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Propaganda
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Highlights

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION

1. The establishment of a Committee for Human Rights in any country save the USSR (and probably Communist China) might almost go unnoticed. But the Soviet Human Rights Committee formed in November by Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his two scientist colleagues is remarkable enough to warrant publicity and appropriate commentary. In discussing or writing about this new Human Rights Committee, assets should be urged to stress its complete legality within the Soviet system ("a creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the state") and therefore, its faithful adherence to the dictum on socialist legality according to Brezhnev ("everyone must obey the laws without regard to position, grade or rank"). Any repressive action taken, or even threatened, against the committee members would merely expose the Soviet leadership to additional ridicule. In fact, the stated principles of the committee are so aptly and carefully phrased as to indicate that official condemnation of the committee would be practically unimaginable.

2. Concerning the existence of and the crying need for this new Committee for Human Rights, what we want to encourage most of all is commentary from the left, from the pro-Soviet (or pre-Czechoslovakia pro-Soviet) sympathizers found primarily among free world Communist parties; Communist dissident groups; labor unions, and other organizations --- particularly those which have any direct or indirect connections with the United Nations' accredited non-governmental organizations. The committee's appeal is addressed indirectly to the United Nations, the one forum where world opinion just might carry a little weight with a power-hungry Kremlin. To stimulate such commentary, local promotional efforts might be required to focus wider attention on the existence of the Soviet Committee for Human Rights.

3. Because of the legalistic care with which they were composed, the committee's stated principles make pretty dull reading. See the attached English translation. The establishment of the committee, however, affords a peg for reviving the two previous documents with which Andrei Sakharov was concerned -- both of which are also legalistically proper --: Sakharov's essay of June 1968, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,"

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December 1970

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONA New Soviet Constitution; Is the Issue
Dead or Imminent?

Next January marks the twelfth year since former Premier Nikita Khrushchev told the 21st Party Congress that the time was ripe for making changes and additions to the Constitution of the USSR. While no draft of any new Constitution has appeared, a 97-member Constitutional Commission, whose members are all deputies to the Supreme Soviet, has been at work off and on for the past decade. The Commission was originally set up by Khrushchev in 1962 and then reorganized by Party Secretary Brezhnev after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. If it is to continue working, the Commission needs another reorganization: some 19 of its members have either died, been demoted, or lost out in this year's elections. However, another reorganization of the Constitutional Commission would only underline the government's procrastination in the drafting of the long-awaited new document.

One way of avoiding publicity for the present leadership's inefficiency in getting things done, would be to publish a draft for a new Constitution at an early date. This presupposes that the various factions in the leadership will have been able to work out a compromise document. Disagreement over basic provisions is undoubtedly what has held up the draft. Over four years ago the draft had apparently jelled sufficiently for Brezhnev to prophesy the adoption of a new Constitution during the 1967 50th anniversary celebrations. In a June 1966 pre-election speech, Brezhnev said: "All the best that the practice of state construction has given our country must be implemented in the new Constitution of the USSR, which will crown the majestic half-century road of our country." This statement, carried in Pravda, was censored out of the text of Brezhnev's electoral speech when it was later published in the two-volume edition of Brezhnev's Works.

In this year's election campaign speeches, Brezhnev did not mention any Constitution. Instead, he concentrated on the need for well-written laws "which constitute an intimate, stable and correct expression of the processes taking place in our society" and that "everybody must obey without regard to position, grade, or rank." His statements reflect the leadership's dissatisfaction with the undetected and unpunished corruption and bureaucratic ineffectiveness widespread throughout the Soviet system. They also reflect the leadership's concern over growing disrespect for

Soviet laws, both among the general public and in the ranks of Soviet officialdom. In a regime which officially scoffs at the concept of the "rule of law," the anomaly of the role of law is as unsolvable a dilemma for the present leadership as it was for all their predecessors.

Thus far, the only change following the 1970 elections has been just another step backward and closer to the "planned, controlled justice" of Stalin's day with the revival of the old USSR Ministry of Justice (and thereby, similar ministries in each Republic). On the surface at least, the Constitution appears a dead issue. It would seem that the consensus prevails that there is no need at the present time to replace the old Stalin Constitution of 1936 which, according to Moscow's own admission, is inadequate even for "building communism." The conservatives among the leadership stand to gain little from a new Constitution since it would represent a step forward along the path of "the further development of socialist democracy" in the USSR. And this is the path that would threaten their present status. Events in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 must have been a godsend to the conservatives in strengthening their arguments against whatever progressive steps might by then have been proposed by the Constitutional Commission.

The 1970 pre-election speeches reflected what appear to be serious differences among the leadership about the further development of Soviet "socialist democracy" and the degree of repression by the KGB compatible with this development. President Nikolai Podgorny was consistent in his advocacy of building "socialist democracy" by means of extending the powers and functions of the "system of soviets" as the most representative power groups in the USSR. KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov was just as consistent in his intimations that any substantial growth of "socialist democracy" in the USSR would merely dilute the powers of the Soviet state and negate the effective functioning of the KGB. And so it would. Brezhnev, while careful to avoid statements that might be open to interpretation as indicating differences of opinion, tended to side with Andropov; a truly "new" Constitution would seem incompatible with such thinking.

On the other hand, if the present leadership wished to avoid exposing itself to ridicule --- something it has not done so far --- this could be an incentive for the Soviet leaders to overcome their differences and work out some sort of compromise. Unless it is cancelled again, the 24th Congress of the CPSU will be held in March next year. The Congress would provide a unique and timely platform from which to present the draft of a new Constitution.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 November 1970

Physicists speak up in Russia

By Charlotte Saikowski
*Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor*

Moscow

The formation here of a Committee for Human Rights by three physicists is a further indication that voices of dissent in Russia grow more and more emboldened.

The committee includes the eminent nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, already widely known in the West for his forthright pleas for freedom of thought, democratization of Soviet society, and Soviet-American cooperation.

But a hallmark of this dissent within Russia — limited in extent, unorganized, and with virtually no political influence — is that by and large the dissenters do not seek the overthrow of the Soviet regime. Nor do they want the establishment of a capitalist society.

Their immediate concern is the observance of citizens' rights as guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.

Aims delineated

The new committee, according to a type-written copy of the announcement made available to the Western press over the weekend, sets these specific aims:

- "Consultative help" to state governing bodies in creating and applying human rights guarantees.

- Assistance to persons studying theoretical aspects of the problem in a socialist society.

- Legal education, in particular the propaganda of documents dealing with international and Soviet law on human rights.

Political observers here are rather astonished by the continued bold efforts of academician Sakharov and other leading scientists to challenge some basic policies of the Soviet Government.

Presumably because of Dr. Sakharov's stature as a physicist (he developed the Soviet hydrogen bomb) the regime does not appear to have restricted his freedom of action.

Political aims denied

However, it is difficult to believe that the authorities would allow the committee to function above board—even though its principles are carefully couched in legal terms.

The founders of the committee, which include physicists Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Valery Chalidze, make clear they are not organizing a political group.

The committee is defined as a "creative association" that works within Soviet law. Anyone can join who abides by its principles, but he must not be a member of a political party or other organization which seeks to govern the state or of any organization whose principles permit participation in either orthodox political activity or in an opposition.

In its study and "constructive criticism" of the present state of Soviet legal guarantees of freedom of the individual, the committee states it will be guided by principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Further, it will take into account "traditions" that have formed here and the state's "practical difficulties" in this field.

In practice, no group of any kind is formed in the Soviet Union without the sanction and participation of the Communist Party. If the regime officially suppresses the newly formed Committee, its founders would of course be in a position to point to this as an infringement of civil rights.

Although there is no organized or united dissent in the Soviet Union, recent years have seen the emergence of a variety of miniscule underground groups. One such unofficial organization was the Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the U.S.S.R., which fought government repressions by means of appeals to the United Nations.

The regime has harshly cracked down on such groups, however.

Problem for the regime

According to the underground Chronicle of Human Events, its members have been subjected to arrests, imprisonment, detention in mental hospitals or, at least, dismissal from their jobs, interrogations and harassment.

When prestigious and needed scientists are involved, however, it becomes a far more worrisome problem for the regime.

It should be borne in mind of course that the Soviet physicists, mathematicians, and others who are speaking out on behalf of civil rights constitute but a tiny fraction of the entire scientific intelligentsia. Thousands more go about their daily business without

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participating in open protest or voicing personal views that conflict with the official policy.

Even so, the leadership is patently irritated by the growing dissent among the scientific community. Last month the party central committee criticized the Lebedev Physics Institute, of which Dr. Sakharov is an associate, for "serious shortcomings" in the education of the scientific and technical intelligentsia.

Without mentioning any names, the party criticized institute scientists for poor contact with workers' collectives, for publishing few works on philosophical problems in the natural sciences, and for not adequately combatting "unscientific, idealistic conceptions of bourgeois scientists."

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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
16 November 1970

Soviet scientists form civil rights group

By FRANK TAYLOR in Moscow

THREE Soviet scientists, including Dr Andrei Sakharov, "father" of the Soviet H-bomb, were reported yesterday to have taken the struggle for civil liberties in Russia a significant stage further by forming a committee for human rights.

The committee's aims are set forth in a set of principles, copies of which reached Western correspondents in Moscow last night. It is carefully worded and stresses the Committee's non-political nature and that it seeks to work within existing Soviet law.

The move strengthens the view that concern for civil rights in Russia is growing among intellectuals.

It follows the open letter by Mstislav Rostropovich, the 'cellist, in which he criticised official control over the arts and literature, the trial of Andrei Amalrik, the author, and the trial of Dr Revolt Pimenov, a mathematician.

Dr Sakharov, 49, led a campaign of protest last June against the detention in a mental clinic of a fellow-scientist.

But his decision to help found the committee means that one of the most distinguished of Russian scientists has joined the broader struggle for basic human rights as a whole.

Interest growing

The preamble to the committee's principles declares that: "The problem of the maintenance of human rights is important for the creation of favourable conditions for people's lives, the consolidation of peace and the development of mutual understanding."

It "notes the growth in recent years among Soviet citizens of an interest in this field" and expresses "satisfaction with successes achieved in the Soviet Union since 1953" in this area.

Stalin died in 1953.

The committee says it wants to co-operate "on a consultative

basis" with further efforts by the State in creating guarantees for the defence of rights, "taking into account the specific character of the problem in the conditions of the socialist system and the specific character of Soviet traditions in this field."

In its set of principles, the committee describes itself as a "creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the State."

No member of the committee can be a member of a political party or of organisations which allow participation in orthodox or oppositional activity."

Legal education

The committee also sets out to promote legal education and, in particular, the dissemination of documents on international and Soviet law on human rights.

The set of principles ends: "The committee is prepared for creative contacts with public and scientific organisations, with international non-governmental organisations, if in their activities they proceed from the principles of the United Nations and do not pursue the goal of bringing harm to the Soviet Union."

Dr Sakharov's signature is followed by those of Andrei Tvyordokhlebov and Valery Chalidze, who are both physicists.

The question immediately raised by the action of the three is—how they intend to publicise the committee in order to get members?

Because all information media in Russia are Government-controlled they must rely, internally at least, on word of mouth and on the circulation of typewritten copies of the principles.

Many Russians rely on foreign radio broadcasts for acquiring news which is either suppressed or disregarded by the controlled Soviet Press, radio and television.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 November 1970

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3 IN RUSSIA MOVE TO DEFEND RIGHTS

**Sakharov Among Physicists
Who Establish Committee
on Personal Freedom**

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 15 — Dr.

Andrei D. Sakharov, a prominent nuclear physicist, and two of his colleagues have formed a Committee for Human Rights to seek ways of guaranteeing personal freedom in the Soviet Union.

A statement of principles, signed by Dr. Sakharov, Andrei N. Tverdokhlebov and Valery N. Chalidze, was made available to western correspondents today.

The principles appeared to have been composed to avoid direct criticism of the government, possibly because it is a crime under Soviet law to belong to an "anti-Soviet organization." In fact, the sponsors seem to offer a hand of friendship to the authorities.

The Only Legal Party

But the rules of membership outlined by the three men flatly state that only those who "are not members of a political party" may join. This would rule out members of the Communist party, the only legal political party in the Soviet Union.

The three physicists were joined by six other scientists, including Mikhail A. Leontovich, a leading theoretical physicist, in making public a letter protesting last month's sentencing of a Leningrad mathematician, Revolt I. Pimenov, to five years of Siberian exile. The letter was addressed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Pimenov and a friend,

Boris B. Vail, a worker in a Kiev puppet theater, were found guilty of slandering the Soviet state. The nine scientists said that the two men had committed no crime in exchanging information that they had in their possession.

Writings Printed Abroad

Dr. Sakharov, 49 years old, has emerged in recent years as a leading advocate of free speech in the Soviet Union. His writings have been printed abroad and he has protested against the detention and sentencing of several people who have been convicted or sent to psychiatric hospitals for views critical of Soviet society.

Because of his political activity, Dr. Sakharov, a creator of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, has been barred from working on security projects, his friends say. He is believed to be still associated with the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow—the Soviet Union's most prestigious physics institute—which recently was criticized by the Central Committee of the Communist party for lax ideological discipline.

The Soviet authorities do not permit the formation of groups over which they do not have control. Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution says that Soviet citizens are guaranteed the right to form public organizations, but adds that the Communist party "is the leading core of all organizations of the working people both public and state."

Article 72 of the Russian Federation's criminal code makes it a serious crime to participate in "an anti-Soviet organization." It does not state what constitutes such a body.

Peace and Understanding

The principles of Dr. Sakharov's committee said: "The problem of the maintenance of human rights is important for the creation of favorable conditions for people's lives, the consolidation of peace and the development of mutual understanding."

The statement expressed satisfaction with what it

termed successes achieved in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death in 1953, and said that the committee wanted "to cooperate on a consultative basis with the further efforts of the state in the creation of the guarantees for the defense of rights, taking into account the specific character of the problem in the conditions of the socialist system and the specific character of Soviet traditions in this field."

The group said that members of the committee could not be those who are members of a political party "or other organizations claiming participation in governmental management." It also ruled out those who belong to organizations "whose principles allow participation in orthodox or opposition political activity."

Cooperation With the State

It said that the goals of the committee included "cooperation with organs of state power in the field of the creation and carrying out of guarantees of human rights, either at the initiative of the committee or the initiative of interested organs of power."

The group further said that it would assist those concerned with research into human rights and "the specific character of this problem in the socialist society." It promised "constructive criticism of the contemporary conditions of the system of legal rights of personal freedom in Soviet law." This criticism, it said, would be guided not only by the general principles of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, but also by "the specific character of Soviet law" and "the complicated traditions and real difficulties of the state in this area."

The three physicists said that they were prepared for contacts with nonofficial foreign organizations so long as "they proceed from the principles of the United Nations and do not pursue the goal of bringing harm to the Soviet Union."

It is not known how the three physicists plan to recruit members, but it is unlikely that the Soviet authorities will take kindly to the idea.

In May, 1969, a group of 15 political dissidents formed an organization called the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union. This group, however,

was openly critical of the Soviet system and appealed to the United Nations Human Rights Commission for help in stopping the arrests of dissidents.

The United Nations took no action and many members of the group have since been arrested.

PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

"Proceeding from the conviction that the problem of the maintenance of human rights is important for the creation of favorable conditions for peoples' lives, and that the consolidation of peace and the development of mutual understanding is an inalienable area of contemporary culture;

"Seeking to cooperate with international efforts to propagate the idea of human rights and the search for constructive methods of maintaining rights;

"Noting the growing interest in this field of culture in recent years among Soviet citizens;

"Expressing satisfaction with successes achieved in the Soviet Union since 1955 in this field of law and seeking to cooperate on a consultative basis with the further efforts of the State in the creation of guarantees for the defense of rights, taking into account the specific character of the problem in the conditions of a Socialist system and the specific character of Soviet traditions in this field, A. D. Sakharov, A. N. Tverdokhlebov, V. N. Chalidze have decided jointly to continue their activity in the constructive study of the problem as a Committee for Human Rights on the basis of the following principles:

"1. The Committee for Human Rights is a creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the State, the present principles and regulations of the committee.

"2. Members of the committee may be persons guided, when they act as members of the committee, by the present principles and regulations, who are neither members of a political party or other organization which claims participation in the management of the government nor of organizations whose principles allow participation in orthodox or oppositional political activity, who do not intend to use their participation in the committee for political goals.

"3. The goals of activity of the committee are: cooperation with organs of State power in the field of the creation and application of guarantees of human rights either at the initiative of the committee or the initiative of interested organs of power; creative assistance to persons concerned with the constructive research of theoretical aspects of the problem of human rights and the study of the specific aspects of this problem in the socialist society; legal education, in particular, propagation of the documents of international and Soviet law on human rights.

"4. In theoretical research and constructive criticism of the contemporary condition of the system of legal guarantees of personal freedom in Soviet law, the committee will be guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, will proceed from recognition of the specifics of Soviet law, and will take into account the complicated traditions and real difficulties of the State in this area.

"5. The committee is prepared for creative contacts with public and scientific organizations and with international non-governmental organizations if in their

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activities they proceed from the principles of the United Nations and do not pursue the goal of bringing harm to the Soviet Union.

"Moscow, 4 November 1970. (signed) Andrei D. Sakharov, Andrei N. Tvyerdokhlebov, Valery N. Chalidze."

TIME
13 April 1970

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Blueprint for a Better System

The Soviets have traditionally found it difficult to talk realistically about the faults and failings of their society. In the past two years, a courageous new voice has arisen to question the official pretensions of infallibility. It belongs to Physicist Andrei Sakharov, 48, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, whose own views are believed to mirror those of many Russian intellectuals. In 1968 Sakharov wrote a 10,000-word essay, studied with great interest in the West, that called for a *rap-prochement* of the capitalist and Communist systems and for greater personal freedoms in the Soviet Union.

Last week a new Sakharov essay was circulating in Moscow.* In it, Sakharov warned that unless the Soviet Union changes drastically, it will be unable to solve its grave problems. Citing such signs as a rise in alcoholism and drug addiction as symptoms of Russia's malaise, Sakharov wrote: "At the end of the '50s our country was first in the world to have launched the Sputnik and send a man into space. At the end of the '60s we have lost our leadership, and the Americans have become the first to land on the moon. Now, at the start of the '70s, we see that having failed to catch up with America, we lag further and further behind."

Essential Freedom. Does this prove the superiority of capitalism over socialism? "Of course not," declared Sakharov. The problem, as he sees it, is that the Soviet system is still laboring under autocratic practices left over from the Stalin era. Freedom of ideas and information, he declared, are essential to the growth and success of a modern economy. He criticized the present regime's handling of intellectual dissenters, who seek to reform the Communist system from within. As Sakharov asked in the essay: "How can one justify the detention in prisons, camps and psychiatric clinics of persons who, although in opposition, act entirely within the framework of law?"

As a remedy for the country's ills, Sakharov proposed a 14-point program of gradual democratization. It would begin with such measures as the accessibility of information about the state, the sale of foreign books and periodicals, and the creation of a public opinion institute. Eventually his program would lead to amnesty for political prisoners, reform of legal and educational systems, and direct elections offering a choice of candidates for party and state posts. Sakharov warned that unless the Soviet Union moves in this direction, it will decline to a second-class power. "Tightening the screws," he wrote, will not solve any problems, "but on the contrary will lead the country into a tragic dead end."

* It was also signed by two lesser-known scholars, Historian Roy Medvedev and Physicist Valentin Turchin.

AFL-CIO
 Free Trade Union News
 September 1970

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The Rule of Lawlessness in the Soviet Penal System

By PAUL BARTON

"GET this, the laws weren't written for us; we'll do just as we like with you." This is what the great Russian civil rights fighter, Major-General P. G. Grigorenko, was told by the police when they arrested him on May 7, 1969 (see Grigorenko's prison diary in *A Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 12, February 28, 1970. The *Chronicle* is the most remarkable underground publication, issued in Moscow every two months; an English edition of the first 10 issues will soon be available: Peter Reddaway, ed., *Underground Russia*, New York, Cowles).

This cynical statement is no more than a fair description of the Soviet penal system, political persecution and especially as the treatment of political prisoners is concerned. In fact, the rule of lawlessness is the prevailing feature of the whole system. It asserts itself through all the stages of the process, starting with the arrest.

Stalin's basic principle of political repression is still very broadly applied: in flagrant violation of the rule of law, the repression is still mainly directed against definite categories of the population, rather than against individuals. Wherever this principle prevails—as it clearly does in the case of persecuted nationalities or of religious believers—a man is arrested not for having committed specific acts punishable by law but because he is considered by the KGB (the secret police) as being representative of the category singled out for repression. Though the growing resistance of the population against the Soviet dictatorship is reflected by a growing number of people sentenced for their own deeds, the "representatives" of the persecuted categories still constitute the bulk of Soviet political prisoners.

Actually, the all-pervasive lawlessness of the penal system comes to the fore in both cases, though maybe to a different degree. The KGB invariably distorts any possible manifestation of political dissidence that comes to its knowledge, so as to build it up into a criminal offense, and even, wherever possible, into one of the "particularly dangerous crimes against the state" defined in criminal legislation. As to the charges made against entire categories of the population, they are mostly trumped up.

In complete disregard of the existing legislation, most political convicts are sentenced in closed court. The majority are not even shown a copy of the sentence; they have to confirm by their signature that it has been read to them. In the Mordvian concentration camps, Marchenko found a few dozen men who had been sentenced in open courts; they were "policemen, wartime collaborators, war criminals, men with bloody crimes on their record, crimes against humanity."

Since the charges against them were the same as against all political prisoners, the publicity given to their trials apparently served the purpose of making the population believe that all the camp inmates were of the same sort (Anatoly Marchenko, *My Testimony*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, p. 42). Moreover, in recent years, the rare attempts to hear truly political cases in open court usually resulted in serious trouble for the regime, because of the growing courage

of the defendants. Thanks to the firm attitude of the two writers, the Siniavsky-Daniel trial turned into a scandal. Similarly, in January 1966, the Ukrainian intellectual, Valentyn Moroz, spoke during his open trial about the Russification and the unequal status of the Ukraine and refuted the accusation of "bourgeois nationalism" (*The Chornovil Papers*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968, p. 30).

However, even a case heard in closed court may make a considerable impact on public opinion if the defendants are well-known or famous. An efficient way of coping with such a situation has been found: with the complicity of certain psychiatrists, defendants of perfectly sound mind are committed in lunatic asylums and thus prevented from participating in their own trial.

The latest victim of this procedure has been Major-General Grigorenko. After his arrest, he was examined by a commission of psychiatrists and found to be of sound mind on August 8, 1969. However, the investigator sent him from Tashkent to Moscow for a new examination at the ill-famed Serbsky Institute and this time the maneuver was successful: in November 1969, Grigorenko was declared mad. So when his trial opened on February 3, he was safely held in an asylum. His defense counsel and his wife were refused permission to visit him before

the trial. The presiding judge rejected the requests of the defense that Grigorenko be called to court and that a third psychiatric team be appointed. The great civil rights fighter was found guilty but exempted from punishment; the court decided to place him in a psychiatric hospital of a special type until "his recovery" (A Chronicle of Current Events, February 28, 1970).

Naturally, this caricature of justice could not be achieved without the complicity of the officers of the court (prosecutors and judges).

No less scandalous is the attitude of a great many defense lawyers. It would not be fair to say that in this respect nothing has changed since Stalin's days when the counsel for defense used to attack the defendant in the same spirit as the prosecutor. At present, a growing number of defense lawyers try to assist the defendant; some of them have displayed an admirable courage in doing so. Unfortunately, this is far from being the prevailing attitude. Even among those who do try to be useful to their client, an excessively cautious attitude is much more characteristic.

If the rule of lawlessness asserts itself in the administration of justice, it is not hard to imagine the situation in jails and concentration camps.

The legal framework of the Soviet penitentiary system is itself marked by a systematic violation of the most basic concepts of legality. Until the adoption on July 11, 1969 of the Basic Principles of the Corrective Legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics—which is to be followed by the adoption of new Corrective Labor Codes in the Union Republics—the functioning of the whole system was, in theory, determined by the Corrective Labor Codes dating back to 1933, which were already obsolete towards the end of the 1930's and had no longer been applied since that time.

On the other hand, the "Regulations of the Corrective Labor Colonies and Prisons of the Ministry of Internal Affairs," adopted in 1958, were a secret act whose very existence would have remained unknown had it not been mentioned by the Prosecutor-General, R. A. Rudenko, in his December 1958 speech at the Supreme Soviet. New regulations of the same name were adopted in 1961, again as a secret act.

Finally, the concept of "source of law" is defined in such a way as to encompass practically any administrative decision. Professor Utevski's textbook, *Soviet Corrective Labor Law* (Moscow, 1960—in Russian) mentions, among the "sources of law," not only legislative acts and decrees but also the orders, instructions, ordinances, regulations, advice, rules, decisions and explanatory notes issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its organs, as well as the orders, instructions and decisions of local administration (pp. 55-56).

At a conference convened in Moscow in May 1957 to study the problems of corrective labor law (as reported in the Soviet legal journal, *Soviet State and Law*, December 1957), one of the rapporteurs gave definite hints to the effect that it was not desirable to impose too narrow limits upon the arbitrary rule exerted by the police inside the camps.

According to him, legal acts should not determine in a precise manner the internal structure and the functioning of the camps; only "fundamental problems" ought to be dealt with by legal acts, all the rest being left to administrative decisions. This is exactly how the 1969 Basic Principles of the Corrective Labor Legislation have been drafted, and it is very likely that the same pattern will be followed by the Corrective Labor Codes of the Union Republics when they are adopted in their turn. The provisions are so general and so vaguely worded that the jail and camp authorities' freedom of action can hardly be affected.

This is not all. Since all the regulations other than the laws are secret, there is no guarantee that the provisions of published acts will not be cancelled by such regulations. It is in fact very likely that that is what happens wherever legal provisions prove embarrassing.

A case can be mentioned here. According to the legislation, all prisoners have the right to address complaints and petitions to the highest authorities of the country. Yet in his petition to the Supreme Court of June 7, 1966, the imprisoned Ukrainian journalist, Svyatoslav Karavansky, claims that in accordance with a secret circular of the Prosecutor-General of the USSR, which is effective in the camp system, the KGB agents confiscate all letters and complaints addressed by prisoners to higher authorities and do not forward them. Karavansky also mentions a specific case of such an action which occurred in one of the Mordvian camps and points out that the prosecutor of these camps took no action against the KGB agent concerned (The Chornovil Papers, pp. 218-219).

Karavansky's allegation is corroborated by Marchenko's testimony, according to which prisoners on hunger strike are told that it is their right to complain about the camp administration to higher authority, but that it is by the camp administration that their complaints will be examined (pp. 70-71).

In these conditions, Larissa Daniel was far from overstating the case when, in her open letter to Soviet authorities of June 17, 1967, she described the absolute power of the camp administration in the following terms: "Any arbitrary decision by the Camp Commandant has the force of law: he can reduce the rations, cut the number of visits from relations or stop them altogether, forbid parcels, letters, tobacco, books and, in the last resort, order the punishment cell,

the handcuffs, the rigorous discipline. Since the Camp Commandant is subject to no control and the prisoners have no rights, living as they do cut off from society and the outside world, the Commandant can always justify his decision by the alleged 'bad behavior' of the prisoner, or accuse him of failing to reach his production quota. In these circumstances, the prisoner's life and health depend entirely upon whether the Commandant, the instructors, the warders happen to be good or bad, for his human rights are in no way ensured or safeguarded" (Christopher R. Hill, ed., *Rights and Wrongs*, London, Penguin Books, 1969, p. 109).

Incidentally, there is a striking similarity between the formulations one finds in different witness accounts. While Larissa Daniel states that "the prisoners have no rights," Marchenko says that "all these rights are no better than a dream, a mirage" (p. 224), and Valentyn Moroz (whose account will be published in Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*, London, Macmillan) puts it this way: "All prisoners' rights are looked upon as privileges which can be withdrawn."

