank and junior officers favour more drastic action.

The TPLA's links with Al Fatah are clearly established. During the last few months several Turkish youths have been caught while crossing the Turkish-Syrian border illegally, on their way to and from Al Fatah camps. Some possessed arms, explosives and propaganda material.

One of the kidnapers of the four American airmen was **Huseyin Inan**, whose police record shows he had been trained at guerrilla camps in neighbouring Arab countries. He is also known to have smuggled guns for distribution at the Middle East Technical University, which has been the centre of the recent wave of violence. During the eight-hour battle there last Friday the students not only used Palestinian weapons but tried to look like the Palestinian guerrillas, by wearing large scarves on their heads ('the Arafat look'). About 200 of the 350 students detained after the fighting (only 29 were formally charged) had received training at Palestinian camps.

But if the equipment comes from the Arab guerrillas, the intellectual inspiration of the TPLA is Latin American; the very manner in which it proudly proclaimed its achievements savoured of the Tupamaros. There are other similarities with the Latin American urban guerrillas. TPLA men have attacked police stations, thrown bombs and other explosives at American buildings (or at the homes of American families

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stationed in Turkey), robbed banks three times, and embarked on an intimidation campaign. (Wealthy citizens are suddenly visited and told that their properties will be seized and returned to the people 'when the revolution comes'.)

The security authorities know the names of a few dozen of the ringleaders. They include, in addition to Huseyin Inan, university dropouts and militant leftist revolutionaries such as Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan and Sinan Cemgil. What is not exactly known is the exact strength of the TPLA.

In its basic aims, as distinct from its methods, the TPLA differs little from other marxist organisations. Its leaders are opposed to what they consider a capitalist system 'dominated by American imperialism'. Turkey's parlous economic situation gives them plenty of ammunition for their propaganda onslaught on the government.

But the significant thing is that, apart from the militant leftist students, the majority of the Turkish people, all the major political parties, and even a good number of leftist politicians, have condemned the kidnapping and other acts of terrorism. This sharp reaction from a vast section of the people, and the intelligentsia, no doubt contributed to the sudden decision of the kidnapers to release the four airmen. Killing the Americans would have set off a wave of indignation that would have gravely damaged their cause.

To sum up: the TPLA has scored a number of points.

1. Its activities have attracted world attention to Turkey's social and economic plight.
2. It has cast a new shadow over American-Turkish relations and to some extent intimidated American families stationed in Turkey.
3. It has made the police look foolish, because they took so long to find the kidnapped men.
4. It has caused new difficulties for Mr Demirel's government which already is in deep trouble.

But, on the other hand, the TPLA has been rebuffed; the kidnapers have proved to be 'bluffers' by failing to carry out their threats to kill the Americans; and they have given the authorities the perfect pretext to crack down hard on the technical university, which the leftists have turned into a miniature fortress with underground tunnels and caches of modern weapons.

But, most important, the new terror wave has resulted in a rapprochement (probably temporary) between the opposition parties and the government; it has split the marxist left; and it has turned more moderate leftists against the revolutionaries. Before the public emergence of the TPLA, most of the terrorists belonged to Dev-gene, the extreme leftist youth organisation which has been very active in the universities during recent months. But as the terrorism has escalated, some members have broken away from Dev-gene, and the formation of the TPLA reflects the split in its ranks.

AFRICAN CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1971

Guerrilla movements and the OAU

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With the latest moves in the campaign for a "dialogue" between the independent states and white-controlled South Africa, including President Houphouët-Boigny's offer of a visit and diplomatic relations and the diplomatic "gaffe" of Premier John Vorster's attempt to cut the ground from under the OAU militants with his exposure of correspondence with President Kaunda focussing attention once again on the southern African issue, a correspondent takes a timely, if gloomy, look at the liberation movements:

African liberation movements appear to get in worse, rather than better, shape as time goes on. And they are showing few prospects of improvement in the near, or even the not-so-near, future. The only exception is the PAIGC, which has been carrying on a reasonably successful war in Portuguese Guinea.

Portuguese Guinea, or Guinea-Bissau, as the nationalists call it, is, however, a very small country, with a population of less than half a million and little, if any, economic importance. Lisbon is making an effort to hold on there mainly because the Portuguese fear that giving independence to Guinea-Bissau would be a bad precedent and would weaken their position in the big and valuable southern African colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

In the South, however, there is no PAIGC. The main liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique, as in Rhodesia, South Africa and South-west Africa, are, for the most part, ineffective. Most of them, in fact, now serve very little purpose except that of collecting funds that enable a handful of leaders to maintain themselves in Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka.

This has tended to cause dissatisfaction and build up opposition to them among their followers, who usually have a very difficult time keeping body and soul together. The party leaders have managed to maintain their positions partly because they have the personal support of the Tanzanian and Zambian leaders. They also have the support of the Tanzanian-controlled OAU Liberation Committee Secretariat, which does not accept any leaders other than those recognised by the Tanzanian Government. One result has been desertion of militants from the movements. Another has been the use of assassination attempts to remove leaders.

The Mozambican group, FRELIMO, is an example. Since the assassination of its first President, Dr. Edouarde Mondlane, two years ago by a group of dissidents, there have been a number of assassinations and attempted assassinations of leaders by their followers. The dissidents, however, say that the movement's leaders have also made wide use of assassination to remove their opponents within the party. Among the prominent victims were Filipe Magaia, the former supreme military commander; Samuel Kankombe, his deputy, and various leaders from the Makonde and Nyanja-speaking regions of the north, who came into conflict with the top leaders, who are mainly southerners from the Ronga and Shangaan tribes, or of mulatto or Indian origin.

FRELIMO has also been hit hard by desertions. Most of the important leaders of northern origin have left the movement during the past two years because of conflict with the southern-controlled leadership and the fear of assassination. They include the Makonde chief, Lazaro Nkavandame, whose desertion with 60,000 followers and thousands of FRELIMO troops of Makonde origin ruined the group's position in Cabo Delgado province, where it was strongest. Then there were a number of other leaders, including important chiefs and members of the FRELIMO Central Committee, who deserted or defected to the Portuguese in Niassa and Zambesia provinces. These included: Alejandro Magno, a member of the executive of FRELIMO's Central Committee and its top man in Zambesia, who defected to the Portuguese just over a year ago; Manuel Masa Catur, a Central Committee member who surrendered last October, and was a traditional chief in Niassa Province and one of the most important of the remaining FRELIMO leaders. His defection meant the end of FRELIMO's influence in Niassa. The situation became still worse in December, with the defection of Miguel Murrupa, a Niassa member of the executive of FRELIMO's Central Committee.

