



# PERSPECTIVES

November 1970

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
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
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November 1970

THE COMMUNIST SCENEI. Venezuelan Communist Petkoff Seeks Break With CPSU

Earlier this year, Teodoro Petkoff, a leading Venezuelan Communist of Bulgarian descent, wrote a book called Checoeslovaquia: El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism), in which he condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and subjected the Soviet Union, as a supposedly socialist state, to searching and critical examination. The book brought him into open conflict with the orthodox, pro-Soviet leadership which dominates the Party, and his book was officially denounced by the Party. He has now produced what may be regarded as a logical sequel in a slim volume called: Socialismo para Venezuela? (Socialism for Venezuela?), in which he rejects the orthodox Soviet doctrine concerning Communist seizure and exercise of political power, a doctrine which the CPSU regards as mandatory for all CP's. In its place he advocates his own solution of how to achieve socialism in Venezuela based on a completely original analysis of Venezuelan society in terms of its economy, class structure, social forces, and recent history, with particular attention to the historical and current role of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV).

In effect, Petkoff ends by rejecting the Soviet model and along with it the stagnation which afflicts the PCV leadership. His criticism of this leadership, voiced in the prologue of the book, is familiar to anyone acquainted with the criticism of the numerous Communist dissidents throughout the world. His characterization of the PCV leadership applies with equal force to practically all Latin American Communist leaders, and for that matter to the leadership of every Communist Party that voices its allegiance to the Soviet Union, and is worth citing at the outset:

"On the road toward setting up this organization, we face problems which we could categorize under the following headings: reformism or revolution? renovation and modernization or maintenance of the organizational status quo?"

I. Teodoro Petkoff. Socialismo para Venezuela? Editorial Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970; 139 pp. It calls to mind French Communist dissident Roger Garaudy's book, Pour un modèle français du socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism)

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an independent and national party or an alien and vassal party?...

"Will the party, as it is now constituted, in its rusty condition, with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification, of corruption at some levels, of softening up, of ideological impoverishment, with leadership organs which to a large extent do not reflect the reality of our militancy and the degree of its development, will such a party be in a condition to take an effective part in the revolutionary process?...

"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent criticism on the international plane, in a position to develop and advance a genuinely revolutionary policy?...

"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the final analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party of the revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the system." [pp 6-7; emphasis added.]

Much of what Petkoff proposes for PCV policy has little relevance outside of the local Venezuelan scene, but a summary of some of his views will serve to illustrate his independence of outlook and the extent of his break with Soviet-approved orthodoxy.

First of all, he criticizes Stalinism as responsible for the "world crisis" in which Communism finds itself at present. Though implicit, such criticism can only refer to the continued existence of Stalinism within the current Soviet leadership, placed, as it is, in a contemporary context and having reference to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He then advocates the adoption of a platform for the PCV whereby the Party will be unequivocally dissociated from the Soviet brand of Communism. Included in his platform would be guarantees for the preservation of the various essential democratic, political and personal freedoms and preservation of a "pluralistic" society, whose opposite, of course, is the Soviet monolith.

Corollary to this dissociation is his insistence that the PCV pursue its own specific, national form of socialism. The achievement and content of this socialism are totally unorthodox. It is to be achieved, according to Petkoff, not by the traditional alliance of workers and peasants, but by a different constellation of forces, which includes as the most revolutionary ally (!!), the "middle-level and poor petit bourgeoisie," followed in importance by what Petkoff calls "fringe" sectors (large masses of displaced, unemployed persons in the cities)

and finally as a poor third among allies of the proletariat, poor peasants. Even more unorthodox, Petkoff considers as potential revolutionary allies elements of "the most varied social organizations: the armed forces, the church, and political parties," plus students. "To come right out and say it, we are simply proposing a critical revision of the old formula of the worker-peasant alliance as the axis of the revolutionary movement. [p 100]

As if this were not enough of a challenge to Communist orthodoxy, he also discards the notion, sacred to all orthodox Communists, that the Communist Party must lead the revolution as the "vanguard" exercising hegemony (i.e. absolute control) over whatever allies it enlists in its revolutionary effort:

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"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard and the leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement (and this could very well be a Communist party such as the Chinese which based itself on the peasant masses, a heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July in which the petit bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of conspiratorial high officers not organically linked to the masses as in the Egyptian case and Nasir)...

"The historic experience of all modern revolutions demonstrates that the concept which Marx had --- a class as such playing the active leading role --- and which Rosa Luxemburg opposed to the theory of Lenin's party, in which, not without reason, she saw an organization above the working class, is no longer valid...." [pp 100-101]

Sheer heresy.

(Attached are a number of additional excerpts from Petkoff's book illustrating his break with Soviet Communism).

Petkoff's theories in themselves are relatively unimportant. What is significant is that, as a full-fledged Communist, a major leader among Venezuelan Communists, he should plead independence of Soviet tutelage, that he should make an earnest case for a specific Venezuelan national road to "socialism." While he may be very nearly unique among Communists in Latin America, his plea is that voiced by several individual Communists in the free world such as the French Communist Roger Garaudy and many of his fellow dissidents, the Austrian Communists Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, the Italian Communists of the "II Manifesto" group (see item two below), to name a handful; and by free world Communist parties on other continents: the British, the Swedish, Spanish, Australian, Japanese, various Indian parties, etc. etc. Petkoff is one more representative of that growing "community of Communist dissent," a growing centrifugal force spinning away from the Soviet center.

In the growing community of Communist dissent must be reckoned also the number of ruling Communist parties that have succeeded in following their "own road to socialism," or are attempting to do so, against the Soviet drive to keep them closely tied to the center: The Chinese, Yugoslav, Albanian, North Vietnamese, North Korean, Rumanian. Czechoslovakia represents the tragic instance of a Communist regime whose efforts to follow its "own road to socialism" was crushed by Soviet tanks. The only reason that others have not been similarly crushed is that they were geographically or geopolitically beyond the reach of Soviet arms. In the free world the Soviets for the most part have succeeded in extinguishing the attempts at independence by maverick Communists by getting the parties to expel them (at a threat of withdrawal of financial support, without which most parties could not survive). It will be interesting to see whether heretic Petkoff and his supporters in the PCV leadership will continue to hold their positions in the party. So far they have succeeded -- which means less that the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet faction in the PCV accept or tolerate "Petkovianism" than that the alternative, i.e. expelling him, is an even less palatable measure at this time.

2. Italian Communists of "II Manifesto" Group to Form Own Party.

An example of the resistance to the Soviet brand of Communism, and even more to the Soviet compulsion to force its views on subordinate parties, is the case of the so-called "II Manifesto" group of Italian Communists. Known to the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the "Chinese" for their criticism of the Soviet Union since its invasion of Czechoslovakia and for its advocacy of a return to pure, revolutionary Communism, the Manifesto leaders were first suspended and then (in November 1969) expelled from the PCI. Recently, the group seems to have undertaken moves to form a new Communist Party, according to the attached item appearing in the New York Times. Independent estimates suggest that their membership is growing rapidly so that the party may soon constitute a political factor of some significance, at least as far as the PCI is concerned.

3. Briefly Noted

a. WAIC Preparatory Meeting

A brief nondescript "communique" (attached) issued from Budapest revealed that 45 Communist parties had met in Budapest 28-30 September to discuss the possibilities of convoking a World Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC). The WAIC was launched as a goal during the June 1969 World Communist

Conference (WCC), which appointed a 13-party commission to make preparations for the larger conclave. The commission consisted of representatives of the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Mongolian, French, Italian, British, Indian, Syrian, Chilean, Uruguayan, South African, and U.S. parties. Presumably the commission has met one or more times since June 1969, and while the presence of 45 parties at the recently announced Budapest meeting is unexplained, it may be that this meeting was thrown open to any CP's that wished to participate. Compared with the fanfare that accompanied almost two years of preparatory meetings for the WCC, the silence surrounding the current meeting is deafening. Even the participating parties were not identified. The silence can only mean that the usual quarrels took place between the CPSU along with its supporters and those parties which resist the effort of the CPSU to force acceptance of its requirements by such conferences. It is not difficult to surmise that the Soviets want a conference represented by delegates over whom they have complete control and that parties like the Yugoslavs (who are known to have taken part in this Budapest meeting) are resisting and looking for a conference represented by a wider and more independent spectrum of leftists.

b. European CP's Hold their Own Meeting

In another curious "happening," the French and Italian Communist dailies (see attachment) announced that several European parties had met in London on 21 September to discuss problems arising for the development of "multinational societies" (presumably multinational organizations like NATO, EEC, etc.). They are to meet again in London 11-13 January 1971. European CP's met for the first time as a regional grouping of CP's last May, apparently on the joint initiative of the Italian and French CP's to discuss common problems, but ended up with a bland, routine communique condemning the Vietnam conflict. How the Soviets view this kind of meeting is not known. It appears that the Soviets were not represented in either instance.

c. Upcoming French Dissident Communist Congress

A brief article in Le Monde of 16 September (attached) summarizes an article in the French bulletin Synthèse-Flash which claims that French Communist dissidents, including Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon, Jean Pronteau, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, and a dissident group called "Unir-Débat" will assemble in congress in December on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the French Communist Party (PCF). With so many eloquent critics of the PCF, this should prove a very interesting occasion.



Excerpts from Teodoro Petkoff, Socialismo para Venezuela?, Editorial

Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970, 139 pp.

Prologue

"...This [Communist] world crisis is the crisis of Stalinism whose rigid ideological, political, organizational and even moral standards are today being thrown into the arena of opposing currents which have become ever stronger, clearer, and more important, born within Communist Parties themselves which have succeeded in appreciating that Stalinism --- after a certain point --- is not only an obstacle in the way of development in any society or societies where the Communist Party holds the reins of power but is even the equal of Trotskyism --- which in its time had tried to be the negation of Stalinism --- and which no longer provides the answers required by a revolutionary force struggling for power.

"It is not a matter of negating Stalinism as a whole nor of not recognizing that it was a historical necessity, but rather of accepting that its outdated patterns --- whose brand during the course of the Third International was borne by all Communist Parties in the world --- are today to all intents and purposes unusable. Communist Parties forged in the mold of Stalinism and which cannot break out of it have virtually blocked their road to power for reasons that are absolutely of their own making, congenital, and which prevent the overcoming of external obstacles. It is not a mere accident that, after Lenin's Bolshevik Party, only the Communist Parties of China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia have been able to achieve power through their own efforts. These are three parties which, through methods involving an attitude that 'one respects but one does not carry out,' made a dead letter of directives issued by the Third International and by Stalin himself and were therefore able to transform themselves into national forces, able to interpret and become an expression of the most deeply felt sentiments among their respective peoples and to bring them to victory.

"If our generation of Venezuelan Communists hopes to be something more than a mere group of propagandists and mere forerunners of socialism, rather than the builders of a new society, they must face up to --- and win --- the challenge represented by breaking with the Stalinist mold of Party and policy....

"What we say in these pages may seem to be tantamount to an attack --- and even a bitter attack --- against a substantial segment of our past as a Marxist revolutionary party and therefore we have taken all possible care as to how to say these things, as our objective is not to hurt feelings but to promote a fruitful discussion. It is only at the cost of

painful review, however, that we can recover our sense of self criticism, getting away from mere 'descriptions' of past errors with that tedious and repetitious reference to their 'petit bourgeois origin' and to make it into an instrument which, by probing as deeply as possible, gets us to discover the nature of the roots of reformism, of collaboration between classes, of rightist and leftist deviations, in order to eliminate them and to make it possible to expand the Party's revolutionary potential. Of course, any review of this kind tends to be painful because it involves questioning a lot of our own individual greater or lesser contribution to those [political] struggles which we always undertake, guided by the most noble of feelings. But there are crossroads in the life of any revolutionary movement where only a deep and violent doubt about what has been done can make it possible successfully to avoid the traps of the real dilemma of life: reformism or revolution; to be or not to be....

"...only 5 months after two spaceships docked together in space, creating the first orbital space station, the Soviet Union and four other countries of the Warsaw Pact took the decision to intervene with military force in another small socialist country, under the pretext of preventing a counterrevolution. At the same time, four members of the socialist community --- China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania --- each for different style, condemned this move. From the Socialist 'little entente,' Vietnam issued a very circumspect and laconic communique in support. Korea did likewise and, in Cuba, Fidel --- after a vigorous attack on Soviet foreign policy and on European socialist models --- ~~CPYRCH~~ gave his support to the invasion. For their part, almost all European Communist Parties, including the three leading ones --- the Italian, French and Spanish parties, together the Japanese Communist Party, --- unequivocally condemned the intervention.

"The conflicts which broke out in the Socialist world and within the Communist movement reached their climax at that time and the evidence it brought out was conclusive: socialism is facing a grave and profound crisis....

"That phrase of Terence --- which the universal and alert mind of Marx was so keen on quoting --- 'nihil humanum alienum puto est' --- nothing human is alien to me --- must be one of the mottoes of any revolutionary, today, not because revolutionaries should not at all times have been like this but because, in practice, they have not been...because the aberration and police state bureaucratic deviationism which Stalinism represents succeeded in causing a kind of fossilization in the minds of millions of Communists, of the best men in this humanity of ours, of men who without question in their time were the salt of the earth, the hope for the world, forcing them under a monstrous yoke which held that 'everything that is not of my party is alien to me....'

"On the road toward setting up this organization, we face problems which we could categorize under the following headings: reformism or revolution? renovation and modernization or maintenance of the organizational status quo? an independent and national party or an alien and vassal party?....

"Today we are at a crucial point, at a crossroads in the history of the PCV. It is the outcome of two consecutive defeats: one growing out of the period of armed struggle, the other resulting from the elections. Now, we are opening up a new historical stage, calling for major political and social changes, a stage within whose framework we must find our means to development.

"Is our party to become one which gradually gives up its great revolutionary traditions of the last 10 years, to become assimilated into the system by transforming itself into a reformist force or, on the other hand, should it break radically away from this kind of prospect, establishing its policy as involving confrontation with the system, of continuous opposition, of preparation for a new revolutionary onslaught at some undetermined but inevitable date?

"Would the party, as it is now constituted, in its rusty condition, with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification, of corruption at some levels, of softening up, of ideological impoverishment, with leadership organs which to a large extent do not reflect the reality of our militancy and the degree of its development, would such a party be in a condition to take an effective part in the revolutionary process?

"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent criticism on the international plane, in a position to develop and advance a genuinely revolutionary policy?"

"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the final analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party of the revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the system...."

#### Dependent Capitalism and Political Power

"...The objection is frequently heard that a socialist or anti-capitalist pronouncement arouses too much resistance among alleged allies, it 'frightens' some sectors which would be more reasonable toward less radical statements.

"Perhaps it would be useful to discuss this. Above all, it is surprising that such concern at the possible resistance to a socialist program does not consider the fact that the mere name of the party; Communist, is a complete program and definition which associates us

with a new society already under construction in other countries. From the point of view of masses, our very name presupposes socialism --- although what we say may seem contradictory. If we are speaking of 'fright' our very name is enough to cause 'fright' regardless of the program we present.

"In the second place, the name links us in the imagination of the common man with the version of socialism spread about by the bourgeoisie and imperialism. For many Venezuelans, Communist Party means things ranging from the notion that socialism 'kills' God to the idea that it is a cruel dictatorship which does away with all freedom, and that it advocates such things as the abolishment of ownership of tooth brushes, proclaims free love, delivers children to the state, etc.

"In brief, those who worry about the resistance which is alleged to result from the idea of socialism, should also ask themselves for the sake of consistency if the best way to confront that problem might not be to change the name of the party and disassociate it from the world Communist movement as well as from the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. However, would this not be the solution of 'selling the couch?' [Ed. note: reference to the story of a man coming home unexpectedly and catching his wife in flagrante delicto on the couch with another man. His enraged reaction was to sell the couch.]

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"To the contrary, let us view Venezuelan socialism as a result of converging and common action of various social forces and sectors --- socialism will have to be what the group of forces and sectors want it to be --- and let us bring socialism out from under the table and air its problems freely. Discussing it with all those other sectors who in one way or another aim toward the socialist solution, or toward one like it, is much more useful and effective than the vain attempts to 'prettify' the program and slogans of a party whose mere name places it in a status of *capitis diminutio*, in a position of inferiority which it is forced to accept whenever its participation or alliance in fronts is considered.

"By taking measures which leave no room for doubt, let us do away with the fable (which nevertheless is based on objective events that can easily be misleading) that our revolutionary Party is an agent of any socialist power or country, that its policy is part of an international strategy of that power or country, and we will see whether socialism seen in this way continues to 'frighten.' An internationalist policy of support and solidarity with all the world forces which are struggling for revolutionary change in an independent and critical manner, (but which at the same time recognizes divergencies among these forces) suffices to help destroy the idea that socialism is nothing more than an export product of the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba.

"If we agree that of those forces which proclaim the need for socialism, none is capable of achieving it by itself, we implicitly recognize that to be able to achieve a socialist society the united action of all of them is necessary. In order for Venezuelan socialism to materialize it must be plural or it simply cannot exist. This plurality pre-supposes a revolutionary power which guarantees the autonomous contribution of other sectors to the construction of the new society, a contribution which can only be articulated on the basis of a democratic dialectic among the revolutionary forces that precludes a political monopoly by any of them.

"If the transition toward the new society makes a dictatorial power compulsory, it will have the characteristics which the revolutionary forces will want it to have. A revolutionary dictatorship in Venezuela has no reason for being similar to that of other countries because our country has peculiarities which inevitably will place their stamp on the forms of government. However, as of now we can clearly proclaim that our socialism does not carry with it the death penalty, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or make it a crime to express an opinion. It does not carry this with it because a democratic revolutionary power, even if it is dictatorial, makes such practices very difficult because our own principles are against them....

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"A plural socialist society by definition excludes all monolithism in the concept of its political life and its cultural and artistic life. We could not propose Marxism-Leninism as a sort of substitute for religion, which would be learned in schools as the catechism is learned. (This of course is not in contradiction with the fact that the scientific nature of education must mean methodology and a dialectic materialist analysis). Neither could we propose an administratively directed culture, nor one monopolized by 'official' interpreters of the thinking of the regime. A political culture emanating from the base rejects, of course, the attempts by any bureaucratic office to dictate the orientation of artistic creation..."

#### The Motive Forces of Revolution

"Under this very 'orthodox' title, we would like to discuss a relatively 'heterodoxical' point of view on this subject of the forces which in one way or another could impel the Venezuelan revolutionary process.

"The usual manner of handling this aspect consists of presenting the motive forces of the revolution solely from the purely class angle, that is, pointing out the social classes interested in advancing the revolution. This manner of analyzing things --- entirely correct and which we are not going to give up --- does not, however, cover all the

wealth of possibilities offered by a society such as the Venezuelan.

"In it there exist, not only a group of social classes objectively favorable for a nationalist and revolutionary change, but there have been formed interclass sectors or groupings whose members are linked by some institutional reason --- political or professional --- and they are scattered throughout the most varied social organizations, armed forces, church, and political parties, Because of their own nature, their direct links with national problems and with the spheres of political power, make viable the appearance in some of their sectors of a socio-political awareness implicitly or explicitly nationalist and revolutionary....

"...In all political parties of the country, the long years of revolutionary demagogy gave rise to a popular base and a group middle-level and technical cadres, thwarted but motivated in favor of social change and a break with dependency. In the Catholic Church, the post-council trends, the return to the sources of Christianity, the revival of social preoccupations, which in some places acquires profiles of great radicalism, have generated the appearance of sectors which attribute to the church the earthly mission of helping to transform society. In the army --- the main support of power --- the reflection of this trend, which incorrectly been given the name of 'nasserism' and which today finds notable expression in Peru, the very experience with the problem of being a dependent state [along with other factors] ...forces us to reconsider the problem from a different point of view than the traditional. This is particularly so if one takes into account that the armed forces as an institution have been assimilated by the CRYPGHEment and therefore, it would not be strange if dissidence in their midst had a sign of progressive protest, of the left....

"...Of course, this linkup [of social sectors] would be feasible if one recognizes the revolutionary potential of these sectors and if their view of the process of revolutionary change is respected. This supposes not only a pluralist concept of the future society but also a pluralist concept of the struggle for it. This excludes all hegemony decreed a priori and an absolute respect for the autonomy and contribution of each sector.

"In other words, an attempt would be made to work with the idea that in the policy of alliances no one is to be used. If there is no a priori reason which makes us the sole depositories of the revolutionary truth or monopolizers of valor, initiative, or capacity for sacrifice to bring it about, we have no reason to be the ones to establish the standards which measure the revolutionary legitimacy of the rest. Dependence with respect to imperialism and the traumas of dependent capitalist growth, today affect not only the popular classes but the most varied sectors and therefore the awareness for social change is not the exclusive patrimony of any 'vanguard' which arrogates it to itself more or less

arbitrarily. Up to now the opposite concept, which attributes only to Communists --- or Marxist-Leninists in general --- the steadfastness required to carry out the revolution to the end, is the concept which allows the enemy to use the ideas of 'fellow travelers,' and 'useful dupes....'

"A policy of this nature [of linking various revolutionary forces] has to insist that the alternative to what exists today...cannot be anything but a socialist way of development and a new political framework which disavows the present one. In this sense only a 'vastly original' policy --- as Lenin said --- can help us to form our own force capable of playing the role of 'link' among a group of revolutionary sectors and classes which united can promote the social change the neocolonialist status of our country demands.

"This said, let us glance at the driving forces of the revolution from the angle of the social classes in play. From this point of view, we believe that the revolutionary process possesses a popular content. This means that the social forces on whom it must rest are those which make up what are generically known as the people: the working class, the poor peasant, the middle-level and lower petit bourgeoisie, the students --- who can be considered as a discriminated against sector --- and the so-called 'fringe' inhabitants, with the explicit exclusion of any sector of the bourgeoisie....

"We have wanted to point out the vital role which the working class potentially play in the course of the Venezuelan revolution, but at the same time we would like to warn against any 'worker' concept of the Venezuelan revolution. Any comparison of the situation of our country with that of a 'classic' capitalist country could be lamentable. Under the conditions of Venezuela, to rest all the weight of the revolution on the working class could simply mean closing the path to it. There are other social sectors which must be stimulated --- and at the same time --- the middle-level and poor petit bourgeoisie, the 'fringe' sectors, [masses of displaced unemployed persons in the cities] and the poor peasants must be motivated by the revolutionary upsurge. The order of listing indicates the relative importance which we attribute to them....

"In conclusion, a few words on the poor peasants. It is obvious that our thesis on the revolutionary process --- which surely will depend on the urban sectors of the population before any other --- considerably reduces the importance which is traditionally attributed to the peasant sectors. To come right out and say it, we are simply proposing a critical revision of the old formula of the worker-peasant alliance as the axis of the revolutionary movement. Such a way of putting things does not appear to be in consonance with the complexity of contemporary reality. In truth, to continue the discussion of the motive forces of the revolution in the terms of absolutely pinpointing a social vanguard

and a basic alliance of classes, does not appear to fit our case. According to all evidence, a revolutionary process in Venezuela requires the participation of that conglomeration of social forces which we call the people and of some interclass sectors which are not exactly 'people.' Among them, the working class because of its specific weight, its organization, and potential awareness, and the petit bourgeoisie because of their importance and degree of awareness and radicalism, must occupy a front rank position and undoubtedly must play the role of guide for the fringe masses and the poor peasants. Viewed in an over-all manner, from a general historic angle, the crystallization of the entire process expresses the interests of the working class and at the same time the change leads to socialism.

"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard and the leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement (and this could very well be a communist party such as the Chinese which based itself on the peasant masses, a heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July in which the petit bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of conspiratorial high officers not organically linked to the masses as in the Egyptian case and Nasir).

"The historic experience of all modern revolutions demonstrates that the concept which Marx had --- a class as such playing the active leading role --- and which Rosa Luxemburg opposed to the theory of Lenin's party, in which, not without reason, she saw an organization above the working class, is no longer valid. The last revolution in which the working class acted as such, without interposed 'apparatuses,' was that of the Commune of Paris. After it the power of the bourgeoisie acquired such a technical nature that a specialized revolutionary organization is required to overthrow it. Although Lenin created such a specialized organization for the Russian circumstances of the beginning of the century --- and in that sense some of its characteristics are completely Russian --- in the light of contemporary capitalist and imperialist conditions, the universal validity of the concept of specialized and 'professional' revolutionary organization is undeniable...."

[The more significant passages have been underlined for emphasis; the double underlining represents emphasis by the author Petkoff.]



TEODORO PETKOFF

# ¿socialismo para Venezuela?



EDITORIAL DOMINGO FUENTES  
CARAGAS 1970

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Esa crisis mundial es la crisis del stalinismo, cuya rígida armazón ideológica, política, organizativa y hasta moral, está sometida hoy a los embates de corrientes cada vez más fuertes, lúcidas e importantes nacidas de los partidos comunistas y que han llegado a comprender que el stalinismo a partir de un cierto momento no sólo obstaculiza el desarrollo de las sociedades donde el partido comunista está en el poder, sino que, al igual que el trotskismo —que quiso ser su negación en una época—, ya no proporciona las respuestas que demanda una fuerza revolucionaria que lucha por el poder.

No se trata de negar en bloque al stalinismo, ni desconocer aquello que en él fue imperativo histórico, sino de aceptar que sus viejos esquemas —los cuales a través de la III Internacional marcaron a fuego a todos los partidos comunistas del mundo— ya hoy son prácticamente inservibles. Los partidos comunistas fraguados en el crisol del stalinismo y que no logren romper éste tienen virtualmente bloqueado el camino hacia el poder por razones que les son absolutamente propias; congénitas, y que les impiden superar los obstáculos exógenos. No es una simple casualidad que después del partido bolchevique de Lenin, sólo los partidos comunistas de China, Vietnam y Yugoslavia hayan podido alcanzar el poder por sus propios medios. Se trata de tres partidos que mediante la modalidad de "se acata, pero no se cumple" hicieron letra muerta de las directivas de la III Internacional y del propio Stalin y fueron capaces de transformarse, por ello mismo, en fuerzas nacionales, aptas para interpretar y encarnar los más profundos sentimientos de sus respectivos pueblos y llevarlos a la victoria.

Si nuestra generación de comunistas venezolanos pretende ser algo más que un grupo de propagandistas y precursores del socialismo, en lugar de constructores de una nueva sociedad, tiene que enfrentar —y ganar— el reto que representa la ruptura del molde partidista y político stalinista. ]

En estas páginas hay algunas cosas que constituyen una impugnación, si se quiere dura, de buena parte de nuestro pasado como partido marxista revolucionario —y por lo mismo hemos cuidado, hasta donde ha sido posible, la forma de decir las, porque nuestro objetivo no es herir susceptibilidades, sino promover una discusión fructífera—. Pero sólo al precio de estas revisiones lacerantes es como puede recuperar su sentido la *autocrítica*, haciendo que deje de ser la mera *descripción* de los errores cometidos, con la inefable referencia al "origen pequeño-burgués" de aquellos, y devenga el instrumento que hurgando con tal profundidad en nosotros mismos, nos lleve a descubrir las raíces del reformismo, de la colaboración de clases, de las desviaciones de derecha e

izquierda, a fin de extirparlas y facultar la plena expansión de las potencialidades revolucionarias del partido. Por supuesto, revisiones de esta clase son siempre dolorosas porque significan poner en cuestión buena parte de nuestra propia, individual, pequeña o grande, contribución a luchas que siempre emprendimos guiados por los más nobles sentimientos. Pero existen encrucijadas en la vida de un movimiento revolucionario en que sólo la duda, profunda y desgarradora, acerca de todo lo que se ha hecho, es lo que permite sortear con éxito las trampas de ese dilema existencial: reformismo o revolución.

Ser o no ser...

De otro lado, apenas cinco meses después de que dos de sus ingenios espaciales se acoplaban para crear la primera estación orbital, la URSS y otros cuatro países del Pacto de Varsovia tomaron la determinación de intervenir militarmente en otro pequeño país socialista, con el pretexto de impedir una contrarrevolución. Empero, cuatro miembros de la comunidad socialista, —China, Albania, Yugoslavia y Rumania—, por razones diferentes, con lenguajes y estilos distintos, condenaron la medida. De la "pequeña entente" socialista, Vietnam emitió un muy circunspecto y lacónico comunicado de apoyo; Corea procedió de igual manera y en Cuba, Fidel apoyó, después de una vigorosa requisitoria contra la política exterior soviética y contra los modelos socialistas europeos. Por su parte, virtualmente todos los partidos comunistas de Europa, incluyendo los tres mayores y de mayor autoridad —italiano, francés y español— condenaron inequívocamente la intervención, al igual que el partido comunista japonés. Las contradicciones que desgarran al mundo socialista y al movimiento comunista alcanzaron su clímax en aquel período y las evidencias se hicieron concluyentes: el socialismo está sumido en una grave y profunda crisis.

La frase de Terencio, que tanto gustaba citar esa mente universal y alerta que era Marx, *nihil humanum alienam puto est*, "nada de lo que es humano me es extraño", tiene que ser una de las divisas del revolucionario de hoy —no porque no haya debido serlo del de todos los tiempos, sino porque en la práctica no lo ha sido; porque esa aberrante desviación burocrático-policial que es el stalinismo realizó una suerte de lobotomía en los cerebros de millones de comunistas —de los mejores hombres de esta humanidad, de los que una vez fueron sin discusión la sal de la tierra, la juventud del mundo— encuadrándolos bajo una consigna monstruosa: "todo lo que no es de mi partido me es extraño"

En el camino de crear esa organización confrontamos problemas que están colocados bajo el signo de estas disyuntivas: ¿Reformismo o revolución? ¿Renovación y modernización o mantenimiento del *statu quo* organizativo? ¿Partido independiente y nacional o partido

alienado y vasallo? De las respuestas que se den a esas preguntas depende el que éste continúe siendo un partido revolucionario, dispuesto a la lucha por un cambio revolucionario, o un partido más del sistema, una pequeña fuerza, domesticada y asimilada, un "partido crónico", para decirlo con la feliz expresión de Eloy Torres, un partido de "sindicaleros" de la política.

Hoy estamos en un punto crucial, en un punto de inflexión de la historia del PCV. Se viene de la asimilación de dos derrotas consecutivas: una, la que corresponde al período de la lucha armada, otra, la de las elecciones. Se abre ahora una nueva etapa histórica, signada por grandes modificaciones político-sociales, dentro de cuyo marco debemos desenvolvemos.

¿Va a ser el nuestro un partido que progresivamente renuncie a su bella tradición revolucionaria de los últimos diez años, para dejarse asimilar por el sistema, deviniendo en una fuerza reformista, o, por el contrario, romperá radicalmente con tal perspectiva, trazando una política de enfrentamiento al sistema, de impugnación continua, de preparación para una nueva embestida revolucionaria a un plazo indeterminado pero inevitable?

¿El partido, tal como está hoy, bastante "oxidado", con evidentes signos de esclerosis, de petrificación, de corrupción a algunos niveles, de ablandamiento, de pobreza ideológica, con organismos dirigentes que en gran medida no corresponden a la realidad de la militancia y al grado de desarrollo de ella, estaría en condiciones de participar eficazmente en el proceso revolucionario?

¿Un partido que abdique de su independencia crítica en el plano internacional, está en condiciones de elaborar y adelantar una verdadera política revolucionaria?

Tal es el sentido profundo de una polémica que en definitiva no envuelve otra cosa que dos opciones: partido para la revolución o partido para medrar en el sistema.

A este respecto con frecuencia se escucha la objeción de que un planteamiento socialista o anti-capitalista despierta demasiada resistencia en presuntos aliados; "asustada", por así decir, a algunos sectores que ante formulaciones menos radicales serían más sensibles.

Tal vez resulte útil discutir esto. Ante todo, no deja de ser sorprendente que tal preocupación por la posible resistencia ante un programa socialista no tome en cuenta el hecho de que el puro nombre del partido, *partido comunista*, es todo un programa y una definición, que nos asocia a una nueva sociedad ya en construcción en otros países. Desde el punto de vista de masas, nuestro

puro nombre encarna —así en un supuesto negado digamos lo contrario— el socialismo. Si de "sustos" se trata, nuestro solo nombre basta para "asustar", cualquiera sea el programa que presentemos.

En segundo lugar, el nombre nos vincula, en la imaginación del hombre corriente, con la versión que dan la burguesía y el imperialismo sobre el socialismo. Para bastantes venezolanos, partido comunista significa desde la idea de que el socialismo "mata" a Dios hasta la de que se trata de una dictadura atroz, que liquida toda libertad, pasando por consejas como la de que suprime incluso la propiedad de los cepillos de dientes, proclama el amor libre, entrega los hijos al Estado, etc, etc.

En resumen, quienes se preocupan por el rechazo que supuestamente produciría la idea del socialismo, para ser consecuentes con su pensamiento deberían preguntarse también si la mejor manera de enfrentar ese problema no sería la de cambiarle el nombre al partido y disociarlo tanto del movimiento comunista mundial como de la Unión Soviética, China y Cuba.

Sin embargo, ¿no sería ésta la solución de "vender el diván?"

Por el contrario, veamos el socialismo venezolano como un resultado de la acción convergente y común de distintas fuerzas y sectores sociales, —por lo cual tendrá que ser como el conjunto de esas fuerzas y sectores quiera que sea— saquemos el socialismo de debajo de la mesa y ventilemos su problemática libremente, discutiéndola con todos aquellos otros sectores que de una u otra forma se orientan hacia esa solución, o hacia alguna semejante y ello será mucho más útil y eficaz que los baldíos intentos de "matizar" el programa y las consignas de un partido cuyo mero nombre ya lo coloca en una situación de *capitis diminutio*, en una situación de inferioridad que se ve forzado a tolerar en la práctica, cuando se considera su participación en alianzas o frentes.

Perfilemos nítidamente el carácter *nacional* de la lucha por el socialismo, establezcamos claramente que el reconocimiento de la *pluralidad* de contribuciones a la lucha por el socialismo niega la posibilidad de que el resultado de ella signifique, como se dice corrientemente, un "cambio de amo"; rompamos mediante una práctica que no deje lugar a equívocos la patraña —que, sin embargo, se apoya en hechos objetivos fácilmente engañosos— de que el partido revolucionario es una *agencia* de una potencia o país socialista cualquiera, de que su política forma parte de la estrategia internacional de esa potencia o país, y ya veremos si, en este aspecto el socialismo "asusta" tanto como algunos piensan. Una política

internacionalista, de apoyo y solidaridad con todas las fuerzas que luchan en el mundo por un cambio revolucionario, pero que marque las distancias, de manera independiente y crítica, es suficiente para ayudar a destruir la idea de que el socialismo no es otra cosa que un producto de exportación de la Unión Soviética, China o Cuba.<sup>1</sup>

Si admitimos que ninguna fuerza de las que proclaman la necesidad del socialismo, por sí sola, es capaz de lograrlo, implícitamente reconocemos que para poder alcanzar una sociedad socialista se precisa la acción unida

de todas ellas; luego, para que el socialismo venezolano pueda materializarse tendrá que ser *plural*, o sencillamente no podrá existir. Esta pluralidad supone un poder revolucionario que debe garantizar la contribución autónoma de otros sectores a la construcción de la nueva sociedad, aportación que sólo puede articularse sobre la base de una dialéctica democrática entre las fuerzas revolucionarias, que excluye el *monopolio* político de cualquiera de ellas.

Y si la transición hacia la nueva sociedad hace obligatorio un poder dictatorial, éste tendrá las características que las fuerzas revolucionarias quieran que tenga. Una dictadura revolucionaria en Venezuela no tiene por qué parecerse a la de otros países, puesto que el nuestro posee particularidades que inevitablemente darán su sello a las formas de gobierno. Pero, de una vez podemos proclamar claramente que *nuestro socialismo* no comporta la pena de muerte, ni la prisión arbitraria, ni la tortura, ni el delito de opinión. Y no lo comporta porque un poder revolucionario, democrático aun si es dictatorial, dificulta grandemente tales prácticas, amén de que nuestros propios principios están en contra de ellas.

Una sociedad socialista plural excluye por definición todo *monolitismo* en la concepción de su vida política, de su vida cultural y artística. No podríamos proponer el marxismo-leninismo como una suerte de sustituto de la religión, que se aprenderá en las escuelas como se aprende el catecismo. (Lo que no está en contradicción, desde luego, con el hecho de que el carácter científico de la educación deberá suponer la metodología y el análisis materialista dialéctico). Tampoco podríamos proponer una cultura dirigida administrativamente, ni monopolizada por los intérpretes "oficiales" del pensamiento del régimen. Una política cultural que arranque desde la base niega, por supuesto, las pretensiones de cualquier oficina burocrática de dictar las pautas de la creación artística.

## LAS FUERZAS MOTRICES DE LA REVOLUCION

Con este título tan "ortodoxo" quisiéramos someter a la discusión un punto de vista relativamente "heterodoxo" sobre esta cuestión de las fuerzas que de una manera u otra podrían mover el proceso revolucionario venezolano.

La forma acostumbrada de manejar este aspecto consiste en presentar las fuerzas motrices de la revolución solamente desde el ángulo puramente clasista, es decir, señalando las *clases sociales* interesadas en adelantar el curso revolucionario. Esta forma de analizar las cosas —enteramente correcta y a la cual no vamos a renunciar— no cubre, sin embargo, toda la riqueza de posibilidades que ofrece una sociedad como la venezolana.

En ésta no sólo existe un conjunto de clases sociales objetivamente favorables a un cambio nacionalista y re-

volucionario sino que se han constituido *sectores* o *agrupamientos* interclasistas, cuyos miembros están vinculados por alguna razón institucional —política o profesional— y se encuentran dispersos entre las más variadas organizaciones sociales: fuerzas armadas, iglesia, partidos políticos. Estas organizaciones, por su propio carácter, por su vinculación directa con la problemática nacional y *con las esferas del poder político* viabilizan la aparición, entre algunos de sus sectores, de una conciencia socio-política implícita o explícitamente nacionalista y revolucionaria.

En todos los partidos políticos del país los largos lustros de demagogia revolucionaria arrojan como saldo una base popular y un conjunto de cuadros medios y técnicos frustrados pero motivados hacia el cambio social y hacia la ruptura de la dependencia. En la iglesia católica las corrientes post-conciliares, el retorno a las fuentes del cristianismo, el

renacimiento de una preocupación social que asume en algunos sitios perfiles de gran radicalismo, han generado la aparición de sectores que atribuyen a la iglesia la misión terrena de ayudar a la transformación de la sociedad. En el ejército, —asiento principal del poder—, el reflejo

de esa corriente que impropriamente se ha venido designando con el nombre de "nasserismo" y que hoy encuentra una notable expresión en Perú; el propio contacto con los problemas de una dependencia que niega toda la formación patriótica de los oficiales; incluso, la aproximación a la revolución por la vía de combatirla; el recuerdo de los alzamientos de Carúpano y Puerto Cabello, en 1962, y, más atrás, el fenómeno trejista de 1958; nos obligan a reconsiderar su problemática según una óptica diferente a la tradicional. Sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta que las fuerzas armadas, como institución, han sido asimiladas por el *establishment*, de manera que las disidencias en su seno no sería extraño que tuvieran un signo de protesta progresista, de izquierda.

La vinculación entre estos sectores interclasistas y las clases sociales que objetivamente necesitan una transformación revolucionaria en el país, potenciaría la capacidad de éstas últimas para desarrollar una conciencia revolucionaria y al mismo tiempo multiplicaría las posibilidades de creación y acción de un vasto, amplio y profundo movimiento revolucionario. Desde luego, esta vinculación sería factible si se parte de reconocer la potencialidad revolucionaria de esos sectores y se respeta su visión del proceso de cambio revolucionario. Esto supone no sólo una concepción pluralista de la futura sociedad sino también una concepción pluralista de la lucha por ella; lo cual excluye toda hegemonía decretada *a priori*, y un respeto absoluto por la autonomía y la contribución de cada sector.

En otros términos, se trataría de trabajar con una concepción no instrumental de la política de alianzas. Si no existe ninguna razón apriorística que nos haga depositarios únicos de la verdad revolucionaria ni monopolizadores del valor, la iniciativa y la capacidad de sacrificio para plasmarla, no tenemos ninguna razón para ser quienes establecen los raseros que miden la legitimidad revolucionaria de los demás. La dependencia con respecto al imperialismo y los traumas del crecimiento capitalista dependiente afectan hoy no sólo a las clases populares sino a sectores muy variados, de manera que la conciencia del cambio social no es patrimonio exclusivo de ninguna "vanguardia" que se la arrogue más o menos arbitrariamente. Hasta ahora, la concepción contraria, la que atribuye sólo a los comunistas —o marxista-leninistas en general— la consecuencia para llevar la revolución hasta el final, es la

que permite al enemigo manejar las nociones de "compañeros de viaje" y de "tontos útiles": porque, efectivamente, quien no reconoce sino en sí mismo la sinceridad revolucionaria, en los demás no puede ver sino aliados circunstanciales, acompañantes hasta un cierto punto del camino, gente a la cual se puede instrumentalizar, utilizar. Y aunque la intención no sea ésa, objetivamente se trata a esos "aliados" como "tontos útiles".

Una política de esta naturaleza tiene que insistir en que la alternativa a lo que existe hoy —que no es sino el crecimiento capitalista dependiente y subdesarrollado, con su correspondiente superestructura— no puede ser sino una vía de desarrollo socialista y un nuevo marco político, que niegue el existente. En este sentido, sólo una política "vastamente principista" —como diría Lenin— puede ayudarnos a conformar una fuerza propia, capaz de desempeñar ese papel de "eslabón" entre un conjunto de sectores y clases revolucionarias que unidos pueden promover el cambio social que demanda la realidad neocolonial de nuestro país.

Dicho esto, echemos una ojeada a las fuerzas motrices de la revolución desde el ángulo de las clases sociales en juego. Desde este punto de vista pensamos que el proceso revolucionario posee un contenido *popular*. Esto significa que las fuerzas sociales sobre las cuales debería descansar son aquéllas que componen lo que genéricamente se conoce como pueblo: la clase obrera, el campesinado pobre, la pequeña burguesía media y baja, el estudiantado —que puede ser considerado como un sector diferenciado— y los llamados pobladores marginales, con exclusión explícita de cualquier sector de la burguesía.

Conviene detenerse un tanto sobre el papel de la clase obrera, porque recientemente diversos sectores y perso-

Hemos querido destacar el papel vital que la clase obrera podría, potencialmente, desempeñar en el curso de la revolución venezolana, pero al mismo tiempo quisiéramos precaver contra toda concepción "obrerista" de la revolución venezolana. Cualquier asimilación de la situación de nuestro país a la de un país capitalista "clásico" podría resultar funesta. En las condiciones de Venezuela, pretender apoyar sobre la clase obrera todo el peso de la revolución podría significar sencillamente cerrarse el camino de ella. Existen otros sectores sociales que deben ser impulsados —y motivar a su vez— por el envión revolucionario: la pequeña burguesía media y pobre, los pobladores marginales y el campesinado pobre. El orden de la enumeración indica la importancia relativa que les atribuímos.

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Finalmente, unas pocas palabras sobre los campesinos pobres. Es obvio que nuestro planteamiento sobre el proceso revolucionario —que seguramente se apoyará en los sectores urbanos de la población antes que en ningún otro— reduce considerablemente la importancia que tradicionalmente se atribuía a los sectores campesinos. Para decirlo de una vez, estamos simplemente proponiendo una revisión crítica de la vieja formulación sobre la alianza obrero-campesina como eje del movimiento revolucionario. Tal modo de postular las cosas no parece corresponder a la complejidad de la realidad contemporánea. En verdad, continuar la discusión acerca de las fuerzas motrices de la revolución en los términos de precisar absolutamente una vanguardia social y una alianza de clases fundamental, no parece venir al caso. Según todas las evidencias, un proceso revolucionario en Venezuela requiere la participación de ese conjunto de fuerzas sociales que llamamos pueblo y de algunos sectores interclasistas que no son exactamente "pueblo". Entre aquéllos, la clase obrera, por su peso específico, por su organización y por su conciencia potencial, así como la pequeña burguesía, también por su importancia y su grado de conciencia y radicalismo, deben ocupar un lugar de primer orden, y, sin duda, deben ejercer un papel de guía sobre las masas marginales y los campesinos pobres. Visto el conjunto desde un ángulo histórico general, la cristalización de todo el proceso expresa los intereses de la clase obrera, en tanto que el cambio conduce al socialismo.

*Però, en la práctica política concreta la vanguardia y la dirección las proporciona el movimiento revolucionario (y éste puede ser bien un partido comunista, como el chino, que se apoyó en las masas campesinas, bien un movimiento heterogéneo como el "26 de julio", donde la pequeña burguesía desempeñó un papel esencial; bien un grupo de altos oficiales conspiradores, orgánicamente desligados de las masas, como en el caso egipcio de Nasser).*

La experiencia histórica de todas las revoluciones modernas demuestra que la concepción que privaba en Marx —la clase como tal ejerciendo el papel dirigente activo—, y que Rosa Luxemburgo oponía a la teoría del partido de Lenin— en el cual, no sin razón, veía un organismo por encima de la clase obrera— ya es inoperante. La última revolución en la cual la clase obrera actuó como tal, sin "aparatos" interpuestos, fue la de la Comuna de París. Después de ella, el poder de la burguesía ha adquirido tal naturaleza técnica que hace indispensable una organización revolucionaria especializada para derribarlo. Aunque Lenin creó esa organización especializada para las condiciones rusas de comienzos de siglo —y en ese sentido algunas de sus características son totalmente *rusas*—, a la luz de las condiciones del capitalismo y el imperialismo contemporáneos, resulta indiscutible la validez universal de la concepción de la organización revolucionaria especializada y "profesional".

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(21 February - 20 March 1970)

1. Leading Venezuelan Communist Denounces Soviet Model

Teodoro Petkoff, Venezuelan Communist leader of Bulgarian ancestry and until recently a member of the Party's Politburo, is persisting in his criticism of the Soviet Union for trying to impose its will on the international Communist movement. In the long 15th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) from 16 February to 6 March, Petkoff was castigated by the dominant pro-Soviet faction for such heresies as his condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. (In the PCV, orthodox pro-Soviet Communists are sometimes referred to as "soft-liners" for their espousal of the Soviet-approved tactic of legal non-violent political activity in contrast to the "hard-line" characterized by Castro-inspired tactics of violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare.) The PCV's condemnation of Petkoff centered on the ideas expressed in his book Checoeslovaquia: El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism) published last fall. Attached are excerpts from his book illustrating his heresies.

Petkoff's main thesis is that the socialism represented by the Soviet Union cannot be and should not be looked upon as the model for Venezuela. Venezuela must adapt socialism to its own national peculiarities. The Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia essentially because Czechoslovakia was building its own model of socialism on its own traditions, not on those of the Soviet Union. (This independent road to socialism has always been and continues to be intolerable to the Soviets, since it challenges the ultimate wisdom of Soviet ideology and consequently the Soviets' claim to leadership of the world Communist movement.)

While derived independently, Petkoff's ideas as well as his position in the Party, bear striking resemblances to those of Roger Garaudy, the prominent French Communist, as well as a number of other European and Asian Communist intellectuals and leaders, whose breaking point came with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both Petkoff and Garaudy were recently dismissed from their respective Politburos. Both are prominent intellectuals in their own right -- Petkoff as a trained economist, Garaudy as the acknowledged leading ideologue of French Communism. Both are tested and proven militants of Communism, Petkoff until recently as a "hard-line" active guerrilla, Garaudy as a long-time promoter of Soviet orthodoxy in the French Communist party (defending the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, for example). Both risked their careers in the Party by espousing a position critical of the Soviet Union against an orthodox majority of their leadership colleagues. Garaudy's crusade ended by his expulsion from the Politburo and from the Central Committee at the 14th Congress of the PCF in February. He also resigned from his post as head of the Party's Center for Marxist Studies shortly thereafter.

Petkoff earlier lost his Politburo post, and a careful campaign is currently afoot in the PCV to neutralize him even further by maneuvering him out of the Central Committee (see attached accounts of the recently concluded Central Committee Plenum).

There are differences, too. Despite his minority position, Petkoff has substantial support in a small Party with little influence in national politics (typical of Latin American Communist parties), and is a dynamic, young leader; whereas the much older Garaudy has mobilized little practical political support in a large and potentially influential mass party. Another vital difference is that Garaudy was merely one of the most eloquent of a large number of European Communists taking the Soviet Union to task for its invasion of Czechoslovakia, whereas Petkoff's is a lone voice in Latin American Communist parties, which in obedient chorus all (except for the Mexican CP) sang their approval of the Soviet action.

The power of these two men lies in their realistic reappraisal of Soviet aims and pretensions in the world Communist movement, a reappraisal triggered by reflection on the underlying meaning of the Soviets' crushing of the new humane socialism undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968. They recognize the inability of the Soviet leadership to adapt to the requirements of the contemporary world outside the Soviet Union (and even within the Soviet Union). They also are aware of the obsolete Soviet insistence on the necessity of adhering unquestioningly and undeviatingly to the Soviet model. This obligation thinking Communists recognize as a barrier to the advance of the very Communism they support, while the "apparatchiks," thinking or not, give precedence to their own political survival, which in turn depends directly on the financial support the Soviet Union provides in exchange for blind obedience.



PRAVDA, MOSCOW

20 October 1970

CPYRGHT

Mosinev: "On the Eve of the Fourth Congress of Venezuelan Communists"

Venezuelan communists are actively preparing to hold the next, fourth party congress, scheduled to open on 4 December this year. The congress is to sum up the results of the party's activity in the 10 years that have elapsed since the third congress (in March 1961) to adopt a program document and party rules, to elect new personnel for the leading organs, and outline the political policy for the next few years.

The last decade has been an important stage in the development of the revolutionary process in the countries of Latin America. A historic event in this period was the emergence and establishment of the first socialist state on the American continent--the Cuban Republic. Despite all the desires of U.S. imperialism and the reactionary forces of the Latin American countries to isolate Cuba, its example has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the Latin American working people, who have been convinced by their bitter experience of the "charms" of the capitalist "paradise." Recent events in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia--which have been very varied in the forms and methods of the struggle--are evidence of the new, broad upsurge in the struggle of the working masses of Latin America, who are opposing U.S. supremacy and advocating national sovereignty and complete independence, the vital needs of the people, democracy, and social progress.

In Venezuela itself the 10-year interval between the two party congresses of communists has been distinguished by a particular intensity of the class struggle, in the course of which the Communist Party, together with the other parties of the left, rose in armed struggle against the antipopular, terrorist Betancourt regime, which enjoyed the support of U.S. oil and steel trusts. Despite the enormous courage and heroism displayed by the Venezuelan communists, the 5-year armed struggle ended in the defeat of the revolutionary forces.

In April 1967 the eighth Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee plenum took place under strictly conspiratorial conditions. Having exposed the mistakes committed in the course of the armed struggle and recognized that the third congress thesis on the non peaceful nature of the Venezuelan path to complete national liberation and socialism in the modern framework retains its validity, the plenum came to the conclusion that it was necessary to suspend guerrilla actions under the given concrete conditions and to transfer the center of gravity of the party entire struggle to work among the masses. The Central Committee called on all communists to close the ranks on the basis of Leninist organizational principles and to participate in the intraparty discussions which was to develop in connection with the announced preparation for the Fourth Party Congress.

Broad discussion has begun in party organizations about the party's combat experience, questions of party building and tactics under the new conditions, and ideological problems. The draft program document and party rules published by the Central Committee were adopted as the basis for discussion.

Analysis of the concrete socioeconomic and political conditions of modern Venezuela carried out by the Communist Party on the basis of Marxist-Leninist dialectical methods permitted it to draw conclusions on the nature of the Venezuelan revolution at the present historical stage. The program document defines it as an anti-imperialist, primarily anti-U.S. imperialism, anti-oligarchy, anti-large landed estate, patriotic, popular revolution with the prospect of a transition to socialism. The main tasks of the present stage are set forth as follows: to end U.S. supremacy, to eliminate the economic and political power of the haute bourgeoisie, which is in its service, to overcome the country's socioeconomic backwardness, to liquidate large landed property, and to create an independent economy. These tasks can be implemented only by a democratic, patriotic, popular government created in the course of a victorious revolution.

CPYRGHT

The program document points out that the patriotic forces, particularly the working class and its allies, are faced with the task of mastering all forms of struggle to rebuff the enemy and defeat it on all fronts. It stresses that "the path of the Venezuelan revolution is the path of the struggle of the masses under the most varied forms and manifestations, the path of their unity, organization, and militancy."

Now, with hardly six weeks to go before the fourth congress, the discussion has assumed an exceptionally acute nature. A group advocating anti-Leninist positions on several of the most important problems of the Venezuelan revolution and also of the international communist movement has become active in the party. Under the pretext of calling for the "renewal" of the party, this group led by Central Committee member Teodoro Petkoff, is trying to revise Marxism, to pervert its most important tenets, to discredit the most devoted and tempered party leaders, and to demoralize the party from within by rejecting the Leninist organizational principles. In articles published in the bourgeois press and in two books Petkoff sets forth his renegade credo and attacks the Soviet Union, the international communist movement, and the communist parties of the Latin American countries and the socialist countries of Europe. He talks of the Soviet Union with particular, unconcealed hostility, wickedly distorting communist building in the Soviet Union.

In his book "Czechoslovakia--Socialism As a Problem," Petkoff sides completely with the imperialist circles in evaluating the events in that country, speaks in defense of the anticommunist, counterrevolutionary forces who were trying to tear Czechoslovakia away from the socialist camp, and defends the authors of the counterrevolutionary appeal "2,000 Words."

As everybody knows, by a decision of the 10th Central Committee plenum, which took place in August 1968, the Venezuelan Communist Party supported the actions of the socialist community countries aimed at defending socialism in Czechoslovakia and thereby confirmed its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. But Petkoff and the small group of his minions, calling themselves Marxists and revolutionaries, continue the slander campaign against socialism and its main bulwark--the Soviet Union--a campaign organized by the imperialist circles.