Also Served Stalin

It is also important to know who are the men who have been entrusted with such absolute power over the fate of the prisoners. The Mordvian complex of camps, which probably represents the biggest single concentration of political prisoners in the Soviet Union today, is headed by Colonel Gromov, who in Stalin's time commanded the Taiskat camps, which were among the most dreadful (*L'Affaire Guinzbourg-Galanskov*, Paris, Seuil, 1969, p. 185), and a camp in Omsk (Marchenko, p. 265). More generally, among today's jailers one can find a considerable number of those who assumed similar positions under Stalin (Marchenko, pp. 265-267); an underground periodical published in the USSR, *Crime and Punishment*, is especially devoted to uncovering the crimes of Stalin's thugs and the positions they hold at present.

Theoretically, all the activities of the camp administration are to be supervised by the prosecutor's office to make sure that no lawlessness will be permitted. In practice, however, the prosecutor's office in a camp territory is as a rule itself integrated in the camp administration and numerous personal

links exist between the two authorities. A prosecutor often becomes a camp commandant while many camp prosecutors are former administration officials (*The Chornovil Papers*, p. 96). Far from being the guardian of legality, the prosecutor's office helps to maintain the rule of lawlessness.

So the camp official was by no means boasting who told a prisoner trying to in-

voke the law: "I am your law!" (Valentyn Moroz's testimony). One cannot better sum up than by mentioning another episode related by Moroz. At a "political education" session in Mordvian camp No. 11, when prisoners tried to argue by referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by U.N., Senior Lieutenant Lynbayev retorted indulgently: "Listen, but that is for Negroes!"

DAILY TELEGRAPH
London, 17 Nov 1970

CPYRGHT

CIVIL RIGHTS PROBLEM FOR KREMLIN

By FRANK TAYLOR
in Moscow

THE decision of Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the Russian nuclear scientist, and two others, to form a committee for human rights, may present the Soviet authorities with a difficult problem.

Under the law, any organised group, whether its purpose is the study of Marx, or the collection of foreign stamps, must be registered with the State.

It seems inconceivable that Dr Sakharov and his colleagues have not already made the first moves to comply with this regulation.

The authorities must decide whether to allow the committee to operate, thus tacitly admitting that a watchdog over human rights in the Soviet Union is needed, or whether to ban what is essentially a noble idea.

Careful wording

Those who have studied the committee's set of principles cannot fail to be struck by the careful, not to say canny, way in which it is worded.

It emphasises the non-political character of the committee and goes to some length in stressing it will have nothing to do with foreign or domestic organisations which are anti-Soviet.

The reference to the "successes" achieved in the field of human rights since 1953 will also not go unnoticed by those in authority.

It was in 1953 that Stalin died. The present leadership would not, presumably, wish to argue on this part of the committee's statement.

But the other side of the coin, from the Kremlin's view, must be that Dr Sakharov has in recent years been emerging as an outspoken critic of the arbitrariness of the régime when dealing with individuals.

In view of what has happened in the past to others who have been equally outspoken, it must be assumed that only Dr Sakharov's eminence in his profession has preserved his freedom.

LE MOUDE WEEKLY
25 NOVEMBER 1970

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IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

**A constructionist reading
of the Soviet constitution**

Three Soviet physicists—Andrei Sakharov, who at thirty-two became one of the youngest members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Valery Chalidze—announced on November 15 the founding of a committee for the defence of human rights in the Soviet Union.

They are proposing to help the state study the "theoretical aspects of the problem," and they say that their research will be guided by the principles outlined in the United Nations declaration of human rights, but will use the "specifics of Soviet law" as a starting point.

Emphasizing the need to take into account the "established traditions and real difficulties of the state in this field," they point out that the committee will act "in conformity with the laws of the state" by refusing membership to persons belonging to political parties or social organizations involved in the actual running of the political apparatus.

Membership will also be denied to those who might be tempted to use the committee either to criticize the government or as a political tool. They also reject any cooperation with foreign organizations inimical to the Soviet Union.

In any other modern, industrial country, an initiative of the sort that Mr. Sakharov has taken would have gone all but unnoticed. A leading intellectual—he is referred to as the "father of the (Soviet) H-bomb"—founds an association, as he is fully entitled to do under the Soviet constitution, to facilitate the application of the principles on which the Soviet Union is theoretically governed.

Lawful successes

He points with satisfaction to "the successes scored since 1953 in the field of law" and places himself at the regime's disposal so that this fortunate trend may continue. Such being the case, who would possibly find fault with him?

Mr. Sakharov probably has few illusions about the kind of reception his move is liable to get. In 1968 he urged liberalization, suggesting that the Kremlin leaders follow the Czechoslovak example. He was back at it again early this year, openly defending intellectuals being prosecuted for non-conformist ideas, among them the biologist Dr. Zhores Medvedev and the mathematician Revolt Pimenov.

He took the calculated risk of sabotaging his own career, and did apparently lose a few of his posts. But he was equally well aware that his actions posed an

extremely thorny problem for the authorities: they could not bring him to trial without touching off an international scandal and antagonizing the entire Soviet scientific community. The fact is that the government needs the scientists too much to attack them directly.

Mr. Sakharov has thus decided to use his not inconsiderable prestige in the service of those who, like him, are fighting for human rights: Jews who have informed the United Nations that they want to emigrate; believers militating for application of the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of worship; protesters, from the writer Alexander Ginzburg to Major General Pyotr Grigorenko, who organized demonstrations that were in principle authorized by the constitution, but in fact were repressed by the police and punished by the courts.

Futile opposition

Many crestfallen militants are now convinced that "opposition within the law" has no chance of succeeding. Having seen how their comrades tared in a series of court proceedings that began in 1966, they realize the futility of reminding the Soviet leaders of the regime's underlying principles, and they feel it is preferable to fight underground, or, in some cases, simply leave the country. It is true that their

struggle is being waged in the midst of what seems, at least, to be general public apathy.

Mr. Sakharov's initiative therefore smacks of optimism. He seems convinced, like the writer Andrei Amalrik, that the liberalization process begun in 1953—and sharply braked of late—is irreversible. The committee he set up will be an instrument in the hands of those who fight for respect for human rights and offer help to those who are persecuted.

How the authorities will react to this uncomfortable situation remains to be seen. By rejecting help from politically motivated quarters, Mr. Sakharov has made it impossible for anyone to accuse his committee of being anti-Soviet. At the same time he has created a formidable precedent for the regime.

The Communist Party will put up with any association so long as it can control it. Mr. Sakharov, like the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich who recently published a letter in defence of author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, accepts the regime, but refuses to play along with the system.

BERNARD FERON

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December 1970

SOVIETS MOVE TO CRUSH VENEZUELAN AND SPANISH CP DISSIDENCEThe 'Modern' CPSU Leaders Carry on Ancient Stalinist Tradition

Whatever differences and similarities observers want to see between Stalin's style of supervising the international Communist movement and that of the 'modern' post-Stalin leadership, at least one motivation has remained essentially unchanged: in exercising the Soviet claim to leadership among the world's Communist parties, the CPSU demands from these parties full conformity with Soviet positions in matters of dogma and politics. The price of non-conformity is ejection from the movement. Like Stalin, the modern Soviet leaders eliminate opposition wherever their power can reach, even though it may mean virtually destroying a national movement, as in the case of the Austrian CP during the past year when the expulsion of the liberal faction led by Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek robbed the Party of the little vitality it had.

Within the past two months, the CPSU has again demonstrated its fear of non-conformity and innovative ideas by extending its interest out as far as the Venezuelan CP and the small, illegal Spanish CP (whose main operations are carried on underground in France) in an attempt to split each of the parties and destroy the non-conforming faction. The criticism of the Soviet Union emanating from the two parties stems from the realization that the Soviet brand of Communism is alien and inapplicable to their world. The criticism is typical of the feeling being expressed by an increasing number of free world Communists.

Pravda's Intervention in the PCV

The CPSU finally decided to throw the weight of its authority into the smoldering factional struggle going on in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) by publishing in Pravda on 20 October a crude attack on PCV Central Committee member Teodoro Petkoff. The Soviets like to use a meat-ax approach when they want to leave no doubt of their disapproval in the minds of any party member, even the most simple of Communist faithful in and out of the Soviet Union.

Petkoff's sin was that he criticized the Soviets in a number of ways in two books: Chechoeslovaquia: el Socialismo como Problema (Czechoslovakia, the Problem of Socialism), 1969, and Socialismo para Venezuela? (Socialism for Venezuela?), 1970. In the first, he (like Roger Garaudy in France) criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and rejected the Soviet Union as a proper model for socialism in Venezuela, and in the second

he further criticized the repressive, dictatorial aspects of the Soviet Union as unworthy of emulation by the PCV, presenting his own original theory and program for socialist revolution in Venezuela, a theory departing radically from orthodox Soviet doctrine.

The danger that the virus of independent Communism will spread in Latin America as a variation of the same virus that thrives in Europe in the French, Italian, and Austrian parties, among others, apparently was one of the main reasons for the Soviet intervention in the PCV. Another compelling reason was that the PCV was moving too slowly to rid itself of the Petkoff faction. Judging by the PCV reaction to the Pravda attack, i.e. publishing pro- and anti-Soviet articles in their newspaper Tribuna Popular, the leadership seems to have decided to try to preserve some minimum of unity against the Soviet onslaught which is supported by the conservative, "rightist," pro-Soviet faction which is trying to oust Petkoff (see the Larrazabal article on the Pravda attack, attached). While Petkoff is criticized by the leadership for breaking Party discipline, it is in relatively mild, unthreatening terms. The fact is that Petkoff has substantial support not only in leadership circles (see attached articles by Laird and Adam) but in the relatively large youth organization, and his expulsion would be costly to party strength. The precarious balance of power apparently is held by a moderate, conciliatory, "centrist" faction (see the Gustavo Machado article attached) which at least temporarily is resisting rightist efforts to oust Petkoff. (Petkoff refrained from attacking the Soviets in his contribution to the newspaper discussion.)

It will be interesting to see whether the Soviet politicking in internal PCV affairs succeeds in eliminating Petkoff, regardless of the cost to the PCV, or whether they will have to resort to the ultimate weapon: withdrawal of financial support. The PCV 4th Congress which has been scheduled to convene early in December may tell the story.

CPSU Manipulation of the PCE

Another recent target of Moscow's classic strategy of attempting to split any Communist party which attacks its policies is the small, illegal Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Espanol -- PCE). For two years the PCE has ceaselessly condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August 1970, when most European parties were submissively accepting "normalization" in Czechoslovakia, the PCE described ousted Czech leader Alexander Dubcek as the "best hope" of socialism! In September Enrique Lister, renowned fighter of the Spanish Civil War, stormed out of the PCE Central Committee with four comrades and set up a rival group which began publishing a Mundo Obrero to rival the PCE's main weekly organ of the same name. The new publication's orthodox, pro-Soviet line and harsh

attacks against PCE leadership leave little doubt about the source of their funds. The move is part of a Soviet operation to destroy the independent current Party by replacing it with an orthodox obedient one.

The clandestine PCE, nearly 200,000 strong according to Secretary General Santiago Carrillo's highly inflated claims, (or about 5,000 according to more objective observers) includes, says Carrillo, about 5,000 exiles living in the Soviet Union and another 1,000 in Paris. Among those living in the USSR is Dolores Ibarruri, the noted "La Pasionaria" of the Spanish Civil War, who led a strong protest in 1969 against the Kremlin's attempt to split the PCE when it supported the divisive efforts of two Central Committee members based in Russia, Augustin Gomez and Eduardo Garcia. The dominant Carrillo-Ibarruri faction expelled them from the PCE in December 1969. Carrillo, who roams Europe and is especially close to the independent-minded Rumanian and Yugoslavian leaders, publishes Mundo Obrero in France, Nuestra Bandera in Belgium, and operates clandestine "Radio Espana Independiente (REI) from Rumania.

Although they are long time critics of the Czech affair, with an eye, no doubt, to their potential constituency in Spain, the PCE complaints about the Kremlin cover an even wider range. They have castigated the Soviet Union for dealing with Franco, who forced the Party out of Spain. They have urged China and the Soviet Union to negotiate their differences instead of fighting. They criticize the ideological stagnation of Communism, its failure to understand economic and social realities in the advanced countries of Europe and have even questioned whether Moscow should be the real center of Communism! As recently as September this year, they published a strong denunciation of Stalinism.

Obviously, such heresies could not go unpunished. But the Soviet Union faced a dilemma over the best means of silencing this Spanish criticism and of reducing its effect on other European parties. Cutting off all support to the Party they had harbored in the USSR since the Spanish Civil War would unquestionably cripple the PCE and its publications but the Soviets apparently judged that such a tactic would be too crude and obviously a case of blackmail. By backing PCE Central Committee member Lister (who himself had originally condemned the Czech invasion) in his challenge to the PCE leadership and then financing his Party faction, the Soviets found a somewhat subtler weapon against their "revisionist" critics. If, as expected, Gomez and Garcia can swing some of the exiles now in the USSR to support of Lister faction, the Carrillo-Ibarruri group could be noticeably weakened. Whether it can be silenced is more doubtful; the reaction from the European CP's may be crucial. (Articles from Le Monde and the Carrillo-edited Mundo Obrero concerning some of these matters are attached.)

LE MONDE, Paris
23 October 1970

[Charles Vanhecke article: "A New Garaudy?"]

[Text] The Venezuelan Communist Party has its Garaudy. His name is Theodore Petkoff, 38 years old, with an economics degree, former party deputy, and till last year a member of its political bureau. Since 1969 he has practically been a dissident, first by publishing a book on the Czechoslovak affair, then a few weeks ago by making a virulent attack on the ideas and the methods of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is an orthodox of the orthodox, since it abandoned the principles of armed struggle for obtaining power in 1964.

Petkoff, who is still a Central Committee member, has his supporters within the Venezuelan Communist Party and his brushes with the "old guard"--who remain in the majority--give rise to much stirring among the militants. And so the appeals for unity are increasing in the official party organ TRIBUNA POPULAR as the time for the fourth congress, which is scheduled for the first two weeks of December, approaches. General Secretary Jesus Faria has just denounced the danger of a "split." TRIBUNA POPULAR (1 through 7 October) itself uses against the "renegade" certain of the arguments which Etienne Fajon (who is quoted by name) used against the author of the "Great Turning Point of Socialism."

In his book "Socialism for Venezuela?" Theodore Petkoff takes up some of the ideas dear to Garaudy and hurls some particularly venomous darts against the Venezuelan Communist Party apparatus. The attack appeared so serious to the Venezuelan Communist Party Political Bureau that it took care in a communique on 11 August to defend itself against accusations of "corruption" and "vassaldom."

The comparison with Garaudy is all the more justified since, like the French philosopher, Petkoff began to question himself about the conditions for a socialist revival in his country after analyzing the "Prague Spring." His first book "Czechoslovakia, the Problem of Socialism" was in fact entirely devoted to the great crisis of 1968. It stated that the crisis had destroyed certain of the myths cherished by communists throughout the world and denounced the attitude of the Soviets, who, according to him, were solely responsible for certain contradictions, certain negative and "jingoist" positions which had arisen in Czechoslovakia under the Dubcek government.

"No, socialism was not then in peril in Czechoslovakia. It had, on the contrary, become stronger," he wrote. And after attacking the "monstrous bureaucracy" of the Soviet Union, which understood that the necessity for economic democratization involved a political democratization which was harmful to its maintenance in power, Teodoro Petkoff declared it necessary to reject the "Soviet model, which is a specific product of history."

Petkoff's two books were obviously condemned by the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several times the former Venezuelan deputy was invited to make a self-criticism, but he refused. He was expelled from the Political Bureau in 1969 and has been accused of "splitting" intentions following a recent trip to Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria where, it is alleged, he vainly sought support for an attempt to create a Venezuelan party independent of Moscow.

At one time Petkoff appeared to be able to count on the neutrality of the former General Secretary Marquez, with whom he had been imprisoned for more than 2 years under the "democratic" governments of Romolo Betancourt and Raul Leoni for having been one of the supporters, within the Venezuelan Communist Party, of the "insurreccional" line. He was imprisoned three times under the Perez Jimenez dictatorship during the fifties. But Marquez signed the condemnation of Petkoff's theses on 11 August. Having eliminated him from the leadership of the regional committee of the State of Miranda, the Venezuelan communist leaders are trying to think up a "legal way" of excluding him from the Venezuelan Communist Party at next December's congress.

UN NOUVEAU GARAUDY ?

Le P.C. vénézuélien a son Garaudy. Il s'appelle Teodoro Petkoff. Il a trente-huit ans, il est licencié en sciences économiques, ancien député de son parti, et il était membre, jusqu'à l'an dernier, du bureau politique. Depuis 1969, il est pratiquement entré en dissidence, d'abord en publiant un livre sur l'affaire tchécoslovaque, puis, voilà quelques semaines, une attaque virulente contre les conceptions et les méthodes du parti communiste vénézuélien — orthodoxe parmi les orthodoxes, depuis qu'il a abandonné en 1964 les principes de la lutte armée pour conquérir le pouvoir.

M. Petkoff, qui est encore membre du comité central, a ses partisans au sein du P.C.V., et ses démêlés avec la « vieille garde » — qui reste majoritaire — suscitent beaucoup de remous chez les militants. Aussi les appels à l'unité se multiplient-ils dans l'organe officiel du parti, *Tribuna popular*, à l'approche du quatrième congrès, qui doit se tenir dans la première quinzaine de décembre. Le secrétaire général, M. Jesus Faria, vient de dénoncer la menace « scissionniste ». C'est d'ailleurs *Tribuna popular* (daté du 1^{er} au 7 octobre) qui utilise, contre le « renégat », certains des arguments que M. Etienne Fajon, cité nommément, employait contre l'auteur du *Grand Tournant du socialisme*.

Dans son dernier livre, intitulé *Socialisme pour la Venezuela ?*, M. Teodoro Petkoff reprend quelques idées chères à M. Garaudy et lance des flèches particulièrement empoisonnées contre l'appareil du P.C.V. Après s'être prononcé pour la diversité des opinions au sein du parti, il accuse littéralement le P.C.V. de « sclérose », de « corruption », de « pauvreté idéologique ». Puis il pose quelques questions, souvent les mêmes, sous des latitudes différentes : le P.C. vénézuélien a-t-il eu la « volonté de conquérir le pouvoir », et en a-t-il réuni les conditions ? Est-il un parti indépendant et national ou un parti « aliéné » et « vassal » ? « Un parti qui abdique son indépendance critique sur le plan international est-il en mesure de promouvoir une véritable politique révolutionnaire ? »

L'attaque a paru si sérieuse au bureau politique du P.C.V. que, le 11 août dernier, il prenait le soin, dans un communiqué, de se défendre contre les accusations de « corruption » et de « vassalité ». Après avoir rejeté le pluralisme des opinions, contraire aux « principes léninistes » du centralisme démocratique, il affirmait en substance : « Parler de « volonté de pouvoir », c'est se référer à des « facteurs subjectifs », lesquels, sans analyse objective de la situation, conduisent à l'aventure. » Le P.C.V. réaffirmait ensuite sa fidélité à l'internationalisme prolétarien

et dénonçait, dans la démarche de M. Teodoro Petkoff, une tentative de fonder un nouveau parti communiste.

La comparaison avec M. Garaudy est d'autant plus justifiée que M. Petkoff, comme le philosophe français, a commencé à s'interroger sur les conditions d'un renouveau socialiste dans son pays après avoir analysé le « printemps de Prague ». Son premier livre : *Tchécoslovaquie, le problème du socialisme*, était en effet tout entier consacré à la grande crise de 1968. Il affirmait que cette crise avait détruit certains mythes respectés par les communistes du monde entier, et dénonçait l'attitude des Soviétiques, seuls responsables, selon lui, de certaines contradictions, de certaines positions négatives et « patriotardes » qui avaient pu surgir en Tchécoslovaquie sous le gouvernement de M. Dubcek.

« Non, le socialisme n'était pas alors en péril en Tchécoslovaquie, il s'était renforcé au contraire », écrivait-il. Et, après avoir attaqué la « bureaucratie monstrueuse » de l'Union soviétique, qui avait bien compris que les nécessités de la démocratisation économique entraînaient une démocratisation politique néfaste à son maintien au pouvoir, M. Teodoro Petkoff proclamait la nécessité de renoncer au « modèle soviétique, produit spécifique de l'histoire ».

Les deux livres de M. Petkoff ont été évidemment condamnés par le P.C.V. A plusieurs reprises l'ancien député vénézuélien a été invité à faire son autocritique, ce qu'il a refusé. Exclu du bureau politique en 1969, il s'est vu reprocher des intentions scissionnistes à la suite d'un récent voyage en Italie, en Roumanie, en Yougoslavie et en Bulgarie, où il aurait cherché — en vain — des appuis pour tenter de créer un parti vénézuélien indépendant de Moscou...

Dans un premier temps, M. Petkoff semblait pouvoir compter sur la neutralité de l'ancien secrétaire général du parti, M. Pompeyo Marquez, avec qui il fut emprisonné pendant plus de deux ans sous les gouvernements « démocratiques » de MM. Romulo Betancourt et Raoul Leoni, pour avoir été l'un des partisans, au sein du P.C.V., de la ligne « insurrectionnelle ». Il avait été emprisonné à trois reprises sous la dictature de M. Perez Jimenez, dans les années cinquante. Mais M. Marquez a signé la condamnation des thèses de M. Petkoff le 11 août dernier. Et les dirigeants communistes vénézuéliens, après avoir essayé de l'éliminer de la direction du comité régional de l'Etat de Miranda, sont en train d'imaginer une « façon légale » de l'exclure du P.C.V. au congrès de décembre prochain.

CHARLES VANHECKE.

Four articles from Tribuna Popular, (organ of the Venezuelan Communist Party), 5-11 November 1970, Caracas.

1. Alexis Adam, "An Article by Pravda."

Pravda, the CPSU Central Committee newspaper, carried an article signed by A. Mosinev in reply to the arguments set forth by comrade Teodoro Petkoff, a member of our party's Central Committee.

Because of the ideological discussion we are advancing, it would have been of the utmost desirability and usefulness for us to have found solid arguments which could have been opposed with scientific seriousness to those submitted by comrade Petkoff as a magnificent contribution to the progress of the debate and to the task of coming closer to the truth on such vital topics as those affecting the international communist movement, the building of socialism, and the development of Soviet society. However, we are forced to deplore the absence of such critical elements in the article discussed.

In his reply to Teodoro, comrade Mosinev displays the same style to which we have been accustomed by those who inside the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) seek to replace valid discussion and a genuine and broadly democratic confrontation of opinions with a war of "slogans" and attributions based upon irreversible and preconceived positions, and opposed to any critical references. However, despite the style -- which our Central Committee considers to be futile and harmful, we would have (to recognize the right of the author of the article to participate in a public discussion, all the more since it concerns someone who as a Soviet citizen and a CPSU member believes that he has the right to oppose what he considers to be erroneous appraisals, unfounded assertions, or simply attacks upon his country or the CPSU.

In establishing a public discussion, the Communist Party of Venezuela opened the doors to the views of those who inside and outside our country are interested in participating in the theoretic explanation of the cardinal problems of the revolution. Such contributions are welcome.

That is one thing. It is quite another thing when opinions openly slip onto the ground of internal organizational problems, particularly at a time when our Communist Party is making unusual efforts to surmount a situation that is endangering its unity. I believe that reporter Mosinev is committing this great error.

It would also appear that his main efforts are not directed toward conducting a polemic with Petkoff, refuting his arguments, and defending the USSR, but rather toward making a statement which can be used within the framework of our internal strife as in fact it is being used.

It might be convenient to point to a deeply rooted feeling among the Venezuelan communists -- which was strengthened during the polemic with comrade Fidel Castro -- and that is the need for an independent party which has the sovereign right to make decisions and to draft its own policy. We are convinced that the autonomy of the party is an indispensable premise for the success of our historic tasks. A party whose action depends upon the opinions of others can look forward to anything except having national roots and being the interpreter and guide of its people.

The views set forth by Mosinev, and particularly the internal use to which they are being put, violate these feelings and convictions. That is why we consider it important to make this comment which merely seeks to protect our party's inalienable rights.

In conclusion, we would like to express our confidence that despite these accidents, the PCV will continue to assert its national character while it consolidates its internationalism; to strengthen its solidarity with revolutionary organizations in their struggle against imperialism and in their staunch defense of the socialism camp; and to develop -- unequivocally -- its ties of friendship and solidarity with the Soviet Union. Caracas, 27 October 1970.

* * * * *

2. German Lairet, "Letter from German Lairet."

Comrade Gustavo Machado, Director of Tribuna Popular:

Dear Gustavo, It was with surprise and displeasure that I read in the last issue of Tribuna Popular a reprint of an article originally published in the official newspaper of a fraternal party in which all kinds of charges are leveled against a member of our party's leadership, Comrade Teodoro Petkoff.

Without going into an analysis of the reasons behind the editing and publishing of such an article in the CPSU's official newspaper, and while recognizing the full right of the Soviet comrades to polemize in whatever tone they consider proper and to reply to whatever they consider to be attacks upon their policy, **I do find it unprecedented and censurable that the pages of Tribuna Popular, our Central Committee newspaper, should have been used to reprint the article which amounts to nothing more than an opportunistic use of the pages of our press for the current polemic that is being waged inside the PCV -- a polemic in which Teodoro is an important actor -- as well as an expression of the manifest intention of some comrades to employ such means to influence the results of the Fourth Congress, making illegal use of the authority of the CPSU and the respect it owes all Venezuelan communists.**

As a member of the Central Committee, I wish to express through this letter to the leadership my disapproval of the reprint, which also constitutes a violation of the rules approved by the Central Committee prohibiting the slander of the PCV leadership, and Teodoro Petkoff is still a member of that leadership.

Aware of the spirit of justice and equanimity you have sought to maintain during this difficult internal struggle, I take the liberty, through you, of making my displeasure known, which is also a way of expressing my solidarity with a comrade like Teodoro Petkoff whose path deserves respect, despite the differences that may exist with regard to his arguments and concerning whose revolutionary attitude I have no doubt whatsoever. With Revolutionary Greetings:

* * * * *

3. Radames Iarrazabal, "But, What Interference?"

The protests against the publication in Tribuna Popular of A. Mosinev's article which originally appeared in the glorious USSR newspaper Pravda come in three varieties. One variety does not reject, but rather excuses the socialist news media for defending themselves against the attacks made by Petkoff in two books of essays and in several newspaper articles over his signature. However, these same comrades find it unpardonable that a certain "group" participating in the discussion inside the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) should seek to profit and to derive benefit from the Soviet defense. It is a curious dialectic which attempts surreptitiously to disqualify the CPSU's position of principle and to reduce it to a pragmatic "group interest" and to a simple "factional interest".

To say that the CPSU is defending itself against implied attacks would be to equate the quality of the attacks and of the defense with "questionable" intent. This would mean that both could make errors of procedure or that the punishable error lay in Tribuna Popular's publication. But also there is an attempt to equate the fact that all "legitimate defense" presupposes, as is the case in bourgeois justice, a legitimate attack, at least until proven otherwise.

The CPSU is not only defending itself with that article, but it is belligerently refuting the slanders and anti-Soviet charges implied not so gratuitously -- in the last analysis "it" is paid for by the enemy's reception -- by Petkoff. What is more, and this is very important for anyone with a broad view of proletarian internationalism, it unmasks Petkoff's anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist stand.

But while recognizing recourse to "legitimate defense," albeit formally, these comrades would violently oppose its use as an external bulwark in the internal "struggle of groups." Strangely, those who are basically disgusted by "the interference" now call to the same Soviets in order to advise them so that they will not allow themselves to be used. What can we call this? Naivete? Stupidity? Ignorance of internationalist practice?

Another variety of protest displays more sincere agitation than the others by what it calls the "crass Soviet interference in Venezuelan affairs," as if faced with a Russian tank at the doors of the "Cantaclaro Publishing House." Paragraphs of Mosinev's article which necessarily refer to the Fourth Congress and to the characteristics of the discussion are taken this way.