Difficult conditions

The other Mozambiquan movements are also in difficult conditions. In Lusaka, there is COREMO, which is not recognised by the OAU's Liberation Committee, but is permitted to operate in Zambia under the protection of the Zambian Vice-President, Mainza Chona. This is primarily due to the fact that Paul Gumane's wife and Mainza Chona's wife are relatives. COREMO, however, has not been able to accomplish much through its protected status in Zambia. It has tended to suffer from a lack of effective leadership, which has led to the drying up of the needed flow of recruits and aid.

The other Mozambiquan movement, **MANU (Mozambique African National Union)** is also in trouble, though for somewhat different reasons. While it has managed to retain and build up its clandestine network in northern Mozambique and in the **FRELIMO** bases in Tanzania, it has no bases in independent Africa and suffers from lack of financial and material resources.

In Angola, the situation is almost as bad. **Holden Roberto's GRAE (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)**, which is strong in the Bakongo region of northern Angola and has managed to hang on to its liberation areas around Nambuancongo through nine years of fighting, has never been able to establish itself in other parts of the country. While it has the support of Congo-Kinshasa, it suffers from constant attempts at sabotage by the OAU's Liberation Committee, which wants to eliminate it as a rival to the OAU-supported **MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)**.

While the **MPLA** enjoys the support of the Liberation Committee and the Soviet bloc, it remains principally a propaganda organization. In spite of having a black figure-head President, **Dr. Agostinho Neto**, it remains primarily a mulatto and white-leftist-controlled organization and for this reason has been unable to build up much popular support inside Angola. Like **FRELIMO**, it has also suffered from a tendency to liquidate those militants who are seen by the leaders as potential rivals.

The third Angolan group, **UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)** of **Dr. Jonas Savimbi**, has strong support in south-eastern Angola, but it was banned in Zambia two years ago after blowing up the Benguela Railway in Angola which carries Zambian copper to the Angolan port of Lobito Bay. Since that time, the lack of a dependable supply line has made it difficult for **UNITA** to take advantage of its popular support. Its prospects, therefore, are rather limited at the moment.

For the countries south of the Zambezi, the prospects are still worse. The nationalists are farther away from possible sources of outside support and the movements are in a state of virtual collapse. The two Rhodesian movements, **ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)** and **ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union)** are split along tribal lines. **ZANU** represents the Mashona tribal groups of the north-eastern part of the country, while **ZAPU** mainly consists of Matabele from the south-west, although its leadership has strong Shona elements. Recently there have been attempts to unite the two groups under a neutral leader. But there has been no success and there are no prospects of it. The **ZAPU** leadership itself is divided along tribal lines and the conflict has erupted into gun battles in Lusaka in which there have been a number of dead and wounded. There was an attempt to bring **ZANU** and **ZAPU** leaders together to hold unity talks in Dar-es-Salaam, but it collapsed before it began when two rival **ZAPU** delegations showed up. They were tribally-based delegations, one of them representing the mainly Matabele leadership of **ZAPU**, who are opposed to the acting leader, **Mr. James Chikerema**, a Shona.

The South African movements are in even worse straits. The **African National Congress (ANC)**, which two years ago attempted some trans-Zambezi military adventures in collaboration with **ZAPU**, gives every appearance of having given up the struggle. Recently, when the Zambians tried to pressure them to get their armed men out of the camps and to move across the Zambezi, the **ANC** leaders found it expedient to fly their remaining guerillas back to eastern Europe for "additional training".

There are also serious splits within the **ANC** leadership and the men who might have had some chance of holding it together—the old Moscow stalwarts, **J. B. Marks** and **Moses Ketano**, have been moved aside. **Ketano** is in Moscow for medical treatment and it seems that he will remain there. The men in control now, **Oliver Tambo** and **Duma Nokwe**—seem unequal to the task.

The **Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)** has literally gone down the drain. The party has fragmented, as most of the leaders who had any influence came out against the leadership of the acting president, **P. K. Leballo**. On more than one occasion, the other **PAC** leaders outside the country have combined to expel **Leballo** from the party on charges of corruption. Each time, however, this has been prevented by the Tanzanian government and the Liberation Committee, which support **Leballo** on a personal basis.

An interesting aspect of all this is that it has been firmly established that **Leballo** is not a South African. At the OAU Heads of State conference in Addis Ababa last September, members of the Lesotho delegation pointed out that **Leballo** was a Lesotho citizen, born in Lesotho and still holding a Lesotho passport, and involving himself in Lesotho politics.

Mainly as a result of opposition to **Leballo**, what remains of the **PAC** has split into several groups—the main ones being **Leballo's** own group in Dar-es-Salaam, which is left with an army of 15 men, and another led by **Mashomba** in Kinshasa, where it operates under the wing of **Holden Roberto**.

Both the **ANC** and the **PAC** have lost most of their support at home as a result of the corruption and squabbles of the exiled leaders. What remains of the **ANC** in South Africa is mainly a few sections of its alter-ego, the clandestine **South African Communist Party**. Outside South Africa, it is a mere corpse, kept going by infusions of aid from Moscow.

South-West Africa

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In South-West Africa, SWANUF (South West African National United Front), the successor to SWANU, is almost dead and Sam Nujoma's SWAPO (South-West African Peoples' Organisation) is in nearly the same state. So far, SWAPO has been kept alive by the recognition of Tanzania and the Liberation Committee and the friendship of the ANC, which has led the Soviets to channel a few drops of aid to Nujoma. On the other hand, however, most of the SWAPO militants have long ago escaped from Nujoma's control by the expedient of fleeing to Kenya, Ethiopia or elsewhere.

The African Liberation Committee itself is in a state of decline. Only four of the OAU member-states are up to date in their contributions (one of them is Ghana, which is extremely dissatisfied with the organization and is supporting Houphouët-Boigny in seeking a "dialogue" with South Africa). The others are as much as three years in arrears. The result is that the ALC is almost broke and is certainly in no condition to give material aid to even the most favoured of the Dar-es-Salaam-based movements. The movements are having to depend almost exclusively on bilateral support—mainly from the Socialist countries, but also from certain African states. Some of them are getting some aid—but hardly enough for any serious revolutionary efforts—from Sweden and Israel, as well as from organisations in other Western countries.