Petkov's writings are permeated with an open hatred of the world's first socialist state--the Soviet Union--and Lenin's party. As is rightly noted by eminent Venezuelan Communist Party figures P. Ortega Diaz and A. Garcia Ponce, rebuking the renegade in their brochure "T. Petkoff's Antisocialist Views," "Anti-Sovietism is the thread which runs through Petkoff's book from the first to the last page." It is absolutely right to say, the authors note, that the Czechoslovak theme is merely an occasion for anti-Sovietism, for expressing the most absurd and slanderous fabrications about the USSR, and for falsifying the development of the Russian revolution. Not having facts to support his slanderous assertions, Petkoff calls as witnesses the most inveterate troubadours of anti-Sovietism from Trotsky to Deutscher, Garaudy, and Sik.

In deserting to the positions of socialism's enemies, Petkoff deliberately distorts the process of its creation in the USSR and the other socialist countries for the purpose of discrediting it. He tries to show that socialism in the Soviet Union was developed ostensibly "in accordance with inimitable and special features," and that the Soviet Union is "a model of socialism specifically and absolutely limited by its own historic framework."

Meanwhile the Soviet people, having completed the building of the first phase of a classless society, are successfully solving questions of building the material and technical base of communism, the creation of communist social attitudes, and the education of the new man. The experience which the Soviet people have accumulated is of permanent international significance, acknowledged by true communists throughout the world.

Petkoff goes as far as to monstrously assert that the forces of the socialist countries are not unified but shattered and isolated. According to him, the shattering of the socialist camp "would create new starting points for the development of a revolutionary movement!" In his hatred of the socialist countries the slanderer goes as far as to say that changes of power are needed in these countries. And with all this Petkoff tries to appear to be a communist, a "friend" of the socialist countries. Venezuelan Communist Party General Secretary Jesus Faria was right when, in answer to attacks by one of Petkoff's supporters, he said: "If these are our friends, who are our enemies?"

Petkoff lifts his hand against the principles of party building. Here he does not stop at falsifying the CPSU's historic documents. He states that the Tenth RCP (B) Congress resolution on party unity, which strictly forbade factions and groups in the party ranks, was a temporary measure, and that V.I. Lenin advocated "pluralism" in the party, in questions of building socialism, and in the interpretation of proletarian literature. This is the most blatant distortion of the Leninist doctrine on party unity.

The author of the libel subjects the fraternal parties of Latin America and Europe to abuse. His appraisal of these and others means, substantially, the denial of their role as the fighting vanguard of the working class. In place of the existing parties, which have in fact demonstrated their vitality and combat capability, he proposes the creation of rightwing opportunist parties with a minority and a majority, rejecting the principle of democratic centralism and the Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Petkoff subjects the fundamental principled tenets of Marxism-Leninism to distortion. He denies the historic mission of the working class and its vanguard role in the struggle to overthrow capitalism and in the building of a new society. The working class, in Petkoff's view, "is striving to become a factor of conservatism," and the "revolutionary intelligentsia" and the youth are ostensibly the real revolutionary force which "infects" the working class with a revolutionary nature.

Petkoff criticizes the aim of the Seventh Comintern Congress to create antifascist people's fronts. He categorically states that the creation of peoples' fronts provided capitalism with an opportunity of "gaining a respite" again! He ignores the fact that in many countries, long before the war with Hitlerite Germany, the policy of antifascist peoples' fronts helped strengthen the unity of the working class and of all democratic forces. Why is it necessary for Petkoff to make such an assertion? In order to reject the necessity of the Venezuelan Communist Party's struggle at the present stage for the creation of a broad anti-imperialist people's front. There can be no doubt as to who is interested in this.

Petkoff needed such fabrications to put forward his own "model" of socialism. What kind of socialism is it that Petkoff describes in his book "Socialism for Venezuela"? It is socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the leading role of the Communist Party, with complete freedom to disseminate bourgeois ideas, which is precisely what the counterrevolutionary forces tried to do in Czechoslovakia.

CPYRGHT

Having met with a decisive rebuff in the party, Petkoff appeals to student youth and tries to gain support for himself among a certain section of the young communists. In publishing his concoction he tries to blackmail the party leadership and the rank and file communists with the threat of a split. As is noted in a Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee Politburo statement, Petkoff even dares to put forward conditions of unity, which are that the party should reject the Leninist organizational principles and the principle of democratic centralism as the law of the party's internal life, allow the existence of factions, and reject unity based on programs and regulations.

The renegade's claims are being rejected both by the leaders and by the lower party organizations. A Central Committee Politburo statement says that Petkoff's machinations have encountered universal condemnation. The Venezuelan Communist Party leadership, having shown the real essence of Petkoff's inclinations, called on all party and young communist party organizations to energetically defend the unity and cohesion of the party. It noted that Petkoff openly opposes the party and its political line, obviously trying to create the foundations for forming a new organization. It called on communists of the lower organizations and local and district committees to give an appropriate rebuff to Petkoff's antiparty aspirations.

The provocative activity of Petkoff and his group cannot fail to create certain difficulties for the Venezuelan revolutionary movement. However, the international experience of the communist movement shows that wherever a decisive struggle is proclaimed against opportunism, a struggle based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism coupled with the rallying of all the party's healthy forces round the leadership, any attempts to lead it off the correct Leninist road will end in failure. The Venezuelan communists' many years of experience, devotion to their Marxist-Leninist cause, and the political maturity of the leadership will permit the Communist Party to overcome all obstacles. The Venezuelan Communist Party Fourth Congress will become an important landmark on the road of strengthening and developing the Communist Party--the real vanguard of the working class and of all Venezuela's working people.

Excerpt from Jiri Pelikan's Introduction to  
Der Piller Bericht: Das unterdrückte Dossier  
 Europa Verlag, Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich, 1970, 442 pp.

"... Today we know that the Cominform was supposed to be and did operate as an instrument for the domination of the communist parties in the socialist countries by the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin personally. By declaring the Soviet model of socialism as the only correct model, the model obligatory for all countries, the Cominform expressly discarded and condemned all ideas as to the possibility of individual, specific roads to socialism, which even Lenin had predicted. This cleared the way to the mechanical imitation and transfer of the Soviet model -- which had emerged from entirely different historical preconditions -- to the other socialist countries. This rejection of nationally differentiated ways to socialism was expressed in a particularly dramatic form in 1948, in the conflict between the Cominform and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was supposed to be forced to capitulate through an economic blockade but which resisted bravely....

"It thus seems that Stalin, (Polish Communist leader) [Bierut, and other dogmatists were offended by Czechoslovakia precisely because the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had deep national roots and was thus capable of developing its own way to socialism, a way which was in keeping with the conditions of the country and the mentality of the people and which was therefore a promising way that would lead to success. They were obviously afraid that the Czechoslovak example, if it were indeed to be successful, could have a contagious effect and could trigger similar tendencies in their countries.

"The extraordinary pressure, against Czechoslovakia, of all countries, and the enormous proportion of political assassinations and liquidations in that country, of all countries, can only be explained by saying that Stalin and the Soviet leadership had no use for a Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) which had strong bonds with the masses, which enjoyed their confidence, and which had a cadre of experienced, respected politicians. Instead, it was obviously much more in keeping with the intentions of the Soviet leadership at that time -- and it is likewise in keeping with the present Soviet leadership -- to make sure that the parties will be compact and closed off in themselves, that they will be based mostly on administrative power, that they will not have any real personalities around, and that they will depend completely on Soviet power, wherever possible also on the presence of Soviet troops, which the CPSU obviously considers the only reliable guarantee for socialism.

CPYRGHT

"This is why the Soviet leadership has always looked with distrust toward countries which liberated themselves in their own revolutionary struggle, such as Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and also Vietnam. Wherever the country had a revolution of its own which carried the national leadership to the top from the bosom of the movement, it is by far not as easy to obtain obedience and subordination toward the center, that is, the CPSU, as it is in countries where the governments had come to power under the protection of the Soviet Army which bore the brunt of the liberation. One might say that the common denominator of this Stalinist view is the lack of confidence in the force of the revolutionary movement as well as the overestimation of the Soviet role or the endeavor to control everything and to decide everything according to subjective Soviet views as to what is good or bad for socialism -- and this in reality is not always identical to what is in the interest of Soviet big-power policy.

"Herein lies the key to the answer to the question which many people throughout the world have asked: why was it impossible, after the August 1968 invasion, to salvage at least a portion of the post-January reforms in Czechoslovakia, and why was this development reversed so abruptly and thrown back not just to the time prior to January 1968 but much further back? Why -- after 20 years -- have the old accusations been brought out again? Why were they raised this time primarily by the GDR, Poland, and Bulgaria and of course also Moscow? Why was Czechoslovakia accused in 1968 -- after the CPCZ had once again won the full authority and support of the population, when the people had spontaneously pledged themselves to socialism, when not a single enterprise had been given back to the capitalists, when not a single agricultural cooperative had collapsed, when a communist leadership, which enjoyed general popularity and natural authority, had developed? Very probably because the Soviet leadership, that is to say, its dogmatic wing -- as it had in the years 1948-1950 -- did not want to tolerate any other model of socialism. The Czechoslovak experiment had to be punished, as an example, as a warning to all others, because the Soviet leadership was now afraid that the Czechoslovak road to socialism could lead to success and could have repercussions on the USSR and other socialist countries.

"Yugoslavia is a tolerated exception because it had won its right to its own road through its own struggle in the past and because it is obviously not prepared to drop its own road; China is the excommunicated heretic and China is too strong for the Soviets to risk a Czechoslovak-style intervention; and Romania is left untouched for the time being because it proved to be determined to defend its independent policy and because it proceeds very cautiously in doing so. The tragic mistake of the Czech leadership after January consisted in the fact that it stuck to Gottwald's old basic principle of 1948 also in 1968, the principle that Czechoslovakia would not

become another Yugoslavia and would risk everything on one throw of the dice: on the understanding of the Soviet Union, in the belief that the "Yugoslav case" could not be repeated after the 20th congress of the CPSU. This is why Czechoslovakia had to pay all the more dearly for its endeavor to walk its own road to socialism.

"The fact is that the CPSU leadership today must itself play the role which the Cominform used to play and therefore relies on the discipline of the other parties. This is why it is angry not only with the Czechoslovak communists and this is why it wants to decimate their party to a small but obedient sect; it is just as hostile toward the Communist Party of Italy which, on the basis of its mass character, its bonds with the people, its participation in the parliamentary struggle, its strong political cadre and its independent ideas of socialist upheaval, constitutes a potential heretic. This is why the CPSU leadership without hesitation and consideration of the tragic consequences, practically allowed the Communist Party of Austria to fall apart and this is why it promoted the smashing of the Communist Party of Greece against which it struck a blow at the very moment when its leading representatives were jailed and tortured by the dictatorial regime of the colonels. With equal distrust it looks toward the Left in the West and the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to the extent that these movements do not want to subordinate themselves to Moscow and develop their own, local fighting and development forms."

[Underlining added]

# **Das unterdrückte Dossier**

**Bericht der Kommission  
des ZK der KPTsch über  
politische Prozesse  
und »Rehabilitierungen«  
in der Tschechoslowakei  
1949 - 1968**

**Herausgegeben von Jiří Pelikán**

Pravděpodobně směřá nově vydání

československé komunistické strany, která byla v roce 1968  
odstraněna z veřejného života a její činnost byla zastavena

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tschechoslowakische kommunistische Partei  
Europa Verlag  
Wien • Frankfurt • Zürich



Bleibt die Frage, ob die Änderung von Strategie und Taktik der KPTsch durch die Sektierer innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei bewerkstelligt worden sein konnte oder vor allem durch die Wendung in der gesamten sowjetischen Strategie und Taktik nach 1947, als das *Kominform* gegründet wurde. Heute weiß man, daß das *Kominform* ein Instrument zur Beherrschung der kommunistischen Parteien in den sozialistischen Ländern durch die sowjetische KP und Stalin persönlich hat sein sollen und dies auch gewesen ist. Indem es das sowjetische Sozialismusmodell zum einzig richtigen und für alle Länder obligaten Modell erklärte, verwarf und verurteilte das *Kominform* ausdrücklich alle Vorstellungen von der Möglichkeit eigener, spezifischer Wege zum Sozialismus, die schon Lenin prognostiziert hatte. Damit war der Weg frei für die mechanische Nachahmung und Übertragung des sowjetischen Modells, das aus ganz anderen historischen Voraussetzungen hervorgegangen war, auf die übrigen sozialistischen Länder. Diese Ablehnung national differenzierter Wege zum Sozialismus kam in besonders dramatischer Form 1948 zum Ausdruck, im Konflikt zwischen dem *Kominform* und der Kommunistischen Partei Jugoslawiens, die durch wirtschaftliche Blockade zur Kapitulation gezwungen werden sollte, sich jedoch tapfer zur Wehr setzte.

In der *Kominform*-Resolution gegen Jugoslawien wurden eigentlich bereits die Anklagepunkte für die kommenden politischen Prozesse angeführt: als *Verrat* oder *Verschwörung* verurteilt wurden *bürgerlicher Nationalismus* und *Kosmopolitismus*, die Unterschätzung des Klassenkampfes sowie die Hervorhebung nationaler Besonderheiten und die *Unterschätzung* des entscheidenden Anteils der Sowjetarmee an der Befreiung.

Es scheint also, daß Stalin, Rákosi, Bierut und andere Dogmatiker an der Tschechoslowakei eben deshalb Anstoß nahmen, weil die Kommunistische Partei der Tschechoslowakei national verwurzelt und also fähig war, einen eigenen, den Verhältnissen des Landes und der Volksmentalität entsprechenden und daher erfolgverheißenden Weg zum Sozialismus zu entwickeln. Offenbar fürchteten sie, das tschechoslowakische Beispiel könnte, wenn es erfolgreich wäre, ansteckend wirken und ähnliche Tendenzen in ihren Ländern hervorrufen.

Der außerordentliche Druck, gerade auf die Tschechoslowakei, und die enorme Quote politischer Morde und Liquidierungen gerade in diesem Land ist nur so zu erklären, daß Stalin und die sowjetische Führung eine KPTsch, die mit den Massen verbunden war, sich auf deren Vertrauen stützen konnte und einen Kader erfahrener, angesehener Politiker besaß, nicht brauchen konnten.

CPYRGHT

Vielmehr entsprach es den damaligen — und es entspricht ebenso den heutigen — Absichten der Sowjetführung offenbar weit mehr, wenn die Parteien in sich abgeschlossen sind, sich hauptsächlich auf administrative Macht stützen, über keine wirklichen Persönlichkeiten verfügen und völlig von der sowjetischen Macht abhängen, womöglich auch von der Anwesenheit sowjetischer Truppen, in der die KPdSU offensichtlich die einzig verlässliche Garantie für den Sozialismus sieht.

Aus diesen Gründen hat die Sowjetführung stets mit Mißtrauen auf Länder geblickt, die sich durch ihren eigenen revolutionären Kampf befreit haben, wie Jugoslawien, China, Kuba und auch Vietnam. Denn wo es die eigene Revolution gewesen ist, welche die nationale Führung aus dem Schoß der Bewegung emporgetragen hat, kann man von der Führung nicht so leicht Gehorsam und Unterordnung gegenüber dem Zentrum, das heißt der KPdSU, erreichen wie dort, wo die Regierungen eigentlich unter dem Schutz der Sowjetarmee, welche die Hauptlast der Befreiung getragen hatte, zur Macht gelangt sind. Man könnte sagen, der gemeinsame Nenner dieser Stalinschen Auffassung ist der Mangel an Vertrauen in die Kraft der revolutionären Bewegung sowie die Überschätzung der eigenen Rolle oder das Streben, alles zu kontrollieren und nach den eigenen subjektiven Anschauungen zu entscheiden, was dem Sozialismus nützt oder nicht — und das ist in Wirklichkeit nicht immer identisch mit dem, was im Interesse der sowjetischen Großmachtspolitik liegt.

Hierin liegt auch der Schlüssel zur Beantwortung der Frage, die von vielen Menschen auf der ganzen Welt gestellt wird: Warum war es nach der Invasion im August 1968 nicht möglich, in der ČSSR wenigstens einen Teil der Nachjanuar-Reformen zu retten, und warum wurde die Entwicklung so jäh, nicht nur vor den Januar 1968, sondern noch viel weiter zurückgeworfen. Warum sind wiederum — nach zwanzig Jahren die alten Anschuldigungen aufgetaucht, diesmal vor allem von der DDR, von Polen und Bulgarien und natürlich auch von Moskau erhoben. Warum beschuldigte man die Tschechoslowakei 1968, nachdem die KPTsch neuerlich die volle Autorität und die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung gewonnen, das Volk sich spontan zum Sozialismus bekannt hatte, wo kein einziger Betrieb den Kapitalisten zurückgegeben worden war, keine einzige landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaft zerfallen ist, wo eine kommunistische Führung, die allgemeine Popularität und natürliche Autorität genoß, sich herausgebildet hatte? Wohl, weil die sowjetische Führung beziehungsweise deren dogmatischer Flügel — ähnlich wie in den Jahren 1948 bis 1950 — kein anderes Sozialismus-Modell dulden wollte. Weil nun die Sowjetführung

fürchtete, der tschechoslowakische Weg zum Sozialismus könnte zum Erfolg führen und auf die UdSSR und andere sozialistische Länder zurückwirken, mußte das tschechoslowakische Experiment exemplarisch bestraft werden, allen anderen zur Warnung.

Jugoslawien ist eine tolerierte Ausnahme, weil es sich das Recht auf einen eigenen Weg bereits erkämpft hat und offenbar nicht bereit ist, darauf zu verzichten; China ist der exkommunizierte Ketzer, zu stark, als daß man an ihm einen tschechoslowakischen Eingriff riskieren könnte, und Rumänien wird vorläufig respektiert, weil es sich entschlossen gezeigt hat, seine unabhängige Politik zu verteidigen, und dabei sehr vorsichtig vorgeht. Der tragische Fehler der tschechischen Führung nach dem Januar bestand darin, daß sie sich auch 1968 noch an Gottwalds alten Grundsatz von 1948 hielt, die Tschechoslowakei werde kein zweites Jugoslawien sein, und alles auf eine Karte setzte: auf das Verständnis der Sowjetunion, in der Meinung, nach dem 20. Parteitag der KPdSU könne der Fall Jugoslawien sich nicht mehr wiederholen. Um so teurer mußte die Tschechoslowakei für das Unterfangen zahlen, ihren eigenen Weg zum Sozialismus gehen zu wollen.

Denn heute muß die Führung der KPdSU die Rolle, die einst das Kominform hatte, selber spielen und braucht daher die Disziplin der anderen Parteien. Darum ist sie nicht nur auf die tschechoslowakischen Kommunisten böse und will deren Partei zu einer kleinen, aber gefügigen Sekte dezimieren; ebenso feindselig verhält sie sich zur Kommunistischen Partei Italiens, die auf Grund ihres Massencharakters, ihrer Volksverbundenheit, ihrer Teilnahme am parlamentarischen Kampf, ihres starken politischen Kaders und ihrer eigenständigen Vorstellungen von der sozialistischen Umwälzung, eine potentielle Ketzerin ist. Darum ließ die Führung der KPdSU auch ohne Zögern und ohne Rücksicht auf die tragischen Folgen die Kommunistische Partei Österreichs praktisch zerfallen und förderte die Zerschlagung der Kommunistischen Partei Griechenlands, gegen die sie den Schlag in einem Augenblick führte, da deren führende Vertreter vom Diktaturregime der Obersten eingekerkert und gefoltert wurden. Mit gleichem Mißtrauen betrachtet sie die Linke im Westen und die nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika, sofern diese sich nicht Moskau unterordnen wollen und ihre eigenen, bodenständigen Kampf- und Entwicklungsformen herausbilden.

Was für die einzelnen Länder gilt, das gilt auch für Einzelpersonen. Die härteste Repression richtet sich gegen jene Kommunisten, die aktiv am Widerstandskampf daheim oder im Ausland

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE~~

November 1970

JIRI PELIKAN: BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Jiri Pelikan was reported by the London Times, on October 1, 1969, to have chosen "temporary exile" in the West. His decision is further proof of the frustration suffered by many Communist intellectuals in Czechoslovakia since the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968.

Pelikan announced that he was unable to serve the present Czechoslovak leadership, and that he believed he would be able to play a more effective part in upholding the ideas of "progressive Communism" if he remained outside Czechoslovakia. But he emphasized his continuing loyalty both to his country and to his Communist ideals, saying that he intended to return to Prague as soon as free speech was restored. The Czechoslovak news agency, CTK, reported by the London Communist Morning Star on October 3, described this statement as being "in full contradiction to the teaching and policy of the Communist Party," and accused Pelikan of having "misused" Prague television "to disturb the Communist Party and the Socialist order." (Pelikan was for five years Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.)

At 46, Pelikan is a striking example of a committed Communist who supported the reforms introduced in Czechoslovakia after the fall of Novotny in January, 1968, and the weakness of the charges brought in the CTK statement indicate the embarrassment felt by the present authorities at his defection.

## Highpoints of his Communist career are:


- 1940        Joined the Communist Party at age 16. Was jailed by the Nazis.
- 1940/1945    Escaped prison and spent the rest of the war fighting in the resistance.
- 1948        Entered the National Assembly when the Communists took power.
- 1953        He became General-Secretary of the Communist International Union of Students. (IUS)
- 1955/1963    He served as IUS President.
- 1964        Elected to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, where he was active on the Cultural and Foreign Affairs Committees.
- 1968        Became President of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
- 1963/1968    He served as Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.
- 1969        Served as Cultural Counsellor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Rome.

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SOVIET ARMS AND COLONIALISM



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November 1970

SOVIET ARMS AND COLONIALISM

Vaudeville Is Dead

Does the impulse of the expansionistic Tzarist drive toward empire beat on in the breasts of the present Soviet leaders? Are they about to give birth to an idea, colonialism, long after its death?

Historians and political scientists agree that the classic era of Kiplingesque empire building ended long ago, except in the minds of Soviet ideologues and activists. These worthies have the curious tendency to see in their principal opponents a reflected image of themselves; time after time in their propaganda they accuse the U.S. of faults inherent in their own society, such as racism (They built a ghetto university for their African students and cannot establish a modus vivendi with their Chinese coreligionists) and repressive police statism (Soviet dissenters will vouch for their own government's preeminence in this field) - and lastly, they accuse the U.S. of having aggressive global intentions. They are sure the Americans aspire to world power and dominion over foreign peoples, but they demonstrate by thier own acts that the urge is within themselves.

The Germans, the French, the Italians and the British have for one reason or another put away the uniforms and trappings of overseas rule. The Portuguese empire, though diminished, hangs on - for how long nobody knows. In the interest of historical considerations, popular sentiment and economic good sense the United States since World War II has entered an era of retrenchment by taking a hard look at its great-power commitments and obligations, both military and otherwise, and by returning political self-determination to those from whom it was taken, as in the case of the Philippines and of Okinawa. America's objective is not one of control but of enlightened self-interest and the mutual benefit of economic partners. Colonialism, like vaudeville, has been confined to the dustbin by most of the major powers.

But, incredible as it might seem, there is a mighty bustling about in the wings and apparently ignoring the change in times, the Russians are going to give a performance in empire, in physical expansion, in overseas rule by satraps. The main evidence of this lies in the pace of Soviet rearmament, not just in strategic weaponry but in the field of conventional arms as well. In the latter the Soviet Union has long maintained a strong status in such landbased conventional

weapons as tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry. However, not satisfied with its current great-power status Russia, historically a land power, now for the first time since her defeat at the hands of the Japanese at the turn of the century has begun to eye prizes across the oceans.

The Sun Never Sets...

To move out from home bases into wider areas of the world Russia needs power, and power she has - more power than she needs. Present Soviet nuclear stockpiles are awesome. Despite their power the Soviets maintain a forced rate of missile construction, the reason for which is quite obvious when one thinks in terms of their colonial ambitions. A nuclear shield nearly equal to that of the U.S. is adequate for a balance of terror: neither side can move into an area of vital concern to the other. But this is precisely what the Soviets dream of doing - of being able to undertake any actions that might suit them at any place in the world they chose. They seek, in short, ultimate world domination, and for that they need more than a balance of terror. They need a nuclear umbrella over their conventional forces so large that no power or combination of powers could even dream of brow-beating them into retreating from an aggressive course of action, as was the case in Cuba in 1962. Then they would be free to move their conventional forces anywhere they chose at any time.

These conventional forces on land are already reaching the point of providing two-front protection. Nuclear and technical inferiority keep the Chinese infantry masses in a respectful military posture to the east, checkmated by a highly mechanized Soviet counterforce. To the west is NATO, its forces just equal to the task of keeping the bear at bay, but a force completely inadequate for any aggressive Western designs on Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union itself. Left over in between are sufficient pools of military and technical personnel to provide an increasing flow of manpower for "advisory cadres" manning rocket and fighter aircraft forces in countries like the Sudan, Egypt, and Cuba.

All that is missing to complete the image of a very modern empire is a blue-water navy. Now with the appearance of just such a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, etc., we have a very convincing image. As with the missile program, so with the ship construction plans. While the Soviet navy still ranks second to the U.S. navy in tonnage and overall combat power, it has been steadily closing the gap and already has sufficient forces to seize and secure continuing right of passage through all the major sea lanes of the world.

Without major naval bases on foreign soil all that has been attributed to the Soviets above does not make them a colonial power. But the bases are there - at Santiago in Cuba, at Alexandria in Egypt, at Port Sudan and coming soon in Mauritius and Socotra, and perhaps eventually at Mers el Kebir, Algeria. So, the Soviet sea lanes already have secure terminals in land areas firmly under political, military and economic control. This structure has all the oddity of a live mastadon- a classic colonial empire is evolving in our time.

#### White Man's Burden

The teachings of Marx and Lenin prove conclusively that none of the foregoing can possibly be true. There is no Soviet vaudeville show; there can be no mastadon. Colonialism was a logical, historical outgrowth of the evils of capitalism. Under the more advanced state of a Marxist-Leninist society the exploitation of man by man is impossible, the exploitation of a backward people by the Communist Motherland unthinkable. Therefore our view of Soviet activities is a misapprehension. What we take to be political control in, say, Cuba is simply the provision of an opportunity for the disciplined study of higher truths (for those who don't escape) beneficently supplied by Russian comrades. What we take to be military control in, say, Czechoslovakia is nothing more than a response to a plea for aid in suppressing political hooliganism. As for economic control, no right-thinking person would believe that Soviet personnel would tell the Egyptians how to manage the Aswan Dam or the Helwan Steel Works just because they were built with Soviet capital, or tell the Egyptian army when, where, and how to fight with its billions of dollars worth of Soviet equipment.

When the French and British empires collapsed, the Soviets felt a brotherly compulsion to come to the aid of destitute peoples ill-used by centuries of exploitation. Whereas the Western powers, during the post-colonial era, have supplied billions worth of developmental capital and goods to these peoples, the Soviet Union after half a century of scientific planning, found itself short of both of these commodities. It did, however, have sufficient military goods, and it could present itself as a developmental example with people to advise on its emulation. No thought of national gain was countenanced at any time. Fired by altruism, the Soviet economy, half the size of that of the U.S. in gross national product, has been making twice the effort of the U.S. to do that which it could do best (or wanted to do most), build armaments with which to strengthen its approaches to those less privileged and fortunate peoples it wished to protect and advise.



Russians are willing to do without consumer goods and adequate housing as long as necessary so that these humanitarian efforts can continue.

Of course there are commodities available in some of these countries which could prove highly useful to the home economy, oil, minerals and foods and fibers. So it is quite possible that we will see iron galleons flying the hammer and sickle beating home to Odessa, Leningrad and Vladivostok with cargoes of the modern equivalents of Inca gold and plate in ever-increasing numbers. They've already begun to move. When these treasure fleets become large enough to enable the Soviets to materially ease the impoverished situation of their own citizens they may be able to accumulate enough capital and enough goods to treat with overseas nations on the basis of modern economic internationalism. Until then (and if the transition ever occurs it will be far in the future, to judge from the present sluggish Soviet economic performance and the scope of their ambitions) we have a grand old-fashioned show onstage.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
 CPYRIGHT October 1970

## Russia and defense spending

THE series of articles on Russia's unprecedented military buildup in peacetime, written by Scripps-Howard defense specialist Mike Miller and appearing in The Washington Daily News, is important and disquieting reading. (See Page 3.)

Briefly, Mr. Miller's findings are that the Kremlin is making a massive military effort right across the board. It has either surpassed us or is rapidly catching up in strategic missiles, nuclear submarines, naval surface craft and supersonic fighters. Also, the Soviet Union has long had a lead in such conventional items as tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry.

The implications of the Soviet buildup are disturbing. The United States clearly had nuclear superiority in the mid-1960s. The Johnson and Nixon administrations opted to freeze the building of intercontinental ballistic missiles and to let the Russians close the gap.

The theory was that Moscow would be satisfied with "parity" and the nuclear arms race could thus be brought to a halt. Unfortunately, in practice the Russians have shown few signs of slowing down. Their momentum is such that they threaten to move clearly ahead in nuclear striking power.

Why is the Kremlin driving its subjects so hard? We don't pretend to know, and we worry over these questions: If the United States had trouble with the Russians in the 1960s, when it had nuclear superiority, what will the 1970s be like when its advantage is lost? Can the Kremlin be trusted to have a military lead and not try pressure plays

against our allies in Europe or this country itself?

This should not be taken as a call to resume the arms race. The Soviet-American strategic arms limitation (SALT) talks have shown signs of progress and remain a hope of mankind. But if the SALT talks do not reach agreement in about a year and Russia maintains its thrust for primacy, the United States will have to rethink its defense policy.

Ironically, President Nixon, often attacked as a hawk, has been the only recent president to cut the defense budget seriously. His proposed 1971 defense spending of \$71.8 billion is \$6 billion under 1970.

Foes of defense spending in Congress think the Pentagon can make further savings and have cut \$2 billion more from its budget. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird insists that the cut causes intolerable risk, that the 1971 budget was already "rock bottom, bare bones."

Altho there usually is fat in Pentagon budgets, this time Mr. Laird may be right. We'll have more confidence in the bare-bones claims, tho, when the Pentagon starts firing brass hats who cover up costs overruns and not the auditors who expose them.

There's a point of view in Congress and the nation that regard defense spending as waste that robs money from social purposes. But the way Russia has been evidencing adventure and seeking arms supremacy, the defense budget looks like a life-insurance premium that we must pay.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
20 October 1970

## Soviet pushing subs

# U. S. faces missile gap

By MIKE MILLER  
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

The Soviet Union, after years of playing catch-up to the United States in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, now is plunging ahead.

A big question confronting U.S. defense planners is where the Soviet ICBM buildup eventually will stop.

Simultaneously the Soviets have launched a drive to catch and possibly surpass the U.S. in numbers of strategic nuclear submarines and submarine-fired nuclear missiles.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird says the United States will have to proceed with some major new strategic weapons system, possibly beginning next year, if the Soviet buildup continues unabated and no agreement emerges from the strategic arms limitation talks.

Already the United States is deploying multiple warheads on some of its missiles in a giant step forward in the arms race. Each warhead on these missiles can be fired at a different target.

The Soviet Union has deployed more than 1,300 ICBMs and is continuing at the rate of at least 150 per year. The United States has 1,054 and is holding at that level, altho 500 of these are to be armed with three separately targetable warheads each.

The Soviet monster SS9 missile concerns U.S. defense officials most. The Russians have more than 300 SS9S operational and under construction.

The Soviet arsenal also includes almost 800 SS11 missiles. These are comparable to the U.S. Minuteman missile which carries a warhead of slightly more than one megaton. In comparison, the huge SS9 could carry either one 25-megaton warhead or three warheads of five megatons each plus guidance equipment.

### SPACE BOMBER TESTED

Russia also continues to test-fire a potential terror weapon known as a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). This vehicle achieves orbit like a satellite. It could be used to orbit a nuclear warhead over the United States repeatedly. However, U.S. officials believe the Soviets would fire it down on the first pass to achieve surprise and attempt to reduce radar warning time. The Soviets are also testing a low-trajectory ICBM with the like purpose of cutting down radar warning time.

The United States has 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 older Titans. The U.S. arsenal includes nothing comparable to the SS9. Because the SS9 warhead is much more powerful than necessary to destroy cities, Mr. Laird

and other defense officials believe it might be designed as a first-strike weapon against the Minuteman force in its underground silos. This led the administration to begin deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system to protect Minuteman.

The Russians have 700 intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles — 70 believed targeted against Red China and 630 against Western Europe. The United States used to maintain these types of missiles in Europe but phased them out as obsolescent in view of the ICBM buildup.

Russia has deployed 13 of its latest model Yankee-class strategic nuclear submarines. Like the U.S. Polaris force, these carry 16 missiles each. At least 15 more Yankee-class submarines are under construction, and the Pentagon estimates these will join the fleet at the rate of about eight per year. At that rate, Mr. Laird notes, the Soviet missile submarine fleet will surpass the 41-boat Polaris fleet by 1973 or 1974.

All but 10 of the U.S. Polaris submarines will be converted to fire Poseidon missiles, a weapon with 10 separately targetable warheads. Thus each submarine, which now carries 16 nuclear warheads on the same number of missiles, will be armed with 160 warheads.

### LEAD IN BOMBERS

The 540 U.S. strategic bombers give this country a big lead in that field, altho U.S. bomber strength has been reduced from 780 five years ago. The Soviets have 200 long-range bombers, about 50 of which are configured as tankers.

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, claims to have intelligence reports that Russia is building a new bomber fleet. The United States has awarded a contract for some test models of a new bomber, dubbed the B1, but

no final decision has been made on whether to build it.

The Russians have an ABM system operational around Moscow consisting of 64 missile launchers. Some U.S. officials have warned Russia might also be able to convert some of its more than 10,000 antiaircraft missiles to ABMS.

The U.S. ABM system so far consists of construction work on two sites and recent congressional approval for work on a third site. The system will not be fully operational before the mid-1970s, assuming continued congressional approval.

The Soviet Union has tested multiple war-

heads in the Pacific on Both SS9 and SS11 missiles, altho these warheads have not been confirmed as separately targetable. Mr. Laird predicts Russia could have a MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability by next year.

### DISCLOSE FEARS

In arguing for the Safeguard ABM and other strategic programs, Mr. Laird and other defense officials describe this scenario:

- A massive force of MIRVed SS9 blockbusters with multiple warheads and increased accuracy could destroy all or most of the U.S. ICBM force in a surprise attack.
- Submarine-launched missiles would destroy the U.S. bomber force before it could get airborne. From off the U.S. coasts these missiles would have a flight time of only six to nine minutes to the airfields — not enough time for the bombers to receive radar alert and take off.

- With the ICBMs and bombers destroyed, only the missiles of the Polaris/Poseidon fleet would remain intact in the U.S. strategic arsenal.

CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

19 October 1970

**Big Soviet expansion****Arms buildup worries U.S.**

By MIKE MILLER

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Russia is forging ahead with what U.S. defense officials describe as the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.

From strategic nuclear missiles and submarines to conventional ships and planes, the Soviet military effort is impressive. U.S. officials view it with growing concern.

The United States still ranks as the world's foremost military power. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is so powerful this country could destroy the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange even if Russia hit first in a surprise attack. This power to retaliate should be sufficient to deter the Russians from attacking for the time being.

But U.S. defense experts are concerned over the momentum of the Russian effort on all fronts, particularly strategic nuclear missiles and sea power. If the Russians continue to build and the United States does not take some countermeasures, the experts fear Russia will reach such a superior position in five years or more that it might attempt nuclear blackmail of the United States.

**FEAR SOVIET SUPERIORITY**

"If present trends continue," President Nixon told a private congressional briefing during the recent fight over the antiballistic missile system, "the United States a very few years hence will find itself clearly in second position — with the Soviet Union undisputably the greatest military power on earth."

"I am afraid the day has already arrived," said Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., the superhawk chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in reference to the President's warning during a recent House speech on the Soviet threat.

"If they (the Russians) keep this momentum going," says Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, "they will be in a position where they will have a superior force and we will have a second-rate force. This concerns me because a decision to build new strategic weapons takes five to seven years to implement."

**RUSSIA SPENDS MORE**

According to the best available estimates, Russia's military spending of about \$60 billion annually, including the military aspects of its space program, surpasses that of the United States if costs of the Vietnam war are discounted. The Administration's defense request for this fiscal year is \$71.8 billion. While the

Vietnam war costs have not been disclosed for this year, they apparently more than account for the difference in the Soviet and U.S. budgets.

Mr. Laird interprets the defense spending figures to mean that Russia is making twice the defense "effort" of the United States because her gross national product is only about half that of this country.

Further comparison shows the United States spent \$7.5 billion last year on strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems — the hardware that figures in a nuclear war — while the Soviets spent \$13 billion for strategic systems. Rep. Rivers says the additional \$5.5 billion spent by the Russians for strategic hardware in one year would pay for about 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles like the U.S. Minuteman.

**RESEARCH CITED**

Of greatest concern to many officials is Russia's margin in spending for military research and development. The United States will spend \$13 billion to \$14 billion for that purpose this year; the Soviet Union will spend \$16 billion to \$17 billion. The U.S. research and development budget has leveled off and is declining; the Soviet budget for these activities is rising at the rate of 10 to 13 per cent a year.

"The picture here is a sobering one," says Dr. John S. Foster Jr., the Defense Department's research and development chief. "It is today's research and development that provides tomorrow's weapons — for 1975 and beyond — and provides also a capability to understand early and counter quickly the qualitative weapons improvements on the other side."

Military pay in the Soviet armed forces is lower than the compensation for U.S. servicemen. Therefore, a greater share of Russia's defense budget goes for weapons.

Russia has about 3.3 million men in its regular forces. The U.S. active military strength has declined to about three million from a high of more than 3.5 million at the peak of the Vietnam buildup. The U.S. force is scheduled to continue declining to somewhere between two million and 2.5 million.

**MISSILE CRISIS RECALLED**

In assessing relative military strengths of the United States and Russia, the comparison inevitably is made between today's balance and the situation as it existed at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

When the late President John F. Kennedy demanded under threat of nuclear war that the Russians withdraw their missiles from Cuba, the Soviets had to comply because they were an inferior nuclear power. Their navy also lacked the power to challenge the U.S. blockade of Cuba so are from the Soviet homeland.

The Russians suffered such extreme humiliation in the 1962 crisis that Soviet leaders resolved to build such a military power that they would never have to back down again. Now, eight years later, the United States is witnessing the results of that resolve.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

21 October 1970

# Reds threaten sea supremacy

By **MIKE MILLER**

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Russia's growing fleet of modern combat ships and submarines poses a serious challenge to the U. S. Navy's supremacy of the seas.

The Soviet navy already has seized a clear lead in some important phases of sea power — principally total submarine strength and fast, missile-firing gunboats.

While the Red navy still ranks second to the United States in tonnage and overall combat power, it steadily has been closing the gap. This trend is being accelerated by the Defense Department's retirement of large numbers of older vessels to hold down military spending.

Russia's fleet is much more modern than that of the United States. Only an insignificant number of Russia's more than 1,000 surface



combat ships and submarines are more than 20 years old. The U. S. Navy has had to operate in recent years with more than half of its surface combat ships more than 20 years old.

Navy officials have estimated that a ship construction program costing \$35 billion over 10 years will be necessary to keep pace. Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S. C., House Armed Services Committee chairman, says the Navy has told him privately a faster crash program totalling \$25 billion in the next five years is needed.

Russia has more than 350 operational submarines, including the 13 Yankee-class strategic nuclear missile-firing submarines comparable to the U. S. Polaris. The Defense Department says intelligence reports indicate the Soviets may be building a submarine base in Cuba to serve these vessels. Yankee-class submarines, carrying 16 missiles each, already have begun patrols in the Atlantic within missile range of the United States.

Forty of the Soviet submarines — nine of them nuclear-powered — are older models which carry three ballistic missiles each. These are believed to be targeted against Europe and Asia.

Sixty-five of Russia's submarines — 35 of them nuclear-powered — are equipped with supersonic cruise missiles with ranges up to 400 miles. They are designed for firing at an enemy's naval and merchant ships. This missile is unique to the Soviet Navy.

The other 240 Soviet submarines are attack models with the wartime mission of firing torpedoes at surface ships and other submarines; 22 of these are nuclear-powered.

All of Russia's submarines are of post-World War II vintage.

Based on information he says was supplied

by the Pentagon, Rep. Rivers estimates the Soviet nuclear submarine construction capacity at from 20 to 35 per year. The Soviets now are producing 10 to 14 submarines annually. One Russian submarine yard has greater capacity than all of the U. S. submarine yards combined.

American admirals grimly recall in public speeches that Nazi Germany had only 57 diesel submarines in early World War II but exacted a heavy toll of allied shipping and almost won the battle of the Atlantic.

Other features of the modern Soviet navy include two helicopter carriers used for anti-submarine warfare maneuvers, 30 guided-missile destroyers, 120 of the fast, missile-firing gunboats and 700 smaller patrol craft and gunboats used for coastal defense.

Many Soviet vessels, including small patrol boats, carry the STYX missile with which the Egyptians sank an Israeli destroyer in the Mediterranean Sea. The United States has no comparable missile and has been working hard to develop a defense against the STYX.

Against the Soviet fleet of more than 350 submarines, the United States has 147 submarines. Eighty-eight of these are nuclear-powered — the 41 Polaris strategic missile-firing boats and 47 nuclear-powered attack submarines. The remaining 59 attack submarines are older Diesel models.

However, the United States has not tried to match Russia in total numbers of submarines, nor does the Navy contend that this is necessary. The United States relies on naval aircraft and surface vessels for a major portion of its antisubmarine warfare activities.

For years Russian admirals have boasted that the United States will have to share the world's oceans with its growing fleet. That already has happened in the Mediterranean, where the Red fleet matches the U. S. 6th Fleet in size altho not in combat power because of the U. S. aircraft carriers.

The Soviets also have begun penetrating the Caribbean with periodic voyages, held a massive 200-ship worldwide naval exercise earlier this year and have extended naval operations into the Indian Ocean and widespread areas of the Atlantic and Pacific far from their home shores.

The U. S. Navy's principal margin in combat power lies in its force of 15 attack aircraft carriers. The Russians have no aircraft carriers. However, the U. S. Navy is under increasing pressure in Congress to reduce its carrier fleet to hold down defense spending. Carriers are extremely costly.

Example: One nuclear aircraft carrier now under construction will cost about \$600 million.

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 October 1970

## Italians Bolt Communist Party To Join a New Ultraleft Group

By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Oct. 11—A left-wing revolt in the rank and file of the Italian Communist party, the strongest in the West, appears to be spreading.

Many members, especially younger ones, are disgruntled over the way the party reacted to President Nixon's visit here, and this is cited as a major reason for a spate of defections during the last few days.

The Communists who have left the party recently, including some well-known local and regional organizers, have generally joined a year-old ultra-left group, known as Manifesto, which seems well on its way to becoming Italy's second Communist party.

Manifesto is named after the group's monthly magazine, which has a paid circulation of 30,000. The growing splinter movement accuses the Soviet Union of seeking an accommodation with the United States, and the Italian Communist party of seeking to strike a deal with the Government to become a part of the power structure.

The Manifesto group has accused the Communist party of failing to commit itself during President Nixon's visit, and the party seems to be hurting from the criticism.

The party sponsored a parade and rally in Rome on Sept. 26, the day before President Nixon arrived here, to protest against what it denounced as his attempts to implicate Italy in an imperialist, pro-Israel plot in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A crowd estimated at 5,000 to 10,000 people participated in the demonstration, which

looked rather perfunctory and caused no major disturbances.

The Communist party asserted afterward that radical students and Maoists had boycotted its anti-Nixon rally.

Students and other ultraleftists demonstrated on their own against Mr. Nixon before and during his sojourn here, attacking American-operated offices and cars, and rampaging in downtown Rome. Some 1,000 rioters were detained, but most of them were released after questioning.

The official Communist party also drew ultraleftist scorn for an editorial in its main newspaper, L'Unita. The editorial said that President Nixon, though unwelcome in capitalist Italy, might be welcome in Communist Yugoslavia, which he visited on the next stage of his European tour.

During the last week, hardly a day passed with the Communist headquarters in Rome receiving reports of new desertions of individual party members or entire groups.

The latest defectors were eight prominent Communists in Venice, including a secretary of the local party federation, Pietro Granziera, and the secretary of the Giudecca district, Walter Parmeggiani. The eight are said to have taken a sizable following in the rank and file over to the Manifesto group.

Four days earlier, a group of Bergamo Communists, including a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Eliseo Milani, joined the Manifesto movement. Mr. Milani was the sixth Communist deputy to declare himself independent of the party.

[World Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC) Preparatory Meeting]

MTI (Hungarian press agency), Budapest  
30 September 1970

Representatives of 45 communist and workers parties exchanged views in Budapest 28-30 September 1970 on topical questions regarding the anti-imperialist struggle.

The delegations expressed their parties readiness to make efforts to strengthen the cohesion of the communists and other anti-imperialist organizations, to widen their cooperation on the basis of equality, and to intensify their solidarity in joint struggle against imperialism.

The meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of objectivity and in a spirit of comradeship and solidarity.

L'HUMANITE, Paris  
23 September 1970

MEETING OF THE CP'S FROM THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE

Took Place in London

On 21 September 1970 a meeting of communist parties from European capitalist countries took place in London. Representatives of the FRG, Cypriot, Spanish French, British, Greek, Irish, Italian, and Netherlands communist parties were present.

After discussing problems arising from the development of multinational societies, these representatives expressed their opinion that a conference of communist parties from European capitalist countries should take place in London from 11 through 13 January 1971. "The struggle of the working class in European capitalist countries with regard to the development of multinational societies" is to be on the conference's agenda.

The proposals advanced at the meeting are being submitted for the approval of the central committees of the parties concerned, including parties which were unable to participate in this meeting and which wrote in order to make known their approval of the idea of such a conference.

(The PCF was represented in London by Central Committee member Jacques Denis).

LE MONDE, Paris  
16 September 1970

The French Communist Party "Opposition" Is  
Going To Reactivate Its Operation

Announces Mr. Jean Poperen

In the bulletin, Synthèse-Flash, published by the Socialist Study, Research, and Information Clubs (ex-UGCS), Mr. Jean Poperen, who is the moving spirit of this association, gives his opinion on the internal situation of the French Communist Party. Specifically, he writes: "On the internal plane, the upswing of the French Communist Party, begun in 1965, seems to have been halted for an indeterminate period. The Communists are not retreating, but must be content with exploiting the opinions of traditional "malcontents." Recruitment is stagnating; militants are no longer giving evidence of the same enthusiasm with respect to attending meetings, distributing party literature, or pasting up posters.

Mr. Poperen continues: "This standstill could nevertheless be jostled in forthcoming weeks. In fact, a sector of the left which has been very discreet for several years within the Communist opposition, has received new impetus after the expulsion of Garaudy and of Tillon. These expulsions and the persistence of malaise within the Communist Party seem to have galvanized traditional activists. In recent months, an initial regrouping took place, first of all with Garaudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau, and Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont.

Shortly thereafter, a majority of the militants of the "Unir Débat" group, specifically Marcel Prenant and Jean Chaintron, stated that they had joined the initiative of the above-mentioned four in behalf of a "Twentieth De-Stalinization Congress"...

Mr. Poperen also specifies: "In December, the opposition will hold a national conference where they will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. On this occasion, they will try to define their internal and external Communist Party strategy. As of now, they have contacted other groups, particularly the PSU (Unified Socialist Party). The appearance, on 8 October, of Politique Hebdo, put out by activists of all Socialist organizations, including former members of the Communist Party, will provide possibly significant support to these campaigns."



L'HUMANITE, Paris  
 CPYROH 21 September 1970

## Une réunion de P.C. des pays capitalistes d'Europe a eu lieu à Londres

**U**NE réunion de Partis communistes des pays capitalistes d'Europe a eu lieu à Londres le lundi 21 septembre. Etaient présents des représentants des Partis communistes d'Allemagne Fédérale, Chypre, Espagne, France, Grande-Bretagne, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Pays-Bas.

Après avoir discuté des problèmes posés par le développement des sociétés multinationales, les représentants présents ont exprimé l'opinion qu'une conférence des Partis communistes des pays capitalistes d'Europe devrait se tenir à Londres les 11, 12 et 13 janvier 1971 avec pour ordre du jour : « La lutte de la classe ouvrière des pays capitalistes d'Europe devant le développement des sociétés multinationales. »

Les suggestions avancées par la réunion sont soumises à l'approbation des comités centraux des Partis concernés, y compris ceux qui ne furent pas en mesure de participer à cette consultation et qui ont écrit pour faire connaître leur approbation de l'idée d'une telle conférence.

(Le Parti Communiste Français était représenté à Londres par Jacques Denis, membre du Comité Central.)

LE MONDE, Paris  
 16 September 1970

## Les « oppositionnels » du P.C.F. vont relancer leur action annonce M. Jean Poperen

Dans le bulletin *Synthèse-Flash*, publié par les clubs Etudes, Recherches et Information socialiste (ex-U.G.C.S.), M. Jean Poperen, qui anime cette association, donne son opinion sur la situation interne du parti communiste français. Il écrit notamment : « Sur le plan intérieur, la remontée du P.C.F., amorcée en 1965, semble stoppée pour une période indéterminée. Les communistes ne reculent pas, mais doivent se contenter de capitaliser les voix des « mécontents » traditionnels. Le recrutement stagne, les militants ne font plus preuve de la même ardeur à assister aux réunions, à distribuer des tracts ou à coller des affiches. »

M. Poperen poursuit : « Cet immobilisme pourrait toutefois bien être bousculé dans les semaines à venir. En effet, un secteur de la gauche, très discret depuis plusieurs années, celui de l'opposition communiste, a reçu un coup neuf après l'échec de Curaudy et de Tillon. Ces évolutions et la persistance du malaise à l'intérieur du P.C. semblent

avoir galvanisé les militants traditionnels. Durant ces derniers mois, un premier regroupement a eu lieu, tout d'abord avec Garaudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau et Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont.

» Peu après, la majorité des militants du groupe Unir Débat, notamment Marcel Prenant et Jean Chaintron, déclaraient s'associer à l'initiative des quatre précédents en faveur d'un « vingtième congrès de la déstalinisation »...

M. Poperen précise d'autre part : « Au mois de décembre, les oppositionnels tiendront une conférence nationale où ils fêteront le cinquantième anniversaire de la fondation du P.C. A cette occasion, ils tenteront de définir leur stratégie à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du P.C. D'ores et déjà, ils ont pris contact avec d'autres formations et en particulier avec le P.S.U. La sortie, le 8 octobre, de *Politique hebdo*, dirigé par des militants de toutes les organisations socialistes, dont des anciens du P.C., constituera un soutien éventuel important à ces campagnes ».

November 1970

## DATES WORTH NOTING

November 7	Moscow	Anniversary of the October Revolution.
November 9-11	Tripoli	Meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. AAPSO is a Communist-dominated, pro-Soviet organization based in Cairo and headed by Yusuf el Sebai (AAPSO Secretary-General) of the UAR. In late June in Rome, AAPSO co-sponsored with the World Peace Council an International Conference in Support of the Fighting Peoples of the Portugese Colonies.
November 10	Latin America	Latin America Student Strike for Vietnam, being promoted by the (Communist) World Federation of Democratic Youth and the (Communist) International Union of Students. The date is to coincide with the 25th anniversary of WFDY's founding in 1945. November 10 will also be the eve of International Student Week (Nov. 11-17) adopted by IUS after WW II as an annual student commemoration of the mass student demonstrations in Prague in Nov. 1939 protesting the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and the death of a Czech medical student, Jan Opletal, killed that week in a street clash between students and occupying forces. Thirty years later, the Prague-based IUS was witness to new mass student demonstrations and the death of another Czech student, Jan Palach, who set himself afire in downtown Prague, January 16, 1969, to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November 14	Sino-Soviet border	Anniversary of the signing in 1860 of the Treaty of Peking, by which Russia gained 841,500 square kilometres along the lower Amur River and east of the Ussuri River, areas initially penetrated by Russia 200 years earlier and thereafter intermittently contested by troops of the Tzarist and Manchu


Empires. Communist China characterizes the Treaty of Peking as one of the "unequal treaties," and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in recent years have occurred along segments of the border established by this treaty.


November 15	New Delhi	4th Afro-Asian Writers Conference sponsored by the Cairo-based, pro-Soviet, Communist front, the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau. This meeting has been long-delayed (the 3rd conference was in 1967), because the Sino-Soviet split ruptured the Bureau.
Mid-November	New York	The UN General Assembly will take its annual vote on Chinese representation. Apparently, for the first time, there is a possibility Peking may gain a majority of UNGA votes, but probably not the two-thirds required for an "Important Question" vote.
November 27- December 3	Southeast Asia	Pope Paul VI to visit Manila November 27-29, Sydney November 30-December 3, and possibly Ceylon on his return to the Vatican.
December 4	Venezuela	The Venezuelan Communist Party is to hold its 4th Congress. Interest is focused on the outcome of long-standing factional differences between the majority pro-Soviet faction and a faction led by Teodoro Petkoff, Central Committee member, who in a recent book advocated a Venezuelan national brand of Communism and rejection of the Soviet model. He earlier wrote a book criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 20 October, Pravda denounced Petkoff's "anti-Sovietism."


December 10


Stockholm

Awarding of the Nobel Prizes. The Soviet author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, is to be awarded the prize for literature. The American agronomist, Dr. Norman E. Borlaug, is to be awarded the prize for peace for his great contribution to the agricultural "green revolution."












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# SOLJENITSYNE

## GRANDEUR ET LIMITES D'UN HUMANISME

IL est difficile de juger calmement de l'œuvre de Soljénitsyne, entre l'antisoviétisme des campagnes qui ont préparé et exploitent l'attribution du Prix Nobel, et l'« affaire » qui en U.R.S.S. a conduit à la mesure administrative le privant du titre d'écrivain. Ni l'un ni l'autre, pourtant, ne devrait faire oublier qu'il est question d'une œuvre, discutable sans doute, mais considérable, à tous les sens du mot.