Another kind of protest upbraids with "national" fury things which, because they are known and recognized, form part of the routine, but which intentionally become subtle accusations of subjugation. I am referring to the arguments concerning the need to resolve our problems on our own, in our own way, without borrowing anything. No one questions this, least of all the CPSU.

These three varieties of protest against Tribuna Popular's publication of the article are bound by the common denominator of a common outcry against an alleged "Russian interference" in our affairs. They all speculate much and little, directly and indirectly, on the chauvinistic burden which is systematically reinforced by the news media of the pro-imperialist and bourgeois enemy.

But, what interference?

Let us get down to essentials. Did those same persons who are protesting today publicly protest their indignation not only at Petkoff's interference and slanders, but also at his belligerent stand concerning the events in Czechoslovakia that in the last analysis were provoked by imperialism which made use of rightwing opportunists and other anti-socialist groups as "useful fools"?

Did those who are protesting today do so publicly when this same Petkoff repeated in his second book of essays his slanders against the USSR and the CPSU and distorted with revisionist audacity, the cardinal problems of Marxism-Leninism, of the party, of the working class, and of the revolution? Not only they did not protest, but they were opposed to the resolutions issued by the national leadership in this matter.

However, it is obvious that Mosinev's article does not constitute an attempt to deprive anyone of his right to criticize or to dissent, but it does attempt to let everyone see what the exercise of the forbidden right to slander and distortion can lead. Pravda did not react to the criticism, but to the slander and to the revisionist efforts. And here there can be no valid protests against "interference." Have those who today are protesting ideological and political interference clearly raised their voice against the real interference in our affairs by the bourgeois and imperialist press, radio, and television? Obviously there is the interference which provokes the sacred outburst of "national feeling": that which comes from the socialist world; and the interference which, on the contrary, they claim lends "national distinction" and is even anxiously sought: that which comes from the propaganda machines of the ruling classes.

Moreover, if we assume the right and the duty of the Soviet comrades to self-defense and to discussion, and if this defense coincides fully with the viewpoints of the PCV Central Committee, why then be alarmed and raise one's voice to demand punishment for the reprinting of the Pravda article on the pages of Tribuna Popular? The contrary would be alarming.

As things stand at present, our Fourth Congress will have to be an unusually important event in this difficult mission of continuing to forge a Leninist party with the irrevocable and sustained determination to assume revolutionary power at the head of the workers. Circumstances have increased the fraternal parties' anticipation of this event, and they will be represented either by delegations or by messages. And do not call them "interference"! To this effect, any article by Lenin's party in connection with our Congress should not only command our greatest attention, but

we should consider it a duty and a right coming from the pages most concerned with proletarian internationalism.

* * * * *

4. Gustavo Machado, "Our Opinion."

The Political Bureau having studied the commotion caused by the insertion of the TASS wire summing up A. Mosinev's article, today we publish the full text of the article and the critical views of Aléxis Adam and German Lairé. I must immediately announce that the responsibility for the initial report that was sent by the Soviet news agency appearing in No. 73 of Tribuna Popular was wholly and personally mine.

Neither the summarized wire version nor the complete text represents the slightest interference in the internal affairs of the PCV Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). There is no interference, firstly because A. Mosinev is resorting to legitimate defense against Teodoro Petkoff's repeated attacks in books, statements, and writings upon the socialist camp, particularly upon the Soviet Union; and secondly, no intervention is involved because the Soviet writer limits his observations to material written and edited by Venezuelan communists. He is informing public opinion in his country on what the Venezuelan Communist Party leadership is thinking and resolving. Do the Soviet comrades not have the right to keep abreast of the situation in our Party?

It is necessary to reject any alleged similarity between Pravda's article and the difficulties that have arisen in the recent past with the Cuban communists. Even if any intent to advise or to sway one way or the other could be detected, and this is not the case, a direct and aggressive interference in favor of a member of a faction for the purpose of dividing the PCV against its national leadership would be quite another thing.

In the issue following the one in which the TASS wire appeared, we are publishing an article by Pompeyo Marquez setting forth with reasonable prudence the doctrine of proletarian internationalism which has been the norm guiding the fraternal relations between the PCV and the CPSU in the course of the years with no harm to our sovereignty and with a broad and steady sense of brotherhood on the part of our Soviet comrades. And if we do not publish any article on this topic, it is because there is no room in Tribuna Popular for attacks and slanders against the socialist world and our Soviet comrades.

Gustavo Machado

UN ARTICULO DE "PRAVDA"

ALEXIS ADAM

A manera de respuesta a las tesis del camarada Teodoro Petkoff, miembro del Comité Central de nuestro Partido, apareció en "Pravda", órgano del CC del PCUS, un artículo bajo la firma de A. Mosinev.

Para nosotros hubiera sido de sumo interés y utilidad, en razón de la discusión ideológica que adelantamos, encontrar sólidos argumentos que pudieran ser contrapuestos con seriedad científica, a los esgrimidos por el camarada Petkoff como un magnífico aporte a la elevación del debate y a la tarea de aproximarse a la verdad en tan vitales temas como los concernientes al movimiento comunista internacional, a la construcción del socialismo y al desarrollo de la sociedad soviética. Tenemos que lamentar, sin embargo, la ausencia de tales elementos críticos en el comentado escrito.

El camarada Mosinev, en su respuesta a Teodoro, hace gala del mismo estilo a que nos tienen acostumbrados quienes en el seno del PCV quieren sustituir la discusión valde, la real confrontación de opiniones ampliamente democrática, con la guerra de "slogans" y calificativos inspirada en posiciones irreversibles y pretomadas, refractarias a toda referencia crítica. Pero aún así, pese a tal estilo —considerado estéril y dañino por nuestro CC— tendríamos que reconocer el derecho que le asiste al autor del

Esto es una cosa. Muy distinto es cuando las opiniones se deslizan abiertamente al terreno de los problemas organizativos internos, máxime en momentos que nuestro PC realiza inusitados esfuerzos a fin de superar una situación cargada de peligros para su unidad. Creo que el periodista, Mosinev comete este gran error.

Pareciera incluso, que sus principales esfuerzos no están dirigidos a sostener la polémica con Petkoff, a rebatir sus tesis, a defender a la URSS, sino a brindar una referencia que pueda ser utilizada en los marcos de nuestra lucha interna, como en efecto lo es.

Oportuna es la ocasión para destacar un sentimiento profundamente arraigado entre los comunistas venezolanos —fortalecido durante la polémica con el camarada Fidel Castro— cual es la necesidad de un partido independiente, soberano en la

toma de decisiones y en la elaboración de su política. Estamos convencidos de que la autonomía del Partido es una premisa indispensable para alcanzar éxito en nuestras tareas históricas. Un Partido que haga depender su acción de las opiniones de otro, podrá aspirar a cualquier cosa menos a tener raigambre nacional y a ser intérprete y guía de su pueblo.

Las opiniones emitidas por Mosinev, y sobre todo la utiliza-

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas
5 November 1970

CPYRGHT

Carta de Germán Lairé

Camarada
GUSTAVO MACHADO
Director de "Tribuna Popular".

Apreciado Gustavo:
Con sorpresa y desagrado lei en el último número de "TP" la reproducción de un artículo publicado en el órgano oficial de un partido hermano en el cual se hacen toda clase de imputaciones contra un miembro de la dirección de nuestro Partido, el camarada Teodoro Petkoff.

Sin entrar a analizar las causas que motivan la redacción y publicación de tal artículo en el diario oficial del PCUS y reconociendo todo el derecho que puedan tener los camaradas soviéticos para polemizar en el tono que consideren conveniente y responder a lo que consideran ataques a su política, me resulta sí inaudito y censurable que las páginas de "TP", órgano del Comité Central, se empleen para reproducir tal artículo lo cual no es más que un uso ventajista de las páginas de nuestra prensa para la actual polémica que hoy se libra en el seno del PCV —polémica en la cual Teodoro es actor importante— y expresión de la intención manifiesta que tienen algunos camaradas de echar mano de tales recursos para influir en los resultados del IV Congreso, empleando en forma ilegítima la autoridad que tiene el PCUS y el respeto que nos merece a todos los comunistas verezolanos.

Como miembro del Comité Central quiero con esta carta a la Dirección dejar expresa constancia de mi desacuerdo con tal reproducción, la cual además es violatoria de las normas aprobadas por el CC que prohíbe denigrar de la dirección del PCV y Teodoro Petkoff es hasta el presente miembro de esa dirección. Conocedor del espíritu de justicia y de la ecuanimidad que has tratado de mantener durante esta ardorosa lucha interna me permito por tu intermedio hacer público mi desacuerdo que es también una manera de ex-

presar mi solidaridad con un camarada como Teodoro Petkoff cuya trayectoria merece respeto, a pesar de las divergencias que se puedan tener alrededor de las tesis que sostiene, y sobre el cual no me cabe duda alguna en cuanto a su condición de revolucionario.

Con saludos comunistas:

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas
5 November 1970

CPYRGHT

Pero, ¿Cuál Intromisión?

RADAMES
LARRAZABAL

De tres variantes son las protestas dirigidas contra la publicación en "Tribuna Popular", del artículo de A. Mosinev originalmente aparecido en el glorioso diario "PRAVDA" de la URSS.

Una de ellas no rechaza, sino que por el contrario perdona, que los medios de comunicación socialistas se defiendan de los ataques que Petkoff ha producido a través de dos libros de ensayos y varios sueltos de prensa calzados con su firma. Pero lo que sería imperdonable, según estos mismos camaradas, es que determinada "corriente" de la discusión que cursa en el PCV intente en forma ventajista utilizar en su beneficio la defensa soviética. Curiosa dialéctica por medio de la cual se busca introducir subrepticamente la descalificación de la posición de principios del PCUS y reducir la a un p r a c m á t i c o "interés de corrientes", a un simple "interés de fracción".

Decir que el PCUS se defiende de ataques inferidos, sería igualar con intención "cuestionadora"

la calidad de los ataques y las defensas. De ese modo resultaría que ambos pudieran incurrir en errores de procedimiento o que el error castigable estuvo en la publicación de "Tribuna Popular". Pero también se pretende igualar, por aquello de que toda "legítima defensa" supone, como en la justicia burguesa, un legítimo ataque, por lo menos hasta que no se demuestre lo contrario.

El PCUS, a través de ese artículo, está, no defendiéndose pura y simplemente, sino rechazando beligerantemente las calumnias y posturas antisoviéticas inferidas no de modo tan gratuito —porque al fin y al cabo "ese" se cobra en la receptividad que demuestra el enemigo— por Petkoff. Pero además, y esto es muy importante para quien tenga un criterio amplio acerca del internacionalismo proletario, desenmascara las posiciones anti-leninistas y anti-marxistas de Petkoff.

Pero admitiendo el recurso de la "legítima defensa", aun cuando formalmente, estos camaradas dicen oponerse con todas sus fuerzas, a que se la utilice como base de apoyo externo en la interna "lucha de corrientes". De modo extraño, quienes en el fondo se hallan disgustados por "la intromisión", apelan ahora a los mismos soviéticos para orientarles en el sentido que no se dejen utilizar. ¿Cómo llamar eso? ¿Ingenuidad? ¿Necedad? Desconocimiento de la práctica internacionalista?

Otra de esas protestas se encrepa más sinceramente que las otras variantes, por lo que califica "burda intromisión soviética en los asuntos venezolanos", algo así como la aparición de un tanque ruso a las puertas del edificio "Cantaclaro". Párrafos del artículo de Mosinev, donde alude obligatoriamente el IV Congreso y las características de la discusión, son tomadas de esa manera.

Otra de esas protestas es la

que enrostra con furia "nacional" cosas que por sabidas y admitidas, forman parte de la rutina, pero que intencionadas de ese modo, se convierten en sutiles acusaciones de vasallaje. Me refiero a los argumentos acerca de la necesidad de resolver nuestras cuestiones con criterio propio, con cabeza propia y sin trasplantes, cosa que nadie pone en duda y menos el PCUS.

Estas tres clases de protestas ante la publicación de "Tribuna Popular", se hallan entrelazadas por el dominador común de la grito común contra una supuesta "ingerencia rusa en nuestros asuntos". Todas ellas especulan mucho y poco, directa e indirectamente, el fardo chovinista que, sistemáticamente es reforzado desde los medios de comunicación del enemigo pro-imperialista y burgués.

Pero, ¿cuál intromisión?

Vamos al grano. ¿Es que esos mismos que hoy protestan dieron constancia pública e indignada de su protesta, ya no sólo de la intromisión, ni de las calumnias, sino además, de la vergaeramente toma de posiciones de Petkoff en relación a los sucesos de Checoslovaquia, provocados, en última instancia, por el imperialismo que utilizó en calidad de "tontos útiles" a los oportunistas de derecha y demás corrientes anti-socialistas?

¿Es que esos mismos que hoy protestan lo hicieron y públicamente, cuando el mismo Petkoff reincide en su segundo libro de ensayos en la comisión de infamias contra la URSS, el PCUS y donde tergiversa con audacia de revisionista cuestiones cardinales del marxismo-leninismo. ¿El partido, de la clase obrera y la revolución? No sólo no protestaron sino que se mostraron contrarios a las resoluciones producidas por la dirección nacional en este sentido.

Sin embargo, está visto por el artículo de Mosinev, que no se traía de pisotearle nadie su derecho de criticar ni de disentir, pero sí de exponer a la vista de todo el mundo a donde puede conducir el ejercicio del negado derecho de calumniar y tergiversar. "PRAVDA" no ha reaccionado ante la crítica, sino ante la infamia y los intentos revisionistas. Y en este terreno no hay gritos contra "la intromisión" que valgan.

¿Es que esos mismos que hoy protestan contra la intromisión ideológica y política han elevado claramente su voz contra la verdadera intromisión en nuestros asuntos, de la prensa, la radio y la televisión burguesa e imperialista? Por lo visto, hay intromisiones que provocan el estallido sagrado de "sentimientos nacionales": aquellas que proceden del mundo socialista; e intromisiones que, por el contrario, halagan dan "brillo nacional" y hasta se solicitan afanosamente: las que proceden de los aparatos propagandísticos de las clases dominantes.

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas

5 November 1970

Por otra parte, si damos por supuesto el derecho y el deber de los camaradas soviéticos de defenderse y discutir y si esa defensa coincide plenamente con los puntos de vista del CC del PCV, ¿por qué entonces alarmarse y exagerar el tono solicitando sanciones, por la reproducción del artículo de "PRAVDA" en las páginas de "Tribuna Popular"? Lo alarmante sería lo contrario.

Tal como están las cosas, nuestro IV Congreso habrá de ser un jalón inusitadamente importante en esta ardorosa misión de seguir empeñados en la forja de un partido leninista con irrevocable y sostenida decisión de asumir el poder revolucionario a la cabeza de los trabaja-

dores. Las circunstancias han redoblado las expectativas que por este evento, se dan en los Partidos hermanos, a los cuales naturalmente veremos representados, bien por delegaciones o por mensajeros y que esto no se llame "intromisión"! En este sentido, cualquier publicación venida del Partido que forjó Lenin en relación a nuestro Congreso, no sólo nos debe estimular la más sana atención, sino que la creeríamos un deber y un derecho nacidos de las páginas más preocupadas del internacionalismo proletario.

NUESTRA OPINION

Pevia consideración en el Buró Político del revuelo causado por la inserción del telegrama de la Agencia Tass resumiendo el artículo de A. Mosinev, hoy publicamos el texto completo y opiniones críticas de Alexis Adam y Germán Lairret. Debo anunciar de inmediato que la responsabilidad de que la información inicial transmitida por la agencia soviética apareciera en el N° 73 de "Tribuna Popular", me corresponde íntegra y personalmente.

Ni en la versión telegráfica resumida, ni en el texto completo existe la más leve intromisión en los asuntos internos del PCV. No hay ingerencia, primero, porque A. Mosinev, acude a un recurso de legítima defensa ante la reiterada agresión, en libros, declaraciones y escritos, de Teodoro Petkoff contra el campo socialista y en particular contra la Unión Soviética; y, en segundo término, no se produce intervención porque el articulista soviético circunscribe sus observaciones a materiales elaborados y editados por los comunistas venezolanos. Es el caso de informar a la opinión pública de su país de lo que piensa y resuelve la Dirección del Partido Comunista de Venezuela. ¿No tienen derecho los camaradas soviéticos de mantenerse enterados de la situación que vive nuestro Partido?

Es necesario rechazar cualquier pretendida similitud entre el trabajo de "Pravda" y las dificultades surgidas en el reciente pasado con los comunistas cubanos. Incluso, en el supuesto negado que se percibiera la intención de aconsejar u orientar en uno u otro sentido, sería totalmente distinto de la ingerencia directa y agresiva practicada en favor de un fraccionalista, con propósitos de dividir el PCV en contra de su Dirección Nacional.

En la edición siguiente en la que apareciera el telegrama de Tass, publicamos un artículo de Pompeyo Márquez donde fija con prudencia razonable la doctrina del internacionalismo proletario que ha sido la norma que ha regido las relaciones fraternales entre el PCV y PCUS durante los años transcurridos, sin sombras para la soberanía nuestra y con amplia y consecuente fraternidad por parte de los camaradas soviéticos. Y si no publicamos algún artículo sobre este tema, es porque en "TP" no caben agresiones y calumnias contra el mundo socialista y los camaradas soviéticos.

GUSTAVO MACHADO

2 November 1970

INADMISIBLE INTERVENCION RUSA EN PROBLEMAS DEL PCV

- Para salvar la unidad del PCV Pompeyo Márquez estaría dispuesto a desoír las órdenes de Moscú.
- La corriente derechista de Eduardo Machado y García Ponce estaría aislada.
- La juventud aprieta filas en torno a Teodoro Petkoff que es calumniado por el diario PRAVDA.

UN artículo publicado en Pravda, el órgano oficial del Partido Comunista Soviético, en el que se analiza la situación del Partido Comunista venezolano (que se prepara para realizar su IV Congreso en el próximo mes de diciembre), ha dado un violento vuelco a la discusión que se venía manteniendo en ese partido en relación a las ideas de Teodoro Petkoff, expresadas en sus dos últimos libros, y ha producido una polarización de las opiniones, que viene a agudizar la crisis por la cual atraviesa en los momentos el PCV.

La publicación del cable soviético, debidamente corregido e intencionado, en Tribuna Popular, órgano oficial del PC venezolano, parece indicar que un sector de ese partido, el más atrasado y cuestionado, está dispuesto a utilizar la posición oficial de los soviéticos para respaldar sus posiciones derechistas e indefendibles y para atacar a Teodoro Petkoff, quien desde "CHECOSLOVAQUIA: el socialismo como problema" y "Socialismo para Venezuela?" ha hecho serenos análisis críticos de la dinámica de los pulses socialistas y de algunos aspectos de la política del Partido Comunista de Venezuela.

El cable —llegado a través de la agencia Tass— no es un trabajo de fondo, y se limita a emitir toda clase de epítetos sin fundamentos contra la persona de Petkoff. Desde las

épocas de Stalin y la discusión Chino-soviética no se habían producido ataques tan virulentos y pasionales como los que en esta oportunidad se esgrimen contra él; dice, por ejemplo, que el dirigente comunista "con un odio especial, que no disimula en absoluto, con evidente animadversión, habla de la Unión Soviética y adultera páfidamente el proceso de construcción del socialismo en la URSS", por otra parte dice que "Petkoff, después de pasarse a la posición de los enemigos del socialismo, tergiversa...etc, etc.". En otras partes lo llaman "renegado", "revisor del marxismo" y "negador de la misión histórica de la clase obrera y su papel de vanguardia en la lucha por el derrocamiento del capitalismo..."

Evidentemente el articulista del Pravda no estaba dispues-

to a entrar en mayores discusiones con los comunistas venezolanos que coinciden con Petkoff sino que su único objetivo era enunciar la posición oficial del PCUS y dictar una línea a sus pretendidos satélites.

Como una línea política ha sido acogida la posición de Pravda por los lectores derechistas del PCV, quienes al publicar el cable en su periódico se culdaron muy bien de intencionarlo debidamente y de suprimir "delicadamente" algunas frases contenidas en el cable de Tass, como, por ejemplo, la que se refiere a Petkoff y su grupo", acción que evidencia la desesperada pretensión de aislar al dirigente que los ha criticado.

Sin embargo, para amplios sectores del PCV el documento de los rusos constituye una intervención inadmisibles. Algunos veteranos dirigentes opinan que así como los rusos no intervinieron cuando el Partido Comunista Francés polemizó con Garaudy, o cuando apareció el grupo "El Manifiesto" en el Partido Italiano --y mucho menos pretendió dictarles líneas a seguir-- asimismo el Partido Soviético se debería abstener de inmiscuirse en los asuntos internos del PCV sobre todo en una situación tan compleja y crítica como la que reina en esta oportunidad. Muchos de estos líderes, que en algún momento mantuvieron posiciones contrarias a las de Petkoff, cierran filas hoy para protestar contra la intervención soviética esgrimiendo como argumento que su partido siempre ha tratado de mantener, sin olvidar el internacionalismo proletario, una total autonomía de otros partidos comunistas, y recuerdan, de paso, la posición esgrimida por la Dirección del PCV cuando Fidel proponía ciertas formas de lucha para nuestro país.

La utilización del artículo ruso por parte de la derecha del PCV evidencia su desesperación ante la inevitable derrota que le propinarán las posiciones más progresistas y revolucionarias en el próximo IV Congreso. En busca desesperada de argumentos para defender sus anacrónicas actitudes, la derecha, representada principalmente en Eduardo Machado y Guillermo García Ponce, convierte cada uno de sus gestos en un ridículo "pataleo de ahogado".

¿QUE BUSCAN LOS SOVIETICOS?

La discusión internacional en el campo del socialismo, las duras críticas que se le han hecho a la burocracia dirigentes (satelinistas) de la URSS y la pretensión de los rusos de que el suyo es el mejor y único modelo de socialismo ha conducido a los comunistas soviéticos a diseñar una política internacional que garantice el apoyo irrestricto e incondicional de otros Partidos Comunistas, tanto en la discusión como en sus difíciles posiciones políticas, frente al imperialismo y frente a otros países socialistas. Esto ha traído como consecuencia una intervención y un condicionamiento de los pequeños partidos de nuestros países. Condicionamiento en la mayoría de los casos ha producido consecuencias negativas y ha retrasado el proceso revolucionario en varios países del mundo y especialmente de América Latina.

En el caso que nos ocupa, la intervención soviética tiene como objetivo garantizar el mantenimiento del partido venezolano bajo su área de influencia política y evitar lo que, supuestamente, significaría una actitud crítica siste-

mática cuya incondicionalidad no puede ser garantizada en los actuales momentos.

Esta última posición estaría representada por Petkoff.

Así que los soviéticos prefieren trabajar con los "pájaros" que conocen. Su primer paso es dirigir su mensaje -- a través del Pravda-- a Pompeyo Márquez y a aquel núcleo que en la organización han permitido la discusión y el enfrentamiento aun cuando estén en desacuerdo con Petkoff. La intención es presionarlo para que cierre la discusión, llenen de epítetos a aquel dirigente, y mantengan su órbita en el sitio "adecuado".

Sin embargo, ni la posición intervencionista de los soviéticos, ni los "pataleos de ahogado" del oportunismo de derecha, según ha trascendido en los diversos niveles del PCV impedirán que la discusión continúe y que las posiciones revolucionarias del grupo de Teodoro Petkoff y la Juventud Comunista logren renovar las anacrónicas estructuras del PCV.

LE MONDE, Paris
4 November 1970

The "Revisions" of the Spanish Communist Party: 2 Years of Crisis

Charles Vanhecke interview with Santiago Carrillo

For almost 2 months there have been two Spanish communist parties and two MUNDO OBRERO's, the Spanish Communist Party's central organ (see LE MONDE of 23 October). This is certainly not the first time that the Spanish communist have split. There was the "Chinese" split in 1964 and the 1967 secession of the Catalan communists, who were opposed to the national party's peaceful policy and favored revolutionary methods. They then published another edition of the communist paper.

This time, however, the division is important. Not only because it has been brought about by Enrique Lister, the celebrated communist fighter of the Spanish Civil War who won renown at the head of the 5th Regiment during the defense of Madrid in 1936 and at the head of the 11th Division in the battle of Guadalajara, but also because it has been clearly fomented by the Soviets, who, it may be reasonably believed, support the party led by Lister both morally and financially.

The affair originated in the repeated condemnations voiced by the Spanish Communist Party against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops. As early as 21 August 1968 Party Chairman Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria," protested at the Kremlin against the intervention. One month later the Spanish Communist Party Executive Committee plenum declared itself against the intervention by 66 votes (including that of Lister) against five. In 1969 the pro-Soviet trend was confined to the "factional" activities of Executive Committee member Eduardo Garcia and Central Committee member Agustin Gomez.

In December 1969, after those leaders' expulsion, Enrique Lister took over, first appearing as the champion of the expelled by means of letters addressed to Central Committee members and later demanding that the discussion be pursued at the party's eighth congress, which, he claimed, should be convened.

Two months earlier the Spanish Communist Party had protested against the accusations victimizing Dubcek and Smrkovsky in Czechoslovakia. It renewed its protests in July 1970, following Dubcek's expulsion from the CZCP ("No, We Cannot Remain Silent").

The positions having hardened on both sides, the final split occurred in September 1970. Lister led four Central Committee members in his wake. Celestino Uriarte, Jose Barzana, Luis Balaguer, and Jesus Saiz. In the first pro-Soviet issue of MUNDO OBRERO he violently denounced the doctrine, methods, and person of Spanish Communist Party General Secretary Santiago Carrillo.

Thus, the general secretary was accused of establishing after World War II "a tribunal which was to interrogate and judge all the comrades who had returned from Nazi concentration camps," openly suspecting them of "having become Kapos in order to save their lives." Furthermore, he was made "responsible for the death or imprisonment of comrades sent into Spain without necessary precautions." And finally, Lister asserted that Carrillo had plotted the death of Spanish Communists Comorera and Monzon by making them cross the border at points where they were expected by the Spanish police.

In the doctrinal sphere, he has been guilty, according to Lister, of "anti-Sovietism," "nationalism," and "anti-Marxism" (by advocating a national model of socialism). He is also accused of trying to change the Spanish Communist Party into a "bourgeois workers" party by integrating it into "Spanish neocapitalism" and making it fight for an "alleged democratization of the country."

At its recent session the Spanish Communist Party Central Committee called the personal attacks directed against Santiago Carrillo "calumnies." It again propounded its views, which can be briefly presented as follows: The Spanish Communist Party must "come to the surface." It must conquer "free zones" within Spain.

We have put questions concerning all these problems to Santiago Carrillo, 55 former typographer and journalist, Socialist Youth secretary at 19, Communist Party member since 1936, made Central Committee member in 1937, responsible for party organization in Spain since 1942, and general secretary in 1960, a post in which he succeeded Dolores Ibarurri, and since then has led a several hundred thousand-strong party, if its leaders are to be believed.

Santiago Carrillo Believes That the Communist Movement Should No Longer Be Centered on Moscow

In order to explain the split caused by Enrique Lister and his "group" Santiago Carrillo first said:

For a long time two concepts have been in opposition within the Spanish Communist Party. On the one hand there were followers of a new type of revolutionary party ready to form alliances with all new opposition forces, and in particular with Catholics, a party which no longer sees socialism as its own preserve but as a party belonging to all the people. And on the other hand, there were those who still view the Communist Party as as it was in the twenties, a narrow and sectarian party awaiting an extraordinary conjunction of circumstances which would enable it to gain power. These two concepts have become crystallized as a result of the Czechoslovak affair, which started a crisis within the international communist movement.

Question: Lister accuses you of being anti-Marxist because you advocate a model of "National communism"....

