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August 1970


Propaganda
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Highlights

PRIORITIES

SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CPYRGHT



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Union has been assiduously cultivating relations over the past year in line with its policy of working with what it considers "progressive" military governments. b) Although the Soviet airlift is reputedly the largest disaster relief operation undertaken outside the Soviet Union, the amount of aid is modest, about \$1 million, compared to the \$20-30 million already donated by some 20 free world countries, including the United States, which has contributed \$10 million in funds alone. c) The use of aircraft rather than ships to carry Soviet relief supplies and equipment is obviously designed for propaganda purposes which include countering the propaganda impact of the considerable flood-aid that Western nations gave Rumania, as well as trying to offset the Soviets' own tardiness in offering aid to Peru. Sea delivery would have been less expensive, less complicated, and as it turns out, probably faster. The several hundred tons of Soviet supplies would not have filled even one cargo ship, which would have taken about two and one half weeks from the Soviet Union to Peru. As of mid-July, only five flights had arrived in Peru, having met supply and fueling problems. The airlift had been scheduled to arrive ten days earlier in a spectacular wave, with groups of eight landing at intervals of ten minutes. In contrast, by the first of July, the U.S. had made 44 flights to Peru and 1,564 within the country. These flights alone carried over three million pounds of relief supplies, with the bulk of equipment going by ship. (See attached article for further details.)

* * * * *

Spanish-Soviet Warmup. If any treatment of the above story should support the theme of Soviet efforts to warm up their relations with military regimes and/or dictatorships, it may be pertinent to also remind audiences of Moscow's growing rapprochement with General Franco's regime: (at the same time as Soviet propaganda media lambasts the "capitalist imperialists" for "supporting the Fascist Spanish" regime.) *Economically* -- Spanish-Soviet trade volume jumped from \$14 million in 1966 to \$34 million in 1968. Early this year the Spanish government held out the possibility that a Soviet fuel agreement (for the Soviets to sell natural gas to Spain) could double Spanish-Soviet trade to \$80 million yearly over the next three years. *Diplomatically* -- In April this year the Soviets opened a merchant marine office in Madrid and established a four-man "maritime mission" wherein two of its members have diplomatic passports. Recall that just six years ago diplomats were aflutter over the news that the Spanish and Soviet ambassadors in Paris had drunk a toast to the future establishment of diplomatic relations between their countries. Indicative of Soviet eagerness is the story of Spanish Foreign Minister Sr. Lopez Bravo's enforced detour to Moscow while on his way to Manila in December last year: Sr. Lopez Bravo's plane was scheduled to refuel in Tashkent but it was diverted to Moscow at the request of Soviet authorities to permit Soviet Foreign Ministry officials to meet with Sr. Lopez Bravo while he "happened" to be in the Soviet capital.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 July 1970

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SOVIET POSTPONES PARTY'S CONGRESS UNTIL NEXT MARCH

Delay Comes as a Surprise,
Since Brezhnev Said It
Would Convene in '70

ECONOMY MAY BE CAUSE

Planners Believed to Need
More Time to Draft New
Five-Year Program

By JAMES F. CLARITY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 13 — The

Communist party's Central Committee announced today that the 24th party congress would be postponed to next March.

The decision, disclosed by Tass, the official press agency, surprised the diplomatic community because as late as July 2 the party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, said in speeches that the congress would be held "this year."

Western diplomats attributed the postponement to economic problems, possibly complicated by political maneuvering in the Central Committee and the Politburo. But the diplomats said the speculation that factions were forming in the party in opposition to Mr. Brezhnev or Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, or both, might be premature.

It is more likely, the diplomats said, that Soviet planners have asked the leadership for more time to formulate the five-year plan.

Revitalizing Is Urged

In recent months, Mr. Brezhnev has called for new efforts and increased party discipline to improve the sluggish economy. To a lesser extent, Mr. Kosygin has also spoken on economic problems. When Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin deposed Nikita S. Khrushchev as head of the party and the government in October, 1964, they promised economic reforms that would presumably correct the shortcomings in Mr. Khrushchev's policies.

The rules of the party require that a congress be held every four years. But it is not unusual for a congress to be delayed. The 23d congress was convened in March, 1966. The 22d congress met in October 1961.

The Tass announcement of the Central Committee decision, made in a plenary session today, did not note that the new date amounted to a postponement. The agency gave no reason, but said Mr. Brezhnev had made a speech on this question.

Tass also said that Mr. Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin would address the March congress. Mr. Brezhnev, Tass said, will deliver the Central Committee's main report and Mr. Kosygin will discuss the next five-year plan, which starts in 1971.

The announcement that Mr. Kosygin would address the congress in March was considered confirmation that he would be renamed Premier by the newly elected Supreme Soviet, the national legislature, which convenes tomorrow.

Under the Constitution, Mr. Kosygin and his Government submit their resignations to the Parliament, which either accepts them or renames the same government. Any decision to replace Mr. Kosygin would normally have to be first approved by the party's ruling 11-member Politburo and the Central Committee, which has about 190 members.

The Soviet economy, Western analysts have said, is suffering from low labor productivity in industry, unpredictable agricultural production and widespread shortage of consumer goods. The economy is also under strain, the analysts said, from the maintenance of its military capabilities.

On July 2, Mr. Brezhnev, in a report approved by the Central Committee, condemned agricultural mismanagement, acknowledged food shortages and promised increased production in the five years beginning in January.

Some diplomats speculated that Mr. Brezhnev might want more time to improve his leadership record, thus strengthening his chances of being re-elected General Secretary in March. The diplomats said that, in addition to the solution of economic problems, Mr. Brezhnev might want to present the congress with achievements in foreign affairs.

These would include, the diplomats said, accelerated improvement in relations with West Germany, lessening of tensions that could involve the Soviet Union more deeply in the Middle East, positive results in the Chinese-Soviet border talks being held in Peking, and next year the holding of a European security conference, proposed by the Kremlin.

Speculation that changes would be made in the Soviet leadership has continued sporadically since spring, when several Politburo members were ill, including Mr. Kosygin, who was hospitalized for influenza.

Mr. Brezhnev, according to a Tass announcement, did not go to Bucharest last week for the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty because he had a respiratory ailment. But he was seen a few days after the announcement at a soccer game on a cool, rainy night. Mr. Brezhnev, who is 63, is also said to be suffering from high blood pressure.

Russian Quake-Aid Airlift To Peru Stirs Speculation

CPYRGHT

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY

Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union yesterday sent the first plane in a 65-flight relief airlift from Russia to earthquake-torn Peru, arousing considerable speculation in Washington about whether the gesture opens a broad new area of Eastern interest in the Western Hemisphere.

Officials were considering what relationship, if any, the Soviet airlift had to the recent non-stop flights from Murmansk to Havana by military reconnaissance Bear aircraft.

The flights to Peru will be made by AN12 and 22 civilian model long-range transports bearing numbers similar to the ones painted on the tails of planes used by the Russian national airline Aeroflot.

Some observers believe the Bear flights to Havana had several motives: To familiarize Russian pilots with airways that are new to them; to indicate Soviet solidarity with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and to let the United States know none too subtly what Russian aviation can do.

Fly Via Arctic

The Bear flew a long dogleg route over the Arctic Ocean between the Greenland-Iceland channel and hooked around Cuba to approach Havana from the south.

The mercy flights to Peru were delayed until this weekend because the flights cannot be made non-stop and the Russians had asked for far more

flight clearances and alternative landing sites than some South American countries thought were justified.

Reports reaching Washington were that the Russians asked for at least seven alternate landing fields, including several in Brazil.

Washington sources said the clearances now issued for the Russian relief planes will provide for fuel stops at Gander and St. John's, Nfld.; Havana; and Barranquilla, Colombia. The project is said to involve a shuttle of planes totaling 65 flights.

Communist Cuba has already sent about 25 special flights to Peru to assist the relief efforts of government of Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado.

Primary Mission

But the Russian airlift creates a whole new dimension in the relationship of the Soviet Union to South America.

No one seems to doubt that a primary mission of the airlift is earthquake relief. The Russian cargos will include food, medical supplies, roadbuilding equipment, helicopters, portable transmitters, components for 100 prefabricated homes, a 200-bed hospital and three nurseries.

The planes may bring as many as 500 Soviet personnel, including 325 crew members, 75 doctors, 25 geological engineers and an unannounced number of nurses and construction crews.

The total Soviet contribution to Peru will be about 700 tons. The Cubans sent 200 doctors, nurses and technicians and about 10 tons of cargo per flight, including five field hospitals, blankets and blood plasma.

In addition, a Cuban refrigerated trawler, the Camaron, recently arrived at the Peruvian port of Callao with shoes and mobile kitchen equipment.

Aid Sent by U.S.

By contrast, the United States made a \$10 million relief grant; sent more than 4,000 tons of food and medicine and dispatched the helicopter carrier Guam to Peruvian waters to aid the relief effort. Mrs. Richard M. Nixon made a flying visit to Peru to show the U.S. concern for the sufferings of the Peruvian people.


The big question on the Russian airlift is whether it is a one-shot proposition or whether it signals a new drive for increased relationships and communication with South America.


At present, the Soviet Union has diplomatic representatives in eight Latin countries, not counting Cuba which survives because of \$1.4 million per day in Russian assistance. These countries are: Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay.

The total of Russian diplomatic representatives in the eight countries is 265, of whom an estimated 50 percent are intelligence personnel. Informed sources believe this is twice as many as the intelligence roster in the region 10 years ago.

CPYRGHT

EL COMERCIO,
Lima, Peru
July 1970





August 1970

THE COMMUNIST SCENECZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968-1970: FROM HUMANE SOCIALISM TO SOVIET ORTHODOXY

The Czechoslovaks approach the second anniversary of the 20 August Soviet-led invasion of their country in a state of political subjugation. For the Czech people the situation is tragically familiar. After the Soviet-run Communist takeover of 1948, their personal and political freedoms were crushed and the country was rapidly Stalinized. Today all that remains to repeat the process is a re-institution of political show trials. (Whether present Party leader Husak has repeatedly promised there would be no show trials because he deludes himself that he can resist Soviet pressures or whether it is a cynical promise made merely to quiet popular fears until fool-proof control is established, matters little now.) In classic Communist fashion, officials and politics of the Dubcek era are now being blamed for all current ills of the Communist society.

Years of Soviet experience and the skillful use of salami tactics -- one slice of liberty at a time in order to avoid arousing open revolt -- paid off as the Soviets wiped out nearly every trace of the most promising experiment ever undertaken in a Communist country. Some of the methods used in what Moscow calls a "normalizing" process are described below.

Political normalization was a job of considerable magnitude for the Soviets, given the popularity and wide ranging nature of political changes which the reformers had achieved as well as the virulence of anti-Soviet feeling.

One of the Dubcek regime's more important political innovations was to grant autonomy to various, formerly impotent non-Party organizations. Former puppet parties in the Czech National Front, which were established in 1948 as a meaningless concession to the non-Communists, were permitted under Dubcek to organize and formulate programs of their own. The national trade union federation, a mere rubber-stamp front group in any Communist regime, struck out independently, criticizing the regime and supporting the interests of its worker members. Quasi-political organizations such as KAN, a group of youthful non-Party reformers; the 231 Club dedicated to rehabilitating some 50,000 former political prisoners; and the newly formed Society for Human Rights, acted as pressure groups in the body politic.

After the invasion these symptoms of democracy were wiped out. The National Front parties were forbidden to organize independently. The leader of the trade union federation, Karel Polacek, was co-opted into the Party leadership, to remove him from trade union affairs and in order to use him as a whip for controlling the workers. The new clubs were put under Interior Ministry control and refused licenses to operate.

The second essential step in political normalization was remaking the Party. Under Dubcek and popular legislative leader Josef Smrkovsky, Party membership shot up. Many formerly apathetic functionaries became active liberals in the new cause. First they tried force; they kidnapped and imprisoned the top leaders. But no quislings came forward; Dubcek, Smrkovsky and the others were reinstalled for later, more gradual replacement. Smrkovsky was removed from leadership of the Federal Assembly (parliament) in October 1969, Premier Cernik was replaced in January 1970, and Dubcek lost one party and governmental post after another until he was finally read out of the Party altogether in June 1970.

Hand in hand with the purge of the top leadership went the continuing Party purge, also euphemistically called the "exchange of Party cards." Moscow's stated aim is to insure that every member of the Party is interrogated. Under Soviet prodding some 2,000 investigating commissions, abetted by a pervasive informant network, put the purges into high gear in January 1970 with the evident aim of reducing the mass Party to roughly half its 1968 strength of about 1,600,000. In addition, great numbers have resigned during the past two years. Progressives, and even moderates, have been replaced at all levels by ultra-conservatives on whom Moscow can depend. The presidium has been reduced from 21 to 11 men. Some 70 members of the 1968 Central Committee have been ousted. The moderates, are now outnumbered by the Stalinists.

Normalization of information media got top priority. Freedom of information, the lifeblood of an open society, had been restored in February 1968 for the first time in twenty years. The Czech people discovered their own country; television introduced them to their modest new Party First Secretary; magazines and newspapers proliferated, reporting the astonishing new Party developments. All government and Party officers were put under the close and critical scrutiny of the free press. Circulation of popular magazines like Literarni Listy, Reporter, and Politika rose astonishingly as they opened their pages to free-wheeling discussions of long suppressed social topics. This heady climate of public debate inevitably brought charges against the Party for failure to liberalize fast enough and against the Soviet Union for its attempted domination of Czechoslovakia. But in the pre-invasion period the popular press gave nearly unanimous support and a "stand firm" edict to Dubcek as he desperately negotiated with the Russians for Czechoslovakian sovereignty at Cierna and Bratislava. Later, in the five days following the invasion, many magazines and newspapers, including the Party's Rude Pravo, continued publication underground. Twelve mobile TV and radio units kept the people informed of what was happening; radio stations continuously repeated the Party leaders' statement that, despite Soviet propaganda claims, no request had been issued to Warsaw Pact troops to enter the country and no forewarning of the invasion had been given.

On 21 August, the Russians tried to clamp censorship on all news media. One by one, publications were suspended or banned, among them the Czech Journalist Union's respected Reporter and the Central Committee's own weekly Politika.

The staff of Rude Pravo was entirely replaced as was that of the trade union's Prace. The present Rude Pravo chief editor is a militant Stalinist and a member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The new Prace chief editor and the new director of Czech radio were themselves later replaced as Soviet pressure for orthodoxy increased. Purges dug deep into all media staffs, where Soviets correctly feared Czech democratic traditions. Standard Communist purge tactics were used: firing, recantations and self-criticism. Journalist groups continued their protests late into 1969 but were eventually quieted. Some disbanded rather than kow-tow. Large numbers now have difficulty finding jobs. Jiri Hochman, formerly well known on the Reporter, wrote friends in June that he is now working as a mechanic and expects to be put on trial after the invasion anniversary. Occasionally a newspaperman is hired by a sympathetic factory manager only to be fired under Party pressure. When he can no longer find any such work, he may be arrested as a "parasite" for not working!

Cultural normalization was also a part of Moscow's program. When Dubcek appointed Eduard Goldstuecker, vice rector of Prague's world famous Charles University, to head the Writers Union and freed it from Interior Ministry control, intellectual expression bloomed freely. Artists wrote, composed, and painted with uncontrolled freedom. Czech film makers earned artistic acclaim in the west. Twenty years of Communist education fell away as students who had led the first mass protests in 1967 became vociferous supporters of the progressive Communists, often outreaching Dubcek's stated limitations of freedom. They continued to demonstrate against the Soviet occupation for months after the invasion.

The invaders quickly reduced artists to the sterility of state-censored "socialist realism" under control of the Ministry of Interior. An occasional film maker still retains limited independence because of the foreign exchange his films earn abroad. But playwright Vaclav Havel, winner of the 1969 Austrian prize for European literature was not permitted even to go to Vienna to receive his award (shades of Boris Pasternak). The purges hit hardest among the Charles University intellectuals whom Moscow has always feared. Thousands have now fled or resigned. The new Education Minister opened an inquisition by requiring all higher school officials to report any public statement or act of "rightist opportunism" from school faculties or students during 1968-69. Should any official be reluctant to turn informer, he was assured that the Ministry's own investigation would find him out! At the same time each Ministry employee was required to evaluate himself and ten of his colleagues in intimate, personal detail. Nearly all school curricula are now under control. Studies in humanities, such as social sciences, have been banned, all foreign source material prohibited and the granting of all higher degrees in Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) suspended. Autonomy, even for higher schools, has been wiped out.

Personal freedom has been reduced to the standard of other Communist countries. The security police apparatus has been reconstituted, complete with links to a spy network under the Soviet ambassador. An "emergency"

law of indefinite duration allows police to hold a suspect incommunicado and without trial for a renewable period of 21 days, despite the fact that the Czech constitution permits a maximum of only 48 hours. Free assembly is no longer possible. Individuals are no longer permitted to travel to the west, a privilege which had been fully restored in 1968, and no Czech citizen may live abroad. The Czech border "iron curtain" is being re-built and re-electrified, but an estimated 800 flee the country weekly, mostly through other Communist countries. More than 100,000 have fled abroad since the invasion. The amnesty law which would permit them to return without punishment has expired. Churches and church schools are again restricted after a brief revitalization and big rise in membership. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court recently attacked the 1968 law for rehabilitation of former political prisoners as "not in harmony with socialist legality" and urged its immediate repeal.

The above Soviet program of "normalization" of Czechoslovakia -- on the political, propaganda/information, and cultural fronts, including the severe abridgement of personal freedoms -- offers only a partial picture of the two-year transformation of a fresh and humane brand of socialism initiated during the "Prague Spring" to the bleakness of Soviet orthodoxy.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS 1968
Robert Rhodes James, ed.

Selected Chronology January-December 1968

5 January. Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee plenum decides to separate the functions of party First Secretary and President of the Republic, 'in accordance with the process of democratization which has begun'. Antonin Novotny, while retaining the Presidency, resigns as First Secretary and is succeeded by Alexander Dubcek, previously First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party.

29-30 January. Dubcek pays unaccompanied visit to Soviet Union. The communiqué at the end of the visit announces 'full identity of views on all questions discussed'.

5 March. Czechoslovak Party Praesidium transfers responsibility for ideology from the conservative, Jiri Hendrych, to Josef Spacek.

6-7 March. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact meets in Sofia.

16 March. Dubcek, in a speech at Brno, reaffirms that the alliance with the Soviet Union remains the basis of Czechoslovak foreign policy.

23 March. Meeting in Dresden of Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, East German, Hungarian, Polish and Soviet party leaders. Communiqué refers to a forthcoming economic summit meeting and to agreement on practical measures to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and its armed forces.

26 March. Speech by Hager, Secretary of the SED Central Committee, criticizing Czech policies and Smrkovsky's speeches. (Later the subject of formal exchanges between the Czech and East German Governments.)

1 April. At resumed meeting of the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee Dubcek says: 'We must continue to build up our army and improve it according to Socialist principles; as a defensive barrier against the enemy outside, the imperialist aggressors. We must build it up as a firm link in the alliance of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty.'

3 April. Resignation of Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, General Bohumir Lomsky.

4 April. New Praesidium of Czechoslovak Communist Party elected.

6 April. Oldrich Cernik succeeds Jozef Lenart as Prime Minister.

8 April. New Cabinet announced.

9 April. Czechoslovak Party's Action Programme published.

23-26 April. Session of Rumanian Central Committee adopts resolution noting that the Rumanian Party had not been invited to Dresden Meeting at which questions of importance to Warsaw Pact and CMEA were discussed.

24 April. Announcing in the National Assembly the programme of Czechoslovak Government, Prime Minister Cernik says: 'As long as NATO exists, we shall contribute to the strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty, we shall strive to make the Czechoslovak People's Army a firm link of this alliance, and we shall develop greater initiative towards the intensification of the work of its joint command. The government will ensure the needs of defence in harmony with the possibilities of our State.'