Les coups de marteau sur un rail des premières lignes d'« Une journée d'Ivan Denisovitch » (1) sonnaient un début qui ne pouvait passer inaperçu. Il est vrai que rien n'allait être plus terrible à lire pour un communiste : le récit, minute par minute, d'un simple jour, et même plutôt moins malheureux que d'autres, d'un simple détenu dans un de ces camps de concentration où des hommes comme l'auteur passèrent de longues années, avant d'être réhabilités après 1956. Mais tout ce qui disait, dans son irrécusable et impitoyable détail, la vérité crasse de cette journée, parmi tant d'autres, débouchait précisément sur cette autre vérité : tout le roman écrit au présent s'achevait sur un petit verbe de rien du tout dont le passé signifiait beaucoup plus qu'il pouvait sembler : « De ces journées, il y en eut 3.653. » C'est au passé qu'il fallait désormais parler de ces injustices.

DANS cet esprit pouvait se remarquer tout ce qui, dans ce livre, portait critique de ce passé au nom du socialisme même. Tel prisonnier criant à des gardiens : « Vous n'êtes pas des Soviétiques ! Vous n'êtes pas des communistes ! »

Mais surtout, un ton nouveau, et pour qui accédait au texte original, une écriture nouvelle, attiraient l'attention. Et cela n'était pas étranger au fait que le héros ainsi suivi de près, Ivan Choukhov, était un homme du peuple. Rien de plus déchirant, au cœur de ce livre déchirant, que cette page admirable, où paradoxalement c'est comme « héros positif » que Choukhov nous touche au plus profond : cet amour de son travail qui survit en lui en dépit de tout.

« Toute chose et toute peine comptent pour lui, il ne peut pas admettre que ça se perde pour rien.

« *Ciment ! parpaing ! ciment ! parpaing !*  
« ...Choukhov, l'escorte pourrait bien lui lâcher les chiens dessus, il faut quand même qu'il prenne du recul en vitesse pour jeter un coup d'œil. Ça peut aller. Ensuite, il se rapproche en courant et regarde par-dessus le mur, à gauche, à droite. Le compas dans l'œil ! Bien droit ! Le tour de main est toujours là ! »

Le même caractère se retrouvait dans « La Maison de Matriona » (2), où c'est lui surtout qui conférait vraisemblance et émotion à la peinture au noir de la vie d'un coin de campagne soviétique, en réaction, assez systématique, contre bien des peintures au rose des

kolkhozes et sovkhoses. La vieille et pauvre paysanne était sœur profonde de Choukhov, et par exemple justement sur ce point : « *Je l'avais remarqué, elle avait un sûr moyen de retrouver sa belle humeur, c'était le travail. Aussitôt, elle empoignait sa pelle et bêchait la podterre. Ou bien elle prenait un sac sous le bras et allait chercher de la soube. Ou encore, avec une corbeille d'écorce, cueillir des baies dans une forêt éloignée. Et non point faire la courbette à des bureaux d'administrations, mais aux buissons de la forêt.* »

ET désormais cela ne changera guère. Lieutenant, professeur, médecin ou ouvrier, il y aura toujours au moins dans les livres de Soljénitsyne ces personnages qui ne sauraient être les ennemis du Zotov de « L'Inconnu de Kretchétoïka », au moins partageant avec lui un amour immense de la patrie.

« *Zotov non plus ne tenait pas à sauver sa vie depuis qu'avait commencé la guerre. Le sens de sa petite vie se mesurait à l'aide qu'il pouvait apporter à la révolution... En réchapper pour lui-même était dépourvu de sens. Pour sa femme et pour son futur enfant, cela n'était pas non plus indispensable. Mais si les Allemands arrivaient jusqu'au lac Baïkal et qu'un miracle lui eût conservé la vie, Zotov savait qu'il irait à pied en Chine par Kiakhta, ou en Inde, ou bien qu'il franchirait l'océan, il partirait dans le seul but de s'intégrer à des unités qui auraient repris des forces et de retourner, les armes à la main, en Russie, en Europe.* »

ET si le titre de la nouvelle « Pour le bien de la cause » est loin de pouvoir se prendre au pied de la lettre, comme une profession de foi, s'il contient surtout la critique de dirigeants qui couvrent sous la formule des décisions parfois injustifiables, celui qui, à la fin, la reprend à son compte, pour avoir avec elle le dernier mot, n'en est pas moins Fedor Mikhéevitch, directeur d'un institut, qui, avec l'aide du secrétaire du comité de ville du Parti, Gradchikov, combat une de ces décisions. Ce même Gradchikov à qui il revient d'en formuler les raisons : « *Mais en fin de compte, à quoi tenons-nous le plus ? Aux pierres ou aux hommes ?... Ce n'est pas dans les pierres, c'est dans les hommes que nous devons édifier le communisme.* »

C'est cet humanisme de Soljénitsyne qui devait éclater dans toutes ses dimensions — mais aussi apparaître dans ses limites — avec le grand roman intitulé « Le Pavillon des cancéreux » (3), le plus sombre sans doute de ses livres en même temps que le plus riche de sympathie, de compassion et de compréhension pour les douleurs des hommes. « *Qui êtes-vous ?* », demande-t-on à Oleg Kostoglotov, héros du livre, autre frère profond de Chou-

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khov et Matriona. « Un homme... répondit-il à mi-voix, indolemment. » Et la grande question que la proximité de la mort fait se poser avec une force singulière, en lui et autour de lui, parmi les malades qui partagent sa chambre, est : « Qu'est-ce qui fait vivre les hommes ? »

**L**E débat politique qui s'est instauré autour d'un tel livre, et de l'œuvre de Soljénitsyne en général, ne saurait épuiser toutes les questions qu'elle pose. Pour nous, ce débat se complique de l'éloignement, de l'ignorance relative des réalités en cause, et parfois aussi des qualités ou défauts des éditions qui nous sont proposées. C'est ainsi que la traduction, voire le texte même, d'un autre roman de Soljénitsyne : « *Le Premier Cercle* » (4) paraissent souvent sujets à caution, même si cela n'explique pas entièrement le schématisme criant de telles pages de ce livre, qui jure avec ce que l'auteur a écrit jusque-là.

Au dossier de Soljénitsyne, outre la question du talent, généralement tranchée, dans le bon sens, peuvent figurer des questions comme celle-ci : l'image qu'il donne de la vie soviétique est-elle fidèle, véridique, ou projette-t-il injustement sur tout ce qui s'est fait et se fait cette ombre terrible de l'injustice qu'il a subie ? De quel point de vue décrit-il et à plus forte raison critique-t-il ? A quoi la réponse n'est jamais si simple, jamais entièrement donnée dans aucun livre. Un point de vue spiritualiste, assez ouvertement religieux, et dans « *Le Pavillon des concréux* », par exemple, des propositions qui s'apparentent plus à une sorte de « réarmement moral » qu'au marxisme, se corrigent parfois de déclarations comme celle-ci, d'Oleg Kostoglotov : « Je ne veux pas dire que je m'y connaisse en sciences sociales, j'ai peu d'occasions de les étudier. Mais il me suffit de ma petite comprenette pour voir que si Lénine a reproché à Tolstoï son idée de perfectionnement moral, c'est parce que cette idée détournait la société du combat avec l'arbitraire, et l'éloignait de la révolution qui mûrissait. D'accord ! » Mais autour de ce « d'accord ! », ou de ce qui, ailleurs, peut paraître le contredire, même la question — importante — de savoir si Soljénitsyne et son œuvre sont en définitive favorables ou non au socialisme n'épuise pas tout. A supposer même qu'on y réponde par la négative, l'ampleur et la profondeur du tableau font de ces livres des interlocuteurs valables s'il en est pour tout esprit partisan du socialisme, des repères et témoignages importants quant aux réalités de la construction du socialisme, offerts au débat et éventuellement au combat idéologique, dont ni une mesure administrative, ni l'argument frappant d'un grand prix, ne sauraient dispenser personne.

**C**AR au-delà de telles questions, ce qui existe, noir sur blanc, des mots sur du papier, possède une force qui ne se résume ni ne se résume en des idées. Ainsi, pour y revenir, de cette sympathie pour le peuple, qui, serait-elle marquée d'un certain populisme, et par-dessus éventuellement les partis pris d'un auteur ou, de ses personnages, milite pour le socialisme, comme elle le faisait déjà dans le grand roman russe classique. Et le plus beau serait de voir, pour qui aime l'Union Soviétique, pour qui admire la littérature soviétique, dans tant de ses créations incomparables, la décision de Stockholm se retourner un jour contre ses promoteurs mal intentionnés, l'œuvre d'Alexandre Soljénitsyne ayant trouvé sa place, dans la littérature russe, soviétique.

André STIL.

(1) Julliard, traduction de Maurice Decailot.

(2) Qui formait volume, sous ce titre, dans l'édition française, avec deux autres nouvelles : « *L'Inconnu de Kretchévka* » et « *Pour le bien de la cause* ». Julliard, traduction de Léon et André Robel.

(3) Julliard, traduction de A. et M. Auctourier, L. et G. Nivat, J.-P. Semon.

(4) Lafont.

Paris L'HUMANITE 15 Oct 70 p 10 L  
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It is difficult to judge Solzhenitsyn's work coolly between the anti-Sovietism of the campaigns which have prepared and which are exploiting the awarding of the Nobel prize and the "affair" which in the USSR led to the administrative measure depriving him of the title of writer. Neither, however, should make us forget that it is a question of a work which is certainly debatable, but also significant in every sense of the word.

The blows of a hammer on a rail in the first lines of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" heralded a beginning which could not pass unnoticed. It is true that nothing is more terrible for a communist to read: The minute by minute account of an ordinary day and even a day rather less unhappy than others and of an ordinary detainee in one of the concentration camps where men like the author spent long years before being rehabilitated after 1956. However, everything with its irreproachable and un pitying detail, the cruel truth of this day among so many others led to another truth: The entire novel, written in the present tense, ended with a little insignificant verb whose past tense meant far more than it might seem: "There were 3,653 of these days." These injustices must henceforth always be spoken of in the past tense.

Everything in this book which criticized the past in the name of socialism itself might be regarded in this light. Such is the case of the prisoner shouting to the guards: "You are not Soviets! You are not communists!"

In particular, one's attention was attracted by a new tone for which there was an original text and a new writing. This was not out of keeping with the fact that Ivan Chukov, the hero being studied, was a man of the people. There is nothing more agonizing within the heart of this agonizing book than that marvellous page where, paradoxically, as a "positive hero" Chukov touches us most deeply with this line of his work which survives in him in spite of everything.

"Everything and every hardship count for him, he cannot admit that these are lost for nothing.

"Cement wall! Cement wall!

"...the escort could easily have let the dogs loose on Chukov, but he had to slow down to have a look. It would work. He ran up and looked over the wall to the left and to the right. His eye was his compass! Straight ahead! His skill was still with him."

The same character appears in "Matryona's Home" (including in French two other short stories: "The Stranger From Krechetovka" and "For the Good of the Cause") where it is this above all which lends verisimilitude and feeling to the black picture of life in a corner of the Soviet countryside, a picture which is reactionary, quite systematic, and against many of the pink pictures of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The poor old peasant woman was Chukov's true sister, especially on this point, for example: "I had noticed that she had a sure way of recovering her good humor, this was work. Without hesitation she would pick up her spade and dig the soil."  
[paragraph continues]

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Or she would tuck a bag beneath her arm and go looking for peat. Or she would take her birch basket and pick berries in a remote wood and not bow down to the administrative bureaus but to the bushes of the forest."

This will hardly change from then on. Lieutenant, teacher, doctor, or worker, there will always be in Solzhenitsyn's works at least these persons who could not be the enemies of Zotov in "the stranger from Krechetovka," at least sharing with him an immense love for the motherland.

"Zotov was no longer anxious to save his life since the war had started. The meaning of his little life was measured by the assistance which he could bring to the revolution... to escape for his own sake was senseless. That was no longer indispensable for his wife and his future child. But if the Germans reached Lake Baykal and a miracle saved his life, Zotov knew that he would walk to China via Kiakhta or to India or that he would cross the sea: He would leave with the sole aim of joining up with units which had gathered their strength again and of returning weapon in hand to Russia and to Europe."

And if the title of the short story "For the Good of the Cause" is far from being a literal profession of faith and if it contains, in particular, a criticism of leaders who cover their sometimes unjustifiable decisions beneath a formula, the man who finally accepts this criticism on his own count to have the last word on it is none other than institute director Fedor Mikheyevich, who, aided by party gorkom Secretary Gradchikov, is fighting one of these decisions. This is the same Gradchikov who is wont to formulate the thoughts: "But finally, what do we hold most dear? Stones or men...? It is not in stones but in men that we must build communism."

It is this humanism of Solzhenitsyn's which is to sparkle in all its magnitude, but also to appear within its limitations in the great novel entitled "Cancer Ward" (3--Julliard, translation by A. and M. Aucouturier, L. and G. Nivat, and J. P. Semon), without doubt the most somber of his books, and at the same time, the richest in fellow-feeling, compassion, and understanding for the sorrows of men. The hero of the book and another true brother of Chukov and Matryona, Oleg Kostoglotov, is asked: "Who are you?" He replies indolently and in a whisper: "a man..." The major question which the nearness of death causes to be asked with singular force in him and around him, among the sick who are sharing his room is: "What makes men live?"

The political debate which has begun around such a book and around the work of Solzhenitsyn in general cannot exhaust all the questions which it raises. For us this debate is complicated by distance and by the relative ignorance of the realities in question and sometimes also by the qualities or defects of editions which are offered to us. Thus, the translation and, indeed, the very text of another of Solzhenitsyn's novels "The First Circle" are often subject to caution, even if this does not completely explain the glaring sketchiness of such pages of this book which clashes with what the author has written so far.

Apart from the question of talent, which is generally settled in a favorable direction, questions such as the following can figure in Solzhenitsyn's file: Is the picture which he gives of Soviet life faithful and truthful or does it project unjustly what has become and continues to become this terrible shadow of the injustice which he has suffered? From what viewpoint does he describe and, with far greater reason, criticize? The answer to this is never so simple and never completely given in any book. [paragraph continues].

A spiritualist and quite openly religious viewpoint and proposals in "Cancer Ward," for example, which are closer to a kind of "moral rearmament" than Marxism, are sometimes corrected by statements like the following by Oleg Kostoglotov: "I do not want to say that I am knowledgeable about the social sciences, I have had little opportunity to study them. But my little understanding is sufficient for me to see that if Lenin reproached Tolstoy for his idea of moral perfection, this is because this idea turned society aside from the fight against arbitrariness and moved it away from the ripening revolution. Agreed!" But regarding this "agreed" or what may seem to contradict it elsewhere, even the important question of knowing if Solzhenitsyn and his works are ultimately favorable or not to socialism, does not exhaust everything. Supposing that one answers this in the negative, the scope and the depth of the picture make these books valid questioners, for every partisan spirit of socialism if there are any and also important witnesses and evidence regarding the realities of building socialism offered in the debate and ultimately in the ideological struggle from which neither an administrative measure nor the striking argument of a major prize could absolve no one.

For beyond such questions what exists in black and white and as words on paper possess a power which is not reduced to or summed up as ideas. Thus, to return to it, this fellow-feeling for the people, even if it is marked by a certain populism and over and above even the prejudices of an author or of his characters, does militate in favor of socialism, as it has done in the great classical Russian novel. The finest thing for a person who loves the Soviet Union and who admires Soviet literature in so many of its incomparable creations would be to see the Stockholm decision one day turned against its ill-intentioned promoters, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's work having found its place in Russian and Soviet literature.

**J**UST before leaving Havana I went round to see an old Cuban friend to say goodbye. Both of us were rather depressed by the current scene in Cuba and I told him that after many conversations in Havana and a trip through the interior I still didn't feel that I really understood what was happening in the island. In these circumstances how could I profitably write about it? "Well," he replied, "perhaps at the moment nobody really understands what's happening, and perhaps you should say just that."

It was sensible advice. From Castro downwards, there appears to be an uncertainty about the immediate future which has cast a pall over the entire population. The inevitable conclusion is that the revolution has quite simply run out of steam.

The failure to secure the ten million ton sugar harvest—a point of honour for the revolution—has left the country in a stupor out of which the current slogan "Convert the setback into a victory" has so far failed to pull it.

Twelve years after the revolution the major advances still stand. The principal abuses of the previous regime still common in the rest of Latin America have been abolished. The "miseria" of the shantytowns has gone, as has the extreme poverty of the peasantry in certain forgotten corners of the island. Health and education remain at the top of the Revolutionary Government's list of priorities.

### Anti-imperialist

Cuba, the first country to tear away the mask of benevolence from the face of American imperialism, has remained faithful to its first anti-imperialist utterances, inspired by a tradition that owes more to Jose Marti than to Karl Marx. But in 1970 Cuba is no longer at the centre even of Latin American affairs. The eye of the Latin American hurricane has moved from the Caribbean to the mainland and currently hovers over the Andes at the point where Chile and Bolivia meet Peru.

There are still many people in Cuba with tremendous energy and motivation but one



# Fidel Castro's Cuban crisis

First of three reports by  
**RICHARD GOTT** twelve  
years after the Revolution

senses that among the vast bulk of the population political apathy prevails, although this is in no sense a counter-revolutionary spirit. There can be no going back to the old days, nor is there any intention to dilute the revolutionary content of the present system.

But the leaders of the revolution, immensely benevolent and well-meaning as they undoubtedly are, find themselves faced with a population that is no longer willing to follow blindly where Castro leads. Nor is it clear that even he knows what the next move is.

One would feel less concerned about these developments if it were not for the very serious economic criticisms of the Government published this year in France by K. S. Karol (in "Les Guerrilleros au Pouvoir") and Rene Dumont (in "Cuba: est-il socialiste?"). The disappointment of these two distinguished French writers, both tremendously sympathetic to the Cuban regime, is not directed at the obvious targets—the fact that there are still people who want to leave, food rationing, political prisoners—but rather at the organisation of government and its rather limited possibilities of delivering to the people the goods and services that they demand. The subject of their concern is Castro's apparent inability to put his good intentions into practice.

No one should doubt the massive investment that went into the sugar industry in the attempt to achieve the ten million ton target. Castro himself, in his July 26 speech, detailed the adverse effects the emphasis on sugar had had on other areas of the economy. In Cienfuegos I was shown the largest sugar terminal in the world, built a couple of years ago. The size of a small cathedral it contained several veritable mountains of brown sugar, ready for loading. Brought from the refineries in wagons that the Cubans designed themselves (and built in China and Rumania), the sugar is shipped all over the world, though the bulk goes to the Soviet Union.

The harvest was in fact the largest ever, and if the Government had set their sights lower, the result would have been an occasion for rejoicing and not one for gloom. But through the massive mobilisation for the harvest, too many people saw the imperfections of the system. Enough cane was cut, but too often there were delays in getting it to the refineries—and with each day's delay the sugar content of the cane declines. Imagine the feelings of a volunteer whose cut cane stands forlornly outside the refinery waiting for a spare part to repair the ageing machinery.

Most of the current shell-shock to be observed in Cuba

is based on the failure to secure what all had promised themselves would be secured. But most people agree that the sugar disaster came as the climax to a whole series of problems and doubts about the efficacy of the Cuban system (or non-system) of government. "Welcome be the defeat," says Castro, if it makes us look at our problems afresh. This is what is happening at the moment.

An endless round of meetings and discussions have been taking place since the beginning of September, but so far nothing has emerged except for Castro's emphasis on the need for democratisation.

Castro's system of government has always been basically paternalist. Quick to praise individual initiative, he has usually

preferred to absorb the initiative into the State system rather than to encourage its autonomous growth. At a recent meeting a worker sent up a note to Castro explaining how at his factory the workers themselves had built a dining room, even making the bricks themselves. Good, said Fidel. But instead of using this as a marvellous pattern for allowing workers to solve their own problems, he announced a decision "to organise a few brigades to build dining rooms in places where there aren't any as yet."

Out of the current maelstrom, no one really knows what is to be the future rôle of the party and the Armed Forces. For some years the two institutions have been virtually interchangeable. A high proportion of the party's Central Committee and of Castro's Ministers are members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. No one who was a Communist prior to the revolution is a member of the Political Bureau.

### Power curb

The army has been playing an increasingly large rôle in the past few years—notably in the organisation of agriculture—and even the Revolution's most friendly critics have expressed their unhappiness at this development. Bearing in mind the links between the army and the party, it was therefore interesting to hear Castro at a speech on September 28, denounce the dominant rôle

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played by the party in administration: "The rôle of our party cannot and will never be that of a substitute for the administration, nor a substitute for the mass organisations; rather its task is to guide this phenomenon, this process, this formidable revolution of the masses."

The Communist Party in Cuba (only formed afresh in 1965) has in fact never been a particularly significant institutional factor in Cuban life. Castro's fulminations against it may well cloak a desire to curb the power of the army and his brother Raul, who is both head of the armed forces and second secretary of the party.

The inner workings of Cuban political life, however, remain a mystery, perhaps as much to the participants as to the outsider. What is certain, however, is that the Cuban Revolution, which for more than a decade has pioneered a form of left wing independent of previous ideologies, is on the verge of an ideological crisis of (for Cuba) unprecedented dimensions.



The second of three reports by RICHARD GOTT on  
Cuba—12 years after Fidel Castro's revolution

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# Paradox of longer queues

"The change that has taken place in the life of the country has been, so deep, that, in a sense, we are receiving not only the positive but also the negative fruits of the Revolution. This is because the Revolution, first of all, creates a tremendous disorder in the whole life of a country."—Fidel Castro, September 3 1970

ALMOST everywhere in Cuba one is conscious of queues. They have been there for so long that one begins to feel that they have now been incorporated into Cuban folkculture. The queue at the restaurant near my hotel is exactly as I remember it seven years ago when I first visited Havana. However, it is longer, and this, paradoxically, because things are better than before.

After the gigantic effort of the harvest—"the largest in our history"—there is an atmosphere of relaxation, with dancing on the Malecon, and more clubs and restaurants open—and more queues. (There are of course far fewer bars and restaurants than before the Revolution, and the nightclubs are only open from Thursday to Sunday. This in itself would be enough to create queues. But demand has also increased, as a new educated, employed generation seeks to take advantage of what were once the perks of a privileged élite.)

One of the failures of the Revolution has been to provide alternative forms of entertainment for the masses. While avant-garde culture flourishes as never before—Cuban films and pop art posters are magnificent—the preferred amusement of the average Cuban is still the club or restaurant. This, rather than the actual lack of food, is the chief cause of the queue phenomenon. Though food for consumption at home is rationed, few Cubans today go hungry. Eating out is more a relaxation than a necessity. But it

is also virtually the only way of passing the time in a society which happily has not yet geared its evenings to sitting in family units around the television set.

## Adamant

To stand in a queue for hours on end, or to watch others do so, is not a good advertisement for any society, and especially not for one that complains of its shortage of manpower. Why not permit a certain amount of private food production—as they do in North Vietnam—and help end the food shortage? It may be true that the private production of vegetables for the Warsaw market is restoring a capitalist class in Poland, but need this be true for Havana? Castro, however, has adamantly set his face against such ideological backsliding: "If we were to use capitalist methods to solve our problems, what kind of a Communist man, what kind of a man with a superior mind, culture and conscientiousness would we be creating? Impossible! We cannot be Socialists with capitalist methods."

The ideology remains pure, but the shortages remain. Cuba concentrates its efforts principally on growing sugar, which it is good at. With the proceeds from its export, heavy machinery for assisting agricultural production is acquired from abroad. Vegetables and fruit are also grown, and there is some cattle raising, both for milk and beef, but much of this is designed at present for the export market. By keeping Cubans on tight rations, it is possible to earn the foreign exchange to buy what is needed for the development plan.

An often-voiced complaint, however, articulated notably by Rene Dumont, is that the imported machinery is ill-used by inexperienced cadres, and that therefore the immense sacrifice of the

people has to some extent been wasted. Certainly one does see a lot of under-utilised agricultural equipment. Might it not be better to postpone "development" for a few more years in order to feed the people now and to provide them with some elementary consumer goods?

This is not a question that can be answered by a foreigner, though it was put to me by a Cuban university student. As far as the Cuban leadership is concerned, the Cuban appetite increases by feeding, and therefore there is nothing to be gained by providing a lot more. They would certainly like, however, to provide a little more, and the plans for the early seventies have in fact been drawn up with this in mind.

The lack of food and consumer goods is not the only cause for exasperation. Electricity, too, is in short supply. Perhaps two or three nights a week in Havana the lights go out. Quickly I rationalise. Well, it's like wartime. It gives people a feeling of togetherness, of problems shared. But for most people it's a nuisance. For someone with kids to feed and only an electric stove, it is infuriating and—perhaps more important—dispiriting.

## Inefficiency

In the twelfth year of the Revolution it really shouldn't be necessary for chaos and inefficiency to be so near the surface. As an outsider one can take a long view. Revolution involves upheaval; inevitably it takes time to smooth out the wrinkles. But those who live here cannot indefinitely take refuge in this argument.

Consolation still comes chiefly from Castro. Think of a problem and he seems to have thought of it first. We were sitting round one night moaning about the power cut, and then the following day Castro made a speech largely devoted to the electricity

problem, explaining why there was a shortage, and announcing arrangements to ensure that each region of the city would at least have warning of impending cuts. Everyone cheered up.

The queues and shortages inevitably make their impact on the foreigner, but what is perhaps sadder is the permitted decay of the country's legacy from the past. Havana is in a mess. Still one of the

most beautiful cities in the world, it is nevertheless gradually falling to pieces. The houses lack paint, the gardens need attention, the pavement potholes need filling in. Some houses are on the verge of collapse. Though this is true of many Latin-American cities, it is now a generalised phenomenon in Havana, with the exception of the hotels and skyscraper blocks which appear to be well cared for. Many of the problems can still be put down to the economic blockade. The bits and pieces needed to make a sophisticated urban society operate

once came from Miami, 90 miles away across the water. Now they must come from Europe, with inevitable delays and lowering of standards.

It is easy to rationalise. Large cities are designed for commerce. Abolish private trading, as the Cubans did in 1968, and the city loses its *raison d'être*. It is not a unique phenomenon. I have seen the same thing happening in Rangoon. One day, perhaps, Socialist abundance will bring life back to the nationalised towns, but in the meantime hundreds of thousands of people have to live among

these all-too-evident signs of decay. Probably the vast majority don't mind. Decay is gradual, striking the returning visitor rather than the resident, but the apathy is symptomatic of a deeper malaise.

In a strange sense there is an atmosphere of calm in Cuba today, almost as though things had returned to

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normal. But what strikes one most forcibly is the failure of the revolution to overcome the cultural legacy from the past. Today's Cuba is the product of its history rather than its Revolution. It needs a cultural revolution if it is to break away from this heritage.

### Hideous

Most Cubans, for example, have never really disliked American bourgeois culture. When they took over the huge apartment blocks and the gambling hotels in Havana, it wasn't with a view to closing down these hideous excrescences of bourgeois taste, but rather of making them available to all. The Revolution did not seek to smash Cuban-American social customs, but merely to reject their exclusiveness. And people really do walk in and out of the once-smart hotels and beach-clubs as though they owned them. They're not really "the people," more the children of the "new class," but they are Negroes and other formerly underprivileged groups from the middle sectors of society.

This almost childlike enjoyment of the expropriated property of the oligarchs and the exploiters was one of the most endearing features of the Revolution in its early years. Today the Cuban Government, like that of every other undeveloped country, has the unenviable and difficult task of trying to persuade its inhabitants not to want what they cannot have.

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# Castro's crop of trouble

The last of three reports from RICHARD GOTT on Cuba—12 years after the revolution

"THE HOUSING PROBLEM has been solved for many; medicines, education, social security—the possibility of everyone having a secure life. There are no beggars, prostitutes, destitute people, or abandoned orphans in this country. The present generation of young people has not even known the scourge of unemployment." — Fidel Castro, September 3, 1970.

IN the South of Havana province the massive rice plan is now in full swing. No Cuban is happy without rice, but for many years the country has had to import it, most recently from China. Chinese failure to keep pace with Cuban requirements was a contributory cause of the distinctly cool relations the two countries have had since 1966. Cuba could be self-supporting by next year.

## Mechanised

The process has been highly mechanised with little of the back-breaking labour-intensive rice culture of Vietnam. Here, as much as possible is done by aeroplane—fumigating and fertilising—and about a quarter of the area has already been sown by the eight Russian planes the rice plan has permanently at its disposal.

The rice plan began in 1967 when a bulldozer brigade came to clear the land which had hitherto been largely unproductive. Planted with several different varieties of "miracle" rice from the Rice Institute in the Philippines (and tested in Cuba's own experimental stations) the yield is high and so far they have been able to secure two crops a year.

When the zone was cleared, the peasants had to be cleared out as well. There weren't many, and the few who were there lived by subsistence farming, with a few cattle. They were moved into a brand new village—small bungalows with plumbing and electricity, but inevitably some wanted to stay on their historic lands. They eventually moved of their own free will, but it would be idle to deny that the transformation

of peasant life takes place without problems.

Whereas the Vietnamese revolution created a new economic environment in which it was possible for the peasantry to thrive and prosper, the Cuban revolution wrote "finis" to a peasant class which had never had much chance to develop. By the 1960s its revival would have been impossible. A drive through Cuba is sufficient to reveal that this has always been an underpopulated and undercultivated island. Money was made in the sugar fields by bringing in seasonal cane-cutters, and although there were—and remain—a considerable number of small farmers, they were for the most part isolated units without the possibility of forming a peasant class.

It is easy to see that there has never been much of a peasant culture in Cuba—no cooking, no weaving or pottery to speak of. It is not an unusual phenomenon. England and the United States have both got rid of their peasants. But it is unusual for an underdeveloped country, and it makes the task of urban-rooted middle-class revolutionaries doubly difficult, especially when they have opted, as the Cubans have done, for an agricultural rather than an industrial revolution. How does one develop agriculture with few peasants and less capital?

Arguably, there were just enough peasants around to have formed the cornerstone of a development strategy. But in practice the guerrilla revolutionaries found that the poorest and most revolutionary peasants were in the Sierra Maestra, in hostile terrain far from the consumption centres, while the "middle" peasants who had some profit-making, capitalist instincts, were eliminated in the second agrarian reform of 1963, chiefly for political reasons. It was felt that they were aiding the counter-revolution.

Rightly or wrongly, the revo-

lution went ahead to base its agricultural future, not on the local peasantry, but first on capital-intensive exploitation (the use of aeroplanes and heavy machinery), and secondly, where a labour force was needed, on brigades of the young that could be easily mobilised, motivated, and disciplined.

My first acquaintance with a youth brigade was near Camaguey, in the centre of the island. A few miles outside the town, beside a vast pineapple plantation, I found a pop group, called "Los Novels" rehearsing. Complete with electric guitars and amplification equipment they were practising for the evening's dance. The group were part of the group of 400 youths working on the plantation from the "Columna Juvenil del Centenario," a youth organisation that provides some 40,000 young workers between the ages of 17 and 27 to work in agriculture in the province of Camaguey—an impressive percentage of the workforce of the entire province.

## Shortage

The idea of the Columna was dreamt up by Raul Castro and first suggested in a speech in 1967. Faced with a tremendous manpower shortage in agriculture, the obvious solution was to mobilise the younger generation, and an appeal for 50,000 volunteers was made. Theoretically voluntary, in practice men work in the "Youth Column" for three years as an alternative form of military service. The Column is run by an army officer, and its members are subject to military discipline.

When I was visiting the pineapple plantation the members of the Columna were about to embark on a 15-day weeding campaign to commemorate the deaths in October of Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. For this task the workers were divided into a number of groups, called guerrilla fronts, each bearing the name of a Latin-American country. Before going to the fields in the mornings there would be a collective reading of a page from Guevara's Bolivian Diary.

The Cubans are still caught up in guerrilla terminology. We have to force the idlers on to the defensive, cried Castro in a recent speech, we have to encircle them and then liquidate them—as the guerrillas do. Anniversaries of the deaths of heroic guerrillas, both Cuban and Latin-American are faithfully recorded in the principal newspaper "Granma"—September and October being especially full with the deaths of Inti and Coco Peredo, Tania, Turcios Lima, let alone Che and Camilo.

But this verbal enthusiasm is in inverse proportion to the actual interest of Cuba in today's Latin-American guerrillas. Apart from the Tupamaros in Uruguay, which get Cuban headlines because they're effective, and the Liberation Army in Bolivia which seems to be supported for sentimental reasons, Cuba takes a declining interest in guerrilla movements. Salvador Allende, president-elect of Chile, and Juan Velasco and Juan Jose Torres, revolutionary generals of Peru and Bolivia, are the current heroes.

Nevertheless the guerrilla atmosphere which pervades the "Columna Juvenil" is clearly a necessary motivating factor. Although Cuba has been criticised for the "militarisation" of agriculture, this should not be allowed to disguise the fact that Cuba, largely by a policy of social investment, has more nearly conquered the unemployment problem than any other Latin-American country.

In most of Latin America and the Caribbean the unemployment rate is enormous. There are perhaps 25 million people unemployed in the continent as a whole. Foreseeing no job opportunities for the new children born each year, the international agencies have been demanding massive population control campaigns. In Cuba the situation appears to be the reverse.

Officially, unemployment has almost ceased to exist. The authorities complain of being desperately short of manpower, and where possible capital-intensive techniques are being

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
introduced. While birth control is permitted, population control is quite out of the question. We need more Cubans, runs the argument, and seeing the vast fertile spaces of the island that are as yet uncultivated or covered with the dreaded marabu, it is difficult not to agree.

This tremendous labour shortage is made more tragic by the fact that, simply by looking around, it cannot be said that the Cubans at the moment are a people mobilised for work. The power of the people, as both Mao and Fidel know well, is immense. But although once in a millennium the people "stand up"—as Mao puts it—they show a remarkable propensity to sit down again unless given some new stimulation or motivation.

#### **Work-shy**

The lesson to be drawn from the Cuban experience is that the workshy mentality of the habitually unemployed cannot be changed overnight, nor even in 12 years. Currently in Cuba there is a tremendous campaign against the loafers and idlers, and the leadership of the revolution seems to have concluded that since there are few material incentives to work—the payment for food and clothing is insignificant—stiff penalties will be needed in future to prevent absenteeism. Guevara used to talk about moral incentives, but without a total rejection of old cultural patterns it is difficult to see how these could work. While a substantial "lumpen" element remains, moral incentives are utopian.

The Cuban revolution remains intensely volatile, and it is possible that the moment of pessimism and soul-searching noticeable during my visit will soon give way to something more positive, perhaps even to a "Great Leap Forward," or some new development more in keeping with the Cuban character. The high incidence of absenteeism, and the Government's preoccupation with it, comes at a time of maximum disillusionment as a result of the sugar harvest. The fact that the Cubans have survived this severe blow to their revolutionary élan should in itself be seen as an optimistic sign.



SECRET

~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

November 1970

SOVIET NEED TO EXPORT OIL

In 1973 the Soviet Union will celebrate 100 years of history as an exporter of oil. At the turn of the century Russia produced about fifty percent of the world's oil. The 1917 revolution and subsequent disruption of the economy set back oil exports until the mid 1920's. For about the next ten years the Soviets were very aggressive as oil exporters; but in the mid 1930's Soviet oil disappeared from the market. The Soviet government had begun stockpiling oil for war; the bulk of Soviet oil came from the Caucasus, an area vulnerable to probable enemy attacks.

Soviet oil exports resumed in 1946 but on a very limited scale. Not until 1951 did oil sales to the West show any increase. By 1955 the position of the USSR as a net exporter of oil was established. Soviet planners had discovered that oil could be an important source of foreign exchange. The Soviet Union is rich in natural resources - notably oil - and with a disequilibrium economy like that existing in the Soviet Union the cost of exporting a ton of oil in terms of domestic uses sacrificed can be administratively rearranged. In other words Soviet economists are well aware that the USSR has abundant resources of oil and they are well aware that the exportation of oil will earn foreign exchange. Foreign exchange, especially hard currency is needed to purchase equipment and technology the USSR does not yet produce. In a disequilibrium situation the government merely substitutes another kind of energy, no matter the actual cost, to replace the energy lost through the export of oil.

The USSR has abundant potential resources of petroleum, both onshore and offshore, that could make it the world's leading producer of petroleum by the end of the 20th century. However, 30% to 40% of these resources are located in permafrost regions. Permafrost is, as the name suggests, a condition whereby the ground or tundra is in a constant frozen state and in Western Siberia it has been encountered at depths up to 500 meters. The Soviet problems with permafrost arise because of the Soviet decision to use turbodrills rather than

rotary drilling methods. The turbodrill is efficient for shallow drilling in hard formations; but in deepwell permafrost situations the high speed of the turbodrill generates too much heat and literally melts the permafrost so that the drilling hole collapses as though some paleolithic creature pulled the hole inside out. Warm flows of gas around the borehole can thaw permafrost up to 6 meters around the well and cause the casing to collapse.

In addition to problems with permafrost the Soviets are also plagued with technological problems which they will have to overcome if they want to get the oil they know they have. The Soviet authorities know generally where the oil is: new reserves are being found in Central Asia, the Volga-Ural and Siberia. The question is where in these areas should they drill. Despite the Soviet success in rocketry, missiles and space vehicles they are deficient in the technology required for mapping and exploration for new wells. Most Soviet geophysical instruments used in mapping subsurface structures are less accurate than comparable Western equipment. For example, the Soviet Union is about 7 to 10 years behind the United States in computerized seismograph technology which permits exploration of deep complex geologic formations. The first computerized seismic field unit was deployed in the northern regions of the USSR in 1969, whereas the application of this technology had contributed impressive benefits to petroleum exploration in the United States by 1963. Limited application of modern geophysical techniques has contributed to the lag in Soviet rates of petroleum discovery compared to the growth in production during the past decade.

This deficiency in the use of computers in the modern Soviet State is absolutely appalling. The Soviet Union with 2500 computers ranks sixth behind France (5,000 units) Britain (5600) West Germany (5750) Japan (5800) and the United States with 70,000 units.

Assuming the Soviet State will eventually conquer their problems in mapping and seismographic technology the Soviets must concurrently modernize their drilling program and techniques. The average depth of Soviet wells has increased from 1,000 meters in 1940 to over 2,500 meters in 1969. But much of their drilling equipment and technology employed is inefficient and obsolete. Most of the turbodrills and rigs now in use were designed for shallow drilling in hard formations, such as those in the Urals-Volga region where wells generally are less than 2,000 meters deep. The extra weight and high rotational speeds of turbodrills facilitated the rapid drilling of shallow wells, but in regions with geological structures requiring deeper drilling, turbodrilling is less satisfactory. In soft formations and at depths below 2,500 meters the conventional turbodrill is very inefficient. Although deeper drilling is becoming increasingly necessary both in the older producing fields and in

the new areas being developed, the turbodrill continues to be used for about 80% of all drilling operations in the USSR. Soviet technicians have suggested modifications to make the turbodrill more effective, but most of its shortcomings persist. To improve deep drilling capability, Soviet experts have advocated the combined use of turbodrilling and rotary drilling -- turbodrilling to depths of 1,500 meters and rotary drilling beyond. The lack of high-quality drill pipe, however, precludes widespread use of rotary drilling. Soviet deep-drilling capability also is limited by the lack of high-powered mud pumps, blowout preventors, and high-quality bits. Soviet data reveal that 8 to 10 months are needed to drill a well to depths of 3,000 to 3,500 meters. In the United States, such wells are usually drilled in about a month. Soviet inability to drill faster, deeper, and more efficiently will limit the amount of oil and gas reserves that can be explored and exploited without disproportionate increases in investment.

The Soviet oil industry operates in a distinctive institutional setting that might be termed an "administratively organized economy." The Soviet economy as a whole can be thought of as an organization in which the goals and objectives are determined by the leadership. During the 1970's that leadership plans to continue the export of oil if only to get enough hard currency to be able to purchase the technology necessary to overcome the obstacles in producing its own oil. The Soviet Minister of the Petroleum Extraction Industry, Mr. V.D. Shashin said the USSR will continue to maintain the high level of exports to Eastern Europe and to the West, although he expressed some doubt that exports to the West would show much of an increase. Yet domestic Soviet demands will increase, in spite of a disequilibrium economy. Also East European demands for foreign oil are expected to outstrip Soviet production capabilities. Now the Soviet Union is caught up in a vicious circle: It must export oil to gain hard currency so as to get the technical means to expand production so that it can meet its commitment to supply East Europe. The commitment to East Europe cannot be waived without risk of reducing East European dependence on the USSR. If the USSR is to maintain exports of oil to hard currency countries it will have to obtain oil from non communist producers. The largest source of this oil and also the cheapest are the Middle East and North African countries; by 1975 the Soviets will be obtaining 10 million metric tons for shipment to other countries. By 1980 the USSR may have to obtain as much as 80 million tons from this area to maintain its deliveries to foreign clients.

Soviet procurement of oil from the Middle East has one characteristic: the Soviets prefer to do business with



countries over which they have some political influence and they prefer to deal with nationalized oil companies. The entrance of the Soviet bloc as a purchaser of Middle East oil does offer some competition to Western oil companies and may result in negotiating new price agreements. Yet there is one thing to be kept in mind: even if the Soviet bloc exceeds the projected level of purchases from the Middle East and North Africa over the next ten years that area will still be dependent on free world markets for the disposal of more than 90 percent of their oil.

In the long run, if the USSR is able to acquire the necessary modern technology -- especially exploration, drilling and transport equipment the need for Middle East and North African oil may be only temporary. The need could disappear, in the late 1980's if the large oil deposits that the USSR unquestionably possesses are developed.

Analysis of the facts and the logic of economics involved contain a message to the Middle East and North African countries who are tempted to remake their economy and foreign policies to cater to Soviet policies merely for a short term gain in the sale of a small part of their oil resources.

**WORLD: ESTIMATED CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (a)**  
 (Thousand Metric Tons)

	Jan.-June 1967	July-Dec. 1967	Jan.-June 1968
<b>North America</b>			
U.S.A.	208,076	225,660	221,079
Canada	22,552	24,629	26,700
	<u>230,628</u>	<u>250,289</u>	<u>247,779</u>
<b>Caribbean Area</b>	98,605	104,658	103,617
<b>Other Latin America</b>	23,553	25,543	26,392
<b>Middle East</b>			
Saudi Arabia	65,300	64,000	70,020
Iran	62,206	67,092	66,680
Kuwait	57,543	57,626	56,398
Iraq	23,925	36,240	37,300
Abu Dhabi	8,917	9,208	12,261
Kuwait/Neutral Zone	11,239	11,379	10,970
Qatar	7,247	8,232	8,028
Egypt	3,288	2,928(b)	5,100(b)
Oman	—	2,800	4,780
Bahrain	1,629	1,814	1,800
Turkey	945	1,375	1,450
Syria	—	—	200
Israel	68	63	50
	<u>242,307</u>	<u>262,757</u>	<u>275,237</u>
<b>Africa (excluding Egypt)</b>			
Libya	35,001	48,814	57,999
Algeria	17,990	20,380	20,500
Gabon/Congo (Braz.)	1,548	1,916	2,100
Nigeria	13,974	1,771	1,700
Tunisia	978	1,262	1,500
Angola	278	259	250
Morocco	51	47	50
	<u>69,820</u>	<u>74,449</u>	<u>84,099</u>
<b>Western Europe</b>	8,635	8,937	8,602
<b>Far East</b>			
Indonesia	12,220	12,600	13,500
India	2,719	2,840	3,000
Brunei/Sarawak	2,410	2,540	2,900
Australia	308	659	850
Japan	394	393	400
Burma	282	305	300
Pakistan	250	250	250
	<u>18,583</u>	<u>19,587</u>	<u>21,200</u>
<b>FREE WORLD</b>			
Western Hemisphere	352,786	380,490	377,788
Eastern Hemisphere	339,345	365,730	369,138
	<u>692,131</u>	<u>746,220</u>	<u>746,926</u>
<b>Of which: outside U.S.A.</b>	484,055	520,560	545,847
<b>Eastern Europe and China</b>			
U.S.S.R.	139,400	148,600	151,000
Rumania	6,530	6,077	6,600
Yugoslavia	1,154	1,221	1,200
Hungary	833	853	750
Albania	500	500	600
Bulgaria	237	262	300
Poland	215	235	240
Czechoslovakia	100	100	100
E. Germany	30	30	30
China (c)	5,000	5,000	5,000
	<u>153,999</u>	<u>163,478</u>	<u>165,820</u>
<b>WORLD TOTAL</b>	846,130	909,698	932,746

(a) Excluding small-scale production in Cuba, Thailand, Formosa, Mongolia and New Zealand.

(b) Figures include the estimated output of the Israeli-occupied Sinai fields (500,000 tons in July-December 1967 and 1,000,000 tons in January-June 1968).

(c) China's production (including shale and coal-based oil) is believed to be of the order of 10,000,000 tons/year, but no up-to-date estimates are available.

Petroleum Press Service

# Soviet Interest in Middle East Oil


Lincoln Landis

The Soviet Union's concern with the Middle East is primarily that of a Great Power. As such its interests are not unlike those of other Powers that have dominated the area, especially the British and the Americans. This is not something conspiratorial, nor a peculiarly Russian cloak-and-dagger affair, but something rooted firmly in the strategic position and economic importance of the Middle East and North Africa. The sum of these spells Middle East oil, with its implications for the European economy and Nato security. It is understandable that the Soviet Union should show an uncommon interest at this stage. But what does it mean? The realities are here searchingly examined by LINCOLN LANDIS of the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, who conducted his researches on the spot in the Middle East during this summer, and by D. C. WATT of the London School of Economics, who meticulously weighs all the evidence and implications of this far-reaching Soviet interest on future American and Nato policy in the Mediterranean. [See also pages 58 & 59]

The U.S.S.R.'s new presence in the Middle East has emerged from policies influenced by both geopolitics and oil

During his stay in Berlin from November 12th to 13th . . . Com-  
rade W. M. Molotov had a meeting

thus hung in Iran long before the English speaking democracies learned of its existence" & The Red Army



along with several of its East European Communist allies, has established long range economic ties with most of the Middle East oil-producing countries. Lastly, and of particular significance, Russia is acquiring a foothold in the world's richest petroleum region.

In Teheran, the Soviet Union has acquired a new respectability, symbolized partly, by the replacement of the high brick wall round her Embassy with a Western-style, see-through fence. Unlike earlier days, there are increasing visits of officialdom—political, economic, military, and imperial—between Teheran and Moscow, as well as other eastern bloc capitals.

In many Arab countries the Russian presence is equally evident, from the Slavic accent occasionally heard on street corners, to the Soviet equipment and armament being unloaded at airfields and ports. The Russian is no longer a stranger in the Middle East, and the prospect of a growing dependence upon the U.S.S.R., particularly since the 1967 War, appears to be somewhat more palatable, even to some Western-leaning Arabs.

A number of them seem to have felt, at least until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that recent East European resistance to Soviet political and economic hegemony was a kind of proof that Communism "had mellowed".

How has this peaceful Russian victory been achieved? The answer lies in the emphasis on Middle East petroleum in Soviet strategy after the death of Stalin. Reminiscent of Moscow's nineteenth century ploy—the pan-Slavic credo—to penetrate the Balkans *en route* to the Mediterranean, was the new theme of "national liberation" which went along with U.S.S.R. offers of "disinterested assistance" to Middle East states.

The region's petroleum was simultaneously hoisted as an anti-western symbol by exploiting the growing nationalist and revolutionary currents. The new "trade and aid" policies involved petroleum wherever possible, whether with major oil-producers or not, and took the form of arms-delivery arrangements, barter agreements and long-term economic loans.

Moscow's growing preoccupation with Middle East petroleum gives rise to conjecture since the U.S.S.R.'s own oil and natural gas production rank second in the world, and vast new discoveries of petroleum resources have been made in western Siberia and central Asia.

The richest production area is the Volga-Ural region, which yields about 75% of its crude oil. Soviet leaders also speak of outstanding prospects in the Tyumen fields of Western Siberia, which may eventually provide the bulk of Soviet production. From a

total of 286 million tons in 1967, Russia satisfied its own needs and exported some 50 million tons, half to Eastern Europe, and the rest to capitalist nations and developing countries. Moscow is counting on Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Japan, to build long pipelines from Tyumen for repayment in oil deliveries over a long period.

Natural gas too is being rapidly developed, with production in 1967 reaching 160 billion cubic meters. From the richest region, Western Kazakhstan, a pipeline over 1700 miles in length reaches the Moscow-Leningrad area. Russia already exports gas to Eastern Europe, and hopes to persuade Japan and countries of Western Europe, including Italy, to build new lines in return for deferred payment in Soviet gas.

Some Western observers believe that the capacity of Russia's own petroleum industry indicates that the U.S.S.R. has little cause to incorporate Middle East oil and natural gas in its economic planning. Soviet actions in the region, however, strongly suggest such a conclusion is misleading.

Moscow has sent oil technicians to Algeria, Egypt, and Syria; pursues the exploration of oil in Iran and Iraq; and is scheduled to import large amounts of natural gas from Iran. Soviet tankers make regular runs between Egypt and the Aden refinery and, prompted by the Suez closure,

have been loading British Petroleum stocks of Abu Dhabi crude for delivery to the U.S.S.R.'s own market East of Suez, while Soviet oil goes to BP customers in Britain.

All of this activity would seem to indicate that "the Russians are moving into" the industry. Aside from the immediate military advantage to be realized from a presence in the Middle East region, there are both economic and political reasons to explain Moscow's strategy.

Despite reports of new crude oil and natural gas deposits, Soviet economic planners are faced with long-range production problems. As a result, Russia's own East European customers are lining up imports of Middle East crude oil. These arrangements are intended to assure adequate future energy supplies by supplementing deliveries from the U.S.S.R.

Moscow itself seems to be insuring its future needs, since it will soon become an importer of natural gas from Afghanistan and Iran on a permanent basis involving construction of long pipelines. The Kremlin also appears ready to begin importing both Iraqi and Iranian crude oil.

Squaring these commercial developments with the U.S.S.R.'s sizeable petroleum industry becomes more understandable, after a brief examination of several hard, economic facts.

First, there is a growing need for petroleum as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continue their industrialization, and increase production of private automobiles. Speaking of long-range requirements, an authoritative Soviet journal estimates that the world demand for oil and natural gas will continue to rise through the year 2000, and, while oil production of the Middle East should increase six-fold by that time, Soviet Bloc production would do little more than quadruple. The estimate further suggests the inability of the Soviet Bloc to meet its own needs:

... the insufficiency of energy in certain countries and regions of the world will in large measure be provided by other countries and regions. The world energy delivery systems will play an important role in this regard.<sup>8</sup>

A Polish economist, speaking of the shorter-range problem of demand, has estimated that by 1980 the Soviet bloc will need 730 million tons of crude oil for domestic use, which is some 100 million tons greater than planned Soviet production.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, the Soviet economy is still plagued by difficulties which hamper production and distribution, and prevent maximum development of new petroleum resources. It is one thing to boast of plan fulfilment and claim "discovery of oil and gas in Siberia is one of the greatest events of our time",<sup>10</sup> and quite another to assure the full satisfaction of petroleum needs through adequate exploitation.

The U.S.S.R.'s dependence upon foreign assistance to exploit its own resources emphasizes the background of Moscow's present aggressive policies in Eastern Europe. It now becomes clearer that Czechoslovakia must have only grudgingly acquiesced to the 1966 "agreement" to develop Siberian oilfields and construct yet another crude oil pipeline to Czechoslovakia from far in the East.

A third economic factor contributing to Moscow's failure to meet its production challenge consists of serious endemic defects in its totalitarian and centralized industrial system. The rare, frank criticism of a Party economist indicates the wide range of production breakdowns prevailing after fifty years of Bolshevik power in the U.S.S.R.'s "well-established" petroleum-producing region of the Ukraine:

Year after year the plan for the deep prospective drilling in the Ukraine is not being fulfilled. The main reasons for this? High frequency of accidents, prolonged stoppage, inferior quality of material and technical provisions, and shortage of qualified workers and engineering and technical cadres...<sup>11</sup>

Another deficiency of the over-centralized economy arises from the pressures to fulfil production plan quotas. Despite much ballyhoo of Premier Kosygin's intended "rationalization" of industry through Liberman reforms, the system continues to generate wasteful and self-defeating practices. In order to "over-fulfil" its plan and collect capitalist incentive

pay, a major oil refinery at Grozny has been engaged "for years" in re-processing its crude oil as soon as it fills its inadequate storage facilities.<sup>12</sup>

Eventually, Party leaders may come to realize that it is precisely such rigidity which inhibits Soviet production, by stifling initiative and ignoring the regulating influence of the market place on production.

Yet, political objectives remain uppermost, and Middle East petroleum is apparently looked to as a stop-gap solution, far preferable to "experiments" which might place the Party's unchallenged political power in jeopardy.

Soviet strategy insures that any given policy, such as the petroleum plan, will be subordinated to her overall, strategic objectives. Thus it is of prime concern to the United States, Western Europe and the Middle East, that the developing Soviet presence in the region, and, particularly, its growing involvement with the petroleum industry, does not alter the present regional, or perhaps world balance.

The importance of Middle East oil in Soviet political strategy was described with some objectivity by King Hussein of oil-less Jordan, a few months before the serious Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967:

I believe there is a new Soviet policy, and that this policy aims at the control of this area. I think the Soviets are prepared to go very far in this matter—almost to the point of a confrontation with the free world...

What interests the Soviets is, first of all, to be able to get control of the natural resources of this area—the oil—so as to deprive the West of the oil that it needs...

Of late, we have begun to see this policy, and there are plenty of signs of how it is working. It is evident that in recent years the Soviets have been able to achieve a position where they are capable of exercising control over some Arab states...<sup>13</sup>

Events since the monarch's candid remarks, while limiting his freedom to discuss Soviet aims publicly, have tended to affirm, rather than to challenge, his appraisal of Moscow's

intentions in the Middle East.

On the one hand, the U.S.S.R. has been pursuing arrangements for the import of Iraqi and probably Iranian crude oil, while, on the other hand, it has, as a natural, oil-producing competitor of the Middle East, moved deeper into that region's West European markets, even taking advantage of the 1967 Arab boycott toward such an end.