Answer: I am in favor of a model of socialism adapted to Spanish realities. This has nothing in common with so-called "national communism." Of course, I am a Marxist and Leninist. I believe, however, that the unanimity of communist parties which existed at the time of the Comintern is no longer possible. The international communist movement should recognize that all its supporting parties have the right to differ because of the existing differences in the development of their respective countries. As far as we are concerned the main point is to insure a unity of action against North American imperialism, a unity which does not exclude ideological differences, and not to achieve an ideological unity which is entirely superficial. That is why we are in favor of reestablishing relations with the Chinese Communists, just as we are in favor of an alliance with all anti-imperialist forces in Spain. It is a traditional reflex that makes some comrades believe that the communist movement must continue to be centered on Moscow.

Question: Does it mean that you are breaking with the Soviets?

Answer: Why? In June 1969 the CPSU approved, just as we did, the Moscow conference resolution stating that no differences among the communist parties, not even differences of a lasting nature, should prevent interparty collaboration. It also agreed with our policy in April when it signed a bilateral communique with Dolores Ibaruri and myself. The Spanish Communist Party premises in Moscow are still in our hands. Of the 1,000 Spaniards living in the Soviet Union about 900 support us, the others have been expelled for supporting Lister and his group.

Question: Nevertheless, it is at Soviet instigation and with Soviet support that Lister has founded a new Spanish Communist Party and publishes another MUNDO OBRERO?

Answer: By exploiting our differences with the CPSU Lister and his group are now trying to find in Spain the strength they do not have. You know, however, that a Russian proverb says: "A devoted bear is man's worst enemy." Those in our country who claim to be the Soviet Union's most ardent champions are its worst enemies.

Question: What attitude would you adopt should the Soviet Union establish diplomatic relations with General Franco?

Answer: Such a step would have been understandable 10 or 15 years ago but it would not be now, when Franco's regime is drawing to a close. We believe that diplomatic relations between the socialist countries and Franco are detrimental to those countries' prestige in the eyes of the popular masses.

Question: How will the Spanish Communist Party be able to resist Lister's offensive if he is supported by Moscow?

Answer: Our party, which is independent, has already solved this problem. The game has been won ever since the 111 members of our Central Committee, including the 90 members living in Spain, approved our policy, which is supported by all our organizations in Spain. Lister has only small groups of followers among emigres living in one or two socialist countries. In France he has only about 60 sympathizers among over 10,000 communist emigres.

Question: But you have expelled people who did not agree with you. Is this quite consistent with your views on ideological pluralism?

Answer: Lister and his group have excluded themselves by leaving the recent Central Committee session in September and founding a caricature of the Communist Party. Some comrades were left absolutely free to disapprove of our views on Czechoslovakia but when it came to action, unity was necessary. This having been said, it is true that a better balance should be struck between this necessity and the need for internal democracy. In September the Spanish Communist party adopted the principle that in the future any differences may be set forth in party papers. But we still are an illegal party. Democracy within the party is affected by the lack of democracy in the entire country. This also applies to the other Spanish opposition parties, although they do not lay claim to democratic centralism.

Question: Is your attitude to Czechoslovakia not a precaution taken with a view to acquiring the sympathy of the rest of the Spanish opposition?

Answer: Our national and international policies are indivisible. It is not a question of taking precautions but of the very essence of our policy. Otherwise, who will believe us when we talk about democratic socialism? [paragraph continues]

It does not follow that we are anti-Soviet. We do not underestimate the importance of the Soviet Union as an anti-imperialist power. But we are against the division of the world into two military blocs, against zones of influence, which, in the final analysis, serve only imperialism.

Question: Who are your allies in Spain?

Answer: All those who are in favor of the reestablishment of democratic liberties, even if their aims are contrary to ours and even if they have supported the Franco regime in the past.

Question: But can the working class accept an alliance which would include a section of the propertied classes?

Answer: You forget that the Spanish regime has retained fascist traits and that our first task is to abolish them. To achieve this we are prepared to come to terms with the devil himself: The people understand this very well. When the French Communists had to fight against nazism they did not hesitate to form an alliance with De Gaulle: Indeed, we need the bourgeois opposition and one has only to read the Spanish press to see that this opposition exists. Some capitalists no longer believe in the authoritarian system and increasingly numerous forces, even within the state apparatus and among the military, are prepared to conclude a pact for freedom.

Question: Are you relying on Juan Carlos to reestablish democracy?

Answer: No one in Spain relies on Juan Carlos. Most military men do not trust him. Franco has the authority of the man who won a war. Juan Carlos has won no war and has no authority. The monarchy has no great future in Spain. If Juan Carlos does ascend the throne it will only be provisionally.

Question: Is socialism not your first objective?

Answer: Spain cannot directly progress from the Franco regime to socialism. A halting place is necessary. But, of course, socialism is our objective, a democratic and independent socialist system in which the communist party may be the leading party but not the dominant one, a socialist system which will accept philosophical and political pluralism, the only possible socialist system in a developed country. We can very well imagine a socialist Spain with a Catholic at the head of the government and the Communist Party in the minority. Anyway, our history teaches us that this is possible. During the Civil War the Communist Party could have gained power--it had the best military units and it had armor and an air force--but it did not go along with those who wanted it to do so. There were only two communist ministers in the Republican Government, but even so our party played a leading role because its ideas carried weight.

Question: You said: "A Catholic head of state." What is your attitude toward the church?

Answer: The Spanish church has been the most integrationist and reactionary in the world. It has represented the main force of the Franco regime. However, it is now adopting attitudes which, for all their timidity, are estranging it from the regime. It is still assuming a great responsibility by failing to demand an amnesty which is necessary for liquidating the Civil War. But there are powerful progressive undercurrents within the church, undercurrents which may transform it into the most progressive church in the world. Recently, in Oviedo, a Jesuit who is a professor at the Gregorio school in Rome and two of whose brothers are members of the army and gendarmic general staffs, condemned private ownership and declared himself in favor of the struggle. [paragraph continues]

The church has voiced its views on the Granada shootings. Workers commissions often meet in monasteries. Communists and Catholics jointly work in these commissions-- both workers and peasant ones--and also in the national commission which was created at the beginning of 1970. It was with Catholic support that on 13 October 20,000 agricultural workers took part in a 24-hour strike in Seville Province. Without the policy of alliance with Catholics the opposition would not have been able to surface. You know, we have often said that Spanish socialism would advance with hammer and sickle in one hand and the cross in the other!

LES « RÉVISIONS » DU P. C. ESPAGNOL :

DEUX ANS DE CRISE

Depuis près de deux mois, il existe deux partis communistes espagnols, et deux « Mundo obrero » (Mundo ouvrier), l'organe central du P.C.E. (voir « Le Monde » du 23 octobre). Les communistes espagnols n'en sont sans doute pas à leur première scission : scission « chinoise » de 1954, sécession de 1967 des communistes catalans, qui, opposés à la ligne pacifiste du parti national et partisans de la voie insurrectionnelle, ont publié alors une autre édition du journal communiste.

Mais cette fois, la division est d'importance. Pas seulement parce qu'elle a été provoquée par M. Enrique Lister, célèbre combattant communiste de la guerre civile espagnole, qui s'illustra à la tête du 5^e régiment dans la défense de Madrid en 1936, et à la tête de la 11^e division dans la bataille de Guadalajara, mais aussi parce qu'elle a été visiblement fomentée par les Soviétiques, dont on peut raisonnablement penser qu'ils appuient, moralement et financièrement, le parti conduit par M. Lister.

L'affaire trouve son origine dans les condamnations répétées que le P.C.E. a formulées contre l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie par les troupes du pacte de Varsovie. Dès le 21 août 1968, Mme Dolores Ibarruri — la

« Pasionaria », — présidente du parti, protestait au Kremlin contre l'intervention. Un mois plus tard, le plénum du comité exécutif du parti communiste espagnol, par 66 voix (dont celle de M. Lister) contre 5, se prononçait contre l'intervention. En 1968, la tendance pro-soviétique fut réduite à l'activité « fractionnelle » de M. Eduardo Garcia, membre du comité exécutif, et de M. Agustín Gomez, membre du comité central.

Après l'exclusion de ces dirigeants, M. Enrique Lister, en décembre 1969, prit le relais, d'abord en se faisant le défenseur des exclus dans des lettres adressées aux membres du comité central, puis en demandant que le débat soit porté devant le huitième congrès du parti, dont il réclamait la convocation.

Deux mois plus tôt, le P.C.E. s'était élevé contre les accusations dont MM. Dubcek et Smrkovsky étaient victimes en Tchécoslovaquie. Il renouvela ses protestations en juillet dernier après l'exclusion de M. Dubcek du parti communiste tchécoslovaque. (« Non, nous ne pouvons plus nous taire. »)

Les positions étant durcies de part et d'autre, la rupture fut consommée en septembre dernier. M. Lister

entraîna à sa suite quatre membres du comité central : MM. Celestino Uriarte, José Barzana, Luis Balaguer et Jesus Saiz. Dans le premier numéro du « Mundo obrero » pro-soviétique, il dénigra violemment la doctrine, les méthodes et la personne même de M. Santiago Carrillo, secrétaire général du P.C.E.

C'est ainsi que le secrétaire général est accusé d'avoir formé après la fin de la guerre un « tribunal pour interroger et juger tous les camarades revenus des camps de concentration nazis », les soupçonnant ouvertement « d'être devenus des « kapos » pour sauver leur vie ». Il est également rendu « responsable de la mort ou de l'emprisonnement de camarades envoyés en Espagne sans les précautions nécessaires ». Enfin, M. Lister affirme que M. Carrillo a complété la mort des communistes espagnols Comorera et Monzon, en leur faisant franchir la frontière en des points où les attendait la police espagnole.

Sur le plan de la doctrine, M. Carrillo est, selon M. Lister, coupable d'« antisoviétisme », de « nationalisme », d'« antimarxisme » (en prônant un modèle national de socialisme). Il est également accusé de vou-

loir faire du parti communiste espagnol un parti « ouvrier bourgeois », en l'intégrant dans le « néo-capitalisme espagnol » et en le faisant combattre pour « une prétendue démocratisation du pays ».

Le comité central du P.C.E., lors de sa dernière réunion, a qualifié de « calomnies » les attaques personnelles lancées contre M. Santiago Carrillo. Et il s'est de nouveau expliqué sur ses positions, qu'on résumera de la façon suivante : le parti communiste espagnol doit « sortir à la surface » ; il doit conquérir en Espagne des « zones de liberté ».

Sur tous ces problèmes, nous avons interrogé M. Santiago Carrillo, cinquante-cinq ans, ancien typographe et ancien journaliste, secrétaire des Jeunesses socialistes à dix-neuf ans, membre du parti communiste depuis 1936, membre du comité central l'année suivante, chargé de l'organisation du parti en Espagne à partir de 1942, secrétaire général en 1960, poste auquel il succédait à Mme Dolores Ibarruri, qui préside depuis lors un parti fort de quelque cent mille adhérents, si l'on en croit ses responsables.

CHARLES VANHECKE.

M. Santiago Carrillo estime que le mouvement communiste ne peut plus avoir son centre à Moscou

Pour expliquer la scission opérée par M. Enrique Lister et son « groupe », M. Santiago Carrillo déclare d'abord :

« Deux conceptions se sont affrontées depuis longtemps au sein du parti communiste espagnol. Il y avait, d'un côté, les adeptes d'un parti révolutionnaire de type nouveau, ouvert aux alliances avec toutes les forces nouvelles d'opposition, notamment avec les catholiques, d'un parti qui ne conçoit plus le socialisme comme son seul fait, mais comme celui du peuple tout entier. De l'autre, ceux qui en étaient restés au P.C. des années 20, à l'idée d'un parti étroit et sectaire, qui attend un concours de circonstances extraordinaire pour prendre le pouvoir. Ces deux conceptions se sont cristallisées sur l'affaire tchécoslovaque, qui a déclenché une crise au sein du mouvement communiste international. »

QUESTION. — M. Lister vous accuse d'être antimarxiste parce que vous prônez un modèle de « communisme national »...

REPONSE. — Je suis partisan d'un modèle de socialisme adapté aux réalités de l'Espagne, ce qui n'a rien à voir avec ce qu'on appelle un « communisme national » ; et je suis, évidemment, marxiste et léniniste. Seulement, je pense que l'unanimité des partis communistes, comme elle existait au temps du Komintern, n'est plus possible. Le mouvement communiste international se doit de reconnaître à tous les partis adhérents le droit à la diversité, étant données les différences de développement de leurs pays respectifs. Pour nous, l'essentiel n'est pas une unité idéologique de façade, mais l'unité d'action contre l'impérialisme nord-américain, laquelle n'exclut pas les divergences idéologiques. C'est pourquoi nous sommes pour le rétablissement de rapports avec les communistes chinois, comme nous sommes pour l'alliance, en Espagne, avec toutes les forces anti-impérialistes. Là encore, c'est un réflexe traditionnel qui amène certains camarades à penser que le mouvement communiste doit continuer d'avoir son centre à Moscou.

Q. — Donc, c'est la rupture avec les Soviétiques ?

R. — Pourquoi ? Le parti communiste soviétique a approuvé, comme nous, en juin 1969, la résolution de la conférence de Moscou disant que les différences, même durables, entre les P.C. ne doivent pas faire obstacle à leur collaboration. Il a encore approuvé notre politique en avril, en signant, avec Dolores Ibarruri et moi-même, un communiqué bilatéral. Les locaux du parti communiste espagnol à Moscou sont toujours entre nos mains. Sur le millier d'Espagnols qui vivent en Union soviétique, neuf cents environ sont avec nous, les autres ont été exclus pour leur appui à Lister et son groupe.

Q. — C'est pourtant bien à l'instigation et avec l'appui des Soviétiques que M. Lister a fondé un nouveau P.C. espagnol et publié un autre « Mundo obrero » ?

R. — Lister et son groupe essaient, aujourd'hui, en exploitant nos différends avec le parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, de trouver en Espagne la force qu'ils n'ont pas. Mais, vous savez, il y a un proverbe russe qui dit : « Le pire ami de l'homme, c'est l'ours dévoué. » Les pires amis de l'Union soviétique, dans notre pays, ce sont ceux qui se présentent comme ses défenseurs les plus farouches.

Q. — Si l'Union soviétique établissait des relations diplomatiques avec le général Franco, quelle serait votre position ?

R. — C'est un pas qui aurait été compréhensible il y a dix ou quinze ans, mais qui ne l'est plus quand le franquisme touche à sa fin. Nous pensons que des relations diplomatiques entre des pays socialistes et Franco portent préjudice au prestige de ces pays aux yeux des masses populaires.

Q. — Si M. Lister a l'appui de Moscou, comment le parti communiste espagnol pourra-t-il résister à son offensive ?

R. — Notre parti, qui est indépendant, a déjà réglé ce problème. La partie est gagnée à partir du moment où les cent onze membres de notre comité central, dont quatre-vingt-dix vivent en Espagne, approuvent notre politique, laquelle est suivie par toutes nos organisations d'Espagne. Lister n'a que de petits groupes de partisans parmi les émigrés installés dans un ou deux pays socialistes. En France, il n'a qu'une soixantaine de sympathisants parmi plus de dix mille communistes émigrés.

Q. — Mais vous avez exclu ceux qui n'étaient pas d'accord avec vous. Est-ce bien conforme à vos positions sur le pluralisme idéologique ?

R. — Lister et son groupe se sont exclus d'eux-mêmes en quittant la dernière réunion du comité central, en septembre, et en fondant une caricature de parti communiste. Toute liberté a été laissée à certains camarades de désapprouver nos prises de position sur la Tchécoslovaquie, mais au moment d'agir l'unité était nécessaire. Cela dit, il est vrai qu'il faut trouver un meilleur équilibre entre cette nécessité-là et celle de la démocratie interne. En septembre, le parti communiste espagnol a adopté pour principe que les divergences pourraient être exposées à l'avenir dans ses journaux. Mais nous sommes encore un parti illégal. La démocratie dans le parti se ressent du manque de démocratie dans le pays tout entier. C'est vrai pour les autres partis d'opposition espagnols, bien qu'ils ne se réclament pas du centralisme démocratique.

Q. — Votre position sur la Tchécoslovaquie n'est-elle pas une précaution destinée à vous conci-

lier la sympathie du reste de l'opposition espagnole ?

R. — Notre politique nationale et internationale ne fait qu'un tout. Il ne s'agit pas d'une précaution, mais du fond même de cette politique. Sinon, qui pourrait nous croire quand nous parlons de socialisme démocratique ? Nous ne sommes pas pour autant antisoviétiques. Nous ne sous-estimons pas l'importance de l'Union soviétique comme puissance anti-impérialiste. Mais nous sommes contre la division du monde en deux blocs militaires, contre les zones d'influence, qui ne servent finalement que l'impérialisme.

Q. — Quels sont vos alliés en Espagne ?

R. — Tous ceux qui sont favorables au rétablissement des libertés démocratiques, même s'ils ont des buts opposés aux nôtres, même si, dans le passé, ils ont appuyé le régime franquiste.

Q. — Mais la classe ouvrière peut-elle accepter une alliance qui englobe une partie des classes possédantes ?

R. — Vous oubliez que le régime espagnol a gardé des formes fascistes, et que notre première tâche, c'est d'en finir avec elles. Pour y arriver, nous sommes prêts à pactiser avec le diable ! Cela, le peuple le comprend très bien. Quand les communistes français ont dû lutter contre le nazisme, ils se sont bien alliés à de Gaulle ! L'opposition bourgeoise nous est donc nécessaire, et il suffit de lire la presse espagnole pour constater qu'elle existe. Une partie du capitalisme ne croit plus au système autoritaire; des forces de plus en plus nombreuses, jusque dans l'appareil de l'Etat, jusque chez les militaires, sont prêtes à conclure un pacte pour la liberté.

Q. — Comptez-vous sur Juan Carlos pour rétablir la démocratie ?

R. — Personne, en Espagne, ne compte sur Juan Carlos. La plupart des militaires n'ont pas confiance en lui. Franco a l'autorité de celui qui a gagné une guerre. Juan Carlos n'en a gagné aucune, il n'a aucune autorité. La monarchie n'a pas beaucoup d'avenir en Espagne. Si Juan Carlos monte sur le trône, ce sera provisoire.

Q. — Le socialisme n'est pas votre premier objectif ?

R. — L'Espagne ne peut passer directement du franquisme au socialisme. Il faut une étape. Mais notre objectif est évidemment le socialisme — un socialisme démocratique et indépendant, où le parti communiste pourra être un parti dirigeant, mais non dominant. Un socialisme qui acceptera le pluralisme philosophique et politique, le seul possible dans un pays développé. Nous concevons très bien une Espagne socialiste où le chef du gouvernement serait catholique et où le P.C. serait minoritaire. C'est d'ailleurs la leçon même de notre histoire. Pendant la guerre civile, le parti communiste aurait pu prendre le pouvoir — il avait les meilleures unités militaires, il avait les blindés, l'aviation, — mais il n'a pas suivi ceux qui lui suggéraient de le faire. Le gouvernement républicain ne comptait que deux ministres communistes, mais notre parti avait tout de même un rôle dirigeant, car ses idées avaient de l'influence.

Q. — Vous avez dit : « Un chef de gouvernement catholique ». Quelle est votre position à l'égard de l'Eglise ?

R. — L'Eglise espagnole a été

la plus intégriste, la plus réactionnaire qui soit, elle a été la force principale du franquisme. Mais aujourd'hui, elle adopte des positions qui, aussi timides soient-elles, l'éloignent du régime. Elle prend encore une énorme responsabilité en ne demandant pas l'amnistie, ce qui est indispensable pour liquider la guerre civile. Mais elle a en son sein des courants progressistes puissants, qui peuvent en faire l'Eglise la plus progressiste du monde. Récemment, à Oviedo, un jésuite, professeur à l'Ecole grégorienne de Rome, qui a deux frères dans

l'état-major de l'armée et de la gendarmerie, a condamné la propriété privée et s'est prononcé pour la lutte des classes. L'Eglise a pris position sur les fusillades de Grenade. C'est dans des couvents que se réunissent souvent les commissions ouvrières. Communistes et catholiques travaillent ensemble dans ces commissions — ouvrières, paysannes — et dans la commission nationale créée au début de l'année. C'est avec l'appui des catholiques qu'une grève de vingt-quatre heures a été suivie, le 13 octobre dernier, par vingt mille ouvriers agricoles dans la province de Séville. Sans la politique d'unité avec les catholiques, l'opposition n'aurait pas pu faire surface. Vous savez, nous avons souvent dit que le socialisme espagnol marcherait avec la faucille et le marteau dans une main et la croix dans l'autre !

LE MONDE, Paris
4 November 1970

"The Study of Marxism Is Not Our Exclusive Patrimony"

"Monolithic," "dogmatic," "mechanical repetition of orders from above," "communist parties transformed into organs of execution": it is a veritable volley of blows that is struck. This is found in issue No 64 of the very official, although secret, "theoretical and political" magazine of the Spanish communist party, Nuestra Bandera (Our Flag). The author, E. Marti,* draws up the balance sheet of several decades of Stalinism. In the first paragraph, he states: "The facts are there: the communist movement today is not facing up to the complex problems that arise in the building of socialism and it shows great weaknesses in the ideological struggle, especially in the developed capitalist countries."

The author of the article tries to explain why the communist movement has experienced a long period of "theoretical stagnation." Referring to the polemics that opposed Lenin to Trotsky and Bukharin in 1921, he stresses that at the time the communists gave full publicity to the discussions that divided them. In addition, "in spite of the criticisms and sarcasm of Lenin, in spite of their minority position at the 10th congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union, those who were the subject of the polemics had a right to respect and to their maintenance in responsible party and Soviet state posts."**

"This does not mean to attribute exceptional merit to Lenin," Mr Marti continues. "Frankness, freedom of discussion and the respect of individuals were customary in the first years of the communist

*Assumed name of a Spanish communist party leader.

**Nevertheless, it was the 10th congress that prohibited party factions. (Editor's note).

international." And he adds that "without a lively and frank exchange of opinions a party could not maintain its vitality easily."

After having explained under what conditions Stalinism was forged and having listed the consequences (hierarchical power, sanctification of official texts and speeches, and so forth), the author arrives at the following observation. After the war, the bourgeois grew stronger and capitalism experienced an expansion that it had not itself foreseen. It used this to spread an ideology of "development" and "technocracy" based on the "death of ideologies," and this is a phenomenon that the communist movement has not known how to analyze, hindered as it has been by "its monolithic and authoritarian traditions."

The "French May"

Mr Marti states that a significant fact of the weaknesses in the communist movement was that the first symptoms of change in capitalist countries appeared "either spontaneously or under the stimulus of foreign advanced guard movements toward the communist movement. These included the black explosion and the struggle against the Vietnamese war in the United States; the university revolt in a number of countries; the entrance of a number of intellectual and professional sectors "into the anti-imperialist struggle." On this last point, the author underlines the importance of the "French May," which saw university professors, radio and television journalists and officials of urban departments "asking themselves about their social role."

Mr Marti attributes the broadening of the "revolutionary front" to the "ideological deficiencies of capitalism." But what is more important, he sees in this the necessity for a strengthening of theory in communist parties wishing to integrate the new disputers into the struggle for socialism. He clearly describes one of the conditions for this: "Revolutionary criticism must examine and explain the problems of the socialist camp without fear of what use the enemy may make of them, because we are in such a situation that adverse propaganda is much more harmful if we are not capable of giving rational and Marxist explanations for these phenomena." (Of the socialist camp).

Such an analysis has significance concerning the evolution of the Spanish communist party. It is drawing nearer to the latest resolution of the central committee of the Spanish communist party: "The study of Marxism is not the exclusive patrimony of communists."

LE MONDE, Paris
4 November 1970

CPYRGHT

« L'étude du marxisme n'est pas notre patrimoine exclusif »

« Monolithisme », « dogmatisme », « répétition mécanique de consignes venues d'en haut », « partis communistes transformés en organes d'exécution » : c'est une véritable volée de bois vert. On la trouve dans le n° 64 de la très officielle, encore que clandestine, revue « théorique et politique » du parti communiste espagnol, « Nuestra Bandera » (« Notre drapeau »). L'auteur, E. Martí (1), dresse le bilan de plusieurs décennies de stalinisme. Dès le premier paragraphe, il affirme : « Les faits sont là : le mouvement communiste n'affronte pas pleinement, aujourd'hui, les problèmes complexes surgis pendant la construction du socialisme, et il présente d'importantes faiblesses dans la lutte idéologique, surtout dans les pays capitalistes développés. »

L'auteur de l'article essaie d'expliquer pourquoi le mouvement communiste a connu une longue période de « stagnation théorique ». Se reportant aux polémiques qui, en 1921, opposaient Lénine à Trotski et Boukharine, il souligne qu'à l'époque les communistes donnaient toute publicité aux débats qui les divisaient. En outre, « malgré les critiques et sarcasmes de Lénine, malgré leur position minoritaire au sein du dixième Congrès du P.C.U.S., ceux qui étaient l'objet de la polémique avaient droit au respect et à leur maintien aux postes de responsabilité du parti et de l'Etat soviétiques » (2).

« Il ne s'agit pas d'attribuer à Lénine des mérites exceptionnels, poursuit M. Martí, la

franchise, la liberté de discussion, le respect des personnes étaient monnaie courante dans les premières années de l'Internationale communiste. » Et d'ajouter que « sans un échange vif et franc d'opinions un parti peut difficilement garder sa vitalité ».

Après avoir expliqué dans quelles conditions s'était forgé le stalinisme, et en avoir énuméré les conséquences (pouvoir des hiérarques, sacralisation des textes et des discours officiels, etc.), l'auteur en arrive à cette constatation : après la guerre, la bourgeoisie s'est renforcée ; le capitalisme a connu une expansion que lui-même n'avait pas prévue ; il s'en est servi pour répandre une idéologie du « développement » et de la « technocratie » fondée sur la « mort des idéologies », et c'est un phénomène que le mouvement communiste n'a pas su analyser, entravé qu'il était par « ses traditions de monolithisme et d'autoritarisme ».

Le « mai français »

Fait significatif des faiblesses du mouvement communiste, précise M. Martí : les premiers symptômes de changement dans les pays capitalistes sont apparus « soit spontanément, soit sous l'impulsion d'avant-gardes étrangères au mouvement communiste » : explosion noire et lutte contre la guerre du Vietnam aux États-Unis, révolte universitaire dans de nombreux pays, entrée de nombreux secteurs intellectuels et profession-

nels « dans la lutte anti-impérialiste ». Sur ce dernier point, l'auteur souligne l'importance du « mai français », qui a vu les universitaires, les journalistes de la radio et de la télévision, les fonctionnaires des services d'urbanisme « s'interroger sur leur rôle social ».

M. Martí attribue l'élargissement du « front révolutionnaire » à la « carence idéologique du capitalisme ». Mais, ce qui est plus important, il y voit la nécessité, pour les partis communistes qui veulent intégrer les nouvelles forces contestataires dans la lutte pour le socialisme, d'un renforcement théorique, dont il expose clairement une des conditions : « La critique révolutionnaire doit examiner et expliquer les problèmes du camp socialiste sans craindre l'utilisation que l'ennemi peut en faire, car nous sommes dans une situation telle que la propagande adverse est d'autant plus nuisible que nous sommes moins capables de donner des explications rationnelles et marxistes de ces phénomènes. » (Du camp socialiste.)

Une telle analyse est significative de l'évolution du parti communiste espagnol. Elle est à rapprocher de ce que dit la dernière résolution du comité central du P.C.E. : « L'étude du marxisme n'est pas le patrimoine exclusif des communistes ».

(1) Nom d'emprunt d'un responsable du P.C.E.

(2) C'est néanmoins le X^e Congrès qui interdit les organisations de tendances dans le parti.
— N.D.R.L.

MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid
30 September 1970

Enlarged Central Committee Plenum Meets

Text of Political Resolution

The enlarged Central Committee plenum met in September and was attended by party leaders from the principal zones and cities of the country.

The enlarged Central Committee plenum observed a minute of silence in memory of the victims of Granada.