26 April.	Czechoslovak-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance renewed.		
30 April.	<i>Pravda</i> carries account of Czechoslovak provincial party meetings, quoting fears expressed by conservatives of consequences of lifting of Press and TV censorship and expressing anxiety over subversive attacks against the Action Programme.		Dubcek's visit to Moscow, says: 'We must understand the fears of the Soviet Union which has in mind not only Czechoslovakia but the security of the whole Socialist camp. Even so, the Soviet comrades declared that they do not want to, and will not, interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs.'
4-5 May.	Dubcek accompanied by Cernik, Smrkovsky and Bilak had what <i>Tass</i> describes as a 'brief friendly meeting' with Soviet leaders in Moscow.	17-22 May.	Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, and General Epishev visit Czechoslovakia. Communiqué states, <i>inter alia</i> , '... concrete steps have been outlined for the further development of the friendships between the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army and the strengthening of their co-operation within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty'.
6 May.	<i>Le Monde</i> reports a CPSU meeting of 23 April. Brezhnev described as worried over Czech developments and believing Dubcek a prisoner of 'reactionary and anti-Communist elements'. General Epishev (head of the political control department of the Soviet armed forces) quoted as speculating on appeals for intervention from 'faithful communists' in Czechoslovakia. Should this happen the Red Army would be 'ready to do its duty'. The same article claims that a similar line is prevalent in Bulgarian Party circles. Polish Government protests to Czechoslovakia about 'anti-Polish campaign'. New Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow, Vladimir Koucky, presents credentials; President Podgorny refers to 'anti-Socialist' elements in Czechoslovakia.	17-25 May.	Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, visits Czechoslovakia for cure and consultations.
		18 May.	Czechoslovak protest to East Germany about article in <i>Berliner Zeitung</i> of 9 May alleging US and Western German military units in Czechoslovakia.
		19 May.	Czechoslovakia news agency, <i>CTK</i> , reports denial by General Epishev of <i>Le Monde</i> report on possible Soviet Army assistance to loyal communists.
		24 May.	Announcement in Prague that Warsaw Pact command staff exercises will take place in Czechoslovakia in June.
6-7 May.	Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, visits Soviet Union.	30 May.	Novotny dismissed from the Party Central Committee and suspended from Party membership.
7 May.	Czech trade union newspaper, <i>Prace</i> , takes up Epishev's remarks, saying it is 'unbelievable' that Soviet Central Committee would consider military intervention.	1 June.	Czechoslovak Central Committee decides to convene an extraordinary party congress on 9 September.
8 May.	Meeting in Moscow of leaders of Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian parties. There is little publicity and no communiqué.	3-15 June.	Czechoslovak National Assembly delegation, led by Smrkovsky, visits Soviet Union.
15 May.	Statement by Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, Josef Smrkovsky, on	4 June.	Dubcek, addressing meeting of party activists at Brno, says: 'Anti-party and anti-Communist tendencies exist ... what do we mean by the

- anti-Communist danger? The danger arises from tendencies to weaken our relations with the Soviet Union. Our whole policy is based on our relations with the Soviet Union - our foreign policy, our economic policy.'
- 12 June. Soviet-Czechoslovak economic agreement signed.
- 16 June. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid between Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed in Budapest.
- 17 June. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, goes to East Germany for a two-day visit. He says his talks with his East German counterpart, Otto Winzer, had taken place in a 'friendly and cordial atmosphere'.
- Smrkovsky and the Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly, Josef Zednik, give interviews on the visit by the National Assembly delegation to the Soviet Union, and say that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering with Czechoslovak internal affairs. The highest Soviet officials had confirmed this, he says.
- 20 June. Warsaw Pact command staff exercises in Czechoslovakia and Poland begin.
- 26 June. National Assembly passes law abolishing advance censorship.
- 27 June. Prague newspapers, *Prace*, *Mlada Fronta*, *Zemelske Noviny* and *Literarni Listy* publish the manifesto '2,000 Words' by Ludvik Vaculik, demanding an acceleration of the democratization process and calling on workers to demand the departure of those who had abused their power. The manifesto is criticized the same day by Dubcek and the party Praesidium.
- 2 July. Announcement in Prague that Warsaw Pact exercises have ended.
- 4 July. Prague newspaper, *Vecerni Praha*, reports that leaflets attacking 'progressive representatives' of the Communist Party have been found in the street.
- 5 July. In a note to the West German Government, the Soviet Union refers to the 'enemy states' articles in the UN Charter.
- Smrkovsky criticizes the '2,000 Words' for 'political romanticism', while admitting the 'honourable intentions' of its author.
- 8 July. Czechoslovak Communist Party Praesidium issues a statement expressing willingness to confer bilaterally with any of their allies.
- 8-10 July. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, visits Bulgaria.
- 9 July. Bill granting every Czechoslovak citizen right to obtain a passport without restrictions passed by National Assembly.
- General Dzur, Minister of National Defence, announces that 35 per cent of the troops in the Warsaw Pact exercises have returned to their permanent garrisons.
- 10 July. Czechoslovak General Vaclav Pchlik announces that a 'new situation' had developed since the original official statement that the troops in the Warsaw Pact exercise would be withdrawn immediately on July 2.
- The Soviet *Literaturnaya Gazeta* attacks '2,000 Words'.
- 11 July. Article in *Pravda* attacks '2,000 Words' and compares situation with that in Hungary in 1956. *Prague Radio* broadcasts rejoinder deploring attempts to 'spread among the inadequately informed public the false belief about the dangers threatening Czechoslovak Socialism'.
- 12 July. Soviet Defence Ministry organ, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), denies that Warsaw Pact exercises were intended to force Soviet strategic concepts on the allies.
- 13 July. Yugoslav news agency, *Tanyug*, quotes President Tito as expressing disbelief that there could exist in the USSR elements so short-sighted as to resort to a policy of force over Czechoslovakia.

- The East German party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, attacks '2,000 Words' and Czechoslovak developments in article entitled 'The Strategy of Imperialism and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic'.
- Kosygin, at Press conference in Stockholm, expresses confidence that Czechoslovak party will not surrender its leading role and recommends correspondents to read the assessment of events in Czechoslovakia in *Pravda* of 11 July.
- Letter of the Czechoslovak Army, declaring support for the party, handed to military attachés of other Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia.
- 14-15 July. Bulgarian, East German, Hungarian, Polish and Soviet leaders meet in Warsaw. Meeting sends letter to the Czechoslovak party saying that the signatories are 'deeply disturbed' by events in Czechoslovakia.
- 14 July. Polish party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, criticizes 'reactionary forces, supported by centres of imperialist subversion' for their 'offensive' against Communism in Czechoslovakia.
- 15 July. Rumanian Head of State and party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, in a speech at Galati, and the party organ, *Scinteia*, express confidence in the Czechoslovak party and its leadership.
- General Prchlik, head of the Party Central Committee department for Military and Security Affairs, criticizes the Warsaw meeting and claims that the Warsaw Pact does not allow the troops of any party to the Treaty to stay in the territory of another without the latter's consent.
- 16 July. Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, General Dzur, writing in *Rude Pravo*, recommends reform of Warsaw Pact command.
- 17 July. *Neues Deutschland* adduces 'illuminating details' of 'massive' West German intervention in Czechoslovakia.
- 18 July. Speech by Ceausescu describing Warsaw Pact as instrument of collective defence rather than a justification for interference in the internal affairs of other states.
- Czechoslovak Praesidium issues reply to Warsaw letter refuting its allegations.
- Dubcek broadcasts to the nation, thanking citizens for their support and observing that 'we have no alternative but to complete the profound democratic and Socialist changes in our life, together with the people'. Reaffirms Czech loyalty to the Warsaw Pact.
- The Bulgarian party newspaper, *Rabotnich esko Delo*, in a leading article headed 'The counter-revolution should be routed', alleges 'disorganization of the State and entire party life' in Czechoslovakia.
- US Secretary of State Rusk denies rumours that US had warned Soviet Union against intervening by force in Czechoslovakia.
- 19 July. Dubcek, addressing Central Committee plenum, reaffirms adhesion to the Action Programme. All speakers express agreement with the Praesidium.
- Tass* announces Soviet proposal for meeting between Soviet Politburo and Czechoslovak Praesidium on 22 or 23 July in Moscow, Kiev or Lvov.
- Pravda* claims that on 12 July Czechoslovak security forces found a secret cache of American arms near the West German border. It also claims that documents are in Soviet hands describing a NATO and CIA plot to subvert the East European countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and East Germany. (This allegation was subsequently denied both by a State Department spokesman in Washington and a NATO spokesman in Brussels.)
- Hungarian party newspaper, *Nepszabadsag*, says that Hungarian sympathy for Czechoslovakia remains unchanged but has been overtaken by concern that her 'Socialist achievements are imperilled'.

- The Rumanian party organ, *Scinteia*, carries full texts of the joint Warsaw letter and the Czechoslovaks' reply.
- 19-20 July. Marshal Grechko cuts short visit to Algeria and returns to Moscow.
- Waldeck Rochet, General Secretary of French Communist Party, visits Prague. Dubcek speaking to Central Committee reacts cautiously to Waldeck Rochet's proposal for a meeting of European Communist Parties.
- 20 July. Hungarian news agency, MTI, publishes summary of the Czechoslovak Praesidium's reply to the Warsaw letter. But this step is not followed by any of the other countries which met in Warsaw.
- Scinteia* carries article entitled 'Full Confidence in the Czechoslovak People, in its Communist Party', expressing 'serious alarm' at 'tendencies towards interference from outside' which could only damage the international communist movement.
- Krasnaya Zvezda* joins other major Soviet newspapers in commenting on Czech internal developments.
- 21 July. President Svoboda, in a speech at Javoruna, reaffirms loyalty to the Warsaw Pact.
- 22 July. The *Pravda* revelations about an arms cache (see entry for 19 July): CTK reports the official Prague view that the hiding of the arms was a provocation to dramatize the situation. *Prace* notes that the weapons were hidden inexpertly and conspicuously.
- Agreement reached on meeting between Soviet Politburo and Czechoslovak Praesidium, on Czechoslovak soil.
- CTK reports acceleration in withdrawal of Russian troops.
- Announcement in Bonn that, in view of the political situation, the Defence Ministry would try to reschedule or relocate Exercise Black Lion (previously planned for Autumn 1968; and which would have taken 3 West German divisions, with US and French support, to the Czech frontier area).
- 23 July. General Karel Peprny, Commander of the Czechoslovak Border Guards, refuting allegations of laxity, states that Czechoslovakia is perfectly able 'to protect its state borders with its capitalist neighbours'.
- UN spokesman announces the Czech permanent representative's denial that the situation in his country constituted a menace to international peace and security.
- Krasnaya Zvezda* attacks General Prchlik for his Press conference of 15 July. Western observers note that *Krasnaya Zvezda* takes care to distinguish between the General and the rest of the Czech Army, and even leaves the impression that reforms of the Warsaw Pact organization would not be rejected out of hand by the Soviet Defence Ministry.
- Izvestia* accuses Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior Josef Pavel of having been responsible for the conviction of innocent persons in the early days of the communist régime.
- Izvestia* announces Soviet exercises on the western frontiers of the Soviet Union.
- Further Moscow statements that reservists were being called up and that civilian transport would be requisitioned for these exercises, which would continue until 10 August.
- 25 July. Announcement in Prague of the abolition of the party department for military and security affairs, and return of its head, Gen. Prchlik, to the army.
- Pravda* article accuses certain Czechoslovak party leaders of conniving at the activity of 'Right-wing anti-Socialist revisionist forces'.
- Soviet and Polish government halt the movement of Soviet and Polish tourists into Czechoslovakia without explanation.
- Nepszabadsag* calls on the Czech leaders to take action against a 'bourgeois counter-

- 26 July. revolution', accusing them of an 'erroneous interpretation of democracy and freedom' by abolishing press censorship, and exhorts them not to permit developments which had led in Hungary to a 'counter-revolution'.
Pravda article expresses fears that Czechoslovakia is moving towards the restoration of a 'bourgeois régime' and attacks Deputy Prime Minister Sik.
Berliner Zeitung article denounces West German aid for 'creeping counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia.
Polish Army newspaper, *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, denounces danger to socialism in Czechoslovakia created by 'external imperialist forces, internal forces of reaction and revisionist forces actively co-operating with them'.
Literarni Listy appeals to Czech Praesidium: 'You are writing a fateful page in our history. . . . Write with deliberation but, above all, with courage.'
- 27 July. Professor Sik, writing in *Rude Pravo*, recalls Brezhnev's refusal to support the 'old guard of discredited politicians' in December and reaffirms the view that the Communist Party's leading role should rest not on repressive force but on the conviction of ideas.
CTK publishes official statement criticizing General Prchlik's statement of 15 July.
- 28 July. Bulgarian frontier authorities refuse admission to 50 young Czechoslovaks planning to take part in World Youth Festival.
Professor Sik, writing in *Rude Pravo*, demands a public correction of statements in *Pravda* article of 26 July.
Marshal Grechko's Order of the Day on Soviet Navy Day refers to 'imperialist attempts to force a breach in the Socialist system and change the balance of power in their favour'.
- 29 July. Talks between Czechoslovak Praesidium, accompanied by Svoboda, and the Soviet Politburo open at Cierna-nad-Tisou, near Czechoslovak border.
- 30 July. *Pravda* publishes article stressing Czechoslovak indebtedness to and dependence on the Soviet Union.
Czech Ministry of the Interior issues, for the guidance of chief editors and publishers, a list of items which may not be published in the mass media.
Hungarian daily newspaper, *Magyar Hirlap*, states that 'the tragic experience of Hungary has not been taken into consideration in Czechoslovakia'.
Pravda leader says: 'We cannot remain indifferent to attacks by revisionists on Marxism-Leninism as a unitary international doctrine, attacks which have recently become stronger.'
Article in *Zycie Warszawy* quoted by PAP discusses 'the satisfaction of the anti-Communist experts in the West German Press' about the situation in Czechoslovakia.
Neues Deutschland publishes full-page article headed 'Overcome Mistakes so as to strengthen the Socialist worker-peasant power', stating that the 'profound disquiet' expressed in the Warsaw letter is becoming 'daily more justified as the result of growing activity by hostile forces'.
Rabotnichesko Delo, quoted by BTA, says that 'the threat to Socialism in Czechoslovakia, that fraternal country, is getting greater every day'.
Rude Pravo, quoted by CTK, describes 'the idea that relations between Communist parties can be successfully solved by methods of propagandistic, political or military pressure' as a 'dangerous illusion'.
Belgrade *Politika Express* publishes the results of a public opinion poll on Czechoslovakia under the heading 'Support for Prague with heart and mind'.
Scinteia, in an article entitled 'The road to strengthening the unity of the Socialist countries', says: 'The Communists, all working people in our country, follow with a feeling of sympathy

- the renewal and transformations in the friendly country (Czechoslovakia).'
- 1 August. *Pravda* suspends attacks on Czechoslovakia.
A short joint communiqué issued on the conclusion of the Cierna talks speaks of the 'atmosphere of frankness, sincerity and mutual understanding in which the talks had been conducted and announced that the Czechoslovak leaders would meet the signatories of the Warsaw letter in Bratislava on 3 August.
Srnkovsky tells a large crowd in the Old Town Square, Prague, that the Czechoslovak delegation had 'succeeded in securing the sympathy of the Soviet comrades for our internal affairs. Our internal affairs will not be the subject of discussion at the Bratislava meeting'.
- 2 August. Dubcek, in a broadcast, thanks the people for their 'wise and circumspect attitude' and assures them: 'You can be completely satisfied with the results and the spirit of the negotiations. . . . We kept our promise to you.' At the same time he stresses the need to maintain a 'prudent and statesmanlike attitude', adding: 'There must be no misuse of spontaneous . . . meetings for the expression of anti-Socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments. . . . All of us, and also our friends abroad, must see to it that we seek ways, patiently and calmly, of strengthening our co-operation. . . . By so doing we shall create favourable conditions for the 14th Congress of our party.'
- 3 August. Participants in Bratislava meeting issue a Declaration which makes no reference to the internal situation in Czechoslovakia.
Kadar, on his return home from Bratislava, says: 'It is a very great thing that it has been possible partly to clear up the misunderstandings and differences.'
Prague Radio and *CTK* announce that the last Soviet troops have left Czechoslovak territory.
- 4 August. Dubcek, in a television broadcast, gives an assurance that no secret agreement was reached at either Cierna or Bratislava, and says that the meetings had opened up new scope for the revival process in Czechoslovakia.
- 5 August. *Pravda* editorial describes the Bratislava talks as an important step along the road of consolidating the unity of the socialist countries, and as a crushing blow to imperialist plans to sow discord.
Trybuna Ludu expresses satisfaction with the Bratislava talks, calling the declaration a 'momentous document of the international Communist movement'.
Rabotnichesko Delo acclaims the Bratislava document as of 'enormous importance for the triumph of Socialism in the world and for strengthening the unity of the Socialist community and the international Communist movement'.
- 8 August. Josef Valka publishes article in *Literarni Listy* entitled 'From Warsaw to Bratislava' attacking the Russians for interference in Czechoslovak affairs. Another article in the same number warning the Russians that they had forfeited Czechoslovak friendship.
- 9-11 August. President Tito visits Czechoslovakia and is given an enthusiastic welcome.
- 9 August. Hungarian party secretary, Zoltan Komocsin, quoted by *Budapest Radio* as saying that the Bratislava meeting had 'restored the unity which had suffered a certain rupture'.
Moscow *Pravda* article by Rodionov on democratic centralism and danger of permitting factions in communist parties.
- 10 August. Draft party statutes published as a supplement to *Rude Pravo*. They assert the right of an out-voted minority to adhere to its views, secret voting and the limitation on period of term of office by one person.
- 12-13 August. Ulbricht visits Czechoslovakia and meets Dubcek at Karlovy Vary.

- 14 August. Moscow *Literaturnaya Gazeta* accuses *Literarni Listy* of 'attacks on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and seditious attacks on the Soviet Union'.
 Marshal Grechko meets East German Defence Minister, General Hoffman, to 'exchange views on general political questions and co-operation between the fraternal armies'.
 Moscow *Red Star* article by Brigadier-General Baranski, Deputy Chief of Polish Armed Forces, 'Our common concern and common responsibility' expressing concern at the 'growth of hostile and dangerous trends in fraternal Czechoslovakia', declaring 'readiness to aid' the Czechoslovak Party and people and asserting the indivisibility of the defence of Eastern Europe.
- 15-17 August. President Ceausescu of Rumania visits Czechoslovakia and is warmly received by the people.
- 16 August. Twenty-year Czechoslovak-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid signed in Prague.
Pravda article by Yurg. Zhukov attacking items in Czechoslovak Press underestimating the importance and finality of the Cierna and Bratislava declarations.
- 17 August. Prime Minister Cernik reported to have stated that Czechoslovakia was contemplating a World Bank loan.
- 18 August. *Pravda* article by Kolesnichenko ('Loyalty to international duty'), and by Aleksandrov ('Blatant outbursts of reaction') denouncing the 'noticeable intensification in Prague of late of subversive activities by anti-Socialist forces against the foundations of the Socialist system in Czechoslovakia'.
- 19 August. CTK denies that Cernik had said that Czechoslovakia was considering a World Bank Loan, but only loans from individual countries.
Pravda article alleging victimization of 99 Auto-Prague workers for writing to *Pravda*.
- 20 August. The East German Party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, says that socialist internationalism includes a readiness to enlist help from the fraternal countries.
 Emergency session of CPSU Central Committee.
- 21 August. Soviet ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington inform the Governments to which they are accredited that troops from the five Warsaw Pact countries, Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany have crossed the Czechoslovak frontier.
Tass announces that the troop movement is in response to a request from the Czech party and Government leaders.
 Ceausescu in Bucharest denounces the invasion as 'Flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal, socialist, free and independent state'. He announces the formation of 'new armed patriotic detachments' to defend the independence of the country.
 NATO Council sets aside regular business for an all-day discussion of Czechoslovak events. Spokesman refers to impact on détente and on plans for mutual force reductions.
 Individual NATO Governments reacted as follows:
 USSR: 'A flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of all accepted standards of international behaviour.'
 France: 'The armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia shows that the government of Moscow has not freed itself of the policy of blocs which was imposed on Europe by the effect of the Yalta agreements.' (President de Gaulle)
 Canada: Mr Sharp said that the invasion will set back the East/West détente but 'there's little we can do or little that we need fear concerning any outbreak of hostilities.'
 US: 'The tragic news from Czechoslovakia

shocks the conscience of the world. The Soviet Union and its allies have invaded a defenceless country to stamp out a resurgence of ordinary human freedom. It is a sad commentary on the communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental threat to the security of the Soviet System.'

Netherlands: After a special meeting of the Dutch cabinet, Prime Minister Piet de Jong announced that a visit of Soviet warships to Amsterdam planned for September will be cancelled.

West Germany: Condemns the Soviet military intervention as a clear violation of Czechoslovak sovereignty and as interference in that country's internal affairs.

U Thant issues an appeal to the Soviet Union to exercise the greatest possible 'moderation' in regard to Czechoslovakia, and to withdraw her troops.

The Security Council meets at the request of Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the UK and the US.

22 August.

The Security Council votes to inscribe on its agenda 'the present serious situation in Czechoslovakia'.

Voting:

For: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, UK, US.

Against: Hungary, USSR.

Abstentions: None.

A draft resolution (S/8761) is introduced by the Danish representative on behalf of Canada, Brazil, France, Paraguay, UK and the US. (Senegal later became a co-sponsor.) Then follows a procedural vote on the conditions under which the Council would temporarily adjourn, in which the Soviet Union and Hungary were joined in their abstention by India, Pakistan and Algeria.

Further NATO reactions include:

Italy: communiqué following an emergency cabinet meeting says that in the face of the crisis Italy believed that the Atlantic Alliance provides the only real guarantee 'against all external attempts at its free institutions'.

West Germany: weekend Army leaves are cancelled.

Denmark: cancelled visits planned for September by Zhukov and Peter.

Norway: cancelled planned September visit by Zhuvov.

Czechoslovak National Assembly issues declaration reaffirming loyalty to President Svoboda and the legal Government and Party leadership, and calls on the people to maintain dignity. The declaration is sent to the embassies of the invading powers; all accept the documents except the East Germans.

Pravda publishes a 2-page report on developments in Czechoslovakia, in justification of armed invasion. Dubcek leader of a minority, revisionist group in Czechoslovak Praesidium which 'adopted right-wing opportunist attitudes' and prevented implementation of Cierna and Bratislava agreements.

23 August.

Security Council continues discussion of the first resolution on Czechoslovakia. Acting Czechoslovak permanent representative announces that Hajek (who had been on holiday in Yugoslavia) is on his way to address the Assembly.

Voting on the resolution:

For: Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Paraguay, Senegal, UK and US.

Against: Hungary and USSR.

Abstentions: Algeria, India, Pakistan.

A second resolution (S/8767) is introduced by Canada on behalf of Brazil, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Senegal, UK and US.

NATO spokesman says that the Council 'closely and thoroughly analysed the political and military situation in Europe, by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia' and will continue to watch developments and will consult on their political effects.

Further individual NATO reactions were:

Italy: announces indefinite postponement of an industrial show, scheduled to be held in Moscow in December.

UK: Foreign Office announces that Secretary of State Stewart has cancelled official visits to Hungary and Bulgaria.

Belgium: announces that it will not participate in economic, cultural and technical contact with the five Warsaw Pact countries which have invaded Czechoslovakia until further notice.

Turkey: expresses the hope that the Security Council will find a just solution to the Czechoslovak question, and that foreign forces will leave the country as soon as possible.

President Svoboda leaves for Moscow with Husak, Dzur, Bilak, Piller, Indra and Kucera. On arrival there are greeted by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny.

Husak, from Moscow, tells members of the Slovak Party Central Committee that Dubcek and Cernik are in Moscow.

Tass publishes address to Czechoslovak 'brothers' from governments of USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland. Soviet and other troops did not come to interfere in Czechoslovak internal affairs.

Rumania broadcasts reaffirm solidarity with Czechoslovakia.

New patriotic detachments in Budapest take part in military parade.

The Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party denounces the 'barbarous aggression' undertaken by the 'five' and declares

24 August.

that the Warsaw Pact has been transformed into a treaty of aggression.

Procedural debate in the Security Council on seating an East German representative.

The East German request is defeated.

Voting:

<i>For:</i>	Hungary, USSR.
<i>Against:</i>	Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Paraguay, Senegal, UK and US.
<i>Abstentions:</i>	Algeria, India, Pakistan, Brazil.

Hajek addresses the Security Council which is adjourned on the assumption that it will reconvene on Monday, 26 August.

AFP reports from Moscow that Svoboda is requesting Hajek to ask the Security Council to end its discussions on the Czech Crisis.

Sources in the West German Ministry of Defence are reported by the Press as saying that the occupation force has made a definite attempt to jam West German radars.

Moscow Television denies rumours of a concentration of troops on the Soviet and Bulgarian borders of Rumania.

Tass attacks Rumania for aiding anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia. *Tass* accuses Rumania and Yugoslavia of giving 'active assistance to anti-Socialist forces' in Czechoslovakia, and of taking the same line as the 'imperialist NATO' powers and the 'Maoist group' in China. *Tass* also speaks of 'Czechoslovak political adventurers' being active in Belgrade and Bucharest. *Izvestia* attacks Ceausescu by name and accuses him of assisting Czechoslovak 'counter-revolutionaries'.