The strategic implications in Hussein's remarks were borne out a few weeks later by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy's Commander-in-Chief, who seemed to be anticipating large-scale Russian naval deployments in Middle East waters, such as were carried out after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War:

With the growth of the economic might of the Soviet Union, its interests on the seas and oceans continue to expand greatly, and consequently new demands are levied upon the Navy for their defence against the conquests of the imperialists.<sup>14</sup>

The commitment of Soviet naval power to the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean areas, in conjunction with the withdrawal of a British presence East of Suez, suggests Russian ambitions to become the dominant super-power in that area of the world.

Furthermore, the unpredictability of Soviet behaviour on the international scene, as demonstrated by the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia, creates an additional element of conjecture as to future Kremlin decisions regarding its role in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it can be observed

that peaceful means have at long last contributed more significantly to the extension of Moscow's influence into Muslim petroleum than military occupation and diplomatic pressure could

ever manage to do. Likewise, the Soviet Union's skilful manipulation of the petroleum symbol as a means of discrediting the intentions of western powers among the oil-producing states, has gone far to prepare the way for acceptance of "innocuous" Russian aid.

In turn, Moscow policy-makers have wisely reinforced their offers of eco-

nomie and arms assistance agreements for the Middle East with a distinct programme to exploit regional sympathies by support of the national oil companies of Iran and Arab states, accompanied by concrete proposals to further their independent development.

This "petroleum offensive" forms a striking parallel with Soviet naval activities and Gorshkov's strategic formulations do point toward a probable Russian objective of acquiring such a position of influence in the Middle East as to be able to threaten the orderly flow of oil to Western Europe and the United States.

Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for both economic and political reasons, the U.S.S.R. remains vigilant to turn Middle East petroleum to its own purposes.

<sup>14</sup> "Kommyunike o peregovorakh predsedatel'ya sovnrarkoma S.S.S.R. i narodnovo komissara ipostranykh del t. V. M. Molotov s rukovoditel'yami germanskovo pravitel'stva," (Communiqué on negotiations between Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade V. M. Molotov and leaders of the German Government) *Pravda* (Moscow), November 15, 1940, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup> "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41," *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (U.S. Department of State Publication 3023, 1948), p. 257, as quoted in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 193.

<sup>16</sup> "Statement by Molotov to the German Ambassador on the Proposed Four-Power Pact, 25 November 1940," *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1939-1941. Dokumente des auswärtigen Amtes. (Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941. Documents of the Foreign Office)* (Tuebingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1949), p. 296, as quoted in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy III* (1933-1941) Issued under auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 477-78.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> E. Carman, *Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive toward World Domination* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950), p. 122.

<sup>19</sup> George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 193.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

<sup>21</sup> L. Tomashpol'skiy, "Mirovoi energeticheskii balans: problemy poslednei treti veka" (World Energy Balance: Problems of the Last Third of the Century) *Microvaya Ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya* (World Economics and International Relations) (Moscow), February, 1967, pp. 28-29.

<sup>22</sup> Stanislaw Albinowski, writing in *Polytyka* (Warsaw) as quoted in "Red Oil: Eastern Europe fuel problem turns attention to Siberia," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 13, 1967, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> *Izvestiya* (Moscow), as quoted in "Soviets Bank on 'Third Baku'," *Oil and Gas Journal*, April 11, 1966, p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> T. Honta, "Some Problems in the Development of the Oil and Gas industry in Ukraine," *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kiev), January, 1967, pp. 9-11, trans. Digest of Soviet Ukrainian Press, PROLOG, April, 1967, pp. 10-11.

<sup>25</sup> *Izvestiya* (Moscow), as quoted in H. Kamm, "Soviet Refinery 'fulfills' its Plan: Grozny Processed Same oil Over and Over to Meet Goal," *New York Times* November 18, 1967, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> "What the Russians Are up to in the Middle East; Interview with King Hussein of Jordan," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 26, 1966, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup> S. G. Gorshkov, "Razvitiye sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva" (Development of Soviet Naval Art of War) *Morskoi sbornik* (Naval Journal) (Moscow) No. 2, 1967, p. 21.

# RUSSIANS NEED MIDDLE EAST OIL

to thinking about them. [Soviet foreign policy is not normally distinguished by its attention to middle-range forecasting and planning.] And the task of answering them is made more difficult by the indignant Soviet denials that their oil production is likely to fall behind their domestic needs and those of their present foreign contracts. The tendency in the Soviet press is simply to denounce such speculation as a propaganda move by the Western "international

## D. C. Watt

Since the main Soviet entry into the international politics of the Middle East in 1955 with the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the most widely accepted interpretation of Soviet policy was that it was designed to deny control of the Middle East to the main Atlantic powers, Britain and the United States.

the Soviet Union entered the world oil markets as an oil-exporting power, on some scale, and its oil actually competed on the European markets with the large international oil companies, the argument seemed to take on even more strength and plausibility.

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The Middle East was an area where British interests and power was paramount, and where it was already being challenged by local bourgeois nationalism. Knowing that the area was of vital importance to Britain because of its oil and general strategic significance, it was hardly surprising that the Soviet leadership decided to give aid and assistance to those local forces which already saw Britain as their principal enemy.

In the last few years however, the basic assumptions on which this interpretation rests have been seen to change. By 1967 the Soviet Union had won itself a substantial position on the world market, supplying not only the major part of the oil needs of Eastern Europe (some 28 million tons of crude oil in 1967), but also selling another 25 million tons of crude and some 23 million tons of oil products to Western Europe, Italy, West Germany, Finland, Sweden, plus very considerable amounts to Cuba and Japan. She had become a substantial charterer of tanker tonnage and was building up her own tanker fleet at a surprising rate.

The primitive reaction of some British commentators to this Soviet challenge, particularly on the right wing of the Conservative party, was to see the Soviet intervention as an attempt to take over the Middle East oil fields and convert them to their own use and profit. Such reactions always met the sophisticated counter-argument of the oil experts. They pointed out the Soviet bloc had enough oil for its own needs and that the natural outflow ports for the principal Middle Eastern oil fields, even in countries which like Iran shared frontiers with the Soviet Union, lay southwards to the Gulf and the open sea where bulk tankers could transport it cheaply, rather than northwards across the mountain ranges to a fairly inaccessible Soviet frontier, to the industrial oil-consuming areas of the Soviet bloc.

At the same time there were signs that the Soviet Union's position as a major exporter of oil was threatened; by 1975 or so, it is said, despite the new discoveries in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union could well become a net importer of oil, and her East European satellites could no longer depend on her for their supplies of crude and refined products.

The questions then arise—how will the Soviets react to this situation? Have they already started reviewing their policy in the Middle East to take account of this? What will be the reactions of the oil producing states of the Middle East to any new Soviet policy?

The Soviet aim then had to be seen principally as one of denial rather than substitution; and as

There are no easy answers to these questions—possibly because the Soviet authorities have not yet got around

oil consortium" to discourage would-be purchasers of Soviet oil from entering into long term contracts with Soviet oil exporters. Their new oil fields will, they insist, be perfectly capable of expansion to cover the needs of their present policy.

If one sets this aside, however, one is left with a set of political as well as economic possibilities which have serious implications. One may begin by discarding the simple assumption that the Soviets will be content to see their export trade decline, and will devote themselves mainly to entering into long-term contracts with Middle Eastern oil suppliers, either with the big internationals or the local state-owned national oil companies.

Such an assumption leads all too easily to the placid conclusion that any development along these lines would come to lead the Soviet Union to share the West's basic interest in Middle Eastern stability, and that "time is therefore on our side".

More urgent objections are that this assumption ignores three vital factors; first is the existence of a Soviet distribution network which the Soviets would be far from happy or willing to disband; second, is the political importance, only recently demonstrated over Czechoslovakia, that the Soviet Union sets on maintaining its position as the principal source of supply for the basic raw materials to the countries of the Soviet bloc, as an instrument of political control; the third is the Soviet Union's insistence on behaving as it believes a world power should.

It is suggested that a good deal of current Soviet policy in the Middle East can be explained as stemming from this preoccupation with her role as one of the two super powers.

If the Soviet Union were merely to look to the Middle East to supply its own needs in the late 1970's,

might, over the next decade, be expected to enter the Middle Eastern market on some considerable scale. This is especially so in Iraq, whose pipelines run through Syria and are therefore always vulnerable to the political whims of a country already heavily dependent economically on the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet propaganda already points that way. The agreement of December 1967 with Iraq was hailed as providing a great contrast between the commercialism of the oil independents and the aid provided by the Soviet Union. It would enable Iraq, as a writer in Moscow's *New Times* put it recently, "to produce oil independently. The assistance of a friendly socialist country has for the first time in her history afforded Iraq the chance to exploit her own oil reserves . . . it has opened a new market to Baghdad thereby breaking Iraq Petroleum's monopoly hold." The argument that the Soviet Union can provide alternative outlets for Middle Eastern oil can rarely have been put so clearly.

If one is to expect the Soviet Union to loom increasingly large as a purchaser for Middle Eastern oil in return for aid, this will clearly reduce the Soviet's areas of operation to countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Iran, countries which despite their capacity to earn substantial foreign exchange, have serious aid and development problems.

States such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and so on, then one would expect a number of fairly small scale agreements with national oil companies, developing perhaps out of the existing Soviet agreements with Syria, Egypt and Iraq, by which the Soviets might be paid for their development aid in local crude. Such arrangements would fit in with the general low level of Soviet capacity to pay for any large scale deliveries of Middle Eastern oil save by barter agreements. And it is this economic factor which is perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the simple assumption.

If however, for the reasons outlined above, the Soviet Union should seek to continue to maintain her present position as chief supplier to the

countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and continue her invasion of West European and Japanese oil markets, the situation could very well change drastically.

At present growth rates, the 25 million tons Eastern Europe took from the Soviets in 1966 is expected to reach 80 million tons by 1975 and 130 million tons by 1980. The Soviet Union's own demand has been rising by 10% per annum faster than Soviet production these last few years. These are very considerable amounts even with the glut of Middle Eastern oil on the market today, and a lot more than the small surplus hawked around the world markets at substantial discounts by the Arab national oil companies.

It would seem that the Soviet Union and its East European partners obviously see little the Soviets can offer to counter the immense sums *per capita* of population they can earn and dispose of on the open market from oil royalties, taxation and the like. One need not necessarily expect any Soviet encouragement therefore to such countries to nationalize western oil enterprises in the hope of taking over the exploitation or distribution of their products. What one has at the moment is a positive inducement to the Soviet Union to extend its influence in Iraq in the same way as it has in Syria, to form a new Fertile Crescent Scheme under Soviet leadership.

This leaves open, however, the question of the reaction of Middle East states to a new Soviet "oil for aid" policy on a scale sufficient to enable her to maintain her monopoly position in eastern Europe. From the point of view of the West one can discern two dangers perhaps. The first is that there is nothing in the new Soviet policy here postulated which would alter the old Soviet interest in denying control or exploitation of the Middle East to the West, and continuing her dog in the manger attitude towards the principal western interests in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia.

The new Soviet interest in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean argues for a Soviet intervention sooner or later in the affairs of South Arabia as

she has already intervened in the Yemen; and some South Arabian revolutionary voices have in fact already been raised against Oman and the Sheikhs of the coast.

The other is a rather different point. Since the fiasco of Iranian oil nationalization in 1951-54, the main factor restraining similar action has been the monopoly western oil companies have maintained over the distribution and marketing of oil. Increasing Soviet activity in the purchase and distribution of Middle Eastern crude oil could well provide the chimera of an alternative system of distribution and marketing so as to encourage a government to nationalize where otherwise they might hesitate.

Fortunately, apart from Iraq and possibly Bahrain, the sole state in the Gulf to look politically open for revolution, it is difficult to see any of the other Arab oil-owning governments proceeding to so drastic a step.

If one should however be tempted to consider this step in the course of some dispute over the division of royalties or the like, the existence of the Soviet oil network could tip the balance towards nationalization.

To sum up, there is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are and will be showing increasing interest in the conclusion of long term contracts for the purchase of Middle Eastern crude oil over the next decade to maintain their monopoly position in the supply of oil to the Soviet bloc states. Financial exigency will knit these contracts to those countries with substantial needs in the aid and development field. These countries are Syria, Egypt,

Iraq and Iran, countries with which the Soviet Union is already entering into agreements of one kind or another (in the case of Iran it is for its natural gas).

These new agreements cannot however be expected to increase Soviet interest in the overall stability of the Middle East; rather the reverse. They will of course greatly enhance the Soviet's interest in the stability of the particular governments with which they have concluded agreements. This is of particular significance in relation to the government of



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Iraq in view of the peculiarly violent cycle of *coup* and counter-*coup* of past Iraqi politics.

One might even look to a Soviet sponsored Fertile Crescent Scheme as an obvious development from the present Soviet stronghold on Syria. So far as the rest of the Middle East is concerned, the Soviets may be expected to maintain their present policy of encouraging local nationalism wherever this might lead to conflicts between that nationalism and the West, the Yemen, South Arabia and possibly Bahrein being centres of such nationalism. The increasing Soviet naval activity at the Gulf and Indian Ocean must be seen in this connection too.

The main Soviet motives will be a combination of commercial incentives and pride. The possibility of a marked decline in the surplus of Soviet oil available for export will drive Soviet oil-exporting agencies to seek Middle Eastern sources of crude oil just as once American oil companies were driven by their anxieties to enter the Middle East.

The alternative—to abandon the present scale of Soviet oil marketing outside the Soviet Union—will be dismissed, partly for reasons of the need to control the Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and Cuba, partly because of the Soviet Union's continuing distrust and antipathy towards the big independents, and partly because as a great power the Soviet Union is determined to maintain its position and activities in the Middle East.

Here as elsewhere ideology, national pride and commercial considerations reinforce one another to confront the West with a continuing and increasing problem.

DAILY TELEGRAPH  
London, 7 August 1970

BEHIND THE MIDDLE EAST MANOEUVRES

# Oil key to Soviet policy

**I**T SAYS a great deal for the power of Soviet propaganda and the skill of Soviet diplomacy that there is a quite substantial body of opinion in the West which believes that the Soviet leaders are interested in bringing about peace in the Middle East.

The impression has got around in some quarters, in Europe and America alike, that the Russians are almost reluctant about their intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, that they have been drawn into them against their will, and that they exert a "moderating influence" over their Arab allies.

In truth the Soviet leaders from Stalin onwards have never made a secret of their Middle Eastern aspirations. Thirty years ago, when Stalin and Hitler were discussing how they would carve up the world after their victory in World War II, the Soviet Government insisted on a secret clause which read:

"The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations centre south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." That was frank enough.

In fact, Russian aspirations in the direction of the warm-water ports of the Eastern Mediterranean pre-date the Soviet régime. The Soviet leaders today are in fact pursuing Russia's imperial policies.

But today they have a much more pressing reason for moving into the Middle East and dominating the area. That reason is that the Soviet Union is today suffering from a shortage of oil. There is every reason to suppose that the shortage will become more acute and endanger the continued expansion of Soviet industrial potential.

It seems at first scarcely credible that the Soviet Union, which increased its total production of crude oil from just under 150 million tons in 1960 to nearly 330 million tons last year, and which finds it possible to export around 50 million tons every year outside the Soviet bloc, i.e., to the West, can be experiencing a shortage of

By **DAVID FLOYD**

oil. Nevertheless estimates based on Soviet statistics alone suggest that even today the Soviet economy needs 100 million tons more than it has available, and this figure will grow year by year.

The explanation is very simple: the rate of growth of Soviet oil production is falling off, while the growth-rate of consumption is rising. Last year for the first time total Soviet consumption of oil increased by substantially more than production.

Gloomy as this picture undoubtedly is for the Soviet planners, the reality is still gloomier. The Soviet Union is still, industrially, a developing country, with a greater need to increase its consumption of oil than, say, the

United States, which can today afford to increase yearly consumption by only about 5 per cent. But consumption in Western Europe still rises at more than 10 per cent. a year, and the rate of Soviet increase should be even greater. In a strictly controlled economy actual consumption is seldom the same as actual requirements. Consumption can be restricted or suppressed artificially in ways that are not possible in a free economy, partly at the expense of economic progress. If the Soviet economy is to be modernised—as it must be if it is to keep up in the economic and military race with America—it must make greater use of oil.

The clearest evidence of the "suppressed consumption" of oil in the Soviet Union is provided by the way production plans have been repeatedly revised downwards. The original plan for 1970, drawn up in 1961, provided for an output of 390 million tons. This was scaled down in the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan to 350 million tons. Similarly the planned figure for 1980 was reduced from 700 to 600 million tons. And even the higher figures were only a compromise between the planners' estimate of what the economy would need in 1970 and 1980 and

the estimated possibility of production. They were forced later to conclude that the oil industry was incapable of fulfilling even the lower target.

The older oil-producing regions of the Soviet Union, in the Caucasus and Volga-Urals region, are being exhausted and no longer produce crude oil of good quality. Other known deposits in West Siberia, and Kazakhstan are being developed, and are expected to account for three-quarters of the increased output by 1975. But because of their climatic and geographic conditions these new areas involve enormous capital expenditure.

## The only hope

Two other paths would appear to be open to the Soviet planners in their search for oil: they could cut down their exports and they could increase their imports. In practice neither path is practicable.

That the Soviet Union is short of oil for export is apparent from the way the export figures have flattened out in recent years. The threat of "Red oil" on the world market is no longer regarded seriously. Even the governments of Eastern Europe are now finding it difficult to persuade Moscow to increase oil deliveries to them, and are even being encouraged by the Russians to look elsewhere for their supplies. But the Soviet leaders can scarcely stop their exports to Eastern Europe altogether.

Nor can they withdraw entirely from Western markets where the sale of oil brings them the hard currency which they urgently need for purchasing the machinery on which the modernisation of their economy depends.

What about imports? Until 1967 the Soviet Union imported no crude oil at all, and it was only in 1969 that it concluded a trade agreement with Algeria for the supply of 500,000 tons a year until 1975. Iraq is also to supply crude oil to Russia in exchange for aid

in the development of Iraqi oil fields. But neither of these sources appreciably improve the Soviet situation. The only countries which could supply the quantities Soviet industry needs are still outside the Soviet sphere.

The Russians appear to have an objection in principle to importing oil in any large quantities from any country which they do not control politically. They stopped importing oil from Austria as soon as they withdrew their occupation forces and accepted Austria's neutrality. They are unlikely therefore to become major purchasers on the world market, even if they could afford to do so.

Why should they, when a much more promising solution offers itself? From the Soviet point of view acquisition of control of the rich oil-producing regions of the Middle East is the *only* hope they have of satisfying Soviet industry's thirst for oil in the foreseeable future. And it does not appear to be out of their reach.

What it requires immediately is a continuing state of unrest throughout the Middle East, which will make the Arab States increasingly dependent on the supplies of armaments which the Soviet Union can easily afford and the military and economic advisers which they are only too delighted to despatch. They do not want, of course, a major war or "confrontation" with America, which accounts for their appearing occasionally to be restraining the Arab leaders.

But, whatever tactical moves they may make, no one should doubt the Soviet leaders' long-term aims: ever-increasing control of the Arab "socialist" States, with the introduction where possible of "progressive" men into government, and the overthrow of the Arab rulers who have not yet seen the light.

But the aim is not purely economic, even if the economic needs are the most pressing at the moment. One of the most important developments in the Soviet Union in recent years is the implied acceptance by the present leaders that they have no hope of winning the "peaceful competition" of which Khrushchev used to speak. The Soviet economic system

is not capable of expanding faster than the free economies of the West; it is in fact lagging behind in most important fields.

The idea of grabbing the oil in the Middle East must have even greater attraction to the men of the Kremlin today than the idea of installing missiles in Cuba had to Mr Khrushchev. It would solve a lot of economic problems at one blow; it would be a major loss for the Western powers; it would satisfy the Soviet military and the more hawkish of the party leaders; and it could at least be recorded as a major success by a government which can see little prospect of success in any other direction.

The temptation must be great indeed. So great as to make any thought of a "lasting peace" in the Middle East reached with Soviet acquiescence only laughable. Moscow has nothing at all to gain from peace. Equally illusory is the belief that the Soviet leaders are interested in maintaining the State of Israel. It may be true that Israel was once useful to the Russians as a means of establishing themselves in the Middle East. But it is now an obstacle to the establishment of the Soviet "new order" in the Middle East—an obstacle which must be removed.

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THE ECONOMIST  
10 October 1970

## Mr Watson goes to Moscow

The visit to Russia by Mr Thomas Watson, Jr, chairman of International Business Machines, did not, as expected, result in concrete action, but some hard political and industrial realities lie behind it. The most important is the Russians' backwardness with the machines that, according to legend, are transforming organisational life in the west. The Russians are not only six or seven years behind the west in computer technology, they lack the ability to manufacture the big computers called for by their centralised economy, not to mention their space and military programmes. Their largest machines would be considered medium-large computers outside Russia and so far the Russians are only producing a dozen or so a year. All in all, there are perhaps only 2,500 computers in Russia today and there appears to be no way, without outside help, that the Russian economy will be able to acquire the minimum of 13,000 computers it is said to need by 1975. Soldering irons have been seen by



*Still not much to look at*

visitors hanging beside the computers in some of the country's major laboratories, ready heated for repairing the apparently inevitable breakdowns.

Mr Watson could of course supply

the help but he is forbidden to do so by the embargoes laid down by the Nato countries, which cover every sizeable computer industry in the world except Japan's. But the Japanese sit on Nato's Cocom (co-ordinating committee) as observers and adhere strictly to Cocom rules. So nothing much can happen now, despite persistent rumours in the computer industry that IBM some day will build a computer factory for the Russians. It may well be convenient for Mr Watson that the Russians believe he wants to do something of the sort. So long as they do, they are likely to encourage IBM's efforts to sell the smaller, unembargoed end of its 360 range in east Europe. IBM reportedly has 400 employees based in Vienna engaged in this operation, who so far have sold between 35 and 40 computers, although Britain's International Computers has sold even more. ICL also sells in Russia itself, a move IBM has not yet taken, presumably because of fears of right-wing reaction in America.

**Correction :** in last week's issue we said that the Lebanon was one of those helping to compensate Egypt for the Suez canal closure. This should have been Libya, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

THE OIL AND GAS JOURNAL—AUGUST 24, 1970



For the first time ever, a Russian oil minister has toured oil fields and equipment plants in the U.S. V. D. Shashin (left), accompanied by eight other top-ranking Soviet oilmen, admittedly was here to shop for equipment and to see what makes the American oil industry tick. They visited fields and facilities in the Southwest, Gulf Coast, West Coast, and Alaska. And Shashin ended the tour with a secluded interview in Greenwich, Conn., with the Journal's international specialists Frank J. Gardner, international editor, and Larry Auldridge. Here's the result.

## Soviet oil minister sees 10 million b/d flow by 1975

IF you want to activate an otherwise-calm Russian oil executive, ask him if it's true that the Soviet Union will become a net importer of crude oil.

That question certainly energized V. D. Shashin, minister of the petroleum industry of the Soviet Union. Shashin was asked by the Journal in Greenwich, Conn., last week to comment on several published reports predicting that the U.S.S.R. will become a net crude-importer by 1980. He did. "Utterly absurd—fantastic! That," he said, "is a big mistake, and you are very wrong. We'll be selling, not buying."

The U.S.S.R., Shashin declares, has Siberian oil coming out its ears—or at least will have. "In the last 10 years," he says, "our crude production has increased by 150 million tons (about 3 million b/d)—a faster increase than any other country.

"In the next 5 years, our production

will increase by 30 million tons (600,000 b/d) per year. In the beginning it will be less. But it will soon start in a straight line right up to 500 million tons/year (10 million b/d). Of the increase, 75-80% will come from Siberia." That would be in excess of current U.S. production.

Not high cost. The Russian oil minister refutes just as strongly contentions by some that Siberian crude (though admittedly plentiful) is so costly to get to market that the Soviets will import cheaper Mideast oil in large volume instead. That is the base premise behind the net-importer-by-1980 argument.

"We are solving our transportation problems, building pipelines—even one to the Pacific coast. There really isn't much difference in the cost (of Siberian as against imported Mideast crude)."

Shashin, however, failed to clarify how recent Soviet oil-aid deals in the Middle East and North Africa—some of

them involving the Russians taking crude oil in payment—fit into this picture.

He admits that the U.S.S.R. "most likely will be paid in oil. But there could be some money, too."

Shashin doesn't dispute, however, that Russia will become a net gas importer—for a time. That will happen when Iranian gas begins to flow into the U.S.S.R. this fall.

And it will hold this status until the spring when gas exports to West Europe in 1975. Russia now exports about 105 billion cu ft/year and imports about the same from Afghanistan.

Refining lack denied. Shashin does vociferously dispute western reports that the Russian industry is plagued with a severe shortage of refining capacity.

"We have much more capacity than we need," he declared. "That's why we are able to increase our production at such a rapid rate."

Exports steady. The oil minister expects exports of crude and products to the free world to hold at about present levels for the foreseeable future. He looks for no big increase. "Our own consumption is rising rapidly, you know, and only a small proportion of our oil will be available to the western and Asian countries."

Is the Russian industry feeling the worldwide pinch for tanker tonnage? Shashin says not—that most Russian oil exports (meaning those to Comecon countries) move by pipeline. Nearly all exports to the West and all those to Asia and Africa, however, must go by tanker (the Russian fleet now

boasts about 180 ships). Shashin declined to go into this area, however, on grounds that marine transport does not come under jurisdiction of his ministry. The oil ministry controls all drilling and production. Refining, transport, and natural gas have their own ministries.

No hurry offshore. The Russians apparently are in no hurry to develop potential offshore reserves.

Asked about exploration of the Arctic seas, the Baltic, the Sea of Okhotsk, the minister says there's been "some" geophysical work in all these areas—but no drilling. For the moment, most drilling activity will continue in the Caspian.

But there is to be some drilling in the Black Sea? When asked that question, Shashin broke into a broad grin. "You surprise me," he said. "How did you know about that? Yes, we will begin drilling there in the first half of 1971. We expect to find gas—but maybe oil."

Again the lack of any offshore push is believed largely due to Siberian finds and prospects.

"If we had discovered the Siberian fields before World War II," he said, "we wouldn't have had the knowledge nor the equipment to develop them. Now, however, we have everything we need to cope with development of the remote Siberian areas and to keep the chemical and petrochemical industries booming right along with it."

Decentralizing. Shashin recently authored a long article in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Economic Gazette) about his plans to streamline the administration and management of the Soviet oil industry.

Queried on the status, he said: "It's going very well. We are delegating more authority to men in the field. The foreman in Siberia can make his own decisions and even his own purchases. We are definitely decentralizing our industry."

Currently, the oil ministry has 700,000 employees, Shashin says, including 1,000 administrative personnel in Moscow. It has a budget of \$2.75 billion/year. Of this, \$1.1 billion goes for drilling, \$1.1 billion for construction, and \$550 million for domestic purchase of new equipment. Any purchase of foreign equipment is on top of these budgeted items.

The ministry figures its income last year at \$4.4 billion.

The Soviet Union, Shashin says, now has 18,000 miles of oil pipelines, 60,000 producing wells, and drills 39 million ft/year of hole.

Of this footage, 40% goes into exploratory drilling and 60% into development wells. There are, the minister claims, 1,800 rigs at work in Russia today. He pegs the Soviet reserves/production ratio for crude oil at about 25/1—and for gas at about 60/1.

Equipment eyed. To accomplish the tremendous drilling, production, transportation, and refining job confronting them, Shashin says, the Russians will need a vast amount of machinery and

equipment.

And that's one prime reason—when coupled with the January U.S. Government relaxation of its export controls act—why the minister and his entourage came here. He says he likes what he saw.

"We have already bought blowout preventors, gas-lift equipment, valves, christmas trees, and pipe benders in the U.S." Shashin said. "We don't need every type of equipment — we have our own — so we can be very selective. We're going to buy modern techniques—whatever interests us."

Earlier, one of the Russian technicians remarked that the Soviets would rather trade with U.S. suppliers "because they have better technology than anyone else."

Pressed for details on what types of equipment the delegation seeks, Shashin hedged. "I can't tell you exactly—only in rough categories. Drilling equipment, yet. And production equipment, geophysical equipment—modern, A-1, very specific equipment."

Shashin termed his U.S. trip "a great success. We can't tell the exact business results today. But if I'm not mistaken, the desire to cooperate has been evident on both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sides. All the companies seem interested in selling to us."

The Soviet Committee on Science and Technology, the minister said, must approve all budget requests for purchases. Then the Petroleum Ministry may place an order with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which negotiates the deal.

"I am," he said, both "impressed and pleased." And the delegation hopes, "despite certain problems that we can't spell out, that shortly business will develop into something great."

Will there be a credit problem in purchasing U.S. equipment? "Could be," Shashin said. What about barter? "That's the same question the companies (American equipment firms) asked!"

Tour members. Shashin, who is also chairman of the Eighth World Petroleum Congress in Moscow next June, was accompanied by eight of the biggest names in Russian oil.

These included: A. A. Asan-Nouri,

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director of Ace Union Scientific and Experimental Institute of Drilling Technique (VNIIBT) and secretary general of the WPC; V. I. Muravlenko, of Tyumen Petroleum Exploration; V. B. Nazarov, manager of "Grozneft;" and N. I. Strijov, deputy manager of the Oil and Gas Industries Department of Gosplan (the bill-paying arm of the ministry).

Also Y. M. Markov, chief scientist of VNIIBT; V. I. Pavlov, deputy manager of the Main Petroleum Machine Department of the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machinery; V. V. Rudoiskatel, chief construction engineer of drilling installation at the Ural machines factory; and V. N. Kolomatzky, chief mechanical engineer of "Glav-Tyumenneftgas."

The Russian delegation arrived in New York on July 29 and spent the next 17 days touring oil fields and equipment manufacturers in the Dallas and Houston area, southern Louisiana, the Los Angeles area, and Alaska.

A scheduled visit to the North Slope, by special assent of the U.S. State Department, proved a frustration when fog enveloped the slope, and the party's plane was grounded in Fairbanks.

Host for the group's private visit was New York-based Satra Corp.

James H. Giffen, president of Satra, says that in return for their U.S. visit, the Russian group will host a group of U.S. business men on a tour of Western Siberia next year. Presumably, it will consist largely of equipment manufacturers.

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- Thomas Land in "The Scorpion Bites In Sudan's Civil War," points to the death rates in South Sudan from starvation and violence as exceeded only by Biafra and at the same time suggests that Nimery's claim that external forces are fanning the flames in South Sudan should not be lightly dismissed. "Israel," he writes, "may well regard the cost of backing the Anya-Nya as a bargain in terms of the Sudanese Army tied down at home. Nevertheless, it remains mere conjecture until Prime Minister Nimery publishes the proofs he says he holds." (East Africa Journal, June 1970)
- Keith Irvine in "Storm Clouds over the African Horn," sees one long-term effect of the Arab-Israeli War as the tendency among African-Islamic Governments to compensate for their frustrations over the Middle East by being more militant toward their African adversaries. "Thus Soviet arms sent to the Sudan for the fight against Israel," he writes, "are likely to be used against the southern secessionist movement." (Current History, March 1970)
- David Robinson in "The Anya Nya Revolt," gives a first hand account of conditions in Southern Sudan where the guerrillas, armed with "an incredible melange of Chinese banana guns, Belgian Mausers and a few .88 cannon" show no sign of giving in and where conditions of starvation and malnutrition present a "grim scene reminiscent of Biafra." (Newsweek, 13 October 1969)

~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

November 1970

THE SOVIET HAND IN THE SUDAN:  
A NEW ARSENAL FOR THE SUDAN

On 25 May 1969, a military coup d'etat overthrew the Sudanese Government and almost immediately a surprising underground of pro-Moscow Communists began to surface. It had been happily assumed by the previous government that these people were in prison or exile. The immediate consequence was a Kremlin policy decision to move into the Sudan --- a move which facilitated last month's a new, large counter-insurgency operation against the Southern Sudanese rebels.

Arms for the Sudan

Right after the coup, an East German delegation visited Khartoum. As a result of this visit, the Sudan immediately granted formal diplomatic recognition to East Germany. By spring 1970 Sudan had signed a military training agreement with the East Germans who have undertaken to train the Sudanese army in the use of their recently acquired Soviet tanks and to take on some Sudanese army units for radar and electronics training in East Germany. Then, on the heels of the East Germans, the Soviet arms barons turned up in Khartoum. A really massive weapons deal, well embellished with Russian technicians, has been shaping up ever since.

Actually, the Soviets had been discussing arms aid with the Sudanese Government ever since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Sudanese press on several occasions had reported that high-level delegations were to discuss arms sales, but the discussions never took place, very possibly as a result of uncertainty on both sides. Certainly, the then Prime Minister Mahjoub and Sudanese army elements were hesitant over allowing Soviet technicians to come to the Sudan. On the other hand, the Soviets were unwilling to make arms deliveries to a country whose government might turn against the USSR. Then, in the wake of evidence of growing strength among Sudan's more radical, anti-Western elements, (e.g., the late 1967 merger of the pro-Egyptian People's Democratic Party and the President's National Unionist Party) the Soviets began pushing for completion of an arms deal and Sudan's Minister of Defense went East.

In mid-February, Minister of Defense Adam Musa Madibu returned to Khartoum from a month-long tour of East Europe to announce that he had signed up with Moscow, Belgrade, and Sofia for \$86 million worth of military equipment. The Soviets

were to provide the largest share by way of aircraft, weapons, and training (both in the USSR and in the Sudan); the Yugoslavs were to supply naval equipment; and the Bulgarians, technical assistance. Estimates of the Soviet share vary from \$60 to \$80 million. In September 1968, a second arms agreement was made involving some \$30 million additional Soviet aviation and air defense equipment.

By September this year, the Soviets had padded Khartoum's military inventory with the following new equipment: MIG-21 fighter aircraft (at least 12), MI-4 helicopters (at least 6), AN-24 medium transports (at least 3), V-75 surface-to-air missiles (numbers unknown), T-55 tanks (60 to 70), a dozen armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces including rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, and flame throwers --- with more to come. Preliminary deliveries of this equipment got underway sometime in mid to late 1968, with the tempo of deliveries markedly increasing after the May 1969 coup. In September 1968, the Sudanese press announced the arrival of the first 50 Soviet military advisors and instructors. By October 1970, that number is over 200 and, reportedly, some 50 of the Soviet military advisors are stationed with the Government of Sudan troops in Southern Sudan.


#### War in the South

Kenneth Grundy, coauthor of African Socialism (1964) and now teacher in Kampala, Uganda, wrote in 1968 that "the Sudanese Government is spending nearly half its limited budget on the armed rebellion in the southern provinces and about two-thirds of its army is deployed in the three provinces. They cannot sustain operations indefinitely just as the guerrillas cannot win militarily with their meager material and financial resources. A stalemate and long drawn-out war seem likely, barring massive outside intervention." The Sudanese army made no bones about its need for foreign arms to carry on the war in the south and the Soviet Union knows full well that its arms shipments are the key to enabling the regime in Khartoum to suppress the Southern Sudanese rebellion.

Last year, Prime Minister al-Nimery declared a general amnesty on all Southerners laying down arms, apparently dropped the government's program of "forced Islamization," and proposed a settlement based on a formula of local autonomy for the Sudan's southern provinces. The period of amnesty expired last month, on 19 October, without accommodation having been reached. Meanwhile, mounting Sudanese army discontent with the regime's failure to act vigorously against the Southern

guerrillas may well have resulted in al-Nimery's sanctioning of a major military campaign in the southernmost province of Equatoria during late September and early October this year, well before the end of the amnesty. Observers see this new offensive as possibly just the beginning of an all-out effort by the Government of the Sudan to eliminate the guerrilla opposition in the South --- an effort that would have been impossible without Soviet military equipment and tactical advice.

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# The Unknown War

## In the Sudan

By LAWRENCE FELLOWS

*Khartoum, the Sudan.*

**A** SUDANESE Army captain lay sprawling out of a wicker chair on the covered deck of the steamer *El Mirrech*. He was half-asleep and rolled uncomfortably as the steamer and its half a dozen barges made their way down the upper reaches of the White Nile, bumping from one bank of matted vegetation to the other in a fetid, mauve-green sea of reeds. The captain's long, white robe clung to his skin where the perspiration had soaked through. He had been reading, but the oppressive heat and the heavy progress of the steamer were overpowering and lay open on its crumpled pages on the deck by his chair.

When the barges started to heave up onto the bank at one sharp bend in the river, the sun crept up to his eyes and he half-consciously sheltered them against the hard light. The cables groaned and snapped like great, cracking whips and the waves pushed out by the sidling barges rushed hissing into the reeds. We knew we would hit the bank hard. Yet the captain seemed startled by the bump when it came. He sat bolt upright and, still not really awake, tried to concentrate on a plume of smoke rising from a distant point on the horizon. It might have been nothing more than a camp of Dinka tribesmen burning off the coarse grass so that fresh grass for their cattle could come up later. It might also have been a village burning after an army raid, or perhaps after a raid by the Anya'nya rebels. A frown deepened on the captain's face, and he looked away.

"Oh," he said, "I had already forgotten about the war."

**I**T is easy enough to forget about the savage, awful war that has raged through the three southern provinces of the Sudan for the last six years. It is a war that involves neither foreign ideologies nor foreign powers, fought over distant and isolated territory of no special economic value, and by Africans with

feeble political and military power. And yet it will not go away; it has rent the physically biggest state in Africa disastrously, perhaps irreparably; it has spilled over the borders into five neighboring countries, creating recurrent diplomatic, military and refugee problems; and it has taken already perhaps half a million lives, making it a far more costly war than Vietnam, and the rebels vow that they will continue to fight for 20 years more if need be.

In simplest terms, the war is a rebellion run by a ragged organization of guerrillas hoping to lead the 3 or 4 million black, Christian or pagan, Africa-oriented people of the southern third of the Sudan away from the 9 million Moslem and Arab-oriented people of the north. The rebels are fighting the Arab-dominated Government in Khartoum and its well-equipped, growing army of 22,000 men with a raggle-taggle organization known as the Anya'nya, whose name is taken from the deadly powder made by drying and grinding the whole head of the cobra, a slow but invariably fatal poison. Their political arm is the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, headed by ex-civil servant Aggrey Jaden, and the military is a force of perhaps 5,000 men splintered into small uncoordinated bands, nominally commanded by Col. Tafeng Lodongi.

**F**LYING low over the south, you can get an idea of the chaotic effect of this hidden war. Nearly every village in the south has been burned to the ground by troops trying to stamp out support for the rebellion, or by rebels punishing villagers who accepted the army's authority. The survivors in the bush live a hunted, half-starved existence. They can be seen in scattered camps, away from the river, away from the roads, where neither the army nor the Anya'nya can get at them.

Even there, whole camps are easily wiped out by diseases that sweep over them—malaria, dysentery, black fever. They are hungry and

have little resistance. They have no doctors, no medicines. They do not even have salt. African priests and merchants who still move around a bit in the south reckon there can hardly be a family left that has not lost someone.

"Half a million dead," reflected Hamid Ali Shash, the soft-spoken, intense looking Commissioner of Equatoria Province, flush against Uganda and the center of the rebellion. He was shaking his head.

"Half a million," he said. "That's one in six, or one in eight. No, it cannot be. It must be less."

"How many?" I asked.

"I don't know," he said. "How can anyone know?"

Certain knowledge about anything in the Sudan is hard to come by. It is extremely difficult to gauge the progress of the rebellion, both because the Khartoum Government does not normally allow outsiders, including journalists, free access to and around the south, and because this war—like Vietnam's, without definable fronts—is largely a matter of ambush, political murder, occupation and pacification, where the allegiance of the countryside is always uncertain. But indications are that the Government in recent months has managed to make considerable progress in isolating the Anya'nya bands, opening thin corridors of authority along the major roads and, through soldiers and police, keeping the peace in many newly established villages.

**H**OW long the rebellion can stay under control is anybody's guess, and the Government is hoping fervently for a continuance of the disunity and tribal antagonisms that have plagued both the political and military sides of the Anya'nya. But it is clear that the guerrilla force has won overt allegiance from many southerners and tacit support from many more because it expresses their very real and long-standing religious, racial, tribal, economic and historical grievances against the northerners. As long as these grievances remain unsatisfied, the brutal business of guerrilla war will continue for years to come.

*In the barges, northerner and southerner did not talk to each other, but neither did they argue. When they ate, Arab and African leaned together over the sides, stripping sugar cane with their teeth, spitting the chewed-out pulp into the water. Sometimes the soldiers would watch the southern women nursing their children, listen to their plaintive songs, study the*

*carefully patterned scars that decorated their backs and chests. When a woman stood and loosened her robes to rub ghee over her body, the Arab soldiers turned discreetly away, looking out into the river.*

Only the Nile and a long, unhappy history tie together north and south. As a British

colony, the Sudan had value only as a buffer for the strategic Nile, and hence Egypt itself; in fact, the British made the south a part of their colony only to keep the French away from the headwaters of the Nile.

British rule extended only slowly over the south, but the British decided the area had to be closed off to Arab influence from the north. Christian missions were made responsible for education. Northern merchants were excluded from the south, Greek and Syrian traders encouraged. Northern clerks and officials were transferred back to the north. Arabic patois and Arabic names were discouraged. One zealous district commissioner even forbade the sale of Arabic clothing.

— After World War II, in the rush to independence, this policy gave way. The southerners were suspicious of the northerners, and hesitant about throwing in their lot with them, but in the end they had no choice. The British began to withdraw. Northern merchants and civil servants flocked into the south. Few southerners got jobs; probably few were eligible, but the south grew morose and a demand welled up for some form of federation to protect southern rights.

At Nazara, on July 26, 1955, half a year before independence, a mob of southerners demonstrated against some mass dismissals from a cotton-growing and processing scheme. The soldiers sent to quell them lost their nerve and fired into the mob; northern merchants stood beside the soldiers, firing with them.

Three weeks later more trouble came. In the garrison of the Equatoria Corps an Arab officer drew his revolver and shot an unruly African soldier. The African soldiers went on a rampage and swept through the province killing every northerner they could find. Men, women and children were butchered or whipped and skinned and hung from trees. Northern troops were

flown to the south to restore order, but not until hundreds had been killed. The whole south was locked under emergency regulations which are still in effect.

The rebellion failed. The mutiny had been unorganized and leaderless and not even the southern politicians in Khartoum had supported it. But it left hundreds of African soldiers armed, vengeful and scattered in the bush.

**C**OPYRIGHT military regime that took over power from the inept politicians in Khartoum in 1958 tried to bear down on the south, but only made things worse. Talk about federation was banned, and the southerners began thinking of secession. Fighting finally broke out again in 1962, villagers dug ditches in the roads or felled trees across them to immobilize the army. The next year, the Anya'nya was formed and the rebellion enveloped the whole of the south.

In 1964 the army regime fell. The caretaker government that took over was more acceptable to the southerners, but there seemed to be no turning back. A cease-fire was proclaimed, but it did not work. When Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub took over as Prime Minister in 1965, he pursued a hard line with the rebels. There were fierce massacres of civilians in Wau and Juba. Refugees were pursued in the bush, and sometimes across the borders. Every village school in the south was destroyed, and there were more than 500 of them. The mission stations were shot up and sometimes bombed.

This spring southerner Ottiafano Amauro returned home to his village of Liria, to his father and his family. After six weary years with the Anya'nya he had had enough. Not that he liked the Arabs of the north any better than any other southerner. He knew from his childhood all the old stories about the 19th-century Arab raids for slaves and ivory. He had been cheated by Arab merchants and had suffered the brutal excesses of Arab soldiers and policemen. He had no wish to become a Moslem or wear the loose-wrapped turban and long, white robe that might help ease him into the fringes of the establishment. He just wanted to be let alone.

Ottiafano had been a corporal in the Sudanese Army at the time of the army mutiny in 1955 which had first set north against south. He and all the 140 other southerners in his company stole 12 army trucks, headed for the Uganda border and walked across as refugees. He wandered back to the Sudan in 1959, heading for Liria, and was thrown into a Sudanese jail. After a month, he was let out, then stayed at home until the Anya'nya rebellion started.

In 1963 he was captured by the Anya'nya in a field outside his village. Of the 75 men in the gang that captured him, two had rifles. The rest were armed with spears, clubs, bows and arrows. Because of Ottiafano's military training, they pressed him into service as a lieutenant, and gave him one of the rifles—a Chinese .375 that was built to hold five cartridges, but jammed if more than four were put into it.

Eventually his group was reduced to seven men—five lieutenants and two privates. All had rifles. They roamed usually through the dense forest around Yei, near the Uganda border, living on the game they could shoot, possibly on the food they were given by villagers or stole from them. Ottiafano refuses to talk about that, or about the battles he had with the soldiers. But when he finally gave himself up this year, he would not surrender to a soldier. He waited in the forest at the edge of Liria until a policeman walked by. Then he surrendered.

The Anya'nya followed him to the village a few months ago, and shot his father and 10 other villagers in revenge before the army chased them away.

**M**OST of the southerners are Nilotic, with scars drawn on their deep-black faces to distinguish them by tribes—the Dinka, the Nuer, the Shilluk, the Annuak. They live in the marshes with their beloved, long-horned cattle, and care for little else. Some live by nothing more than hunting crocodiles, or burning the marsh grass to catch and eat the rats when they come skittering out.

Usually they wear nothing, and smear their bodies with mud when they are in the marshes, to discour-

age the mosquitoes that choke the hot, evening air. But when the Dinkas clamber into the barges on the river, they wear their best: half-shaven heads daubed with earthy hues of orange or red, ears powdered white, necklaces of blue-dyed beads, perhaps a shawl to cover the shoulders. One Dinka wore a wrist watch and nothing else.

Along the southern borders are the smaller tribes, Sudanic, Nilo-Hamitic or Nilotic: the Bari, the Moru, the Azande, the Madi, the Acholi, the Latuka and dozens of others. Some of the tribes have cattle, but most of them in the forest areas are cultivators of the most primitive sort—planting cassava or durra, occasionally raising chickens. Many were never reached by the missionaries. Some never saw a white man before, and when one came they touched his skin and looked under his shirt to see if he was white all over. Almost all of these tribes are represented in the Anya'nya.

**T**HE President of the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, Aggrey Jaden, is a mission-educated Bari tribesman. His Vice President, Camillo Dhol Kwach, who once served as a member of the Sudan's Parliament, is a Dinka. The Minister of Finance, Tadeo Bidai, is a Zande. The Minister of Education, Othwonh Dak, is the son of the Shilluk king. All the tribes are represented, too, in the military side of the Anya'nya, but it doesn't take much imagination to picture the generally primitive state of their weapons and organization. The guerrillas began by raiding police posts and army garrisons for their guns and then in 1964 bought and bartered from the Congo rebels the very same weapons the Sudanese had shipped through in a vain effort to support that rebellion before it collapsed. Today, however, the army has tightened its control, the Congo is quiet and the rebels do not come by weapons so easily; ammunition is especially scarce.

There are always weapons floating around Africa as items of barter, but they usually have to be paid for. The Anya'nya collect taxes in most places in the south, even where the



Sudanese Army feels it has really good control, but the rebels lose when they exchange the Sudanese money; in Nairobi, for example, they get 10 shillings for a pound. Some church groups collect money for them abroad, but very often it arrives in the form of food and medicine, **COPYRIGHT** things are useless to an army that needs sometimes five or six months to get things from one remote point to another.

Other troubles are plaguing the rebels' organization these days. Though the Anya'nya claim now to have an army of 5,000 men, to think of it in terms of an organized force of that size would be wildly wrong. The Sudanese Army probably with more than 12,000 troops in the south, has broken the Anya'nya into isolated bands, sometimes of only three or four men. Without effective central command, the guerrillas live like brigands, sniping at army convoys when they have the chance, raiding villages that refuse to give them food or recruits to go with their rebel army as soldiers or bearers or wives. There are incidents almost every day; any place in the south can be unsafe if a rebel or two happen to be in the area. But only rarely now can the Anya'nya muster the resources to take a sustained attack on a police post or an army garrison, or lay a really deadly ambush for northern troops or for southerners they feel have gone over to the other side.

Col. Tafeng Lodongi, the commander of the rebel army, is a Latuka tribesman, a former corporal in the Sudanese Army who never went to school, a very bitter man. Not long ago two nieces of his, Veronica and Angelica, were taking part in a funeral dance, after an army raid on their village. A second army patrol drove into the village during the dance, and asked the village headman if there were any of Colonel Tafeng's relatives there. When the headman presented the two girls, the officer in charge of the patrol drew his pistol and shot them dead.

**T**HE northerners live in a world apart. They look to Cairo, not Juba; their interests lie more in the Arab world than in black Africa. It is as if the vast swampy region between

them and the south were a stone wall.

They are Nubians and Jaalin, who live on the watered banks of the Nile where it courses through the northern desert to Egypt. They are Hadendoa and Amara from the rugged hills on the Red Sea coast, who trace their ancestry through lines of fierce warriors to the Fuzzy-Wuzzies who fought the British and to the Blannyes who fought the Romans. They are the Baggara, who hunt on horseback for lions and elephants on the western plains; and the Kabbabish, who wander into the southern reaches of the Libyan desert, living for months on nothing but the milk and meat of their camels.

Some are very dark, for over the centuries the Arabs have moved, in conquering armies or as hunters of ivory and men, into all but the most remote and inaccessible regions of the south. They have taken their wives from around them, and the differences in color and facial characteristics now are very often blurred. Because of this, the racial issues are too obscured to be an explanation of the savagery of the war.

Yet the northerner lives in an Islamic culture and is proud of his Arab connections. He can scorn the southerner today as his ancestors did only a few generations ago, his ancestors who captured pagan tribesmen and shipped them in chains to the slave blocks of the Middle East, leaving a bitter residue that survives today.

"We are not slave traders," said Hamid Ali Shash, the Commissioner of Equatoria. "Perhaps our grandfathers were. But they were not the only ones. It doesn't matter. We want to impress on the people that they have nothing more to fear. How else can we get them into the villages? How else can we begin the task of reconstruction?"

He sounded worried. He was an intense man who worried about the task as he worried about a lot of things, the unending rain, the time it took the coffee to arrive for the guest in his office.

*In Juba, I met a nervous, well-dressed man, a Kresh tribesman far from home, headed for Khartoum; he hated the Arab's world, but he*

*was venturing into it to seek his fortune. Together we watched women running to a dance starting in an open field, looking gay in their printed cotton dresses and bare feet. We could hear the drums beating and the sad, shrill voice of a woman. These people were not of his tribe, and their songs must have been different. Yet he was reminded of one, and sang along quietly in halting English:*

*I don't like you,  
But you keep calling me.  
What for?*

*A love song, he said. Rather, sometimes it was a love song; that is what they always told the Arabs who asked. Really, it was a song about the slave trade. He knew nothing more about the slave trade than what his grandmother had told him by the cooking fires at night. Now it was wrapped up in the traditions of bitterness in his tribe, in the secretive instincts, the lingering suspicions. There were other words, he started to say, but he was listening again to the music, and started singing again:*

*The man is still calling me  
And I do not like him.  
My mother, I am the only dead one  
Here in this town.*

**S**SOME signs of normality are now evident in the troubled south. Southerners can be seen walking along the roads these days, at least near the villages in the army's narrow corridors of newly established, still tenuous authority. At the Juba ferry, southerners cross to the west bank of the Nile with bundles of thatch, reed mats and baskets of grain to sell in the Juba market. On the east bank a squat old woman ladles marisa out of five-gallon cans and sells the thick, vinegary brew to the people crossing back from the market with their hard-won piasters. Not so long ago there would have been nobody in sight.

The northerners in the Government in Khartoum seem to be making an effort to return to normal, too. White missionaries are still kept out of the south, but two Tanzanian priests—Father Barnabas Temu and Father Mark Riwa—have just been permitted to take up teaching posts in the Theological College at Malakal

and help minister to the untended flocks of Roman Catholics in Upper Nile Province.

In Equatoria Province, schools have been reopened in Juba and half a dozen big villages. Schools are an indication of the Government's good intentions. They also indicate, more accurately than the army reports, the areas that can be considered fairly secure.

In Bahr el Ghazal the thin lines of apparent security stretch outward for several hundred miles eastward, some 50 or 60 miles north and west. In Upper Nile, the quietest of the three provinces, the rebels appear to be blocked into a narrow margin of territory behind the swamps close to the Ethiopian border.

I traveled 50 miles eastward from Juba to the village of Liria, where the authorities are hoping to open another school. I could travel only in a military convoy. At one time, this stretch of road was broken in a dozen places by deep trenches and vehicle traps, but the army engineers have it open now. We stopped when we saw a trail of vines and branches scattered across the road, but it was nothing. Perhaps a rhinoceros had crashed across the road toward some real or imagined enemy. Farther along, a tree lay across the road, but there was no ambush; probably the work of an elephant.

**T**HE Anya'nya were on this road last November, at the end of the rainy season, burning off the elephant grass by the road before the grass was completely dry. By burning early they made it impossible for the army to set the grass afire when it was completely dry and thus clear the whole roadside of hiding places. Little clumps of grass were still standing, possible cover for the Anya'nya, which the army had not got around to clearing out. But no one fired at the convoy that day.

At Ngangala, on the way, a new village was being built under the watchful eye of the army. It was the only village on a stretch that used to be full of them.

At Liria itself, there were 6,000 people in a village that looked like almost any other. There were no fortifications, no barbed-wire barriers

thrown around. There were 10 policemen and 25 soldiers living in their own camp on one side of town. Eventually, the soldiers were to be withdrawn and the police force enlarged. It would have to be quiet around Liria for a long time before the police, too, could be withdrawn.

*There had been a stampede to get aboard the El Mirrech steamer at Juba; there had been at every landing. Old women and children were thrown from the narrow gangplank in the clamor; everywhere people seemed to be grasping at outstretched hands, grabbing eggs or chickens or canes of sugar, arguing about money. Some merely wanted to get aboard as passengers, and they tumbled against the side of the barge or fell into the river. Police whacked them with sticks, canes and lengths of knotted rope in a hopeless effort to maintain order.*

*"We treat them like animals," the army captain on the deck said, long after the steamer had moved out of the vast expanse of melancholy swamp, and the sea of reeds had turned to desert. Only a few palms and acacias grew by the river, where the water soaks into the banks. The clouds had disappeared from the sky and it was steel blue, but it ought to have been another color—orange or red—for it burned mercilessly on the barren landscape. The fine sand was driven by the wind into a wild, tireless whirlwind that skidded erratically over the hot surface.*

*"The devil is dancing," the captain said, watching the desert. "He will make me forget." ■*

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## A NEW BIAFRA?