The Central Committee heard reports from comrades Santiago Carrillo, Dolores Ibarruri, and Ignacio Gallego, respectively, on the following topics:

The political tasks of the party at the present moment;

The position of the party with regard to the national and regional problems of Spain;

The strengthening of the party.

The broad debate brought out the valuable contribution and experience of men who are participating in the worker, peasant, student, and professional struggle, in the front rank; it pointed up the political maturity and the profound assimilation of the party line.

The Central Committee unanimously approved the reports that were submitted, as well as the executive committee's management, both in terms of directing the work throughout the country and within the International Communist Movement, expressing felicitations on the bilateral conversations that were held with various sister parties as well as those that are being planned.

The Central Committee reaffirmed its confidence in the executive committee and its secretary-general, Comrade Santiago Carrillo, and used the occasion of this meeting to honor Comrade Dolores Ibarruri, party chairlady, who will celebrate her 75th birthday on 9 December; she has lived an exemplary life as revolutionary fighter and she is one of the most outstanding figures of the International Communist Movement.

The Central Committee promoted 29 new members and appointed comrades Ester Blanco, Juan Calanda, Jose Maria Gonzalez Jerez, V. Martin Garcia, and Ricardo Orueta to the executive committee.

The Central Committee decided to expel the following from the party: Enrique Lister, Celestino Uriarte, Jose Barzana, Luis Balaguer, and Jesus Saiz; they had for some time been actively supporting the fractionist front of Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez, establishing with them a group that slandered the policy of the party and insulted its leaders and militants. Enrique Lister, Celestino Uriarte, and Jose Barzana had an opportunity to speak up during the enlarged Central Committee plenum but provocatively walked out of the meeting the moment the first session began, at the instant when the agenda was approved, thus avoiding the confrontation of their positions with those of the Central Committee members.

In concluding its debates, the Central Committee approved the following political resolution:

The crime of Granada, which has shaken the conscience of the country, is a sign of the degree of decay of Francoism. All of the contradictions have become more acute.

Financial scandals, such as the one involving "Matesa," have come to light and this places the OPUS and the government in the dock.

The powerful upsurge of the worker movement, the National Congress of the Legal Profession in Leon, the solidarity demonstrations with the workers of Granada, the general strike of the Madrid subway and of the construction workers, and the new miners' strike in Asturias are other factors in the crisis of the regime.

Thus culminates the crackup of the entire system built on cadavers and on the debris of the Civil War. We are approaching the breakup. Post-Francoism is beginning to emerge in outline. The elements of new democracy are asserting themselves.

The Franco government has perpetrated a new act of national betrayal by renewing the military agreement with the United States. In return for the continued operation of the United States bases, it seeks the kind of support from United States imperialism without which its situation would be even more desperate. But this will not save the dictatorship.

MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid
30 September 1970

Se ha reunido el Pleno ampliado del Comité Central

Texto de la Resolución Política

En el mes de septiembre se ha reunido el Pleno ampliado del Comité Central, con la participación de dirigentes del Partido en las principales zonas y ciudades del país.

El Pleno ampliado del C.C. guardó un minuto de silencio en memoria de las víctimas en Granada.

El C.C. ha escuchado los informes de los camaradas Santiago Carrillo, Dolores Ibárruri e Ignacio Gallego, respectivamente, sobre:

—Las tareas políticas del Partido en el momento presente.

—Posición del Partido ante los problemas nacionales y regionales de España.

—El fortalecimiento del Partido.

El amplio debate ha destacado la valiosa aportación y experiencia de hombres que están participando en primera línea en la lucha obrera, campesina, estudiantil y profesional; ha puesto de relieve la madurez política y la profunda penetración con la línea del Partido.

El C.C. ha aprobado por unanimidad los informes presentados, así como la gestión del Comité Ejecutivo, tanto en la dirección del trabajo en el país como en el seno del movimiento comunista internacional, felicitándose de las conversaciones bilaterales celebradas con diversos partidos hermanos así como de las que están proyectadas.

El C.C. reafirma su confianza en el Comité Ejecutivo y su secretario general, camarada Santiago Carrillo, y aprovecha su reunión para rendir homenaje a la camarada Dolores Ibárruri, presidente del Partido, que el próximo 9 de diciembre cumplirá los 75 años de una vida ejemplar de combatiente revolucionaria, y una de las figuras más destacadas del movimiento comunista internacional.

El C.C. ha promovido 29 nuevos miembros y ha nombrado a los camaradas Ester Blanco, Juan Calanda, José María González Jeréz, V. Martín García y Ricardo Orueta para el Comité Ejecutivo.

El C.C. ha decidido expulsar del Partido a Enrique Lister, Celestino Uriarte,

José Bárzana, Luis Balaguer y Jesús Sáiz, quienes desde hace algún tiempo apoyaban activamente la labor fraccionista de Eduardo García y Agustín Gómez, constituyendo con éstos un grupo que calumniaba la política del Partido e injuriaba a sus dirigentes y militantes. Enrique Lister, Celestino Uriarte y José Bárzana tuvieron la posibilidad de intervenir en el Pleno ampliado del C.C., pero abandonaron provocativamente la reunión desde el comienzo de la primera sesión, en el momento en que fué aprobado el orden del día, huyendo la confrontación de sus posiciones con las de los miembros del C.C.

El C.C., como conclusión de sus debates, aprobó la siguiente resolución política:

El crimen de Granada, que ha estremecido la conciencia del país, es un signo del grado de descomposición del franquismo. Todas las contradicciones se han agudizado.

El estallido a la luz pública de escándalos financieros como «Matesa» coloca

al OPUS, a la vez, en el Gobierno y en el banquillo.

El auge poderoso del movimiento obrero, el Congreso Nacional de la abogacía en León, las manifestaciones solidarias con los trabajadores granadinos, la huelga general del «Metro» madrileño y la de la construcción, la nueva huelga minera de Asturias son otros tantos momentos de la crisis del régimen.

Culmina así la quiebra de todo el sistema montado sobre cadáveres y los escombros de la guerra civil. Nos aproximamos al desenlace. Comienza a perfilarse el postfranquismo. Se afirman los elementos de la nueva democracia.

El Gobierno franquista ha cometido un nuevo acto de traición nacional renovando los acuerdos militares con EE.UU. A trueque de la persistencia de las bases USA, busca en el imperio norteamericano un apoyo sin el cual su situación sería aún más desesperada. Pero esto no salvará a la dictadura.

MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid
30 September 1970

The Specter of Beria

As we can see from the political resolution of our Central Committee, the latter decided, at its plenum, to expel Enrique Lister, Celestino Uriarte, Jose Barzana, Luis Balaguer, and Jesus Saiz from the party because of the fractional activity they are carrying out in connivance with Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez.

Repudiated and condemned for their attitude by the Central Committee, these men quickly launched a phony Mundo Obrero in which they denounce the holding of the Central Committee plenum and give a falsified version of what happened there.

As reflected in the resolution, the Central Committee focused all of its activity on the development of the mass struggles in Spain and on the strengthening of the party. Lister's dirty attack upon the party is devoid of any political ideas and consists of slander and insults; it is designed to promote scandals and provocations.

Lister's conduct reveals total duplicity: he shared the position of the executive committee and the Central Committee with regard to the intervention in Czechoslovakia and the position adopted at the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties by our delegation, of which he was a member, without expressing the slightest disagreement with the statements in these positions. He accepted the resignation of Eduardo Garcia from his leadership functions and voted for the exclusion of Agustin Gomez from the Central Committee. Then he began to write letters to the executive committee in which he defended the men who had been excluded and repeated their insults against the party leadership. Why this sudden and radical about face? Moreover, Lister has now begun to distort and sling mud at the history of the party since the war -- a party of which he was a leader until a short time ago.

At the plenum, the Central Committee members had these letters of Lister available to them. They found that these letters did not contain any political positions on which a serious discussion could be started; they only contained arbitrary statements and insults. Lister had every opportunity to state his opinions at the plenum. The third point on the agenda offered him plenty of room for that. Under the pretext that the Central Committee did not accept his own personal agenda -- which, among other things, eliminated all of the decisive issues of the struggle in Spain from the debate -- he left the meeting, followed by Uriarte and Barzana. With this action, Lister has placed himself beyond the pale of the party.

Powerless to impose their aberrations on the party, failing in their attempt to force our secretary-general and many other comrades out of the leadership, this small bunch of splitters decrees in its papers that it was not they who constituted the fraction but the "fractional group headed by Carrillo," that is to say, the entire Central Committee. A Central Committee -- which we might note, in passing -- they continue to belong to, as is quite natural, since they are prestigious veterans; but a Central Committee which, in its majority, is made up of leaders of the party organizations throughout the country, to a great extent young men, promoted to the leadership by these organizations and not be the executive committee, and others who have distinguished themselves through their work in the various mass movements. For these people, the fraction is the entire party, which repudiates them.

The fraction, from the very beginning, as we know, centered its slander on the person of Comrade Santiago Carrillo. It aimed at the head in order to bring the entire body down. In this way these men hope to -reate confusion and doubts in some militants. Since they failed in this attempt, they now cast tactical precautions to the winds and while stepping up their attacks and slander against Carrillo, they extend them also to the other leaders, not even stopping at the figure of Dolores.

As far as this phony Mundo Obrero is concerned -- which they have come out with after their bankruptcy in the Central Committee -- the best one could say is that it contains slander directed against the party which, we believe, not even Franco propaganda ever outdid. Not even the Franco police has ever come out with so outrageous a series of slanderous statements against the party. All of this is tempered by an obsession, by a fury which we can only refer to as smacking of "trial."

Yes, that fantastic and grotesque "accusation," which Lister did not hesitate to make before the Central Committee -- is impregnated with the mentality that inspired those tragically remembered trials; and as we read it in the phony Mundo Obrero, we understand why they preferred to walk out rather than make such atrocious statements there. From this prose, there emerges an unmistakable smell: the smell of Beria. Behind all of this rises his sinister shadow. This is new proof of how certain communists -- misguided by the most serious ideological and political distortions, moved by personal interests and power ambitions -- can degenerate to the point where they become the very antithesis of our doctrine, our revolutionary role in history, and our reason for existence.

And what about the motives behind this entire fractional campaign? From the very first moment we saw clearly that its objective was to put pressure on the party so that it would withdraw from the position which it had adopted on the problem of Czechoslovakia and so that it would adopt an attitude of unconditionality. When this attempt failed, of course, they attacked the entire policy of

the party. What these men are trying to do now is to divide the party and break it up. There is no need to say that this intention of the fractionists is delirious, just like their slanders.

The response to all of this from the party militants will be what it always has been so far: firmly to defend party unity, to repudiate this entire filth and to redouble their efforts through the application of the party's policy which is the policy that will bring Spain to democracy and socialism.

El tufo de Beria

Como se da cuenta en la resolución política de nuestro Comité Central, éste tomó en su pleno la decisión de expulsar del Partido a Enrique Líster, Celestino Uriarte, José Bárzana, Luis Balaguer y Jesús Saiz por la actividad fraccional que están realizando en connivencia con Eduardo García y Agustín Gómez.

Rechazados, condenada su actitud por el C.C., se han apresurado a lanzar un falso *Mundo Obrero* en el que denuncian la celebración del Pleno del Comité Central y dan una versión embustera de lo ocurrido en él.

El C.C., como se refleja en la resolución, centró toda su actividad en el desarrollo de las luchas de masas en España, en el fortalecimiento del Partido. El sucio ataque de Líster contra el Partido, vacío de ideas políticas, consiste en calumnias e injurias, en promover escándalos y provocaciones.

La conducta de Líster es de una doblez total: compartió la posición del Comité Ejecutivo y del C.C. frente a la intervención en Checoslovaquia y la adoptada en la Conferencia Internacional de Partidos Comunistas y Obreros por nuestra delegación, de la cual formó parte, sin que manifestara el menor desacuerdo con lo expresado allí por ella. Aceptó la dimisión de Eduardo García de sus cargos directivos y votó la exclusión de Agustín Gómez del C.C. Luego, comenzó a escribir cartas al C.E. en las cuales tomaba la defensa de los excluidos y repetía sus injurias contra la dirección del Partido. ¿Por qué tan súbito y radical bandazo? Es más, Líster se ha lanzado a deformar y cubrir de todo la historia del Partido desde la guerra; de un partido del que él ha sido dirigente hasta hace poco.

En el Pleno, los miembros del C.C. tuvieron a su disposición esas cartas de Líster. Se encontraron con que en ellas no era posible hallar posiciones políticas sobre las cuales se pudiera entablar una discusión seria; sólo afirmaciones arbitrarias e injurias. Líster tuvo en el Pleno completa posibilidad de exponer sus opiniones. El tercer punto del Orden del Día le ofrecía amplio marco para ello. Pero con el pretexto de que el C.C. no aceptó su personal Orden del Día —que, entre otras cosas, eliminaba del debate todas las cuestiones decisivas de la lucha en España— abandonó la reunión seguido de Uriarte y Bárzana. La ruptura era para él más cómoda que la discusión en el C.C. Con esa actitud Líster se colocaba fuera del Partido.

Impotentes para imponer al Partido sus aberraciones, fracasados sus intentos de desplazar de la dirección a nuestro secretario general y a otros muchos camaradas, el exiguo racimo de divisionistas decretan en sus papeles que la fracción no la constituyen ellos, sino el grupo fraccional encabezado por Carrillo, es decir, el C.C. entero. Un C.C. —digámoslo entre paréntesis— al cual siguen perteneciendo, como es natural, veteranos prestigiosos, pero que integran ya, en su mayoría, dirigentes de las organizaciones del Partido en el país, en gran parte jóvenes, promovidos a la dirección por dichas organizaciones y no por el Comité

Ejecutivo, y otros que se han destacado por su trabajo en los diferentes movimientos de masas. La fracción, para esa gente, es el Partido entero que los rechaza.

Desde el principio, como se sabe, la fracción centró sus infamias en la persona del camarada Santiago Carrillo. Apuntaba a la cabeza para abatir todo el cuerpo. Así esperaban crear confusión, dudas en algunos militantes. Como no lo han conseguido, ahora precinden de precauciones tácticas y, al mismo tiempo que arremeten en sus ataques y calumnias contra Carrillo, las extienden a los demás dirigentes, sin detenerse siquiera ante la figura de Dolores.

En cuanto a ese falso *Mundo Obrero*, que han hecho aparecer tras su bancarrota en el C.C., lo más exacto que se puede decir es que contiene una difamación del Partido que no creemos que la propaganda franquista haya superado jamás. Difícilmente los servicios policíacos franquistas han tejido nunca tan espesa y delirante serie de calumnias contra el Partido. Todo ello presidido por una obsesión, por una furia que podemos llamar «proccasla».

Sí, esa fantástica y grotesca «acusación» que Líster no se atrevió a hacer ante el C.C.

—y al leerla en el falso *Mundo Obrero* se comprende que prefiriera el portazo a decir allí tales atrocidades— está impregnada de la mentalidad que inspiró aquellos procesos de trágica memoria. De esa prosa trasciende un tufo inconfundible: el de Beria. Tras todo eso se alza su sombra siniestra. Nueva prueba de como, extraviados por deformaciones ideológicas y políticas gravísimas, movidos por intereses personales y ambiciones de poder, ciertos comunistas pueden degenerar hasta convertirse en la antítesis de lo que son nuestra doctrina, nuestro papel revolucionario en la historia, nuestra razón de ser.

¿Móviles de toda esta campaña fraccional? Desde el primer momento se vio claro que su objetivo era el de presionar al Partido para que se retractara de la posición que tomó en el problema de Checoslovaquia y adoptara una actitud de incondicionalidad. Como, naturalmente, este objetivo fracasó, se lanzan contra toda la política del Partido. Lo que ahora pretenden estos hombres es dividir al Partido, deshacerle. Inútil decir que este propósito de los fraccionistas es como sus calumnias: delirante.

Por parte de los militantes del Partido la respuesta a todo ello seguirá siendo la que han dado hasta ahora: defender firmemente la unidad del Partido, rechazar toda esa basura y redoblar su esfuerzo en la aplicación de la política del Partido, que es la que llevará a España a la democracia y al socialismo.

MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid
30 September 1970

Pact for Liberty, Key to the Situation

The mass movement needs a veritable jump in terms of its level. The decisive factor here is, precisely, the concrete materialization of the Pact for Liberty.

In view of the exhaustion of the regime, the political vacuum which is becoming increasingly noticeable in Spain, can be filled properly at this time only through a real, authentic, and deep-rooted alternative. The forces of the working class and of the democratic movement are prepared to bring that alternative to life. Everything depends on the response from the other social and political sectors.

The Pact for Liberty must be accomplished at the top, at the bottom, and in the middle. Its accomplishment at the top is an imperative requirement of the hour and will be the consequence of the struggle of the mass movement. The latter, in turn, can achieve its zenith, during this phase, through the crystalization of this pact. There is a close link between the mass movement, the political agreements, and the Pact for Liberty.

A concrete alternative to the Franco regime will release powerful forces among the masses which so far have been standing by and waiting because they do not yet see a clear way out of the situation.

The Pact for Liberty must win support and neutralize resistance within the armed forces. It will have to tip in its favor sectors of the government machine, the Church, and the bourgeoisie, who still support the system today out of inertia or due to a lack of an effective option. Much resistance would be reduced or neutralized in this manner.

As we understand it, the minimum foundations for a Pact for Liberty are:

- A provisional, broad-coalition government;
- Complete amnesty for political-social prisoners and exiles;
- Fundamental political freedoms of the press, of speech, of association, of assembly and of strike;
- Constituent elections.

That government would furthermore have to pledge to pursue a foreign policy of peace, independence, and neutrality with respect to military blocs, thus diversifying its relations with all countries, regardless of their social system.

That government would have to give Catalonia, Euzkadi, and Galicia a Statute of Autonomy, in provisional terms, on the basis of those which existed in the past, until the new state is given its final structure.

The Communist Party would loyally support that government, so long as it carries out the program mutually agreed upon among the forces sponsoring it, maintaining its independence with respect to the solutions to be provided for other fundamental problems.

The key to the situation is an alternative, boosted by strong popular support in the streets.

If this is achieved, political freedom will be a reality within a relatively short time.

If not, the situation could be prolonged and could give rise to all kinds of disorders and provocations against the working class and the other working strata and classes.

MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid
30 September 1970

El Pacto para la libertad, clave de la situación

Hace falta un verdadero salto de nivel del movimiento de masas. El factor decisivo para ello es, precisamente, la concreción del Pacto para la libertad.

Dado el agotamiento del régimen, el vacío político, cada vez más sensible en España, sólo puede llenarse cumplidamente en este momento con una alternativa real, auténtica, con raíz profunda. Las fuerzas de la clase obrera y del movimiento democrático están dispuestas a dar vida a esa alternativa. Todo depende de la respuesta de otros sectores sociales y políticos.

El Pacto para la libertad ha de realizarse por arriba, por abajo y por en medio. Su realización por arriba, imperativo de la hora, será consecuencia de la lucha del movimiento de masas. A su vez, ésta puede alcanzar su cenit en esta fase con la cristalización de dicho pacto. Existe, pues, estrecha ligazón entre movimientos de masas, convergencias políticas y Pacto para la libertad.

Una alternativa concreta al régimen franquista liberará potentes fuerzas de masa, hasta ahora expectantes porque aún no ven clara la salida a la situación.

El Pacto para la Libertad tiene que ganar apoyos y neutralizar resistencias en el seno de las fuerzas armadas. Haría bascular a su favor sectores del aparato del Estado, de la Iglesia y de la burguesía que hoy todavía apoyan al sistema por inercia o por falta de opción eficaz. Muchas resistencias se ablandarían o neutralizarían.

A nuestro entender, bases mínimas de un Pacto para la Libertad son:

- Un gobierno provisional de amplia coalición.
- Amnistía total para los presos y exiliados político-sociales.
- Libertades políticas fundamentales: de prensa, de palabra, de asociación, de reunión y de huelga.
- Elecciones constituyentes.

Ese gobierno debería, además, comprometerse a realizar una política exterior de paz, independencia y neutralidad respecto a los bloques militares, diversificando sus relaciones con todos

los países, cualquiera que sea su régimen social.

Ese gobierno debería reconocer a Cataluña, Euzkadi y Galicia un Estatuto de autonomía, a título provisional, sobre la base de los que existieron en el pasado, mientras no se estructure definitivamente el nuevo Estado.

El Partido Comunista apoyaría lealmente a ese gobierno, en tanto cumpla el programa mutuamente convenido entre las fuerzas que lo patrocinan, manteniendo su independencia en cuanto a la solución a dar a otros problemas fundamentales.

La clave de la situación está en una alternativa, potenciada por un fuerte apoyo popular en la calle.

Si esto se consigue, la libertad política será una realidad en plazo relativamente breve.

Si no, esta situación podría prolongarse, y dar paso a todo género de desórdenes y de provocaciones contra la clase obrera y las demás capas y clases trabajadoras.

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December 1970

ANDREI AMALRIK - SOVIET DISSIDENT OR DISSEMBLER

After 6 months imprisonment following his arrest last May at his summer cottage in Ryazan Province, southeast of Moscow, Andrei Amalrik was sentenced on 12 November 1970 to a term of three years in a labor camp under "intensive regime". The trial, which took two days, was held at Sverdlovsk, 900 miles east of the city where he is registered as living -- Moscow. The reason given for the trial's transfer to this Urals city was that copies of his works were found there, but this appears to have been a transparent device to limit publicity of the trial. Sverdlovsk is off limits to foreigners.

Amalrik was tried under Article 190 (1) of the Russian Republic's criminal code, which makes it a crime to spread "deliberate fabrications defaming the Soviet State and public order." This article, signed in 1966, is used against dissenters. The prosecution's charges were based on 5 documents: an open letter he wrote to Anatoly Kuznetsov (who defected to Britain last year), transcripts of two interviews with CBS, and two books - Involuntary Journey to Siberia and Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? The former was published in August 1970 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 757 3rd Ave. New York, N.Y. 10017, and the latter by Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 49 East 33rd St., New York, N.Y. 10016. This soft cover edition, distributed as a selection by the Book of the Month Club, contains a preface by Henry Kamm which is a portrait of the author as a dissenter, as well as a commentary about the work by Sidney Monas. In Canada Fitzhenry and Whiteside, Limited, Toronto, has also published an edition, and one has been put out in Russian by the Alexander Herzen Foundation, Amstel 268, Amsterdam-C, The Netherlands.

The historical vision of the Soviet Union that Amalrik holds is ironic in that at a time of the expansion of the USSR's physical power his attention is riveted on the collapse of the source of that power. What Amalrik sees in his country is the transformation of what was a primal flash of energy in 1917 into a peevish and fearful structure of weak and unimaginative bureaucrats determined to hold on to their privileges and to power for its own sake. Because of their weakness and division they will be unable to take the necessary measures soon enough, or to make them strong enough, to enable Russia to survive the changing situations and pressures.

Essentially the author views the Soviet state not as a 50 year old phenomenon but as the final phase of an empire which had its origins over 1,000 years ago in the Kievan Rus, and which is less

than 14 years from destruction. Beginning as a sober, analytical treatise on the causes and sources of the current difficulties in the Soviet Union, the work evolves into an Old Testament prophecy of a holocaust to come which is contained in the last 26 pages of the book. Among the ideas expressed in the build-up preceding it perhaps the most controversial concerns Amalrik's disbelief in the inevitability of the triumph of liberalism in his country as a result of an increasing standard of living and a concurrent tide of Western influence, such as jazz and miniskirts, with a consequent softening of ideological hostility toward the West, and even its own citizens. As he puts it, "It is possible that we will indeed have a 'socialism' with bare knees someday, but not likely one with a human face."

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Amalrik Says Soviet Fears Ideas

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
 SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES
 MOSCOW, Nov. 14 — Andrei

Regime's Cowardice Reflected by Trial, Dissenter Asserts

Amalrik, the dissident Soviet author, was reported today to have told a court that his trial on charges of defaming the Soviet state reflected "the cowardice of a regime that regards as a danger the spreading of any thought, any idea alien to its top bureaucrats."

The Sverdlovsk court, in a two-day trial that ended on Thursday, sentenced Mr. Amalrik, 32-year-old author of several books and essays published abroad, to three years' confinement in a labor camp. A codefendant, Lev. G. Ubozhko, a Sverdlovsk student, also received three years but in a less strict camp.

Mr. Amalrik's friends related his remarks to Western newsmen. They said the verdict would be appealed.

In his final words before being sentenced, Mr. Amalrik said his trial was meant to frighten others into silence, but "I think that the process of ideological emancipation that has begun is irreversible."

Appears in Good Health

Mr. Amalrik, a slightly built, bespectacled historian, made it a point to know many foreigners before his arrest last May at his summer cottage in Ryazan Province, southeast of Moscow. His wife, Guyzel, a painter, attended the trial as a witness.

According to his friends, Mr. Amalrik looked in good health despite the six months' confinement, and he seemed as outspokenly critical of the Soviet leadership as in his works. His book "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until 1984" predicts the downfall of the Soviet regime because of internal disorders and a war with China.

Mr. Amalrik compared the trials of dissidents to witch trials of the Middle Ages.

"But if one could at least partly explain the struggle against heretic ideas in the Middle Ages as religious fanaticism," he told the three-man tribunal, "everything taking

place now can be explained only as the cowardice of a regime that regards as a danger the spreading of any thought, any idea alien to its top bureaucrats."

Although the Soviet authorities talk about an ideological struggle, he said, they can oppose alien ideas only with "the threat of criminal prosecution."

"Recognizing their ideological hopelessness, they cling in fear to criminal codes, prisons, camps and psychiatric hospitals," he said.

"In particular, the fear of my thoughts, of the facts expressed in my books, forces these people to put me in the dock as a criminal. This fear led them also to be afraid of trying me in Moscow. They brought me here, thinking that here the trial would attract less attention."

Code Amended in 1966

The Amalriks are legally registered as living in Moscow, where they share a communal apartment. Sverdlovsk, in the Urals, is off limits to foreigners. Mr. Amalrik was notified that he was being tried in Sverdlovsk on the ground that copies of his works were found in that Urals city.

Mr. Amalrik and Mr. Ubozhko were tried under Article 190 (1) of the Russian Republic's Criminal Code, which makes it a crime to

spread "deliberate fabrications defaming the Soviet state and public order." The article was added in 1966 and is used against dissidents.

In addition to his books, published only abroad, Mr. Amalrik was also cited for interviews he gave to William Cole, a correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System who was subsequently expelled from Moscow.

Mr. Amalrik refused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, insisting that the court had no right to try him for his views.

He repeated his refusal to discuss his views in his final statement, but said he did wish to answer the allegations that his statements "were directed against my people and my country."

"It seems to me that now the main task for my country is to unburden itself of the heavy weight of the past, and for this criticism is necessary above all and not glorification," he said.

"I think that I am a better patriot than those who, loudly declaring their love for the motherland, by love for the motherland mean love for their own privileges."

"Neither the witch hunt carried out by the regime, nor this particular example—this trial—arouses in me the slightest respect nor any fear. I understand, however, that such trials are counted on the frightened many, and many will be frightened. But all the same, I think the development of ideological emancipation, having begun, is irreversible."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
15 November 1970

Sentencing Ideas Is Crime In Itself, Amalrik Declares

By Anthony Astrachan.

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Nov. 14—(The

sentence ideas to criminal punishment, whether they be true or false, seems to me to be a crime in itself."

So dissident author Andrei Amalrik told the court that sentenced him Thursday to three years in a prison camp, his friends said today.

He also accused the Soviet regime of intellectual cowardice that led it to medieval-style witch hunts, which he said could not reverse the "process of ideological emancipation now under way."

Amalrik was charged with violating article 190-1 of the Russian Republic Criminal Code, which deals with "dissemination of falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system."

The prosecution based its case on five documents including Amalrik's book "Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" in which he analyzed the various groups of dissidents here and predicted the disintegration of the Soviet empire in a war with China.

None of these has been published in the Soviet Union, but some are available through samizdat (self-publishing).