Presidents Tito and Ceausescu meet at Urchatz, on the Yugoslav-Rumanian frontier, in secrecy. Brief official communiqué states that there had been an exchange of views 'concerning problems pertaining to bilateral relations and

- 25 August. present-day international problems of interest to the two countries'.
Press reports from Bonn speak of a request from Kiesinger for 'a NATO Summit'.
US Embassy in Prague publishes an appeal asking all US Nationals to leave the country as soon as possible.
Radio Free Slovakia issues a warning that spurious tracts are being distributed by collaborators, proposing that Slovakia should withdraw from the Czechoslovak State, and become a Soviet Republic.
Pravda leader refers to Soviet troops having to act under extremely difficult conditions in Czechoslovakia.
- 26 August. Additional request from Foreign Minister Hajek that the Security Council ceases discussion on the Czechoslovak Situation, lest it should prejudice the Moscow talks.
- 27 August. President Svoboda and other Czech leaders return from Moscow.
A second communiqué confirms the presence in Moscow of Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, East German leaders.
Czechoslovak delegation at UN announces it will not take part in any further Security Council discussions on Czechoslovakia.
- 28 August. West German cabinet issues a demand for complete restoration of Czech sovereignty and the pull-back of all Soviet invasion forces.
Svoboda reaffirms adhesion to the Action Programme; calls for continued unity, wisdom and prudence. Dubcek, on radio, states that Government seeks 'the complete removal' of Pact forces at the earliest possible date, and that 'normalization' requires suppression of 'passion and psychoses'. Extraordinary Congress of Slovak Communist Party replaces Bilak as First Secretary by Husak, and elects new Central Committee.
- 29 August. Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee issues a statement that it 'considers of the utmost importance the carrying into effect of the complete withdrawal, in the shortest time, of the Armed Forces of the five Socialist states from Czechoslovakia'.
Smrkovsky, in radio broadcast says that only national unity had prevented imposition of even harsher terms in Moscow.
- 30 August. President Johnson in a speech at San Antonio, Texas issues a stern warning against a Soviet attack on Rumania.
Deputy Minister of the Interior commits suicide after refusing to hand over documents to Russian secret police.
Ceausescu, at Cluj, says that use of forces by one Socialist country against another is incompatible with Communism.
- 31 August. Consultations between NATO ambassadors and the State Department take place in Washington in the morning. In the afternoon the following statement issued by the State Department:

There are larger Soviet forces now present in Central Europe than at any other time since the early post-war period. The changed East-West military situation in Europe is of significance to the security of the US and its allies.
In the light of these events we are reviewing with our allies what the implications may be for existing arrangements to provide for our common security.

In the evening Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, informs Mr Rusk that he is authorized by his government to deny rumours cited by Johnson that Russian troops were preparing for action against Rumania.
Central Committee Plenum of Czechoslovak Communist Party announces new Praesidium of 21 members. Plenum told by Dubcek that the leadership 'had failed to appreciate the collective strategic interests of the Soviet Union and its four other Warsaw Pact allies as a concrete and

- objective factor in determining the pace of Czechoslovakia's internal development' and that temporary censorship of the mass media would have to be introduced.
- 1 September. Dubcek announces indefinite postponement of the 14th Party Congress.
- 3 September. Opening the general debate of the UN-sponsored conference of non-nuclear states, Brandt appeals for a global convention to prevent any use of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons.
Svoboda accepts Professor Sik's resignation as Deputy Prime Minister.
Izvestia announces indefinite postponement of the 14th Party Congress.
- 4 September. Following a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (on which France is not represented) an agreed NATO statement is issued referring to the review which is now being undertaken of defence arrangements.
Press reports from Bonn claim that seven new Soviet divisions have moved into East Germany. Chancellor Kiesinger is reported as 'unsatisfied with the Western allied response'.
Pravda describes as 'wild lies' reports that Washington had been told in advance of its plan to invade, and had received a White House assurance that the US would not react.
Tass, reporting Sik's resignation, describes him as 'one of the most odious figures among the right-wing revisionist forces'.
- 5 September. US cancellation of the first planned event under the US-Soviet cultural exchange agreement; a second 'inaugural' flight by Aeroflot officials from Moscow to New York was also cancelled.
- 6 September. Secretary of Defence Clifford, speaking to the National Press Club, says that Moscow's action 'clearly demonstrated that a significant American presence in Western Europe is still needed'. He went on to say that work must proceed on the anti-missile system, so that the Americans can negotiate with the Russians from a position of strength.
- V. Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, arrives in Prague. Czechoslovak Party Praesidium expresses opposition to 'extremes in politics, irresponsible tendencies of any kind, efforts to endanger the post-January policy and the conclusions of the Moscow negotiations from whatever side'.
- 8 September. Senator Mansfield, speaking on 'Face the Nation', referring to actions that should be taken in the aftermath of the Czech crisis, said: 'Primary responsibility should not fall on us, but should fall on our allies, who are there in the immediate area of concern, who are fully capable of meeting the requirements which they have agreed to under the NATO agreement.'
Gomulka justifies invasion by the existence of a 'concrete threat of detaching Czechoslovakia from the ranks of the Warsaw Pact countries'.
- 9 September. *New York Times* news service reports that the US is pressing its European allies to:
(a) restore to full strength the divisions that they had assigned to NATO;
(b) speed up the re-equipment of the German Air Force for a conventional, and not just a nuclear role;
(c) improve long-neglected contingency plans for a quick call-up of forces and an effective mobilization of reserve units in the European countries.
In the course of his Press Conference, General de Gaulle says that France will not participate in any special NATO ministerial meeting.
Rude Pravo estimates production loss as a result of the invasion at 1,626 million crowns (£94,308,000).
- 10 September. Clifford, briefing a House armed services subcommittee, says that Czechoslovakia will not cause an increase in US defence spending.

Cernik, Hamouz (Deputy Prime Minister) and Vales (Foreign Trade Minister) go to Moscow for economic talks and sign economic agreement.

Svoboda, Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik and Husak issue statement reaffirming policy of 'strengthening the Socialist order of society and developing its democratic and human character', and appealing to Czechoslovaks abroad to return.

Tass and *Pravda* accuse some Czechoslovak newspapers of continuing to 'speak from anti-Socialist positions' and of alleging that there had been no counter-revolution.

11 September.

President Johnson says:

The leaders of the Soviet Union seem to have decided that a movement toward a humane version of Communism in a small friendly country is a threat to their security - despite the fact that the Czechs remained their ally in the Warsaw Pact.

New military and political risks have arisen from this aggressive act, which demand ever closer cooperation among the Western Allies. For our part, we have made it unmistakably clear that the use of force and the threat of force will not be tolerated in areas of common responsibility like Berlin.

Czechoslovak Government approves Czech-Soviet economic agreement.

12 September.

Dubcek, in public speech, says that Czechoslovakia wishes to fulfil Moscow Agreement, but would allow no retreat to pre-January conditions.

13 September.

Albanian National Assembly votes unanimously in favour of withdrawal from Warsaw Pact.

Czechoslovak National Assembly approves Bill setting up Office for the Press and Information, and another 'on some measures to secure public order,' which limits the right of assembly.

Dubcek, on radio, reaffirms there will be no return to pre-January conditions, and warns against clashes with occupying forces.

16 September.

Exercise 'Black Lion', involving West German,

US and French forces, begins in Southern Germany well to the west of its originally planned area, near to the Czech border.

Thirteen leading economists publish defence of Sik in *Rude Pravo*.

Smrkovsky, referring to 15 articles of agreement signed in Moscow, declares that some of them say that the Czech Communist Party will continue to implement policy which had been planned in January.

Soviet statement declares 'the firm intention of proceeding against those forces which want to use the positive process which has been under way in Czechoslovakia since January for an overt or covert attack on Socialism'. *Tass* accuses Czechoslovak information media of 'wrecking' the Moscow Agreement, and charges Yugoslav press of spreading 'bourgeois propaganda' about Czechoslovakia.

17 September.

Clifford announces that 20-40,000 US troops may be sent to Europe shortly as a 'temporary measure' to take part in NATO exercises.

19 September.

Prague announces resignation of Dr Hajek.

Pravda article (by Lomakin) says that theory and practice of Yugoslav leaders 'served as an example for revisionist elements in Czechoslovakia'.

20 September.

Izvestia, replying to 16 September statement by Czechoslovak economists, attacks Sik reforms, and alleges that the statement could only impede the implementation of the Moscow Agreement.

23 September.

Smrkovsky, at Zalyzi chemical works, speaks of national unity, and the unity of the Czechoslovak leaders as 'an arch from which not a single stone must be allowed to fall'.

24 September.

Fifty leading Czechoslovak economists reaffirm support for economic reform in *Rude Pravo*.

25 September.

The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Nations says in New York that his government

- opposes any discussion of the Soviet invasion and occupation of his country by the General Assembly. 'We hope that world opinion will understand that we wish to settle our problems within the Socialist community', he told reporters.
- Kiesinger addressing the Bundestag in its first meeting since the invasion says that pending a withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact occupying troops, 'a reappraisal of the NATO forces in Europe is unavoidable'. He adds that West Germany reserves the right to increase its defence budget beyond scheduled plans.
- Heads of Czechoslovak radio and television (Hejzlar and Pelikan) are dismissed.
- Federation proposals are published.
- Pravda* article (by Kovalev) emphasizes that independence of socialist countries is subordinate to interests of world communist movement.
- 27 September. Yakubovsky reported by Prague Radio to have been received by Svoboda in the presence of Dubcek, Cernik and Dzur. Bucharest Radio announces Yakubovsky's arrival there on the same day.
- 29 September. Husak claims on television that the Party had, prior to the invasion, planned to take action against the excesses of the mass media. He announces plans for a new party action programme, 'valid for several months or a year, and concerning both internal and external policy'.
- 1 October. Announcement that the World Communist Summit, previously planned for November in Moscow, will be postponed.
- Tass* alleges establishment of terrorist groups in Czechoslovakia with connivance of 'imperialist intelligence services'.
- 3 October. Gromyko, speaking in the UN General Assembly, defends Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as essential for world peace and emphasizes the need for disarmament.
- 3-4 October. Dubcek visits Moscow for two days of talks on the Czechoslovak normalization programme. Czechoslovak Government represented by Dubcek, Cernik, and Husak; Soviet Union by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny.
- Communique speaks of a treaty on the temporary stationing of Warsaw troops in Czechoslovakia, and Cernik, on return from Moscow, says that this will be signed within the next few days.
- Communique also states that Czechoslovak Government and party 'will intensify the struggle against anti-Socialist forces, will take the necessary measures to place all mass media at the service of Socialism and will strengthen the party and state authorities with men firmly adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism'.
- 4 October. Czechoslovak permanent representative at the UN confirms that his country does not wish its affairs to be discussed in the General Assembly.
- Announcement from Brussels that the NATO Council will advance the date of its December ministerial meeting to the second half of November. (It was also reported that the various members were expected to have an early opportunity for an informal discussion in New York on 7 October.)
- 5 October. General Dzur expresses his confidence that the 'overwhelming majority' of the occupation troops will have left by 28 October, but that 'a certain part of the troops, however, will definitely stay in our country through the winter'.
- 7-9 October. Kosygin visits Finland for talks with President Kekkonen. Communique states that they had reaffirmed their intention 'to continue to adhere in international affairs to the aims of presenting peace, strengthening security in Europe and throughout the world, and developing peaceful co-operation among all peoples'. (Finnish Prime Minister, Dr Koivisto, began a two-week visit to Soviet Union on 22 October.)

11 October.

Dubcek, addressing meeting of party officials, reaffirms intention of adhering to Soviet alliance, also to 'the permanent and positive features of our post-January policy', and to continue trading with the West.

Svoboda states adherence to post-January policy, avoiding those things 'which previously obstructed its consistently Socialist character'.

Three Soviet citizens convicted of violating public order by staging protest against Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Pavel Litvinov, 29, sentenced to five years imprisonment at Chita; Mrs Larissa Daniel sentenced to four years to the Irkutsk region; Konstantier Babitsky sentenced to three years in the Omsk region of Siberia.

14-15 October.

Cernik leads Czechoslovak Government delegation to Moscow to discuss treaty provisions relating to stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia.

16 October.

Treaty signed in Prague by Cernik and Kosygin, the latter being accompanied by Gromyko and Marshal Grechko. Ratified in Moscow by Praesidium on 18 October, and approved by Czechoslovak National Assembly by 228 votes to four, with ten abstentions, and ratified by President Svoboda on same day. Cernik speaks of the 'new reality' the country had to face, and states that the Soviet forces would not interfere in Czechoslovak internal affairs and would respect Czechoslovak law. Kosygin, however, states that 'to defend the achievements of Socialism in Czechoslovakia' is 'a sacred international duty'. The treaty gave the Soviet Union the right for the first time since 1945 to station troops in Czechoslovakia. No details given in treaty of number of troops to remain, covered by a separate secret agreement, but press reports from Prague give a figure of about 100,000. Kosygin states that the 'temporary' stay of

Soviet troops was intended to 'create solid guarantees of Czechoslovakia's security and of its socialist gains (and) to safeguard reliably the interests of the whole Socialist community from encroachments by the forces of imperialism and reaction'.

Announcement in Switzerland states that Professor Ota Sik had entered the country with his family. (On September 18 it had been reported that he had been appointed special economic adviser at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade.)

27 October.

National Assembly passes unanimously legislation establishing a federal structure for Czechoslovakia, to take effect as from 1 January 1969. National Assembly to be replaced by a bicameral Federal Assembly consisting of a directly elected national Chamber of the People, whose composition would reflect the proportions of the various population groups, and a Chamber of Nations, with 150 deputies, half chosen by the Czech National Council and half by the Slovak National Council. Safeguards included to prevent domination by either nationality; each Chamber would have equal status to ensure, in Cernik's words, that 'no nation will be able to force its will on the other and no measure can be adopted against the will of the majority.' Bill was signed by Svoboda on 30 October at Bratislava Castle.

28-30 October.

Meeting at Moscow of Defence Ministers of East European communist countries, attended by General Rusov (Czechoslovak Acting Defence Chief) and Marshal Yakubovsky, to discuss Warsaw Pact matters, and the need to strengthen the Pact.

3 November.

US Defence Department report claims that military balance in Europe has not been upset by the Czechoslovak invasion. Pointed out that NATO defence budgets in 1968 totalled \$75,000 millions compared with \$50,000 for the Warsaw

- Pact countries, and that NATO manpower in Europe was 389,000 as opposed to 360,000 Warsaw Pact troops. Claimed that NATO was qualitatively better prepared than Pact powers in most fields.
- 4 November. *Pravda* attacks critics of Moscow Agreement in Czechoslovakia. 'Instead of listening to sober voices and using healthy criticism to improve things, certain officials of the Czechoslovak party are encouraging those forces which used inner party democracy for brazen attacks against party principles.'
- 7 November. Anti-Russian demonstrations take place in Prague after Dubcek and Cernik are abused by a pro-Russian crowd at memorial service for Russian soldiers who died in the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Germans.
- 12 November. Brezhnev, in a speech to fifth congress of Polish Communist Party, describes invasion as an 'extraordinary step dictated by necessity', and referred to 'recent activation of forces hostile to Socialism in Czechoslovakia'. Declares that 'when internal and external forces that are hostile to Socialism try to turn the development of some Socialist country towards the restoration of a capitalist régime . . . it becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all Socialist countries'.
Seven Western journalists and photographers expelled from Czechoslovakia.
- 14-17 November. Plenary session of Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party. Announcement made of formation of a new eight-man executive committee responsible for 'collective evaluation of urgent political problems' and for co-ordinating the 'procedure and work of Communists in Party, State and Social organs'. Members would be Cernik, Dubcek, Svoboda, Erban, Husak, Sadovsky, Smrkovsky and Dr Strovgal. (Dr Strovgal, Minister of the Interior 1961-5, also

replaced Meynav on the Praesidium.) Dubcek gave assurances that civil liberties and fundamental rights would be upheld.

Resolution passed on 17 November (published following day) condemned right-wing and opportunistic forces for failure in policy that had resulted in the invasion, and criticized the Press for fostering 'anti-Socialist and liberalistic' tendencies; emphasizes that the mass media were responsible for carrying out the policy of the Party and the State. But resolution also stated that Czechoslovakia would be converted into a Federal State, with no return to the pre-January situation.

Some 60,000 students in Bohemia and Moravia start three day sit-in strike at erosion of the Action Programme.

25 November.

Severe restriction on travel, particularly to Western Europe, announced in Prague. Permanent exit visas for Czechoslovak citizens abolished. Announced by Deputy Minister of the Interior (Dr Rybar) that 2,067,200 Czechoslovak citizens had been abroad in first ten months of 1968, of whom about 5,000 had applied for asylum. Stated in *The Times* that between January and October 336,000 citizens had made journeys to Western Countries, of which 92,000 were in September and October, as opposed to 26,000 in same months in 1967.

A delegation of artists, writers, and scientists expressed to Dubcek their concern over erosion of reforms.

28 November.

Izvestia expresses approval of developments in Czechoslovakia, and states that there are 'more and more people facing up to the reality of today'.

Poll published in Catholic People's Party newspaper *Lidova Demokracie* states that public confidence in the Dubcek régime had risen from 55 per cent in February to 85 per cent in November; review also showed concern at failure of Czech leaders to fulfil the democratization policies.

- 6 December. USA announces it has advanced the timing of its annual military exercises in Europe to January, will delay the planned return of some units to America, and that 15,500 men will be flown to Germany to take part in the exercises, to be held some 30 miles from the Czechoslovak frontier. In addition, it was stated that 100 Phantom aircraft would be sent to Europe to take part in the exercises, and that a brigade of the 24th Infantry Division, due to return to the United States, would remain in Europe indefinitely.
- Appointment of Mr Smidmajer as new director of Czechoslovak state television, in succession to Mr Pelikan, announced.
- 6-8 December. Czech-Soviet meeting at Kiev to discuss, according to *Tass*, 'co-operation' between the two governments and parties. Main topic of the talks was economic planning and links between the two countries, and, in particular, the extent of Soviet economic aid. *Rude Pravo* (10 December) describes the 'deepening of co-operation within the framework of COMECON' as the principal subject.
- 12 December. Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party begins its plenary session. Dr Sik announces in Geneva that he will not attend the meeting on advice from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Berne.
- Prace* gives prominence to open letters expressing support for Smrkovsky, questioning his absence from Kiev talks, and a telegram from 42,000 miners in North Bohemia, praising his 'openness, honour, civic pride, and resistance'.
- 16 December. Indra and Bilak reported to have been confirmed as members of the party Secretariat. *Prace* publishes an open letter urging Sik to return to Czechoslovakia to 'explain to the group of comrades dealing with your case all the circumstances which are not clear'.
- 17 December. Nikolai Baibakov, Soviet chief economic planner, arrives in Prague at head of economic delegation. Reports circulating in Vienna that on 1 January Cernik will become Prime Minister of the Federal Government and to replace Dubcek as First Secretary; Dubcek would then become chairman (source, Annelise Schulz, Vienna: *Daily Telegraph*, 18 December). Suggested that these and other leadership changes were discussed at Kiev meeting.
- Reports from Prague in *Mlada Fronta* state that Soviet Government has not granted the loan, said to be £167 millions, urgently needed by Czechoslovakia to modernize its consumer goods industries. Deputy Minister of National Planning, said that exports to capitalist countries 'are getting smaller and smaller while our imports increase'. Output increase of 12% in 1968 largely overtaken by higher wages.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1969: A CHRONOLOGY

- January 1 President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda delivered a speech in which he reiterated his adherence to the essentials of the post-January course.
- January 1 Svoboda appointed a new Czechoslovak federal government, with Oldrich Cernik as premier.
- January 2 The presidium of the Slovak National Council appointed the new government of the Slovak Socialist Republic, with Stefan Sadovsky as premier.
- January 7 The CSCP Presidium moved that Peter Colotka, Deputy Premier of the federal government, be elected chairman of the Federal Assembly; Josef Smrkovsky is to become chairman of the People's Chamber and First Vice-Chairman of the Federal Assembly; Dalibor Hanes, a Slovak, was proposed as chairmanship of the Chamber of Nations.
- January 8 The Czech National Council appointed a new government for the Czech Socialist Republic, with Stanislav Razl as premier.
- January 10 The delegation of the CPSU led by CPSU CC secretary Konstantin Katushev, which had been on a visit to Czechoslovakia since 27 December 1968, left the country by air.
- January 15 The first issue of Tribuna, an ideological and political weekly published by the Bureau for Czech Party Affairs, appeared after a week's delay due to refusal of progressive printers to set objectionable articles.
- January 16 Prague student Jan Palach immolated himself on St. Wenceslas Square in protest against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia (he died on January 19, and his death was followed by a number of anti-Soviet demonstrations).
- January 16-17 The CPCSC CC met in Plenary session; the main report on the current situation was delivered by Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek; the Plenum adopted two resolutions, one on the federal arrangement of the Republic, the other on the current situation, and recommendation that Peter Colotka be replaced by Karol Laco as federal Deputy Premier.

January 20 A Slovak CP Presidium statement on the current situation warned against extremist groups which were trying to exploit the crisis; a Slovak government statement on Palach's death regretted the tragedy, but attacked extremist elements.

January 20 A silent demonstration took place at Prague's Wenceslas Square to honor the memory of Jan Palach; similar manifestations were reported from Brno and Ceske Budejovice, and meetings at university compounds were held in Olomouc and Páráubice; demonstrations of sympathy for Palach were also reported in Slovakia.

January 20 A Soviet delegation arrived in Prague to discuss problems arising from Czechoslovak-Soviet Status of Forces Treaty.

January 21-23 The first Czech Trade Union Congress took place in Prague; Rudolf Pacovsky, chairman of the preparatory committee of the Czech Council of Trade Unions, reserved to the TUs the right to strike, but promised to use it only in extreme cases; Premier Oldrich Cernik charged "anti-socialist extremists" with stirring up emotions, posing unreasonable demands, and continuously creating new conflict situations; the resolution adopted by the Congress reflected most of the ideas expounded by the progressive head of the Czech metal workers, Vlastimil Toman; Rudolf Pacovsky was elected chairman of the Czech Trade Union Council, which consists of 105 members.

January 23 Czech Premier Stanislav Razl presented a program for the Czech government to the first session of the Czech National Council; the ruling Czech body elected 75 representatives to the Federal Chamber of Nations.

January 24 A meeting of the Slovak National Council worked out a basis on which Slovak Premier Stefan Sadvovsky could present the program for Slovak government.