# The Scorpion Bites in Sudan's Civil War

by

Thomas Land

*Thomas Land is a London-based journalist whose articles appear in Africa, Asia and North America as well as in Britain.*

Major-General Jaafar al-Nimeiry, the Nasserite Sudanese leader who has just rescued his regime from the sixth attempted coup since his own seizure of power a year ago, has accused the United States, Israel and West Germany of a plot to turn the South of his country into a new Biafra.

The three countries, of course, deny this. But somebody may well be aiding the Sudan's black rebels, for their little publicized, 15-year old war for succession from the Arab North is rapidly taking on the proportion of the Biafra tragedy. Diplomatic and political observers warn that the fighting has suddenly intensified. The flames are fanned by what appear to be both new supplies of sophisticated military hardware acquired by the rebel forces of the Anya-Nya\* and the ineptitude of the Khartoum regime which first declared a general amnesty on Southerners laying down the arms and then had many of those responding to it shot.

If the seeds of the Biafra war had been sown by the men who once administered the British Empire, the same is true for the growing violence in the Southern Sudan. A traditional reservoir of black slaves for the rich markets of Arabia, the South of Sudan today is the largest single source, after war-torn Portuguese Angola, of African refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees more than 70,000 fugitives from three vast Southern provinces of the Sudan are currently being re-settled in Uganda, 52,000 in Burundi,

24,000 in the Congo and 14,000 in Tanzania. In addition, there are thought to be perhaps hundreds of thousands of refugees unregistered. The war, according to various estimates, has cost close to half a million lives.

Sheltered from modern communications by the immense Sudd swamps, the Nuba mountains and remote savannah grasslands, the war in the South Sudanese provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal ties down the bulk of the country's 30,000-strong, partially Soviet-equipped armed forces. The under-developed, tropical region of 300,000 square miles is populated by three-to-four million, largely Christian and pagan blacks, paying recurring tolls in human lives to sweeping attacks by disease epidemics, famine and Northern raiding parties. The countryside, where more than 59 per cent of the native population lives, is well under the control of the Anya-Nya; while the regular army has hitherto held a secure position in the larger towns. However, the situation is rapidly changing in the Anya-Nya's favour.

The Sudan, the largest and culturally the most varied country on the African continent, was ruled by a British-Egyptian Condominium until 1956 when it gained independence. It is now administered by a Revolutionary Council established by a group of young officers who assumed power in a coup last May. The Sudan, whose closest allies are neighbouring Egypt and Lybia, is at war with Israel, severed diplomatic relations with the US after the June War of 1967 and broke its ties with West Germany when it recognized East Germany after last

\* The rebel named after scorpion's poison.

year's coup. Prime Minister al-Nimeiry accused the three countries of plotting the creation of a new Biafra in the South following an unsuccessful personal attempt to reach accommodation with the rebels. He has threatened shortly to publish the evidence.

A country comprising nearly 600 diverse tribes, the Sudan ranges from sandy deserts to sub-tropical forest regions. It extends over an area of 967,500 square miles, populated by only 14 million people, all Islamic by faith and tradition save those in the black South. Khartoum, at the confluence of the White Nile flowing from Lake Victoria and the Blue Nile from Ethiopia, is at the site of a civilization dating back three thousand years which derived its power and wealth from the great rivers. But today, the 14-year old state survives on an annual per capita income of £40, depends on a single-crop economy of cotton, holds no gold reserves and has foreign exchange resources totalling less than £16.5 million. Certainly, it can ill afford to finance the disastrous war in the South.

But it sees no path out of the madness. Reports from Bonn describe fresh initiatives by a group of European humanitarian organizations until recently busy in Biafra who have turned their attention to the growing famine accompanying the fighting in the South of Sudan. Emergency supplies of food, medicine and clothing are being flown to the countries of asylum surrounding the Sudan war zone, which are receiving a new influx of refugees. A proportion of this aid is being brought illegally into the Sudan where starvation is said to be endemic among children and where the death rate is described as the second highest on the continent, only exceeded by Biafra.

The history of violence in the South of Sudan is one of racial conflict in crude terms, repeated in different patterns in the civil wars of neighbouring Chad and Ethiopia. But the conflict in the Sudan is aggravated by grave inconsistencies in Whitehall's policies in preparing the country for independence.

In an attempt to eradicate slave raiding as well as economic and cultural exploitation of the black tribes by the Northerners, the Victorian administrators cordoned off the South of Sudan, creating in effect a huge

sanctuary shielding its inhabitants from development. This at last created a period of peace and stability. The rigid exclusion of the Northerners from the area was extended after the First World War to bans even on Arab costume and culture. Education was neglected and left completely in the hands of Christian missionaries. Economic development was channeled to the North.

After the Second World War, Britain was confronted with increasing nationalism throughout the Empire, and had neither the economic resources nor the will to resist. Yielding to pressure from the North, Britain abruptly lifted the protective ban on the South of Sudan, and called independence talks at which the black minority was not even represented. The Africans would have liked a loose federation affording them the right to a form of local administration; the Arabs insisted on, and in the end got, a centralized administrative machinery. The national programme of Sudanization preceding independence led to the appointment of Arab, rather than African, civil servants in the South. They were accompanied by a stream of traders and soldiers from the North into a South utterly unprepared for their arrival. And Britain departed without leaving behind a constitution.

Some months before independence, a mutiny of Southern soldiers in Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal provided a final warning. The mutiny was suppressed, but it provided the first elements of open resistance which has since developed into the organised guerilla warfare of the Anya-Nya.

The political leaders of the South, even those voicing their demands for a federal constitution at the Constituent Assembly, were soon imprisoned, killed or forced to seek refuge abroad. The missionaries were summarily expelled. Inter-racial tension erupted in occasional large-scale civilian violence: in one uprising, several hundred Northerners were slaughtered, followed by hundreds of reprisal executions.

In Juba, at least 400 Southerners lost their lives during a single night, recalls a specialist study prepared for the London-based Defence and Air Fund. Southern doctors and medical assistants attending to the wounded at the hospital were shot at and driven out by

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 Northern troops. In Wau, some 70 Southerners were shot dead while peaceably attending a wedding. At Mundri, the Protestant theological college was attacked and burned. A report from a Southern priest at Maridi describes how by June, 1965, the hospital at the town was closed "for many dressers, medical assistants and nurses had been arrested and killed and the rest escaped from fear... All the Southern merchants and traders in the town were suddenly arrested and killed. I know of only two who escaped death."

Many Southerners unable to cross the international frontiers eke out a precarious, fugitive existence in the swamps and forests. Northern raiding parties pursuing Southern refugees are occasionally reported to wander across the ill-defined borders to neighbouring countries, killing and burning on their way. The heaviest losses to the civilian population in the South are inflicted by the lack of adequate food and medical supplies. Hence the current initiative by such relief organisations as the Swedish Red Cross, the World Council of Churches and the Catholic Mission Relief.

To be effective in the rural areas of the South of Sudan, any organisation must win the cooperation of the Anya-Nya which has for some time prevented the free movement of Northern forces except in heavily armed units. The Anya-Nya supports the government-in-exile demanding nothing less than complete secession from Khartoum. The guerilla army is led by General Tafeng, a 60-year old former officer of the Equatoria Corps who led the 1955 mutiny. The force was formally organised in 1963, on Tafeng's release from prison, armed with machetes, knives, spears, bows and arrows. Today, his men are equipped with automatic weapons and are believed recently to have acquired the aid of foreign military advisors.

That is thought to be the only plausible explanation for the current change of tactics of the Anya-Nya, which has repeatedly engaged major units of the federal forces following years of elusive guerilla warfare. Some 40-50 government troops are reliably reported to have been killed during recent battles in the town of Torit where the mutiny started. Several Northern military camps have also been simul-

taneously attacked. Heavy fighting has been reported in the Juba and Nimule regions.

The hard line taken by the exiled Southern politicians is far removed from their modest demands at home while under British rule. Today, it is Prime Minister al-Nimeiry who seeks a federal administrative machinery under which the three Southern provinces would enjoy autonomy. The Southerners reject charges of secessionism on the grounds that, since they were not party to the Cairo agreement involving Britain, Egypt and the Arab political parties of the Sudan, and providing for the country's joint independence, they are simply not bound by it.

Meanwhile, Major-General al-Nimeiry clearly cannot pay sufficient attention to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the South, despite its crucial importance to his entire country as well as to surrounding regions.

The sixth and reputedly so far the most serious attempted coup within a year which he has just crushed has brought down Imam al-Hadi, al-Mahdi, the influential religious and political leader of the Ansari sect. All political parties are now banned in the Sudan, and the prisons are full of political opponents. Khartoum is likely to see further insurrections in the foreseeable future.

Yet his claim that external forces are fanning the flames in the South of Sudan is not to be dismissed lightly as a search for a scapegoat in a politically sticky situation. The U.S. and West Germany are unlikely to seek to antagonize the Arab World further but the CIA, for one, may see fit secretly to controvert Washington's apparent wishes. Ethiopia (publicly unaccused by Khartoum) is believed lately to have supplied some military hardware to the rebels, if only to keep them away from its own borders shared with the Sudan. And Israel, which is in any case busy promoting political sympathy throughout black Africa, may well regard the cost of backing the Anya-Nya as a bargain in terms of the Sudanese army tied down at home. Nevertheless it remains more conjecture until Prime Minister al-Nimeiry publishes the proofs he says he holds or other evidence is forthcoming from that remote, cruel and costly war.

*"The high hopes that accompanied the attainment of independence have, in Northeast Africa as in other parts of the continent, become attenuated as a result of subsequent differences." In actuality, "a gigantic political fracture zone is developing on the African continent. . . ."*

## Storm Clouds Over the African Horn

BY KEITH IRVINE  
Associate Editor, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

CPYRGHT

The Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, was too brief to have direct military consequences in the Horn of Africa, even although the Sudan declared war on Israel and sent Sudanese troops to the U.A.R. (Sudanese troops were also moved to the Ethiopian frontier for a time). Somalia, being engaged in an election campaign that summer, did not become involved, but demonstrated sympathy for the Arab cause. The long-term effects of the war, however, are considerable. There appears to be a tendency among some African Islamic governments—shared by some factions in the Sudan and Somalia—to compensate for the frustrations experienced by the Arab cause in the Middle East by adopting a more militant stance towards potential adversaries in Africa itself. Thus Soviet arms sent to the Sudan for the fight against Israel are likely to be used, instead, against the southern secessionist movement, just as arms sent to Libya—with whose new regime the Sudan and the U.A.R. recently concluded a pact of cooperation—are liable to find their way south to support the rebels against President François Tombalbaye's government in Chad.

The rising level of tension in the Middle East has also done much to heal the old rift between the Sudanese and Egyptian governments, to activate latent suspicions of Western governments, and to overcome religious reservations concerning relations with the Soviet Union. In this last connection, the fact that the Sudan has the largest Communist party in Africa has also had some effect upon the situation, even although the allegiance of Sudanese Communists is demonstrably given first to their own country, and not to Moscow.

The secessionist movement in the southern

Sudan, which has continued intermittently since 1956, reaching the proportions of a full-scale armed revolt in 1963, has deep roots, based on cultural and religious differences between the Christian or animist populations of the south and the Arab government in Khartoum. According to the Khartoum government, the original outbreak of violence in the south in 1956—which resulted in the massacre of whole cadres of badly-needed civil servants, carefully trained in the years before independence—was engineered by Belgian agencies, who were at that time fearful of the effect of the nationalism of an independent Sudan upon the internal situation in the Belgian Congo. Whether true or not, by 1963 the Sudanese dissidents were obtaining support from the Congo (Kinshasa), as well as from Sudanese refugees who had established themselves in other nearby African states, such as Uganda. Since then various efforts to resolve the conflict—among the most notable of which was a conference held in Khartoum itself in 1965—have all failed, even though the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), whose seat is located at Addis Ababa in neighboring Ethiopia, has exerted itself to achieve reconciliation.<sup>5</sup>

One step towards reconciliation nevertheless appears to have occurred recently when the Khartoum government apparently dropped its program of "forced Islamization" in the south—a program that had aroused the most bitter opposition. The Khartoum government, meanwhile, has proposed a settle-

<sup>5</sup> Efforts to induce the Pope to show public interest in the plight of Christians in the southern Sudan—made by Sudanese refugees in Uganda at the time of the recent visit of His Holiness to Kampala—were, at least publicly, unrewarded.

ment based upon the formula of local autonomy for the Sudan's southern provinces. The ~~situation~~ ~~has~~ ~~developed~~ ~~so~~ ~~far~~, ~~however~~, that only a solution upheld by the governments of East Africa and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo—all of which are acting as hosts to Sudanese refugees—would prove viable.

The southern Sudanese are themselves divided into various factions. One of these factions, the Azanya Liberation Front, is willing to accept Khartoum's promise of local autonomy, whereas another—the Nile Provisional Government, formed in March, 1969, under the leadership of Gordon Muertat Mayen—is not, insisting upon a separate sovereign identity for the southern Sudan. Yet another faction, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government, which is supported by the *Anyanya*, the military wing of the secessionist movement, also insists upon a separate national identity.

Such confusion within the Sudan is harmful in several ways. First, it diverts to military ends economic resources that are desperately needed for national policies that would promote health, education and commercial development, and so help restore stability and prosperity. Second, it creates a small cyclone of violence that grows by what it feeds on, threatening to draw neighboring states into its vortex, and eventually to merge with that other cyclone already blowing up a storm in the Middle East. Third, it invites states from outside the region to risk pursuing their interests in the area by adventurous means, thus, in turn, tempting others to resort to adventurism, at the expense of the civilian populations of Northeast Africa. Cool heads are needed to help to compose a scenario for the future which does not bear any resemblance to the events that generated their own momentum in Southeast Asia.

NEWSWEEK

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SUDAN:

## The Anya'Nya Revolt

During most of the nineteenth century, Arab slave traders sailed down the reed-choked White Nile to southern Sudan in search of blacks to be sold in the great slave markets of Khartoum and Cairo. Although the slave trade has long been outlawed, the bitterness of the Sudan's black minority (6.5 million) toward the country's ruling Arabs (9 million) has remained. Six years ago, the blacks revolted and plunged their country into a savage civil war which, through disease, famine and bloodshed, has already claimed an estimated half million lives. Despite promises by a new leftist military regime in Khartoum to give the blacks some measure of local self-government, the war shows no signs of diminishing. Recently, Newsweek's David Robison spent seven weeks in southern Sudan, thus becoming the first Western newsman to travel extensively in the guerrilla-infested territory. Below, his report:

Anyan'Nya is a slow and fatal poison made by grinding the dried head of the cobra into fine powder. And Anyan'Nya is also the name that the 10,000 black guerrillas in Sudan's three southern provinces have given themselves. With the overwhelming support of black Sudanese, these poorly armed rebels have gained what amounts to de facto rule over much of southern Sudan. In fact, outside a few closely guarded cities and towns—in the swamps, forests and malaria-ridden grasslands—the Anyan'Nya is usually the only law.

The guerrillas have given southern Sudan the first effective and popular government it has ever known. There is an Anyan'Nya police force, and each year a tax of \$1.30 per family is collected to further the struggle for an independent black state. "We don't pay the tax because the Anyan'Nya force us to," an old man told me. "We pay because they have so few weapons, bullets and clothes."

Not once during the weeks in which I walked through Equatoria Province did I come upon a Sudanese official or army patrol. This is not as unusual as it might seem, since Khartoum has been playing a waiting game. No medicine and almost no clothing have reached the countryside in several years, and the Sudanese Government believes that, sooner or later, the rebels will have to give in. Yet, morale in the southern Sudan remains high, despite the fact that most black Sudanese have less clothing and food than even the

poorest Africans in neighboring states. In every village the night air is punctuated by the hacking, wheezing and rasping of the sick. And children, with stomachs swollen from malnutrition and skin covered with flaky sores, sit dull and listless in the dusty streets—a grim scene reminiscent of Biafra.

Stories: In Yaribe, a not untypical village of 700, Chief Yoseke Yongo said that 111 of the 400 children under his care had died in the past two years from measles, whooping cough, worms and pneumonia. Only once during that time have the villagers gone to the nearest town for medical treatment. "In December 1968," Chief Yongo said sadly, "my brother sent four of his children to Yei. They were caught by the Arabs at the hospital, taken to the military barracks and slaughtered." Almost all black Sudanese have similar atrocity stories to tell (though, in fairness to the Arab side, one must point out that these tales are impossible to verify). Most blacks insist, moreover, that although the tempo of violence has slowed in the past two years, Sudanese troops still occasionally venture out of their garrison towns to burn villages, destroy crops and kill random villagers.

Though the Anyan'Nya are anxious to carry the fight to the Arabs, they are prevented from doing so by their lack of the modern instruments of war. The weapons they do have—an incredible mélange of Chinese banana guns, Belgian Mausers and a few .88-mm. cannon—were obtained years ago at black markets in the Congo. Two out of three rebel soldiers are armed with bows and cunningly barbed arrows that can only be removed by a surgeon. Even those troops who carry guns have so little ammunition that they cannot afford to risk long skirmishes with Arab patrols. Although the rebel area is bigger than the eastern United States (map), the guerrillas have no radio communication or vehicular transportation. When Lt. Col. James Loro, the Anyan'Nya commander of Upper Nile Province, travels from Anyan'Nya headquarters in Equatoria to his regional headquarters, it requires a 400-mile trek by foot and canoe. "All we have are small canoes and a few guns," the 24-year-old officer says with a touch of bravado, "and we fight the Arab motorboats and machine guns." Even with such limited weaponry, the guerrillas have set themselves a difficult goal—to attack every government road convoy and Nile steamer, as well as the once-a-week train from Khartoum to the south.

New Order: The rebel officers have placed their hopes for military success in the hands of a soft-spoken major general named Emidio Tafeng. Three months ago, General Tafeng, 59, took over the Anyan'Nya government from civilian politicians whom he accused of embezzling tax money. Tafeng, who dresses no better than his ragged troops, proclaimed that the southern Sudan was an independent state and would henceforth be known as Anyidi. More important, as far as Anyan'Nya military men were concerned, the energetic Tafeng has set out to seek large shipments of arms from Western sources such as West Germany and Israel. "God says men should be free," he argues. "The Arabs will never develop us. There is no trust. And we in turn will not accept anything less than complete independence."

This leaves the four-month-old leftist government of Africa's largest country with a terrible dilemma. Its old policy of keeping the south an isolated, ignorant patch of suffering has only stiffened black resistance. Yet to go halfway and grant the blacks local autonomy might only spread the virus of separatism. For the educated elite of the south are almost all Anyan'Nya or Anyan'Nya sympathizers. And they are not likely to give up their goal of an independent Anyidi for the nebulous concept of partial local self-rule. Whatever Khartoum decides to do, the prospect is for continued fighting and suffering. The south is just too vast for the 30,000-man Sudanese Army ever to fully pacify. The Anyan'Nya, for their part, are too weak and poorly armed to wrest independence from Khartoum. Should General Tafeng succeed in obtaining foreign arms, the Arabs will probably seek more of their own—possibly from the Russians. Even without foreign military aid, the conflict is likely to attract sympathy—and perhaps direct military aid—from outside powers, with Arab states siding with the Sudan Government and African nations helping the Anyan'Nya. And if that happens, then the unknown war will be unknown no longer.



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THE COMMUNIST SCENE

I. Venezuelan Communist Petkoff Seeks Break With CPSU

Earlier this year, Teodoro Petkoff, a leading Venezuelan Communist of Bulgarian descent, wrote a book called Checoeslovaquia: El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism), in which he condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and subjected the Soviet Union, as a supposedly socialist state, to searching and critical examination. The book brought him into open conflict with the orthodox, pro-Soviet leadership which dominates the Party, and his book was officially denounced by the Party. He has now produced what may be regarded as a logical sequel in a slim volume called: Socialismo para Venezuela? (Socialism for Venezuela?), in which he rejects the orthodox Soviet doctrine concerning Communist seizure and exercise of political power, a doctrine which the CPSU regards as mandatory for all CP's. In its place he advocates his own solution of how to achieve socialism in Venezuela based on a completely original analysis of Venezuelan society in terms of its economy, class structure, social forces, and recent history, with particular attention to the historical and current role of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV).

In effect, Petkoff ends by rejecting the Soviet model and along with it the stagnation which afflicts the PCV leadership. His criticism of this leadership, voiced in the prologue of the book, is familiar to anyone acquainted with the criticism of the numerous Communist dissidents throughout the world. His characterization of the PCV leadership applies with equal force to practically all Latin American Communist leaders, and for that matter to the leadership of every Communist Party that voices its allegiance to the Soviet Union, and is worth citing at the outset:

"On the road toward setting up this organization, we face problems which we could categorize under the following headings: reformism or revolution? renovation and modernization or maintenance of the organizational status quo?

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I. Teodoro Petkoff. Socialismo para Venezuela? Editorial Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970; 139 pp. It calls to mind French Communist dissident Roger Garaudy's book, Pour un modèle français du socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism)

an independent and national party or an alien and vassal party?...

"Will the party, as it is now constituted, in its rusty condition, with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification, of corruption at some levels, of softening up, of ideological impoverishment, with leadership organs which to a large extent do not reflect the reality of our militancy and the degree of its development, will such a party be in a condition to take an effective part in the revolutionary process?...

"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent criticism on the international plane, in a position to develop and advance a genuinely revolutionary policy?...

"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the final analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party of the revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the system." [pp 6-7; emphasis added.]

Much of what Petkoff proposes for PCV policy has little relevance outside of the local Venezuelan scene, but a summary of some of his views will serve to illustrate his independence of outlook and the extent of his break with Soviet-approved orthodoxy.

First of all, he criticizes Stalinism as responsible for the "world crisis" in which Communism finds itself at present. Though implicit, such criticism can only refer to the continued existence of Stalinism within the current Soviet leadership, placed, as it is, in a contemporary context and having reference to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He then advocates the adoption of a platform for the PCV whereby the Party will be unequivocally dissociated from the Soviet brand of Communism. Included in his platform would be guarantees for the preservation of the various essential democratic, political and personal freedoms and preservation of a "pluralistic" society, whose opposite, of course, is the Soviet monolith.

Corollary to this dissociation is his insistence that the PCV pursue its own specific, national form of socialism. The achievement and content of this socialism are totally unorthodox. It is to be achieved, according to Petkoff, not by the traditional alliance of workers and peasants, but by a different constellation of forces, which includes as the most revolutionary ally (!!), the "middle-level and poor petit bourgeoisie," followed in importance by what Petkoff calls "fringe" sectors (large masses of displaced, unemployed persons in the cities)

and finally as a poor third among allies of the proletariat, poor peasants. Even more unorthodox, Petkoff considers as potential revolutionary allies elements of "the most varied social organizations: the armed forces, the church, and political parties," plus students. "To come right out and say it, we are simply proposing a critical revision of the old formula of the worker-peasant alliance as the axis of the revolutionary movement. [p 100]

As if this were not enough of a challenge to Communist orthodoxy, he also discards the notion, sacred to all orthodox Communists, that the Communist Party must lead the revolution as the "vanguard" exercising hegemony (i.e. absolute control) over whatever allies it enlists in its revolutionary effort:

"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard and the leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement (and this could very well be a Communist party such as the Chinese which based itself on the peasant masses, a heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July in which the petit bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of conspiratorial high officers not organically linked to the masses as in the Egyptian case and Nasir)...

"The historic experience of all modern revolutions demonstrates that the concept which Marx had --- a class as such playing the active leading role --- and which Rosa Luxembourgh opposed to the theory of Lenin's party, in which, not without reason, she saw an organization above the working class, is no longer valid...." [pp 100-101]

Sheer heresy.

(Attached are a number of additional excerpts from Petkoff's book illustrating his break with Soviet Communism).

Petkoff's theories in themselves are relatively unimportant. What is significant is that, as a full-fledged Communist, a major leader among Venezuelan Communists, he should plead independence of Soviet tutelage, that he should make an earnest case for a specific Venezuelan national road to "socialism." While he may be very nearly unique among Communists in Latin America, his plea is that voiced by several individual Communists in the free world such as the French Communist Roger Garaudy and many of his fellow dissidents, the Austrian Communists Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, the Italian Communists of the "II Manifesto" group (see item two below), to name a handful; and by free world Communist parties on other continents: the British, the Swedish, Spanish, Australian, Japanese, various Indian parties, etc. etc. Petkoff is one more representative of that growing "community of Communist dissent," a growing centrifugal force spinning away from the Soviet center.

In the growing community of Communist dissent must be reckoned also the number of ruling Communist parties that have succeeded in following their "own road to socialism," or are attempting to do so, against the Soviet drive to keep them closely tied to the center: The Chinese, Yugoslav, Albanian, North Vietnamese, North Korean, Rumanian. Czechoslovakia represents the tragic instance of a Communist regime whose efforts to follow its "own road to socialism" was crushed by Soviet tanks. The only reason that others have not been similarly crushed is that they were geographically or geopolitically beyond the reach of Soviet arms. In the free world the Soviets for the most part have succeeded in extinguishing the attempts at independence by maverick Communists by getting the parties to expel them (at a threat of withdrawal of financial support, without which most parties could not survive). It will be interesting to see whether heretic Petkoff and his supporters in the PCV leadership will continue to hold their positions in the party. So far they have succeeded -- which means less that the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet faction in the PCV accept or tolerate "Petkovianism" than that the alternative, i.e. expelling him, is an even less palatable measure at this time.

2. Italian Communists of "II Manifesto" Group to Form Own Party.

An example of the resistance to the Soviet brand of Communism, and even more to the Soviet compulsion to force its views on subordinate parties, is the case of the so-called "II Manifesto" group of Italian Communists. Known to the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the "Chinese" for their criticism of the Soviet Union since its invasion of Czechoslovakia and for its advocacy of a return to pure, revolutionary Communism, the Manifesto leaders were first suspended and then (in November 1969) expelled from the PCI. Recently, the group seems to have undertaken moves to form a new Communist Party, according to the attached item appearing in the New York Times. Independent estimates suggest that their membership is growing rapidly so that the party may soon constitute a political factor of some significance, at least as far as the PCI is concerned.

3. Briefly Noted

a. WAIC Preparatory Meeting

A brief nondescript "communique" (attached) issued from Budapest revealed that 45 Communist parties had met in Budapest 28-30 September to discuss the possibilities of convoking a World Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC). The WAIC was launched as a goal during the June 1969 World Communist

Conference (WCC), which appointed a 13-party commission to make preparations for the larger conclave. The commission consisted of representatives of the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Mongolian, French, Italian, British, Indian, Syrian, Chilean, Uruguayan, South African, and U.S. parties. Presumably the commission has met one or more times since June 1969, and while the presence of 45 parties at the recently announced Budapest meeting is unexplained, it may be that this meeting was thrown open to any CP's that wished to participate. Compared with the fanfare that accompanied almost two years of preparatory meetings for the WCC, the silence surrounding the current meeting is deafening. Even the participating parties were not identified. The silence can only mean that the usual quarrels took place between the CPSU along with its supporters and those parties which resist the effort of the CPSU to force acceptance of its requirements by such conferences. It is not difficult to surmise that the Soviets want a conference represented by delegates over whom they have complete control and that parties like the Yugoslavs (who are known to have taken part in this Budapest meeting) are resisting and looking for a conference represented by a wider and more independent spectrum of leftists.

b. European CP's Hold their Own Meeting

In another curious "happening," the French and Italian Communist dailies (see attachment) announced that several European parties had met in London on 21 September to discuss problems arising for the development of "multinational societies" (presumably multinational organizations like NATO, EEC, etc.). They are to meet again in London 11-13 January 1971. European CP's met for the first time as a regional grouping of CP's last May, apparently on the joint initiative of the Italian and French CP's to discuss common problems, but ended up with a bland, routine communique condemning the Vietnam conflict. How the Soviets view this kind of meeting is not known. It appears that the Soviets were not represented in either instance.

c. Upcoming French Dissident Communist Congress

A brief article in Le Monde of 16 September (attached) summarizes an article in the French bulletin Synthèse-Flash which claims that French Communist dissidents, including Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon, Jean Pronteau, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, and a dissident group called "Unir-Débat" will assemble in congress in December on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the French Communist Party (PCF). With so many eloquent critics of the PCF, this should prove a very interesting occasion.

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November 1970

SOVIET NEED TO EXPORT OIL

In 1973 the Soviet Union will celebrate 100 years of history as an exporter of oil. At the turn of the century Russia produced about fifty percent of the world's oil. The 1917 revolution and subsequent disruption of the economy set back oil exports until the mid 1920's. For about the next ten years the Soviets were very aggressive as oil exporters; but in the mid 1930's Soviet oil disappeared from the market. The Soviet government had begun stockpiling oil for war; the bulk of Soviet oil came from the Caucasus, an area vulnerable to probable enemy attacks.

Soviet oil exports resumed in 1946 but on a very limited scale. Not until 1951 did oil sales to the West show any increase. By 1955 the position of the USSR as a net exporter of oil was established. Soviet planners had discovered that oil could be an important source of foreign exchange. The Soviet Union is rich in natural resources - notably oil - and with a disequilibrium economy like that existing in the Soviet Union the cost of exporting a ton of oil in terms of domestic uses sacrificed can be administratively rearranged. In other words Soviet economists are well aware that the USSR has abundant resources of oil and they are well aware that the exportation of oil will earn foreign exchange. Foreign exchange, especially hard currency is needed to purchase equipment and technology the USSR does not yet produce. In a disequilibrium situation the government merely substitutes another kind of energy, no matter the actual cost, to replace the energy lost through the export of oil.

The USSR has abundant potential resources of petroleum, both onshore and offshore, that could make it the world's leading producer of petroleum by the end of the 20th century. However, 30% to 40% of these resources are located in permafrost regions. Permafrost is, as the name suggests, a condition whereby the ground or tundra is in a constant frozen state and in Western Siberia it has been encountered at depths up to 500 meters. The Soviet problems with permafrost arise because of the Soviet decision to use turbodrills rather than



rotary drilling methods. The turbodrill is efficient for shallow drilling in hard formations; but in deepwell permafrost situations the high speed of the turbodrill generates too much heat and literally melts the permafrost so that the drilling hole collapses as though some paleolithic creature pulled the hole inside out. Warm flows of gas around the borehole can thaw permafrost up to 6 meters around the well and cause the casing to collapse.

In addition to problems with permafrost the Soviets are also plagued with technological problems which they will have to overcome if they want to get the oil they know they have. The Soviet authorities know generally where the oil is: new reserves are being found in Central Asia, the Volga-Ural and Siberia. The question is where in these areas should they drill. Despite the Soviet success in rocketry, missiles and space vehicles they are deficient in the technology required for mapping and exploration for new wells. Most Soviet geophysical instruments used in mapping subsurface structures are less accurate than comparable Western equipment. For example, the Soviet Union is about 7 to 10 years behind the United States in computerized seismograph technology which permits exploration of deep complex geologic formations. The first computerized seismic field unit was deployed in the northern regions of the USSR in 1969, whereas the application of this technology had contributed impressive benefits to petroleum exploration in the United States by 1963. Limited application of modern geophysical techniques has contributed to the lag in Soviet rates of petroleum discovery compared to the growth in production during the past decade.

This deficiency in the use of computers in the modern Soviet State is absolutely appalling. The Soviet Union with 2500 computers ranks sixth behind France (5,000 units) Britain (5600) West Germany (5750) Japan (5800) and the United States with 70,000 units.

Assuming the Soviet State will eventually conquer their problems in mapping and seismographic technology the Soviets must concurrently modernize their drilling program and techniques. The average depth of Soviet wells has increased from 1,000 meters in 1940 to over 2,500 meters in 1969. But much of their drilling equipment and technology employed is inefficient and obsolete. Most of the turbodrills and rigs now in use were designed for shallow drilling in hard formations, such as those in the Urals-Volga region where wells generally are less than 2,000 meters deep. The extra weight and high rotational speeds of turbodrills facilitated the rapid drilling of shallow wells, but in regions with geological structures requiring deeper drilling, turbodrilling is less satisfactory. In soft formations and at depths below 2,500 meters the conventional turbodrill is very inefficient. Although deeper drilling is becoming increasingly necessary both in the older producing fields and in

the new areas being developed, the turbodrill continues to be used for about 80% of all drilling operations in the USSR. Soviet technicians have suggested modifications to make the turbodrill more effective, but most of its shortcomings persist. To improve deep drilling capability, Soviet experts have advocated the combined use of turbodrilling and rotary drilling -- turbodrilling to depths of 1,500 meters and rotary drilling beyond. The lack of high-quality drill pipe, however, precludes widespread use of rotary drilling. Soviet deep-drilling capability also is limited by the lack of high-powered mud pumps, blowout preventors, and high-quality bits. Soviet data reveal that 8 to 10 months are needed to drill a well to depths of 3,000 to 3,500 meters. In the United States, such wells are usually drilled in about a month. Soviet inability to drill faster, deeper, and more efficiently will limit the amount of oil and gas reserves that can be explored and exploited without disproportionate increases in investment.

The Soviet oil industry operates in a distinctive institutional setting that might be termed an "administratively organized economy." The Soviet economy, as a whole can be thought of as an organization in which the goals and objectives are determined by the leadership. During the 1970's that leadership plans to continue the export of oil if only to get enough hard currency to be able to purchase the technology necessary to overcome the obstacles in producing its own oil. The Soviet Minister of the Petroleum Extraction Industry, Mr. V.D. Shashin said the USSR will continue to maintain the high level of exports to Eastern Europe and to the West, although he expressed some doubt that exports to the West would show much of an increase. Yet domestic Soviet demands will increase, in spite of a disequilibrium economy. Also East European demands for foreign oil are expected to outstrip Soviet production capabilities. Now the Soviet Union is caught up in a vicious circle: It must export oil to gain hard currency so as to get the technical means to expand production so that it can meet its commitment to supply East Europe. The commitment to East Europe cannot be waived without risk of reducing East European dependence on the USSR. If the USSR is to maintain exports of oil to hard currency countries it will have to obtain oil from non communist producers. The largest source of this oil and also the cheapest are the Middle East and North African countries; by 1975 the Soviets will be obtaining 10 million metric tons for shipment to other countries. By 1980 the USSR may have to obtain as much as 80 million tons from this area to maintain its deliveries to foreign clients.

Soviet procurement of oil from the Middle East has one characteristic: the Soviets prefer to do business with

countries over which they have some political influence and they prefer to deal with nationalized oil companies. The entrance of the Soviet bloc as a purchaser of Middle East oil does offer some competition to Western oil companies and may result in negotiating new price agreements. Yet there is one thing to be kept in mind: even if the Soviet bloc exceeds the projected level of purchases from the Middle East and North Africa over the next ten years that area will still be dependent on free world markets for the disposal of more than 90 percent of their oil.

In the long run, if the USSR is able to acquire the necessary modern technology -- especially exploration, drilling and transport equipment the need for Middle East and North African oil may be only temporary. The need could disappear, in the late 1980's if the large oil deposits that the USSR unquestionably possesses are developed.

Analysis of the facts and the logic of economics involved contain a message to the Middle East and North African countries who are tempted to remake their economy and foreign policies to cater to Soviet policies merely for a short term gain in the sale of a small part of their oil resources.

**WORLD: ESTIMATED CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (a)**  
(Thousand Metric Tons)

	Jan.-June 1967	July-Dec. 1967	Jan.-June 1968
<b>North America</b>			
U.S.A. .. .. .	203,076	225,660	221,079
Canada .. .. .	22,554	24,629	26,700
	<u>230,628</u>	<u>250,289</u>	<u>247,779</u>
<b>Caribbean Area</b> .. .. .	98,603	104,658	103,617
<b>Other Latin America</b> .. .. .	23,553	25,543	26,392
<b>Middle East</b>			
Saudi Arabia .. .. .	65,300	64,000	70,020
Iran .. .. .	62,206	67,092	66,680
Kuwait .. .. .	57,543	57,626	56,398
Iraq .. .. .	23,925	36,240	37,300
Abu Dhabi .. .. .	8,917	9,208	12,861
Kuwait/Neutral Zone .. .. .	11,239	11,379	10,970
Qatar .. .. .	7,247	8,232	8,028
Egypt .. .. .	3,288	2,928(b)	5,300(b)
Oman .. .. .	—	2,800	4,780
Bahrain .. .. .	1,629	1,814	1,800
Turkey .. .. .	945	1,375	1,450
Syria .. .. .	—	—	800
Israel .. .. .	68	63	50
	<u>242,307</u>	<u>262,757</u>	<u>275,237</u>
<b>Africa (excluding Egypt)</b>			
Libya .. .. .	35,001	48,814	57,999
Algeria .. .. .	17,990	20,380	20,500
Gabon/Congo (Bras.) .. .. .	1,548	1,916	2,100
Nigeria .. .. .	13,974	1,771	1,700
Tunisia .. .. .	978	1,262	1,500
Angola .. .. .	278	259	250
Morocco .. .. .	51	47	50
	<u>69,820</u>	<u>74,449</u>	<u>84,099</u>
<b>Western Europe</b> .. .. .	8,635	8,937	8,602
<b>Far East</b>			
Indonesia .. .. .	12,220	12,600	13,500
India .. .. .	2,719	2,840	3,000
Brunei/Sarawak .. .. .	2,410	2,540	2,900
Australia .. .. .	308	659	850
Japan .. .. .	394	393	400
Burma .. .. .	282	305	300
Pakistan .. .. .	250	250	250
	<u>18,583</u>	<u>19,587</u>	<u>21,200</u>
<b>FREE WORLD</b>			
Western Hemisphere .. .. .	352,786	380,490	377,788
Eastern Hemisphere .. .. .	339,345	365,730	389,138
	<u>692,131</u>	<u>746,220</u>	<u>766,926</u>
<i>Of which: outside U.S.A.</i> .. .. .	484,055	520,560	545,847
<b>Eastern Europe and China</b>			
U.S.S.R. .. .. .	139,400	148,600	151,000
Rumania .. .. .	6,530	6,077	6,600
Yugoslavia .. .. .	1,154	1,221	1,200
Hungary .. .. .	833	853	750
Albania .. .. .	500	500	600
Bulgaria .. .. .	237	262	300
Poland .. .. .	215	235	240
Czechoslovakia .. .. .	100	100	100
E. Germany .. .. .	30	30	30
China (c) .. .. .	5,000	5,000	5,000
	<u>133,999</u>	<u>163,478</u>	<u>165,820</u>
<b>WORLD TOTAL</b> .. .. .	846,130	909,698	932,746

(a) Excluding small-scale production in Cuba, Thailand, Formosa, Mongolia and New Zealand.

(b) Figures include the estimated output of the Israeli-occupied Sinai fields (500,000 tons in July-December 1967 and 1,000,000 tons in January-June 1968).

(c) China's production (including shale and coal-based oil) is believed to be of the order of 10,000,000 tons/year, but no up-to-date estimates are available.

Petroleum Press Service

# Soviet

## Interest

## in Middle

## East Oil

Lincoln Landis

**Copyright** The Soviet Union's concern with the Middle East is primarily that of a Great Power. As such its interests are not unlike those of other Powers that have dominated the area, especially the British and the Americans. This is not something conspiratorial, nor a peculiarly Russian cloak-and-dagger affair, but something rooted firmly in the strategic position and economic importance of the Middle East and North Africa. The sum of these spells Middle East oil, with its implications for the European economy and Nato security. It is understandable that the Soviet Union should show an uncommon interest at this stage. But what does it mean? The realities are here searchingly examined by LINCOLN LANDIS of the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, who conducted his researches on the spot in the Middle East during this summer, and by D. C. WATT of the London School of Economics, who meticulously weighs all the evidence and implications of this far-reaching Soviet interest on future American and Nato policy in the Mediterranean. [See also pages 58 & 59]

The U.S.S.R.'s new presence in the Middle East has emerged from policies influenced by both geopolitics and oil. If there is conjecture now about Moscow's precise intentions in the Middle East, there can be little doubt in regard to Tsarist objectives in reaching Constantinople and expanding to the south.

After Peter the Great conquered Baku, Catherine tried for a foothold in the Straits and, through a so-called "oriental project" sought to bring Russian rule over the land routes to India through Persia and Afghanistan. Nineteenth century Tsars continued this pressure against Persia, dominated Central Asia and, with the help of Balkan nationalism, attempted to become permanently ensconced on the Mediterranean.

The Bolsheviks inherited this fascination for the Middle East, and Lenin and his successors tried in a variety of ways to project Russia's power into the region. After consolidating its hold upon a strife-torn country, the Bolshevik regime quickly moved to destroy the short-lived sovereignty of the oil-rich Transcaucasus and to occupy Persian Azerbaijan in 1920. However, Moscow was forced to pull back its forces from the territory of its weak Muslim neighbour and to defer its Middle East plans because of growing difficulties at home and problems with European Powers.

The threat of Hitler began increasingly to attract Stalin's attention, but, ironically, an understanding with the Nazi Government was the occasion for Moscow's interest in the Middle East to become revitalized and articulated.

The 1939 Non-Aggression Pact was the second Bolshevik accommodation with a German "enemy" in just over two decades, and again caused serious consternation in Western Europe. Meanwhile, under cover of this treaty, Stalin planned a "Middle East sphere of influence", to be supported by his future allies under a Four-Power Pact with Germany, Italy and Japan.

*Pravda* reflected Nazi-Soviet rapport during the negotiations that produced Moscow's slice of the "post-war pie" that was being carved for the budding Rome-Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo Axis:

During his stay in Berlin from November 12th to 13th . . . Comrade V. M. Molotov had a meeting with Reichschancellor Herr A. Hitler and Foreign Minister Herr von Ribbentrop. The exchange of views was carried out in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and established mutual understanding on all important questions of interest to the U.S.S.R. and Germany.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever feeling of trust may have been present during the secret talks, the U.S.S.R. went on record with plans for hegemony over the Middle East in terms reminiscent of Catherine's "oriental project":

The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations centre south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.<sup>2</sup>

Two weeks later, in presenting a refinement of Kremlin desires, strikingly parallel to some aspects of Soviet present-day probes toward the oil-rich Gulf, Molotov assured Moscow's adherence to the Pact, provided:

the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of aspirations of the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

In addition Molotov's statement gave a hint of Soviet concern for Arab and Iranian petroleum resources claimed by a "future ally", when he specified: "that Japan renounces her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin".<sup>4</sup>

A second irony in Nazi-Soviet relations soon had an impact upon Russian Middle East policy. Deterioration in their mutual affairs in 1941, far from presaging an eclipse in Russian plans under the proposed pact, became the very pretext for a resumption of Soviet machinations on Iranian territory. Two months after Hitler's invasion of Russia, Red Army detachments entered the five northern provinces of Iran, under a one-sided, Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, on grounds that "hostile elements" . . . "might attempt to transform Iran into a base for attacks on the U.S.S.R."<sup>5</sup>

An intensive occupation followed, and the region was "softened up" for later moves: "The Iron Curtain was

thus hung in Iran long before the English speaking democracies learned of its existence".<sup>6</sup> The Red Army set the stage for a diplomatic offensive to gain a foothold in Middle East petroleum production.

Between 1944 and 1946, the U.S.S.R. sought, as it seeks now in the Middle East, to acquire its own oil rights in Iran. Its proposed concession would have cast the Soviet Union in "the imperialist role" of majority stockholder for 25 years, followed by an "equal partnership" for a like period.


Diplomatic pressure from the United Nations, Britain, and the United States, and, not least, courageous resistance by Iranian leaders, induced Stalin to withdraw the Red Army in 1946, on condition that the *Majlis* would ratify the oil proposal in a specified time. Bolstered by Western support, particularly that of the United States in 1947, the delegates, some of whom called the plan "the worst agreement in the past hundred years of Iranian history",<sup>7</sup> voted it down. Russian diplomacy retreated from the Middle East to await new opportunities, as it had been forced to do in 1921.

Soon after the end of the Stalin era, however, the situation was to change radically to Soviet advantage. Russia's influence in the Middle East today is in dramatic contrast with its temporary demise in the late 1940's. Not only does it exceed the fondest hopes of Catherine the Great, but it probably goes even beyond the boldest aspirations of Lenin and Stalin.

A sizeable Soviet fleet is now present in the Mediterranean with every indication that it intends to stay. Soviet naval vessels call freely at Middle East ports in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and a growing U.S.S.R. merchant fleet is also active in these waters.

Moscow's military and commercial aircraft operate regularly in the region, and Soviet military advisers are playing an increasing role in the training of Arab pilots and Arab soldiers in the use of Soviet equipment, especially in Egypt and Syria and to a lesser extent in Iraq and the Yemen.

The Kremlin enjoys strong political leverage in a number of capitals of the Middle East and North Africa, and,



along with several of its East European Communist allies, has established long range economic ties with most of the Middle East oil-producing countries. Lastly, and of particular significance, Russia is acquiring a foothold in the world's richest petroleum region.

In Teheran, the Soviet Union has acquired a new respectability, symbolized partly, by the replacement of the high brick wall round her Embassy with a Western-style, see-through fence. Unlike earlier days, there are increasing visits of officialdom—political, economic, military, and imperial—between Teheran and Moscow, as well as other eastern bloc capitals.

In many Arab countries the Russian presence is equally evident, from the Slavic accent occasionally heard on street corners, to the Soviet equipment and armament being unloaded at airfields and ports. The Russian is no longer a stranger in the Middle East, and the prospect of a growing dependence upon the U.S.S.R., particularly since the 1967 War, appears to be somewhat more palatable, even to some Western-leaning Arabs.

A number of them seem to have felt, at least until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that recent East European resistance to Soviet political and economic hegemony was a kind of proof that Communism "had mel- lowed".

How has this peaceful Russian victory been achieved? The answer lies in the emphasis on Middle East petroleum in Soviet strategy after the death of Stalin. Reminiscent of Moscow's nineteenth century ploy—the pan-Slavic credo—to penetrate the Balkans en route to the Mediterranean, was the new theme of "national liberation" which went along with U.S.S.R. offers of "disinterested assistance" to Middle East states.

The region's petroleum was simultaneously hoisted as an anti-western symbol by exploiting the growing nationalist and revolutionary currents. The new "trade and aid" policies involved petroleum wherever possible, whether with major oil-producers or not, and took the form of arms-delivery arrangements, barter agreements and long-term economic loans.

Moscow's growing preoccupation with Middle East petroleum gives rise to conjecture since the U.S.S.R.'s own oil and natural gas production rank second in the world, and vast new discoveries of petroleum resources have been made in western Siberia and central Asia.

The richest production area is the Volga-Ural region, which yields about 75% of its crude oil. Soviet leaders also speak of outstanding prospects in the Tyumen fields of Western Siberia, which may eventually provide the bulk of Soviet production. From a

total of 286 million tons in 1967, Russia satisfied its own needs and exported some 50 million tons, half to Eastern Europe, and the rest to capitalist nations and developing countries. Moscow is counting on Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Japan, to build long pipelines from Tyumen for repayment in oil deliveries over a long period.

Natural gas too is being rapidly developed, with production in 1967 reaching 160 billion cubic meters. From the richest region, Western Kazakhstan, a pipeline over 1700 miles in length reaches the Moscow-Leningrad area. Russia already exports gas to Eastern Europe, and hopes to persuade Japan and countries of Western Europe, including Italy, to build new lines in return for deferred payment in Soviet gas.

Some Western observers believe that the capacity of Russia's own petroleum industry indicates that the U.S.S.R. has little cause to incorporate Middle East oil and natural gas in its economic planning. Soviet actions in the region, however, strongly suggest such a conclusion is misleading.

Moscow has sent oil technicians to Algeria, Egypt, and Syria; pursues the exploration of oil in Iran and Iraq; and is scheduled to import large amounts of natural gas from Iran. Soviet tankers make regular runs between Egypt and the Aden refinery and, prompted by the Suez closure,

have been in Abu Dhabi crude for delivery to the U.S.S.R.'s own market East of Suez, while Soviet oil goes to BP customers in Britain.

All of this activity would seem to indicate that "the Russians are moving into" the industry. Aside from the **imminent** military advantage to be realized from a presence in the Middle East region, there are both economic and political reasons to explain Moscow's strategy.

Despite reports of new crude oil and natural gas deposits, Soviet economic planners are faced with long-range production problems. As a result, Russia's own East European customers are lining up imports of Middle East crude oil. These arrangements are intended to assure adequate future energy supplies by supplementing deliveries from the U.S.S.R.

Moscow itself seems to be insuring its future needs, since it will soon become an importer of natural gas from Afghanistan and Iran on a permanent basis involving construction of long pipelines. The Kremlin also appears ready to begin importing both Iraqi and Iranian crude oil.

Squaring these commercial developments with the U.S.S.R.'s sizeable petroleum industry becomes more understandable, after a brief examination of several hard, economic facts.

First, there is a growing need for petroleum as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continue their industrialization, and increase production of private automobiles. Speaking of long-range requirements, an authoritative Soviet journal estimates that the world demand for oil and natural gas will continue to rise through the year 2000, and, while oil production of the Middle East should increase six-fold by that time, Soviet Bloc production would do little more than quadruple. The estimate further suggests the inability of the Soviet Bloc to meet its own needs:

... the insufficiency of energy in certain countries and regions of the world will in large measure be provided by other countries and regions. The world energy delivery systems will play an important role in this regard.<sup>8</sup>

A Polish economist, speaking of the shorter-range problem of demand, has estimated that by 1980 the Soviet bloc will need 730 million tons of crude oil for domestic use, which is some 100 million tons greater than planned Soviet production.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, the Soviet economy is still plagued by difficulties which hamper production and distribution, and prevent maximum development of new petroleum resources. It is one thing to boast of plan fulfilment and claim "discovery of oil and gas in Siberia is one of the greatest events of our time",<sup>10</sup> and quite another to assure the full satisfaction of petroleum needs through adequate exploitation.

The U.S.S.R.'s dependence upon foreign assistance to exploit its own resources emphasizes the background of Moscow's present aggressive policies in Eastern Europe. It now becomes clearer that Czechoslovakia must have only grudgingly acquiesced to the 1966 "agreement" to develop Siberian oilfields and construct yet another crude oil pipeline to Czechoslovakia from far in the East.

A third economic factor contributing to Moscow's failure to meet its production challenge consists of serious endemic defects in its totalitarian and centralized industrial system. The rare, frank criticism of a Party economist indicates the wide range of production breakdowns prevailing after fifty years of Bolshevik power in the U.S.S.R.'s "well-established" petroleum-producing region of the Ukraine:

Year after year the plan for the deep prospective drilling in the Ukraine is not being fulfilled. The main reasons for this? High frequency of accidents, prolonged stoppage, inferior quality of material and technical provisions, and shortage of qualified workers and engineering and technical cadres...<sup>11</sup>

Another deficiency of the over-centralized economy arises from the pressures to fulfil production plan quotas. Despite much ballyhoo of Premier Kosygin's intended "rationalization" of industry through Liberman reforms, the system continues to generate wasteful and self-defeating practices. In order to "over-fulfil" its plan and collect capitalist incentive

pay, a major oil refinery at Grozny has been engaged "for years" in re-processing its crude oil as soon as it fills its inadequate storage facilities.<sup>12</sup>

Eventually, Party leaders may come to realize that it is precisely such rigidity which inhibits Soviet production, by stifling initiative and ignoring the regulating influence of the market place on production.

Yet, political objectives remain uppermost, and Middle East petroleum is apparently looked to as a stop-gap solution, far preferable to "experiments" which might place the Party's unchallenged political power in jeopardy.

Soviet strategy insures that any given policy, such as the petroleum plan, will be subordinated to her overall, strategic objectives. Thus it is of prime concern to the United States, Western Europe and the Middle East, that the developing Soviet presence in the region, and, particularly, its growing involvement with the petroleum industry, does not alter the present regional, or perhaps world balance.

The importance of Middle East oil in Soviet political strategy was described with some objectivity by King Hussein of oil-less Jordan, a few months before the serious Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967:

I believe there is a new Soviet policy, and that this policy aims at the control of this area. I think the Soviets are prepared to go very far in this matter—almost to the point of a confrontation with the free world...

What interests the Soviets is, first of all, to be able to get control of the natural resources of this area—the oil—so as to deprive the West of the oil that it needs...

Of late, we have begun to see this policy, and there are plenty of signs of how it is working. It is evident that in recent years the Soviets have been able to achieve a position where they are capable of exercising control over some Arab states...<sup>13</sup>

Events since the monarch's candid remarks, while limiting his freedom to discuss Soviet aims publicly, have tended to affirm, rather than to challenge, his appraisal of Moscow's

intentions in the Middle East.

On the one hand, the U.S.S.R. has been pursuing arrangements for the import of Iraqi and probably Iranian crude oil, while, on the other hand, it has, as a natural, oil-producing competitor of the Middle East, moved deeper into that region's West European markets, even taking advantage of the 1967 Arab boycott toward such an end.

The strategic implications in Hussein's remarks were borne out a few weeks later by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy's Commander-in-Chief, who seemed to be anticipating large-scale Russian naval deployments in Middle East waters, such as were carried out after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War:

With the growth of the economic might of the Soviet Union, its interests on the seas and oceans continue to expand greatly, and consequently new demands are levied upon the Navy for their defence against the conquests of the imperialists.<sup>14</sup>

The commitment of Soviet naval power to the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean areas, in conjunction with the withdrawal of a British presence East of Suez, suggests Russian ambitions to become the dominant super-power in that area of the world.

Furthermore, the unpredictability of Soviet behaviour on the international scene, as demonstrated by the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia, creates an additional element of conjecture as to future Kremlin decisions regarding its role in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it can be observed

that peaceful means have at long last contributed more significantly to the extension of Moscow's influence into Muslim petroleum than military occupation and diplomatic pressure could

ever manage to do. Likewise, the Soviet Union's skilful manipulation of the petroleum symbol as a means of discrediting the intentions of western powers among the oil-producing states, has gone far to prepare the way for acceptance of "innocuous" Russian aid.