The present condition of the Liberation Committee results from the almost total disenchantment of most of the African states. Many African officials have reached the point of saying bluntly that their governments are not interested in giving their money to be stolen or misused by the Committee's officials. They have also been disappointed by the misuse of those funds that have reached the leaders of the movements.

Many African states specifically blame Tanzania and the secretary-general of the Liberation Committee, George Magombe, for the Committee's ineffectiveness. There have been moves to take the organisation away from Tanzanian control, but these have all failed. There have also been moves to get rid of Magombe, but such moves have always failed—even after the investigation by the Committee of Seven—because of President Nyerere's personal support for him.

At the moment—and for the foreseeable future—the prospects of the OAU Liberation Committee seem dim. It is probable that the flow of funds to the committee will continue to dry up.

As for the movements that it supports, a clean-up of their own houses and a new dedication are vital if their effectiveness is to be improved.

TIME

10 May 1971

CPYRGHT

The Trade in Troublemaking

WHEN Ceylon's leftist government was recently confronted with a massive insurrection by a group of Maoist dissidents known as the People's Liberation Front, it clamped down immediately on one important source of the trouble: it accused the North Korean embassy in Colombo of complicity in the uprising, ordered the embassy closed, and expelled 18 North Korean diplomats. By last week, after a month of fighting throughout the island, several hundred Ceylonese were dead, but the government was slowly gaining an upper hand against the insurgents.

The involvement of the North Koreans in the Ceylon insurrection dramatized the extent to which guerrilla training has become an international activity. Today, with the help of a foreign "scholarship" and perhaps a forged passport, a young, aspiring revolutionary from any of several dozen countries may travel halfway round the world to learn the use of rifles and machine guns, the making of Molotov cocktails and the art of the "Killer's Kiss."

Then, after several months or even years of training, he returns to his home country to put his education into practice.

Almost every region of the world can qualify today as either a target of terrorists or a training ground. Even the tranquil fields of The Netherlands have served as a mock battlefield for a group of Indonesian separatists seeking independence for the South Moluccas Islands; Basque nationalists train secretly in northern Spain and southwestern France. Many countries dabble in terrorism, but five in particular have become large-scale exporters of insurgency. The five:

NORTH KOREA was recently accused of training Mexican as well as Ceylonese terrorists (TIME, April 19). According to the Mexican government, 50 young Mexicans using North Korean passports traveled to Pyongyang by way of the Soviet Union—a clear indication to the Mexican government that the Russians were in on the deal. The North Koreans, however, have members of the

Mexican group \$26,000 for travel expenses and the recruiting of additional guerrillas in Mexico.

To some extent, the North Koreans have concentrated on waging terrorist attacks against South Korea, but they have also managed to train 2,000 guerrillas from 25 countries; 700 foreign rebels are now believed to be in residence in ten special camps. Training lasts from six to 18 months. Foreigners as well as Koreans are taught *taekwondo*, the local version of judo and karate, and are put through such rigorous training as running five hours at night, sometimes through rough mountain terrain, shouldering 100-lb. sandbags. "Running, running, running," in fact, is the training slogan.

CUBA has trained some 2,500 Latin American guerrillas during the past decade. In addition, the Cubans have sent military instructors to Algeria and to the Congo-Brazzaville. Despite Fidel Castro's tough words two weeks ago about aligning himself with the "revolutionary people of the world," Cuba's

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training program has been somewhat curtailed in the post-Che Guevara period. While still capable of exploiting regional trouble spots, the Cubans have lately been preoccupied with economic problems at home and have been inhibited by the fact that leftist movements in many Latin American countries are splintered.

ALGERIA. More than 20 "national liberation fronts" and assorted movements maintain offices or representatives in Algiers, which has won the reputation of being the "home of revolutionaries." These groups include Al-Fatah, the Viet Cong, the Angolan resistance movement (M.P.L.A.) and the Black Panthers, whose local office is presided over by Eldridge Cleaver. There is even a representative for a group known as the Movement for the Autodetermination and Independence of the Canary Islands, which have belonged to Spain since the 15th century. "Catholics go to Rome," remarked an Algerian official, "Moslems to Mecca, and revolutionaries come to Algiers."

The Algerians provide military training facilities, however, for only a few major organizations, such as the fedayeen and the Angolans. For the most part, Algiers is a base for propaganda and political agitation rather than guerrilla training.

CHINA has emphasized the training of insurgents from elsewhere in Asia—Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ceylon, Japan and the Philippines. The Chinese program, which currently

involves 100-150 students per year, is one of the toughest and most fervent. Most sources agree that, while the Russians provide strong ideological and theoretical training for warfare in the indefinite future, the Chinese program is pragmatically oriented toward more immediate action, and is extremely rigorous. Training takes place under deliberately primitive conditions; if guerrillas visit the cities at all, they do so in the guise of students or tourists.

One measure of the fierce hostility between China and the Soviet Union is the fact that both countries are training members of several tribes that live along the Sino-Soviet border. In addition, the Chinese provide military training in Tanzania for several groups of black freedom fighters from South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. They also supply small arms and ammunition to the fedayeen.

SOVIET UNION. Western intelligence agencies say that Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University is a prime recruiting ground for Soviet intelligence. The university's student body consists of 3,000 foreign students, mostly from the non-Communist developing nations, and 1,000 Russians. Its vice rector is a major general in the KGB secret police; his job on campus is to screen out "undesirable" elements and watch for prospective recruits. If a student is among the several dozen chosen for guerrilla training, he receives special courses and favors and may discover that he has become irresist-

ible to pretty Russian girls. Later he may be "farmed out" to North Korea, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or elsewhere for further instruction. When he finally goes home, he remains under the guidance of a resident KGB man.

The Soviets prefer to remain in the background, but they are deeply involved in the financing and control of programs in Cuba, Algeria, North Korea and among the fedayeen. The recent Mexican case revealed how closely the Soviets are working with the North Koreans. The Ceylon civil war demonstrated that the Russians still maintain a two-pronged policy of giving official support to relatively moderate leftist governments, while at the same time subsidizing local subversive opposition movements. Accordingly, the Russians have delivered six MIGs with pilots and ground crews to help the Socialist government of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike put down the insurrection. At the same time, they have given arms to the Ceylonese rebels through an organization called the Ceylonese-Soviet Friendship Society.