At the opening of the trial Wednesday, Amalrik gave a short statement in answer to

the question, how did he plead.

"I consider neither the in-

terviews I have given nor my

articles and books derogatory," he said. "I also think that the truth or falsehood of any views put forward publicly can be established only by free and open discussion, not by legal proceedings.

"No criminal court has a moral right to sentence anyone for views he has put forward . . ."

"I do not consider myself guilty," he added, "but will not try to prove my innocence, for the principle of freedom of speech excludes the question of my guilt."

At the end of the trial Thursday, Amalrik made a short final statement in which he compared the trial to medieval witch hunts.

He said the regime's ideological struggle was reduced to the criminal persecution of ideas. "Recognizing their ideological helplessness," he said, "they grope in fear for the criminal code, prisons, camps, psychiatric clinics." Some dissidents have been ruled insane instead of being convicted in criminal trials.

Amalrik blamed the regime's fears for his indictment and for his being tried in Sverdlovsk, 900 mile east of Moscow, so "that the trial would attract less attention."

Amalrik said that he wanted to answer the claims that he made statements "directed against my people and my country. It seems to me that the main task of my country just now is to throw off the burden of the heavy past, and for this my country needs free criticism, not self-glorification.

"I think that I am a better patriot than those who shout about their love for the motherland and who mean by that love for their privileges," Amalrik added.

He concluded, "I understand that such trials are intended to scare many people and that they will scare many people—and even so that the process of ideological emancipation now under way is irreversible. I have nothing to ask of this court."

Amalrik's friends expressed the belief that this final statement was what impelled the judge to sentence him to three years in camp under intensive regime, when the prosecutor had asked three years under the less severe general regime.

CPYRGHT

THE SUNDAY STAR
15 November 1970

Soviet Author Says Kremlin Fears Thought

MOSCOW (UPI) — Russian

writer Andrei Amalrik, sentenced this week to three years in a prison camp, says the government is afraid of his ideas and described his trial as part of a Kremlin "witch-hunting" campaign against dissident intellectuals.

In a courtroom speech at the end of his trial in Sverdlovsk, Amalrik said: "I think I am a better patriot than those who shout about their love for the fatherland but mean, by that, love for their privileges."

Amalrik's speech was made available to western correspondents in Moscow yesterday.

Says He's Not Afraid

"Everything that is going on now can only be explained by the cowardice of a regime which sees dangers in the spreading of any thought, any idea alien to the bureaucratic summit," he said.

"Neither the witch-hunting conducted by the regime nor this special example — my trial — evoke respect or fear in me," the 31-year-old author said. "Such trials are intended to scare people and many will be scared — but, even so, the process of ideological liberation now under way is irreversible."

Amalrik, author of "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?", was sentenced Thursday for violating article 190-1 of the Russian republic criminal code dealing with dissemination of "falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system."

'Moral Right' Disputed

"It is the fear for the ideas I have expressed, for those facts I mentioned in my books, that compel these people to put me on the stand as a criminal," Amalrik said. He added that the authorities are "afraid" to try him in Moscow and brought him to Sverdlovsk instead, 900 miles to the east.

"No criminal court has a moral right to sentence anyone for views he had put forward," he said. "To sentence ideas — whether they are true or false — by a criminal sentence seems to me to be a crime in itself.

"I shall not discuss my opinions here because the court is not the right place for it. I only want to answer claims that some of my pronouncements are directed against my country and my people.

Evidence Listed

"It seems to me that the main task for my country just now is to throw off its burden of the heavy past and, for this, my country needs first of all free critical discussion and not self-praise."

In his "1984" Amalrik forecast war with China that would lead to collapse of the Soviet regime sometime between 1980 and 1985. The book was published in the West as was his "Involuntary Journey to Siberia."

According to dissident sources, the prosecution based the case against Amalrik on five documents, including the two books, his two interviews with the Columbia Broadcasting System and an open letter he wrote to Soviet writer Anatoly Kuznetsov after the latter defected to Britain last year.

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Foreign Report

CPYRGHT

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Hanoi Purge in Full Swing

While Cambodia and South Vietnam have captured the headlines during the past three months, significant developments have been taking place in Hanoi. It is now possible to trace fairly clearly the course of the power struggle that followed the death of Ho Chi Minh ten months ago.

Ho's authority was never challenged, but during his declining years there were signs that his lieutenants were beginning to skirmish over the succession. On his death the rivals for power and their supporting factions were already identifiable; but the war in the south, and the resulting strains in the north, made it imperative that inter-party strife should be avoided. Hence a 'collective leadership' was unanimously agreed upon by the party.

Within a month or two, however, it became apparent that this concept was Utopian and totally unsuited to the existing situation in North Vietnam. With each passing week the power struggle, particularly between **Le Duan**, the first secretary of the party, and **Truong Chinh**, the party's theoretician grew fiercer, and the 'collective leadership' less realistic.

The two leaders quarrelled over several issues, notably: (a) the priorities to be accorded to winning the war in the south and to socialist construction in the north; (b) the role of material incentives to increase productivity; and (c) the organisation of collectivised agriculture. When Truong Chinh alleged that capitalist agriculture was being re-established in North Vietnam, Le Duan countered with expressions of sympathy for Lenin (who had to face similar charges against his New Economic Policy from ignorant and bigoted comrades.)

At first the greater publicity accorded to Truong Chinh, and the adoption of several of his political proposals, suggested he was gaining the upper hand. But by mid-February there were clear indications that Le Duan was the victor. In a long, authoritative, and widely published article, Le Duan confidently laid down the lines along which every major sector of North Vietnamese activity would develop. Significantly, his pronouncements were not challenged from any quarter.

The emergence of a new leader in a communist state is often the signal for a purge of those elements deemed hostile to him - the victims usually being accused of serious crimes. North Vietnam has run true to communist pattern.

Late in March an order for a party purge was published in the party periodical, *Hoc Tap*. This publication is read primarily by senior party members, and the first

widely disseminated announcement was broadcast by Hanoi radio on 25 April. The order took the form of a 'politburo resolution,' signed by Le Duan on behalf of that body, and was addressed to all party organs.

It charged that numbers of party members were of 'inferior quality' or 'inferior character', and were unworthy of party membership. Other elements 'displayed very inferior political standards', worked badly, and failed to carry out their duties. Others again were guilty of 'sagging determination to fight', 'low ethical standards', and 'inferior political enlightenment'. Nor did the catalogue end there; other allegations were of corruption, bullying, indiscipline, and infringing other peoples' rights. All the culprits, it went on, would be expelled from the party in a purge lasting one year; their places would be filled by 'virtuous' new recruits to be known as the 'Ho Chi Minh class' of party members.

All party organs were required to submit to the central committee secretariat detailed plans for implementing the resolution, and this is believed to have been completed. A 'guiding committee' was set up to supervise the whole operation - and on 19 May the purge started. Though details of its progress are kept a tight secret from all outsiders, articles in the Hanoi press claim that it is proceeding well. The people are urged to maintain their vigour and enthusiasm.

Whatever the truth of the allegations made about party members in the politburo-resolution - after all, corruption, backsliding, inefficiency, and authoritarianism are fairly common features in many Asian countries, so the charges may not be far off the mark - it is a safe assumption that those who have opposed Le Duan will form the bulk of the victims. Some notorious offenders may be included to lend an air of verisimilitude to the whole operation.

It is still too early to know whether the purge will lead to torture, bloodshed, and mass executions as the 1955 agrarian reforms did. But this grim possibility must be in the minds of all North Vietnamese.

Although the objective of the purge is to create a ruling Communist party united under one leader, its short-term effects could be damaging. Quite apart from the burden of waging war in the South, Laos, and Cambodia simultaneously, North Vietnam's rulers are beset by manifold domestic difficulties. The Hanoi press itself has admitted shortages of food and materials, popular apathy, absenteeism among workers, manpower shortages, black marketeering, and indiscipline.

The party, in its present state, seems to be unequal to the task of resolving these difficulties. Whether Le Duan's purge will ultimately strengthen it, or merely disrupt it further, is one of the many imponderables in the confused Indo-China situation.

Excerpts from:
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
6 April 1970

HANOI'S FORMULA:

Mixed strategy. Recent fast-moving developments disclose just how Hanoi has used a mixture of political and military strategy to capitalize not only on the vague politics of Southeast Asia but on American political unrest as well.

Political decisions—not military—led to a halt in U. S. bombing of North Vietnam and to the start of withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Political maneuvering and military pressure are undermining the Government in Laos. In Cambodia, mass infiltration by Red troops endangers that key nation—without a shot being fired.

The current Communist drive for domination over Southeast Asia is not new. The goal was set when the Indo-Chinese Communist Party was formed 40 years ago by Ho Chi Minh: one Red nation composed of what is now Cambodia, Laos and all of Vietnam.

Says a leading Western expert:

"The main point which always must be kept in mind is this: For Hanoi, this war is and always has been a war to win all of Indo-China, not just South

Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are not separate campaigns. They are all parts of the whole."

North Vietnamese are convinced that they are the only people of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula capable of ruling. Tough, and clever, the Vietnamese are far more aggressive and resourceful than their Cambodian or Laotian neighbors.

The price to North Vietnam in this unremitting fight for power has been high in money, lives and destruction.

The precise cost may never be known. But U. S. intelligence officers insist they can estimate the toll with considerable accuracy.

To keep the Vietnam war going, Hanoi has maintained a standing Army of 457,000 men and a people's militia of about 420,000—a huge force for a nation of only 21 million. Nearly half the Regular Army is based outside North Vietnam—100,000 in South Vietnam, 67,000 in Laos and about 48,000 in Cambodia.

"**Tremendous drain.**" An American officer says: "That is a tremendous drain on resources. Maintaining troops outside your borders is expensive."

Hanoi's cost per soldier is not rated significantly higher in South Vietnam than in Laos. But the Communists are finding it more expensive to support up to 60,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong infantrymen in Cambodia, even though they do little fighting there. In South Vietnam and Laos, Reds seize much of their food from the peasants. But in Cambodia, Communist units usually pay cash for food and medicine and as bribes to Cambodian officials.

Man for man, it is vastly cheaper to maintain a North Vietnamese soldier, living on rice and getting few benefits, than it is to support an American GI eating well and in touch with his homeland 10,000 miles away. However, observers consider the relative drain is greater on North Vietnam because its economic base is infinitesimally small compared with that of the U. S.

Intelligence sources in Saigon estimate that the Communists have lost more than 600,000 men in combat in South Vietnam since 1961, many of them trained

company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. During one four-year period in South Vietnam alone, nearly 480,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed: 55,524 in 1966; 86,104 in 1967; 181,149 in 1968, and 156,954 in 1969.

Three years of U. S. bombing of North Vietnam almost wrecked the civilian economy. Although the attacks have ceased, food still is scarce, housing in short supply, manpower a serious problem. With so many men at war, women of North Vietnam make up about 80 per cent of the farm labor force. Population specialists say North Vietnam has 1 million "surplus" women because so many men died in war.

Says a French expert on Vietnam:


"Hanoi doesn't want to do anything now that would bring the war back to North Vietnam. The country is being rebuilt, and the leadership does not want to risk destruction by bombing again. The people of North Vietnam are tired and want the war to end."

A sizable part of Hanoi's war costs is met by Russia and Communist China.

Russia and other East European nations provide Hanoi with about 1 billion dollars a year in weapons, medicine, raw materials and some food. Most of

this aid is in loans which must be repaid—a major mortgage on North Vietnam's future. Red Chinese aid is smaller in amount and is concentrated in food and weapons.

Some Far East experts are convinced that North Vietnam is finding the war so costly that its future military moves will be highly selective and designed even more than in the past to get the largest political profit out of the smallest military outlay.



HANOI vs. REST OF INDO-CHINA

Outmanned and Outgunned, but . . .

POPULATION

North Vietnam has 21 million people.

Rest of Indo-China — South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia — has combined population of 27 million.

TROOPS

North Vietnam has 877,000 men under arms.

Rest of Indo-China has 1.2 million men under arms.

ALLIES

North Vietnam is supported by 150,000 troops of Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, plus generous aid from Russia and Red China.

Rest of Indo-China: In South Vietnam, anti-Communists are supported by 454,000 U. S. troops, more than 60,000 other allies, plus virtually unlimited aid from U. S.

DESPITE THESE ODDS, Hanoi is determined to dominate all of Indo-China by waging a three country campaign — in South Vietnam — with 100,000 of its own troops, in Cambodia — with 48,000 of its own troops, and in Laos — with 100,000 of its own troops.

CPYRGHT

N. Vietnam Behind In Harvesting Rice

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, July 17—

North Vietnam once again is exhorting an apparently reluctant and undermanned peasantry to meet the state's rice quotas.

In numerous broadcasts this month, Hanoi Radio has complained that the sowing of the summer-fall rice crop is far behind schedule.

"A number of localities are still unaware of the urgency of this year's (second) rice crop," the radio said recently.

Although rice production is most pressing, it is only one of the areas in which the North Vietnamese leadership has been unable to galvanize its people to meet officially established goals.

"We have been striving to maintain the wartime mode of life and give fuller play to the new production relations chiefly by relying on the ardent patriotism and the zeal of our people," a member of the State Planning Commission wrote last January.

However, since American bombing was halted in November, 1968, North Vietnam's peasants have sought to slow down a little.

The government launched a drive for "intensive cultivation" aiming at production of five tons of rice on each 2.2 acres under cultivation. According to Hanoi broadcasts, the drive has achieved only mixed results.

To achieve the goal, Radio Hanoi reported, farmers in some areas have abandoned their poorer rice fields and thus reduced their overall production while getting the desired yield from a few choice plots.

In addition to complaints about waste, Hanoi has made remarkably open statements about corruption in the farm cooperatives. The party directive on collective ownership issued last month called for "drastic" curtailment of embezzlement.

Vice Premier Do Muoi commented in May that it was necessary to "implement satisfactorily" the policy of farmers selling their grain to the state, implying that some rice was being sold privately to black marketeers.

Manpower shortages have been an additional problem for North Vietnam's agricultural programs, particularly at harvest times.

North Vietnam has been struggling with its food problem for years, but the warnings that the present planting is behind schedule seem to indicate that Hanoi faces a particularly serious situation this summer.

CPYRGHT

Hanoi Setting Up 'Task Forces' In Bid to Spur Lagging Industry

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — new regional forces must quick-

Despite increased warnings of hardships and sacrifices ahead, Washington officials say North Vietnam appears determined to pursue the war in South Vietnam indefinitely, at least until a peace settlement can be reached on Hanoi's terms.

This is the conclusion drawn by specialists on North Vietnamese affairs from the latest pronouncements by Government, military and Communist party figures in Hanoi as well as from internal party debates in North Vietnam.

The most significant new trend observed in the North Vietnamese conduct of the war and management of the battered economy is the effort to create so-called "local military task forces." These are to serve both as army reserves and as civilian labor units working to spur what Hanoi acknowledges publicly is lagging industrial production.

'Enormous Efforts' Asked

This latest North Vietnamese approach to the problem of sustaining militarily and economically the strategy of the "protracted war" — defined by Hanoi's Defense Minister, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, as a persistent struggle on a low level of activity designed to outlast the United States with a minimum of North Vietnamese losses — was described in detail Aug. 15 in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, North Vietnam's army newspaper.

In an editorial, the paper said that North Vietnam must make "enormous efforts" to accelerate production and "stabilize the people's livelihood step by step."

Discussing the responsibilities of the "local military task forces," the newspaper said they must strive "to increase the economic and national defense potential" of North Vietnam, to "fulfill their duty as the great rear area of the great frontline."

In what American analysts considered an unusually frank admission by Hanoi of its mounting problems of manpower allocation between defense and the economy Quan Doi Nhan Dan said that the

ly develop "quantitatively and qualitatively" to "replenish the main-force army" and to "combine economic development with the considerations of national defense in their localities."

The complaints about inadequacy of production—and the rarely sounded theme that the civilian population hungers for consumer goods—was sounded more recently in Nhan Dan, the Communist party's newspaper, in an editorial Sept. 19.

People's Needs Are Noted

"The rate of development is low," the newspaper said, "compared to our manpower capacity and to our supply of raw materials, the needs of our people and the export demands."

"During the first half of this year, the output of a number of handicraft [industry] branches and professions in many localities was at a standstill or even declined," Nhan Dan said. "The present level of handicraft production is lower than that of 1964," it asserted.

In a comment on the results of the dispersion of North Vietnamese industry during the 1965-68 bombings by the United States, the newspaper said that "along with actively restoring and building state-owned industrial factories, it is necessary urgently to restore and develop various small industry and handicraft branches and professions and to pursue the socialist transformation."

The theme of further sacrifices was significantly sounded for the first time in the official slogans for the celebrations last month of the anniversary of the 1945 proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In past years, sacrifices were not mentioned, but this year the third of the 17 slogans said:

"For the independence and freedom of the fatherland, we are resolved to overcome all the difficulties and hardships, persist and step up resistance against United States aggression and work for national salvation until total victory."

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BALTIMORE SUN
3 October 1970

Hanoi Presses Party Discipline

Weakening Leadership Could Bring Internal Political Crisis

By MICHAEL PARKS
(Sun Staff Correspondent)

Saigon, Oct. 2—Beset with severe economic problems and a continued food shortage, North Vietnamese leaders are pressing Communist party members to tighten party discipline and increase production.

If Hanoi's campaign fails, some senior western analysts here believe, North Vietnam will be plunged into a serious internal political crisis.

The same analysts, however, are divided on what this means for the war in South Vietnam and the peace talks in Paris. Some believe it could lead North Vietnam to seek some sort of settlement, others feel Hanoi would just reduce the level of fighting until its domestic problems are solved.

Party Criticism

This speculation is based on the repeated criticism of party members and local officials and technicians recently, and Hanoi's own admissions that deteriorating party leadership is sapping efforts and its industrial and agricultural production.

An editorial in the current issue of a leading party journal, *Hoc Tap*, says that the quality of the party's local activities is poor, that basic political education is perfunctory and that, as a result, production and "revolutionary progress" are lagging.

Last week, the secretary of the Ha Bac province party committee indicted local leaders for poor agricultural management. "Ha Bac is at a standstill," he said,

"Erroneous Views"

"Many party cadres and members . . . still cultivate erroneous views, lack the spirit of self-reliance, are afraid of hardships and difficulties, are conservative and are prone to rely on the state and higher authorities."

The deputy secretary of the Hanoi city party committee said this summer that many youths in the capital are bourgeois and lack "revolutionary ideals and socialist enlightenment."

Other party leaders repeatedly have called for better leadership in agriculture, production of consumer goods, light industry and education.

Common Theme

The need for better management and stronger party leadership are the themes of even basically technical articles dealing with fertilization of rice crops, the planting of potatoes and corn and water irrigation projects.

While extensive self criticism is practiced in many Communist-led countries and is the equivalent of political debate in the United States, the increasing frankness about shortcomings in North Vietnam and the calls for reform are the basis of the western analysts' conclusion that Hanoi is trying to reverse a trend that could lead to a complete breakdown in party discipline.

One senior analyst commented, It appears that the men in charge in Hanoi have no idea whether their orders will be carried out in the provinces once they are given. That is certainly the implication of those recent statements.

Collapse Predicted

A British specialist on North Vietnamese affairs, P. J. Honey, who was here last month, said he is convinced that the Communist party in the north is nearing an internal collapse.

"The war has brought economic ruin, and that in turn is breaking up the country's political organization and structure," he said. "There is no doubt in my mind that they are in very serious trouble. That is what all these calls for reform are about."

American, South Vietnamese and some other analysts do not go as far as Mr. Honey, but they

too feel Hanoi is scrambling to regain the control it lost when it decentralized its economy during the American bombings nearly five years ago.

The party is admitting an unspecified number of new younger members in three phases to replace older members "who are not worthy . . . are inferior, whose nature has been changed and who are useless."

Originally announced in February by the first secretary of the Communist party, Le Duan, these ousters so far appear to be more a weeding out of deadwood than the widespread purge first expected.

Stealing From Peasants

Party leaders are also attacking members and cadres who steal from the peasants and workers they are supposed to be leading. To Huu, the party central committee secretary, said in a recent speech: "There are party members who live and fight, not for the revolutionary cause, but for personal interests. Some of them take advantage of their position to steal public funds or encroach upon the masses' democratic rights. . . (others) use the party as a tool to obtain promotions or enrich themselves."

"On the other hand, the party's organizational, educational and control tasks have been loosely carried out. This situation has enabled a number of bad elements to achieve power."

THE DAILY YOMIURI, Tokyo
28 September 1970

SOME think that communist North Vietnam can carry on the war indefinitely. But Hanoi also has massive problems that could force it to the peace table. The writer describes some of these problems in a two part series, the first of which follows.

North Vietnam at 25 (1)

Country Sagging Under Soaring Cost Of War

By Arthur C. Miller

<p>Hong Kong (CNS)—The</p>	<p>not able to meet its needs. Lack of proper irrigation,</p>	<p>of, whether the farmers produce more. Any surplus they produce may be stored, sold to families in the collective or sold to the state.</p>	<p>power pressures—have coupled with the other miseries of war such as the loss of husbands and sons on the battlefield and inevitably created a feeling of weariness with the war.</p>
<p>Democratic Republic of Vietnam—more commonly known as North Vietnam—is observing the 25th anniversary of its founding this month. Despite the encouraging official reports and festivities that surround the celebration, the country has little cause for joy.</p>	<p>shortages of fertilizer, and labor problems underlie this shortcoming. Part of the problem, too, is the lack of adequate management and professional expertise to guide the economy. Most of the country's top management and professional talent has been going into the war effort.</p>	<p>In effect, these measures offer powerful incentives to successful cooperatives and hold the prospect of the farmers benefiting materially from their increased output.</p>	<p>The expansion of the war into Cambodia means a further drain on North Vietnam's manpower resources, adding to the economic and other discontent.</p>
<p>North Vietnam today is suffering from serious political divisions. Economically things have seldom been worse, even though the United States stopped bombing the country nearly two years ago.</p>	<p>Because of the demands of the war, and especially during the period of US bombing, the leaders in Hanoi loosened their ideological demands on the farmers and allowed habits antithetical to communism to creep in.</p>	<p>A similar measure was adopted in the Soviet Union in 1965, when grain procurement was fixed at a standard rate for six years. The problem the Hanoi leaders fear is the one that arose from the move in the Soviet Union: the resultant prosperity of the farmers outstripped that of and consequently angered those people living in the urban areas.</p>	<p>China and the Soviet Union, through their aid commitments, are keeping the North Vietnamese economy from collapsing or being engulfed in uncontrollable inflation. As long as that aid is forthcoming the North Vietnamese will not starve.</p>
<p>The expansion of the Vietnam war into Cambodia has created some important new problems for the leaders in Hanoi.</p>	<p>Basically this involved letting the peasants engage in private, capitalist-style enterprises as a</p>	<p>means of boosting output. Earlier this year, Hanoi launched a new campaign to strengthen the system of agricultural cooperatives and to achieve the final "socialization" of farming.</p>	<p>But the picture that is often painted of total solidarity among the people of North Vietnam in support of the war effort is a false one. They, too, are growing tired of the conflict.</p>
<p>North Vietnam has put considerable effort into concealing just what the war is costing, not only in terms of men and material but also in terms of economic development and stability within the political hierarchy.</p>	<p>But even with that tightening of the ideological reins, the North Vietnamese leaders decided to preserve, even assist in developing, private plots operated by and benefiting the individual rather than the collective. The reason is not hard to find. The greater productivity of peasants working for themselves instead of for the state makes this a necessity.</p>	<p>Industrial development, especially in the heavy industry sector, has begun moving forward again. But huge amounts of capital investment and equipment are required, not to mention skilled manpower.</p>	<p>So much so, in fact, that are beginning to appear that indicate their economic discontent now is spilling over into the political sphere. The collective leadership that has ruled since the death a year ago of Ho Chi Minh also is showing signs of division.</p>
<p>But enough information is available, both from official North Vietnamese and other sources, to conclude that the war is creating serious strains.</p>	<p>Another habit Hanoi is having trouble breaking is that of selling commodities on the open or black market.</p>	<p>The Soviet Union is providing new industrial plants for North Vietnam, but the problem of properly trained workers and of management and other professional expertise continues to hamper the industrial rehabilitation effort.</p>	<p>And this could have an important bearing on the future course of the Indochina conflict.—CNS.</p>
<p>What is happening to the economy offers one glimpse of the problem.</p>	<p>Having failed to eliminate the black marketing activities with decrees, Hanoi has now adopted a different approach.</p>	<p>Manpower, perhaps more than any other sector of North Vietnam's economy, has suffered most from the war effort. And, it is a problem that will continue until the war ends.</p>	<p>Of the estimated 7,500,000</p>
<p>North Vietnam remains basically an agricultural country. Some 90 percent of its labor force is engaged in producing agricultural products.</p>	<p>The country's farmers have been guaranteed that the state will take only a fixed annual quota of their production for the next five years regardless</p>	<p>workers engaged in agriculture, for example, some 6,000,000 are women. Women also make up the great majority in Hanoi's factories and work shops.</p>	<p>All of these strains—the shortage of rice and consumer goods, the capital and man-</p>
<p>Two years ago, in hopes of reaching self-sufficiency in rice, the country introduced the high-yielding "miracle rice" strain developed in the Philippines (Hanoi claims one of its scientists developed the new rice, but in fact the seeds came via Pakistan).</p>	<p>Although yields have increased, the country still is</p>	<p>Of the estimated 7,500,000 workers engaged in agriculture, for example, some 6,000,000 are women. Women also make up the great majority in Hanoi's factories and work shops.</p>	<p>All of these strains—the shortage of rice and consumer goods, the capital and man-</p>
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THE DAILY YOMIURI, Tokyo
25 September 1970

North Vietnam At 25 (2)

Leadership In Hanoi Faces Two Problems

By Arthur C. Miller

Hong Kong (CNS)—As North Vietnam observes the 25th anniversary of its founding this month, two steadily worsening problems are confronting the Hanoi leadership. Both could have an important bearing on the future course of the Indochina war.

Those two problems are a growing distaste for and opposition to the war by the North Vietnamese people, and increasing dissension within the collective leadership forged after Ho Chi Minh's death on September 3, 1969.

Because of the closed nature of the North Vietnamese society, the lack of a free press and government control of all information outlets, Hanoi has generally been able to conceal the existence of antiwar sentiments and political divisions within the leadership. But now and then hints of the problem seep through.

And, not unexpectedly, the two problems—like a self-devouring animal—are feeding on each other.

Analysts of North Vietnamese affairs have long believed that one of the major reasons Hanoi was able to hold the country together during the last two decades of war was Ho Chi Minh and his immense prestige among his people.

With his death at the age of 79, Ho was replaced by a more impersonal collective leadership.

That leadership has attempted to carry on with Ho's policies and to persist in the war to unite North and South Vietnam and impose Vietnamese hegemony over the rest of Indochina.

Surprisingly, the collective leadership in Hanoi managed to operate fairly smoothly much longer than many had expected.

The main personalities in the current leadership hierarchy are Le Duan, the 61-year-old first secretary of the Lao Dong (Workers' or Communist) Party, Truong Chinh, leader of the pro-Chinese faction and second only to Le Duan in party influence (who is also 61) and

Nguyen Giap, the defense minister, Pham Van Dong, premier and the country's foremost diplomat, and Le Thanh Nghi, a deputy premier charged with handling the country's economic problems.

The turning point in the fortunes of the collective appears to have come with the events in Cambodia in March of this year. The ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the emergence of the stoutly anticommunist government of Lon Nol had political repercussions in Hanoi that were not immediately noticeable.

The primary impact of the Cambodian developments was to further depress the morale of the people in North Vietnam.

Prospects of an enlarged Indochina war, with the consequent increased material and manpower drain on North Vietnam, is hardly the sort of thing to raise spirits. Today, five months after the political winds in Cambodia shifted, signs of the new discontent are becoming more evident.

From reports by defectors, captured troops and even from Hanoi's official pronouncements emerges a picture of disenchantment with the war effort and discord within the collective leadership.