In turn, Moscow policy-makers have wisely reinforced their offers of eco-

nomical and arms assistance agreements for the Middle East with a distinct programme to exploit regional sympathies by support of the national oil companies of Iran and Arab states, accompanied by concrete proposals to further their independent development.

This "petroleum offensive" forms a striking parallel with Soviet naval activities and Gorshkov's strategic formulations do point toward a probable Russian objective of acquiring such a position of influence in the Middle East as to be able to threaten the orderly flow of oil to Western Europe and the United States.

Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for both economic and political reasons, the U.S.S.R. remains vigilant to turn Middle East petroleum to its own purposes.

<sup>1</sup> "Kommyunike o peregovorakh predsedatel'ya sovnrarkoma S.S.S.R. i narodnovo komissara ipostranykh del t. V. M. Molotov s rukovoditel'yami germanskovo pravitel'stva," (Communiqué on negotiations between Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade V. M. Molotov and leaders of the German Government) *Pravda* (Moscow), November 15, 1940, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41," *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (U.S. Department of State Publication 3023, 1948), p. 257, as quoted in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 193.

<sup>3</sup> "Statement by Molotov to the German Ambassador on the Proposed Four-Power Pact, 25 November 1940," *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1939-1941. Dokumente des auswaertigen Amtes. (Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941. Documents of the Foreign Office)* (Tuebingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1949), p. 296, as quoted in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy III* (1933-1941) Issued under auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 477-78.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> E. Carman, *Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive toward World Domination* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950), p. 122.

<sup>6</sup> George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 195.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

<sup>8</sup> L. Tomashpol'skiy, "Mirovoi energeticheskiy balans: problemy poslednei treti veka" (World Energy Balance: Problems of the Last Third of the Century) *Microvaya Ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya* (World Economics and International Relations) (Moscow), February, 1967, pp. 28-29.

<sup>9</sup> Stanislaw Albinowski, writing in *Polietyka* (Warsaw) as quoted in "Red Oil: Eastern Europe fuel problem turns attention to Siberia," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 13, 1967, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> *Izvestiya* (Moscow), as quoted in "Soviets Bank on 'Third Baku'," *Oil and Gas Journal*, April 11, 1966, p. 64.

<sup>11</sup> T. Honta, "Some Problems in the Development of the Oil and Gas industry in Ukraine," *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kiev), January, 1967, pp. 9-11, trans. Digest of Soviet Ukrainian Press, PROLOG, April, 1967, pp. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup> *Izvestiya* (Moscow), as quoted in H. Kamm, "Soviet Refinery 'fulfills' its Plan: Grozny Processed Same oil Over and Over to Meet Goal," *New York Times* November 18, 1967, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> "What the Russians Are up to in the Middle East; Interview with King Hussein of Jordan," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 26, 1966, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> S. G. Gorshkov, "Razvitiye sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva" (Development of Soviet Naval Art of War) *Morskoi sbornik* (Naval Journal) (Moscow) No. 2, 1967, p. 21.



# RUSSIANS NEED MIDDLE EAST OIL

D. C. Watt

Since the main Soviet entry into the international politics of the Middle East in 1955 with the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the most widely accepted interpretation of Soviet policy was that it was designed to deny control of the Middle East to the main Atlantic powers, Britain and the United States.

The Middle East was an area where British interests and power was paramount, and where it was being challenged by local bourgeois nationalism. Knowing that the area was of vital importance to Britain because of its oil and general strategic significance, it was hardly surprising that the Soviet leadership decided to give aid and assistance to those local forces which already saw Britain as their principal enemy.

The primitive reaction of some British commentators to this Soviet challenge, particularly on the right wing of the Conservative party, was to see the Soviet intervention as an attempt to take over the Middle East oil fields and convert them to their own use and profit. Such reactions always met the sophisticated counter-argument of the oil experts. They pointed out the Soviet bloc had enough oil for its own needs and that the natural outflow ports for the principal Middle Eastern oil fields, even in countries which like Iran shared frontiers with the Soviet Union, lay southwards to the Gulf and the open sea where bulk tankers could transport it cheaply, rather than northwards across the mountain ranges to a fairly inaccessible Soviet frontier, to the industrial oil-consuming areas of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet aim then had to be seen principally as one of denial rather than substitution; and as

the Soviet Union entered the world oil markets as an oil-exporting power, on some scale, and its oil actually competed on the European markets with the large international oil companies, the argument seemed to take on even more strength and plausibility.

In the last few years however, the basic assumptions on which this interpretation rests have been seen to change. By 1967 the Soviet Union had won itself a substantial position on the world market, supplying not only the major part of the oil needs of Eastern Europe (some 28 million tons of crude oil in 1967), but also selling another 25 million tons of crude and some 23 million tons of oil products to Western Europe, Italy, West Germany, Finland, Sweden, plus very considerable amounts to Cuba and Japan. She had become a substantial charterer of tanker tonnage and was building up her own tanker fleet at a surprising rate.

At the same time there were signs that the Soviet Union's position as a major exporter of oil was threatened; by 1975 or so, it is said, despite the new discoveries in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union could well become a net importer of oil, and her East European satellites could no longer depend on her for their supplies of crude and refined products.

The questions then arise—how will the Soviets react to this situation? Have they already started reviewing their policy in the Middle East to take account of this? What will be the reactions of the oil producing states of the Middle East to any new Soviet policy?

There are no easy answers to these questions—possibly because the Soviet authorities have not yet got around

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194A000400020001-0 Soviet foreign policy is not normally distinguished by its attention to middle-range forecasting and planning.] And the task of answering them is made more difficult by the indignant Soviet denials that their oil production is likely to fall behind their domestic needs and those of their present foreign contracts. The tendency in the Soviet press is simply to denounce such speculation as a propaganda move by the Western "international oil consortium" to discourage would-be purchasers of Soviet oil from entering into long term contracts with Soviet oil exporters. Their new oil fields will, they insist, be perfectly capable of expansion to cover the needs of their present policy.

If one sets this aside, however, one is left with a set of political as well as economic possibilities which have serious implications. One may begin by discarding the simple assumption that the Soviets will be content to see their export trade decline, and will devote themselves mainly to entering into long-term contracts with Middle Eastern oil suppliers, either with the big internationals or the local state-owned national oil companies.

Such an assumption leads all too easily to the placid conclusion that any development along these lines would come to lead the Soviet Union to share the West's basic interest in Middle Eastern stability, and that "time is therefore on our side".

More urgent objections are that this assumption ignores three vital factors; first is the existence of a Soviet distribution network which the Soviets would be far from happy or willing to disband; second, is the political importance, only recently demonstrated over Czechoslovakia, that the Soviet Union sets on maintaining its position as the principal source of supply for the basic raw materials to the countries of the Soviet bloc, as an instrument of political control; the third is the Soviet Union's insistence on behaving as it believes a world power should.

It is suggested that a good deal of current Soviet policy in the Middle East can be explained as stemming from this preoccupation with her role as one of the two super powers.

If the Soviet Union were merely to look to the Middle East to supply its own needs in the late 1970's,

might, over the next decade, be expected to enter the Middle Eastern market on some considerable scale. This is especially so in Iraq, whose pipelines run through Syria and are therefore always vulnerable to the political whims of a country already heavily dependent economically on the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet propaganda already points that way. The agreement of December 1967 with Iraq was hailed as providing a great contrast between the commercialism of the oil independents and the aid provided by the Soviet Union. It would enable Iraq, as a writer in Moscow's *New Times* put it recently, "to produce oil independently. The assistance of a friendly socialist country has for the first time in her history afforded Iraq the chance to exploit her own oil reserves . . . it has opened a new market to Baghdad thereby breaking Iraq Petroleum's monopoly hold." The argument that the Soviet Union can provide alternative outlets for Middle Eastern oil can rarely have been put so clearly.

If one is to expect the Soviet Union to loom increasingly large as a purchaser for Middle Eastern oil in return for aid, this will clearly reduce the Soviet's areas of operation to countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Iran, countries which despite their capacity to earn substantial foreign exchange, have serious aid and development problems.

States such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and so on, then one would expect a number of fairly small scale agreements with national oil companies, developing perhaps out of the existing Soviet agreements with Syria, Egypt and Iraq, by which the Soviets might be paid for their development aid in local crude. Such arrangements would fit in with the general low level of Soviet capacity to pay for any large scale deliveries of Middle Eastern oil save by barter agreements. And it is this economic factor which is in favour of the strongest argument in favour of the simple assumption.

If however, for the reasons outlined above, the Soviet Union should seek to continue to maintain her present position as chief supplier to the

countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and continue her invasion of West European and Japanese oil markets, the situation could very well change drastically.

At present growth rates, the 25 million tons Eastern Europe took from the Soviets in 1966 is expected to reach 80 million tons by 1975 and 130 million tons by 1980. The Soviet Union's own demand has been rising by 10% per annum faster than Soviet production these last few years. These are very considerable amounts even with the glut of Middle Eastern oil on the market today, and a lot more than the small surplus hawked around the world markets at substantial discounts by the Arab national oil companies.

It would seem that the Soviet Union and its East European partners obviously see little the Soviets can offer to counter the immense sums *per capita* of population they can earn and dispose of on the open market from oil royalties, taxation and the like. One need not necessarily expect any Soviet encouragement therefore to such countries to nationalize western oil enterprises in the hope of taking over the exploitation or distribution of their products. What one has at the moment is a positive inducement to the Soviet Union to extend its influence in Iraq in the same way as it has in Syria, to form a new Fertile Crescent Scheme under Soviet leadership.

This leaves open, however, the question of the reaction of Middle East states to a new Soviet "oil for aid" policy on a scale sufficient to enable her to maintain her monopoly position in eastern Europe. From the point of view of the West one can discern two dangers perhaps. The first is that there is nothing in the new Soviet policy here postulated which would alter the old Soviet interest in denying control or exploitation of the Middle East to the West, and continuing her dog in the manger attitude towards the principal western interests in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia.

The new Soviet interest in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean argues for a Soviet intervention sooner or later in the affairs of South Arabia as

she has already intervened in the Yemen; and some South Arabian revolutionary voices have in fact already been raised against Oman and the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast.

The other is a rather different point. Since the fiasco of Iranian oil nationalization in 1951-54, the main factor restraining similar action has been the monopoly western oil companies have maintained over the distribution and marketing of oil. Increasing Soviet activity in the purchase and distribution of Middle Eastern crude oil could well provide the chimera of an alternative system of distribution and marketing so as to encourage a government to nationalize where otherwise they might hesitate.

Fortunately, apart from Iraq and possibly Bahrein, the sole state in the Gulf to look politically open for revolution, it is difficult to see any of the other Arab oil-owning governments proceeding to so drastic a step.

If one should however be tempted to consider this step in the course of some dispute over the division of royalties or the like, the existence of the Soviet oil network could tip the balance towards nationalization.

To sum up, there is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are and will be showing increasing interest in the conclusion of long term contracts for the purchase of Middle Eastern crude oil over the next decade to maintain their monopoly position in the supply of oil to the Soviet bloc states. Financial exigency will knit these contracts to those countries with substantial needs in the aid and development field. These countries are Syria, Egypt,

Iraq and Iran, countries with which the Soviet Union is already entering into agreements of one kind or another (in the case of Iran it is for its natural gas).

These new agreements cannot however be expected to increase Soviet interest in the overall stability of the Middle East; rather the reverse. They will of course greatly enhance the Soviet's interest in the stability of the particular governments with which they have concluded agreements. This is of particular significance in relation to the government of

IRAQ IN VIEW OF THE PECULIARLY VIOLENT  
CYCLE OF COUP AND COUNTER-COUP OF  
PAST IRAQI POLITICS.

One might even look to a Soviet sponsored Fertile Crescent Scheme as an obvious development from the present Soviet stronghold on Syria. So far as the rest of the Middle East is concerned, the Soviets may be expected to maintain their present policy of encouraging local nationalism wherever this might lead to conflicts between that nationalism and the West, the Yemen, South Arabia and possibly Bahrein being centres of such nationalism. The increasing Soviet naval activity at the Gulf and Indian Ocean must be seen in this connection too.

The main Soviet motives will be a combination of commercial incentives and pride. The possibility of a marked decline in the surplus of Soviet oil available for export will drive Soviet oil-exporting agencies to seek Middle Eastern sources of crude oil just as once American oil companies were driven by their anxieties to enter the Middle East.

The alternative—to abandon the present scale of Soviet oil marketing outside the Soviet Union—will be dismissed, partly for reasons of the need to control the Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and Cuba, partly because of the Soviet Union's continuing distrust and antipathy towards the big independents, and partly because as a great power the Soviet Union is determined to maintain its position and activities in the Middle East.

Here as elsewhere ideology, national pride and commercial considerations reinforce one another to confront the West with a continuing and increasing problem.

DAILY TELEGRAPH  
London, 7 August 1970

BEHIND THE MIDDLE EAST MANOEUVRES

# Oil key to Soviet policy

**I**T SAYS a great deal for the power of Soviet propaganda and the skill of Soviet diplomacy that there is a quite substantial body of opinion in the West which believes that the Soviet leaders are interested in bringing about peace in the Middle East.

The impression has got around in some quarters, in Europe and America alike, that the Russians are almost reluctant about their intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, that they have been drawn into them against their will, and they exert a "moderating influence" over their Arab allies.

In truth the Soviet leaders from Stalin onwards have never made a secret of their Middle Eastern aspirations. Thirty years ago, when Stalin and Hitler were discussing how they would carve up the world after their victory in World War II, the Soviet Government insisted on a secret clause which read:

"The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations centre south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." That was frank enough.

In fact, Russian aspirations in the direction of the warm-water ports of the Eastern Mediterranean pre-date the Soviet régime. The Soviet leaders today are in fact pursuing Russia's imperial policies.

But today they have a much more pressing reason for moving into the Middle East and dominating the area. That reason is that the Soviet Union is today suffering from a shortage of oil. There is every reason to suppose that the shortage will become more acute and endanger the continued expansion of Soviet industrial potential.

It seems at first scarcely credible that the Soviet Union, which increased its total production of crude oil from just under 150 million tons in 1960 to nearly 330 million tons last year, and which finds it possible to export around 50 million tons every year outside the Soviet bloc, i.e., to the West, can be experiencing a shortage of

**By DAVID FLOYD**

oil. Nevertheless estimates based on Soviet statistics alone suggest that even today the Soviet economy needs 100 million tons more than it has available, and this figure will grow year by year.

The explanation is very simple: the rate of growth of Soviet oil production is falling off, while the growth-rate of consumption is rising. Last year for the first time total Soviet consumption of oil increased by substantially more than production.

Gloomy as this picture undoubtedly is for the Soviet planners, the reality is still gloomier. The Soviet Union is still, industrially, a developing country, with a greater need to increase its consumption of oil than, say, the

United States, which can today afford to increase yearly consumption by only about 5 per cent. But consumption in Western Europe still rises at more than 10 per cent. a year, and the rate of Soviet increase should be even greater. In a strictly controlled economy actual consumption is seldom the same as actual requirements. Consumption can be restricted or suppressed artificially in ways that are not possible in a free economy, partly at the expense of economic progress. If the Soviet economy is to be modernised—as it must be if it is to keep up in the economic and military race with America—it must make greater use of oil.

The clearest evidence of the "suppressed consumption" of oil in the Soviet Union is provided by the way production plans have been repeatedly revised downwards. The original plan for 1970, drawn up in 1961, provided for an output of 390 million tons. This was scaled down in the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan to 350 million tons. Similarly the planned figure for 1980 was reduced from 700 to 600 million tons. And even the higher figures were only a compromise between the planners' estimate of what the economy would need in 1970 and 1980 and

the estimated possibility of production. They were forced later to conclude that the oil industry was incapable of fulfilling even the lower target.

The older oil-producing regions of the Soviet Union, in the Caucasus and Volga-Urals region, are being exhausted and no longer produce crude oil of good quality. Other known deposits in West Siberia, and Kazakhstan are being developed, and are expected to account for three-quarters of the increased output by 1975. But because of their climatic and geographic conditions these new areas involve enormous capital expenditure.

## The only hope

Two other paths would appear to be open to the Soviet planners in their search for oil: they could cut down their exports and they could increase their imports. In practice neither path is practicable.

That the Soviet Union is short of oil for export is apparent from the way the export figures have flattened out in recent years. The threat of "Red oil" on the world market is no longer regarded seriously. Even the governments of Eastern Europe are now finding it difficult to persuade Moscow to increase oil deliveries to them, and are even being encouraged by the Russians to look elsewhere for their supplies. But the Soviet leaders can scarcely stop their exports to Eastern Europe altogether.

Nor can they withdraw entirely from Western markets where the sale of oil brings them the hard currency which they urgently need for purchasing the machinery on which the modernisation of their economy depends.

What about imports? Until 1967 the Soviet Union imported no crude oil at all, and it was only in 1969 that it concluded a trade agreement with Algeria for the supply of 500,000 tons a year until 1975. Iraq is also to supply crude oil to Russia in exchange for aid

in the development of Iraqi oil fields. But neither of these sources appreciably improve the Soviet situation. The only countries which could supply the quantities Soviet industry needs are still outside the Soviet sphere.

The Russians appear to have an objection in principle to importing large quantities from any country which they do not control politically. They stopped importing oil from Austria as soon as they withdrew their occupation forces and accepted Austria's neutrality. They are unlikely therefore to become major purchasers on the world market, even if they could afford to do so.

Why should they, when a much more promising solution offers itself? From the Soviet point of view acquisition of control of the rich oil-producing regions of the Middle East is the *only* hope they have of satisfying Soviet industry's thirst for oil in the foreseeable future. And it does not appear to be out of their reach.

What it requires immediately is a continuing state of unrest throughout the Middle East, which will make the Arab States increasingly dependent on the supplies of armaments which the Soviet Union can easily afford and the military and economic advisers which they are only too delighted to despatch. They do not want, of course, a major war or "confrontation" with America, which accounts for their appearing occasionally to be restraining the Arab leaders.

But, whatever tactical moves they may make, no one should doubt the Soviet leaders' long-term aims: ever-increasing control of the Arab "socialist" States, with the introduction where possible of "progressive" men into government, and the overthrow of the Arab rulers who have not yet seen the light.

But the aim is not purely economic, even if the economic needs are the most pressing at the moment. One of the most important developments in the Soviet Union in recent years is the implied acceptance by the present leaders that they have no hope of winning the "peaceful competition" of which Khrushchev used to speak. The Soviet economic system

is not capable of expanding faster than the free economies of the West; it is in fact lagging behind in most important fields.

The idea of grabbing the oil in the Middle East must have even greater attraction to the men of the Kremlin today than the idea of installing missiles in Cuba had to Mr Khrushchev. It would solve a lot of economic problems at one blow; it would be a major loss for the Western powers; it would satisfy the Soviet military and the more hawkish of the party leaders; and it could at least be recorded as a major success by a government which can see little prospect of success in any other direction.

The temptation must be great indeed. So great as to make any thought of a "lasting peace" in the Middle East reached with Soviet acquiescence only laughable. Moscow has nothing at all to gain from peace. Equally illusory is the belief that the Soviet leaders are interested in maintaining the State of Israel. It may be true that Israel was once useful to the Russians as a means of establishing themselves in the Middle East. But it is now an obstacle to the establishment of the Soviet "new order" in the Middle East—an obstacle which must be removed.

THE ECONOMIST  
10 October 1970

Mr Watson goes  
to Moscow

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The visit to Russia by Mr Thomas Watson, Jr, chairman of International Business Machines, did not, as expected, result in concrete action, but some hard political and industrial realities lie behind it. The most important is the Russians' backwardness with the machines that, according to legend, are transforming organisational life in the west. The Russians are not only six or seven years behind the west in computer technology, they lack the ability to manufacture the big computers called for by their centralised economy, not to mention their space and military programmes. Their largest machines would be considered medium-large computers outside Russia and so far the Russians are only producing a dozen or so a year. All in all, there are perhaps only 2,500 computers in Russia today and there appears to be no way, without outside help, that the Russian economy will be able to acquire the minimum of 13,000 computers it is said to need by 1975. Soldering irons have been seen by



Still not much to look at


visitors hanging beside the computers in some of the country's major laboratories, ready heated for repairing the apparently inevitable breakdowns.

Mr Watson could of course supply

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the help but he is forbidden to do so by the embargoes laid down by the Nato countries, which cover every sizeable computer industry in the world except Japan's. But the Japanese sit on Nato's Cocom (co-ordinating committee) as observers and adhere strictly to Cocom rules. So nothing much can happen now, despite persistent rumours in the computer industry that IBM some day will build a computer factory for the Russians. It may well be convenient for Mr Watson that the Russians believe he wants to do something of the sort. So long as they do, they are likely to encourage IBM's efforts to sell the smaller, unembargoed end of its 360 range in east Europe. IBM reportedly has 400 employees based in Vienna engaged in this operation, who so far have sold between 35 and 40 computers, although Britain's International Computers has sold even more. ICL also sells in Russia itself, a move IBM has not yet taken, presumably because of fears of right-wing reaction in America.

Correction : in last week's issue we said that the Lebanon was one of those helping to compensate Egypt for the Suez canal closure. This should have been Libya, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.



For the first time ever, a Russian oil minister has toured oil fields and equipment plants in the U.S. V. D. Shashin (left), accompanied by eight other representing Soviet oilmen, admittedly was here to shop for equipment and to see what makes the American oil industry tick. They visited fields and facilities in the Southwest, Gulf Coast, West Coast, and Alaska. And Shashin ended the tour with a secluded interview in Greenwich, Conn., with the Journal's international specialists Frank J. Gardner, international editor, and Larry Aldridge. Here's the result.

## Soviet oil minister sees 10 million b/d flow by 1975

IF you want to activate an otherwise-calm Russian oil executive, ask him if it's true that the Soviet Union will become a net importer of crude oil.

That question certainly energized V. D. Shashin, minister of the petroleum industry of the Soviet Union. Shashin was asked by the Journal in Greenwich, Conn., last week to comment on several published reports predicting that the U.S.S.R. will become a net crude-importer by 1980. He did. "Utterly absurd—fantastic! That," he said, "is a big mistake, and you are very wrong. We'll be selling, not buying."

The U.S.S.R., Shashin declares, has Siberian oil coming out its ears—or at least will have. "In the last 10 years," he says, "our crude production has increased by 150 million tons (about 3 million b/d)—a faster increase than any other country.

"In the next 5 years, our production

will increase by 30 million tons (600,000 b/d) per year. In the beginning it will be less. But it will soon start in a straight line right up to 500 million tons/year (10 million b/d). Of the increase, 75-80% will come from Siberia." That would be in excess of current U.S. production.

Not high cost. The Russian oil minister refutes just as strongly contentions by some that Siberian crude (though admittedly plentiful) is so costly to get to market that the Soviets will import cheaper Mideast oil in large volume instead. That is the base premise behind the net-importer-by-1980 argument.

"We are solving our transportation problems, building pipelines—even one to the Pacific coast. There really isn't much difference in the cost (of Siberian as against imported Mideast crude)."

Shashin, however, failed to clarify how recent Soviet oil-aid deals in the Middle East and North Africa—some of

them involving the Russians taking crude oil in payment—fit into this picture.

He admits that the U.S.S.R. "most likely will be paid in oil. But there could be some money, too."

Shashin doesn't dispute, however, that Russia will become a net gas importer—for a time. That will happen when Iranian gas begins to flow into the U.S.S.R. this fall.

And it will hold this status until the Soviets begin gas exports to West Europe in 1975. Russia now exports about 105 billion cu ft/year and imports about the same from Afghanistan.

Refining lack denied. Shashin does vociferously dispute western reports that the Russian industry is plagued with a severe shortage of refining capacity.

"We have much more capacity than we need," he declared. "That's why we are able to increase our production at such a rapid rate."

Exports steady. The oil minister expects exports of crude and products to the free world to hold at about present levels for the foreseeable future. He looks for no big increase. "Our own consumption is rising rapidly, you know, and only a small proportion of our oil will be available to the western and Asian countries."

Is the Russian industry feeling the worldwide pinch for tanker tonnage? Shashin says not—that most Russian oil exports (meaning those to Comecon countries) move by pipeline. Nearly all exports to the West and all those to Asia and Africa, however, must go by tanker (the Russian fleet now

boasts about 180 ships). Shashin declined to go into this area, however, on grounds that marine transport does not come under jurisdiction of his ministry. The oil ministry controls all drilling and production. Refining, transport, and natural gas have their own ministries.

No hurry offshore. The Russians apparently are in no hurry to develop potential offshore reserves.

Asked about exploration of the Arctic seas, the Baltic, the Sea of Okhotsk, the minister says there's been "some" geophysical work in all these areas—but no drilling. For the moment, most drilling activity will continue in the Caspian.

But there is to be some drilling in

the Black Sea? When asked that question, Shashin broke into a broad grin. "You surprise me," he said. "How did you know about that? Yes, we will begin drilling there in the first half of 1971. We expect to find gas—but maybe oil."

Again the lack of any offshore push is believed largely due to Siberian finds and prospects.

"If we had discovered the Siberian fields before World War II," he said, "we wouldn't have had the knowledge nor the equipment to develop them. Now, however, we have everything we need to cope with development of the remote Siberian areas and to keep the chemical and petrochemical industries booming right along with it."

Decentralizing. Shashin recently authored a long article in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Economic Gazette) about his plans to streamline the administration and management of the Soviet oil industry.

Queried on the status, he said: "It's going very well. We are delegating more authority to men in the field. The foreman in Siberia can make his own decisions and even his own purchases. We are definitely decentralizing our industry."

Currently, the oil ministry has 700,000 employees, Shashin says, including 1,000 administrative personnel in Moscow. It has a budget of \$2.75 billion/year. Of this, \$1.1 billion goes for drilling, \$1.1 billion for construction, and \$550 million for domestic purchase of new equipment. Any purchase of foreign equipment is on top of these budgeted items.

The ministry figures its income last year at \$4.4 billion.

The Soviet Union, Shashin says, now has 18,000 miles of oil pipelines, 60,000 producing wells, and drills 39 million ft/year of hole.

Of this footage, 40% goes into exploratory drilling and 60% into development wells. There are, the minister claims, 1,800 rigs at work in Russia today. He pegs the Soviet reserves/production ratio for crude oil at about 25/1—and for gas at about 60/1.

Equipment eyed. To accomplish the tremendous drilling, production, transportation, and refining job confronting them, Shashin says, the Russians will need a vast amount of machinery and

equipment.

And that's one prime reason—when coupled with the January U.S. Government relaxation of its export controls act—why the minister and his entourage came here. He says he likes what he saw.

"We have already bought blowout preventors, gas-lift equipment, valves, christmas trees, and pipe benders in the U.S." Shashin said. "We don't need every type of equipment — we have our own — so we can be very selective. We're going to buy modern techniques—whatever interests us."

Earlier, one of the Russian technicians remarked that the Soviets would rather trade with U.S. suppliers "because they have better technology than anyone else."

Pressed for details on what types of equipment the delegation seeks, Shashin hedged. "I can't tell you exactly—only in rough categories. Drilling equipment, yet. And production equipment, geophysical equipment—modern, A-1, very specific equipment."

Shashin termed his U.S. trip "a great success. We can't tell the exact business results today. But if I'm not mistaken, the desire to cooperate has been evident on both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sides. All the companies seem interested in selling to us."

The Soviet Committee on Science and Technology, the minister said, must approve all budget requests for purchases. Then the Petroleum Ministry may place an order with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which negotiates the deal.

"I am," he said, both "impressed and pleased." And the delegation hopes, "despite certain problems that we can't spell out, that shortly business will develop into something great."

Will there be a credit problem in purchasing U.S. equipment? "Could be," Shashin said. What about barter? "That's the same question the companies (American equipment firms) asked!"

Tour members. Shashin, who is also chairman of the Eighth World Petroleum Congress in Moscow next June, was accompanied by eight of the biggest names in Russian oil.

These included: A. A. Asan-Nouri,



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director of Ace Union Scientific and Experimental Institute of Drilling Technique (VNIIBT) and secretary general of the WPC; V. I. Muravlenko, of Tyumen Petroleum Exploration; V. B. Nazarov, manager of "Grozneft;" and N. I. Strijov, deputy manager of the Oil and Gas Industries Department of Gosplan (the bill-paying arm of the ministry).

Also Y. M. Markov, chief scientist of VNIIBT; V. I. Pavlov, deputy manager of the Main Petroleum Machine Department of the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machinery; V. V. Rudoiskatel, chief construction engineer of drilling installation at the Ural machines factory; and V. N. Kolomatzky, chief mechanical engineer of "Glav-Tyumenneftgas."

The Russian delegation arrived in New York on July 29 and spent the next 17 days touring oil fields and equipment manufacturers in the Dallas and Houston area, southern Louisiana, the Los Angeles area, and Alaska.

A scheduled visit to the North Slope, by special assent of the U.S. State Department, proved a frustration when fog enveloped the slope, and the party's plane was grounded in Fairbanks.

Host for the group's private visit was New York-based Satra Corp.

James H. Giffen, president of Satra, says that in return for their U.S. visit, the Russian group will host a group of U.S. business men on a tour of Western Siberia next year. Presumably, it will consist largely of equipment manufacturers.

Excerpts from Teodoro Petkoff, Socialismo para Venezuela?, Editorial

Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970, 139 pp.

Prologue

CPYRGHT...This [Communist] world crisis is the crisis of Stalinism whose rigid ideological, political, organizational and even moral standards are today being thrown into the arena of opposing currents which have become ever stronger, clearer, and more important, born within Communist Parties themselves which have succeeded in appreciating that Stalinism --- after a certain point --- is not only an obstacle in the way of development in any society or societies where the Communist Party holds the reins of power but is even the equal of Trotskyism --- which in its time had tried to be the negation of Stalinism --- and which no longer provides the answers required by a revolutionary force struggling for power.

"It is not a matter of negating Stalinism as a whole nor of not recognizing that it was a historical necessity, but rather of accepting that its outdated patterns --- whose brand during the course of the Third International was borne by all Communist Parties in the world --- are today to all intents and purposes unusable. Communist Parties forged in the mold of Stalinism and which cannot break out of it have virtually blocked their road to power for reasons that are absolutely of their own making, congenital, and which prevent the overcoming of external obstacles. It is not a mere accident that, after Lenin's Bolshevik Party, only the Communist Parties of China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia have been able to achieve power through their own efforts. These are three parties which, through methods involving an attitude that 'one respects but one does not carry out,' made a dead letter of directives issued by the Third International and by Stalin himself and were therefore able to transform themselves into national forces, able to interpret and become an expression of the most deeply felt sentiments among their respective peoples and to bring them to victory.

"If our generation of Venezuelan Communists hopes to be something more than a mere group of propagandists and mere forerunners of socialism, rather than the builders of a new society, they must face up to --- and win --- the challenge represented by breaking with the Stalinist mold of Party and policy....

"What we say in these pages may seem to be tantamount to an attack --- and even a bitter attack --- against a substantial segment of our past as a Marxist revolutionary party and therefore we have taken all possible care as to how to say these things, as our objective is not to hurt feelings but to promote a fruitful discussion. It is only at the cost of

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 painful review, however, that we can recover our sense of self criticism, getting away from mere 'descriptions' of past errors with that tedious and repetitious reference to their 'petit bourgeois origin' and to make it into an instrument which, by probing as deeply as possible, gets us to discover the nature of the roots of reformism, of collaboration between classes, of rightist and leftist deviations, in order to eliminate them and to make it possible to expand the Party's revolutionary potential. Of course, any review of this kind tends to be painful because it involves questioning a lot of our own individual greater or lesser contribution to those [political] struggles which we always undertake, guided by the most noble of feelings. But there are crossroads in the life of any revolutionary movement where only a deep and violent doubt about what has been done can make it possible successfully to avoid the traps of the real dilemma of life: reformism or revolution; to be or not to be....

"...only 5 months after two spaceships docked together in space, creating the first orbital space station, the Soviet Union and four other countries of the Warsaw Pact took the decision to intervene with military force in another small socialist country, under the pretext of preventing a counterrevolution. At the same time, four members of the socialist community --- China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania --- each for different style, condemned this move. From the Socialist 'little entente,' Vietnam issued a very circumspect and laconic communique in support. Korea did likewise and, in Cuba, Fidel --- after a vigorous attack on Soviet foreign policy and on European socialist models --- also gave his support to the invasion. For their part, almost all European Communist Parties, including the three leading ones --- the Italian, French and Spanish parties, together the Japanese Communist Party, --- unequivocally condemned the intervention.

"The conflicts which broke out in the Socialist world and within the Communist movement reached their climax at that time and the evidence it brought out was conclusive: socialism is facing a grave and profound crisis....

"That phrase of Terence --- which the universal and alert mind of Marx was so keen on quoting --- 'nihil humanum alienam puto est' --- nothing human is alien to me --- must be one of the mottoes of any revolutionary, today, not because revolutionaries should not at all times have been like this but because, in practice, they have not been...because the aberration and police state bureaucratic deviationism which Stalinism represents succeeded in causing a kind of fossilization in the minds of millions of Communists, of the best men in this humanity of ours, of men who without question in their time were the salt of the earth, the hope for the world, forcing them under a monstrous yoke which held that 'everything that is not of my party is alien to me....'

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"On the road toward setting up this organization, we face problems we could categorize under the following headings: reformism or revolution? renovation and modernization or maintenance of the organizational status quo? an independent and national party or an alien and vassal party?....

"Today we are at a crucial point, at a crossroads in the history of the PCV. It is the outcome of two consecutive defeats: one growing out of the period of armed struggle, the other resulting from the elections. Now, we are opening up a new historical stage, calling for major political and social changes, a stage within whose framework we must find our means to development.

"Is our party to become one which gradually gives up its great revolutionary traditions of the last 10 years, to become assimilated into the system by transforming itself into a reformist force or, on the other hand, should it break radically away from this kind of prospect, establishing its policy as involving confrontation with the system, of continuous opposition, of preparation for a new revolutionary onslaught at some undetermined but inevitable date?

"Would the party, as it is now constituted, in its rusty condition, with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification, of corruption at some levels, of softening up, of ideological impoverishment, with leadership organs which to a large extent do not reflect the reality of our militancy and the degree of its development, would such a party be in a condition to take an effective part in the revolutionary process?

"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent criticism on the international plane, in a position to develop and advance a genuinely revolutionary policy?"

"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the final analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party of the revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the system...."

#### Dependent Capitalism and Political Power

"...The objection is frequently heard that a socialist or anti-capitalist pronouncement arouses too much resistance among alleged allies, it 'frightens' some sectors which would be more reasonable toward less radical statements.

"Perhaps it would be useful to discuss this. Above all, it is surprising that such concern at the possible resistance to a socialist program does not consider the fact that the mere name of the party: Communist, is a complete program and definition which associates us

with a new society already under construction in other countries. From the point of view of masses, our very name presupposes socialism --- although what we say may seem contradictory. If we are speaking of 'fright' our very name is enough to cause 'fright' regardless of the CP program we present.

"In the second place, the name links us in the imagination of the common man with the version of socialism spread about by the bourgeoisie and imperialism. For many Venezuelans, Communist Party means things ranging from the notion that socialism 'kills' God to the idea that it is a cruel dictatorship which does away with all freedom, and that it advocates such things as the abolishment of ownership of tooth brushes, proclaims free love, delivers children to the state, etc.

"In brief, those who worry about the resistance which is alleged to result from the idea of socialism, should also ask themselves for the sake of consistency if the best way to confront that problem might not be to change the name of the party and disassociate it from the world Communist movement as well as from the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. However, would this not be the solution of 'selling the couch?' [Ed. note: reference to the story of a man coming home unexpectedly and catching his wife in flagrante delicto on the couch with another man. His enraged reaction was to sell the couch.]

"To the contrary, let us view Venezuelan socialism as a result of converging and common action of various social forces and sectors --- socialism will have to be what the group of forces and sectors want it to be --- and let us bring socialism out from under the table and air its problems freely. Discussing it with all those other sectors who in one way or another aim toward the socialist solution, or toward one like it, is much more useful and effective than the vain attempts to 'prettify' the program and slogans of a party whose mere name places it in a status of capitis diminutio, in a position of inferiority which it is forced to accept whenever its participation or alliance in fronts is considered.

"By taking measures which leave no room for doubt, let us do away with the fable (which nevertheless is based on objective events that can easily be misleading) that our revolutionary Party is an agent of any socialist power or country, that its policy is part of an international strategy of that power or country, and we will see whether socialism seen in this way continues to 'frighten.' An internationalist policy of support and solidarity with all the world forces which are struggling for revolutionary change in an independent and critical manner, (but which at the same time recognizes divergencies among these forces) suffices to help destroy the idea that socialism is nothing more than an export product of the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba.

CPYRIGHT "If we agree that of those forces which proclaim the need for socialism, none is capable of achieving it by itself, we implicitly recognize that to be able to achieve a socialist society the united action of all of them is necessary. In order for Venezuelan socialism to materialize it must be plural or it simply cannot exist. This plurality pre-supposes a revolutionary power which guarantees the autonomous contribution of other sectors to the construction of the new society, a contribution which can only be articulated on the basis of a democratic dialectic among the revolutionary forces that precludes a political monopoly by any of them.

"If the transition toward the new society makes a dictatorial power compulsory, it will have the characteristics which the revolutionary forces will want it to have. A revolutionary dictatorship in Venezuela has no reason for being similar to that of other countries because our country has peculiarities which inevitably will place their stamp on the forms of government. However, as of now we can clearly proclaim that our socialism does not carry with it the death penalty, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or make it a crime to express an opinion. It does not carry this with it because a democratic revolutionary power, even if it is dictatorial, makes such practices very difficult because our own principles are against them....

"A plural socialist society by definition excludes all monolithism in the concept of its political life and its cultural and artistic life. We could not propose Marxism-Leninism as a sort of substitute for religion, which would be learned in schools as the catechism is learned. (This of course is not in contradiction with the fact that the scientific nature of education must mean methodology and a dialectic materialist analysis). Neither could we propose an administratively directed culture, nor one monopolized by 'official' interpreters of the thinking of the regime. A political culture emanating from the base rejects, of course, the attempts by any bureaucratic office to dictate the orientation of artistic creation..."

#### The Motive Forces of Revolution

"Under this very 'orthodox' title, we would like to discuss a relatively 'heterodoxical' point of view on this subject of the forces which in one way or another could impel the Venezuelan revolutionary process.

"The usual manner of handling this aspect consists of presenting the motive forces of the revolution solely from the purely class angle, that is, pointing out the social classes interested in advancing the revolution. This manner of analyzing things --- entirely correct and which we are not going to give up --- does not, however, cover all the

wealth of possibilities offered by a society such as the Venezuelan.

CPYRGHT "In it there exist, not only a group of social classes objectively favorable for a nationalist and revolutionary change, but there have been formed interclass sectors or groupings whose members are linked by some institutional reason --- political or professional --- and they are scattered throughout the most varied social organizations, armed forces, church, and political parties. Because of their own nature, their direct links with national problems and with the spheres of political power, make viable the appearance in some of their sectors of a socio-political awareness implicitly or explicitly nationalist and revolutionary....

"...In all political parties of the country, the long years of revolutionary demagogy gave rise to a popular base and a group middle-level and technical cadres, thwarted but motivated in favor of social change and a break with dependency. In the Catholic Church, the post-council trends, the return to the sources of Christianity, the revival of social preoccupations, which in some places acquires profiles of great radicalism, have generated the appearance of sectors which attribute to the church the earthly mission of helping to transform society. In the army --- the main support of power --- the reflection of this trend, which incorrectly been given the name of 'nasserism' and which today finds notable expression in Peru, the very experience with the problem of being a dependent state [along with other factors] ...forces us to reconsider the problem from a different point of view than the traditional. This is particularly so if one takes into account that the armed forces as an institution have been assimilated by the establishment and therefore, it would not be strange if dissidence in their midst had a sign of progressive protest, of the left....

"...Of course, this linkup [of social sectors] would be feasible if one recognizes the revolutionary potential of these sectors and if their view of the process of revolutionary change is respected. This supposes not only a pluralist concept of the future society but also a pluralist concept of the struggle for it. This excludes all hegemony decreed a priori and an absolute respect for the autonomy and contribution of each sector.

"In other words, an attempt would be made to work with the idea that in the policy of alliances no one is to be used. If there is no a priori reason which makes us the sole depositories of the revolutionary truth or monopolizers of valor, initiative, or capacity for sacrifice to bring it about, we have no reason to be the ones to establish the standards which measure the revolutionary legitimacy of the rest. Dependence with respect to imperialism and the traumas of dependent capitalist growth, today affect not only the popular classes but the most varied sectors and therefore the awareness for social change is not the exclusive patrimony of any 'vanguard' which arrogates it to itself more or less

arbitrarily. Up to now the opposite concept, which attributes only to Communists --- or Marxist-Leninists in general --- the steadfastness required to carry out the revolution to the end, is the concept which allows the enemy to use the ideas of 'fellow travelers,' and 'useful CPYRHT..'

"A policy of this nature [of linking various revolutionary forces] has to insist that the alternative to what exists today...cannot be anything but a socialist way of development and a new political framework which disavows the present one. In this sense only a 'vastly original' policy --- as Lenin said --- can help us to form our own force capable of playing the role of 'link' among a group of revolutionary sectors and classes which united can promote the social change the neocolonialist status of our country demands.

"This said, let us glance at the driving forces of the revolution from the angle of the social classes in play. From this point of view, we believe that the revolutionary process possesses a popular content. This means that the social forces on whom it must rest are those which make up what are generically known as the people: the working class, the poor peasant, the middle-level and lower petit bourgeoisie, the students --- who can be considered as a discriminated against sector --- and the so-called 'fringe' inhabitants, with the explicit exclusion of any sector of the bourgeoisie....

"We have wanted to point out the vital role which the working class could potentially play in the course of the Venezuelan revolution, but at the same time we would like to warn against any 'worker' concept of the Venezuelan revolution. Any comparison of the situation of our country with that of a 'classic' capitalist country could be lamentable. Under the conditions of Venezuela, to rest all the weight of the revolution on the working class could simply mean closing the path to it. There are other social sectors which must be stimulated --- and at the same time --- the middle-level and poor petit bourgeoisie, the 'fringe' sectors, [masses of displaced unemployed persons in the cities] and the poor peasants must be motivated by the revolutionary upsurge. The order of listing indicates the relative importance which we attribute to them....

"In conclusion, a few words on the poor peasants. It is obvious that our thesis on the revolutionary process --- which surely will depend on the urban sectors of the population before any other --- considerably reduces the importance which is traditionally attributed to the peasant sectors. To come right out and say it, we are simply proposing a critical revision of the old formula of the worker-peasant alliance as the axis of the revolutionary movement. Such a way of putting things does not appear to be in consonance with the complexity of contemporary reality. In truth, to continue the discussion of the motive forces of the revolution in the terms of absolutely pinpointing a social vanguard



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and a basic alliance of classes, does not appear to fit our case. According to all evidence, a revolutionary process in Venezuela requires the participation of that conglomeration of social forces which we call the people and of some interclass sectors which are not exactly 'people.' Among them, the working class because of its specific weight, its organization, and potential awareness, and the petit bourgeoisie because of their importance and degree of awareness and radicalism, must occupy a front rank position and undoubtedly must play the role of guide for the fringe masses and the poor peasants. Viewed in an over-all manner, from a general historic angle, the crystallization of the entire process expresses the interests of the working class and at the same time the change leads to socialism.

"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard and the leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement (and this could very well be a communist party such as the Chinese which based itself on the peasant masses, a heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July in which the petit bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of conspiratorial high officers not organically linked to the masses as in the Egyptian case and Nasir).

"The historic experience of all modern revolutions demonstrates that the concept which Marx had --- a class as such playing the active leading role --- and which Rosa Luxembourg opposed to the theory of Lenin's party, in which, not without reason, she saw an organization above the working class, is no longer valid. The last revolution in which the working class acted as such, without interposed 'apparatuses,' was that of the Commune of Paris. After it the power of the bourgeoisie acquired such a technical nature that a specialized revolutionary organization is required to overthrow it. Although Lenin created such a specialized organization for the Russian circumstances of the beginning of the century --- and in that sense some of its characteristics are completely Russian --- in the light of contemporary capitalist and imperialist conditions, the universal validity of the concept of specialized and 'professional' revolutionary organization is undeniable...."

[The more significant passages have been underlined for emphasis; the double underlining represents emphasis by the author Petkoff.]

TEODORO PETKOFF

# ¿socialismo para Venezuela?



EDITORIAL DOMINGO FUENTES  
CARACAS 1970

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Esa crisis mundial es la crisis del stalinismo, cuya rígida armazón ideológica, política, organizativa y hasta moral, está sometida hoy a los embates de corrientes cada vez más fuertes, lúcidas e importantes nacidas de los partidos comunistas y que han llegado a comprender que el stalinismo a partir de un cierto momento no sólo obstaculiza el desarrollo de las sociedades donde el partido comunista está en el poder, sino que, al igual que el *traskismo* —que quiso ser su negación en una época—, ya no proporciona las respuestas que demanda una fuerza revolucionaria que lucha por el poder.

No se trata de negar en bloque al stalinismo, ni desconocer aquello que en él fue imperativo histórico, sino de aceptar que sus viejos esquemas —los cuales a través de la III Internacional marcaron a fuego a todos los partidos comunistas del mundo— ya hoy son prácticamente inservibles. Los partidos comunistas fraguados en el crisol del stalinismo y que no logren romper éste tienen virtualmente bloqueado el camino hacia el poder por razones que les son absolutamente propias, congénitas, y que les impiden superar los obstáculos exógenos. No es una simple casualidad que después del partido bolchevique de Lenin, sólo los partidos comunistas de China, Vietnam y Yugoslavia hayan podido alcanzar el poder por sus propios medios. Se trata de tres partidos que mediante la modalidad de "se acata, pero no se cumple" hicieron letra muerta de las directivas de la III Internacional y del propio Stalin y fueron capaces de transformarse, por ello mismo, en fuerzas nacionales, aptas para interpretar y encarnar los más profundos sentimientos de sus respectivos pueblos y llevarlos a la victoria.

Si nuestra generación de comunistas venezolanos pretende ser algo más que un grupo de propagandistas y precursores del socialismo, en lugar de constructores de una nueva sociedad, tiene que enfrentar —y ganar— el reto que representa la ruptura del molde partidista y político stalinista. ]

En estas páginas hay algunas cosas que constituyen una impugnación, si se quiere dura, de buena parte de nuestro pasado como partido marxista revolucionario —y por lo mismo hemos cuidado, hasta donde ha sido posible, la forma de decir las, porque nuestro objetivo no es herir susceptibilidades, sino promover una discusión fructífera—. Pero sólo al precio de estas revisiones lacerantes es como puede recuperar su sentido la *autocrítica*, haciendo que deje de ser la mera *descripción* de los errores cometidos, con la inefable referencia al "origen pequeño-burgués" de aquellos, y devenga el instrumento que hurgando con tal profundidad en nosotros mismos, nos lleve a descubrir las raíces del reformismo, de la colaboración de clases, de las desviaciones de derecha e

izquierda, a fin de extirparlas y facultar la plena expansión de las potencialidades revolucionarias del partido. Por supuesto, revisiones de esta clase son siempre dolorosas porque significan poner en cuestión buena parte de nuestra propia, individual, pequeña o grande, contribución a luchas que siempre emprendimos guiados por los más nobles sentimientos. Pero existen encrucijadas en la vida de un movimiento revolucionario en que sólo la duda, profunda y desgarradora, acerca de todo lo que se ha hecho, es lo que permite sortear con éxito las trampas de ese dilema existencial: reformismo o revolución. Ser o no ser...

De otro lado, apenas cinco meses después de que dos de sus ingenios espaciales se acoplaban para crear la primera estación orbital, la URSS y otros cuatro países del Pacto de Varsovia tomaron la determinación de intervenir militarmente en otro pequeño país socialista, con el pretexto de impedir una contrarrevolución. Empero, cuatro miembros de la comunidad socialista, —China, Albania, Yugoslavia y Rumania—, por razones diferentes, con lenguajes y estilos distintos, condenaron la medida. De la "pequeña entente" socialista, Vietnam emitió un muy circunspecto y lacónico comunicado de apoyo; Corea procedió de igual manera y en Cuba, Fidel apoyó, después de una vigorosa requisitoria contra la política exterior soviética y contra los modelos socialistas europeos. Por su parte, virtualmente todos los partidos comunistas de Europa, incluyendo los tres mayores y de mayor autoridad —italiano, francés y español— condenaron inequívocamente la intervención, al igual que el partido comunista japonés. Las contradicciones que desgarran al mundo socialista y al movimiento comunista alcanzaron su clímax en aquel período y las evidencias se hicieron concluyentes: el socialismo está sumido en una grave y profunda crisis...

La frase de Terencio, que tanto gustaba citar esa mente universal y alerta que era Marx, *nihil humanum alienam puto est*, "nada de lo que es humano me es extraño", tiene que ser una de las divisas del revolucionario de hoy —no porque no haya debido serlo del de todos los tiempos, sino porque en la práctica no lo ha sido; porque esa aberrante desviación burocrático-policia que es el stalinismo realizó una suerte de lobotomía en los cerebros de millones de comunistas —de los mejores hombres de esta humanidad, de los que una vez fueron sin discusión la sal de la tierra, la juventud del mundo— encuadrándolos bajo una consigna monstruosa: "todo lo que no es de mi partido me es extraño".

En el camino de crear esa organización confrontamos problemas que están colocados bajo el signo de estas disyuntivas: ¿Reformismo o revolución? ¿Renovación y modernización o mantenimiento del *statu quo* organizativo? ¿Partido independiente y nacional o partido

alienado y vasallo? De las respuestas que se den a esas preguntas depende el que éste continúe siendo un partido revolucionario, dispuesto a la lucha por un cambio revolucionario, o un partido más del sistema, una pequeña fuerza, domesticada y asimilada, un "partido crónico", para decirlo con la feliz expresión de Eloy Torres, un partido de "sindicaleros" de la política.

Hoy estamos en un punto crucial, en un punto de inflexión de la historia del PCV. Se viene de la asimilación de dos derrotas consecutivas: una, la que corresponde al período de la lucha armada, otra, la de las elecciones. Se abre ahora una nueva etapa histórica, signada por grandes modificaciones político-sociales, dentro de cuyo marco debemos desenvolvemos.

¿Va a ser el nuestro un partido que progresivamente renuncie a su bella tradición revolucionaria de los últimos diez años, para dejarse asimilar por el sistema, deviniendo en una fuerza reformista, o, por el contrario, romperá radicalmente con tal perspectiva, trazando una política de enfrentamiento al sistema, de impugnación continua, de preparación para una nueva embestida revolucionaria a un plazo indeterminado pero inevitable?

¿El partido, tal como está hoy, bastante "oxidado", con evidentes signos de esclerosis, de petrificación, de corrupción a algunos niveles, de ablandamiento, de pobreza ideológica, con organismos dirigentes que en gran medida no corresponden a la realidad de la militancia y al grado de desarrollo de ella, estaría en condiciones de participar eficazmente en el proceso revolucionario?

¿Un partido que abdique de su independencia crítica en el plano internacional, está en condiciones de elaborar y adelantar una verdadera política revolucionaria?

Tal es el sentido profundo de una polémica que en definitiva no envuelve otra cosa que dos opciones: partido para la revolución o partido para medrar en el sistema.

A este respecto con frecuencia se escucha la objeción de que un planteamiento socialista o anti-capitalista despierta demasiada resistencia en presuntos aliados; "asusta", por así decir, a algunos sectores que ante formulaciones menos radicales serían más sensibles.

Tal vez resulte útil discutir esto. Ante todo, no deja de ser sorprendente que tal preocupación por la posible resistencia ante un programa socialista no tome en cuenta el hecho de que el puro nombre del partido, partido comunista, es todo un programa y una definición, que nos asocia a una nueva sociedad ya en construcción en otros países. Desde el punto de vista de masas, nuestro

puro nombre encarna —así en un supuesto negado digamos lo contrario— el socialismo. Si de "sustos" se trata, nuestro solo nombre basta para "asustar", cualquiera sea el programa que presentemos.

En segundo lugar, el nombre nos vincula, en la imaginación del hombre corriente, con la versión que dan la burguesía y el imperialismo sobre el socialismo. Para bastantes venezolanos, partido comunista significa desde la idea de que el socialismo "mata" a Dios hasta la de que se trata de una dictadura atroz, que liquida toda libertad, pasando por consejas como la de que suprime incluso la propiedad de los cepillos de dientes, proclama el amor libre, entrega los hijos al Estado, etc, etc.

En resumen, quienes se preocupan por el rechazo que supuestamente produciría la idea del socialismo, para ser consecuentes con su pensamiento deberían preguntarse también si la mejor manera de enfrentar ese problema no sería la de cambiarle el nombre al partido y disociarlo tanto del movimiento comunista mundial como de la Unión Soviética, China y Cuba.

Sin embargo, ¿no sería ésta la solución de "vender el diván"?

Por el contrario, veamos el socialismo venezolano como un resultado de la acción convergente y común de distintas fuerzas y sectores sociales, —por lo cual tendrá que ser como el conjunto de esas fuerzas y sectores quiera que sea— saquemos el socialismo de debajo de la mesa y ventilemos su problemática libremente, discutiéndola con todos aquellos otros sectores que de una u otra forma se orientan hacia esa solución, o hacia alguna semejante y ello será mucho más útil y eficaz que los baldíos intentos de "matizar" el programa y las consignas de un partido cuyo mero nombre ya lo coloca en una situación de *capitis diminutio*, en una situación de inferioridad que se ve forzado a tolerar en la práctica, cuando se considera su participación en alianzas o frentes.