Another group of Soviet protégés who recently made news were the Turkish students involved in the kidnaping of four U.S. airmen two months ago. The students, it turned out, had received training from Soviet instructors in Syria. The Soviet "diplomat" who had overseen their activities in Turkey was subsequently transferred to—of all places—Ceylon.

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June 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

June 14	East Germany	East German SED (Communist Party) Congress.
June 22	USSR	30th anniversary of beginning of Soviet "Great Patriotic War," 1941: Soviet Union switches sides in WW II when Germany breaks Nazi-Soviet Pact and invades USSR. Although the Red Army was numerically superior, it was unprepared for the attack and Soviet losses were heavy, because Stalin refused to believe reports that Hitler would break their pact.
June 25	Moscow	1st anniversary of unveiling of Stalin bust over his grave, 1970.
June 26	Czechoslovakia	1st anniversary of Dubcek's expulsion from Czech CP, 1970. <u>Quick</u> , the illustrated West German weekly, reported 29 April that the former Party leader and reformer now manages a garage in Bratislava.
June 28	Poland	15th anniversary of the Poznan workers riots, 1956, which brought Gomulka to power at the head of -- Poles hoped -- a liberalized regime. Under pressure from Soviet and Polish hardliners, Gomulka reverted to a harsh rule. A deteriorating economy, exploitation of the workers, and sudden price increases set off new workers riots in December 1970, that swept Gomulka out of office and again brought hopes of liberalization to Poland.
July 1	China	50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.

July 4	Philippines	25th anniversary of Philippine independence, 1946, provided for by act of U.S. Congress in 1934.
July 11	Mongolia	50th anniversary of Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence from China, 1921, following overthrow of Mongolian government by Mongolian revolutionaries with the aid of the Russian army. In 1924 the Mongolian Peoples Republic was proclaimed.
July--	Germany	10th anniversary of mass fleeing of East Germans to the West. During month of July, 1961, a total of 30,444 refugees were registered at the West Berlin receiving center. Two weeks later, on August 13, the Ulbricht regime sealed the border and began building the Berlin Wall.
July--	Yugoslavia	League of Yugoslav Communists is to meet during the summer, probably July. Yugoslavia's current work on economic reforms and constitutional changes and Soviet displeasure with the Yugoslav reform efforts, make this year's LCY annual conference particularly important.

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June 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

RE-STALINIZATION AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS? Franz Marek, formerly Central Committee member of the Austrian Communist Party, expelled in December 1970 and now editor-in-chief of the prominent dissident journal Wiener Tagebuch (Vienna Diary) gave an interesting dissertation on the issue of re-Stalinization at the 24th CPSU Congress (see attached article and translation). Examining the various negative phenomena of modern Soviet society --- itself a formidable catalogue of evils --- he gives his own, excellent definition of Stalinism and concludes that re-Stalinization has indeed not occurred, and cannot occur, for the simple reason that there has never been a de-Stalinization.

* * * * *

ULBRICHT BOWS OUT: "PLUS ÇA CHANGE..." Kremlinologists are fond of saying about the Soviet Union: "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" (The more it changes, the more it is the same thing). When ageless Party boss of East Germany, Walter Ulbricht, bowed out early in May, one might have hoped for change in East Germany from the obsolete Cold War policies followed by Ulbricht. But with his replacement by his Deputy, Erich Honecker, one might now say, "plus ça change, plus c'est pire" (the more it changes, the worse it becomes). By all accounts (examples attached), Honecker is even more a hard-liner than Ulbricht.

In 1927 Stalin gave a famous definition of a good, revolutionary Communist, devoted to the principle of proletarian internationalism:

"A revolutionary is he who without arguments, unconditionally, openly and honestly...is ready to defend and strengthen the USSR, since the USSR is the first proletarian, revolutionary state in the world...an internationalist is he who, unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and to defend, to advance this

revolutionary movement is impossible without defending the USSR."

Honecker's Stalinist credentials are evident from a statement of his, reprinted in Pravda, 7 October 1968, when the memory of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was still fresh:

"Now, when proletarian internationalism is again being tested for strength, the SED [Communist] and all the democratic parties and mass organizations of the GDR, all our people feel closely tied to the great Soviet people, to their glorious Leninist Party, the CPSU, and for us, as for all Leninists, the most important criterion by which a party pretending to the right to call itself Marxist-Leninist is judged. In our time, it is impossible to be a Communist without love for the land of Lenin, without supporting its policy of peace and socialism."

* * * * *

CHOLERA: A NEW DISEASE FOR AFRICA. Foreign travelers report being warned of the spread of cholera in Africa following its outbreak in Egypt and the USSR last year. Cholera had not been a common disease in Africa until recently. Now there are reports that there may be as many as 100,000 cases in about twenty-two countries. Furthermore it is likely to spread rapidly in Africa because local sanitary conditions are poor and there is a lack of control programs. In the summer of 1970 there was a large-scale outbreak of this particular strain of cholera in the southern USSR, in the area around the Caspian and Black Seas, as well as in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East. In spite of an extensive quarantine established by the Soviet government, the disease did spread to Czechoslovakia and possibly also to Romania. Although the USSR and Egypt are taking broadscale precautions to prevent another outbreak this summer, it is apparently too late for such measures to help Africa.

* * * * *

RED ELEPHANT FOR EQUATORIAL GUINEA. The Soviets have apparently gotten off to a bad start in impressing Equatorial Guinea with the value of their economic assistance. After ignoring Equatorial Guinea's pleas for some kind of economic and military assistance, even though diplomatic relations were established in late 1968, the Soviets agreed to provide limited military assistance, as well as an aircraft (AN-24) on "easy credit" terms for the personal use of Guinean President Macias. Although the Soviets agreed to provide aid only after the Chinese Communists had established relations

with the Guinean government, President Macias was highly pleased by this gesture of Soviet interest and praised the USSR for its assistance. Yet just about a month after the plane was put into use, one of its engines caught fire during takeoff, and, the plane has been grounded until a replacement engine arrives from Moscow. Furthermore, it is said the President himself was aboard when the fire broke out, that he was among those evacuated and was then flown back to the capital in a Convair.

WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
May 1971

STALINISM AND RE-STALINIZATION

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In connection with the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the question has been brought up again of whether this Congress will symbolize re-Stalinization or whether this re-Stalinization has already taken place perhaps. As far as we know, there was no talk of de-Stalinization.

Kremlinologists keep an exact record on whether, when, and how Stalin is shown or mentioned in order to answer this question and in order to be able to figure out the latest status in the conflicts within the Kremlin leadership. Politologists interpret the Leningrad Trial, the sentencing of Amalrik, the shift in the accent toward a centralized planned economy in the latest work of Libermann, the exit ban on Rostropovich, etc., as symptoms of re-Stalinization; they interpret the departure of several hundred Jews to Israel, the continued position of Kosygin in the Party leadership, the fact that the Zakharov group has come through unscathed in spite of its attempt to found a club of its own, etc., as signs that there have been no re-Stalinization and that, moreover, it could not come about. It seems to us that most of the discussions miss the point.

Of course, we are not dealing with unimportant phenomena here, in each case; but since Stalinism cannot be explained simply in terms of Stalin alone, the mere fact as to whether his picture is shown in the news reels or whether his name is mentioned in the memoirs of a general does not yet enable us to make any judgements, particularly since opposing concepts, forces, and calculations often can lead to the absence of any concept, to an out-of-focus view, and to unpredictability.

If the idea of a personality cult is connected with the concept of Stalinism, then it is quite clear that there is no re-Stalinization -- for that, there is simply no personality. If we think of the millions who were deported, the hundreds of thousands who were liquidated, then it is quite clear that a re-edition of such a terror wave is impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible in view of the loss of authority on the part of the leadership group, the uneasiness and distrust among the population, to whom one could no longer explain such terror measures, with some sort of reference to the revolution; (this is also true) in view of the need for handling the technical intelligentsia carefully, etc.; a terror wave in the style of the thirties is likewise unnecessary because the active political opposition boils down to some very small groups which are under police surveillance. To

be sure, one could hardly repeat Khrushchev's statement to the effect that there is no single political prisoner left in the Soviet Union -- is is questionable whether that statement was true at the time it was made -- but the number of political opponents of the regime, who were deported, sentenced, or remanded to an insane asylum, would add up to hardly more than a three-digit figure. If, on top of this, we tie in with the concept of Stalinism the memory of those trials during which important protagonists of the revolution accused themselves of the worst crimes, then we have all prerequisites for the mechanism of these tragedies in our time. There are hardly any important revolutionaries left whom one could discredit and, above all, nobody would give any credence anymore to such self-accusations. In this sense, a re-Stalinization is certainly impossible.

If, finally, by Stalinism we mean the tutelage over science and art, administrative interference in the creative activities of scientists and artists, the process of having apparatchiki, who know nothing of art or science, make decisions on disputed issues in science and art -- then quite a few changes were bound to occur also in this respect. To be sure, in the field of the arts, social science, historical research, and philosophy, the present situation differs from the past only in terms of nuances; but in the natural sciences, the domination of a Lysenko, the tales of a Lepeshinskaya and a Boshyan would hardly be possible and the ban on modern theories would be unthinkable; natural scientists are spared even if they belong to opposition groups. Artists are somewhat worse off, although not as badly as once upon a time. They can accept official commissions; their own works, which cannot be exhibited, they can sell privately; and their private customers also include dignitaries of the regime, such as, for example, the chairman of the Soviet Commission at the SALT talks in Vienna.

But -- does that cover the essence of this problem complex? Stalinism after all is that network of bureaucracy and executive authority which covers the entire population, in the name of the proletariat, created for the protection of the proletariat, but for a long time now characterized by privileges and parasitary features; every decision by the particular leadership -- in whose case the decision-making process as such is shrouded in secrecy -- is considered infallible, as something that springs from Marxism-Leninism, and no alternatives are possible, no discussions are permitted, so that the constant reference to politics and ideology was paralleled by extensive depolitization and de-ideologization which do not prevent technological progress, which make economic progress more difficult, but which in the end lead to ideological stagnation.

Stalinism above is that strange kind of schizophrenia of word and deed, theory and practice, terminology and reality, which is not exhausted through the concept of contradiction because the use and misuse of terminology and the reference to ideology also introduce obligations which the leadership group cannot always avoid -- quite apart from the fact that the existence of China prevents the leadership group from avoiding this. The Soviet

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Union simply cannot engage in big-power politics without taking the institutionalized ideology into account -- and this is what some simplifying left-wing critics often overlook. Thus it is certainly possible that, one year after Lon Nol's Putsch, the Soviet Union still has not recognized the Sihanouk Government, although it controls the major portion of Cambodia and although Lon Nol even advocated an invasion of the Vietnamese People's Republic; but at the same time, the Soviet Union is giving Vietnam important material assistance, not only because of its rivalry with the other superpower, but also because it cannot always and simply ignore the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle.

We are therefore convinced that Stalinism -- as a system of repression in a state in which there is no private ownership of the means of production, as a system of the instrumentalization and institutionalization of a revolutionary ideology -- was not overcome even during the warmest times of the Khrushchev thaw. The various nuances and differences in the climate are of course important, above all to the sorely-tried population, but also for the worldwide revolutionary movement; however, re-Stalinization is impossible because there has never been any de-Stalinization.

The problem complex of the communist parties in the capitalist countries looks entirely different; here there has indeed been cases of de-Stalinization -- and re-Stalinization, which are also called "normalization."

WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
May 1971

Stalinismus und Restalinisierung

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Im Zusammenhang mit dem 24. Parteitag der KPdSU ist wieder die Frage aufgeworfen worden, ob dieser im Zeichen einer Restalinisierung stehen wird oder diese gar schon erfolgt ist. Von der Möglichkeit einer Entstalinisierung ist unseres Wissens nicht die Rede gewesen.