January 25 Jan Palach was buried; many official personalities emphasized in their speeches the ideals for which Palach died -- love of truth, freedom, and democracy.

January 26 Clashes occurred in Prague between a massed police force and young people who began to congregate near the St. Wenceslas statue; many were arrested.

January 26 Czechoslovak authorities expelled from the country 16 Western correspondents on grounds that they had been collecting political and military information.

January 26-29 A Slovak Trade Union Congress was held in Bratislava, during which an 81-member plenum was elected and Vojtech Daubner was confirmed in the post of Chairman of the Slovak Council of Trade Unions.

January 29-31 The constituent session of the Federal Assembly took place; Josef Smrkovsky was elected chairman of the Chamber of People, Dalibor Hanes, a Slovak, chairman of the Chamber of Nations, Peter Colotka chairman and Josef Smrkovsky first vice-chairman of the Federal Assembly; the Assembly unanimously approved the governmental program in a speech by Premier Oldrich Cernik.

February 3 The Government of Slovak Socialist Republic decided to abolish regional national committees.

February 4 An extraordinary Slovak congress of the Czechoslovak Youth Union opened in Bratislava; the Czechoslovak Youth Union in Slovakia was dissolved and replaced by six youth organizations.

February 10 The Central Committee of the Slovak National Front was established, and elected Antonin Tazky as its chairman.

February 12 The Dresden-located station Radio Vltava ceased operations; on February 13, Radio Berlin International identified itself on the wavelength which has been used by Vltava since 21 August 1968.

February 19 A constituent meeting of the Czech National Front appointed a central committee and elected Josef Korcek its chairman.

February 20 Gustav Husak made a speech to 700 Party officials in Brezno nad Hronom, in which he underlined the necessity for a strong Party and a disciplined society.

February 25 A high school student from the Moravian town of Sumperk, Jan Zajic, immolated himself on Wenceslas Square in Prague.

March 1 According to constitutional law, President Ludvik Svoboda appointed the members of the State Defense Council, with Alexander Dubcek as chairman.

March 4-7 The Seventh Czechoslovak All-Trade Union Congress took place in Prague; it adopted four documents

of major importance: 1) The Czechoslovak Trade Union Charter; 2) a Standpoint on the Law on Socialist Enterprises; 3) a Political Resolution; and 4) a Standpoint on amendments to the Labor Code; Karel Polacek was re-elected chairman of the Central Council.

- March 12 A one-day Slovak CP Central Committee Plenum was held in Bratislava; in the main speech, Slovak CP First Secretary Gustav Husak announced the dismissal of Miroslav Kusy as head of the Slovak CP CC ideological department, and many other personnel changes were made in the leading bodies of the Slovak CP CC.
- March 13 Federal Premier Oldrich Cernik, his deputy Vaclav Vales, and Planning Minister Frantisek Vlasak made a one-day visit to Moscow.
- March 14 A sizable pro-Yugoslav demonstration took place in front of the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague.
- March 16 The Czechoslovak delegation to the Warsaw Pact Conference in Budapest headed by Czechoslovak CP First Secretary Alexander Dubcek and including President Ludvik Svoboda, arrived in the Hungarian capital.
- March 24-26 The constituent Congress of the Czech Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters took place in Prague; Frantisek Blaha was elected Union chairman.
- March 26-28 The last Congress of the Czechoslovak Anti-Fascist Fighters' Union (in its old pre-federative form) took place in Prague; Samuel Faltan was elected chairman and Josef Husek secretary general of the Czechoslovak Union.
- March 28 Mass anti-Soviet demonstrations took place in Prague and other towns with Soviet garrisons in the night from March 28 to March 29, sparked by the second Czechoslovak victory over the USSR in the ice-hockey World Championships in Stockholm.
- March 29 The Czech government condemned anti-Soviet demonstrations.
- March 31 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semyonov and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko arrived in Prague in connection with the anti-Soviet outbursts in Czechoslovakia; an ultimatum was delivered to the Czechoslovak leadership demanding the ouster of the reformers.
- April 1 The Czechoslovak CP Presidium met in extraordinary session to discuss the anti-Soviet demonstrations in the country.

April 2 Czechoslovak radio stations broadcast a statement issued by the CSCP Presidium in which, for the first time since the August 1968 invasion, it identified itself with the Soviet assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

April 2 The Federal government announced the first repressive measures; preventive censorship was introduced in those mass communication media which offered no guarantee of an editorial policy consistent with "important domestic and foreign policy interests."

April 3 CPCS First Secretary Alexander Dubcek appealed to the population to refrain from provocative acts.

April 6 The Slovak CP Presidium issued a communiqué after an extraordinary session on April 3, in which the March 28-29 violence was for the first time described as having been of an "evidently terrorist and counterrevolutionary character."

April 8 The Czechoslovak CP Presidium convened under the chairmanship of Alexander Dubcek to assess the current political situation and adopted measures designed to strengthen the role of the Party in the mass communication media and discipline within the Party itself.

April 8 Josef Vohnout, chairman of the Czech Office for Press and Information was replaced by Josef Havlin.

April 11 Gustav Husak, addressing a rally of Slovak collective farmers in Nitra, launched a scathing attack on the Party and state leadership.

April 12 Within two hours, the federal government denied its own report that Soviet reinforcements were to be brought to Czechoslovakia.

April 16 The Executive Committee of the CPCS Presidium rehabilitated a number of "conservatives" like Indra, Bilak, Svestka, and Rigo.

April 17 At a one-day Czechoslovak CP Central Committee Plenum Czechoslovak First Party Secretary Alexander Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak; the Presidium and its 8-member Executive Committee were replaced by a new Party Presidium consisting of 11 members; all "progressive" members of the old Party Presidium were ousted.

April 18 The Slovak CP Central Committee Plenum met in Bratislava, and expressed full support for the

decisions and cadre measures of CPCS CC meeting in Prague the day before.

April 18 Jiri Sekera, editor-in-chief of the Czechoslovak CP daily Rude Pravo, was relieved of his office and replaced by the orthodox Miroslav Moc.

April 21 Gustav Husak appointed the Defense Council of the Czech Socialist Republic, with Lubomir Strougal as chairman.

April 22 A delegation headed by CPCS leader Gustav Husak arrived in Moscow to attend the long-delayed Comecon summit meeting.

April 22 The Federal Government appointed a new Federal Committee for Press and Information, the highest censorship organ, with Jaroslav Havelka as Minister-Chairman.

April 28 The two Chambers of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, convened in Prague, elected Alexander Dubcek chairman after the resignation of Peter Colotka, who was proposed for the post of Slovak premier.

April 26-28 The second Congress of the Union of Czech and Moravian Students took place in Olomouc; no decision was reached on whether or not the organization should join the National Front.

May 1 May Day celebrations were generally calm, marked only by small disturbances in Prague.

May 4 The Slovak CP Central Committee convened in Bratislava and elected Stefan Sadovsky as Slovak First Secretary in place of Gustav Husak; the Presidium of the Slovak National Council named Peter Colotka to Sadovsky's post as Premier of the Slovak government.

May 5 The 24th anniversary of the liberation of Plzen by US troops turned into a spontaneous pro-American demonstration.

May 6 A regular meeting of the CSCP Presidium took place, at which further measures designed to "improve" the work of mass communication media were adopted..

May 7 A delegation headed by President Svoboda visited the Central Group of the Soviet Army at its headquarters in Milovice; the purpose of the visit was to initiate Czechoslovak-Soviet fraternization on a national level.

May 10 The Soviet occupation sheet Zpravy announced that the paper would discontinue further publication

May 13 The Federal Government, supported by the governments of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics, announced austerity measures, effective May 14.

May 17 The Party daily Rude Pravo published a proclamation entitled "A Word to Our Own Ranks," signed by 130 orthodox Czechoslovak journalists and radio and TV staff members.

May 17 The Archbishop of Prague, Cardinal Josef Beran, who had resided in Rome since 1965, died at the age of 80.

May 19-26 The Czechoslovak-Soviet military staff maneuvers took place in Czechoslovakia, attended by Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky.

May 20 The US astronaut, Colonel Frank Borman, arrived in Prague at the invitation of the International Committee on Space Research.

May 22 Prosecutor General Milos Cerovsky, a distinguished progressive, was released from his post by President Svoboda, at his own request.

May 22 A joint meeting of Czechoslovak Creative Unions took place in Prague, at which Czech writers and men of science and art solemnly declared their adherence to the ideals of freedom and a just society.

May 23 President Ludvik Svoboda appointed Jan Fejes Prosecutor General.

May 24 Czechoslovak Party leader Gustav Husak made a one-day visit to Warsaw where he met Polish Party leader Gomulka and other PUPP representatives.

May 26 Husak left for East Germany, where he met SED leader Walter Ulbricht and other GDR dignitaries in Erfurt.

May 27 President Svoboda granted an amnesty to persons who had escaped or remained abroad without authorization after the August 1968 events.

May 28 The Czech Ministry of the Interior banned the Association for Human Rights because its activity had allegedly demonstrated that it had been fulfilling functions of a political nature.

May 29-30. The Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee met in plenary session; three resolutions were adopted: 1) on a guideline for Party activities until the 14th Congress; 2) on the Party attitude toward the forthcoming Moscow summit; 3) on organizational and cadre questions (this involved Party disciplinary measures and expulsion of prominent reformers).

June 2 The Prague Municipal Party Committee held an extraordinary plenary session, at which leading secretary Bohumil Simon and the entire Presidium resigned.

June 2-3 A two-day plenary session of the Slovak CP Central Committee took place in Bratislava at which Slovak First Party Secretary Stefan Sadovsky lauded the fact that the situation in Slovakia had always been more "consolidated" than in the Czech Lands.

June 3 A CPCS CC delegation headed by Party leader Husak left for the Moscow international conference of Communist and workers' Parties.

June 9 The Central Committee of the Union of Czech Journalists convened in Prague; a new 12-member presidium, again with reformer Vlado Kaspar as chairman, was elected.

June 9 The Prague Municipal CP Committee elected a new nine-member presidium, with Oldrich Matejka as chairman.

June 10 Vladimir Koucky, Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow, proposed in Rude Pravo that the statement of the CPCS Presidium issued in the early hours of 21 August 1968 and condemning the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia be revised.

June 10 A constituent congress of the Union of Czech Writers was held in Prague; Jaroslav Seifert, one of the elders of Czech lyrical poetry, was re-elected chairman of the Union.

June 11 Gustav Husak spoke at the Moscow summit conference.

June 11 A constituent congress of the Slovak Writers' Union convened in Bratislava; Wojtech Mihalik was elected chairman.

June 12 Zdenek Fierlinger tendered his resignation as chairman of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Association.

June 18 The CPCS delegation led by Gustav Husak returned from the Moscow summit.

June 19 Bohuslav Chnoupek was appointed director of Czechoslovak Radio, replacing Odom Zavodsky.

June 20 The Czech Ministry of the Interior disbanded the Union of Czech and Moravian Students.

June 26 Gustav Husak addressed a state-wide conference (in Prague) of leading Party secretaries and national committee chairmen from regions and districts; he stressed the fact that the struggle against right-wing forces must be carried down to the local level.

June 30 The CPCS Presidium appointed Jan Fojtik, former ideologist under Novotny, to the post of rector of the Prague Party College; he replaced reformer Milan Huebl.

July 9 The preparatory committee of the Marxist-Leninist Association of the Left Front (a revival of a prewar organization of the same name which was a Communist front outfit for dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology) began its activities.

July 10 The Czech Minister of Culture, Miroslav Galuska, was replaced by Miloslav Bruzek, a hardliner.

July 14 The Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in Prague was closed because of its past "revisionist" activities.

July 21 Czechoslovak CP leader Husak, who accompanied President Svoboda to the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the foundation of People's Poland, addressed the Polish Sejm.

July 23 President Svoboda and Party head Gustav Husak returned from Warsaw; before leaving the Polish capital they had "friendly talks" with Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny.

July 26 Erika Kadlecova was dismissed as head of the Secretariat for Church Affairs at the Czech Ministry of Culture.

July 28 Gustav Husak arrived in Sofia, on the last leg of a trip designed to achieve "normalization" with those countries which took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

July 29 On his return from Bulgaria, Husak stopped for a brief unannounced visit in Budapest, and met with Hungarian Party leader Janos Kadar.

July 29 A Moscow Municipal CP delegation was prevented from entering the Avia factory in Letnany, near Prague, and was pelted with debris by the workers.

August 2 Party leader Gustav Husak and President Svoboda arrived in Simferopol, in the Crimea, where they met their Soviet counterparts Brezhnev and Podgorny.

August 6 A dogmatist, Jan Zelenka, replaced Josef Smidmajer as Czechoslovak TV director.

August 6 A delegation representing the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Administration, led by General Alexei Yepishev, arrived in Prague.

August 10 President Svoboda and Party leader Gustav Husak returned to Prague from the Crimea.

August 14 The CPCS Presidium met in Prague to hear Husak's and Svoboda's reports on their recent talks with Brezhnev and Podgorny.

August 14 The Federal and national governments issued a joint proclamation assessing the situation in the country as serious.

August 15 Defense Minister Martin Dzur issued a declaration stressing that the army is not only an instrument for guarding the country against foreign enemies, but also a tool in the class struggle which protects the "socialist" system against hostile domestic forces.

August 19 Clashes occurred between the citizens and the police at Prague's St. Wenceslas Square.

August 20 Demonstrations took place in Prague, in which two persons were killed and several injured; 320 individuals were arrested.

August 21 Demonstrations took place in Prague, Brno, Liberec, and allegedly also in Bratislava; three persons were killed in Brno and 12 others wounded, among them four militiamen.

August 21 The CPCS Presidium met in extraordinary session; the subsequent communiqué admitted demonstrations of active resistance.

August 22 Another session of the CPCS Presidium was held to discuss Premier Oldrich Cernik's report on the situation in the country.

August 22 Emergency laws were announced by the Federal Assembly Presidium; they became effective the same day and will be valid until 31 December 1969.

August 26 The Czech Party Bureau, led by conservative hardliner Lubomir Strougal, issued a call for purges.

August 27 The Czech National Council Presidium relieved Vilibald Bezdicek of his office as Czech Minister of Education, and replaced him by the dogmatist hardliner Jaromir Hrbek.

August 28 The Slovak CP CC, the Slovak government, the Slovak National Council, and the CC of the Anti-Fascist Fighters' League met for a festive session in Banska Bystrica to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the August 1944 Slovak National Uprising; in the main speech Stefan Sadvsky conceded that the fears of allies prior to invasion in August 1968 were "justified."

August 29 A mass rally took place in Banska Bystrica, at which the main speaker was Gustav Husak; he declared that the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops in August 1968 "was in no way a hostile act against the Czechoslovak People and the Czechoslovak state."

September 1 President Svoboda arrived in Warsaw for a "friendly visit," at the invitation of Polish President Marian Spychalski.

September 5 The reformist chairman of the Council of the Association of Czech Children's and Youth Organizations, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, resigned.

September 6 The 11th International Fair in Brno was opened.

September 8 The Prague Municipal Journalist organization was disbanded and the Czech Journalist Union neutralized when its Presidium "resigned."

September 9 At a regular session the Slovak CP Presidium rescinded several documents passed in July and August 1968 (including the declaration condemning the invasion).

September 10 The Editor-in-chief of the Slovak CP daily Pravda, Leopold Podstupka, was replaced by an unreconstructed hardliner, Bohus Travnicek.

September 15 Polish Party leader Gomulka met Gustav Husak in Ostrava.

September 16 Czechoslovak Federal Premier Oldrich Cernik left for Moscow to negotiate on Czechoslovak-Soviet economic co-operation.

September 17-18 A two-day plenary session of the Central Council of Trade Unions ended in Prague; the letters sent on 24 August 1968 to the TUs of the five invading countries and other TU centers were declared invalid.

September 19 The Plenum of the Slovak Council of Children's and Youth Associations released the Council's chairman, Robert Harencar, and named his deputy, Rudolf Belan, to lead the organization.

September 19 The Party Presidium decided to renew the activity of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Institute of the Academy of Sciences, defunct since the early 1960s.

September 20 Alois Polednak, a noted progressive in charge of the Czechoslovak film industry, was removed from his post by the federal government and replaced by Jiri Purs, a staunch follower of socialist realism in cultural matters.

September 22 New leaders of the Union of Czech Journalists were appointed, with orthodox Josef Valenta as head of the 4-man leading committee and the 15-member secretariat.

September 25 The Czech National Council Presidium held a session in Prague; Five progressive members resigned, the immunity of deputy Rudolf Batték was revoked.

September 26-27 A two-day plenary session of CPCSS CC, which ended in the early morning hours, effected far-reaching policy and personnel changes; the extraordinary 14th Party Congress was officially declared illegal; Alexander Dubcek was removed from the Party Presidium, 29 members were dropped from the Central Committee and 6 from the Czech Party Bureau.

September 27 The federal government resigned and a new one was appointed by Oldrich Cernik, who remained Czechoslovak Premier.

September 29 At its first session the new federal government rescinded several documents passed in July and August 1968.

September 29 The Czech National Council Presidium appointed a new Czech Government, with Josef Kempny replacing Stanislav Razl as premier.

September 30 The Party Presidium dissolved the Party organizations at Prague, Brno, Bratislava, and Kosice universities, and decided to close the Central Committee Institute for Political Sciences as of 1 October 1969.

October 2 Meeting in plenary session, the Slovak CP Central Committee withdrew documents passed in 1968 and decided upon personnel changes more moderate than those in Prague (four progressives dropped from the Party Presidium).

October 2 A minor personnel reshuffle was effected in the Slovak government.

October 2 Federal Assembly Presidium removed Stefan Gasparik as its Chairman and as a member of the Central People's Control Commission replacing him with Dragomir Kolder; it also lifted the immunity of deputy Vaclav Prchlik, former head of the Army's Main Political Administration.

October 2 The Czechoslovak trade unions decided to rescind all documents passed in 1968 in connection with the invasion, and to appoint a commission to reassess all the resolutions of the Seventh TU Congress.

October 2 Finnish President Urho Kekkonen arrived in Prague.

October 5 The 25th anniversary of the entry of Soviet and Czechoslovak troops onto Czechoslovak territory through the Dukla Pass was celebrated; the main speeches were delivered by President Svoboda and Marshal Grechko.

October 8 The Czechoslovak government approved "temporary extraordinary measures" regarding travel to and sojourn in "capitalist" countries.

October 9 The Czech Council of Trade Unions' fifth plenary session ended; notable reformers were eliminated from the leading Czech TU body.

October 9 The Slovak Council of Trade Unions held a plenary meeting, but made no personnel changes.

October 15-16 A plenum of the Federal Assembly began; in the People's Chamber the deputies approved the removal of Josef Smrkovsky as chairman and Marie Mikova as vice-chairman of the House; the Chairman of the Chamber of Nations Dalibor Hanes resigned from his post and was elected chairman of the Federal Assembly, succeeding Alexander Dubcek; Vojtech Mihalik became the new chairman of the Chamber of Nations and Sona Pennigerova the new chairman of the Chamber of People; progressives who had to resign from the Federal Assembly Presidium were replaced by politicians with conservative or ultra-conservative leanings; 18 documents passed by the former National Assembly between 21 and 28 August 1968, were revoked; a governmental program was presented by Premier Oldrich Cernik; the terms of office of all parliamentary bodies, national committees, and judges were extended until the end of 1971; Seven progressive members of the People's Chamber were deprived of their parliamentary seats and replaced by conservatives.

October 20-28 A top-level Czechoslovak Party and State delegation headed by Husak went to Moscow for negotiations; a joint Czechoslovak-Soviet statement was signed in

which Czechoslovakia gave her formal placet to the Soviet invasion, agreed to the virtually unlimited stay of Soviet troops in the country, and tied herself more closely to Soviet Union, politically as well as economically.

October 24 The Committee of the Slovak Writers' Union released Vojtech Mihalik, the new Chairman of the Chamber of Nations, from the Union's chairmanship and replaced him by Andrej Plavka.

October 29 The federal government accepted the resignation of progressive Frantisek Sorm as chairman of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and appointed Jaroslav Kozesnik in his place.

October 30 A Warsaw Pact foreign ministers conference on European security took place at Lany Castle near Prague; simultaneously, a conference of Warsaw Pact steering organs presided over by Marshal Yakubovsky began in Prague, and lasted until November 3.

October 31 A communiqué was signed in Prague by the foreign ministers who had attended the Lany conference.

November 3 The CPCS Presidium appointed pro-Soviet dogmatist Jan Fojtik to the office of CPCS CC secretary (replacing Josef Kempny).

November 3 A protocol on goods exchange between Czechoslovakia and the USSR for 1970 was signed in Prague, providing for a 6-per cent increase in trade over 1969.

November 5 In plenary session, the Czech Women's Union accepted resignation of the entire presidium; Marie Jarosova, a subservient official, was elected chairman.

November 6 The 52nd anniversary of the October Revolution was celebrated in Prague and Bratislava.

November 7 The Slovak government appointed Milos Marko director of Czechoslovak Radio for Slovakia.

November 11 The Plzen Skoda Works Enterprise Council disbanded itself.

November 11 The Czech Council of Children's and Youth Organizations appointed as its chairman an orthodox youth apparatchik, Antonin Himl.

November 17 International Student Day was celebrated, without disturbances; several hundred young people laid wreaths on the grave of Jan Palach.

November 17 The CPCS Presidium appointed Vaclav Kves rector of the Prague Party College.

November 20 President Svoboda appointed Major General Vaclav Horacek chief of the Army's Main Political Administration, replacing Lieutenant-General Frantisek Bedrich.

November 20 Most CC members of the Czech Union of Composers, including its chairman, Veroslav Neumann, "resigned."

November 24-29 President Svoboda paid an official visit to Iran.

November 24 The CC of the Union of Czech Lawyers accepted the "resignation" of the Union's Presidium, including chairman Zdenek Kratochvil, who was replaced by dogmatist Colonel Zbynek Kisewetter.

November 25-26 A two-day plenum of the Central Czechoslovak Trade Union Council carried out a sizable purge and revoked documents condemning the Soviet invasion.

November 26 The Czech National Council was purged; 53 deputies were forced to resign, 9 were expelled, and 5 dismissed from the Presidium, including chairman Cestmir Cisar; the Council elected 62 new deputies, with Evzen Erban as chairman.

November 27 Moderate Jindrich Suk, director of the Ceteka News Agency, was replaced by pro-Soviet dogmatist Otakar Svercina.

November 28 Juraj Varholik was appointed chairman of the Federal Council of Children's and Youth Organizations.

November 28 The discredited widow of Communist "hero" Julius Fucik, pro-Soviet dogmatist Gusta Fucikova, was elected chairman of the Czechoslovak Women's Council, replacing liberal Miluse Fiserova.