Perfilemos nítidamente el carácter nacional de la lucha por el socialismo, establezcamos claramente que el reconocimiento de la pluralidad de contribuciones a la lucha por el socialismo niega la posibilidad de que el resultado de ella signifique, como se dice corrientemente, un "cambio de amo"; rompamos mediante una práctica que no deje lugar a equívocos la patraña —que, sin embargo, se apoya en hechos objetivos fácilmente engañosos— de que el partido revolucionario es una *agencia* de una potencia o país socialista cualquiera, de que su política forma parte de la estrategia internacional de esa potencia o país, y ya veremos si, en este aspecto el socialismo "asusta" tanto como algunos piensan. Una política

internacionalista, de apoyo y solidaridad con todas las fuerzas que luchan en el mundo por un cambio revolucionario, pero que marque las distancias, de manera independiente y crítica, es suficiente para ayudar a destruir la idea de que el socialismo no es otra cosa que un producto de exportación de la Unión Soviética, China o Cuba.

Si admitimos que ninguna fuerza de las que proclaman la necesidad del socialismo, por sí sola, es capaz de lograrlo, implícitamente reconocemos que para poder alcanzar una sociedad socialista se precisa la acción unida de todas ellas; luego, para que el socialismo venezolano pueda materializarse tendrá que ser *plural*, o sencillamente no podrá existir. Esta pluralidad supone un poder revolucionario que debe garantizar la contribución autónoma de otros sectores a la construcción de la nueva sociedad, aportación que sólo puede articularse sobre la base de una dialéctica democrática entre las fuerzas revolucionarias, que excluye el *monopolio* político de cualquiera de ellas.

Y si la transición hacia la nueva sociedad hace obligatorio un poder dictatorial, éste tendrá las características que las fuerzas revolucionarias quieran que tenga. Una dictadura revolucionaria en Venezuela no tiene por qué parecerse a la de otros países, puesto que el nuestro posee particularidades que inevitablemente darán su sello a las formas de gobierno. Pero, de una vez podemos proclamar claramente que *nuestro socialismo* no comporta la pena de muerte, ni la prisión arbitraria, ni la tortura, ni el delito de opinión. Y no lo comporta porque un poder revolucionario, democrático aun si es dictatorial, dificulta grandemente tales prácticas, amén de que nuestros propios principios están en contra de ellas.

Una sociedad socialista plural excluye por definición todo *monolitismo* en la concepción de su vida política, de su vida cultural y artística. No podríamos proponer el marxismo-leninismo como una suerte de sustituto de la religión, que se aprenderá en las escuelas como se aprende el catecismo. (Lo que no está en contradicción, desde luego, con el hecho de que el carácter científico de la educación deberá suponer la metodología y el análisis materialista dialéctico). Tampoco podríamos proponer una cultura dirigida administrativamente, ni monopolizada por los intérpretes "oficiales" del pensamiento del régimen. Una política cultural que arranque desde la base niega, por supuesto, las pretensiones de cualquier oficina burocrática de dictar las pautas de la creación artística.

## LAS FUERZAS MOTRICES DE LA REVOLUCION

Con este título tan "ortodoxo" quisiéramos someter a la discusión un punto de vista relativamente "heterodoxo" sobre esta cuestión de las fuerzas que de una manera u otra podrían mover el proceso revolucionario venezolano.

La forma acostumbrada de manejar este aspecto consiste en presentar las fuerzas motrices de la revolución solamente desde el ángulo puramente clasista, es decir señalando las *clases sociales* interesadas en adelantar el curso revolucionario. Esta forma de analizar las cosas —enteramente correcta y a la cual no vamos a renunciar— no cubre, sin embargo, toda la riqueza de posibilidades que ofrece una sociedad como la venezolana.

En ésta no sólo existe un conjunto de *clases sociales* objetivamente favorables a un cambio nacionalista y revolucionario sino que se han constituido *sectores* o *agrupamientos* interclasistas, cuyos miembros están vinculados por alguna razón institucional —política o profesional— y se encuentran dispersos entre las más variadas organizaciones sociales: fuerzas armadas, iglesia, partidos políticos. Estas organizaciones, por su propio carácter, por su vinculación directa con la problemática nacional y con las *esferas del poder político* viabilizan la aparición, entre algunos de sus sectores, de una conciencia socio-política implícita o explícitamente nacionalista y revolucionaria.

En todos los partidos políticos del país los largos lustros de demagogia revolucionaria arrojan como saldo una base popular y un conjunto de cuadros medios y técnicos frustrados pero motivados hacia el cambio social y hacia la ruptura de la dependencia. En la iglesia católica las corrientes post-conciliares, el retorno a las fuentes del cristianismo, el

renacimiento de una preocupación social que asume en algunos sitios perfiles de gran radicalismo, han generado la aparición de sectores que atribuyen a la iglesia la misión terrena de ayudar a la transformación de la sociedad. En el ejército, —asiento principal del poder—, el reflejo de esa corriente que impropriadamente se ha venido designando con el nombre de "nasserismo" y que hoy encuentra una notable expresión en Perú; el propio contacto con los problemas de una dependencia que niega toda la formación patriótica de los oficiales; incluso, la aproximación a la revolución por la vía de combatirla; el recuerdo de los alzamientos de Carúpano y Puerto Cabello, en 1962, y, más atrás, el fenómeno trejista de 1958; nos obligan a reconsiderar su problemática según una óptica diferente a la tradicional. Sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta que las fuerzas armadas, como institución, han sido asimiladas por el *establishment*, de manera que las disidencias en su seno no sería extraño que tuvieran un signo de protesta progresista, de izquierda.

La vinculación entre estos sectores interclasistas y las clases sociales que objetivamente necesitan una transformación revolucionaria en el país, potenciaría la capacidad de éstas últimas para desarrollar una conciencia revolucionaria y al mismo tiempo multiplicaría las posibilidades de creación y acción de un vasto, amplio y profundo movimiento revolucionario. Desde luego, esta vinculación sería factible si se parte de reconocer la potencialidad revolucionaria de esos sectores y se respeta su visión del proceso de cambio revolucionario. Esto supone no sólo una concepción pluralista de la futura sociedad sino también una concepción pluralista de la lucha por ella; lo cual excluye toda hegemonía decretada *a priori*, y un respeto absoluto por la autonomía y la contribución de cada sector.

En otros términos, se trataría de trabajar con una concepción no instrumental de la política de alianzas. Si no existe ninguna razón apriorística que nos haga depositarios únicos de la verdad revolucionaria ni monopolizadores del valor, la iniciativa y la capacidad de sacrificio para plasmarla, no tenemos ninguna razón para ser quienes establecen los raseros que miden la legitimidad revolucionaria de los demás. La dependencia con respecto al imperialismo y los traumas del crecimiento capitalista dependiente afectan hoy no sólo a las clases populares sino a sectores muy variados, de manera que la conciencia del cambio social no es patrimonio exclusivo de ninguna "vanguardia" que se la arrogue más o menos arbitrariamente. Hasta ahora, la concepción contraria, la que atribuye sólo a los comunistas —o marxista-leninistas en general— la consecuencia para llevar la revolución hasta el final, es la

que permite al enemigo manejar las nociones de "compañeros de viaje" y de "tontos útiles": porque, efectivamente, quien no reconoce sino en sí mismo la sinceridad revolucionaria, en los demás no puede ver sino aliados circunstanciales, acompañantes hasta un cierto punto del camino, gente a la cual se puede instrumentalizar, utilizar. Y aunque la intención no sea ésta, objetivamente se trata a esos "aliados" como "tontos útiles".

Una política de esta naturaleza tiene que insistir en que la alternativa a lo que existe hoy —que no es sino el crecimiento capitalista dependiente y subdesarrollado, con su correspondiente superestructura— no puede ser sino una vía de desarrollo socialista y un nuevo marco político, que niegue el existente. En este sentido, sólo una política "vastamente principista" —como diría Lenin— puede ayudarnos a conformar una fuerza propia, capaz de desempeñar ese papel de "eslabón" entre un conjunto de sectores y clases revolucionarias que unidos pueden promover el cambio social que demanda la realidad neocolonial de nuestro país.

Dicho esto, echemos una ojeada a las fuerzas motrices de la revolución desde el ángulo de las clases sociales en juego. Desde este punto de vista pensamos que el proceso revolucionario posee un contenido *popular*. Esto significa que las fuerzas sociales sobre las cuales debería descansar son aquéllas que componen lo que genéricamente se conoce como pueblo: la clase obrera, el campesinado pobre, la pequeña burguesía media y baja, el estudiantado —que puede ser considerado como un sector diferenciado— y los llamados pobladores marginales, con exclusión explícita de cualquier sector de la burguesía.

Conviene detenerse un tanto sobre el papel de la clase obrera, porque recientemente diversos sectores y perso-

Hemos querido destacar el papel vital que la clase obrera podría, potencialmente, desempeñar en el curso de la revolución venezolana, pero al mismo tiempo quisiéramos precaver contra toda concepción "obrerista" de la revolución venezolana. Cualquier asimilación de la situación de nuestro país a la de un país capitalista "clásico" podría resultar funesta. En las condiciones de Venezuela, pretender apoyar sobre la clase obrera todo el peso de la revolución podría significar sencillamente cerrarse el camino de ella. Existen otros sectores sociales que deben ser impulsados —y motivar a su vez— por el envión revolucionario: la pequeña burguesía media y pobre, los pobladores marginales y el campesinado pobre. El orden de la enumeración indica la importancia relativa que les atribuimos.

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Finalmente, unas pocas palabras sobre los campesinos pobres. Es obvio que nuestro planteamiento sobre el proceso revolucionario —que seguramente se apoyará en los sectores urbanos de la población antes que en ningún otro— reduce considerablemente la importancia que tradicionalmente se atribuía a los sectores campesinos. Para decirlo de una vez, estamos simplemente proponiendo una revisión crítica de la vieja formulación sobre la alianza obrero-campesina como eje del movimiento revolucionario. Tal modo de postular las cosas no parece corresponder a la complejidad de la realidad contemporánea. En verdad, continuar la discusión acerca de las fuerzas motrices de la revolución en los términos de precisar absolutamente una vanguardia social y una alianza de clases fundamental, no parece venir al caso. Según todas las evidencias, un proceso revolucionario en Venezuela requiere la participación de ese conjunto de fuerzas sociales que llamamos pueblo y de algunos sectores interclasistas que no son exactamente "pueblo". Entre aquéllos, la clase obrera, por su peso específico, por su organización y por su conciencia potencial, así como la pequeña burguesía, también por su importancia y su grado de conciencia y radicalismo, deben ocupar un lugar de primer orden, y, sin duda, deben ejercer un papel de guía sobre las masas marginales y los campesinos pobres. Visto el conjunto desde un ángulo histórico general, la cristalización de todo el proceso expresa los intereses de la clase obrera, en tanto que el cambio conduce al socialismo.

*Pero, en la práctica política concreta la vanguardia y la dirección las proporciona el movimiento revolucionario (y éste puede ser bien un partido comunista, como el chino, que se apoyó en las masas campesinas, bien un movimiento heterogéneo como el "26 de julio", donde la pequeña burguesía desempeñó un papel esencial; bien un grupo de altos oficiales conspiradores, orgánicamente desligados de las masas, como en el caso egipcio de Nasser).*

La experiencia histórica de todas las revoluciones modernas demuestra que la concepción que privaba en Marx —la clase como tal ejerciendo el papel dirigente activo—, y que Rosa Luxemburgo oponía a la teoría del partido de Lenin— en el cual, no sin razón, veía un organismo por encima de la clase obrera— ya es inoperante. La última revolución en la cual la clase obrera actuó como tal, sin "aparatos" interpuestos, fue la de la Comuna de París. Después de ella, el poder de la burguesía ha adquirido tal naturaleza técnica que hace indispensable una organización revolucionaria especializada para derribarlo. Aunque Lenin creó esa organización especializada para las condiciones rusas de comienzos de siglo —y en ese sentido algunas de sus características son totalmente rusas—, a la luz de las condiciones del capitalismo y el imperialismo contemporáneos, resulta indiscutible la validez universal de la concepción de la organización revolucionaria especializada y "profesional".

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(21 February - 20 March 1970)

1. Leading Venezuelan Communist Denounces Soviet Model

Teodoro Petkoff, Venezuelan Communist leader of Bulgarian ancestry and until recently a member of the Party's Politburo, is persisting in his criticism of the Soviet Union for trying to impose its will on the international Communist movement. In the long 15th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) from 16 February to 6 March, Petkoff was castigated by the dominant pro-Soviet faction for such heresies as his condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. (In the PCV, orthodox pro-Soviet Communists are sometimes referred to as "soft-liners" for their espousal of the Soviet-approved tactic of legal non-violent political activity in contrast to the "hard-line" characterized by Castro-inspired tactics of violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare.) The PCV's condemnation of Petkoff centered on the ideas expressed in his book Checoeslovaquia: El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism) published last fall. Attached are excerpts from his book illustrating his heresies.

Petkoff's main thesis is that the socialism represented by the Soviet Union cannot be and should not be looked upon as the model for Venezuela. Venezuela must adapt socialism to its own national peculiarities. The Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia essentially because Czechoslovakia was building its own model of socialism on its own traditions, not on those of the Soviet Union. (This independent road to socialism has always been and continues to be intolerable to the Soviets, since it challenges the ultimate wisdom of Soviet ideology and consequently the Soviets' claim to leadership of the world Communist movement.)

While derived independently, Petkoff's ideas as well as his position in the Party, bear striking resemblances to those of Roger Garaudy, the prominent French Communist, as well as a number of other European and Asian Communist intellectuals and leaders, whose breaking point came with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both Petkoff and Garaudy were recently dismissed from their respective Politburos. Both are prominent intellectuals in their own right -- Petkoff as a trained economist, Garaudy as the acknowledged leading ideologue of French Communism. Both are tested and proven militants of Communism, Petkoff until recently as a "hard-line" active guerrilla, Garaudy as a long-time promoter of Soviet orthodoxy in the French Communist party (defending the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, for example). Both risked their careers in the Party by espousing a position critical of the Soviet Union against an orthodox majority of their leadership colleagues. Garaudy's crusade ended by his expulsion from the Politburo and from the Central Committee at the 14th Congress of the PCF in February. He also resigned from his post as head of the Party's Center for Marxist Studies shortly thereafter.



Petkoff earlier lost his Politburo post, and a careful campaign is currently afoot in the PCV to neutralize him even further by maneuvering him out of the Central Committee (see attached accounts of the recently concluded Central Committee Plenum).

There are differences, too. Despite his minority position, Petkoff has substantial support in a small Party with little influence in national politics (typical of Latin American Communist parties), and is a dynamic, young leader; whereas the much older Garaudy has mobilized little practical political support in a large and potentially influential mass party. Another vital difference is that Garaudy was merely one of the most eloquent of a large number of European Communists taking the Soviet Union to task for its invasion of Czechoslovakia, whereas Petkoff's is a lone voice in Latin American Communist parties, which in obedient chorus all (except for the Mexican CP) sang their approval of the Soviet action.

The power of these two men lies in their realistic reappraisal of Soviet aims and pretensions in the world Communist movement, a reappraisal triggered by reflection on the underlying meaning of the Soviets' crushing of the new humane socialism undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968. They recognize the inability of the Soviet leadership to adapt to the requirements of the contemporary world outside the Soviet Union (and even within the Soviet Union). They also are aware of the obsolete Soviet insistence on the necessity of adhering unquestioningly and undeviatingly to the Soviet model. This obligation thinking Communists recognize as a barrier to the advance of the very Communism they support, while the "apparatchiks," thinking or not, give precedence to their own political survival, which in turn depends directly on the financial support the Soviet Union provides in exchange for blind obedience.

## Mosinev: "On the Eve of the Fourth Congress of Venezuelan Communists"

Venezuelan communists are actively preparing to hold the next, fourth party congress, scheduled to open on 4 December this year. The congress is to sum up the results of the party's activity in the 10 years that have elapsed since the third congress (in March 1961) to adopt a program document and party rules, to elect new personnel for the leading organs, and outline the political policy for the next few years.

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The last decade has been an important stage in the development of the revolutionary process in the countries of Latin America. A historic event in this period was the emergence and establishment of the first socialist state on the American continent--the Cuban Republic. Despite all the desires of U.S. imperialism and the reactionary forces of the Latin American countries to isolate Cuba, its example has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the Latin American working people, who have been convinced by their bitter experience of the "charms" of the capitalist "paradise." Recent events in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia--which have been very varied in the forms and methods of the struggle--are evidence of the new, broad upsurge in the struggle of the working masses of Latin America, who are opposing U.S. supremacy and advocating national sovereignty and complete independence, the vital needs of the people, democracy, and social progress.

In Venezuela itself the 10-year interval between the two party congresses of communists has been distinguished by a particular intensity of the class struggle, in the course of which the Communist Party, together with the other parties of the left, rose in armed struggle against the antipopular, terrorist Betancourt regime, which enjoyed the support of U.S. oil and steel trusts. Despite the enormous courage and heroism displayed by the Venezuelan communists, the 5-year armed struggle ended in the defeat of the revolutionary forces.

In April 1967 the eighth Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee plenum took place under strictly conspiratorial conditions. Having exposed the mistakes committed in the course of the armed struggle and recognized that the third congress thesis on the non peaceful nature of the Venezuelan path to complete national liberation and socialism in the modern framework retains its validity, the plenum came to the conclusion that it was necessary to suspend guerrilla actions under the given concrete conditions and to transfer the center of gravity of the party entire struggle to work among the masses. The Central Committee called on all communists to close the ranks on the basis of Leninist organizational principles and to participate in the intraparty discussions which was to develop in connection with the announced preparation for the Fourth Party Congress.

Broad discussion has begun in party organizations about the party's combat experience, questions of party building and tactics under the new conditions, and ideological problems. The draft program document and party rules published by the Central Committee were adopted as the basis for discussion.

Analysis of the concrete socioeconomic and political conditions of modern Venezuela carried out by the Communist Party on the basis of Marxist-Leninist dialectical methods permitted it to draw conclusions on the nature of the Venezuelan revolution at the present historical stage. The program document defines it as an anti-imperialist, primarily anti-U.S. imperialism, anti-oligarchy, anti-large landed estate, patriotic, popular revolution with the prospect of a transition to socialism. The main tasks of the present stage are set forth as follows: to end U.S. supremacy, to eliminate the economic and political power of the haute bourgeoisie, which is in its service, to overcome the country's socioeconomic backwardness, to liquidate large landed property, and to create an independent economy. These tasks can be implemented only by a democratic, patriotic, popular government created in the course of a victorious revolution.

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 The program document points out that the patriotic forces, particularly the working class and its allies, are faced with the task of mastering all forms of struggle to repuff the enemy and defeat it on all fronts. It stresses that "the path of the Venezuelan revolution is the path of the struggle of the masses under the most varied forms and manifestations, the path of their unity, organization, and militancy."

Now, with hardly six weeks to go before the fourth congress, the discussion has assumed an exceptionally acute nature. A group advocating anti-Leninist positions on several of the most important problems of the Venezuelan revolution and also of the international communist movement has become active in the party, Under the pretext of calling for the "renewal" of the party, this group led by Central Committee member Teodoro Petkoff, is trying to revise Marxism, to pervert its most important tenets, to discredit the most devoted and tempered party leaders, and to demoralize the party from within by rejecting the Leninist organizational principles. In articles published in the bourgeois press and in two books Petkoff sets forth his renegade credo and attacks the Soviet Union, the international communist movement, and the communist parties of the Latin American countries and the socialist countries of Europe. He talks of the Soviet Union with particular, unconcealed hostility, wickedly distorting communist building in the Soviet Union.

In his book "Czechoslovakia--Socialism As a Problem," Petkoff sides completely with the imperialist circles in evaluating the events in that country, speaks in defense of the anticommunist, counterrevolutionary forces who were trying to tear Czechoslovakia away from the socialist camp, and defends the authors of the counterrevolutionary appeal "2,000 Words."

As everybody knows, by a decision of the 10th Central Committee plenum, which took place in August 1968, the Venezuelan Communist Party supported the actions of the socialist community countries aimed at defending socialism in Czechoslovakia and thereby confirmed its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. But Petkoff and the small group of his minions, calling themselves Marxists and revolutionaries, continue the slander campaign against socialism and its main bulwark--the Soviet Union--a campaign organized by the imperialist circles.

Petkov's writings are permeated with an open hatred of the world's first socialist state--the Soviet Union--and Lenin's party. As is rightly noted by eminent Venezuelan Communist Party figures P. Ortega Diaz and A. Garcia Ponce, rebuking the renegade in their brochure "T. Petkoff's Antisocialist Views," "Anti-Sovietism is the thread which runs through Petkoff's book from the first to the last page." It is absolutely right to say, the authors note, that the Czechoslovak theme is merely an occasion for anti-Sovietism, for expressing the most absurd and slanderous fabrications about the USSR, and for falsifying the development of the Russian revolution. Not having facts to support his slanderous assertions, Petkoff calls as witnesses the most inveterate troubadours of anti-Sovietism from Trotsky to Deutscher, Garaudy, and Sik.

In deserting to the positions of socialism's enemies, Petkoff deliberately distorts the process of its creation in the USSR and the other socialist countries for the purpose of discrediting it. He tries to show that socialism in the Soviet Union was developed ostensibly "in accordance with inimitable and special features," and that the Soviet Union is "a model of socialism specifically and absolutely limited by its own historic framework."

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Meanwhile the Soviet people, having completed the building of the first phase of a classless society, are successfully solving questions of building the material and technical base of communism, the creation of communist social attitudes, and the education of the new man. The experience which the Soviet people have accumulated is of permanent international significance, acknowledged by true communists throughout the world.

Petkoff goes as far as to monstrously assert that the forces of the socialist countries are not unified but shattered and isolated. According to him, the shattering of the socialist camp "would create new starting points for the development of a revolutionary movement!" In his hatred of the socialist countries the slanderer goes as far as to say that changes of power are needed in these countries. And with all this Petkoff tries to appear to be a communist, a "friend" of the socialist countries. Venezuelan Communist Party General Secretary Jesus Faria was right when, in answer to attacks by one of Petkoff's supporters, he said: "If these are our friends, who are our enemies?"

Petkoff lifts his hand against the principles of party building. Here he does not stop at falsifying the CPSU's historic documents. He states that the Tenth RCP (B) Congress resolution on party unity, which strictly forbade factions and groups in the party ranks, was a temporary measure, and that V.I. Lenin advocated "pluralism" in the party, in questions of building socialism, and in the interpretation of proletarian literature. This is the most blatant distortion of the Leninist doctrine on party unity.

The author of the libel subjects the fraternal parties of Latin America and Europe to abuse. His appraisal of these and others means, substantially, the denial of their role as the fighting vanguard of the working class. In place of the existing parties, which have in fact demonstrated their vitality and combat capability, he proposes the creation of rightwing opportunist parties with a minority and a majority, rejecting the principle of democratic centralism and the Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Petkoff subjects the fundamental principled tenets of Marxism-Leninism to distortion. He denies the historic mission of the working class and its vanguard role in the struggle to overthrow capitalism and in the building of a new society. The working class, in Petkoff's view, "is striving to become a factor of conservatism," and the "revolutionary intelligentsia" and the youth are ostensibly the real revolutionary force which "infects" the working class with a revolutionary nature.

Petkoff criticizes the aim of the Seventh Comintern Congress to create antifascist people's fronts. He categorically states that the creation of peoples' fronts provided capitalism with an opportunity of "gaining a respite" again! He ignores the fact that in many countries, long before the war with Hitlerite Germany, the policy of antifascist peoples' fronts helped strengthen the unity of the working class and of all democratic forces. Why is it necessary for Petkoff to make such an assertion? In order to reject the necessity of the Venezuelan Communist Party's struggle at the present stage for the creation of a broad anti-imperialist people's front. There can be no doubt as to who is interested in this.

Petkoff needed such fabrications to put forward his own "model" of socialism. What kind of socialism is it that Petkoff describes in his book "Socialism for Venezuela"? It is socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the leading role of the Communist Party, with complete freedom to disseminate bourgeois ideas, which is precisely what the counterrevolutionary forces tried to do in Czechoslovakia.

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Having met with a decisive rebuff in the party, Petkoff appeals to student youth and tries to gain support for himself among a certain section of the young communists. In publishing his concoction he tries to blackmail the party leadership and the rank and file communists with the threat of a split. As is noted in a Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee Politburo statement, Petkoff even dares to put forward conditions of unity, which are that the party should reject the Leninist organizational principles and the principle of democratic centralism as the law of the party's internal life, allow the existence of factions, and reject unity based on programs and regulations.

The renegade's claims are being rejected both by the leaders and by the lower party organizations. A Central Committee Politburo statement says that Petkoff's machinations have encountered universal condemnation. The Venezuelan Communist Party leadership, having shown the real essence of Petkoff's inclinations, called on all party and young communist party organizations to energetically defend the unity and cohesion of the party. It noted that Petkoff openly opposes the party and its political line, obviously trying to create the foundations for forming a new organization. It called on communists of the lower organizations and local and district committees to give an appropriate rebuff to Petkoff's antiparty aspirations.

The provocative activity of Petkoff and his group cannot fail to create certain difficulties for the Venezuelan revolutionary movement. However, the international experience of the communist movement shows that wherever a decisive struggle is proclaimed against opportunism, a struggle based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism coupled with the rallying of all the party's healthy forces round the leadership, any attempts to lead it off the correct Leninist road will end in failure. The Venezuelan communists' many years of experience, devotion to their Marxist-Leninist cause, and the political maturity of the leadership will permit the Communist Party to overcome all obstacles. The Venezuelan Communist Party Fourth Congress will become an important landmark on the road of strengthening and developing the Communist Party--the real vanguard of the working class and of all Venezuela's working people.

CPYRGHT

Excerpt from Jiri Pelikan's Introduction to  
Der Piller Bericht: Das unterdrückte Dossier  
Europa Verlag, Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich, 1970, 442 pp.

"... Today we know that the Cominform was supposed to be and did operate as an instrument for the domination of the communist parties in the socialist countries by the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin personally. By declaring the Soviet model of socialism as the only correct model, the model obligatory for all countries, the Cominform expressly discarded and condemned all ideas as to the possibility of individual, specific roads to socialism, which even Lenin had predicted. This cleared the way to the mechanical imitation and transfer of the Soviet model -- which had emerged from entirely different historical preconditions -- to the other socialist countries. This rejection of nationally differentiated ways to socialism was expressed in a particularly dramatic form in 1948, in the conflict between the Cominform and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was supposed to be forced to capitulate through an economic blockade but which resisted bravely...."

"It thus seems that Stalin, (Polish Communist leader) Bierut, and other dogmatists were offended by Czechoslovakia precisely because the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had deep national roots and was thus capable of developing its own way to socialism, a way which was in keeping with the conditions of the country and the mentality of the people and which was therefore a promising way that would lead to success. They were obviously afraid that the Czechoslovak example, if it were indeed to be successful, could have a contagious effect and could trigger similar tendencies in their countries.

"The extraordinary pressure, against Czechoslovakia, of all countries, and the enormous proportion of political assassinations and liquidations in that country, of all countries, can only be explained by saying that Stalin and the Soviet leadership had no use for a Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) which had strong bonds with the masses, which enjoyed their confidence, and which had a cadre of experienced, respected politicians. Instead, it was obviously much more in keeping with the intentions of the Soviet leadership at that time -- and it is likewise in keeping with the present Soviet leadership -- to make sure that the parties will be compact and closed off in themselves, that they will be based mostly on administrative power, that they will not have any real personalities around, and that they will depend completely on Soviet power, wherever possible also on the presence of Soviet troops, which the CPSU obviously considers the only reliable guarantee for socialism.

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"This is why the Soviet leadership has always looked with distrust toward countries which liberated themselves in their own revolutionary struggle, such as Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and also Vietnam. Wherever the country had a revolution of its own which carried the national leadership to the top from the bosom of the movement, it is by far not as easy to obtain obedience and subordination toward the center, that is, the CPSU, as it is in countries where the governments had come to power under the protection of the Soviet Army which bore the brunt of the liberation. One might say that the common denominator of this Stalinist view is the lack of confidence in the force of the revolutionary movement as well as the overestimation of the Soviet role or the endeavor to control everything and to decide everything according to subjective Soviet views as to what is good or bad for socialism -- and this in reality is not always identical to what is in the interest of Soviet big-power policy.

"Herein lies the key to the answer to the question which many people throughout the world have asked: why was it impossible, after the August 1968 invasion, to salvage at least a portion of the post-January reforms in Czechoslovakia, and why was this development reversed so abruptly and thrown back not just to the time prior to January 1968 but much further back? Why -- after 20 years -- have the old accusations been brought out again? Why were they raised this time primarily by the GDR, Poland, and Bulgaria and of course also Moscow? Why was Czechoslovakia accused in 1968 -- after the CPCZ had once again won the full authority and support of the population, when the people had spontaneously pledged themselves to socialism, when not a single enterprise had been given back to the capitalists, when not a single agricultural cooperative had collapsed, when a communist leadership, which enjoyed general popularity and natural authority, had developed? Very probably because the Soviet leadership, that is to say, its dogmatic wing -- as it had in the years 1948-1950 -- did not want to tolerate any other model of socialism. The Czechoslovak experiment had to be punished, as an example, as a warning to all others, because the Soviet leadership was now afraid that the Czechoslovak road to socialism could lead to success and could have repercussions on the USSR and other socialist countries.

"Yugoslavia is a tolerated exception because it had won its right to its own road through its own struggle in the past and because it is obviously not prepared to drop its own road; China is the excommunicated heretic and China is too strong for the Soviets to risk a Czechoslovak-style intervention; and Romania is left untouched for the time being because it proved to be determined to defend its independent policy and because it proceeds very cautiously in doing so. The tragic mistake of the Czech leadership after January consisted in the fact that it stuck to Gottwald's old basic principle of 1948 also in 1968, the principle that Czechoslovakia would not

become another Yugoslavia and would risk everything on one throw of the dice: on the understanding of the Soviet Union, in the belief that the "Yugoslav case" could not be repeated after the 20th congress of the CPSU. This is why Czechoslovakia had to pay all the more dearly for its endeavor to walk its own road to socialism.

"The fact is that the CPSU leadership today must itself play the role which the Cominform used to play and therefore relies on the discipline of the other parties. This is why it is angry not only with the Czechoslovak communists and this is why it wants to decimate their party to a small but obedient sect; it is just as hostile toward the Communist Party of Italy which, on the basis of its mass character, its bonds with the people, its participation in the parliamentary struggle, its strong political cadre and its independent ideas of socialist upheaval, constitutes a potential heretic. This is why the CPSU leadership without hesitation and consideration of the tragic consequences, practically allowed the Communist Party of Austria to fall apart and this is why it promoted the smashing of the Communist Party of Greece against which it struck a blow at the very moment when its leading representatives were jailed and tortured by the dictatorial regime of the colonels. With equal distrust it looks toward the Left in the West and the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to the extent that these movements do not want to subordinate themselves to Moscow and develop their own, local fighting and development forms."

[Underlining added]



# Das unterdrückte Dossier

**Bericht der Kommission  
des ZK der KPTsch über  
politische Prozesse  
und »Rehabilitierungen«  
in der Tschechoslowakei  
1949-1968**

**Herausgegeben von Jiří Pelikán**

Einband von Franz Stadmann

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Bleibt die Frage, ob die Änderung von Strategie und Taktik der KPTsch durch die Sektierer innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei bewerkstelligt worden sein konnte oder vor allem durch die Wendung in der gesamten sowjetischen Strategie und Taktik nach 1947, als das *Kominform* gegründet wurde. Heute weiß man, daß das *Kominform* ein Instrument zur Beherrschung der kommunistischen Parteien in den sozialistischen Ländern durch die sowjetische KP und Stalin persönlich hat sein sollen und dies auch gewesen ist. Indem es das sowjetische Sozialismusmodell zum einzig richtigen und für alle Länder obligaten Modell erklärte, verwarf und verurteilte das *Kominform* ausdrücklich alle Vorstellungen von der Möglichkeit eigener, spezifischer Wege zum Sozialismus, die schon Lenin prognostiziert hatte. Damit war der Weg frei für die mechanische Nachahmung und Übertragung des sowjetischen Modells, das aus ganz anderen historischen Voraussetzungen hervorgegangen war, auf die übrigen sozialistischen Länder. Diese Ablehnung national differenzierter Wege zum Sozialismus kam in besonders dramatischer Form 1948 zum Ausdruck, im Konflikt zwischen dem *Kominform* und der Kommunistischen Partei Jugoslawiens, die durch wirtschaftliche Blockade zur Kapitulation gezwungen werden sollte, sich jedoch tapfer zur Wehr setzte.

In der *Kominform*-Resolution gegen Jugoslawien wurden eigentlich bereits die Anklagepunkte für die kommenden politischen Prozesse angeführt: als *Verrat* oder *Verschwörung* verurteilt wurden *bürgerlicher Nationalismus* und *Kosmopolitismus*, die Unterschätzung des Klassenkampfes sowie die Hervorhebung nationaler Besonderheiten und die *Unterschätzung* des entscheidenden Anteils der Sowjetarmee an der Befreiung.

Es scheint also, daß Stalin, Rákosi, Bierut und andere Dogmatiker an der Tschechoslowakei eben deshalb Anstoß nahmen, weil die Kommunistische Partei der Tschechoslowakei national verwurzelt und also fähig war, einen eigenen, den Verhältnissen des Landes und der Volksmentalität entsprechenden und daher erfolgverheißenden Weg zum Sozialismus zu entwickeln. Offenbar fürchteten sie, das tschechoslowakische Beispiel könnte, wenn es erfolgreich wäre, ansteckend wirken und ähnliche Tendenzen in ihren Ländern hervorrufen.

Der außerordentliche Druck, gerade auf die Tschechoslowakei, und die enorme Quote politischer Morde und Liquidierungen gerade in diesem Land ist nur so zu erklären, daß Stalin und die sowjetische Führung eine KPTsch, die mit den Massen verbunden war, sich auf deren Vertrauen stützen konnte und einen Kader erfahrener, angesehener Politiker besaß, nicht brauchen konnten.

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 Wenn die Parteien in sich abgeschlossen sind, sich hauptsächlich auf administrative Macht stützen, über keine wirklichen Persönlichkeiten verfügen und völlig von der sowjetischen Macht abhängen, womöglich auch von der Anwesenheit sowjetischer Truppen, in der die KPdSU offensichtlich die einzig verlässliche Garantie für den Sozialismus sieht.

Aus diesen Gründen hat die Sowjetführung stets mit Mißtrauen auf Länder geblickt, die sich durch ihren eigenen revolutionären Kampf befreit haben, wie Jugoslawien, China, Kuba und auch Vietnam. Denn wo es die eigene Revolution gewesen ist, welche die nationale Führung aus dem Schoß der Bewegung emporgetragen hat, kann man von der Führung nicht so leicht Gehorsam und Unterordnung gegenüber dem Zentrum, das heißt der KPdSU, erreichen wie dort, wo die Regierungen eigentlich unter dem Schutz der Sowjetarmee, welche die Hauptlast der Befreiung getragen hatte, zur Macht gelangt sind. Man könnte sagen, der gemeinsame Nenner dieser Stalinschen Auffassung ist der Mangel an Vertrauen in die Kraft der revolutionären Bewegung sowie die Überschätzung der eigenen Rolle oder das Streben, alles zu kontrollieren und nach den eigenen subjektiven Anschauungen zu entscheiden, was dem Sozialismus nützt oder nicht — und das ist in Wirklichkeit nicht immer identisch mit dem, was im Interesse der sowjetischen Großmachtspolitik liegt.

Hierin liegt auch der Schlüssel zur Beantwortung der Frage, die von vielen Menschen auf der ganzen Welt gestellt wird: Warum war es nach der Invasion im August 1968 nicht möglich, in der ČSSR wenigstens einen Teil der Nachjanuar-Reformen zu retten, und warum wurde die Entwicklung so jäh, nicht nur vor den Januar 1968, sondern noch viel weiter zurückgeworfen. Warum sind wiederum — nach zwanzig Jahren die alten Anschuldigungen aufgetaucht, diesmal vor allem von der DDR, von Polen und Bulgarien und natürlich auch von Moskau erhoben. Warum beschuldigte man die Tschechoslowakei 1968, nachdem die KPTsch neuerlich die volle Autorität und die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung gewonnen, das Volk sich spontan zum Sozialismus bekannt hatte, wo kein einziger Betrieb den Kapitalisten zurückgegeben worden war, keine einzige landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaft zerfallen ist, wo eine kommunistische Führung, die allgemeine Popularität und natürliche Autorität genoß, sich herausgebildet hatte? Wohl, weil die sowjetische Führung beziehungsweise deren dogmatischer Flügel — ähnlich wie in den Jahren 1948 bis 1950 — kein anderes Sozialismus-Modell dulden wollte. Weil nun die Sowjetführung

SPYRGHI

fürchtete, der tschechoslowakische Weg zum Sozialismus könnte zum Erfolg führen und auf die UdSSR und andere sozialistische Länder zurückwirken, mußte das tschechoslowakische Experiment exemplarisch bestraft werden, allen anderen zur Warnung.

Jugoslawien ist eine tolerierte Ausnahme, weil es sich das Recht auf einen eigenen Weg bereits erkämpft hat und offenbar nicht bereit ist, darauf zu verzichten; China ist der exkommunizierte Ketzer, zu stark, als daß man an ihm einen *tschechoslowakischen Eingriff* riskieren könnte, und Rumänien wird vorläufig respektiert, weil es sich entschlossen gezeigt hat, seine unabhängige Politik zu verteidigen, und dabei sehr vorsichtig vorgeht. Der tragische Fehler der tschechischen Führung nach dem Januar bestand darin, daß sie sich auch 1968 noch an Gottwalds alten Grundsatz von 1948 hielt, die Tschechoslowakei werde *kein zweites Jugoslawien* sein, und alles auf eine Karte setzte: auf das Verständnis der Sowjetunion, in der Meinung, nach dem 20. Parteitag der KPdSU könne der *Fall Jugoslawien* sich nicht mehr wiederholen. Um so teurer mußte die Tschechoslowakei für das Unterfangen zahlen, ihren eigenen Weg zum Sozialismus gehen zu wollen.

Denn heute muß die Führung der KPdSU die Rolle, die einst das Kominform hatte, selber spielen und braucht daher die Disziplin der anderen Parteien. Darum ist sie nicht nur auf die tschechoslowakischen Kommunisten böse und will deren Partei zu einer kleinen, aber gefügigen Sekte dezimieren; ebenso feindselig verhält sie sich zur Kommunistischen Partei Italiens, die auf Grund ihres Massencharakters, ihrer Volksverbundenheit, ihrer Teilnahme am parlamentarischen Kampf, ihres starken politischen Kaders und ihrer eigenständigen Vorstellungen von der sozialistischen Umwälzung, eine potentielle Ketzerin ist. Darum ließ die Führung der KPdSU auch ohne Zögern und ohne Rücksicht auf die tragischen Folgen die Kommunistische Partei Österreichs praktisch zerfallen und förderte die Zerschlagung der Kommunistischen Partei Griechenlands, gegen die sie den Schlag in einem Augenblick führte, da deren führende Vertreter vom Diktaturregime der Obersten eingekerkert und gefoltert wurden. Mit gleichem Mißtrauen betrachtet sie die Linke im Westen und die nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika, sofern diese sich nicht Moskau unterordnen wollen und ihre eigenen, bodenständigen Kampf- und Entwicklungsformen herausbilden.

Was für die einzelnen Länder gilt, das gilt auch für Einzelpersonen. Die härteste Repression richtet sich gegen jene Kommunisten, die aktiv am Widerstandskampf daheim oder im Ausland

November 1970

JIRI PELIKAN: BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Jiri Pelikan was reported by the London Times, on October 1, 1969, to have chosen "temporary exile" in the West. His decision is further proof of the frustration suffered by many Communist intellectuals in Czechoslovakia since the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968.

Pelikan announced that he was unable to serve the present Czechoslovak leadership, and that he believed he would be able to play a more effective part in upholding the ideas of "progressive Communism" if he remained outside Czechoslovakia. But he emphasized his continuing loyalty both to his country and to his Communist ideals, saying that he intended to return to Prague as soon as free speech was restored. The Czechoslovak news agency, CTK, reported by the London Communist Morning Star on October 3, described this statement as being "in full contradiction to the teaching and policy of the Communist Party," and accused Pelikan of having "misused" Prague television "to disturb the Communist Party and the Socialist order." (Pelikan was for five years Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.)

At 46, Pelikan is a striking example of a committed Communist who supported the reforms introduced in Czechoslovakia after the fall of Novotny in January, 1968, and the weakness of the charges brought in the CTK statement indicate the embarrassment felt by the present authorities at his defection.

Highpoints of his Communist career are:

- 1940            Joined the Communist Party at age 16. Was jailed by the Nazis.
- 1940/1945      Escaped prison and spent the rest of the war fighting in the resistance.
- 1948            Entered the National Assembly when the Communists took power.
- 1953            He became General-Secretary of the Communist International Union of Students. (IUS)
- 1955/1963      He served as IUS President.
- 1964            Elected to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, where he was active on the Cultural and Foreign Affairs Committees.
- 1968            Became President of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
- 1963/1968      He served as Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.
- 1969            Served as Cultural Counsellor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Rome.

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SOVIET ARMS AND COLONIALISMVaudeville Is Dead

Does the impulse of the expansionistic Tzarist drive toward empire beat on in the breasts of the present Soviet leaders? Are they about to give birth to an idea, colonialism, long after its death?

Historians and political scientists agree that the classic era of Kiplingesque empire building ended long ago, except in the minds of Soviet ideologues and activists. These worthies have the curious tendency to see in their principal opponents a reflected image of themselves; time after time in their propaganda they accuse the U.S. of faults inherent in their own society, such as racism (They built a ghetto university for their African students and cannot establish a modus vivendi with their Chinese coreligionists) and repressive police statism (Soviet dissenters will vouch for their own government's preeminence in this field) - and lastly, they accuse the U.S. of having aggressive global intentions. They are sure the Americans aspire to world power and dominion over foreign peoples, but they demonstrate by their own acts that the urge is within themselves.

The Germans, the French, the Italians and the British have for one reason or another put away the uniforms and trappings of overseas rule. The Portuguese empire, though diminished, hangs on - for how long nobody knows. In the interest of historical considerations, popular sentiment and economic good sense the United States since World War II has entered an era of retrenchment by taking a hard look at its great-power commitments and obligations, both military and otherwise, and by returning political self-determination to those from whom it was taken, as in the case of the Philippines and of Okinawa. America's objective is not one of control but of enlightened self-interest and the mutual benefit of economic partners. Colonialism, like vaudeville, has been confined to the dustbin by most of the major powers.

But, incredible as it might seem, there is a mighty bustling about in the wings and apparently ignoring the change in times, the Russians are going to give a performance in empire, in physical expansion, in overseas rule by satraps. The main evidence of this lies in the pace of Soviet rearmament, not just in strategic weaponry but in the field of conventional arms as well. In the latter the Soviet Union has long maintained a strong status in such landbased conventional

weapons as tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry. However, not satisfied with its current great-power status Russia, historically a land power, now for the first time since her defeat at the hands of the Japanese at the turn of the century has begun to eye prizes across the oceans.

The Sun Never Sets...

To move out from home bases into wider areas of the world Russia needs power, and power she has - more power than she needs. Present Soviet nuclear stockpiles are awesome. Despite their power the Soviets maintain a forced rate of missile construction, the reason for which is quite obvious when one thinks in terms of their colonial ambitions. A nuclear shield nearly equal to that of the U.S. is adequate for a balance of terror: neither side can move into an area of vital concern to the other. But this is precisely what the Soviets dream of doing - of being able to undertake any actions that might suit them at any place in the world they chose. They seek, in short, ultimate world domination, and for that they need more than a balance of terror. They need a nuclear umbrella over their conventional forces so large that no power or combination of powers could even dream of brow-beating them into retreating from an aggressive course of action, as was the case in Cuba in 1962. Then they would be free to move their conventional forces anywhere they chose at any time.

These conventional forces on land are already reaching the point of providing two-front protection. Nuclear and technical inferiority keep the Chinese infantry masses in a respectful military posture to the east, checkmated by a highly mechanized Soviet counterforce. To the west is NATO, its forces just equal to the task of keeping the bear at bay, but a force completely inadequate for any aggressive Western designs on Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union itself. Left over in between are sufficient pools of military and technical personnel to provide an increasing flow of manpower for "advisory cadres" manning rocket and fighter aircraft forces in countries like the Sudan, Egypt, and Cuba.

All that is missing to complete the image of a very modern empire is a blue-water navy. Now with the appearance of just such a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, etc., we have a very convincing image. As with the missile program, so with the ship construction plans. While the Soviet navy still ranks second to the U.S. navy in tonnage and overall combat power, it has been steadily closing the gap and already has sufficient forces to seize and secure continuing right of passage through all the major sea lanes of the world.



Without major naval bases on foreign soil all that has been attributed to the Soviets above does not make them a colonial power. But the bases are there - at Santiago in Cuba, at Alexandria in Egypt, at Port Sudan and coming soon in Mauritius and Socotra, and perhaps eventually at Mers el Kebir, Algeria. So, the Soviet sea lanes already have secure terminals in land areas firmly under political, military and economic control. This structure has all the oddity of a live mastadon- a classic colonial empire is evolving in our time.

#### White Man's Burden

The teachings of Marx and Lenin prove conclusively that none of the foregoing can possibly be true. There is no Soviet vaudeville show; there can be no mastadon. Colonialism was a logical, historical outgrowth of the evils of capitalism. Under the more advanced state of a Marxist-Leninist society the exploitation of man by man is impossible, the exploitation of a backward people by the Communist Motherland unthinkable. Therefore our view of Soviet activities is a misapprehension. What we take to be political control in; say, Cuba is simply the provision of an opportunity for the disciplined study of higher truths (for those who don't escape) beneficently supplied by Russian comrades. What we take to be military control in, say, Czechoslovakia is nothing more than a response to a plea for aid in suppressing political hooliganism. As for economic control, no right-thinking person would believe that Soviet personnel would tell the Egyptians how to manage the Aswan Dam or the Helwan Steel Works just because they were built with Soviet capital, or tell the Egyptian army when, where, and how to fight with its billions of dollars worth of Soviet equipment.

When the French and British empires collapsed, the Soviets felt a brotherly compulsion to come to the aid of destitute peoples ill-used by centuries of exploitation. Whereas the Western powers, during the post-colonial era, have supplied billions worth of developmental capital and goods to these peoples, the Soviet Union after half a century of scientific planning, found itself short of both of these commodities. It did, however, have sufficient military goods, and it could present itself as a developmental example with people to advise on its emulation. No thought of national gain was countenanced at any time. Fired by altruism, the Soviet economy, half the size of that of the U.S. in gross national product, has been making twice the effort of the U.S. to do that which it could do best (or wanted to do most), build armaments with which to strengthen its approaches to those less privileged and fortunate peoples it wished to protect and advise.

Of course there are commodities available in some of these countries which could prove highly useful to the home economy, oil, minerals and foods and fibers. So it is quite possible that we will see iron galleons flying the hammer and sickle beating home to Odessa, Leningrad and Vladivostok with cargoes of the modern equivalents of Inca gold and plate in ever-increasing numbers. They've already begun to move. When these treasure fleets become large enough to enable the Soviets to materially ease the impoverished situation of their own citizens they may be able to accumulate enough capital and enough goods to treat with overseas nations on the basis of modern economic internationalism. Until then (and if the transition ever occurs it will be far in the future, to judge from the present sluggish Soviet economic performance and the scope of their ambitions) we have a grand old-fashioned show onstage.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
19 October 1970

## CPYRCHP Russia and defense spending

**T**HE series of articles on Russia's unprecedented military buildup in peacetime, written by Scripps-Howard defense specialist Mike Miller and appearing in The Washington Daily News, is important and disquieting reading. (See Page 3.)

Briefly, Mr. Miller's findings are that the Kremlin is making a massive military effort right across the board. It has either surpassed us or is rapidly catching up in strategic missiles, nuclear submarines, naval surface craft and supersonic fighters. Also, the Soviet Union has long had a lead in such conventional items as tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry.

The implications of the Soviet buildup are disturbing. The United States clearly had nuclear superiority in the mid-1960s. The Johnson and Nixon administrations opted to freeze the building of intercontinental ballistic missiles and to let the Russians close the gap.

The theory was that Moscow would be satisfied with "parity" and the nuclear arms race could thus be brought to a halt. Unfortunately, in practice the Russians have shown few signs of slowing down. Their momentum is such that they threaten to move clearly ahead in nuclear striking power.

Why is the Kremlin driving its subjects so hard? We don't pretend to know, and we worry over these questions: If the United States had trouble with the Russians in the 1960s, when it had nuclear superiority, what will the 1970s be like when its advantage is lost? Can the Kremlin be trusted to have a military lead and not try pressure plays

against our allies in Europe or this country itself?

This should not be taken as a call to resume the arms race. The Soviet-American strategic arms limitation (SALT) talks have shown signs of progress and remain a hope of mankind. But if the SALT talks do not reach agreement in about a year and Russia maintains its thrust for primacy, the United States will have to rethink its defense policy.

Ironically, President Nixon, often attacked as a hawk, has been the only recent president to cut the defense budget seriously. His proposed 1971 defense spending of \$71.8 billion is \$6 billion under 1970.

Foes of defense spending in Congress think the Pentagon can make further savings and have cut \$2 billion more from its budget. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird insists that the cut causes intolerable risk, that the 1971 budget was already "rock bottom, bare bones."

Altho there usually is fat in Pentagon budgets, this time Mr. Laird may be right. We'll have more confidence in the bare-bones claims, tho, when the Pentagon starts firing brass hats who cover up costs overruns and not the auditors who expose them.

There's a point of view in Congress and the nation that regard defense spending as waste that robs money from social purposes. But the way Russia has been evidencing adventure and seeking arms supremacy, the defense budget looks like a life-insurance premium that we must pay.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
20 October 1970

Soviet pushing subs

# U. S. faces missile gap

By MIKE MILLER  
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

The Soviet Union, after years of playing catch-up to the United States in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, now is plunging ahead.

A big question confronting U.S. defense planners is where the Soviet ICBM buildup eventually will stop.

Previously the Soviets have launched a drive to catch and possibly surpass the U.S. in numbers of strategic nuclear submarines and submarine-fired nuclear missiles.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird says the United States will have to proceed with some major new strategic weapons system, possibly beginning next year, if the Soviet buildup continues unabated and no agreement emerges from the strategic arms limitation talks.

Already the United States is deploying multiple warheads on some of its missiles in a giant step forward in the arms race. Each warhead on these missiles can be fired at a different target.

The Soviet Union has deployed more than 1,300 ICBMs and is continuing at the rate of at least 150 per year. The United States has 1,054 and is holding at that level, altho 500 of these are to be armed with three separately targetable warheads each.

The Soviet monster SS9 missile concerns U.S. defense officials most. The Russians have more than 300 SS9S operational and under construction.

The Soviet arsenal also includes almost 800 SS11 missiles. These are comparable to the U.S. Minuteman missile which carries a warhead of slightly more than one megaton. In comparison, the huge SS9 could carry either one 25-megaton warhead or three warheads of five megatons each plus guidance equipment.

## SPACE BOMBER TESTED

Russia also continues to test-fire a potential terror weapon known as a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). This vehicle achieves orbit like a satellite. It could be used to orbit a nuclear warhead over the United States repeatedly. However, U.S. officials believe the Soviets would fire it down on the first pass to achieve surprise and attempt to reduce radar warning time. The Soviets are also testing a low-trajectory ICBM with the like purpose of cutting down radar warning time.

The United States has 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 older Titans. The U.S. arsenal includes nothing comparable to the SS9. Because the SS9 warhead is much more powerful than necessary to destroy cities, Mr. Laird

and other defense officials believe it might be designed as a first-strike weapon against the Minuteman force in its underground silos. This led the administration to begin deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system to protect Minuteman.

The Russians have 700 intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles — 70 believed targeted against Red China and 630 against Western Europe. The United States used to maintain these types of missiles in Europe but phased them out as obsolescent in view of the ICBM buildup.

Russia has deployed 13 of its latest model Yankee-class strategic nuclear submarines. Like the U.S. Polaris force, these carry 16 missiles each. At least 15 more Yankee-class submarines are under construction, and the Pentagon estimates these will join the fleet at the rate of about eight per year. At that rate, Mr. Laird notes, the Soviet missile submarine fleet will surpass the 41-boat Polaris fleet by 1973 or 1974.

All but 10 of the U.S. Polaris submarines will be converted to fire Poseidon missiles, a weapon with 10 separately targetable warheads. Thus each submarine, which now carries 16 nuclear warheads on the same number of missiles, will be armed with 160 warheads.

## LEAD IN BOMBERS

The 540 U.S. strategic bombers give this country a big lead in that field, altho U.S. bomber strength has been reduced from 780 five years ago. The Soviets have 200 long-range bombers, about 50 of which are configured as tankers.

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, claims to have intelligence reports that Russia is building a new bomber fleet. The United States has awarded a contract for some test models of a new bomber, dubbed the B1, but

no final decision has been made on whether to build it.

The Russians have an ABM system operational around Moscow consisting of 64 missile launchers. Some U.S. officials have warned Russia might also be able to convert some of its more than 10,000 antiaircraft missiles to ABMS.

The U.S. ABM system so far consists of construction work on two sites and recent congressional approval for work on a third site. The system will not be fully operational before the mid-1970s, assuming continued congressional approval.

The Soviet Union has tested multiple war-

heads in the Pacific on both SS9 and SS11 missiles, altho these warheads have not been confirmed as separately targetable. Mr. Laird predicts Russia could have a MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capability by next year.

## DISCLOSE FEARS

In arguing for the Safeguard ABM and other strategic programs, Mr. Laird and other defense officials describe this scenario:

- A massive force of MIRVed SS9 blockbusters with multiple warheads and increased accuracy could destroy all or most of the U.S. ICBM force in a surprise attack.

- Submarine-launched missiles would destroy the U.S. bomber force before it could get airborne. From off the U.S. coasts these missiles would have a flight time of only six to nine minutes to the airfields — not enough time for the bombers to receive radar and take off.

- With the ICBMs and bombers only the missiles of the Polaris/Poseidon would remain intact in the U.S. strategic arsenal.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
19 October 1970

## Big Soviet expansion

# Arms buildup worries U.S.

By MIKE MILLER

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Russia is forging ahead with what U.S. defense officials describe as the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.