Kremnologen buchen genau, ob, wann und wie Stalin gezeigt oder erwähnt wird, um die Frage beantworten und den letzten Stand der Auseinandersetzungen in der Kremlführung ableiten zu können. Politologen werten den Leningrader Prozeß, die Verurteilung Amalriks, die Verlagerung der Akzente auf den Zentralismus der Planwirtschaft in der letzten Arbeit Liber-manns, das Ausreiseverbot für Rostropo-witsch usw. als Symptome der Restalini-sierung, die Ausreise einiger Hundert Juden nach Israel, das Verbleiben Kossy-gins in der Parteführung, die Tatsache, daß die Gruppe Sacharow trotz dem Ver-such einer Vereinsgründung ungeschoren blieb usw., als Zeichen, daß keine Re-stalinisierung erfolgt ist, ja gar nicht er-folgen kann. Uns scheint, daß die meisten Diskussionen am eigentlichen Problem vorbeigehen.

Gewiß handelt es sich jeweils um nicht unwichtige Phänomene; aber da der Stali-nismus nicht einfach mit Stalin erklärt werden kann, erlaubt die Tatsache, ob er in einer Wochenschau gezeigt oder in den Memoiren eines Generals erwähnt wird, noch kein Urteil, zumal ja widerstreitende Konzepte, Zugkräfte und Berechnungen oft zur Konzeptlosigkeit, Unschärfe und Unberechenbarkeit führen können.

Wenn mit dem Begriff des Stalinismus die Vorstellung eines Persönlichkeitskults verbunden ist, so ist es ziemlich klar, daß es keine Restalinisierung gibt — dazu fehlt einfach die Persönlichkeit. Wenn man an Millionen Deportierte, an Hun-dertausende Liquidierte denkt, so ist es klar, daß eine Wiederauflage einer solchen Terrorwelle nicht möglich und nicht not-wendig ist. Sie ist nicht möglich ange-sichts des Autoritätsverlusts der Füh-rungsgruppe, des Unbehagens und Miß-trauens in der Bevölkerung, der man solche Terrormaßnahmen nicht mehr, wo-möglich mit Berufung auf die Revolution,

erklären könnte; angesichts der notwen-digen Rücksichtnahme auf die technische Intelligenz usw.; eine Terrorwelle im Stil der dreißiger Jahre ist auch nicht notwen-dig, weil die aktive politische Opposition sich auf ganz kleine Gruppen reduziert, die unter der Kontrolle der Polizei stehen. Gewiß kann Chruschtschews Wort kaum wiederholt werden, daß es in der Sowjet-union keinen einzigen politischen Gefan-genen gibt — es ist fraglich, ob diese Erklärung damals der Wahrheit entsprach —, aber die Zahl der deportierten, ver-urteilten, ins Irrenhaus überstellten poli-tischen Gegner des Regimes dürfte kaum mehr als dreistellig sein. Wenn man noch dazu mit dem Begriff des Stalinismus die Erinnerung an jene Prozesse verbindet, in denen bedeutende Protagonisten der Revo-lution sich selbst der schlimmsten Ver-brechen bezichtigten, so fehlen in unse-rer Zeit alle Voraussetzungen für den Mechanismus dieser Tragödien. Es gibt kaum mehr bedeutende Revolutionäre, die man diskreditieren kann, und vor allem würde kein Mensch mehr solchen Selbst-bezichtigungen Glauben schenken. In die-sem Sinne ist eine Restalinisierung ge-wiß nicht möglich.

Wenn man schließlich unter Stalinismus die Gängelung von Wissenschaft und Kunst versteht, die administrativen Ein-griffe in die schöpferische Tätigkeit von Wissenschaftlern und Künstlern, die Ent-scheidung von Streitfragen in Wissenschaft und Kunst durch Apparatschiki, die weder von Kunst noch von Wissenschaft etwas verstehen, so mußte sich auch in dieser Hinsicht manches wandeln. Gewiß, auf dem Gebiet der Geisteswissenschaften, der Gesellschaftswissenschaft, der Ge-schichtsforschung, der Philosophie unter-scheidet sich die gegenwärtige Situation nur in Nuancen von der Vergangenheit; aber in den Naturwissenschaften wäre

die Dominanz eines Lysenko, die Erzäh-lungen einer Lipeschinskaja und eines Boschjan kaum mehr möglich, das Verbot moderner Theorien undenkbar; Naturwis-senschaftler werden sogar geschont, selbst wenn sie oppositionellen Gruppen ange-hören. Schlechter geht es schon den Künstlern, wenn auch nicht mehr so schlimm wie einst. Sie können offizielle Aufträge erhalten, ihre eigentlichen Werke, die nicht ausgestellt werden können, privat verkaufen, und zu ihren privaten Kun-den gehören auch Würdenträger des Reg-imes, wie z. B. der Leiter der sowjetischen Kommission bei den Salt-Gesprächen in Wien.

Bloß — hat man damit das Wesen der Problematik erfaßt?

Stalinismus — das ist doch jenes Netz von Bürokratie und Exekutive, das die ganze Bevölkerung umspannt, im Namen des Proletariats, zum Schutz des Prole-tariats geschaffen, aber längst schon durch Privilegien und parasitäre Züge gezeich-net; jeder Beschluß der jeweiligen Füh-rung, über dessen Zustandekommen der Schleier des Geheimnisses gebreitet wird, gilt als unfehlbar, als Emanation des Mar-xismus-Leninismus, ohne daß Alternativen möglich sind, Diskussionen zugelassen werden, so daß mit ständiger Berufung auf Politik und Ideologie eine weitgehende Entpolitisierung und Entideologisierung erfolgt, die den technischen Fortschritt nicht verhindert, den ökonomischen Fort-schritt erschwert, aber eine ideologische Stagnation zur Folge hat.

Stalinismus — das ist vor allem jene eigenartige Schizophrenie von Wort und Tat, Theorie und Praxis, Terminologie und Wirklichkeit, die mit dem Begriff Wider-spruch nicht ausgeschöpft ist, weil Ge-brauch und Mißbrauch der Terminologie und die Berufung auf Ideologie auch Ver-

pflichtungen mit sich bringen, deren sich die Führungsgruppe nicht immer entziehen kann — ganz abgesehen davon, daß sie die Existenz Chinas daran hindert. Die Sowjetunion kann einfach nicht Großmachtpolitik betreiben, ohne der institutionalisierten Ideologie Rechenschaft zu tragen, was manche simplifizierende linke Kritiker oft übersehen. So ist es gewiß möglich, daß ein Jahr nach dem Putsch von Lon Nol die Sihanouk-Regierung von der Sowjetunion, noch immer nicht anerkannt ist, obwohl sie den Großteil von Kambodscha kontrolliert und Lon Nol sogar eine Invasion der vietnamesischen Volksrepublik befürwortet; aber gleichzeitig leistet die Sowjetunion doch wichtige materielle Hilfe für Vietnam, nicht nur aus Rivalität zur anderen Supermacht, sondern weil sie nicht immer und einfach die Interessen des ant imperialistischen Kampfes ignorieren kann.