There are reports that North Vietnamese youngsters no longer are so eager to volunteer for military duty. Conscription efforts have run into difficulties and, for the first time, parents are openly opposing the drafting of their sons.

Another problem is that discipline within the armed forces has slackened and the rate of desertions and unauthorized absences is on the rise.

Perhaps most significant, these troubles have led to bickering within the leadership over who is responsible for the deteriorating situation and what should be done to correct it.

Political infighting in Hanoi is now believed to be at its bitterest since Ho Chi Minh's death. And this, in turn, further destroys confidence in the leadership.

* * *
The emergence of this situation had been anticipated by many Hanoi-watchers, although it is generally agreed that the Cambodia developments helped speed its arrival.

Ever since Ho died there have been signs that discipline, especially in the all-powerful Lao Dong Party, was causing the leadership concern. A security drive was launched in November and December last year and revived again early this year.

The main theme of the security campaign was to tighten party control of the armed forces and improve the vigilance of party officials at lower levels who are charged with keeping the population in line.

These developments suggested strongly a lack of confidence in the post-Ho leadership.

Despite the political infighting, so far there are no indications of an actual split in the leadership. But, given the personalities involved and their known differences in political outlook, the situation can certainly be described as volatile.

The two most widely recognized factions in the Hanoi leadership are woven around the country's two main leaders: Le Duan and Truong Chinh.

Le Duan has been the most equal among equals since Ho's death, but Truong Chinh is constantly at his elbow with the reminder of the tremendous influence he wields and of the tremendous backing he has as the leader of the pro-Peking group.

Le and Truong are believed to disagree on a wide range of subjects, but basically Le takes a more pragmatic approach while Truong is an ideological purist.

(For example, Le Duan has recognized the need for offering material incentives to farmers as a means of boosting production, while Truong Chinh follows the concept that proper political outlook—and thus a greater political education effort—will produce the needed motivation.)

The recent expansion of the war into Cambodia has clearly worked in Truong Chinh's favor. China responded to the new situation firmly and with an approach to countering Cambodia's anticommunist stance.

That response took the form of setting Sihanouk up in exile in Peking and helping establish the so-called united front for the liberation of Indochina.

Russia, at the same time, hesitated, fumbled and finally did nothing, thus depriving Le Duan and Hanoi a choice of responses.

With Truong Chinh enthusiastically backing the Chinese-initiated united front idea, and with Le Duan and his right-hand man Premier Pham Van Dong having to go along with it, Truong scored a significant psychological advance.

This is just one example of the kind of maneuvering going on within Hanoi's collective leadership. Much of the jockeying over domestic issues and problems—the sagging economy, depressed morale, lack of confidence in the leadership—is carried on well out of sight of even the more ardent outside observers.

But one thing is clear about the current North Vietnamese leadership, even if the fine details are not visible. The picture of a unified, harmonious leadership is a myth.

(The End)

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
10 November 1970

CPYRGHT

Defectors believe Red cause is lost

By DON TATE

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

BEN TRE, South Vietnam—At Chieu Hoi ("open arms") camps for Viet Cong defectors all thru the Mekong Delta one hears the same story of a lost cause.

I talked to numbers of the defectors at the Chieu Hoi camp here where 800 former Viet Cong milled around, seeming vastly relieved to be out of the shooting.

Their stories left the impression that the indigenous Viet Cong movement would be dead if it were not for Hanoi's heavy control and the presence of North Vietnamese troops.

Ben Tre is the town the allies had to "destroy to save" during the 1968 attacks. It has been rebuilt but "Ben Tre ust not stand" says the current communist battle order.

"Spontaneous uprisings" of the 30,000 Ben Tre people were ordered for early October and again in early November, but the people did not rise up either time, just as they had not during the Reds' high tide offensives of 1968.

Then, Qui Cong Tui Cong Tuong, Viet Cong propaganda and training chief for the Ben Tre area, walked into the Chieu Hoi camp. He said he felt irrelevant doing what he was doing. He did not believe his own propaganda any more. He said he was disillusioned after all these years by the continued failure of the people to respond to the National Liberation Front (NLF).

The drop-outs are the first to tell you the Viet Cong aren't what they used to be. Here's a look at some Viet Cong who quit fighting in the past few days and why:

- Moui Van Tho, 45, Communist party secretary of his village in Long An province. One of those with fear and suspicion still etched into his gaunt face, he explains it took a long time for him to convince himself to defect.

All the Viet Cong around his village already had defected or been wiped out. He was the last except for five North Vietnamese who had been sent in. He did not like the North Vietnamese, especially to be bossed by them. The Viet Cong first came into his village in 1960 and controlled the whole area. There was little choice but to join them, he said.

"But I have been fighting a long time," said Tho. "There is no reason to fight any longer. We have nothing. My family has nothing. I must live in hideout away from my family. We have sacrificed everything for the National Liberation Front. It is my opinion they are beaten. They have no place to go and nothing to offer the people anymore."

But weren't a lot of his people still sympathetic to the NLF?

"No. The people want to be left alone. To be quiet. So they can work and do for themselves. All I want is to be a medium-class farmer and help my family and go fishing."

What happens if the communists find him?

"They would kill me, of course," he says.

- Nguyen Van Loan, 27, company commander of a guerrilla unit in Long An province. He walked in two days ago with his K54 Chinese pistol and said he didn't want to fight anymore. He was fed up with the war. Most of his battalion already had defected or been killed. Only 15 men were left in his company, which had practically no supplies.

Conscripted by the communists when he was 17, he had been very poor. "They promise us everything, we get nothing," he said. Ironically, Loan is already preparing to take a test to become an officer in the South Vietnamese army.

- Tran Van Kiem, 27, platoon leader, Tay Ninh Province. Seven years ago the Viet Cong came into his village and took him. His battalion had grown steadily weaker since the 1968 Tet offensive. A gunship had chased him across a rice field firing rockets, inflicting severe head wounds.

He went to Cambodia to convalesce, but last spring was attacked there. He did not get along with the North Vietnamese who were filling out his battered unit. Supplies got shorter. His unit was under constant pressure. Many of his comrades were discouraged and talked of defecting. Kiem did.

- Nguyen VAN Son, 16, Kien Hoa province, became a Viet Cong when he was 12. He was an information agent for his village. One of his duties was to blow a horn to broadcast victories. "I think I blow lies," he said with a laugh. When ARVN (South Vietnamese) forces began moving into Kien Hoa in force, Son switched.

CPYRGHT

BALTIMORE SUN
14 July 1970

Allies Say Viet Red Troops Balk At Entering Cambodia

By MICHAEL PARKS
[Sun Staff Correspondent]

Saigon, July 13—Large numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers are reportedly refusing to fight in Cambodia, according to allied military sources here.

If so, the allied analysts said, the refusals have ruptured the generally strong discipline of the regular North Vietnamese Army units. American commanders have occasionally been confronted by similar refusals.

An American intelligence officer said there has been what he called "open agitation to return home" in a number of North Vietnamese units now fighting in Cambodia.

Mutinies" Reported

South Vietnamese analysts, speaking independently and citing different sources for their conclusions, said they have evidence of "mutinies" in 13 North Vietnamese battalions now in Cambodia.

Both the American and the South Vietnamese intelligence officers attributed the reported refusal to fight in Cambodia to poor enemy morale following the allied invasion of the formerly attack-free sanctuaries there.

The American intelligence officer said captured documents and interviews with defectors and prisoners showed that the North Vietnamese soldiers repeatedly had been assured by their military and political leaders that the United States and South Vietnam would never invade Cambodia, primarily because of the growing anti-war sentiment in the United States.

Defector's Story

A recent North Vietnamese defector, a senior noncommissioned officer, reportedly told

his South Vietnamese interviewers, "the base camps (Cambodian sanctuaries) were the only respite we had, and when they were gone most of us just gave up."

Intelligence officers cite the sharp rise in the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors during the invasion as additional proof of declining enemy morale.

While this year's defection rate is running about 25 per cent below the record set in 1969, it approached or equaled the comparable weekly rates during most of May and June.

Requests For Guidance

North Vietnamese field commanders have sent urgent requests for guidance on dealing with the morale problem in general, and the problems of mutiny and defection in particular, to their headquarters in Kratie, Cambodia, and to Hanoi, according to intelligence reports.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 September 1970

After Ho, results count

By MICHAEL PARKS

Saigon.

"Ho Chi Minh was like the favorite uncle who dies and leaves many big debts and only keepsakes and memories with which to pay them," a Communist diplomat said recently in appraising the current situation in North Vietnam.

"That is what the new collective leadership in Hanoi has been trying to do—pay old debts with memories. Sometimes it requires a trip to the pawnshop. They have had some success, but the plans they are making are more important than what actually has been accomplished in the year since Uncle Ho died."

When Ho, already a legend, died a year ago Thursday at 79, North Vietnam was faced with its worst economic crisis since the disasters of the farm collectivization shortly after independence.

It had also realized there was little prospect for a quick victory in the war in the South even with an American withdrawal. Its people were increasingly war weary, their morale depressed by severe shortages of food and consumer goods.

In the will, read at his funeral, Ho said that "the resistance war against United States aggression may drag out. Our compatriots may have to undergo new sacrifices in terms of property and human lives. In any case, we must be resolved to fight against the U.S. aggressors until the final victory."

To accomplish that, Ho left a sense of nationhood which he hoped would bring his country independence and forge a disciplined people. The nation also was left with his own emotion-packed image.

Rice, wheat flour imported

Ho's successors have attempted to use all of these things in dealing with North Vietnam's problems, but on the surface little has changed.

The country still lives from hand to mouth, able to feed its own people only by importing 800,000 tons of rice and wheat flour a year. Consumer goods are still in very short supply despite efforts to increase production—the adult cloth ration is about four yards a person a year.

The war continues with tens of thousands of teen-agers marching off each year, never to return. The government, increasingly defensive in its public statements about its war policies, has chided those who do not believe its claims of great victories and who ask when the war will end.

The same four men who ran the government and the war on a day-to-day basis under Ho are still running it now. Intelligence analysts speculate endlessly about who is in charge and what sort of power play put him there.

The consensus is that the 62-year-old first secretary of the Communist party, Le Duan, is the de facto leader.

His pragmatism is rapidly becoming the hallmark of the Hanoi government and American analysts are just beginning to recognize the impact of his problem-solving approach on North Vietnam's military, economic and political policies.

Rearrangement of power

Others in the leadership are Truong Chinh, 62, the chairman of the North Vietnamese National Assembly, Pham Van Dong, also 62, the premier, and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, 58, the defense minister and Army commander. Ho's successor as president is Ton Duc Thang, 82, a figurehead.

Truong Chinh, the party's chief theoretician for many years, is usually cast as Le Duan's protagonist in a hawk-vs.-dove, protracted-war-vs.-quick-strike, Peking-vs.-Moscow power struggle in which Le Duan, the soft-liner, triumphed. A European diplomat who travels frequently to Hanoi suggested that the struggle was far less dramatic than portrayed in the West. "It was more a rearrangement of power and responsibilities than a bitter fight," he said. Yet American analysts especially do not believe any sort of collective leadership can work without devolving into a one-man dictatorship.

EXCERPTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE MEDIA ON LABOR
PROBLEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Workers') Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, called on April 10 for a further development of the "productive labor movement" which has been under way since December, 1969. The aim is to ensure regular attendance by factory workers and an increase in production. There are signs that in this campaign, unlike previous ones, the authorities are not relying solely on appeals to the workers' "Socialist consciousness", but are also providing material incentives for the majority of industries.

North Vietnamese workers have frequently been criticized for what Nhan Dan described on October 16, 1969, as the habit of "late to work, early to leave" (though it claimed some recent improvement) and industrial progress. An editorial in Nhan Dan on November 6, 1969, said that each industrial shift usually had "only four to five really productive work hours" and that machines were actually producing for "only two to three hours". A Ministry of Labor circular on October 22, 1969, laid down strict regulations for working hours, based on eight hours a day for six days a week, extended in some cases to ten hours a day, and with only half an hour's break. But the 1970 State Plan indicated that labor productivity was still not improving. A member of the State Planning Commission, Che Viet Tan, wrote in the army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, on January 8, 1970, that the most important requirement for realization of the 1970 State Plan was an increase in output.

The productive labor movement, although it had been referred to in the Press since December, 1969, was officially inaugurated by a Council of Ministers resolution, broadcast by Hanoi Radio on February 12, 1970. The mobilization of all labor resources, to increase their efficiency and output, was to be achieved by increasing party leadership over labor, strengthening "the Socialist laws and State discipline", and consolidating "educational, ideological and political work".

Behind these orthodox Communist remedies were indications that ideological purity was being neglected in favor of the only measures that might ensure greater enthusiasm among workers - material incentives. Le Thanh Nghi, a Deputy Prime Minister and one of North Vietnam's chief economic planners, recently told building workers to strengthen discipline and return to a full eight-hour day, but also advocated a "piece-work payment system" (Hanoi Radio, February 17). Hanoi Radio quoted him on February 19 as telling chemical workers that "the intensive use of contract and piece-work systems is highly important as a means of increasing production and improving living conditions"; he added that the "ideological leadership tasks" must not be carried out "in a general and unrealistic fashion".

A directive from the Prime Minister's Office, carried by Nhan Dan on February 24, 1970, called for a reorganization of the wage system, which would be aimed at "turning the salary into a real incentive for labor efficiency". On March 17, Nhan Dan criticized labor management and the practice of "squandering labor forces and equipment", and advocated an "appropriate form of wages and bonuses, especially the system of paying wages according to goods produced". Although the need for material incentives has been mentioned before in the North Vietnamese Press, notably by party First Secretary Le Duan in November, 1967, there has been little evidence of their being put into effect. The chief party theoretician and Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, Truong Chinh, made it clear in a speech in 1968 that he abominated such forms of "rightist thinking", and that ideological orthodoxy came first in all economic matters. However, the present trend appears to indicate that economic efficiency has taken precedence over ideological correctness, although the party is clearly keeping a firm grip on the political education of its members.

North Vietnamese workers, however, do not appear to be inspired with more enthusiasm than in the past. Nhan Dan, on April 10, complained that "a large obstacle to be eliminated is the working method of small producers and managerial civil servants", who "rely on old experiences", and fail to see "new factors in seeking ways to exploit latent capabilities".

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December 1970

THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FEEBLE INTRUDERThe Intrusion

On 21 October 1970 Major James Russell landed his small Army transport on an obscure airfield on the Turkish-Soviet border near a town which he took to be Kars. This misconception was dispelled at once by the sight of a red star painted on the side of a helicopter parked to one side of the strip. Major Russell had landed his passengers (Generals Scherrer and Mcquarrie of the US Military Assistance Mission to Turkey and Colonel Cevat Denli, a Turkish Liaison officer) in Leninakan in Soviet Armenia. It was there that the four officers were held and interrogated for 20 days. This was the somewhat pedestrian incident which precipitated one of the noisiest Soviet propaganda outbursts since the U-2 episode in 1960. The reasons for this peculiar magnification of an inadvertent navigational gaffe provide some intriguing clues to the climate of thinking in the Kremlin.

The Feeble Intruder

The factor which is central to the whole episode is the nature of the aircraft used. What Soviet propaganda treated as some sort of advanced, sophisticated, high-performance penetration and reconnaissance weapon was in effect nothing more than a business aircraft incorporating features of a modern airliner and seating from 6 to 9 persons. The plane was a Beechcraft Queen Air 65-80 with an Army designation of U-8. Powered by two conventional 380 HP Lycoming engines it boasted a maximum speed of 252 MPH (406 KMH) at 11,500 feet and a maximum ceiling of 29,000 feet (8,840 meters.) Other relevant operational attributes were a maximum cruising speed of 230 MPH (370 KMH) at 15,000 feet and a maximum economy speed of 189 MPH (304 KMH) at the same altitude. Although it was a military aircraft the plane was unarmed; its function was simply to serve as transportation. This, then, was the awesome weapon that triggered the Soviet propaganda circus.

To conceive of this plane being used to penetrate Soviet airspace on a reconnaissance mission in the face of sophisticated radar, rocket and supersonic interceptor defenses is somewhat on a par with betting on a Bleriot monoplane in a contest with a Messerschmitt. Certainly there could have been no real suspicion in the minds of the Kremlin realists that the incident was anything more than an inadvertent intrusion of a totally non-military character.

Curious Cases

Before proceeding with speculation as to the Soviet leadership's reasons for launching the propaganda campaign, it might be useful to examine some of the recent history of navigational problems which have bedeviled non-Soviet airmen in this geographical area. On 27 June 1958 an American C-118 transport on a cargo run from Adana in south-central Turkey northeast to Trabizon on the Black Sea, some 100 miles west of the Soviet border, was jumped by Russian MIG jets. The crew parachuted safely while the pilot landed his burning plane. After their eventual release by the Soviets the pilot reported something seemed to go wrong with the radio-navigation equipment as they neared Trabizon.

The next episode occurred on 2 September 1958 when a U.S. C-180 transport plane was sent out to check radio beams on a triangular course from Adana to Trabizon and right to Van on a course parallel to the Soviet border, but never closer to it than 100 miles. Near Trabizon the plane completely disappeared. After 10 days' silence, Soviet authorities announced that the "intruding" aircraft had crashed 25 miles inside Soviet Armenia.

To probe these two diversions the U.S. Air Force sent a specially equipped test plane along the same triangular course as above. Sure enough, over Trabizon the radio direction finder was deflected by a signal stronger than that of the local control tower onto a course that would have taken the test plane toward the Soviet border and to Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. This mission was flown in good weather, the pilot was alert to the possibility of false signals, and he relied on visual landmarks for navigation. If he had relied on his instruments, he would have been led into the USSR.

Beaming false radio signals to misguide fliers, called "spoofing", is a cunning trick which dates at least as far back as World War II. All pilots flying in Turkey, Germany, Japan and other areas near Communist borders have been warned about it. Soviet use of this tactic since 1958 has been generally unsuccessful, at least up until the incident of General Scherrer's misadventure, and the evidence here is inconclusive. The element of bad weather was present, forcing the pilot to rely on navigational aids during the crucial time of his approach to Kars. When the cloud deck did break sufficiently to permit visual navigation, he misread landmarks and so descended to Leninakan. Whether or not the Soviets induced this intrusion electronically cannot be proved one way or the other, but when it did occur Soviet propaganda mechanisms seized upon it.

The multiplicity of possible reasons why they did so (and then quite suddenly backed away from the controversy without using

the four officers as bargaining counters to retrieve the recent Soviet skyjackers being held in Turkey) suggests a confused and divided Kremlin leadership. The affair may have been the outgrowth of a "dove-hawk" struggle among them with the various elements, each with vested interest in the matter, vying with each other to gain advantage from the incident. The overall effect is one of a curious and fragile balance between aggressiveness and passivity.

The Curious Case

The reasons for the Russians' magnification of the episode, once it was underway, are both political and military. There may have been the overriding desire in certain quarters to make judicious use of the incident to weaken the U.S. position in Turkey. Since Stalin's death the Soviets have adopted a "good neighbor" policy toward the Turks. Now they see an opportunity to suggest that the presence of these U.S. bases on the soil of a NATO ally is an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union. They probably see as a minimum objective restrictions placed in the way of the continued operation of these bases.

Simply publicizing these bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union provides a rationale for Soviet electronic snooping off the coasts of the United States, and for the creation of overseas military bases for themselves. But this outcry could also be indicative of strong feelings of insecurity among the top members of the ruling elite. To men whose positions are legitimized only by the Divine Right of Stalin the world must look threatening. Pressures being generated within the system for change endanger their powers and privileges, and the legitimate, representative governments of the West must appear to them as another source of infection and military menace. Hence, the Kremlin's maneuvering could reflect genuine fear of any Western forces ranged close to their pressure-sensitive borders.

Then again, it is just possible that for an unfathomable tangle of interconnecting, Byzantine reasons having to do with the Sino-Soviet dispute, dissenters at home, the SALT talks, rapprochement with the West, and what have you, elements in the Kremlin may feel that the rush of events must be slowed to a manageable speed, that the time is at hand when a measure of Cold War chill should be injected into the international arena. They don't want their image to go too soft. Or, maybe they want to examine further President Nixon's reactions under stress.

There remains one possible reason - or speculation, really - which ties in neatly with the Soviets' current foreign preoccupation, their drive toward the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle East. Nothing would facilitate their drive more than land access to Syria and Iraq through eastern Turkey. The Soviets may plan to

achieve this peacefully by drawing the Turks into increasingly closer cooperation, demonstrating that the U.S. is the only irritant precluding a complete rapprochement, and so alienating them from the U.S., and ultimately from NATO, to such an extent that the former will be evicted and all ties with the latter severed. Then [REDACTED] the promise of economic and military aid could be traded for the guarantee of secure and continuing overland access to the Middle East.

On the other hand they may not have ruled out a power play to achieve the same result. If so, the initial removal of the U.S. presence would substantially reduce the risks in such a gamble. The launching of this sort of power play to obtain the land routes either by force or the threat of force would require a considerable logistical build-up in Soviet Armenia. Therefore, the magnified reaction to the intrusion of General Scherrer's plane may reflect a desire to mask significant changes in the Soviet order of battle within the staging area from any threat of low-level surveillance.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 October 1970

Ambivalence in Moscow

There has been a curious ambivalence—suggestion of intense debate at high Kremlin levels—in the Soviet reaction to the accidental landing on Soviet territory of an unarmed plane carrying two American generals, their pilot and a Turkish officer.

A hard line has been implied by the failure to release the plane's passengers as well as by the harsh tone of the Soviet notes to the United States and Turkey on the subject. A more sensible course has been implied by the permission given American diplomats to visit the strayed officers and the subsequent report that the detained men are being treated decently though still denied release.

No doubt there are those in Moscow who urge that the four detainees be held as hostages to exert pressure on Turkey to return the two men who recently hijacked a Soviet plane. But such a policy might well harden the Turks' attitude, while it would create an unfortunate impression in this country. Such petty opportunism would also be widely interpreted here and elsewhere as a negative Kremlin reaction to President Nixon's United Nations appeal for Soviet-American cooperation.

There can be no serious accusation that the plane was guilty of anything more horrendous than a navigational error, but continued failure to release its occupants could blow this still-minor incident into an unnecessary and harmful source of exacerbation in Soviet-American relations.

CPYRGHT

THE NEW YORK TIMES
8 November 1970

Hostages in Leninakan

Moscow's genius for unnecessarily creating ill will toward it in this country is exhibiting itself again in Soviet failure to release the two American generals it has been holding prisoner for over two weeks.

From the beginning, it was patent that a navigational error was responsible for the landing at Leninakan in Soviet Armenia of a light, unarmed American plane carrying the generals, their pilot and a Turkish escort officer. Even the heavy-handed and professionally suspicious Soviet security apparatus has made no formal charge of espionage or the like against the plane's occupants. Yet despite repeated Washington requests for their release, the four men involved are still imprisoned.

Soviet propaganda has sought to draw lurid parallels between the plane and the U-2 shot down over the Urals almost a decade ago, though the facts in the two cases are entirely different. The point of this psychological warfare is presumably to remind the West that the U-2 pilot was exchanged for a Soviet spy, thus hinting that only a similar exchange now will free the four prisoners. Presumably the human trading material Moscow wants is the four Soviet citizens who recently escaped to Turkey in hijacked planes.

There should be no surrender to this effort at blackmail. Washington reduced and downgraded its delegations at celebrations of the Russian Revolution as one means of emphasizing its displeasure. No doubt the State Department is prepared to resort to stronger measures, if necessary, such as proceeding against Soviet fishing vessels—many equipped with elaborate electronic gear—

which sometimes inadvertently enter American waters.

The wiser course for Moscow would be to release the generals and thus avoid blowing this accident into a new and growing source of tension with Washington. There are encouraging rumors that the Russians are about to do just that. It is past time.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 November 1970

CPYRGHT



on border jinks

By John K. Cooley

Beirut, Lebanon

That recent flurry of unscheduled flights across the Soviet-Turkish border have occurred in a small corner of the cold war already marked by eerie mystery and international intrigue.

This fall's border incidents—two hijackings and a strayed U.S. Air Force plane—bring suddenly to mind bizarre events in precisely the same area a dozen years ago. In those incidents, American pilots were lured into Soviet airspace by bogus Soviet radio signals.

In June 27, 1958, Maj. L. W. Lyles and other Air Force personnel were flying a cargo run in a C-118 transport from Adana in south-central Turkey northeast to Trabzon, a Turkish port on the Black Sea some 100 miles west of the Soviet border.

Russian MIG jets appeared and opened fire just about the time a violent thunderstorm broke. The crew parachuted to safety. Major Lyles successfully landed his burning plane.

After he and his crew were released by the Soviets, Major Lyles disclosed that something had seemed to go wrong with their radio-navigation equipment as they neared Trabzon.

The next episode occurred Sept 2, 1958. Capt. Paul E. Duncan, four other officers, and 12 enlisted men took off in a C-130 transport plane from Adana. Their mission, the Air Force said, was to check radio beams and frequencies used by such flights as those of Major Lyles.

Gremlins ride airwaves

First leg of the flight plan was to Trabzon. Next, a right turn into a course—parallel to but never closer than 100 miles from the Soviet border—to the Turkish city of Van. Near Trabzon the plane completely disappeared.

After 10 days' silence, Soviet authorities said the "intruding" aircraft crashed on Alagoz Mountain, 25 miles inside Soviet Armenia.

To probe the mystery of the two diversions, the U.S. Air Force on Sept. 8, 1958, sent a specially equipped test plane along Captain Duncan's route.

Over Trabzon, the first gremlins appeared in the radio equipment. They were Kremlin-type gremlins. Instead of receiving the "TZ" code signal from Trabzon control tower, a louder signal came in. Their radio director finder deflected to lead them toward the Soviet border.

Had visibility been bad and had the Americans been flying on instruments, the Soviet signals, only one kilocycle away from the Trabzon frequency, would have lured the plane to a point near Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia.

The test flight ended safely. Its results and certain other intelligence information were painstakingly evaluated.

On the following Nov. 13, U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy invited the Soviet Ambassador and Air Attaché in Washington to listen to a tape recording.

They declined. The tape was a monitored conversation between two Soviet pilots as they shot down the C-130, probably over Soviet territory. The conversation and the story were published by Allen Rankin in the Reader's Digest of June, 1959.

It's an old trick

The cunning trick of "spoofing," or sending out false radio signals to misguide an enemy, dates back at least as far as World War II. Since the early 1950's, U.S. Air Force pilots flying in Turkey, Germany, Japan, and other areas near Communist borders have been warned about it.

Israeli intelligence employed "spoofing" to high advantage against Egyptian aircraft flying over Sinai when Israel attacked in June, 1967. Sometimes Israeli "spoofers" even called the Egyptian pilots by their first names.

This year's airborne escapades began Oct. 15. After killing a hostess, a Lithuanian father and son hijacked a Soviet Aeroflot plane and landed it in Trabzon, Turkey still holds the skyjackers, who want political asylum, against insistent Soviet demands for their return.

Next, a U.S. Air Force liaison plane, carrying Maj. Gen. Edward Scherer, commanding U.S. forces in Turkey; Brig. Gen. Claude M. McQuarrie; Maj. James Russell; and Turkish Col. Cevdat Enali landed Oct. 22 near Leninakan, in Soviet Armenia.

Moscow may detain the officers until Turkey hands over the Lithuanian skyjackers. Major Russell told U.S. consular officers from Moscow that their plane was blown off course in a storm just before they were about to land at Kars, about 25 miles from the Soviet border.

Finally, on Oct. 27, three Soviet passengers diverted a small plane to Sinop, Turkey.

Sources in Washington say there is no evidence that spoofing was involved; in fact, they think it wasn't. But luring has occurred unsuccessfully — once or twice since 1958. And sources say this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.

CPYRGHT

POST

10 November 1970

2 U.S. Generals Will Be Released, Soviet Ambassador Tells Rogers

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union told the United States yesterday that the two American generals it has held for almost three weeks will be released from custody and permitted to leave Russia.