From strategic nuclear missiles and submarines to conventional ships and planes, the Soviet military effort is impressive. U.S. officials view it with growing concern.

The United States still ranks as the world's foremost military power. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is so powerful this country could destroy the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange even if Russia hit first in a surprise attack. This power to retaliate should be sufficient to deter the Russians from attacking for the time being.

But U.S. defense experts are concerned over the momentum of the Russian effort on all fronts, particularly strategic nuclear missiles and sea power. If the Russians continue to build and the United States does not take some countermeasures, the experts fear Russia will reach such a superior position in five years or more that it might attempt nuclear blackmail of the United States.

### FEAR SOVIET SUPERIORITY

"If present trends continue," President Nixon told a private congressional briefing during the recent fight over the antiballistic missile system, "the United States a very few years hence will find itself clearly in second position — with the Soviet Union undisputedly the greatest military power on earth."

"I am afraid the day has already arrived," said Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., the superhawk chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in reference to the President's warning during a recent House speech on the Soviet threat.

"If they (the Russians) keep this momentum going," says Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, "they will be in a position where they will have a superior force and we will have a second-rate force. This concerns me because a decision to build new strategic weapons takes five to seven years to implement."

### RUSSIA SPENDS MORE

According to the best available estimates, Russia's military spending of about \$80 billion annually, including the military aspects of its space program, surpasses that of the United States if costs of the Vietnam war are discounted. The Administration's defense request for this fiscal year is \$71.8 billion. While the

Vietnam war costs have not been disclosed for this year, they apparently more than account for the difference in the Soviet and U.S. budgets.

Mr. Laird interprets the defense spending figures to mean that Russia is making twice the defense "effort" of the United States because her gross national product is only about half that of this country.

Further comparison shows the United States spent \$7.5 billion last year on strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems — the hardware that figures in a nuclear war — while the Soviets spent \$13 billion for strategic systems. Rep. Rivers says the additional \$5.5 billion spent by the Russians for strategic hardware in one year would pay for about 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles like the U.S. Minuteman.

### RESEARCH CITED

Of greatest concern to many officials is Russia's margin in spending for military research and development. The United States will spend \$13 billion to \$14 billion for that purpose this year; the Soviet Union will spend \$16 billion to \$17 billion. The U.S. research and development budget has leveled off and is declining; the Soviet budget for these activities is rising at the rate of 10 to 13 per cent a year.

"The picture here is a sobering one," says Dr. John S. Foster Jr., the Defense Department's research and development chief. "It is today's research and development that provides tomorrow's weapons — for 1975 and beyond — and provides also a capability to understand early and counter quickly the qualitative weapons improvements on the other side."

Military pay in the Soviet armed forces is lower than the compensation for U.S. servicemen. Therefore, a greater share of Russia's defense budget goes for weapons.

Russia has about 3.3 million men in its regular forces. The U.S. active military strength has declined to about three million from a high of more than 3.5 million at the peak of the Vietnam buildup. The U.S. force is scheduled to continue delining to somewhere between two million and 2.5 million.

### MISSILE CRISIS RECALLED

In assessing relative military strengths of the United States and Russia, the comparison inevitably is made between today's balance and the situation as it existed at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

When the late President John F. Kennedy demanded under threat of nuclear war that the Russians withdraw their missiles from Cuba, the Soviets had to comply because they were an inferior nuclear power. Their navy also lacked the power to challenge the U.S. blockade of Cuba so are from the Soviet homeland.

The Russians suffered such extreme humiliation in the 1962 crisis that Soviet leaders resolved to build such a military power that they would never have to back down again. Now, eight years later, the United States is witnessing the results of that resolve.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

21 October 1970

# Reds threaten sea supremacy

By MIKE MILLER

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Russia's growing fleet of modern combat ships and submarines poses a serious challenge to the U. S. Navy's supremacy of the seas.

The Soviet navy already has seized a clear lead in some important phases of sea power — principally total submarine strength and fast, missile-firing gunboats.

While the Red navy still ranks second to the United States in tonnage and overall combat power, it steadily has been closing the gap. This trend is being accelerated by the Defense Department's retirement of large numbers of older vessels to hold down military spending.

Russia's fleet is much more modern than that of the United States. Only an insignificant number of Russia's more than 1,000 surface



combat ships and submarines are more than 20 years old. The U. S. Navy has had to operate in recent years with more than half of its surface combat ships more than 20 years old.

Navy officials have estimated that a ship construction program costing \$35 billion over 10 years will be necessary to keep pace. Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S. C., House Armed Services Committee chairman, says the Navy has told him privately a faster crash program totalling \$25 billion in the next five years is needed.

Russia has more than 350 operational submarines, including the 13 Yankee-class strategic nuclear missile-firing submarines comparable to the U. S. Polaris. The Defense Department says intelligence reports indicate the Soviets may be building a submarine base in Cuba to serve these vessels. Yankee-class submarines, carrying 16 missiles each, already have begun patrols in the Atlantic within missile range of the United States.

Forty of the Soviet submarines — nine of them nuclear-powered — are older models which carry three ballistic missiles each. These are believed to be targeted against Europe and Asia.

Sixty-five of Russia's submarines — 35 of them nuclear-powered — are equipped with supersonic cruise missiles with ranges up to 400 miles. They are designed for firing at an enemy's naval and merchant ships. This missile is unique to the Soviet Navy.

The other 240 Soviet submarines are attack models with the wartime mission of firing torpedoes at surface ships and other submarines; 22 of these are nuclear-powered.

All of Russia's submarines are of post-World War II vintage.

Based on information he says was supplied

by the Pentagon, Rep. Rivers estimates the Soviet nuclear submarine construction capacity at from 20 to 35 per year. The Soviets now are producing 10 to 14 submarines annually. One Russian submarine yard has greater capacity than all of the U. S. submarine yards combined.

American admirals grimly recall in public speeches that Nazi Germany had only 57 diesel submarines in early World War II but exacted a heavy toll of allied shipping and almost won the battle of the Atlantic.

Other features of the modern Soviet navy include two helicopter carriers used for anti-submarine warfare maneuvers, 30 guided-missile destroyers, 120 of the fast, missile-firing gunboats and 700 smaller patrol craft and gunboats used for coastal defense.

Many Soviet vessels, including small patrol boats, carry the STYX missile with which the Egyptians sank an Israeli destroyer in the Mediterranean Sea. The United States has no comparable missile and has been working hard to develop a defense against the STYX.

Against the Soviet fleet of more than 350 submarines, the United States has 147 submarines. Eighty-eight of these are nuclear-powered — the 41 Polaris strategic missile-firing boats and 47 nuclear-powered attack submarines. The remaining 59 attack submarines are older Diesel models.

However, the United States has not tried to match Russia in total numbers of submarines, nor does the Navy contend that this is necessary. The United States relies on naval aircraft and surface vessels for a major portion of its antisubmarine warfare activities.

For years Russian admirals have boasted that the United States will have to share the world's oceans with its growing fleet. That already has happened in the Mediterranean, where the Red fleet matches the U. S. 6th Fleet in size altho not in combat power because of the U. S. aircraft carriers.

The Soviets also have begun penetrating the Caribbean with periodic voyages, held a massive 200-ship worldwide naval exercise earlier this year and have extended naval operations into the Indian Ocean and widespread areas of the Atlantic and Pacific far from their home shores.

The U. S. Navy's principal margin in combat power lies in its force of 15 attack aircraft carriers. The Russians have no aircraft carriers. However, the U. S. Navy is under increasing pressure in Congress to reduce its carrier fleet to hold down defense spending. Carriers are extremely costly.

Example: One nuclear aircraft carrier now under construction will cost about \$600 million.

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 October 1970

## Italians Bolt Communist Party To Join a New Ultraleft Group

By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Oct. 11—A left-wing revolt in the rank and file of the Italian Communist party, the strongest in the West, appears to be spreading. Many members, especially younger ones, are disgruntled over the way the party reacted to President Nixon's visit here, and this is cited as a major reason for a spate of defections during the last few days.

The Communists who have left the party recently, including some well-known local and regional organizers, have generally joined a year-old ultra-left group, known as Manifesto, which seems well on its way to becoming Italy's second Communist party.

Manifesto is named after the group's monthly magazine, which has a paid circulation of 30,000. The growing splinter movement accuses the Soviet Union of seeking an accommodation with the United States, and the Italian Communist party of seeking to strike a deal with the Government to become a part of the power structure.

The Manifesto group has accused the Communist party of failing to commit itself during President Nixon's visit, and the party seems to be hurting from the criticism.

The party sponsored a parade and rally in Rome on Sept. 26, the day before President Nixon arrived here, to protest against what it denounced as his attempts to implicate Italy in an imperialist, pro-Israel plot in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A crowd estimated at 5,000 to 10,000 people participated in the demonstration, which

looked rather perfunctory and caused no major disturbances. The Communist party asserted afterward that radical students and Maoists had boycotted its anti-Nixon rally. Students and other ultraleftists demonstrated on their own against Mr. Nixon before and during his sojourn here, attacking American-operated offices and cars, and rampaging in downtown Rome. Some 1,000 rioters were detained, but most of them were released after questioning.

The official Communist party also drew ultraleftist scorn for an editorial in its main newspaper, Lunita. The editorial said that President Nixon, though unwelcome in capitalist Italy, might be welcome in Communist Yugoslavia, which he visited on the next stage of his European tour.

During the last week, hardly a day passed with the Communist headquarters in Rome receiving reports of new desertions of individual party members or entire groups.

The latest defectors were eight prominent Communists in Venice, including a secretary of the local party federation, Pietro Granziera, and the secretary of the Giudecca district, Walter Parmeggiani. The eight are said to have taken a sizable following in the rank and file over to the Manifesto group.

Four days earlier, a group of Bergamo Communists, including a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Eliseo Milani, joined the Manifesto movement. Mr. Milani was the sixth Communist deputy to declare himself independent of the party.

[World Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC) Preparatory Meeting]

CPYRGHT

MTI (Hungarian press agency), Budapest  
30 September 1970

Representatives of 45 communist and workers parties exchanged views in Budapest 28-30 September 1970 on topical questions regarding the anti-imperialist struggle.

The delegations expressed their parties readiness to make efforts to strengthen the cohesion of the communists and other anti-imperialist organizations, to widen their cooperation on the basis of equality, and to intensify their solidarity in joint struggle against imperialism.

The meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of objectivity and in a spirit of comradeship and solidarity.

L'HUMANITE, Paris  
23 September 1970

MEETING OF THE CP'S FROM THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE

Took Place in London

On 21 September 1970 a meeting of communist parties from European capitalist countries took place in London. Representatives of the FRG, Cypriot, Spanish French, British, Greek, Irish, Italian, and Netherlands communist parties were present.

After discussing problems arising from the development of multinational societies, these representatives expressed their opinion that a conference of communist parties from European capitalist countries should take place in London from 11 through 13 January 1971. "The struggle of the working class in European capitalist countries with regard to the development of multinational societies" is to be on the conference's agenda.

The proposals advanced at the meeting are being submitted for the approval of the central committees of the parties concerned, including parties which were unable to participate in this meeting and which wrote in order to make known their approval of the idea of such a conference.

(The PCF was represented in London by Central Committee member Jacques Denis).



LE MONDE, Paris  
16 September 1970

The French Communist Party "Opposition" Is  
Going To Reactivate Its Operation

Announces Mr. Jean Poperen

CPYRGHT  
In the bulletin, Synthèse-Flash, published by the Socialist Study, Research, and Information Clubs (ex-UGCS), Mr. Jean Poperen, who is the moving spirit of this association, gives his opinion on the internal situation of the French Communist Party. Specifically, he writes: "On the internal plane, the upswing of the French Communist Party, begun in 1965, seems to have been halted for an indeterminate period. The Communists are not retreating, but must be content with exploiting the opinions of traditional "malcontents." Recruitment is stagnating; militants are no longer giving evidence of the same enthusiasm with respect to attending meetings, distributing party literature, or pasting up posters.

Mr. Poperen continues: "This standstill could nevertheless be jostled in forthcoming weeks. In fact, a sector of the left which has been very discreet for several years within the Communist opposition, has received new impetus after the expulsion of Garaudy and of Tillon. These expulsions and the persistence of malaise within the Communist Party seem to have galvanized traditional activists. In recent months, an initial regrouping took place, first of all with Garaudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau, and Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont.

Shortly thereafter, a majority of the militants of the "Unir Débat" group, specifically Marcel Prenant and Jean Chaintron, stated that they had joined the initiative of the above-mentioned four in behalf of a "Twentieth De-Stalinization Congress"...

Mr. Poperen also specifies: "In December, the opposition will hold a national conference where they will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. On this occasion, they will try to define their internal and external Communist Party strategy. As of now, they have contacted other groups, particularly the PSU (Unified Socialist Party). The appearance, on 8 October, of Politique Hebdo, put out by activists of all Socialist organizations, including former members of the Communist Party, will provide possibly significant support to these campaigns."

CPYRGHT

L'HUMANITE, Paris  
23 September 1970

## Une réunion de P.C. des pays capitalistes d'Europe a eu lieu à Londres

**U**NE réunion de Partis communistes des pays capitalistes d'Europe a eu lieu à Londres le lundi 21 septembre. Etaient présents des représentants des Partis communistes d'Allemagne Fédérale, Chypre, Espagne, France, Grande-Bretagne, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Pays-Bas.

Après avoir discuté des problèmes posés par le développement des sociétés multinationales, les représentants présents ont exprimé l'opinion qu'une conférence des Partis communistes des pays capitalistes d'Europe devrait se tenir à Londres les 11, 12 et 13 janvier 1971 avec pour ordre du jour : « La lutte de la classe ouvrière des pays capitalistes d'Europe devant le développement des sociétés multinationales. »

Les suggestions avancées par la réunion sont soumises à l'approbation des comités centraux des Partis concernés, y compris ceux qui ne furent pas en mesure de participer à cette consultation et qui ont écrit pour faire connaître leur approbation de l'idée d'une telle conférence.

(Le Parti Communiste Français était représenté à Londres par Jacques Denis, membre du Comité Central.)

LE MONDE, Paris  
16 September 1970

## Les « oppositionnels » du P.C.F. vont relancer leur action

annonce M. Jean Poperen

Dans le bulletin *Synthèse-Flash*, publié par les clubs Etudes, Recherches et Information socialiste (ex-U.G.C.S.), M. Jean Poperen, qui anime cette association, donne son opinion sur la situation interne du parti communiste français. Il écrit notamment : « Sur le plan intérieur, la remontée du P.C.F., amorcée en 1965, semble stoppée pour une période indéterminée. Les communistes ne reculent pas, mais doivent se contenter de capitaliser les voix des « mécontents » traditionnels. Le recrutement stagne, les militants ne font plus preuve de la même ardeur à assister aux réunions, à distribuer des tracts ou à coller des affiches. »

M. Poperen poursuit : « Cet immobilisme pourrait toutefois bien être bousculé dans les semaines à venir. En effet, un secteur de la gauche, très discret depuis plusieurs années, celui de l'opposition communiste, a reçu un coup neuf après l'exclusion de Garaudy et de Tillon. Ces exclusions et la persistance du malaise à l'intérieur du P.C. semblent

avoir galvanisé les militants traditionnels. Durant ces derniers mois, un premier regroupement a eu lieu, tout d'abord avec Garaudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau et Maurice Kriegel-Vairimont.

» Peu après, la majorité des militants du groupe Unir Débat, notamment Marcel Prenant et Jean Chaintron, déclaraient s'associer à l'initiative des quatre précédents en faveur d'un « vingtième congrès de la désalinisation »...

M. Poperen précise d'autre part : « Au mois de décembre, les oppositionnels tiendront une conférence nationale où ils fêteront le cinquantième anniversaire de la fondation du P.C. A cette occasion, ils tenteront de définir leur stratégie à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du P.C. D'ores et déjà, ils ont pris contact avec d'autres formations et en particulier avec le P.S.U. La sortie, le 8 octobre, de Politique hebdo, dirigé par des militants de toutes les organisations socialistes, dont des anciens du P.C., constituera un soutien éventuel important à ces campagnes ».

## DATES WORTH NOTING

November 7	Moscow	Anniversary of the October Revolution.
November 9-11	Tripoli	Meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. AAPSO is a Communist-dominated, pro-Soviet organization based in Cairo and headed by Yusuf el Sebai (AAPSO Secretary-General) of the UAR. In late June in Rome, AAPSO co-sponsored with the World Peace Council an International Conference in Support of the Fighting Peoples of the Portugese Colonies.
November 10	Latin America	Latin America Student Strike for Vietnam, being promoted by the (Communist) World Federation of Democratic Youth and the (Communist) International Union of Students. The date is to coincide with the 25th anniversary of WFDY's founding in 1945. November 10 will also be the eve of International Student Week (Nov. 11-17) adopted by IUS after WW II as an annual student commemoration of the mass student demonstrations in Prague in Nov. 1939 protesting the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and the death of a Czech medical student, Jan Opletal, killed that week in a street clash between students and occupying forces. Thirty years later, the Prague-based IUS was witness to new mass student demonstrations and the death of another Czech student, Jan Palach, who set himself afire in downtown Prague, January 16, 1969, to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November 14	Sino-Soviet border	Anniversary of the signing in 1860 of the Treaty of Peking, by which Russia gained 841,500 square kilometres along the lower Amur River and east of the Ussuri River, areas initially penetrated by Russia 200 years earlier and thereafter intermittently contested by troops of the Tzarist and Manchu

Empires. Communist China characterizes the Treaty of Peking as one of the "unequal treaties," and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in recent years have occurred along segments of the border established by this treaty.

November 15            New Delhi            4th Afro-Asian Writers Conference sponsored by the Cairo-based, pro-Soviet, Communist front, the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau. This meeting has been long-delayed (the 3rd conference was in 1967), because the Sino-Soviet split ruptured the Bureau.

Mid-November        New York            The UN General Assembly will take its annual vote on Chinese representation. Apparently, for the first time, there is a possibility Peking may gain a majority of UNGA votes, but probably not the two-thirds required for an "Important Question" vote.

November 27-  
December 3        Southeast Asia      Pope Paul VI to visit Manila November 27-29, Sydney November 30-December 3, and possibly Ceylon on his return to the Vatican.

December 4        Venezuela            The Venezuelan Communist Party is to hold its 4th Congress. Interest is focused on the outcome of long-standing factional differences between the majority pro-Soviet faction and a faction led by Teodoro Petkoff, Central Committee member, who in a recent book advocated a Venezuelan national brand of Communism and rejection of the Soviet model. He earlier wrote a book criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 20 October, Pravda denounced Petkoff's "anti-Sovietism."

December 10

Stockholm

Awarding of the Nobel Prizes. The Soviet author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, is to be awarded the prize for literature. The American agronomist, Dr. Norman E. Borlaug, is to be awarded the prize for peace for his great contribution to the agricultural "green revolution."

# SOLJENITSYNE

## GRANDEUR ET LIMITES D'UN HUMANISME

**I**L est difficile de juger calmement de l'œuvre de Soljénitsyne, entre l'antisoviétisme des campagnes qui ont préparé et exploitent l'attribution du Prix Nobel, et l'« affaire » qui en U.R.S.S. a conduit à la mesure administrative le privant du titre d'écrivain.

CPYROHTI

L'autre, pourtant, ne devrait faire oublier qu'il est question d'une œuvre, discutabile sans doute, mais considérable, à tous les sens du mot.

Les coups de marteau sur un rail des premières lignes d'« Une journée d'Ivan Denisovitch » (1) sonnaient un début qui ne pouvait passer inaperçu. Il est vrai que rien n'allait être plus terrible à lire pour un communiste : le récit, minute par minute, d'un simple jour, et même plutôt moins malheureux que d'autres, d'un simple détenu dans un de ces camps de concentration où des hommes comme l'auteur passèrent de longues années, avant d'être réhabilités après 1956. Mais tout ce qui disait, dans son irrécusable et impitoyable détail, la vérité crue de cette journée, parmi tant d'autres, débouchait précisément sur cette autre vérité : tout le roman écrit au présent s'achevait sur un petit verbe de rien du tout dont le passé signifiait beaucoup plus qu'il pouvait sembler : « De ces journées, il y en eut 3.653. » C'est au passé qu'il fallait désormais parler de ces injustices.

**D**ANS cet esprit pouvait se remarquer tout ce qui, dans ce livre, portait critique de ce passé au nom du socialisme même. Tel prisonnier criant à des gardiens : « Vous n'êtes pas des Soviétiques ! Vous n'êtes pas des communistes ! »

Mais surtout, un ton nouveau, et pour qui accédait au texte original, une écriture nouvelle, attireraient l'attention. Et cela n'était pas étranger au fait que le héros ainsi suivi de près, Ivan Choukhov, était un homme du peuple. Rien de plus déchirant, au cœur de ce livre déchirant, que cette page admirable, où paradoxalement c'est comme « héros positif » que Choukhov nous touche au plus profond : cet amour de son travail qui survit en lui en dépit de tout.

« Toute chose et toute peine comptent pour lui, il ne peut pas admettre que ça se perde pour rien.

« Ciment ! parpaing ! ciment ! parpaing !  
« ...Choukhov, l'escorte pourrait bien lui lâcher les chiens dessus, il faut quand même qu'il prenne du recul en vitesse pour jeter un coup d'œil. Ça peut aller. Ensuite, il se rapproche en courant et regarde par-dessus le mur, à gauche, à droite. Le compas dans l'œil ! Bien droit ! Le tour de main est toujours là ! »

Le même caractère se retrouvait dans « La Maison de Matriona » (2), où c'est lui surtout qui conférerait vraisemblance et émotion à la peinture au noir de la vie d'un coin de campagne soviétique, en réaction, assez systématique, contre bien des peintures au rose des

kolkhozes et sovkhozes. La vieille et pauvre paysanne était sœur profonde de Choukhov, et par exemple justement sur ce point : « Je l'avais remarqué, elle avait un sûr moyen de retrouver sa belle humeur, c'était le travail. Aussitôt, elle empoignait sa pelle et bêchait la podterre. Ou bien elle prenait un sac sous le bras et allait chercher de la tourbe. Ou encore, avec une corbeille d'écorce, cueillir des baies dans une forêt éloignée. Et non point faire la courbette à des bureaux d'administrations, mais aux buissons de la forêt. »

**E**T désormais cela ne changera guère. Lieutenant, professeur, médecin ou ouvrier, il y aura toujours au moins dans les livres de Soljénitsyne ces personnages qui ne sauraient être les ennemis du Zotov de « L'Inconnu de Kretchétoûka », au moins partageant avec lui un amour immense de la patrie.

« Zotov non plus ne tenait pas à sauver sa vie depuis qu'avait commencé la guerre. Le sens de sa petite vie se mesurait à l'aide qu'il pouvait apporter à la révolution... En réchapper pour lui-même était dépourvu de sens. Pour sa femme et pour son futur enfant, cela n'était pas non plus indispensable. Mais si les Allemands arrivaient jusqu'au lac Baïkal et qu'un miracle lui eût conservé la vie, Zotov savait qu'il irait à pied en Chine par Kiakhta, ou en Inde, ou bien qu'il franchirait l'océan, il partirait dans le seul but de s'intégrer à des unités qui auraient repris des forces et de retourner, les armes à la main, en Russie, en Europe. »

**E**T si le titre de la nouvelle « Pour le bien de la cause » est loin de pouvoir se prendre au pied de la lettre, comme une profession de foi, s'il contient surtout la critique de dirigeants qui couvrent sous la formule des décisions parfois injustifiables, celui qui, à la fin, la reprend à son compte, pour avoir avec elle le dernier mot, n'en est pas moins Fedor Mikhéévitch, directeur d'un institut, qui, avec l'aide du secrétaire du comité de ville du Parti, Gradchikov, combat une de ces décisions. Ce même Gradchikov à qui il revient d'en formuler les raisons : « Mais en fin de compte, à quoi tenons-nous le plus ? Aux pierres ou aux hommes ?... Ce n'est pas dans les pierres, c'est dans les hommes que nous devons édifier le communisme. »

C'est cet humanisme de Soljénitsyne qui devait éclater dans toutes ses dimensions — mais aussi apparaître dans ses limites — avec le grand roman intitulé « Le Pavillon des cancéreux » (3), le plus sombre sans doute de ses livres en même temps que le plus riche de sympathie, de compassion et de compréhension pour, les douleurs des hommes. « Qui êtes-vous ? », demande-t-on à Oleg Kostoglotov, héros du livre, autre frère profond de Chou-

khov et Matriona. « Un homme... répondit-il à mi-voix, indolemment. » Et la grande question que la proximité de la mort fait se poser avec une force singulière, en lui et autour de lui, parmi les malades qui partagent sa chambre, est : « Qu'est-ce qui fait vivre les hommes ? »

**L**E débat politique qui s'est instauré autour d'un tel livre, et de l'œuvre de Soljénitsyne en général, ne saurait épuiser toutes les questions qu'elle pose. Pour nous, ce débat se complique de l'éloignement, de l'ignorance relative des réalités en cause, et parfois aussi des qualités ou défauts des éditions qui nous sont proposées. C'est ainsi que la traduction, voire le texte même, d'un autre roman de Soljénitsyne : « *Le Premier Cercle* » (4) paraissent souvent sujets à caution, même si cela n'explique pas entièrement le schématisme criant de telles pages de ce livre, qui jure avec ce que l'auteur a écrit jusque-là.

Au dossier de Soljénitsyne, outre la question du talent, généralement tranchée, dans le bon sens, peuvent figurer des questions comme celle-ci : l'image qu'il donne de la vie soviétique est-elle fidèle, véridique, ou projette-t-il injustement sur tout ce qui s'est fait et se fait cette ombre terrible de l'injustice qu'il a subie ? De quel point de vue décrit-il et à plus forte raison critique-t-il ? A quoi la réponse n'est jamais si simple, jamais entièrement donnée dans aucun livre. Un point de vue spiritualiste, assez ouvertement religieux, et dans « *Le Pavillon des cancéreux* », par exemple, des propositions qui s'apparentent plus à une sorte de « réarmement moral » qu'au marxisme, se corrigent parfois de déclarations comme celle-ci, d'Oleg Kostoglotov : « Je ne veux pas dire que je m'y connaisse en sciences sociales, j'ai peu d'occasions de les étudier. Mais il me suffit de ma petite comprenette pour voir que si Lénine a reproché à Tolstoï son idée de perfectionnement moral, c'est parce que cette idée détournait la société du combat avec l'arbitraire, et l'éloignait de la révolution qui mûrissait. D'accord ! » Mais autour de ce « d'accord ! », ou de ce qui, ailleurs, peut paraître le contredire, même la question — importante — de savoir si Soljénitsyne et son œuvre sont en définitive favorables ou non au socialisme n'épuise pas tout. A supposer même qu'on y réponde par la négative, l'ampleur et la profondeur du tableau font de ces livres des interlocuteurs valables s'il en est pour tout esprit partisan du socialisme, des repères et témoignages importants quant aux réalités de la construction du socialisme, offerts au débat et éventuellement au combat idéologique, dont ni une mesure administrative, ni l'argument frappant d'un grand prix, ne sauraient dispenser personne.

**C**AR au-delà de telles questions, ce qui existe, noir sur blanc, des mots sur du papier, possède une force qui ne se réduit ni ne se résume en des idées. Ainsi, pour y revenir, de cette sympathie pour le peuple, qui, serait-elle marquée d'un certain populisme, et par-dessus éventuellement les partis pris d'un auteur ou de ses personnages, milite pour le socialisme, comme elle le faisait déjà dans le grand roman russe classique. Et le plus beau serait de voir, pour qui aime l'Union Soviétique, pour qui admire la littérature soviétique, dans tant de ses créations incomparables, la décision de Stockholm se retourner un jour contre ses promoteurs mal intentionnés, l'œuvre d'Alexandre Soljénitsyne ayant trouvé sa place, dans la littérature russe, soviétique.

André STIL

- (1) Julliard, traduction de Maurice Decaillet.
- (2) Qui formait volume, sous ce titre, dans l'édition française, avec deux autres nouvelles : « *L'inconnu de Kretchévka* » et « *Pour le bien de la cause*. » Julliard, traduction de Léon et André Robel.
- (3) Julliard, traduction de A. et M. Aucouturier, L. et G. Nivat, J.-P. Semon.
- (4) Lafont.

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It is difficult to judge Solzhenitsyn's work coolly between the anti-Sovietism of the campaigns which have prepared and which are exploiting the awarding of the Nobel prize and the "affair" which in the USSR led to the administrative measure depriving him of the title of writer. Neither, however, should make us forget that it is a question of a work which is certainly debatable, but also significant in every sense of the word.

The blows of a hammer on a rail in the first lines of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" heralded a beginning which could not pass unnoticed. It is true that nothing is more terrible for a communist to read: The minute by minute account of an ordinary day and even a day rather less unhappy than others and of an ordinary detainee in one of the concentration camps where men like the author spent long years before being rehabilitated after 1956. However, everything with its irreproachable and un pitying detail, the cruel truth of this day among so many others led to another truth: The entire novel, written in the present tense, ended with a little insignificant verb whose past tense meant far more than it might seem: "There were 3,653 of these days." These injustices must henceforth always be spoken of in the past tense.

Everything in this book which criticized the past in the name of socialism itself might be regarded in this light. Such is the case of the prisoner shouting to the guards: "You are not Soviets! You are not communists!"

In particular, one's attention was attracted by a new tone for which there was an original text and a new writing. This was not out of keeping with the fact that Ivan Chukov, the hero being studied, was a man of the people. There is nothing more agonizing within the heart of this agonizing book than that marvellous page where, paradoxically, as a "positive hero" Chukov touches us most deeply with this line of his work which survives in him in spite of everything.

"Everything and every hardship count for him, he cannot admit that these are lost for nothing.

"Cement wall! Cement wall!

"...the escort could easily have let the dogs loose on Chukov, but he had to slow down to have a look. It would work. He ran up and looked over the wall to the left and to the right. His eye was his compass! Straight ahead! His skill was still with him."

The same character appears in "Matryona's Home" (including in French two other short stories: "The Stranger From Krechetovka" and "For the Good of the Cause") where it is this above all which lends verisimilitude and feeling to the black picture of life in a corner of the Soviet countryside, a picture which is reactionary, quite systematic, and against many of the pink pictures of kolkhozes and sovkhoses. The poor old peasant woman was Chukov's true sister, especially on this point, for example: "I had noticed that she had a sure way of recovering her good humor, this was work. Without hesitation she would pick up her spade and dig the soil."  
[paragraph continues]



Or she would tuck a bag beneath her arm and go looking for peat. Or she would take her birch basket and pick berries in a remote wood and not bow down to the administrative bureaus but to the bushes of the forest."

CPYRGHT This will hardly change from then on. Lieutenant, teacher, doctor, or worker, there will always be in Solzhenitsyn's works at least these persons who could not be the enemies of Zotov in "the stranger from Krechetovka," at least sharing with him an immense love for the motherland.

"Zotov was no longer anxious to save his life since the war had started. The meaning of his little life was measured by the assistance which he could bring to the revolution... to escape for his own sake was senseless. That was no longer indispensable for his wife and his future child. But if the Germans reached Lake Baykal and a miracle saved his life, Zotov knew that he would walk to China via Kiakhta or to India or that he would cross the sea: He would leave with the sole aim of joining up with units which had gathered their strength again and of returning weapon in hand to Russia and to Europe."

And if the title of the short story "For the Good of the Cause" is far from being a literal profession of faith and if it contains, in particular, a criticism of leaders who cover their sometimes unjustifiable decisions beneath a formula, the man who finally accepts this criticism on his own count to have the last word on it is none other than institute director Fedor Mikheyevich, who, aided by party gorkom Secretary Gradchikov, is fighting one of these decisions. This is the same Gradchikov who is wont to formulate the thoughts: "But finally, what do we hold most dear? Stones or men...? It is not in stones but in men that we must build communism."

It is this humanism of Solzhenitsyn's which is to sparkle in all its magnitude, but also to appear within its limitations in the great novel entitled "Cancer Ward" (3--Julliard, translation by A. and M. Aucouturier, L. and G. Nivat, and J. P. Semon), without doubt the most somber of his books, and at the same time, the richest in fellow-feeling, compassion, and understanding for the sorrows of men. The hero of the book and another true brother of Chukov and Matryona, Oleg Kostoglotov, is asked: "Who are you?" He replies indolently and in a whisper: "a man..." The major question which the nearness of death causes to be asked with singular force in him and around him, among the sick who are sharing his room is: "What makes men live?"

The political debate which has begun around such a book and around the work of Solzhenitsyn in general cannot exhaust all the questions which it raises. For us this debate is complicated by distance and by the relative ignorance of the realities in question and sometimes also by the qualities or defects of editions which are offered to us. Thus, the translation and, indeed, the very text of another of Solzhenitsyn's novels "The First Circle" are often subject to caution, even if this does not completely explain the glaring sketchiness of such pages of this book which clashes with what the author has written so far.

Apart from the question of talent, which is generally settled in a favorable direction, questions such as the following can figure in Solzhenitsyn's file: Is the picture which he gives of Soviet life faithful and truthful or does it project unjustly what has become and continues to become this terrible shadow of the injustice which he has suffered? From what viewpoint does he describe and, with far greater reason, criticize? The answer to this is never so simple and never completely given in any book. [paragraph continues].

A spiritualist and quite openly religious viewpoint and proposals in "Cancer Ward," for example, which are closer to a kind of "moral rearmament" than Marxism, are sometimes corrected by statements like the following by Oleg Kostoglotov: "I do not want to say that I am knowledgeable about the social sciences, I have had little opportunity to study them. But my little understanding is sufficient for me to see that if Lenin reproached Tolstoy for his idea of moral perfection, this is because this idea turned society aside from the fight against arbitrariness and moved it away from the ripening revolution. Agreed?" But regarding this "agreed" or what may seem to contradict it elsewhere, even the important question of knowing if Solzhenitsyn and his works are ultimately favorable or not to socialism, does not exhaust everything. Supposing that one answers this in the negative, the scope and the depth of the picture make these books valid questioners, for every partisan spirit of socialism if there are any and also important witnesses and evidence regarding the realities of building socialism offered in the debate and ultimately in the ideological struggle from which neither an administrative measure nor the striking argument of a major prize could absolve no one.

For beyond such questions what exists in black and white and as words on paper possess a power which is not reduced to or summed up as ideas. Thus, to return to it, this fellow-feeling for the people, even if it is marked by a certain populism and over and above even the prejudices of an author or of his characters, does militate in favor of socialism, as it has done in the great classical Russian novel. The finest thing for a person who loves the Soviet Union and who admires Soviet literature in so many of its incomparable creations would be to see the Stockholm decision one day turned against its ill-intentioned promoters, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's work having found its place in Russian and Soviet literature.

JUST before leaving Havana I went round to see an old Cuban friend to say goodbye. Both of us were rather depressed by the current scene in Cuba and I told him that after many conversations in Havana and a trip through the interior I still didn't feel that I really understood what was happening in the island. In these circumstances how could I profitably write about it? "Well," he replied, "perhaps at the moment nobody really understands what's happening, and perhaps you should say just that."

It was sensible advice. From Castro downwards, there appears to be an uncertainty about the immediate future which has cast a pall over the entire population. The inevitable conclusion is that the revolution has quite simply run out of steam.

The failure to secure the ten million ton sugar harvest—a point of honour for the revolution—has left the country in a stupor out of which the current slogan "Convert the setback into a victory" has so far failed to pull it.

Twelve years after the revolution the major advances still stand. The principal abuses of the previous regime still common in the rest of Latin America have been abolished. The "miseria" of the shantytowns has gone, as has the extreme poverty of the peasantry in certain forgotten corners of the island. Health and education remain at the top of the Revolutionary Government's list of priorities.

### Anti-imperialist

Cuba, the first country to tear away the mask of benevolence from the face of American imperialism, has remained faithful to its first anti-imperialist utterances, inspired by a tradition that owes more to Jose Marti than to Karl Marx. But in 1970 Cuba is no longer at the centre even of Latin American affairs. The eye of the Latin American hurricane has moved from the Caribbean to the mainland and currently hovers over the Andes at the point where Chile and Bolivia meet Peru.

There are still many people in Cuba with tremendous energy and motivation but one



# Fidel Castro's Cuban crisis

First of three reports by RICHARD GOTT twelve years after the Revolution

senses that among the vast bulk of the population political apathy prevails, although this is in no sense a counter-revolutionary spirit. There can be no going back to the old days, nor is there any intention to dilute the revolutionary content of the present system.

But the leaders of the revolution, immensely benevolent and well-meaning as they undoubtedly are, find themselves faced with a population that is no longer willing to follow blindly where Castro leads. Nor is it clear that even he knows what the next move is.

One would feel less concerned about these developments if it were not for the very serious economic criticisms of the Government published this year in France by K. S. Karol (in "Les Guerrilleros au Pouvoir") and Rene Dumont (in "Cuba: est-il socialiste?"). The disappointment of these two distinguished French writers, both tremendously sympathetic to the Cuban regime, is not directed at the obvious targets—the fact that there are still people who want to leave, food rationing, political prisoners—but rather at the organisation of government and its rather limited possibilities of delivering to the people the goods and services that they demand. The subject of their concern is Castro's apparent inability to put his good intentions into practice.

No one should doubt the massive investment that went into the sugar industry in the attempt to achieve the ten million ton target. Castro himself, in his July 26 speech, detailed the adverse effects the emphasis on sugar had had on other areas of the economy. In Cienfuegos I was shown the largest sugar terminal in the world, built a couple of years ago. The size of a small cathedral it contained several veritable mountains of brown sugar, ready for loading. Brought from the refineries in wagons that the Cubans designed themselves (and built in China and Rumania), the sugar is shipped all over the world, though the bulk goes to the Soviet Union.

The harvest was in fact the largest ever, and if the Government had set their sights lower, the result would have been an occasion for rejoicing and not one for gloom. But through the massive mobilisation for the harvest, too many people saw the imperfections of the system. Enough cane was cut, but too often there were delays in getting it to the refineries—and with each day's delay the sugar content of the cane declines. Imagine the feelings of a volunteer whose cut cane stands forlornly outside the refinery waiting for a spare part to repair the ageing machinery.

Most of the current shell-shock to be observed in Cuba

is based on the failure to secure what all had promised themselves would be secured. But most people agree that the sugar disaster came as the climax to a whole series of problems and doubts about the efficacy of the Cuban system (or non-system) of government. "Welcome be the defeat," says Castro, if it makes us look at our problems afresh. This is what is happening at the moment.

An endless round of meetings and discussions have been taking place since the beginning of September, but so far nothing has emerged except for Castro's emphasis on the need for democratisation.

Castro's system of government has always been basically paternalist. Quick to praise individual initiative, he has usually

preferred to absorb the initiative into the State system rather than to encourage its autonomous growth. At a recent meeting a worker sent up a note to Castro explaining how at his factory the workers themselves had built a dining room, even making the bricks themselves. Good, said Fidel. But instead of using this as a marvellous pattern for allowing workers to solve their own problems, he announced a decision "to organise a few brigades to build dining rooms in places where there aren't any as yet."

Out of the current maelstrom, no one really knows what is to be the future rôle of the party and the Armed Forces. For some years the two institutions have been virtually interchangeable. A high proportion of the party's Central Committee and of Castro's Ministers are members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. No one who was a Communist prior to the revolution is a member of the Political Bureau.

### Power curb

The army has been playing an increasingly large rôle in the past few years—notably in the organisation of agriculture—and even the Revolution's most friendly critics have expressed their unhappiness at this development. Bearing in mind the links between the army and the party, it was therefore interesting to hear Castro at a speech on September 28, denounce the dominant rôle

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played by the party in administration: "The rôle of our party cannot and will never be that of a substitute for the administration, nor a substitute for the mass organisations; rather its task is to guide this phenomenon, this process, this formidable revolution of the masses."

The Communist Party in Cuba (only formed afresh in 1965) has in fact never been a particularly significant institutional factor in Cuban life. Castro's fulminations against it may well cloak a desire to curb the power of the army and his brother Raul, who is both head of the armed forces and second secretary of the party.

The inner workings of Cuban political life, however, remain a mystery, perhaps as much to the participants as to the outsider. What is certain, however, is that the Cuban Revolution, which for more than a decade has pioneered a form of left wing independent of previous ideologies, is on the verge of an ideological crisis of (for Cuba) unprecedented dimensions.

The second of three reports by RICHARD GOTT on

Cuba—12 years after Fidel Castro's revolution

# Paradox of longer queues

"The change that has taken place in the life of the country has been so deep, that, in a sense, we are receiving not only the positive but also the negative fruits of the Revolution. This is because the Revolution, first of all, creates a tremendous disorder in the whole life of a country."—Fidel Castro, September 3 1970

ALMOST everywhere in Cuba one is conscious of queues. They have been there to feel that one begins to feel that they have now been incorporated into Cuban folkculture. The queue at the restaurant near my hotel is exactly as I remember it seven years ago when I first visited Havana. However, it is longer, and this, paradoxically, because things are better than before.

After the gigantic effort of the harvest—"the largest in our history"—there is an atmosphere of relaxation, with dancing on the Malecon, and more clubs and restaurants open—and more queues. (There are of course far fewer bars and restaurants than before the Revolution, and the nightclubs are only open from Thursday to Sunday. This in itself would be enough to create queues. But demand has also increased, as a new educated, employed generation seeks to take advantage of what were once the perks of a privileged élite.)

One of the failures of the Revolution has been to provide alternative forms of entertainment for the masses. While avant-garde culture flourishes as never before—Cuban films and pop art posters are magnificent—the preferred amusement of the average Cuban is still the club or restaurant. This, rather than the actual lack of food, is the chief cause of the queue phenomenon. Though food for consumption at home is rationed, few Cubans today go hungry. Eating out is more a relaxation than a necessity. But it

is also virtually the only way of passing the time in a society which happily has not yet geared its evenings to sitting in family units around the television set.

## Adamant

To stand in a queue for hours on end, or to watch others do so, is not a good advertisement for any society, and especially not for one that complains of its shortage of manpower. Why not permit a certain amount of private food production—as they do in North Vietnam—and help end the food shortage? It may be true that the private production of vegetables for the Warsaw market is restoring a capitalist class in Poland, but need this be true for Havana? Castro, however, has adamantly set his face against such ideological backsliding: "If we were to use capitalist methods to solve our problems, what kind of a Communist man, what kind of a man with a superior mind, culture and conscientiousness would we be creating? Impossible! We cannot be Socialists with capitalist methods."

The ideology remains pure, but the shortages remain. Cuba concentrates its efforts principally on growing sugar, which it is good at. With the proceeds from its export, heavy machinery for assisting agricultural production is acquired from abroad. Vegetables and fruit are also grown, and there is some cattle raising, both for milk and beef, but much of this is designed at present for the export market. By keeping Cubans on tight rations, it is possible to earn the foreign exchange to buy what is needed for the development plan.

An often-voiced complaint, however, articulated notably by Rene Dumont, is that the imported machinery is ill-used by inexperienced cadres, and that therefore the immense sacrifice of the

people has to some extent been wasted. Certainly one does see a lot of under-utilised agricultural equipment. Might it not be better to postpone "development" for a few more years in order to feed the people now and to provide them with some elementary consumer goods?

This is not a question that can be answered by a foreigner, though it was put to me by a Cuban university student. As far as the Cuban leadership is concerned, the Cuban appetite increases by feeding, and therefore there is nothing to be gained by providing a lot more. They would certainly like, however, to provide a little more, and the plans for the early seventies have in fact been drawn up with this in mind.

The lack of food and consumer goods is not the only cause for exasperation. Electricity, too, is in short supply. Perhaps two or three nights a week in Havana the lights go out. Quickly I rationalise. Well, it's like wartime. It gives people a feeling of togetherness, of problems shared. But for most people it's a nuisance. For someone with kids to feed and only an electric stove, it is infuriating and—perhaps more important—dispiriting.

## Inefficiency

In the twelfth year of the Revolution it really shouldn't be necessary for chaos and inefficiency to be so near the surface. As an outsider one can take a long view. Revolution involves upheaval; inevitably it takes time to smooth out the wrinkles. But those who live here cannot indefinitely take refuge in this argument.

Consolation still comes chiefly from Castro. Think of a problem and he seems to have thought of it first. We were sitting round one night moaning about the power cut, and then the following day Castro made a speech largely devoted to the electricity

problem, explaining why there was a shortage, and announcing arrangements to ensure that each region of the city would at least have warning of impending cuts. Everyone cheered up.

The queues and shortages inevitably make their impact on the foreigner, but what is perhaps sadder is the permitted decay of the country's legacy from the past. Havana is in a mess. Still one of the

most beautiful cities in the world, it is nevertheless gradually falling to pieces. The houses lack paint, the gardens need attention, the pavement potholes need filling in. Some houses are on the verge of collapse. Though this is true of many Latin American cities, it is now a generalised phenomenon in Havana, with the exception of the hotels and skyscraper blocks which appear to be well cared for. Many of the problems can still be put down to the economic blockade. The bits and pieces needed to make a sophisticated urban society operate

once came from Miami, 90 miles away across the water. Now they must come from Europe, with inevitable delays and lowering of standards.

It is easy to rationalise. Large cities are designed for commerce. Abolish private trading, as the Cubans did in 1968, and the city loses its *raison d'être*. It is not a unique phenomenon. I have seen the same thing happening in Rangoon. One day, perhaps, Socialist abundance will bring life back to the nationalised towns, but in the meantime hundreds of thousands of people have to live among

these all-too-evident signs of decay. Probably the vast majority don't mind. Decay is gradual, striking the returning visitor rather than the resident, but the apathy is symptomatic of a deeper malaise.

In a strange sense there is an atmosphere of calm in Cuba today, almost as though things had returned to

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normal. But what strikes one most forcibly is the failure of the revolution to overcome the cultural legacy from the past. Today's Cuba is the product of its history rather than its Revolution. It needs a cultural revolution if it is to break away from this heritage.

### Hideous

Most Cubans, for example, have never really disliked American bourgeois culture. When they took over the huge apartment blocks and the gambling hotels in Havana, it wasn't with a view to closing down these hideous excrescences of bourgeois taste, but rather of making them available to all. The Revolution did not seek to smash Cuban-American social customs, but merely to reject their exclusiveness. And people really do walk in and out of the once-smart hotels and beach-clubs as though they owned them. They're not really "the people," more the children of the "new class," but they are Negroes and other formerly underprivileged groups from the middle sectors of society.

This almost childlike enjoyment of the expropriated property of the oligarchs and the exploiters was one of the most endearing features of the Revolution in its early years. Today the Cuban Government, like that of every other undeveloped country, has the unenviable and difficult task of trying to persuade its inhabitants not to want what they cannot have.

# Castro's crop of trouble

The last of three reports from RICHARD GOTT on Cuba—12 years after the revolution

**THE HOUSING PROBLEM** has been solved for many; education, social security—the possibility of everyone having a secure life. There are no beggars, prostitutes, destitute people, or abandoned orphans in this country. The present generation of young people has not even known the scourge of unemployment." — Fidel Castro, September 3, 1970.

**CPYRGHT**  
In the South of Havana province the massive rice plan is now in full swing. No Cuban is happy without rice, but for many years the country has had to import it, most recently from China. Chinese failure to keep pace with Cuban requirements as a contributory cause of the distinctly cool relations the two countries have had since 1966. Cuba could be self-supporting next year.

**Mechanised**  
The process has been highly mechanised with little of the back-breaking labour-intensive rice culture of Vietnam. Here, as much as possible is done by aeroplane—fumigating and fertilising—and about a quarter of the area has already been sown by the eight Russian planes the rice plan has permanently at its disposal.

The rice plan began in 1967 when a bulldozer brigade came to clear the land which had hitherto been largely unproductive. Planted with several different varieties of "miracle" rice from the Rice Institute in the Philippines (and tested in Cuba's own experimental stations) the yield is high and so far they have been able to secure two crops a year.

When the zone was cleared, the peasants had to be cleared out as well. There weren't many, and the few who were here lived by subsistence farming, with a few cattle. They were moved into a brand new village—small bungalows with plumbing and electricity, but inevitably some wanted to stay on their historic lands. They eventually moved of their own free will, but it would be idle to deny that the transformation

of peasant life takes place without problems.

Whereas the Vietnamese revolution created a new economic environment in which it was possible for the peasantry to thrive and prosper, the Cuban revolution wrote "finis" to a peasant class which had never had much chance to develop. By the 1960s its revival would have been impossible. A drive through Cuba is sufficient to reveal that this has always been an underpopulated and undercultivated island. Money was made in the sugar fields by bringing in seasonal cane-cutters, and although there were—and remain—a considerable number of small farmers, they were for the most part isolated units without the possibility of forming a peasant class.

It is easy to see that there has never been much of a peasant culture in Cuba—no cooking, no weaving or pottery to speak of. It is not an unusual phenomenon. England and the United States have both got rid of their peasants. But it is unusual for an underdeveloped country, and it makes the task of urban-rooted middle-class revolutionaries doubly difficult, especially when they have opted, as the Cubans have done, for an agricultural rather than an industrial revolution. How does one develop agriculture with few peasants and less capital?

Arguably, there were just enough peasants around to have formed the cornerstone of a development strategy. But in practice the guerrilla revolutionaries found that the poorest and most revolutionary peasants were in the Sierra Maestra, in hostile terrain far from the consumption centres, while the "middle" peasants who had some profit-making, capitalist instincts, were eliminated in the second agrarian reform of 1963, chiefly for political reasons. It was felt that they were aiding the counter-revolution.

Rightly or wrongly, the revo-

lution went ahead to base its agricultural future, not on the local peasantry, but first on capital-intensive exploitation (the use of aeroplanes and heavy machinery), and secondly, where a labour force was needed, on brigades of the young that could be easily mobilised, motivated, and disciplined.

My first acquaintance with a youth brigade was near Camaguey, in the centre of the island. A few miles outside the town, beside a vast pineapple plantation, I found a pop group, called "Los Novels" rehearsing. Complete with electric guitars and amplification equipment they were practising for the evening's dance. The group were part of the group of 400 youths working on the plantation from the "Columna Juvenil del Centenario," a youth organisation that provides some 40,000 young workers between the ages of 17 and 27 to work in agriculture in the province of Camaguey—an impressive percentage of the workforce of the entire province.

### Shortage

The idea of the Columna was dreamt up by Raul Castro and first suggested in a speech in 1967. Faced with a tremendous manpower shortage in agriculture, the obvious solution was to mobilise the younger generation, and an appeal for 50,000 volunteers was made. Theoretically voluntary, in practice men work in the "Youth Column" for three years as an alternative form of military service. The Columna is run by an army officer, and its members are subject to military discipline.

When I was visiting the pineapple plantation the members of the Columna were about to embark on a 15-day weeding campaign to commemorate the deaths in October of Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. For this task the workers were divided into a number of groups, called guerrilla fronts, each bearing the name of a Latin-American country. Before going to the fields in the mornings there would be a collective reading of a page from Guevara's Bolivian Diary.

The Cubans are still caught up in guerrilla terminology. We have to force the idlers on to the defensive, cried Castro in a recent speech, we have to encircle them and then liquidate them—as the guerrillas do. Anniversaries of the deaths of heroic guerrillas, both Cuban and Latin-American are faithfully recorded in the principal newspaper "Granma"—September and October being especially full with the deaths of Inti and Coco Peredo, Tania, Turcios Lima, let alone Che and Camilo.

But this verbal enthusiasm is in inverse proportion to the actual interest of Cuba in today's Latin-American guerrillas. Apart from the Tupamaros in Uruguay, which get Cuban headlines because they're effective, and the Liberation Army in Bolivia which seems to be supported for sentimental reasons, Cuba takes a declining interest in guerrilla movements. Salvador Allende, president-elect of Chile, and Juan Velasco and Juan Jose Torres, revolutionary generals of Peru and Bolivia, are the current heroes.

Nevertheless the guerrilla atmosphere which pervades the "Columna Juvenil" is clearly a necessary motivating factor. Although Cuba has been criticised for the "militarisation" of agriculture, this should not be allowed to disguise the fact that Cuba, largely by a policy of social investment, has more nearly conquered the unemployment problem than any other Latin-American country.

In most of Latin America and the Caribbean the unemployment rate is enormous. There are perhaps 25 million people unemployed in the continent as a whole. Foreseeing no job opportunities for the new children born each year, the international agencies have been demanding massive population control campaigns. In Cuba the situation appears to be the reverse.

Officially, unemployment has almost ceased to exist. The authorities complain of being desperately short of manpower, and where possible capital-intensive techniques are being

Introduced. While birth control is permitted, population control is quite out of the question. We need more Cubans, runs the argument, and seeing the vast fertile spaces of the island that are as yet uncultivated or covered with the dreaded marabu, it is difficult not to agree.

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This tremendous labour shortage is made more tragic by the fact that, simply by looking around, it cannot be said that the Cubans at the moment are a people mobilised for work. The power of the people, as both Mao and Fidel know well, is immense. But although once in a millennium the people "stand up"—as Mao puts it—they show a remarkable propensity to sit down again unless given some new stimulation or motivation.

#### Work-shy

The lesson to be drawn from the Cuban experience is that the workshy mentality of the habitually unemployed cannot be changed overnight, nor even in 12 years. Currently in Cuba there is a tremendous campaign against the loafers and idlers, and the leadership of the revolution seems to have concluded that since there are few material incentives to work—the payment for food and clothing is insignificant—stiff penalties will be needed in future to prevent absenteeism. Guevara used to talk about moral incentives, but without a total rejection of old cultural patterns it is difficult to see how these could work. While a substantial "lumpen" element remains, moral incentives are utopian.

The Cuban revolution remains intensely volatile, and it is possible that the moment of pessimism and soul-searching noticeable during my visit will soon give way to something more positive, perhaps even to a "Great Leap Forward," or some new development more in keeping with the Cuban character. The high incidence of absenteeism, and the Government's preoccupation with it, comes at a time of maximum disillusionment as a result of the sugar harvest. The fact that the Cubans have survived this severe blow to their revolutionary élan should in itself be seen as an optimistic sign.