Wir sind daher der Überzeugung, daß der Stalinismus, als System der Repression in einem Staat, in dem es kein privates Eigentum an Produktionsmitteln gibt, als System der Instrumentalisierung und Institutionalisierung einer revolutionären Ideologie, auch in den wärmsten Zeiten des Chruschtschowschen Tauwetters nicht überwunden wurde. Die verschiedenen Nuancen und klimatischen Unterschiede sind gewiß wichtig, vor allem für die leidgeprüfte Bevölkerung, aber auch für die weltrevolutionäre Bewegung; aber eine Restalinisierung ist nicht möglich, weil niemals eine Entstalinisierung erfolgt ist.

Ganz anders steht es um die Problematik der kommunistischen Parteien der kapitalistischen Länder; hier gab es Fälle von Entstalinisierung — und Restalinisierung, die man auch „Normalisierung“ nennt. ■

Franz Marek

NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1971

New East German Chief

Erich Honecker

CPYRGHT

Special to The New York Times

BONN, May 3—"When we have critical problems we can always get in touch with our friends in the Soviet Union," said the East German Communist official. "We have a hot line to the Soviet generals who used to be in command here."

The man who has sat at the East German end of the hot line to Moscow has been Erich Honecker, who, at age 58, has inherited the leadership of the Socialist Unity (Communist) party, which has controlled East Germany for a quarter of a century in the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin and, lately, Walter Ulbricht.

There was a Berlin crisis of sorts at the beginning of March, 1969, and Mr. Ulbricht, as party and Government leader, was holding the fort as usual at his stark headquarters at the Werdersche Markt. Mr. Honecker, long Mr. Ulbricht's heir apparent, spent the entire five days of threat and counter-threat, army maneuvers and autobahn blockades in Moscow, in the company of his Soviet Army friends. Younger members of the East German party concluded

that he had cast his lot with the most conservative and traditional elements of the Moscow leadership, which naturally gravitated to the Soviet armed forces.

Erich Honecker came by his orthodoxy the hard way. He was born Aug. 25, 1912, in Neunkirchen, a small Saar industrial town, the son of a worker who was a hard-line Communist.

He dutifully joined the Young Pioneers, a Communist youth formation, at age 10, the Communist youth association at age 14 and the Communist party of Germany at age 17, in 1929. He became a functionary of the youth organization in 1931 and, in a sense, he has been one ever since.

Seized by the Nazis in 1935, he spent most of the next 10 years in solitary confinement, until he was liberated by Soviet troops in 1945.

"Solitary confinement does something special to a man," said an East Berlin Communist who knows Mr. Honecker well. "In his case it made him reserved, almost unapproachable. It is no accident his favorite hobby is hunting—a lonely man's sport."

Unlike many German Communists, Mr. Honecker made immediate contact with the "Ulbricht group" of tested Bolsheviks that went to East Berlin in 1945 in Soviet planes to establish a new regime.

It was in it from the start as a member of the new youth organization called Free German Youth, which was to provide the militant cadres for Mr. Ulbricht's party. The group's toughs drove the democrats out of the joint Berlin city administration in 1948, helped quash the workers' uprising in 1953 and manned the barricades that became the Berlin wall in 1961.

Mr. Honecker became chairman of Free German Youth in 1946, a post he held until 1955.

Meanwhile, he married Edith Baumann, an old-time Communist who was three years his senior. He divorced her in 1953 and almost immediately married a 26-year-old youth activist from Halle named Margot Feist—"the beautiful Margot," as she was known in a party that was not noted for handsome leaders.

Both received two years of training in the Soviet

Union and both rose steadily in the party-state apparatus.

Mr. Honecker became a member of the secretariat of the party's Central Committee in 1958 with special responsibility for security questions. His wife was named Minister of Education in 1963 and, according to insiders, has done an excellent job.

They have a teen-age son who lives with them in their heavily guarded party refuge at Wandlitzsee, northeast of Berlin.

Orthodoxy has always paid off in East German politics, yet Mr. Honecker is seen by the scientifically trained younger generation as a bit stodgy.

"He is a good second man," a younger party member said. "He has the apparatus in hand. He is a natural except for one thing: He is not fighter—he has no concept, no party line."

The slender man with well-cut suits, the kinky gray hair and the gold-rimmed spectacles has inherited a going concern. Because it is in Germany—divided Germany—he will soon have to define a party line of his own.

TIME
17 May 1971

CPYRGHT The Russians' New Man in East Berlin

WHEN Soviet troops swept into Berlin in 1945, they battered down the doors of the Brandenburg Prison. Among the prisoners freed was Erich Honecker, a tall, gaunt Communist who had spent most of the past ten years in solitary confinement. Upon his release, Honecker lost no time in joining the Ulbricht Group, a band of Moscow-trained Communists who had been flown to Germany by the Russians to organize a government.

Honecker's record obviously impressed Walter Ulbricht, who had met the young man briefly in Paris in the 1930s. The son of an impoverished Saar miner who was also a dedicated Communist, young Honecker was handing out political pamphlets at eight and was a full-fledged party member at 18. Two years after the Nazis came to power in 1933, he was arrested and later sentenced to ten years in prison for preparing to commit high treason.

Ulbricht put Honecker to work organizing young East Germans into the Communist-run Free German Youth. Honecker built a movement that embraced every young person from age 14. He also gave it a paramilitary character by introducing flying, parachuting and weapons practice, much like the Hitler Youth.

Shortly after the war, Honecker married Edith Baumann, an old-line Communist official, three years his senior. In 1953, he divorced her and took as his wife Margot Feist, then 20, a beautiful and talented youth leader from Halle. Appointed Minister of Education in 1963, she helped turn East Germany's schools into model institutions; many West Germans readily concede that education is one area where the Communist half of Germany has outperformed their own part of the country. There is talk that she may be elevated to the Politburo when the Party Congress meets in June, and even cynics grant that the promotion would be well deserved. In 1957, Honecker supported Ulbricht

against critics who had sought intellectual and cultural freedom in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's destalinization campaign. As a reward, Honecker was named to full Politburo membership and given the country's second most important post: Central Committee Secretary in charge of the armed forces and internal security. In 1961, he supervised the building of the Wall.