This word was transmitted by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin to Secretary of State William P. Rogers around 1:15 p.m.

But Dobrynin did not say when the generals would be released, and up to a late hour last night there was no word that they had crossed any Soviet border.

The fate of the American major who piloted the light U-8 aircraft that the United States said strayed across the border by accident was not mentioned by Dobrynin. But there was reason to believe he and his plane would also be released.

Turk Released

The fourth occupant of the plane, a Turkish colonel, was released yesterday and crossed the Soviet border into Turkey, according to Ankara radio.

The four men are Maj. Gen. Edward Scherrer, head of the U.S. military mission in Turkey, Brig. Gen. Claude Morroe McQuarrie, pilot Major James Russell and Turkish Col. Cevat Deneli.

At the Florida White House, press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said President Nixon would be pleased about the release and that he regarded the development as a constructive step in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Word Slips Out

The State Department, which made public the gist of the Dobrynin word to Rogers late

in the day, had not intended to make an announcement until the officers had left the Soviet Union. But State's congressional relations office passed the word to Rep. Kenneth J. Gray (D-Ill.), in whose district Scherrer's home town of Shaynee Town, Ill., is located, and Gray promptly made it public.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey then made the announcement.

The affair of the generals, as it became known, has been a puzzling aspect of Soviet-American relations since their plane landed in the Soviet Union on Oct. 22.

The initial expectation was that they would be quickly released.

But they were not, and Soviet broadcasts began to stress what Moscow considers the evils of American bases overseas, especially those as close to the Soviet Union as the ones in Turkey that the generals had been inspecting.

Moscow, in a formal note to Washington, called such flights part of "extensive military and intelligence activities" by the U.S. and an activity "openly hostile to the U.S.S.R."

Ankara was warned of "dangerous consequences" if such "provocative actions" from Turkish airfields continued.

The American response, also in a formal note, was that Moscow had violated the Soviet-American consular agreement by refusing permission for American embassy officials in Moscow to visit them within four days. The first of two visits was on the fifth day.

Yesterday, before Dobrynin's call, McCloskey told newsmen that last Thursday Soviet officials had denied a request for a third visit. McCloskey said that "we are considering what would be the next appropriate step" if the men were not soon released.

The U.S. had sent only low-level officials to last Friday's Soviet embassy celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a deliberate snub because of the detention of the generals.

Yesterday McCloskey said that was the only case in which such instructions had been given to U.S. diplomats but that "I would not think we will be out looking for opportunities to bring ourselves together while the officers are still held."

Some American officials felt Moscow was holding the men simply to drain the last bit of propaganda benefit from what was clearly an embarrassment to the United States. Others felt that the use of the case to call attention to American bases was related to the ongoing strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

The Soviets have contended that the U.S. should include in strategic weapons to be put under control those tactical aircraft overseas, land and carrier based, capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Soviet soil.

American planes using Turkish bases could fly such missions, as could planes from West European bases and

from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Some officials here have speculated that there have been differences of opinion in Moscow between foreign office officials and the secret police, and perhaps the military as well, over how to handle the case. However, there appeared to be no evidence.

So far the SALT talks appear to have been insulated from the increased tension in Soviet-American relations. That tension was produced by the Soviet collusion with Egypt in violating the Middle East cease-fire standstill, as Washington charged, from

what Washington took to be a Soviet effort to create a nuclear submarine facility in Cuba, from Soviet threats to block the Berlin air corridors and from the case of the generals.

The tension relaxed after Soviet ships left Cienfuegos, Cuba, but the Pentagon reported yesterday that they were on the way back. However, no alarm bells were being run over that last night, officials here said. But if the ships did enter port and stayed then "we'd have to take another look," one high official said.

December 1970

DATES WORTH NOTING

December 26 - 28	Karachi	Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. The first session is to be open to the public.
January 4 - 9	Havana	7th Congress of the International Organization of Journalists, a Prague-based Soviet-controlled front.
January 11 - 13	London	The Communist Parties of Western Europe are to meet to discuss the role of the working class in Western Europe in relation to development of multinational societies. The projected January meeting is an outgrowth of a meeting in London on September 21, 1969, attended by delegates from the Communist parties of Cyprus, West Germany, England, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain. The Soviet Communist Party was not represented, and never publicly expressed its attitude toward the September meeting.
January 15 - 16	USSR	36th anniversary of the first show trial of Stalin's Great Purge, 1935. The defendants were charged with counterrevolutionary activity and moral responsibility for the assassination of Sergey Kirov, the Soviet leader who was regarded as Stalin's heir-apparent. Among those convicted were Grigoriy Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, who were the initial members with Stalin of the triumvirate that ruled Russia during Lenin's illness. Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed in 1936. It is now widely believed that Stalin, himself, plotted Kirov's assassination.

January 16	Prague	In 1969 Jan Palach, a Czech student, set fire to himself in downtown Prague to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
February 3 - 10	Bratislava	10th Congress of the (Communist) International Union of Students. This Prague-based front was so demoralized by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the 10th Congress had to be postponed repeatedly during the past year.

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December 1970

SHORT SUBJECTS

Big Push for Soviet Arabic Studies. Moscow students complain the former leisurely pace of Arabic studies in the Soviet Union's various institutes of oriental languages is suffering because of the Soviet military build-up in the United Arab Republic. It used to be that students completed three years of study at one of the five institutes, went on to spend ten months of study at Cairo University, then returned to the Soviet Union for their final examinations. Now, the fourth-year students have been pressed into service as military experts. Very bad, say their professors, because the military vocabulary is so very limited. Another disadvantage is the lads might be killed, as was one interpreter during an Israeli bombing raid last summer. Additional Egyptian teachers have been joining colleagues at some of the Soviet institutes as the Arabic teaching program is apparently expanding even more.

Young nationals from such non-Russian speaking states as Estonia and the Uzbek SSR, who normally find themselves discriminated against in competing for places in the Moscow diplomatic school are opting for Arabic studies instead. With the demand for Arabic linguists at a maximum, the non-Russian students feel they can be assured of foreign assignments --- even though their sometimes shaky knowledge of Russian may often hamper even their usefulness as interpreters.

* * * * *

Shot in the Arm. A tourist recently hospitalized in the Soviet Union tells of having refused an injection with some narcotic prescribed for him at the hospital. To his surprise, the nurse then quickly shot herself in the arm and proceeded to become quite euphoric. After learning what had happened, the doctor urged the tourist to tell him if an injection was not wanted, remarking that there was a drug problem in the hospital. According to the doctor, some of the younger, less-educated nurses were joining the hospital staff just to get easy access to drugs.

* * * * *

Frankness on Problems of Trading with the East. It is not only Western businessmen who now voice complaints over the intricacies of doing business with Communist trade monopolies; fellow Communists,

too, have begun complaining. Being compelled to accept products which are not needed and not wanted, uncoordinated tariff lists, running up huge clearing credits instead of receiving hard currency, and having to conduct trade through government administrators rather than with managers of factories which produce the goods being sold: these are some of the complaints which the Yugoslav press has been voicing in its commentaries about the problems of signing new long-term trade agreements with the USSR and East European countries. The Yugoslav press has been reporting regularly on progress, or lack of progress in negotiating the 1971 to 1975 trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Concurrently with these articles, and in contrast to press reporting within the Soviet Bloc, have been articles on the growing difficulties and disadvantages which Yugoslav enterprises must endure in order to meet the government's plans for trade with the COMECON countries. A typical article was published in mid-October 1970 in Belgrade's economic weekly, Ekonomska Politika, emphasizing that the recent high level of negotiating activity between Yugoslav trade officials and those from the East Bloc should not be interpreted as any guarantee of success. The article pointed out that during the previous five-year agreement, with the exception of neighboring Hungary and Rumania, Yugoslav trade with the COMECON partners fell consistently below planned levels and that production licensing contracts were few, plans for joint appearances on third markets remained just plans, and industrial cooperation was severely limited. Such criticism, much of which echoes Western complaints, indicates how Yugoslavia's socialist market economy is drifting slowly but steadily westwards.

* * * * *

Yugoslav Evolution vs. Soviet Involution. In recent weeks the world has seen interesting activity on the Yugoslav political scene. Tito set matters in motion last September by suggesting that when he ceases to act as President of Yugoslavia he be replaced by a "Presidency" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a form of collective leadership in which all republics and nationalities are to have real representation. What precise shape this concept will take remains to be seen but its real importance rests on the fact that there is wide-ranging and free discussion about it among the citizenry as well as among political figures, a phenomenon in Communist-controlled countries.

In another innovation, the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) held a first "Conference" (29 - 31 October) similar to the more familiar institution of Party Congresses, except that the Conference will be convened annually for discussions on more pressing national questions, while the Congresses will continue to be held every five years. Here again, more important than the institution is the fact that delegates really debated issues, disagreed openly and vigorously

with one another, engaged in frank criticism of national policies, etc., rather than observing the standard Communist procedure of rubber stamping decisions made by a handful of the top leaders.

These two events represent the most recent in a continuation of the gingerly, experimental evolution of Yugoslavia started after her separation from the Soviet Bloc in 1948, an evolution that has moved in the direction of individual and institutional freedom.

Though perhaps slight, these genuine moves toward democracy loom as gigantic strides compared to the immobility of Soviet society, where ever since Stalin's death such changes have been for the most part more apparent than real. Thus, while change in Yugoslavia represents evolution, in the Soviet Union it may be regarded as involution (in the biological sense, i.e. degeneration).

* * * * *

Where the Bell (Almost) Never Tolls for Thee. Westerners who blame the union of modern electronics with impersonal corporations for maddeningly inefficient mechanized service, with its frequency of determined misdialings and the lunatic nonsequiturs of prerecorded answering services, might profit by pondering the plight of the Soviet telephone customer. The weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta conducted a series of experiments on the efficiency of the Moscow telephone system and published a report which could not have surprised their readers: the system is not efficient.

The New York Times of 25 October 1970 reported that the Gazeta's attempts to reach the desk of the Hotel Rossiya on Red Square failed, so a reporter was sent by car to find out why. There he found the desk's three phones off their hooks while the two girls assigned to answer them argued heatedly over what shift each would take next.

In another test a dispatch center for taxis was called, but there was no answer after repeated attempts and a total of 100 rings. A motorized investigator found that the Vavilov Street dispatcher's office had 5 telephones serviced by two dispatchers and one driver who had volunteered to help. None of the three bothered to answer because they were busy eating watermelons.

One of the chief problems noted was the length of time needed to find a telephone number. Moscow is unique among major world cities for its lack of a complete directory service. The last comprehensive directory was published 19 years ago. During Literaturnaya Gazeta's experiments, which were conducted on average mornings, it took 5 to 12 calls to get through to information, and then a wait of 7 rings for an answer.

* * * * *

Chile's Christian Democrats Start Opposition to Allende Program. It is noteworthy that the Christian Democratic Party, whose support was vital to the election of Salvador Allende, has started to oppose some of the government's measures which affect their interests, and they have apparently been successful in their first test of strength with the coalition government. Because those civil servants who are also Christian Democrats have been finding it increasingly difficult to keep their jobs in the face of leftist pressures, the party suggested legislation to protect them. The government yielded to this request by announcing it would send such legislation to Congress. This underlines the importance of Christian Democratic support to the government, and should serve as a useful reminder that just as Allende needed the seventy-four votes of the Christian Democratic bloc in Congress to become president, so will he need those same votes if he is to carry out his program within Chile's constitutional framework -- as he has promised to do. However, at the same time that the Christian Democratic party position has stiffened, the more extreme members of the coalition are urging President Allende to undertake even stronger measures against particular Christian Democratic interests, and a leftist columnist has already begun to hint that "rightists" within the Congress are trying to undermine the government's program.

CPYRGHT

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NEW YORK TIMES
5 October 1970
**YUGOSLAVS PLAN
ROTATION OF RULE**

**Post-Tito Joint Presidency
to Get New Head Annually**

By **ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.**
Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Oct.

An authoritative Communist official announced here today that the collective presidency that Marshal Tito has proposed as his eventual successor would be headed by a different man each year.

Opening official and detailed discussion on the succession plan first outlined by President Tito in a speech in Zagreb on Sept. 21, Edvard Kardelj, a leading member of the party Politburo, said the new body would contain the most powerful and representative political leaders in the country.

The actual chairmanship of the group, he told members of the Presidium of the League of Communists in a long speech, should be rotated annually, giving each of the six Yugoslav republics a turn at having its man in the top job.

An exception, will be made for President Tito himself, Mr. Kardelj said. He implied that the 78-year-old leader would remain in the presidency for the rest of his life.

"It is obvious," said Mr. Kardelj, who was one of Marshal Tito's closest collaborators in the wartime partisan movement, "that Yugoslavia most crucially needs the participation of Comrade Tito in this whole undertaking."

'Not a Magic Wand'

Stressing a point that had been made by Marshal Tito in disclosing the collective successorship plan, Mr. Kardelj maintained that the new body would bring in the two or three most influential leaders of each republic to participate in the federal decision-making process.

The collective presidency, he said, "will not be a magic wand to solve all the problems

and controversies that time brings, but it should certainly speed up the discussion and settlement of such disputes."

Historic feuds pitting the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia against central domination by Serbia now take the form of abrasive economic arguments. These are accentuated by the burden the richer, more industrialized, northern republics must bear in assisting the development of the backward areas of Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Power Decentralized

Since World War II, the personal force and prestige of Marshal Tito has served to keep these internal tensions from fragmenting the nation. Since 1965, however, Yugoslavia has been decentralizing the governing power rapidly, leaving the individual republics with large economic and political autonomy.

Mr. Kardelj forecast today that the collective presidency, even if it could not put an end to the disputes, would be a force capable of making and implementing common policy. "Should the presidency be incapable of such initiatives," he said, "it would certainly not be performing its duty."

"This would mean not only that this organ is in crisis, but that the whole society is in crisis," he declared. "But our society is not in crisis, and we have no reason to doubt that the presidency will perform its positive role in overcoming social problems and conflicts."

Presidium Endorses Plan

BELGRADE, Oct. 4 (AP) — The Presidium of the Yugoslav Communist party today endorsed President Tito's proposal for reorganization of the nation's top leadership. Speakers representing the Communist parties of all the Yugoslav republics gave full support to Marshal Tito's proposal, and it was expected here that a formal proposal for constitutional changes would be submitted to the federal parliament early in 1971.

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~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

December 1970

THE SOVIET UNION EXTENDS ITS INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICAObjectives

Soviet representation in Latin America has increased slowly but steadily within the last few years as a result of mutual Soviet-Latin interest in expanded trade and new export markets, and also as a result of Latin America's wish to demonstrate its independence of United States influence by establishing diplomatic relations with all nations. The Soviets have been following a policy that is low-key and long-range in nature, and in keeping with their current approach, which emphasizes gradual and peaceful means of attaining influence and eventually becoming predominant in most of Latin America. The policy emphasizes diplomatic and trade relations as the best method of increasing Soviet presence and influence.

At the same time, and in line with this gradual diplomatic approach, Moscow is stressing that the local Communist parties engage in popular front tactics, rather than those of armed struggle. Consequently these parties are encouraged to engage in mass organization activities, to participate in elections and, where possible, as in Chile now, to participate in coalition governments.

Since Latin American nationalism has heavy anti-American overtones, Soviet and nationalist objectives are frequently parallel, although to be nationalistic does not necessarily mean to be pro-Soviet. Nevertheless, the Soviets doubtless hope that in the long run they can encourage Latin American governments and societies in a leftward direction, which will lead eventually to the emergence of "national revolutionary" regimes, while their major short-term objective is to help undercut United States influence in the area.

Diplomatic Relations

Within the past year the Soviet Union completed negotiations to establish or renew diplomatic relations with Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, so that it now has diplomatic agreements with every country in South America save Paraguay and Guyana, and there are indications a diplomatic agreement will soon be drawn up with the latter. Relations with Mexico have been unbroken since the 1940s, and in Central America, Costa Rica and the Soviet Union recently renewed diplomatic ties after concluding a commercial

agreement to cover cash purchases of Costa Rican coffee by the USSR and the establishment of a Soviet trade mission in San Jose. The USSR can probably now be expected to try and extend its presence in Central America, and also in the Caribbean where it has diplomatic relations only with Cuba.

Economic Relations

In the field of economic relations, and in sharp contrast to its massive aid to Cuba, the Soviet Union appears to be stressing trade agreements with Latin American countries, with trade missions and representatives located throughout the region and also in Jamaica. Yet Latin American trade exchanges with the USSR amounted to less than U.S. \$130 million in 1969, and this represented less than two per cent of Latin America's total world trade. Furthermore, Brazil and Argentina alone accounted for almost three-quarters of this total.

Soviet purchases consist mainly of coffee, bananas, cacao, wheat and other basic agricultural products, while in return the USSR sells manufactured goods. Apparently these have not been well received in Latin America, however, and the outlook for trade between the two is not promising with respect to increased quantity or improved quality.

Although the prospect of major Soviet aid for sizable developmental programs seemed to have been a major incentive to a number of countries in establishing diplomatic relations, such aid has been disappointingly small or has not materialized at all. Even those countries that have had large Soviet credits for some time have been unable to use them because no mutually acceptable projects have been found. In spite of such notable drawbacks, however, the countries of Latin America remain generally receptive to Soviet trade initiatives, and they continue hopeful that trade relations will improve in the future.

Maritime Interest

Related to the growing political and economic ties with Latin America is the Soviet interest in expanding its maritime presence in the area. The Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet, which also serves intelligence purposes, as well as the heavily-equipped research ships, need port facilities in addition to those they have in Cuba. Likewise the Soviets have indicated an interest in the development of fisheries in cooperation with various Latin American governments, and also in the expansion of Soviet merchant shipping. Aside from the naval facilities in Cuba which are available to the USSR, it has no agreements to date for use of any naval facilities in other Latin American countries.

Soviet Visitors to Latin America

Besides the Soviet diplomatic and economic missions which have been set up in recent years, there has been a steady stream of visitors to Latin America. These have included representatives of youth, student and trade union organizations as well as many cultural and sports groups. Both of the latter have lost members through defections in Latin America. It seems to have been the trade union representatives, however, who more than any others have become notorious for promoting dissident and anti-government labor activities, while providing advice on organization and also funds. The result has been an unusual number of expulsions of labor representatives from Latin America over the past few years. By and large, however, Latin American governments seem reluctant to declare Soviet officials persona non grata, apparently because it is believed such action would be harmful to good and useful relations with the Soviet Union. By contrast, the most effective Soviet representatives are the journalists, whether they are permanently assigned or are roving correspondents. As seasoned interviewers, they converse easily, and as experienced investigators they are often in a position to learn information valuable to their government.

Relations With Local Communists

Although Soviet representatives have generally managed to maintain correct, and in some cases openly friendly relations with local Communist parties, on occasion they have been highly embarrassed in relation to the parties and the local governments by the outbreak of Castro-style terrorism in several countries. A recent and striking example was provided by the Soviet representatives in Uruguay after the kidnappings and murder committed by the Tupamaros. While the Uruguayan government was receiving statements of support from other governments around the world, the Soviet government remained silent, with its representatives obviously at a loss as to the appropriate propaganda "line" to take. It was not until the Uruguayan government requested an expression of support that the Soviet Union responded, and even then the statement of support was made indirectly through the Under Secretary of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations.

There have also been indications that prior to establishing diplomatic relations with countries that have had problems with guerrillas, the Soviet Union has requested Castro to ease up on support to such groups so that their own negotiations with the government involved would not be jeopardized. It is likely that the Soviet Union will be caught in situations similar to these in the future as long as it follows on the one hand a policy of supporting armed revolution, through its continued subsidy to Cuba, and, on the other hand, it pursues quiet subversion. Heretofore, when these policies have clashed, and the Soviets have been forced to take a stand, they have chosen the low-key, quietly respectable

course of action. If it is in their interest to change, however, and to support more violent forms of action, there is no doubt they would do so, and this has been hinted at in official Soviet writings. In late June of this year Victor Volsky, Director of the Latin American Institute of the USSR, wrote in Pravda that development of the revolutionary process in Latin American countries had reached the stage when ... "It is necessary first to smash the political and social-economic forces which prop up imperialism... in order to prepare for the transfer to socialist reforms."

Although at first the Soviet Union carefully refrained from any unusual display of enthusiasm toward the newly elected Communist-backed government of Chile, it is now showing its true feelings more openly. This is reflected in the Pravda commentary on the speech which Secretary General Luis Corvalan made before the plenary session of the Chilean Communist Party Central Committee, in which he boasted of the party's importance in the coalition government. Pravda characterized the Communist Party as militant and revolutionary, whereas previously the Soviet press had pictured the Party as a reasonable element in the government. This could presage greater overt Soviet attention to the Communist Party of Chile, which is probably the Soviet Union's most important and effective instrumentality, not only in Chile, but in the area as a whole.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 October 1970

NOW MOSCOW FINDS A WAY TO MOVE INTO LATIN AMERICA

The Russians are scoring gains in Latin America, using a new "soft sell" approach.

"The respectable game," experts call it, and it is succeeding in areas where Castro-style guerrilla warfare flopped.

RIO DE JANEIRO

While the United States concerns itself with crises in distant corners of the world, here in Latin America, closer to home, Soviet Russia is on the move, gaining ground.

So far, no other country in the Hemisphere has joined Castro's Cuba in going Communist. But in varying ways, Latin America appears to be opening up to the influence of Russia and its Communist allies.

Examples of the trend:

- In Bolivia on October 7, a new military strong man, Gen. Juan José Torres, an admirer of Castro, seized power in the name of "revolutionary nationalism."
- In Chile, a Marxist-dominated coalition, narrow winner in a national election, is preparing to install its leader as the country's President on November 4.
- In Peru, a military regime with leftist advisers is steering the country toward state ownership of major industries and other "revolutionary" objectives.

A significant fact about such developments is that they are taking place not as a result of direct outside intervention, but more from pressures that are generated internally.

Rising nationalism, the failure of reforms to keep pace with people's growing expectations, U. S. cutbacks in aid and support—all play a part.

Shaking the trees. Moscow's tactics are a far cry from the Castro policy of trying to export violent revolution—a policy that brought Ernesto "Ché" Guevara to his death as leader of a guerrilla band in the hills of Bolivia.

As one expert on Communist strategy and tactics puts it:

"The Russians are not climbing any trees to get at the fruit. What they are doing is selecting the trees where the fruit is ripest, shaking these a bit and waiting for the fruit to fall."

As another observer sees it, Moscow's basic approach to Latin America these days is to "play it extra cool." He explains Soviet policy this way:

"You will see more ballet companies, chess players, trade missions—things like that coming from Russia. But you won't see bomb throwers."

The Soviet approach calls for no massive outlay of economic aid to Latin America. Over the last five years, Russian credits to countries of the region totaled only 207 million dollars.

U. S. aid to the region, over the same period, amounted to more than 5 billion dollars, on top of some 4 billion in the preceding five years.

The Russian presence. To carry out its policy of influence on a shoestring, Soviet Russia has staged a step-up in one direction: the number of its diplomatic missions and resident officials in Latin America.

In 1960, there were fewer than 100 Soviet diplomats in this part of the world, accredited to three Latin-American countries.

Today, without counting those in Cuba, there are 349 Soviet officials at embassies in a dozen countries.

This increase in diplomatic representation continues. New Soviet embassies are being built in several capitals to accommodate even larger staffs.

Recently, Russia established its first diplomatic relations with a Central American country, Costa Rica, as well as with Guyana.

Trade alone does not justify the rapid escalation of embassies and their staffs. Over-all trade between Latin America and the Soviet Union in 1969 totaled only 129.3 million dollars, compared with 9 billion for two-way trade between the U. S. and Latin America.

Future Soviet-Latin-American trade is expected to increase only moderately.

Russian diplomats insist, nonetheless, that their objectives in this part of the world are limited to trade and normal diplomatic relations.

But experts in such matters are agreed that basically the Soviet objective in the region is political, not economic. Each embassy appears geared to fulfill that particular end.

Spy count. Some estimates put the number of known intelligence officials working in and out of Soviet embassies in the region as high as 50 per cent of the total accredited as diplomats.

Whatever the number of spies and subversive agents, the resident Russians give every indication that they are systematically and patiently extending their contacts and influence.

In pursuit of that objective, each year about 1,500 young Latin Americans are chosen to study in the Soviet Union on scholarships. Most of them go to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

Records from that university are known to be sent back to Soviet embassies in the students' home countries. Once a scholarship student returns home, he is marked for continued contacting and possible recruitment.

Russian diplomats appear to be under strict orders to stay away from the underground activities of local Communist parties, leftist terrorist groups and the revolutionary Castroite organizations.

Cubans are used by the Russians to deliver funds to local Communist groups. Other intelligence activities are carried out for Moscow by Poles, East Germans and other Soviet-bloc officials.

Russian success. Chile is the prime example of how the Soviet policy of "playing it extra cool" can pay off.

For years, the Russians had been trying to convince Havana, Peking and other firebrand Communist regimes that guerrilla tactics are not the sole route to Communist expansion and take-over.

Fidel Castro and Peking-line Communists snorted at that and continued to promote guerrilla warfare and other terrorism—although in Castro's case a severe crimp was put in such activities by Ché Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia.

Then, in 1965, Soviet Russia reopened relations with Chile after a 20-year break. The Russians installed themselves in a mansion in the best part of Santiago. The Ambassador's car was a Cadillac, not a Moskva.

Best foot forward. The new Soviet

Embassy hired the best chef in the Chilean capital, and the wives of diplomats turned out to be fashion-wise and charming. Because most of the Russians had been through a tour of duty in Cuba, they spoke Spanish well and were familiar with Latin-American ways.

Soon, Chileans who had denounced renewal of relations with the Soviet Union came away saying: "Why, they are just like we are."

It didn't hurt that the leader of the Marxist-dominated popular front, Dr. Salvador Allende, is himself a dapper and well-to-do member of Chilean society and a savvy veteran of the country's regular political system.

When the pinch came, in the national election this September, the respectable front put up by Allende and the Soviet Embassy seemed to play no small part in his victory by a narrow plurality.

Swing voters appeared to minimize or ignore the fact that Allende was

pledged to convert Chile into a socialist state, with many of the trappings of Castro's Cuba. Or that the Communist Party was the most powerful element in Allende's coalition.

Playing the game. The "respectable game," as some other diplomats call it, vindicated its effectiveness in Chile while terrorism backed by Castroite and Peeking-line Reds in other Latin-American countries has yet to come close to winning power.

Look around Latin America today and you find the game working in a number of other places, and working fairly well.

Take Peru. There, sitting at the elbows of the ruling military junta is a group of Marxist lawyers who helped show the officers their way of doing things as professors at the Superior War School. Today, these lawyers are top advisers and officials in a regime that is engaged in exerting state control or ownership over major industries and has muzzled the press.

Soviet diplomats in Lima show up at social functions, but otherwise are conspicuous by their absence from the public eye or print. When they do surface, it is to talk trade or promote cultural interchange.

Leftist general. In Bolivia, where Castro-style terrorism once assumed such prominence, General Torres took power October 7 not by using any violence but through an old-style military coup.

Torres promptly proclaimed himself leader of the "revolution of the people." Torres had been forced out as commander in chief of the armed forces by the Bolivian President last July 4 as being too

leftist. Before his dismissal, he had publicly praised Castro and defended expropriation of U. S.-owned mining properties.

Just what part the Soviet Embassy in La Paz played in the Bolivian developments is not clear.

Quite possibly, according to some experts, the answer is: "In a direct sense, no part whatsoever."

But a tide appears to be running in Latin America, these same experts say, and essentially it is a nationalist tide. That explains why even military men, traditionally conservative, appear to be warming up to Soviet overtures and Marxist approaches.

Latin Americans in country after country are trying to break away from their traditional dependence on the U. S. and Western Europe. The Soviet bloc and Japan offer the only real alternatives, as officials in this region see it. And Russia, for one, is capitalizing on this development wherever it can.