December 2 A Czechoslovak delegation led by Party leader Gustav Husak arrived in Moscow to attend a meeting of Party and state representatives of "socialist" countries.

December 3 The Committee of the Slovak Journalists' Union met in Bratislava and carried out a sizable purge.

December 8 The Czech Minister of Culture, Miroslav Bruzek, addressed a "national conference on culture" which 500 Czech artists attended; he stated that culture must be directed by the state.

December 10 Rude Pravo published an interview with Gustav Husak, in which the Czechoslovak Party First Secretary discussed the Moscow consultations and Czechoslovak-West German relations.

December 15 President Svoboda appointed Alexander Dubcek Czechoslovak Ambassador to Turkey.

December 16 A plenary session of the Prague Municipal Committee took place, at which a number of personnel changes were made; leading secretary Oldrich Matejka was replaced by the prominent ultra Antonin Kapek.

December 17 The Hungarian Party leader, Janos Kadar, arrived in Prague for a "friendly visit."

December 17 A plenary session of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly approved several bills; one provided for the indefinite prolongation of the restrictive features of the emergency Law on Public Order of 22 August 1969, and another abolished the autonomy of the institutes of higher learning; progressive deputies "resigned" from the People's Chamber.

December 20 A conference of the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist organization Left Front was held in Prague.

December 23 The federal government approved the economic plan for 1970.

December 26 Professor Josef Lukl Hromadka, a protestant theologian of worldwide renown, died in Prague.

December 26 Jiri Slitr, one of the most popular artistic figures of present-day Czechoslovakia, met with a "sudden tragic death" in Prague.

December 30 Jiri Trnka, internationally known painter, puppeteer, and film man, died in Prague after a protracted illness.

~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

August 1970

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND MILITARY INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

CPYRGHT



The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union (with token contribution of troops by East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria -- but not Rumania) took place on 20 August 1968. The shocking aspect of the "events of August 1968," as the Soviets modestly call the invasion and occupation, is that in these modern times the Soviet Union, a major and supposedly responsible world power, would actually launch such a "Blitzkrieg." It was an act of imperialism which cannot be easily overlooked or forgotten. Less spectacular is the lesson that the Soviets taught by the invasion and that all of its allies have had to learn. It is the lesson of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, the "law" which the Soviets use to justify their invasion and which they consider still in force. During the second anniversary of the occasion which gave rise to the doctrine, it may be of value to recall its genesis and to examine one of the newer, and less well-known applications of it: the Soviet attempt to limit the sovereignty of the East European armed forces by integrating them closely with the Soviet forces and removing them effectively from the control of their individual defense ministries or national high commands.

Genesis of the Brezhnev Doctrine

The Brezhnev Doctrine, stripped of its Communist verbiage, claims the

unilateral right of the Soviet Union to take any measures it deems necessary in a Communist-controlled country (including armed incursion), whenever it deems necessary, to stop any developments in such a country which it deems undesirable from the point of view of Soviet national interest. While the doctrine is not new in Soviet experience, the suppression of Czechoslovakia was a convenient occasion for its resurrection. Lenin applied the device to subordinate all foreign Communist parties to his Soviet party when he established the Comintern. Stalin was notorious for demanding unquestioning subordination of Communist parties and regimes to Soviet dictates. Further, Lenin, Stalin, -- and now Brezhnev -- all disguised this exercise of Soviet national interest by the same euphemism: "proletarian (or "socialist") internationalism."

Three documents authenticate what became known to the non-Soviet world as the Brezhnev Doctrine: the warning letter of the Warsaw Pact Five to the Dubcek regime in July, 1968 (thus before the invasion); an authoritative commentary in Pravda by one S. Kovalev a month after the invasion elaborating the requirement that Communist regimes subordinate their own fates to the higher good of international Communism; and finally, Brezhnev's endorsement of the Kovalev thesis at the Polish Communist Party Congress in November 1968. Attached as an annex hereto are pertinent excerpts from the first two documents (with key passages underlined) and the portion of Brezhnev's speech which gave the doctrine its current name.

Military Application

The Brezhnev Doctrine presents the limited sovereignty of the East European Communist regimes as a general proposition. One of the more specific and practical applications of it has been the Soviet effort to integrate and thus control the East European economies through more aggressive use of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Less well known is another Soviet drive, namely to limit the sovereign right of its East European "allies" to control their own armed forces. The issue received public attention even in the West because of an authoritative article in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), official organ of the Soviet armed forces, by General Sergei M. Shtemenko, Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff, on 24 January 1970 in which Shtemenko promoted the idea of closer integration of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. He spoke of these forces as a "single combat family" and of the "allocation" of units "from national armies" to the "Joint Armed Forces" of the Warsaw Pact. Throughout he emphasized the international obligation and duties of the Warsaw Pact members (in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism," a key catchword used for identifying with the Brezhnev Doctrine). Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A. Grechko, commemorating the 52nd anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Army and Navy, wrote in a similar vein in Pravda, 23 February 1970. (See attached articles.) In March 1970, I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact also promoted the same internationalist line in the Soviet Party journal Kommunist (24 March 1970). These articles are symbolic of a number of subtle moves and maneuvers in the organizational sphere of the Warsaw Pact which also bespeak a persistent

Soviet effort to integrate East European national armies, or parts of them, into a joint army under Soviet control and command and divorced from obligation to their homeland. Attached for purposes of contrast and for throwing into relief the two extremes in conception concerning the function of national armies in the Warsaw Pact is an article by Rumanian Defense Minister Ion Ionita, writing in Red Star almost simultaneously with Shtemenko, on 25 January 1970. His emphasis is clearly on the continued direct subordination of national troops to the governments and the Communist parties of the respective countries and not to some supranational organization.

Both Shtemenko's and Ionita's articles were written in commemoration of the Lenin Centennial year, and it is not without significance that each invokes Lenin. Ionita claims adherence to Lenin's principles in his "nationalistic" conception of the role of national armies, while Shtemenko continuously invokes Lenin for the international or "supranational" aspects of his teachings.

Comparison of the Shtemenko and Ionita texts will reveal many differences of wording, emphasis, and substance which demonstrate Rumanian awareness of and resistance to the Soviet effort to increase its control over national armies. Some Western analysts claim they see this pulling in opposite directions reflected in even more subtly expressed differences on the part of other East European powers, most notably Poland. The attached analysis in the Economist of 21 February 1970 called "Shtemenko's Private Army" gives a Western interpretation of this military dialectic.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
November-December 1968

CPYRGHT

The Warsaw Letter

CPYRGHT

The development of events in your country evokes deep anxiety in us. It is our deep conviction that the offensive of the reactionary forces, backed by imperialism, against your party and the foundations of the socialist system in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic threatens to push your country off the road of socialism and thus jeopardizes the interests of the entire socialist system. . . .

. . . we cannot agree to have hostile forces push your country from the road of socialism and create a threat of severing Czechoslovakia from the socialist community. This is something more than your cause. It is the common cause of our countries, which have joined in the Warsaw Treaty. . . .

You are aware of the understanding with which the fraternal parties treated the decisions of the January plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as they believed that your party, firmly controlling the levers of power, would direct the entire process in the interest of socialism and not let anti-Communist reaction exploit it to grind its own ax. We shared the conviction that you would protect and cherish the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. . . .

Unfortunately, events have taken another course.

Capitalizing on the weakening of party leadership in the country and demagogically abusing the slogan of "democratization," the forces of reaction triggered off a campaign against the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its honest and devoted cadres, clearly seeking to abolish the party's leading role, subvert the socialist system, and place Czechoslovakia in opposition to the other socialist countries. . . .

Anti-socialist and revisionist forces have laid hands on the press, radio and television, making them a rostrum for attacking the Communist Party, disorienting the working class and all working folk, spewing forth uncurbed anti-socialist demagoguery, and undermining friendly relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the other socialist countries. . . .

This is precisely why the reaction has been able publicly to address the entire country and to print its political platform under the title of "The 2,000 Words," which contains an outright call for struggle against the Communist Party and constitutional authority, for strikes and disorders. This call represents a serious danger to the party, the national front, and the socialist state, and is an attempt to introduce anarchy. . . . Far from being repudiated, this platform, being so extensively circulated at

a responsible moment on the eve of the extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, has, on the contrary, found obvious advocates in the party rank and file and its leadership, who second the anti-socialist calls. . . . A situation has thus arisen which is absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country. . . .

Matters have gone so far that the joint staff exercises of our troops, with the participation of several units of the Soviet Army . . ., are being used for groundless accusations of violations of the sovereignty of the CSSR. . . .

Czechoslovakia can retain her independence and sovereignty only as a socialist country, as a member of the socialist community. . . . It is our conviction that a situation has arisen in which the threat to the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia jeopardizes the common vital interests of other socialist countries. . . .

Each of our parties is responsible not only to its working class and its people but also to the international working class and the world Communist movement, and it cannot evade the obligations following from this. . . .

That is why we believe that a decisive rebuff to the forces of anti-communism and decisive efforts to preserve the socialist system in Czechoslovakia are not only your task but ours, too.

The cause of defending the power of the working class and of all working people, as well as Czechoslovakia's socialist gains, demands that a bold and decisive offensive should be launched against right-wing and anti-socialist forces; that all the defensive means set up by the socialist state should be mobilized; that a stop should be put to the activity of all political organizations that come out against socialism; that the party should take control of the mass-information media—press, radio, and television—and use them in the interests of the working class, of all working people, and of socialism; that the ranks of the party itself should be closed on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism; that the principle of democratic centralism should be undeviatingly observed; and that a struggle should be undertaken against those whose activity helps the enemy. . . .

We express the conviction that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, conscious of its responsibility, will take the necessary steps to block the path of reaction. In this struggle, you can count on the solidarity and all-round assistance of the fraternal socialist countries.

—Excerpt from TASS release, July 18, 1968.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
November - December 1968

CPYRGHT

The "Brezhnev Doctrine"

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the question of the relationship and interconnection between the socialist countries' national interests and their internationalist obligations has assumed particular urgency and sharpness. The measures taken jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous significance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations being heard in some places that the actions of the five socialist countries contradict the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of the nations to self-determination.

Such arguments are untenable primarily because they are based on an abstract, non-class approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination.

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country, nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries, nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this is placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist parties, lapsing into one-sidedness, and shirking his internationalist obligations. . . .

Each Communist party is free to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist party). In concrete terms this means primarily that no Communist party can fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems—capitalism and socialism. This struggle is an objective fact that does not depend on the will of people and is conditioned by the division of the world into the two antithetical social systems. . . .

It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an "extrabloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth—and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union, and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the CSSR's withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth. But implementation of such "self-determination," i.e., Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, would run counter to Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other

socialist countries. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist countries could be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interest of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist states, in fulfilling their internationalist duty to the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, had to act and did act in resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. . . .

The assistance given to the working people of the CSSR by the other socialist countries, which prevented the export of counterrevolution from the outside, is in fact a struggle for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's sovereignty against those who would like to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country to the imperialists.

Over a long period of time and with utmost restraint and patience, the fraternal Communist parties of the socialist countries took political measures to help the Czechoslovak people to halt the antisocialist forces' offensive in Czechoslovakia. And only after exhausting all such measures did they undertake to bring in armed forces.

The allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia are proving in deeds that they have no task other than to defend the socialist gains in that country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs, and they are waging a struggle not in words but in deeds for the principles of self-determination of Czechoslovakia's peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their destiny themselves after profound and careful consideration, without intimidation by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery.

Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such thing as non-class law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Workers' parties.

The class approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations. Whoever does so forfeits the only correct, class-oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms and begins to measure events with the yardsticks of bourgeois law. . . .

There is no doubt that the actions taken in Czechoslovakia by the five allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia, actions aimed at defending the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth and primarily at defending Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state, will be increasingly supported by all who really value the interests of the present-day revolutionary movement, the peace and security of peoples, democracy and socialism.

—Excerpt from Sergei Kovalev's article
in Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968.

From Brezhnev's Speech at the Polish CP Congress
12 November 1968

CPYRGHT

"However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem, a concern for all socialist states.

"It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary, emergency step; it can be sparked only by direct actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism."

RED STAR, Moscow
24 January 1970

Combat Fraternity
by: Gen. Sergey Shtemenko

CPYRGHT

The author of this article--Army Gen Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko--was chief of the Operations Directorate and Red Army deputy chief of the General Staff during the Great Patriotic War. In the postwar years S.M. Shtemenko worked as USSR Armed Forces chief of General Staff, chief of the Main Ground Forces Staff, and in other high military posts. In August 1968 he was appointed chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

Every time I enter the building where the command and staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states is situated I see the flags of the seven fraternal countries standing in the vestibule. On the wall next to them are the words of Vladimir Ilch: "To you has fallen the great honor of defending with arms in hands the sacred ideas and...to implement in deeds the international brotherhood of the peoples."

With these words V.I. Lenin in August 1918 addressed the soldiers and officers of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment--formed mainly from Polish volunteers--who were being sent to the front. And now Ilch's words express the very essence of the relations existing between the soldiers of the armies of the socialist countries which are united by the Warsaw Pact. The Leninist idea of the international brotherhood of the peoples unites them in a single combat family.

This fraternity has long-standing traditions. A glorious age in the history of international proletarian solidarity was written by the participation of tens of

thousands of soldier-internationalists in the armed defense of the world's first worker and peasant state in the years of the Civil War and the foreign military intervention. Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet soldiers they realized with weapons in their hands the Leninist behest to the effect that a revolution is only worth something if it knows how to defend itself.

Our people have not forgotten the feats of their foreign brothers and have not remained in their debt. In defending Great October's achievements we have fought for the consolidation of mankind's brightest ideals. As genuine internationalists Soviet soldiers fought in the thirties in Spain, China, and Mongolia. The internationalism of our peoples showed itself particularly clearly in the years of the Great Patriotic War. We went into battle against the Hitlerite invaders and the Japanese militarists not only for our motherland's honor, freedom, and independence but also to deliver the peoples of other countries from their hated foreign yoke.

Here one cannot forget that Polish and Czechoslovak formations formed on USSR territory and, in the final stages of the war, units of the Bulgarian and Romanian armies fought in single formation with Soviet soldiers against the common enemy. In the battles to liberate Budapest the Hungarian Budayskiy Volunteer Regiment operated valiantly together with Red Army soldiers. During my service on the General Staff, I had at that time to deal directly with questions concerning foreign formations and units and organizing their combat application. I therefore know very well the not inconsiderable contribution that they made to the struggle against the Hitlerite hordes.

After defeating world imperialism's shock forces during World War II the Soviet Army honorably fulfilled its noble liberation mission. This to a decisive degree aided the success of the popular democratic revolutions in several European and Asian countries.

V.I. Lenin perspicaciously predicted that the peoples setting out on the socialist path of development "would perforce need a close military and economic alliance, otherwise the capitalists...will crush and suppress us one at a time." Indeed, the most aggressive circles of modern imperialism, primarily in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, are nurturing the most perfidious plans vis-a-vis the socialist countries. As the CPSU Central Committee theses for Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birth centenary stress, they have not abandoned hopes of "playing over again" the historic battles of the 20th century, obtaining revenge, and thrusting socialism from the heights of world influence.

In face of the aggressive strivings of imperialism and the danger of a military attack, the European socialist countries rallied together in an indestructible combat alliance in order, in concert and by collective efforts, to defend the great revolutionary achievements of their peoples. The Warsaw Pact concluded in May 1955 became the expression of that alliance. Its members are now: Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.

The Warsaw Pact, embodying the combat brotherhood of the peoples and the armies of the states forming it, is the firm fortress reliably countering the aggressive NATO bloc, the indestructible barrier to the West German revanchists, and the guarantor and real instrument of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

The combat community of the socialist states, embodies in the Warsaw Pact, has firm economic, political, and ideological foundations. From the economic standpoint their fraternal cooperation is based on socialist production relations and on the advantages of the international socialist division of labor.

It is not fortuitous that all the Warsaw Pact member countries are at the same time members of CEMA. The uniformity of the social and state system of the socialist countries serves as the political base for our combat alliance. Finally, the ideological basis of our unity lies in the community of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook, proletarian internationalism, and the friendship of the peoples.

The fraternal peoples have one common aim: to build communism and socialism. The soldiers of the Warsaw Pact member states' armed forces also have a single common aim: the reliable defense of the revolutionary achievements of the peoples and of their peaceful constructive labor. That is why the CPSU and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the other socialist countries collectively and in concord determine the tasks for further strengthening our community's defense might.

I had occasion to be present at the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states last March, in whose work the leaders of the communist and workers parties and the government heads of the fraternal countries participated. There, in an atmosphere of unity and cohesion, very important decisions were adopted directed toward further strengthening the defense might of the socialist countries belonging to the pact in the interests of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world. And this is only one example. Guided by the Leninist doctrine on the defense of the socialist revolution and socialism's achievements, the fraternal parties show daily concern for strengthening the defense capability of their countries and of the entire socialist community as a whole.

As a result of this concern the Warsaw Pact member states now possess not only first-class national armies. For the collective defense of the cause of socialism they have created mighty Joint Armed Forces. Allocated to them from the national armies by the decisions of their governments are formations and units, and also control and rear organs. The Joint Armed Forces now include ground forces, air and naval forces, and also air defense forces. They have an advanced organization and are equipped with the most modern means of struggle. The fact that the nuclear missile might of the Soviet Armed Forces is standing on guard of the socialist community's security is of exceptionally great importance.

The high combat efficiency and combat-readiness of the troops allocated to the Joint Armed Forces are above all insured by the high level of political consciousness of their personnel, who are educated in the spirit of the Leninist ideas of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. At the same time it should be stressed that unified principles and methods of instruction and troop education lie at the basis of the training of the Joint Armed Forces, along with the retention of national traits and specific features by each army.

We have identical views on conducting modern operations and combat and common very important norms which coincide in their main clauses of regulations, leadership, and directions, and which have absorbed the rich combat experience of the Soviet Army accumulated in the years of the past war and in the postwar period, and also the experience of the friendly armies. The common viewpoint both on questions of military art and generally on all the fundamental problems of military organizational development is determined by the unity of the tasks and goals of the fraternal socialist countries and of their armed defenders, and by the Marxist-Leninist methodology which is common to us all.

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The troop contingents allocated by the Warsaw Pact member states for the Joint Armed Forces engage in daily combat and political training according to the plans of the national commands.

However, the final mastering of the different questions of the joint operations of the allocated troops and also mutual assistance and the exchange of experience are effected according to the plans of the joint command. A particularly important role is played here by troop and command-staff exercises.

A number of such exercises have been carried out recently.

During the course of these many matters of combat interaction were mastered, the skill of the commanders and staffs was sharpened, the combat-readiness of the units and formations was improved, and the military skill of the personnel was heightened. At the same time, as practice shows, these exercises are becoming a true school of socialist internationalism.

The further improvement of the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact has great importance for the steady growth of the defense might of our socialist military coalition. The communist and workers parties of the fraternal countries are showing constant concern about this. The Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, which I have already mentioned, approved the provision on the committee of the defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states, the new provision on the Joint Armed Forces and the joint command, and other important documents.

At present the command and staff of the Joint Armed Forces are working persistently on the implementation of the decisions taken in Budapest. A sitting of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces was held on 9-10 December last year in Moscow. This meeting was devoted to examination of questions of further improving the training of troops and staffs and strengthening the control organs of the Joint Armed Forces.

A sitting of the Committee of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states took place 2 weeks later. This meeting examined questions of the state of the allied armies and measures for strengthening the defense of the Warsaw Pact countries in connection with the aggressive aspirations of NATO's leading circles.

While there exists the threat of military attack from imperialism the patriotic and international duty of the soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces and of all the fraternal armies consists of raising still higher our community's defense capability and of daily heightening their combat-readiness. This is the fundamental principle and the law of the life and activity of the Joint Armed Forces and of all armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries.

The armed defenders of socialism's great achievements well understand their duty and are conscientiously executing it. Proof of this is the enormous political upsurge with which the soldiers of all the fraternal armies are preparing to greet the Vladimir Ilich Lenin centennial. They are striving to study still more fully and more profoundly the ideological heritage of the great Lenin, to implement his undying teaching still more persistently, and to celebrate his glorious jubilee with practical deeds.

The soldiers of the Warsaw Pact member states armed forces stand in indestructible formation. Proud of their international mission, bequeathed by Ilich, they will always be worthy of it.

Our combat fraternity is invincible!

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RED STAR, Moscow
25 January 1970

Following the Behests of the Great Leader
by Romanian Minister of Armed Forces Col. Gen. Ion Ionita CPYRGHT

Socialist Romania is greeting Vladimir Ilich Lenin's birth centenary in a situation of inspired work aimed at implementing the program for creating a comprehensively developed socialist society, which was formulated by the 10th Romanian Communist Party Congress. The servicemen of our armed forces, led by the party's Marxist-Leninist policies, are incessantly improving their combat skill and devoting all their efforts and energy to serving the motherland and the cause of socialism to which the brilliant continuer of Marx and Engels, revolutionary leader of the proletariat and fiery fighter for the social and national liberation of the peoples, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, devoted all his life and immortal creativity. "The life and creativity of V. I. Lenin," the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee resolution on the celebration of Lenin's birth centenary in our country stresses, "are a brilliant model of devoted service to the working class and the working people and an example of revolutionary stanchness, political perspicacity, and bold thinking."

Lenin comprehensively substantiated his tenets on the role, tasks, and structure of the new type of party, created the revolutionary party of the Russian proletariat, led the Great October Socialist Revolution at the head of this party, and founded the world's first socialist state. He enriched the treasure-house of scientific communism with new conclusions and formulated a new theory of the socialist revolution which was brilliantly confirmed in the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union. The all-conquering ideas of Marxism-Leninism and their transforming force acquired new and living embodiment in the victory of the proletarian revolution and the building of socialism in a number of countries in Europe, Asia, and America, including Romania.

In V. I. Lenin's very rich ideological heritage the question of the defense of the socialist fatherland holds an important place. Lenin stressed the need for the socialist state to organize the armed force of the revolution, the socialist worker-peasant army, as Lenin called it, which must defend the revolution and be the bulwark of freedom. In the grave years of the civil war, the Red Army was created under the leadership of V. I. Lenin.

The correctness of the Leninist instructions on the need to continually improve the country's defense capability and to organize and train the socialist states' armed forces was confirmed during the young Soviet power's savage battle against the internal counterrevolution and the foreign intervention and, subsequently, in the historic battles fought against fascism by the brilliant Soviet Army, which made a decisive contribution to mankind's salvation from the danger of fascist enslavement. In our days the Leninist instructions are embodied in continual reinforcement of the USSR's defense capability.