Honecker proved a dutiful deputy to Ulbricht, affecting the same wide-brimmed Panama hats and gray suits that are the old man's trademarks. Politically, Honecker, now 58, is, if anything, even more doctrinaire and rigid than Ulbricht. "Honecker is a stubborn dogmatist," says Werner Baum, a former East German official who defected two years ago. The years of solitary confinement left their mark on Honecker, an obsessively neat man who wears heavy horn-rimmed spectacles and is known as "Granite Face" among East Europeans. "If he were not so utterly dedicated to orthodoxy, one could say he was totally passionless," says one Communist diplomat. "He is fussy to the point of absurdity," reports another. Before his aides dust his desk, they make a diagram showing precisely where everything is placed. After dusting, everything is returned to its proper spot.

As the country's former top cop, Honecker enjoys strong support from the East German security services—and from the Soviets, who maintain 20 combat-ready divisions in East Germany. The Russians, in fact, call him "*nash chelovyek*" (our man). Honecker's only known diversion is hunting, which he does alone. He lives outside Berlin in a villa in the heavily guarded government complex at Wandlitz with Margot and their teen-age son. A Communist diplomat who has visited the Honecker home describes it as "spotless, functional, unimaginative and stiff—just like Honecker."

TIME
17 May 1971
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EAST GERMANY

The Disciple Departs

If Lenin has become a kind of Communist Christ, Walter Ulbricht, 77, is the self-appointed St. Peter. The oldest and most durable of the Soviet bloc party leaders, Ulbricht alone can lace his speeches with references to what he personally heard Lenin say, and he has used his disciple status to lecture the Soviets and East Europeans interminably on the need for political orthodoxy and extreme caution in dealing with the West. Last week Walter Ulbricht lost the bedrock of his power, the leadership of the East German Communist Party, which he helped found in 1946 and has headed since 1950.

To the assembled 131-member East German Central Committee Ulbricht explained that he was retaining his seat in the Politburo and his post as chief of state, which may now become largely ceremonial. But for reasons of health, Ulbricht continued, he was giving up the position of party first secretary. As his replacement, Ulbricht named the party's longtime No. 2 man, Erich Honecker (see box). Willi Stoph, 56, who has been Honecker's rival, remains premier in charge of government affairs. "To be honest, the decision did not come easily," said Ulbricht of his retirement. "Unfortunately," he added, "no cure has been invented for old age."

Soviet Nudge. East Germans took the news calmly. Other Eastern Europeans, who blame Ulbricht for frustrating their desires for closer economic and cultural ties with the West, were delighted. Some Western analysts argue that he was pressured by the Soviets into moving aside. According to that line of reasoning, Moscow grew weary of Ulbricht's obstructionist tactics, which hampered Soviet attempts to capitalize on Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in order to secure Russia's western flank. Wolfgang Leonhard, a visiting professor at Yale and former ranking East German ideologue, who knows both Ulbricht and Honecker, leans toward the theory that old "Spitzbart" (meaning pointed beard) was nudged. Leonhard, a former aide of Ulbricht's, notes that the Soviet press has recently slighted Ulbricht to an astonishing degree. An article on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the East German party in *Kommunist*, the leading Soviet ideological journal, totally ignored Ulbricht's role in establishing the party. At the same time, the Soviet press has recently given great prominence to Honecker's speeches.

Hard-Line Successor. Though a measure of impatience in Moscow was most likely a factor in Ulbricht's exit, many analysts attributed his resignation chiefly to ill health. Ulbricht is an ardent health faddist who used to do rigorous daily exercises and still quaffs great quantities of a carrot-colored health drink. But for some time he has been unable to put in a full ten-hour day at his desk. He departed more gracefully than any East bloc party boss so far. He was able to hand-pick a successor whose views are as hard-line as his own.

In his first speech as the new party leader, Honecker stressed the necessity of "completely shielding" East Germany from contacts with the West. He also called on Bonn to ratify the renunciation-of-force agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland without waiting for the successful conclusion of the current Big Four talks about improving the status of isolated West Berlin. Brandt refuses to submit the Moscow and Warsaw treaties to the Bundestag until the allied custodians of Berlin—Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the U.S.—guarantee the untrammled passage of people and goods between West Berlin and West Germany.

Ulbricht and the Russians want West Germany to negotiate directly with East Germany over access to the divided city on the grounds that the autobahns, barge canals and rail lines cross East German territory. But the three Western powers insist that before the two Germanys talk about modalities of access, the Russians must sign an agreement that would be binding on the East Germans. This is one of the central issues that have snarled progress toward a relaxation of tensions in central Europe.

Ugly Scar. Ulbricht took a poor, unstable part of Germany and turned it into a relatively prosperous, tightly ruled state. Having spent World War II in Russia, he and a handful of aides, including Leonhard, were flown to Berlin during the last days of the war as part of a Soviet plan to impose Communism on defeated Germany. Ulbricht succeeded only in that area where Soviet troops could enforce his orders. Even then, the East Germans in 1953 staged the East bloc's first abortive rebellion. In 1956, as the Soviet bloc was swept by the wave of destalinization, Ulbricht stubbornly refused to relax even slightly his rigid, autocratic rule. His decision proved correct, from a Communist viewpoint, when Hungary and Poland exploded in revolts. In 1961, after more

than 3,600,000 East Germans had fled Ulbricht's fiefdom, he built the Wall that cut off the escape route for his remaining 17 million people.

A decade later, it still remains—an ugly, 25-mile scar across the face of Berlin. But the Wall stanching the drain of talented people, enabling him to stabilize and develop East Germany into the world's ninth largest industrial power, with a gross national income of \$29.5 billion. That, in turn, gave Ulbricht great leverage within the East bloc. He shared none of the Soviet desire for technological help from the West; he has access to West German aid anyhow through various trade arrangements. Ulbricht's consuming fear was that closer ties with the West could undermine Communist rule in Eastern Europe. Now that he has stepped aside, that message may be preached with less apostolic force.