In the grim years of underground work in the activities of the Romanian Communist Party aimed at liberating the working people from exploitation and oppression, work in the ranks of the army occupied an important place. During the period of Hitlerite domination and the military fascist dictatorship in the country, our party attached particular importance to bringing the army over onto the side of the people for the purpose of liberating the country from the fascist yoke. The work carried out by communists in this direction was one of the main component parts of the preparations and victory of the armed uprising in August 1944.

A decisive influence on the means and methods of creating the people's army was exerted precisely by the fact that the path to socialism in our country was opened up by the August 1944 armed uprising and that the Romanian Army, together with the popular masses, took part in implementing the armed uprising and then, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army, fought against Nazi Germany right up to the final victory and the end of the war in Europe. In the course of these battles the Romanian Army, helping to implement the antifascist and anti-imperialist goals of the people's revolution which began at the same time as the armed uprising, displayed patriotism, self-sacrifice, and heroism in the struggle to crush fascism and gain freedom. Fighting shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy, the Romanian and Soviet troops laid the foundations of Romanian-Soviet cooperation and of the friendship between our peoples.

The transforming influence of the people's revolution on the army and the growing authority of the Communist Party--the leading political force of the working people--were displayed in the increasingly more active participation of the servicemen on the side of the popular masses and in actions organized by the Communist Party and aimed at gaining political power, democratizing the country, and completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution. During this period the basis for a whole number of democratic transformations in the life of the army was laid: introduction of a political apparatus, granting of the vote to servicemen, and democratization of the cadre body.

The process of creating the people's army got fully under way in the course of socialist building on the basis of the achievements of our people in creating a new social system.

In accordance with the Leninist thesis that it is impossible to create a new type of army without mass selection of commanders from the ranks of the people, the Communist Party formulated and carried out a whole series of measures insuring within a short time a fundamental change in the structure of the cadre body. A large number of party workers and activists of mass organizations were introduced into the army, and the officer and noncommissioned officer colleges opened their doors to city and rural working people irrespective of their nationality. As our Party General Secretary and Romanian State Council Chairman Nicolae Ceaucescu stressed: "Our present army is flesh of the people's flesh, consisting of sons of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, without distinction of nationality, closely united by their devotion to the party and people and their determination to be worthy defenders of all that was won at the cost of many by their fathers and brothers in the struggle to create socialist Romania."

The guarantee of the unity of our people's army and the chief source of its strength lie in its close ties with the people and their life and aspirations. The Leninist principle of continually strengthening the inviolable unity between the army and the people on the basis of the community of interests of all social forces and the moral and political unity of all people was given remarkable embodiment in our country in the revolutionary transformations which radically changed the structure and makeup of our society.

The principal political factor of the might and vitality of our army and the guarantee of the successful fulfillment of all tasks entrusted to it is the unswerving leadership of the army being implemented by the Communist Party. The basis of the army's life and activities is Marxist-Leninist ideology and the materialistic-dialectical world outlook and the basic principles of the Romanian Communist Party. The Leninist instruction that the policies of the military department must be implemented on the basis of the party's general directives is visibly reflected in the fact that the principal question of the country's defense and the organization and training of the armed forces are solved at the level of the higher party and state organs and under their direct control.

As the country's economic might increased and our social organism improved, the Communist Party resolved the complex questions connected with development and equipping of the army at all stages. The rebuilding of the armed forces on a new technical base, the continual improvement of their technical provision, and the perfecting of the army's organizational structure and process of training the troops in accordance with the demands of modern battle--all this indicates the concern and attention given by our party to increasing the country's military potential and to implementing the leadership of the army.

The party implements the leadership of the armed forces by pursuing its political line and setting the army tasks which are fulfilled directly by the Ministry of the Armed Forces Collegium, commanders of all ranks, and the party organs and organizations.

In setting the army tasks, the party and government proceed from a careful analysis of the international situation and the conclusions stemming from this of strengthening the motherland's defense capability and from an analysis of our country's development and its strategic position. These tasks are in full accordance with our country's obligation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and with the international duty of military cooperation with all socialist countries.

Importance of exceptional magnitude to fulfilling the tasks given to the army is attached to political work and to the work being carried out by party organs and organizations in the army according to the regulations and resolutions of the party.

Placing in the center of political work the education of personnel in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the explanation of the party's policies, commanders and party organs and organizations help the

personnel to master deeply the knowledge of these policies and to understand the multi-faceted phenomena arising in the process of creating a comprehensively developed socialist society, and inculcate in the servicemen a feeling of boundless devotion to the motherland and the people and the cause of socialism and also patriotic and internationalist feelings.

Thanks to their educational and mobilizing work, the political councils and party organizations in the army are the bearers of progressive ideas to the masses of the troops. The party organizations are implementing the innovating spirit characteristic of our party's activity into all the fields of life and are fighting for the incessant improvement of the standard of the forces' combat and political training and for strengthening order and discipline. They are continually coordinating the activities of the personnel with the most urgent demands of the political training of servicemen and achievements in the field of science and military technology and are inculcating in the servicemen high political and moral traits inherent in persons from a socialist society. The fact that over 88 percent of officers and over 47 percent of noncommissioned officers are communists is of particularly great importance in continuous enhancement of the role of party organizations in military life.

Under these conditions the possibilities are being extended of applying the Leninist theses on one-man management as the fundamental principle of the organization and leadership of military activities, of improving the organizational structure and the system of instruction according to the degree of socioeconomic development, of insuring the high and continual combat readiness of the forces, of continuously improving the organizational capabilities and special training of the command body, and of understanding more deeply the law-governed patterns of armed struggle.

Socialist military science and military art, based on the combat training of our armed forces, is a reliable means for implementing these demands and for resolving the fundamental questions connected with modern development of warfare. Built on the foundation of dialectical and historical materialism, and tested in the fire of the glorious Soviet Army's historic battles, socialist military science is developing in our time through the achievements of all the socialist armies.

The increasingly active and fruitful activity of our army's cadres in many-sided researching of warfare and in improving the bases of troop training and employment in battle by means of analyzing the practical experience of military actions taking place at the present time, and the experience accumulated in the process of training troops and also through exchange of experience with other fraternal armies, is also a contribution to the development of military science.

The concern displayed by our party and our state for modernization and development of our armed forces, and also the efforts made by army personnel, find their expression in the constant raising of the combat capability of the units and commands and in the fact that our army is an example of modern armed forces which respond to current demands in the field of warfare.

Our party does not forget for even a second that so long as imperialism exists we must have an army ready at any moment to fulfill its duty to the people and to defend the cause of socialism. Our party's Central Committee and the Romanian Government proceed from their responsibility for strengthening the motherland's defense capability in devoting their all-round attention to supplying the army with modern means and raising the combat and political training of all armed forces personnel, and also to the military training of a part of the active population of the country in the system of patriotic detachments and units, local anti-aircraft defense, and organized military training for youth. Questions of the country's defense and of insuring the state's security are entrusted in peacetime as well as in wartime to Romania's Defense Council, which is accountable for its work to the Party Central Committee and the supreme organ of state power. In this way we are implementing Lenin's instruction on the centralized control of all military activity.

Romania's soldiers, deeply committed to the very highest interests of our socialist motherland, are completely filled with the resolve to spare no efforts to fulfill the task entrusted to them--to defend the people's revolutionary gains. Moreover our army, which is utterly committed to the cause of socialist internationalism and solidarity with the peoples of the socialist countries and with working people and anti-imperialist forces throughout the world, and which is educated in this spirit by the Romanian Communist Party, is constantly developing friendly ties and combat cooperation with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states and with the armies of all the socialist countries. Romanian soldiers rejoice at the successes of the Soviet Army soldiers and of their comrades in arms from all the socialist countries in the matter of increasing their combat skill.

To greet the Vladimir Ilich Lenin birth centenary the commanders, party organs, and party organizations of the Romanian Armed Forces are making all possible efforts for successful fulfillment of their high targets and to educate servicemen in the spirit of the all-conquering ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

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ECONOMIST

21 February 1970

Shtemenko's Private Army

If Russia is really trying to form a supranational army out of the Warsaw pact forces, east Europeans had better watch out

Russian generals are like film stars these days: wherever they go and whatever they say, they hit the headlines. General Shtemenko, chief of staff of the Warsaw pact forces, has hit them without going anywhere by publishing an article in a Russian military newspaper. Since then the spotlight has been on Marshal Grechko, Russia's defence minister, who has been touring various east European capitals and holding important talks there. Between them these two officers have managed to convey the impression that Russia may be trying on something new in the Warsaw pact.

General Shtemenko's article, published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) on January 24th, is no bright new policy statement just out of some Russian equivalent of a western think-tank like the Rand Corporation. It is a routine-looking offering on the occasion of the coming centenary of Lenin's birth. But it contains one passage that has made people sit up with a jerk. It talks of the Warsaw pact's "powerful combined armed forces" which are apparently now allocated by member governments to the combined command. These forces, according to General Shtemenko, consist of ground troops, air and naval forces and anti-aircraft units which "engage daily in military and political training in accordance with the plans of their national commands." But they also carry out various joint exercises, this time "in accordance with the plans of the combined command."

Military experts in the west were divided about the meaning of this article when it first appeared. Those who were sceptical pointed out that the combined command had in fact existed since 1956, and they could not find any real evidence that the Warsaw pact has achieved any significant degree of military integration: certainly nothing like the integration that exists within Nato. There seem to have been fewer doubts in parts of eastern Europe. Only a few days after the article appeared, President Ceausescu of Rumania told a military conference in Bucharest that Rumania's armed forces would continue to take their orders only from the Rumanian authorities. To make this loud hint that Rumania was not going along with any integration plans still louder, he added a few other things. He said that Rumania would of course co-operate with the armies of all socialist countries "without exception." He was clearly referring to Yugoslavia, which is not a member of the Warsaw pact, but is now a very close associate of Rumania. To rub this in, he talked of the value of close co-operation in case of war between military units and the "whole arm people," an idea which is very close to the Yugoslav

defence plan developed since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs, for their part, have fired some more direct broadsides against the idea of supranational armies in eastern Europe, which shows that they too think that something curious is happening.

The idea that something is up has been reinforced by Marshal Grechko's trips to Prague, east Berlin and Warsaw. He did not say in public what his business there was. But he talked thumpingly about fraternal co-operation in the military field, and he and his hosts made frequent references to the danger of west German "revanchism." Just as he left Warsaw last weekend, joint Russian-Czechoslovak exercises were beginning.

If the Russians are indeed proceeding with some plan for combined forces, this fits in very well with their present general strategy in eastern Europe. They are eagerly pushing various projects for economic integration. A few weeks ago, for example, they went into the business of joint planning with Bulgaria. They would clearly like to repeat this elsewhere. But economic integration is difficult and costly, and often has a very divisive political effect. It was Mr Khrushchev's plans for regional integration among the communist countries on the Danube that drove Rumania towards its economic declaration of independence in April, 1964. The Comecon organisation, of which Rumania has since then been rather a detached member, has subsequently known many more bitter but unpublicised internal quarrels. They all show that economic integration is indeed something that could help to tie eastern Europe to Russia in the long run, but that it cannot easily be achieved by countries run by cumbersome bureaucracies which eye one another with unfraternal mistrust.

So it is not surprising that the thoughts of the Russian leaders should be turning to military integration as a means of helping them consolidate their political control of eastern Europe. It is cheaper than economic integration; easier to implement (soldiers obey orders quicker than managers); and it appeals to leaders who like centralised chains of command which bypass national governments that could, some day, turn awkward.

If the Soviet Union's leaders were thinking merely in terms of a temporary consolidation of their sphere of influence on the eve of important negotiations with the west, many people in the west would see this as a reasonable political motive in the present circumstances. East Europeans often accuse westerners of applying a double standard towards the two parts of Europe: of being in favour of supranationalism in the west, but against it, and indeed in favour of

CPYRGHT

nationalism and fragmentation, in the east. There are several answers to this charge. One of them is that in western Europe there is a possibility of integration of equal with equal. In eastern Europe this is not possible, if only because of physical dimensions. Russia's population is nearly three times as large as that of all its Warsaw pact partners put together; the same applies to its gross national product. And Russia's armed forces contain more than three times as many men as the combined forces of its allies.

Integration in those conditions can hardly mean anything but domination. But is there an alternative prospect of some less oppressive relationship that might be acceptable both to the west and to many east Europeans? Russia, of course, is at present busy with its diplomatic offensive for a "European security" conference. Perhaps even more important are the delicate and complicated talks in which the west Germans are now involved (see page 29) in Moscow and in Warsaw. Herr Walter Scheel was given a champagne supper at Moscow airport when he stopped there briefly on his way to Asia. Herr Egon Bahr, the west German chancellor's personal envoy, has been made more fuss of in Moscow than almost any visitor for a long time. But at the same time Marshal Grechko drums out that old tune about German revanchism.

Which is the voice that we should really listen to? The polite and civilised voice that has been wooing the west Germans? Or the gruff military tones going on about those

incurable revanchists? The Russians' policy towards west Germany is still the real touchstone of their intentions in Europe. If they really mean business with the west Germans, this is bound to involve them in concessions in Berlin and in east Germany, and ultimately in showing that they are ready to modify their present style of managing the whole of eastern Europe. Unfortunately, there is little sign at the moment that the Russians have anything like this in mind. It seems more likely that they intend to negotiate with the Germans in the hope of obtaining concessions, without themselves conceding anything. This is not exactly surprising, for their present room for manoeuvre is very small—as is Herr Ulbricht's. The depressing possibility is that they would like to obtain, without paying any price for it, a consolidation of their hold over eastern Europe together with German financial and technological aid and even, perhaps, a weakening of Germany's links with its allies thrown in.


If that is indeed the Russians' real aim, the military integration plan must also be judged in a different light. This is how the Yugoslavs (who ought to know their Russians by now) see it: "Attempts that are being made to give the joint forces of the Warsaw pact supranational powers mean that in the event of a new crisis, be it real or imaginary, the armed forces of a country . . . could participate in an intervention against its legitimate government." What Zagreb radio means is: the spirit of Brezhnev is abroad; watch out.

~~TOP BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

August 1970

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY

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Last year at this time some optimists believed that the Soviet Union would be forced to recognize that its best interests would be served by building up the Czechoslovak economy, or letting the Czechs do it. Such a buildup would have meant Western trade, economic decentralization, and a redistribution of resources away from heavy engineering projects and toward light industry. Now after another twelve months of "normalization" by the Soviets, the pessimists are again proven right: Czechoslovak economic planning in the 1970's will be restricted within the confines of political realities as they are imposed by the Brezhnev Doctrine -- Soviet style tight control, closer ties with the COMECON community, and closer supervision by the Soviets.

Controls Restored

Beginning with July 1969 the "economic plan," a system abandoned during the Dubcek era, was reintroduced as the major economic control mechanism. It was reintroduced as a system of "planning through agreements" under which individual enterprise protocols were to serve as the basic instruments for carrying out the "government's state plan." What happened to the 1970 plan, however, was that central authorities were still dissatisfied with preliminary drafts as drawn up under this system in that they permitted too much local initiative, and as a result, according to the Czech Minister for Planning, Vaclav Hula,

"the draft plan was submitted practically entirely by the center." (Rude Pravo, 29 December 1969.)

In late October 1969 party leader Gustav Husak led a top level delegation to Moscow for "negotiations." What the Czechoslovak regime needed and wanted at that moment was substantial economic help in the form of hard currency to buy from Western markets some urgently needed modern equipment for its industry. Instead the Czechs got a promise from the Soviets for more oil, cotton and other raw materials over the next few years and the promise of a few "extra durable goods" to help purchase some "commodities in foreign markets." The joint communique issued at the end of the meeting merely tied Czechoslovakia more closely to the Soviet Union, politically as well as economically.

By the next month, articles published in official Czechoslovak media began reflecting a decided shift of emphasis from "indirect economic controls" to putting more emphasis on the necessity for direct intervention by Party controllers at the center. At the same time, the period required for "normalization" (i.e., orthodoxy) was extended further. By January 1970 the "need" for a return to full controls was clearly spelled out at the Czechoslovak Party plenum. "A radical centralization is the only means of combating economic disaster," announced Minister Hula at the same time as he blamed Novotny and Dubcek for having allowed the disintegration of the system of centralized control. The extent to which methods of direct intervention were to be applied is reflected in the slogan put out by the same Central Committee meeting that "at least 50 percent of the volume of party work should be devoted to concern with economic problems in the present period."

The final resolution of the January 1970 party plenum published in Bratislava Pravda, 2 February 1970, charged "all Communists in the field of economic management" with "ensuring the restoration of planned management, strengthening the discipline and increasing the effectiveness of the activity of management cadres...." Selection of managers would be entirely a matter for the party. Continuous checks are to be made to ensure that the "managerial cadre member" carries out party directives to the satisfaction of the "center."

By clamping down on management, the Husak regime also hopes to help overcome slack worker discipline. Anti-Soviet and anti-Communist feeling has had a significant impact on lowering Czechoslovak labor productivity. By late 1969 it had become commonplace for workers to leave at noon Friday and show up just before lunch on Monday, effectively chopping the workweek by 20 to 30 percent. Government appeals to laborers to cut absenteeism and to work harder had little effect. In mid-December 1969 the Federal Assembly adopted modified penal and labor codes which gave the courts power to act against industrial malingering: "anti-parasitism" measures almost identical to those in force in the USSR.

Socialist Integration Again

The new twenty year treaty of friendship signed in May 1970 between Czechoslovakia and the USSR enshrines the concept of the Brezhnev Doctrine in more ways than one. Particularly significant for the USSR are the treaty provisions which specify that the signatories are to work for "socialist economic integration." These provisions should help eliminate Czechoslovakia as one of the Soviet Union's headaches in COMECON meetings, where disruptive squabbles occur whenever its members maneuver for greater elbow room for their economic experiments and foreign trading relations.

For Czechoslovakia, the problems of coordinating plans with the USSR and other COMECON members will remain formidable. Since other COMECON members tend to specialize in many of the same machinery items as Czechoslovakia, mutual bargaining about machinery production and trade appears almost hopeless to many East European economists.

August 1970

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

August 6	Hiroshima	25th anniversary of the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, World War II.
August 12-13	Germany	Berlin Wall anniversary -- to stop the mass exodus of East Germans seeking freedom in the West, East Germany sealed the border in Berlin on the night of August 12-13, 1961 and then erected the permanent wall that now divides the city.
August 14		25th anniversary of the end of World War II and the anniversary of the Japanese surrender.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	Second anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in 1968.
September 2	Japan	25th anniversary of the formal surrender of Japan, World War II, aboard the U.S.S. Missouri. Known as V-J Day. (On September 8, 1951 a peace treaty with Japan was signed by 48 nations, but the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to sign. On October 19, 1956 the USSR and Japan signed a protocol ending their technical state of war, but this step left hanging the question of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and with it the question of the Kuril Islands which the Soviet Union seized from Japan in the closing days of World War II and now refuses to return.)
September 8	Lusaka, Zambia	Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.
September 28- October 1	Varna, Bulgaria	2nd International Conference on Problems of Young Workers sponsored by the World Federation of Trade Unions (Communist front).

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THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1970

NEW YORK TIMES
15 July 1970

Red Cross Findings Cited

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, July 14 — Red

Cross inspectors have found in two visits that conditions at the South Vietnamese prison at Con Son were "not too bad" and that a vast majority of the inmates were held as common criminals, reliable sources disclosed today.

These sources also revealed that fewer than 50 of the prison's 9,000 inmates were classified as prisoner of war. The 50 were assigned to the prison rather than to one of South Vietnam's six prisoner-of-war camps, because they were accused of crimes committed a civilians, either common crimes or acts of violence against the South Vietnamese Government, the Red Cross reports stated.

There was no indication whether any of these acts of violence could fall under the description of political crimes.

The latest Red Cross inspection took place last February, according to the sources.

The inspectors, who had been assigned by the all-Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross, reported that some prisoners were held in small, tightly packed cells, these sources said. The reports were not detailed enough, however, to show whether these were the "tiger cages" that have recently become the subject of controversy.

A spokesman for the International Committee reiterated today that, in accordance with the organization's standard practice, the reports on the Con Son Prison would not be made public. He limited himself to the statement that the reports showed that the majority of the prisoners there were not prisoners of war.

Responsibility Is Limited

The International Committee's responsibilities under the Geneva Convention of 1949 are confined to prisoners of war.

A copy of the reports made after each of the two inspections was given to Le Van Voi, South Vietnam's representative to the international organizations situated in Geneva, who forwarded them by diplomatic pouch to his Government.

CPYRGHT

62 POWs Returned To North

First Release
Since '67 Also
Frees Civilians

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From News Dispatches

A group of 62 ailing Communist prisoners of war shouting anti-American slogans were freed by South Vietnam yesterday and returned to North Vietnam, accompanied by 24 interned fishermen who manned the motorized junks that carried them home.

The 86 men were taken in a South Vietnamese navy vessel to a point six miles off North Vietnam and delivered to two waiting motorized junks. The junks took them to a coastal village just north of the 17th Parallel.

As the two junks moved away toward North Vietnam, the prisoners shouted "Down with American imperialism" and tossed plastic flight bags of clothing that had been given them into the South China Sea. They took only their ragged clothes and life-jackets.

In an interview aboard the South Vietnamese vessel, a spokesman for one group said through an interpreter, "Most of us would like to fight again until Vietnam is unified or until we are dead."

Another prisoner said, "During our confinement, we were badly treated and some of us were beaten." This was disputed by Eric Junod, 45, of Geneva, Switzerland, an International Red Cross delegate aboard the ship, who said the POWS were under Red Cross supervision in their six prison camps in South Vietnam.

The released POWs are the first to be returned to North Vietnam since June, 1967, when South Vietnam handed over 41 prisoners at Benhai bridge at the demilitarized zone boundary.

Thereafter, the North Vietnamese refused to accept any more POWs and destroyed the bridge.

A spokesman for the United States mission to the United Nations' Geneva office said today that Mr. Loi, in accord with his standard practice regarding Red Cross reports on prisoner-of-war camps, had submitted a copy to the mission, which sent it to the State Department.

The United States operates no prisoner-of-war camps in South Vietnam. Hence the only reports submitted directly to the American mission are those of Red Cross visits to United States-operated prisoner collection centers, where prisoners are classified as prisoners of war, "civil defendants" or innocent bystanders.

Vietnam Defends Its 'Tiger Cages'


SAIGON, July 9—The South Vietnamese government today defended the treatment of prisoners in special cells on Conson Island. A spokesman described the prisoners in so-called tiger cages as Communist criminals being punished for refusing to obey prison regulations.

He said the prisoners would not be kept long in the punishment cells, but did not indicate that there was any maximum term.

U.S. officials in Saigon said American advisers had seen the special cells and the prisoners, but not the conditions described as atrocious by two U.S. congressmen who visited the island last week.

U.S. advisers reported that the prisoners in the tiger cages looked reasonably well treated and in reasonably

Reuters



July 10, 1970, The Washington Post

Conson, off South Vietnam, is site of prison.

good health, said the officials, who refused to be identified.

Asked to explain discrepancies in the official accounts and the allegations by the congressmen and a Vietnamese-speaking American writer who saw the cells last week, the U.S. officials said it was not the first time that people standing side by side had seen different things in South Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese government issued a statement explaining that the cells were used for punishment of about 400 Communist prisoners who refused to obey the rules in the 9,000-inmate prison.

The government specifically denied that any prisoners in the cages had suffered paralysis.

The U.S. official said that American advisers reported seeing no one in the special cells who was unable to walk, no prisoners with scars, no one who was starving and no one with open sores.

"People in there did not look all that bad and did not look hungry," the officials said.

A statement from the Vietnamese national press center said "In war circumstances, owing to the poor facilities of

our nation, everything cannot be performed exactly as the government wishes."

The statement said those put in cages "are neither political prisoners nor prisoners of war, but Communist criminals."

Hanoi Accuses U.S. of Torture

Reuters

PARIS, July 9 — North Vietnam today accused the United States of carrying out tortures worse than those of the Nazis in the tiger cage prison on Conson Island in South Vietnam.

"We have long denounced U.S. tortures but, like Mylai, the Conson crimes have become big news only when the American Congress and press start talking about them," North Vietnamese spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le said at a press conference after the 74th session of the Paris peace talks.

Much of today's session was taken up by discussion of the Conson allegations, with Saigon chief negotiator Pham Dang Lam challenging North Vietnam and the Vietcong to open their prisons to international inspection.

THE WASHINGTON POST
11 July 1970

Saigon Probes Tiger Cage Use

CPYRIGHT, July 10 (AP)—

South Vietnam began an investigation today into conditions on the prison island of Conson as an international furor shaped up over charges of mistreatment of prisoners there.

The government, bowing to U.S. pressure, sent an inspection team to Conson to investigate charges by two congressmen and others that some inmates were jailed in "tiger cages" and treated like animals.

Premier Tran Thien Khiem said, "If as a result of the investigation, reports are accurate of the mistreatment of prisoners, then the government will take steps to redress the situation and order abolition of the tiger cages."

Kheim was referring to the maximum security section where prisoners are reportedly kept in small, windowless concrete pits without adequate food, water, exercise or medical care.

The latest charges were leveled by three Saigon University students recently released from Conson.

They said that, in addition to the previously disclosed tiger cages, prisoners were kept in what they called "cattle cages." As many as 17 prisoners were jammed into cattle cages, the students said.

Radio Hanoi, in a follow-up of charges made at the Paris peace talks, claimed that more than 100 political prisoners died in the tiger cages in the first nine months of last year.

In Britain, the Times of London commented editorially that "the tiger cages speak for themselves all too clearly."

"What sort of a government is being defended at great cost in American lives?" the Times asked.

The Saigon government's investigation was undertaken by a 10-man team from the Interior Ministry.

The investigation marked a quick turnabout by the government, which said Thursday that no special probe would be made.

political prisoners in South Vietnam.

If the "shocking and abhorrent" accounts are true, Byrd said in a Senate speech, the United States should "withdraw any financial aid that might contribute" to such conditions.

At the same time, the senator urged public pressure on North Vietnam for humane treatment of U.S. prisoners of war.

Excerpts from Western European Newspapers Regarding
North Vietnam's Treatment of Prisoners of War
Following the September 1969 International Conference of the Red Cross

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HET LAATSTE NIEWS, Brussels
7 September 1969
(Liberal; circ. 295,000)

"The North Vietnamese regime is cynically ignoring all purely humane provisions of the Geneva Convention. The tragic complaints of relatives of American servicemen who have not been heard from for months or even years is evidence of this.

"Hanoi simply refuses to recognize the applicability of the provisions of the Convention, which it signed in 1957, under the pretext that the Americans who have been taken prisoner are war criminals because the U.S. never declared war on North Viet-Nam.

Nowhere do the Geneva Conventions stipulate, however, that a declaration of war is essential to recognize the existence of a state of war.... Moreover, the 1949 Convention explicitly states that even irregular forces or guerrillas -- members of the civilian population -- and rebels in a civil war must be considered prisoners of war."

LA DERNIERE HEURE, Brussels
7 September 1969
(Liberal; circ. 190,000)

"Let us hope that North Viet-Nam will finally authorize the U.N., the International Red Cross or a neutral nation to visit the prisoners' camps, and that a list of these prisoners will be handed over to them.

"For humanitarian reasons, the evacuation of the ill and of the wounded to a neutral country and the exchange of correspondence are, of course, also highly commendable."

SUNDAY EXPRESS, London
14 September 1969
(Conservative; circ. 4,200,000)

"A dreadful shadow lies across the lives of 1,300 American families. From each of them a serviceman went to Viet-Nam to hold the line against Communism.

"All 1,300 men are missing. Many, or even all, may be prisoners in North Viet-Nam. But against all civilized practice, the Communists will not release the names of the captives they hold. Nor, despite their pledged word, will they allow the Red Cross to investigate charges of torture.

"In Britain we have had protest meetings about the suffering of the people of North Viet-Nam. Left-wing M.P.s have demonstrated their solidarity with the Communist government. No one doubts the protesters' sincerity or depth of feeling.

"But why do they not extend their sympathy to other innocent people: the families of the missing servicemen who must live a nightmare of uncertainty? Why do not the left-wingers use their influence to insist that their friends in Hanoi display simple humanity and issue a list of prisoners?"

FIGARO, Paris
9 September 1969

By Roger Massip

CPYRGHT

Émotion aux États-Unis au sujet du sort des prisonniers américains détenus au Nord-Vietnam

NOUS avons reçu au cours de ces dernières semaines un certain nombre de lettres émanant de familles américaines qui ont un des leurs prisonniers au Vietnam, et qui depuis de longs mois sont sans nouvelles de lui. Les lettres que ces familles envoient restent sans réponse.

Voici, par exemple, ce que nous écrit une Américaine :

« En ma qualité d'épouse d'un militaire prisonnier au Nord-Vietnam, je vous conjure de m'aider et d'aider celles qui sont dans mon cas. Mon mari est prisonnier depuis le 17 juin 1966. Comme vous le savez, les Nord-Vietnamiens n'ont jamais publié de listes des prisonniers qu'ils détiennent, et jamais ils n'ont donné d'indications sur le traitement réservé à ces prisonniers. »

Un Américain dont le frère a été fait prisonnier en octobre 1965 nous écrit de son côté : *« Des centaines de familles ignorent depuis des années si leurs prisonniers sont encore vivants et s'interrogent avec angoisse sur leur état de santé... »*

Les signataires de ces lettres nous demandent d'alerter l'opinion internationale sur cette situation, dont on devine sans peine combien elle peut être douloureuse.

« Nous le faisons d'autant plus

volontiers que cet état de choses est parfaitement anormal. Le gouvernement du Nord-Vietnam a signé la convention de Genève de 1957 qui définit le traitement dont doivent bénéficier les prisonniers de guerre et les combattants. Cette convention prescrit entre autres : la publication des noms des prisonniers, la libération immédiate de ceux qui sont gravement malades ou des blessés, la possibilité d'inspections destinées à vérifier les conditions de vie des prisonniers, l'échange de lettres entre ces derniers et leurs familles.

Le nombre des prisonniers américains est d'environ 1.350 dont 350 à 400 sont détenus au Nord-Vietnam. Moins de 100 d'entre eux ont été autorisés à écrire à leurs familles.

Cette situation a amené la création aux États-Unis d'une *Ligue nationale des familles de prisonniers américains dans l'Asie du Sud-Est.*

Il est inconcevable qu'un gouvernement qui dit lutter pour la justice et la liberté enfreigne les règles qui veillent à ce qu'un certain degré d'humanité soit respecté au bénéfice de ceux qui ont cessé d'être des combattants.

R. M.

FIGARO, Paris
9 September 1969

CPYRGHT

American Concern Over the Subject Of U.S. Prisoners Detained in North Vietnam

"We have received during these last weeks a certain number of letters from American families with relatives who are prisoners in Vietnam and who have been without news of them for long months. The letters these families send have received no response.

"Here, for example, is what one American woman has written us: 'As the wife of a prisoner of war in

North Viet-Nam, I beseech you to help me and those who are also in my situation. As you know, the North Vietnamese have never published lists of prisoners they hold, and they have never given any information on the treatment of these prisoners.'

"An American man whose brother was taken prisoner in October 1965 has written us: 'Hundreds of families have been without any informa-

tion for years as to whether their relatives who are prisoners are still alive and are most anxious concerning their state of health....'

"The signers of these letters asked us to make this situation, the pain of which one can guess without difficulty, known to international opinion.

"We do it all the more willingly because this state of affairs is completely abnormal. The Government of North Viet-Nam in 1957 signed the Geneva Convention which defines the treatment that must be accorded to prisoners of war and combatants. This Convention prescribes among others the immediate liberation of those who are seriously ill or wounded, inspections to verify the living conditions of the prisoners, the exchange of letters between the prisoners and their families.

"The number of American prisoners is about 1,350, of whom 350 to 400 are held in North Viet-Nam. Fewer than 100 of them have been authorized to write to their families. This situation has led to the establishment in the U.S. of a 'National League of Families of American Prisoners in Southeast Asia.'

"It is inconceivable that a government which claims to fight for justice and liberty would violate rules that are designed to insure that a certain degree of humanity is respected for the well-being of those who have ceased being combatants."

R.M.*

*Roger Massip, Foreign Editor

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ERCILLA, Santiago de Chile
18-24 March 1970

ALESSANDRI STAFF DESCRIBES CANDIDATE'S PLANS

The informed public requires something besides polemic, insinuations, accusations or defenses on the part of the candidates. It needs to know what the various candidates intend to do, in case they win the presidential office, for it is in their activity that the basic aspect of the nation's life originates. Therefore, Ercilla sought out the technical staffs of the three candidates, and asked them about their administration plans. We begin our publication of the results of the inquiry with the staff of Jorge Alessandri, who comes first in alphabetic order. He will be followed by Salvador Allende and Radomiro Tomic.

The "Tacna incident" of last October precipitated the presidential candidacy of JAR /Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez/. At that time, as one of his closest collaborators told a reporter, "the myth became man," with all his qualities and faults. He threw his hat in the ring with all the hits and misses that are part of a campaign. But, 16 months previous (in June of 1968, to be exact), he had notified his air-tight, confidential "team" of his irrevocable decision to try to succeed Frei in the supreme command, and to return to La Moneda following in the footsteps of his father and of Ibanez, who served twice as President of Chile.

June 1968

That month did not only signify a verbal acceptance that was jealously guarded behind the seven keys to the secret. He promptly instructed his "team" to dedicate itself to the preparation of the platform of administration that he would put into effect, should he win, as of 4 November 1970.

Since that time, JAR's hand-picked Alessandrists have been meeting together, namely: Ernesto Pinto Lagarrigue, Enrique Ortuzar, Julio Philippi, Arturo Matte, Pierre Lehmann, Jorge Fontaine, Humberto Diaz Contreras, Carlos Hurtado, Eladio Zuzaeta, Eduardo Urzua Merino, Patricio Huneeus, Raul de la Fuente, Jose Luis Cerda, Julio Alemparte, Manuel Mardones, Jaime Egana, Enrique Edwards Orrego, Patricio Silva Clares and others who will not take offense if they are not mentioned, because they are complying with JAR's wishes that they work with the utmost discretion.

At the present time, those meeting together in 14 study commissions number over 200 persons, for the most part businessmen, engineers and economists. Of that number, 50 are technicians working full-time on the preparation of budget programs, in conformance with an Alessandri administration that does not wish to leave anything to chance.

The experts with whom Ercilla talked admit that, during his first administration, JAR had to improvise and correct many things, "because

CPYRGHT

all we were concerned about in 1950 was winning the election. When we had the power in our possession, we did not know what to do with it, plus the dreadful handicap of lacking a parliamentary majority. This forced the President to set aside his policy of absolute aloofness from political parties. He had to accept Liberals, Conservatives and Radicals. This time, things will be different. He is sure that some militants from the National and Radical Democratic Parties will be asked to collaborate. But, if they agree to do so, they will have to be selected solely on the basis of personal qualifications. JAR will not permit them to ask "leave" of their parties, nor do we expect the parties to request such a procedure, which is not in keeping with a presidential system that JAR will make far more demanding, as he has been announcing in all his speeches and written reports. He has said that his victory will be accompanied, simultaneously, by a plebiscite; that those who vote for him realize that they are, in addition, invested with the faculty of dissolving the present National Congress, so as to call elections that will provide him with a Parliament containing an Alessandrist majority. This means that the political constitution will be completely revised. The State administration will likewise be reorganized, both vertically and horizontally."

At the moment, the most closely knit and centralized team, headed by Enrique Ortuzar Escobar, and including Julio Philippi, Pierre Lehmann, Humberto Diaz Contreras, Jorge Fontaine, Jose Luis Cerda, Raul de la Fuente and Manuel Mardones, as well, is putting the final touches on a plan to reorganize the administration from the top.

The idea is that the President will form a cabinet with five "super-ministers" (as in Argentina), and 16 ministers, the latter having their respective under-secretaries.

They have reached the conclusion that the present cabinet ministers are wasted on routine, fruitless tasks. They lack the time to study, even to read basic papers which they themselves sign, because 80 percent of their time must be spent attending Parliament and granting interviews to members of Congress and of unions, as well as signing millions of letters "of recommendation." Therefore, it has suggested that JAR surround himself with five "super-ministers" (to be known as "Secretaries of State"), who would play a public role only on very rare occasions. They would work directly with the President, and with the cabinet minister subordinate to them. These Secretaries of State would be responsible for the following portfolios: Economic Development, Interior and Justice (revamped), Finance and Economy (revamped), Foreign Relations (devoted, fundamentally, to foreign trade rather than formal diplomacy) and Education. The 16 Ministries and Under-secretariats would be subordinate to each of these five Secretaries of State. The present ODEPLAN /Oficina de Planificacion de la Presidencia de la Republica; National Planning Office / and the Office of the Budget, among others, would be raised to the status of Ministries. On the latter point, the experts with whom Ercilla conversed stated: "The Minister of the Budget must be a veritable 'dictator' in his field. What he decides in the matter of public expenditures will be the last word, and nothing can be resolved without his knowledge and consent. The idea is that not even the President can by-pass the Minister of the Budget."

The Commissions

The first working team for the platform was created in June 1968. It grew as time went on. As we have already noted, there are now 200 business and professional men who are working on, or subordinate to 14 commissions, namely: Interior Government, Economy and Finance, Agriculture, Education, Mining, Constitution-Legislation-Justice, Health, Labor, Social Security, Public Works, Urbanism and Housing, Transportation, International and Tourism. These have proliferated, in turn, into countless sub-commissions which were not identified by the sources, but are engaged in specific tasks. For example, there is a sub-commission that is studying the concrete problems of the youth of today and of the future. Pursuing Frei's policy, great importance is attached to Popular Promotion: "We shall retain its present organization; but we shall attempt to make it more efficient, by eliminating all political and sectarian purposes from it. We really want a promotion that is for all the people; not an apparatus to serve one party or one doctrine." So they told Ercilla.

The modus operandi of these commissions is as follows. Once the overall aspect of a subject has been discussed and outlined, it is handed over to an office of experts who were especially contracted on a full-time basis. Some of these are offices of engineers and economists which were already in existence, such as CADE, INECOM, ASESEC, etc. Others were created on an ad hoc basis, "with the best professional men who have graduated from the universities, mainly the University of Chile and the University of Chile at Santiago."

It is the job of these experts to shape the platform, and to submit it to the commission for a final discussion.

As a result of all this, in January 1969 there was presented what they termed "the first draft," which served as a guideline for a discussion with JAR and his staff of collaborators, headed by Enrique Ortuzar. The outcome of this endeavor was that, last November, the "second draft" appeared, wherein the edited texts of the bills to be submitted to Congress by JAR, if he is elected, are contained, as are the texts of the administrative decrees, where they pertain.

"Philosophy" of Alessandrism

What our sources refer to as "the philosophy of Alessandrism" is based upon three points. They have been defined in terms that the popular masses can understand: "That there be no lack of jobs; that prices not rise; and, more money for Chileans."

In other words, they state that what is primarily involved is the elimination of "extreme poverty;" and they call for a real, effective stabilization that "is not dissipated, like soap bubbles, by the accelerated rate of inflation and public expenditures which, under Frei, have reached the point where they cannot continue in a nation such as ours. In our opinion, public expenditures have one of the foremost priorities, if not the first. But, we must progress with extreme caution. We shall not know,

until November, to what degree the government has committed itself. Or to what limits it is mortgaged with respect to foreign credit; to the balance of payments; to wages and pensions for civil servants. We do not know to what extent certain private industries will have to become State-owned (MADECO /Manufacturas de Cobre, S.A.; Copper Manufactures, Inc. / and MADEMSA /Manufacturas de Metales, S.A.; Metal Manufactures, Inc. / for example); and which enterprises that are currently State-owned may revert to private ownership. It is all very uncertain. But, everything will have to be resolved in the months remaining, so as to take office with a realistic criterion that will hasten the country's construction. One that will correct the many mistakes, and sustain the undeniable successes of the present administration which cannot be overlooked."

Once all the work has been edited by the technical offices under full-time contract, it is submitted to JAR who, according to his spokesmen, "has no commitment with us to accept it. Up until now, he has found it valuable, interesting and novel; and we are confident of his inspiration and trust. But, he will have the last word."

It is the staff's intention to have the "governmental program" completely edited, down to its smallest details, during the month of April. They do not want to leave any loose ends, and, at the same time, the many "alternatives" have been taken into consideration, based upon the country's situation; its economic status; the dynamic forces that may offer support; the others, no less dynamic, that will assume a stubbornly contrary position; the international situation; etc.

To the question concerning any respects in which the Alessandrists might defer to the Frei government, they replied: "In none whatsoever. We shall demonstrate with deeds that we are going to progress at a faster and more resolute pace, but without demagogy. We have been told that JAR will put an end to agrarian reform, or to the nationalization of copper. Not true. We shall continue with reforms in the rural areas, but with two categorical aims: to make the small and medium-level farmers become real land-owners, rather than 'settlers;' and to make reform, not a party banner, but rather a stimulus for producing more, better and cheaper food. In the matter of nationalizing copper, we have studied a way in which the government can acquire all the stock in the Chuquicamata and El Salvador companies before the date set by Frei."

"Have you encountered any very agonizing problems?"

"Of course. They all are. But, let us give one example, out of thousands: the automotive industry. A strange case of collective psychosis has taken place. Nowadays, a Chilean would rather own a car than a home. He considers the car something that will give him social prestige. It raises his status. But, at the same time, the mass-scale purchase of automobiles and the anarchical existence of the automotive industry are deterrents to the national economy. The country does not capitalize. This is one of the elements (together with the extremely pernicious social security) which interfere with progress. Furthermore, if automobiles are pur-

chased in an indiscriminate and almost neurotic fashion, the time may come when transportation will reach a 'standstill.' Because there will be millions of cars, yet insufficient roads and bridges on which they can travel. First, we must have the highways; then the cars. In Chile, we are doing the reverse."

"What about regional development, and the aid to the provinces by grouping them on the basis of their geographical and economic status?"

"Frei's idea was an excellent one. We think that regional development is so important that we shall certainly propose the creation of a special Ministry in this field."

Such were the fundamental ideas described to Ercilla by the Alessandri experts. In subsequent issues, we shall report on the thinking of the Allende and Tomic experts. For they, also, have no intention of expending all their efforts on winning, and then deciding what to do with their victory. Clodomiro Almeyda (of the Socialist Party), Jorge Insunza (Communist Party), Alberto Garretón (Unitary Popular Action Movement) and Camilo Salvo (Radical Party) are studying the concrete platform of the Popular Unity movement. Bosco Parra and Ricardo French-Davis head Tomic's team. The candidates' campaigns are not limited to tours, speeches, attacks and counterattacks. There are highly qualified individuals who are burning the midnight oil silently, without publicity. These were the ones sought out and found by Ercilla.

ERCILLA, Santiago de Chile
25-31 March 1970

CPYRGHT TOMIC'S 1970 PRESIDENTIAL HOPES OUTLINED

In Chile, extemporaneous action is not a practice of politicians trying to gain power. Alessandri has been preparing himself since June 1968 and Frei gathered his advisers in 1961. Allende divides his time between the campaign itself and discussion with his experts, as will be shown in the next issue of Ercilla. Tomic is not counting simply on his 800 campaign groups throughout the country. Since the day he agreed to be the PDC /Partido Demócrata Cristiano; Christian Democrat Party/ candidate, he has organized his command of the campaign, directed by Enrique Krauss and Sergio Saavedra, and at the same time of his National Advisory Department. This is headed by Bosco Parra and includes Gabriel Valdes, Carlos Massad, Luis Maira, Ricardo French-Davis, Gustavo Lagos, Cristian Ossa, Rafael Moreno, Fernando Castillo Velasco, Fernando Molina (president and vice-president of the Catholic University), Mimi Marinovic, Eduardo García (Odeplan /Oficina de Planificación Nacional;

CPYRGHT

National Planning Office/), Alejandro Foxley and Juan Villarzu. There are many more. Almost all the best officials in the public administration who are militant or who sympathize with the DC /Democracia Cristiana; Christian Democracy/and those who are simply independent (like Dr. Jorge Kaplan). But the ones we have named are the main figures. They have divided the work to be done among twelve ordinary commissions and six other special ones, following the pattern of the present Ministries or specific areas like Industry, Transport, Planning, Energy and Fuel, Development of the People, Data Processing and Computing.

Farther Ahead than Frei

Tomicist strategy is to use the experience gained in Frei's six years in a dynamic and critical way. Dynamic, by going farther ahead. Critical, by correcting the natural errors made in the first Christian Democrat government in America. Tomic explains that "the DC under Frei marked a historic step forward and whoever wants to succeed to him cannot go backwards, even if he wants to." Frei was the avalanche, and now there is no dike that can hold it back. It is symptomatic, for instance, that Alessandri is promising to improve the status of the people and agrarian reform. He is promising this, but he will not be able to do it, because these moves represent a revolutionary process of replacement of capitalism. And Alessandri stands for the restoration of capitalism and a greater dependency on imperialism in Chile. Tomic, following Frei's line, stands for the replacement of capitalism ("where the State does not intervene") and neocolonialism ("where the State intervenes, but in favor of those who control capital, exploited and dominated by this") by an open intervention of the State on behalf of the great masses of the nation and with their active participation.

Tomic's advisers take as their point of departure a self-criticism dealing with the mistakes that they themselves made in the Frei government. They explained to Ercilla that "what was good enough in 1964 is not good enough in 1970. The Right, in the past, played a vigorous role, but now there is nothing it can do. However illustrious and honest its spokesmen may be, their experience is no longer of any use. They are not psychologically ready to face up to problems of the magnitude of the nationalization of the copper industry, agrarian reform or educational reform."

What mistakes have the Christian Democrats made in their first administration, or what needs did not get sufficiently attended to? They reply that the problems they feel to be pressing and unsolved are: the unresolved conflict between the aspirations of the masses of the people and those who control resources; an inadequate reduction in the political and economic power of the conservative sectors;

CPYRGHT

insufficient mobilization of the people, who, at the outset, felt that they were represented, and then became frustrated; and the absence of any coordination of the DC with those parties that control industrial unionism. This means that there were no contacts with the communists and socialists, except occasionally, on matters of agrarian reform, constitutional reform on property rights, etc. National solidarity grew weaker and the economy developed painfully, in an unsatisfactory way, relying on foreign control.

What Tomic Will Do

Once you recognize the faults, you can set goals to be met in overcoming them. Tomic's hypothetical scheme of government is based on two fundamental principles: a. widening of the social basis and active support for changes, and b. political coordination of the nation's masses. To achieve this: promotion and participation of all workers in the awareness of economic and social conflicts; unity of the rural dwellers' movement and union of the farm workers with those of the city. Incorporation of the middle sectors.

The things that must be provided in what they call the "next step" are explained in simple terms:

1. more work for all Chileans;
2. more power for organized labor;
3. more independence for the national State.

They explain:

An economy that gives opportunity for work and saving. Any increase in employment requires more efficient industrialization. A nation that is economical in operation gives direction to its hopes: work, sacrifice and discipline today, in order to gather the fruits tomorrow. The direction of everybody's hopes, from the highest to the lowest. Reduction of concessions. An economy that is expanding must have resources. Financing it: redirect the profits produced in the private sector.

Chile cannot develop on the basis of foreign credits. World experience shows that all those countries that have achieved an economic "take off" have done it with their own forces and resources. For this, a Fund for the Economic Independence of Chile must be set up. Know exactly the situation of the traditional capitalist business concerns and proceed resolutely towards the participation of the workers in the management of enterprises. They give two

examples to clarify these concepts. Chile appears to be getting rich from nitrates. But was it the Chileans or a few companies? Chile was going on a spree in Paris with nitrates, in the same way it went on a spree with copper profits until Frei came along. "More power for organized labor" means, in addition, a resulting popular participation in all decisions. The four million Chileans who live by their labor make the decisions, and do this in the political, economic and geographical life of the country. In the handling of credit and in total decentralization.

In politics, what is needed is a strong but change-conscious authority. This must be the President of the Republic. But his strong authority does not emanate from a police state, but from the representative character given to him by the participation of the people. This is power, and it must give rise to three inspirational ideas: solidarity, work and simple life.

We must not come to blows with the United States. It is a matter of not depending on the United States, or any other world power. It is a matter, say the Tomicists, of "finding a Chilean pattern for development," just as the Russians, Swedes and Japanese have found development patterns for their countries. Greater independence means that the national destiny of the Chileans is to move towards a socialism of the workers, egalitarian and free. No reliance on foreign investment. Capital must be sought within Chile, by new means -- not capitalist ones. "Nationalism," say our informers, "is the keynote of Tomic's policy." For this reason he plans the immediate and complete nationalization of the copper industry, with expropriation; for this reason, the abolition of most concessions, leaving only that necessary for regional development. Lastly, the role of the State must meet up to the immediate needs: integrated control of the educational and cultural process, selection of technologies and skills to create an individual character, alliance of the State with the workers and middle sectors, guarantees of the inviolable nature of the national territory.

Institutional Reforms

The Tomicists were reminded that the Alessandrists, according to what they told Ercilla, have been preparing their party program since June 1968 and that they had, at the very least, fifty high-level experts boiling down the ideas under study, projected laws and already drawn-up decrees.

They replied that the philosophy of Alessandrism depends on "the administration of the present capitalist order." We are building a new communal order. We have been working for ten years at this and we do not need to hire experts or economists for they are our members or sympathizers and are handling the most delicate and complex tasks of the

Public Administration or in business. This is what our staff consists of, and if the other group claims to have two hundred, we have three thousand at our disposal -- and their knowledge is not just theoretical. It is living. To cite an example: education. Here they are all working with us, in addition to Maximo Pacheco, Fernando Castillo, William Thayer, Jaime Chang and Fernando Molina who head the universities.

If Tomic wins, he will propose immediately far-reaching reforms that will, in fact, constitute a new Political Constitution whose characteristics would be:

Strong power of the President of the Republic to make changes, with exclusive initiative in economic questions. Reform of the Judiciary.

But the President will not be a Dictator. In case of conflict with the Parliament (a single Chamber), he will have to consult the electorate directly. The electorate now consists of 3.5 million citizens, but will go up to 5.4 million next year, with the participation of 18 year olds and illiterates. The Chief of State will have exclusive initiative in economic questions, but he will not reach his decisions by himself. An Economic-Social Council will be created, with participation of the State, workers and capital, and it will determine the policy to be followed.

In the new Constitution will be included Civil Rights; free Legal Aid and Social Security, substantially modifying the present chaotic system. In order to get laws passed more rapidly, the Senate will be abolished. But the Single Chamber will have a legal obligation to have obligatory technical advisory bodies. Reasons to call for plebiscites will be multiplied. The election of the President will be held on different dates from the election of parliamentary representatives or city councils. The latter will be elected on the same day. A "second round" will be set up if no presidential candidate gets an absolute majority. Administrative Tribunals will also be set up and the "right of indemnification" will be established.

According to the Tomicists, it is true that the present generation of the Judiciary is governed by an idea of class. The great mass of the people are left out and it is also true that in Chile "justice is slow and expensive." To take care of this, there will be set up a free National Service for Legal Aid at the national and regional levels; all the community will participate in it through representative qualified lawyers -- neighborhood groups, unions, cooperatives. All legal codes will be revised and the Ministry of Justice will be reorganized. A Legal Statute for Women will be drawn up, giving full rights to the married woman. A new system of determining the qualifications of judges will take capability as well as age into account.

CPYRGHT

The Advisory Department claimed that "no-one has come to grips" with the reorganization of the Administration. In general, the present form is retained. A Ministry for National Planning is to be created, giving emphasis to improvement of living conditions and regionalization.

When they were asked whether it was intended to create a Ministry for Women, they answered wryly: "Of course, and with four undersecretaries: for married women, spinsters, divorcees and adulteresses!" Then they added, joking aside, that such a Ministry was a pure election device and that the DC made no distinction between men and women. For both, the same rights and the same obligations.

Economic matters are complex, and our informants used a language that is not easy to understand. They admit that the great fault is that "inflation is getting out of any control," with the result of "a gigantic growth in current public expenditures that are out of proportion to any substantial increase in productivity." The solution lies in "deepening popular participation at the national and regional level and breaking through the bottleneck in foreign trade. Stable, sure and selective work."

Will they put an end to private business?

Not at all. But private enterprise must be self-sufficient, without State aid, and must establish new policies with regard to foreign investments. These should be sought when they contribute technology or markets. But not as a source of capital, since this should be found within the country, through its own strength, sacrifice and discipline.

Credit will be decentralized. The State Bank will become autonomous in the regions, both to bring together and to disburse resources.

Relations with Cuba

"Whether the USA likes it or not, Tomic will re-establish relations with Cuba. There is no thought of breaking with the OAS," because it is the unifying group in Latin America and because, thanks to the OAS, it was possible to create the CECLA /Comision Economica de Coordinacion; Economic Coordination Commission/. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will give more importance to economic matters than to traditional diplomacy. The general orientation -- following Frei's line -- will be to apply a foreign policy of full independence and, at the same time, solid friendship, with peoples rather than with governments."

Copper and Industries

If Tomic reaches La Moneda on 4 November, the following day he will nationalize the copper industry by means of an expropriation law. This will mean acquiring 49 percent of

Chuqui, El Salvador and El Teniente" and 75 percent of La Exotica. Formerly this could not even be suggested. Now it is good business and absolutely possible. But it is not a leap in the dark, because Chile has doubled copper production in five years and tripled processing; it is part of the World Copper Club; it knows the market and, on the international scene, this does not involve any break with the United States.

In the area of industrial policy, "there is no reason to protect all manufacturing industries, only those capable of producing capital gains under eight or ten rubrics, period. These are mostly copper, lumber, wines, fruit and fish. These are tied to the basic Chilean products and are all areas where the State can play a dynamic role."

We ask: They state that private enterprise will not be persecuted but it will be left to its fate?

Answer: We should distinguish three types of enterprise: the estate type, which is the main kind among us; the private business, which will have to shape up in order to remain competitive; and the kind belonging to the social economy, i.e., the cooperatives, holding groups, artisan industries -- in general, the businesses belonging to the workers.

The private businessman will not be persecuted. But a "Statute for the Private Sector," will be promulgated, not to make it disappear but to give it stability, defining clearly the rules of the game by which it must operate. We are not infected with a psychosis to nationalize everything, but only those areas dealing with the basic economy of the country. In return, there must be a greater participation of the people.

Agrarian Reform

This participation will be strengthened by continuing the application of reform in the agricultural sector. It is not true that we intend to expropriate all the big estates. They are expropriating 1,200 and the goal is 2,500. This will leave seven thousand large haciendas that will not be touched. Their management organization will be respected, but respect will also be demanded for the unions and holding companies.

Will Agrarian Reform bring a drop in food production?

Over a period of 35 years, the increase in agricultural production came to 1.8 percent a year. In the five years under Frei it increased to 4.6 percent, and this is even recognized by the SNA [National Agriculture Society]. Thanks to

reform (see the University of Michigan study), investments on private estates have risen during this time by 120 percent, and from 1965 to 1969 the State Bank and CORFO /Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion; Production Development Corporation/ allotted seven billion escudos to farmers. Where does the persecution lie? Where is the drop in food supplies?

Do you believe you can win?

On Sunday, El Mercurio published a poll from an office of Alessandrist experts (CESEC) that gave these percentages: Alessandri, 44.4 percent; Tomic, 23.1 percent, and Allende, 18 percent. According to the Head of the group, this poll closed on 30 January, when Alessandri was still an unknown quantity. Soon, CESEC, the independent Center for Economic and Social Studies at the University -- whose director is of recognized and worthy Allendist sympathies -- will release its ranking, which, according to our information, is thus: Alessandri, 42 percent; Tomic, 32, and Allende, 20. The Alessandrists themselves already recognize that their candidate is far from having an absolute majority, and his decline is obvious. As for the second, it is already clear that Tomic is no Catapilco. This is what the Alessandrists have to worry about.

ERCILLA, Santiago de Chile
1-7 April 1970

PLATFORM COMMITTEE REPORTS ON ALLENDE PLANS

CPYRGHT

According to the members of Salvador Allende's Platform Committee with whom Ercilla conversed, that entity has "considered practically all of the nation's basic problems." The Committee is comprised of Clodomiro Almeyda, of the PS /Partido Socialista; Socialist Party/, Jose Cademartori, of the PC /Partido Comunista; Communist Party/, Oscar Garreton, of the MAPU /Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitario; Unitary Popular Action Movement/, Humberto Elgueta, of the PR /Partido Radical; Radical Party/, Col. (ret.) Pedro Toledo, of the API /Alianza Popular Independiente; Independent Popular Alliance/, Luis Oyarce, of the PSD /Partido Social Demócrata; Social Democrat Party/, and, Tomas Montecinos (secretary).

In their view, a mutual criterion has now been achieved, and they have been working since "Popular Unity" came into being (September), even though the candidate, as such, was not nominated until February 1970. Out of that endeavor emerged the document known as the "Basic Administrative Platform of Popular Unity." Next, came the "Pact on Unity," which describes the role of the parties, labor unions and other entities within the Popular government.

Its principle authors have declared that the Basic Platform "combines the handiwork of years of experience of many hundreds of leftist experts and professionals. It contains the thinking expressed by the PR at its 1968 convention, as well as that of the PS, the PC, the MAPU, the API and the Social Democrats. And so, it is an effort to grasp the Chilean way toward socialism, within the national reality."

The concrete points in this platform may be summarized as follows:

If Allende wins, in accordance with his pluralist administration, he will propose a new Political Constitution the chief objective of which will be to institutionalize the incorporation of the people into the State government. The supreme authority will pass from the President of the Republic to the "People's Assembly," a single House which will be elected by Chileans over the age of 18, with universal, secret and direct suffrage. This Assembly will decide upon the duties of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches, and of the regional organs, as well as the role of the political parties. In this way, the vices of parliamentarianism and presidentialism, alike, will be avoided, as well the futile clashes between the Chief Executive and the Parliament. Those elected to the Assembly will be subject to control by the voters, who will be empowered to revoke their mandates. The status of deputy will be incompatible with that of one representing private interests.

Our sources stated that, contrary to what the adversaries of Popular Unity have been deceptively reporting, the movement intends to guarantee the exercise of democratic rights, and the greatest respect for the people's individual and collective guarantees: freedom of conscience, religion, speech, press and assembly; inviolability of the domicile; and the right to form unions and to organize. For this purpose, the present restrictions, which are the offshoots of money and the ruling classes, will be abolished. Union organizations and cooperatives will take part in the government itself. Thus, there will no longer be governments with a single party, or with parties linked by class interests. The personality cult rule, "surrounded by a group of the initiated," will be eliminated. The regions of the country will reside in the government through Popular Unity committees, which are to be formed during this campaign, and must continue thereafter.

These informants denied that firing squads or people's tribunals would be established. The Judicial Branch will be autonomous in both administrative and economic matters; unlike the President of the Republic, who names the members of the Supreme Court. The People's Assembly will be; and the "supremes" will be the ones to make appointments to the rest of the courts and judgeships. Justice will be reformed, so that it can be swift and inexpensive, so as to extricate it from bureaucratic maneuvering. The outdated codes will be revised.

The people will be taught to realize that it is also their obligation to help preserve the national sovereignty. Thus, all Chileans will aid all professional members of the Armed Forces to defend the country and to win a true national independence, now threatened by the specialized agencies of imperialism and the dictatorial oligarchies. Every 18 and 19 September, we

declare that the nation loves the Armed Forces. Now, it will be true, because the Armed Forces, in turn, will never be used to repress the people's movements. So they stated.

The technical improvement of the Armed Forces does not imply merely fair income, equipment, etc. It means a dynamic role for them in the nation's progress.

Nationalization and Ownership

According to the Platform Committee: "In 1967, there were 30,500 industrial enterprises in Chile. Only 150 of them controlled the production, bank credit, transportation, the commercial system and the capital, as either an overt or a concealed monopoly. The remainder, that is, 99 percent, are subservient to the monopolies." Therefore, the popular government will maintain an area of private ownership in all industries, mining, agriculture, fishing, services and trade. These private enterprises will be ensured their stability and progress through the planning of economic development. The State will provide them financial and technical assistance. They will have access to the credit "which is now only for the great, and for the proteges of that great godfather, the Chief Executive." Taxes, patents, duties will all be simplified for them. They will be aided in placing their products on the market. These businessmen, for their part, will abide by the rights of their employees.

The sector that is nationalized, or owned by society, will be made up of the enterprises currently owned by the State, plus those expropriated by law. "The number of businesses to be expropriated will be small in comparison with the total number of businesses in the country, and it will only affect those controlled by foreign capital or domestic monopolies." This means that the big copper mining companies, private banks and insurance firms, and the large companies and trusts will be nationalized.

Foreign trade will be reserved for the State, and, in general, businesses which, because of their wide scope, affect the country's economic development, will either be nationalized or owned by the society.

Expropriations will be made by law; the expropriated party will be reimbursed, and special consideration will be given small stockholders.

There will also be a mixed sector, made up of private businesses which are affiliated with the State. Finally, "the popular government will respect such private and personal property as dwellings, furniture and tools of one's trade."

Concerning agrarian reform, the Allende representatives set the following criteria: 1. To accelerate the process. To expropriate landed property that exceeds the maximum area established according to the various locations. The right of the former owner to select a preferential reserve will be abolished, even if he is to maintain a reserve. The expropriation will include all or part of the machinery, implements, animals, etc. 2. Expropriated lands will preferably be organized according to cooperative forms of ownership. Farmers will no longer be "settled;" they will have the right of domain which attests to final ownership of the house and small farm assigned to them, and to the corresponding rights on the indivisible landed property of the cooperative. 3. In authorized cases,

lands will be assigned to small farmers, tenant farmers, farm co-partners and farm laborers. The minifundio /small landed estate/ will be reorganized into a cooperative. 4. The integrity and expansion of indigenous communities will be protected, and their democratic leadership guaranteed. The Mapuche people, and other Indians, will be assured sufficient land, technical assistance and credit.

Social Security

The solution to the problem of the current, chaotic social security system will be finally found in a drastic, revolutionary measure. In all the social security institutions, the administration will be established with full autonomy over those under their jurisdiction. Councils will be elected in democratic fashion, by secret, direct ballot.

Social security will gradually become unified, perfected and expanded. All the legitimate gains that have been won will be respected; but the privileges, inefficiency and bureaucracy will be eliminated. All the workers and their families who are still outside the system will be provided social security.

Preventive and curative medical care, financed by the State, management and the social security institutions themselves, will be extended to all Chileans. The population will be incorporated into the unifying task of protecting health, and of disseminating and abiding by standards for the prevention of disease. The pharmaceutical industry will be obliged to adapt to standards for a rigid price control, and for the simplification of medicines, in order to maintain a complete, low-priced stock thereof.

The government will exercise all its capacities to put an end to inflation. Through nationalization of banking and foreign trade, and the elimination of trusts, the State will control policy on exchange, credit and price hikes. No more speculation and cornering the market. Credit will be distributed in accordance with the actual needs of production, and will be made available to small and medium-sized businesses.

No more periodic devaluations of the escudo, which make the dollar and the commodities imported every 2 weeks more expensive. But, at the same time, the development of exports will be fostered. Incentives will be offered to small and medium-sized producers who can export.

Strict price controls, and no more persecution of businesses of the minority. A careful review of costs, in order to reduce prices. The entire nation, in unified fashion, will cooperate in the fight against inflation.

With respect to remuneration, entities will be created so that the workers themselves can decide upon readjustments. The latter will be automatic and, so long as inflation continues, will be based upon the rise in the cost of living. The index of consumer prices will be controlled by the workers, housewives, etc. High salaries will be restricted in all State agencies and in positions of trust within the Executive Branch. Equal pay for equal work will be the rule for men and women, young and old. There will be a single pay scale for administration.

Chile will maintain relations with all countries, irrespective of their ideological position, based upon respect for Chile's self-determination and interests. Rapprochement with nations that have rejected the colonial yoke; impetus to a Latin American policy; increased exchanges with the socialist countries. Resumption of relations with Cuba, which does not imply a break with the U.S., but does mean an "untying" of the bonds with the OAS, because the latter is a tool of Washington. The creation of genuinely Latin American organizations. Review of the agreements which restrict our sovereignty. Repudiation of loans with strings attached. International solidarity with those struggling against colonialism and imperialism, and on behalf of self-determination.

A new culture will be established, oriented toward placing a higher value upon man's labor; preserving and enhancing the nation's spiritual heritage. A scientific view of the national and international reality. All of this based upon the assumption that there will be deep-seated reforms in every aspect of the educational system. For this purpose, an extensive network of local centers of popular culture will be created. A national plan and fund for scholarships, in order to incorporate the children of the workers into the highest educational levels. An extraordinary plan for academic institutions.

An extraordinary budgetary fund to industrialize construction; price controls and restriction of the profits of existing businesses. Assignment of land, with technical assistance in building homes. The goal is for every family to own its own home. Elimination of the system of readjustable dividends, because the very policy of stability will make them unnecessary. But, all who have savings shares will be entitled to have their funds at their disposal, and to receive readjustments through currency devaluation. Monthly shares and taxes paid by purchasers will not exceed 10 percent of the family income.

A Special Ministry

The present savings and loan associations will continue to operate, and to guarantee the rights of savings account holders and of holders of mortgage loans; but excessive administrative expenditures and benefits to construction magnates will be eliminated. Depositors and debtors will have an active share in these associations.

There will be no evictions based upon abuses by landlords. Renovation will be done with respect for the rights of tenants.

A special ministry will be formed for family protection, and to see that the children are the only privileged ones. For this purpose, a careful concern for their nutrition, medical care, education, sports, recreation and skills.

These were the specific topics stressed by the members of the Popular Unity Platform Committee, in their interview with Ercilla. Other issues, which produced differences among their parties and, particularly with their opponents, are under intensive study. The particular topic referred to is that of freedom of information, and what Clodomiro Almeyda termed "different alternatives," once Allende becomes the hypothetical winner of the great day. For example: What positions will be taken by the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Cuba or the Soviet Union, if the Popular

Unity should win? Will the right respect the verdict of the ballot-boxes, or rise up in rebellion, and attempt to drag a sector of the Armed Forces along with it? Can socialism be built in peace, or must this be accomplished through armed revolution?

The Allende team believes that it can count on the vast majority of organized labor, and that the latter (without any need for violence) will be their best guarantee for what they call "the Chilean path toward socialism." In concluding this report, they said: "We do not want to imitate any revolution, much less export our own."

EL MERCURIO, Santiago
15 March 1970

CPYRGHT

SENATOR FORESEES MARXIST SYSTEM IF ALLENDE WINS

(Interview with Sen. Raul Morales Adriasola by Silvia Pinto)

When Sen Raul Morales Adriasola visited India, the President of that country presented him with a sharkskin billfold at a special ceremony. "Wear it over your heart and you will always be protected," he told him upon giving it to him.

The then representative asked why a power of protection was attributed to a billfold and they explained that it was because of the sharkskin, which symbolizes the hardness that every politician should have with respect to attacks.

And, apparently, the sharkskin had the desired effect. Because Raul Morales has been attacked, but he maintains that after 17 years as a member of parliament, at 40 years of age, he is immune to attacks and they no longer affect him as they did when he entered politics.

He has completed 1 year as a senator and finds the Senate very much to his liking. Much more so than the Radical Party, which he renounced after 26 years of membership in order to support the Radical Democracy.

He is a goodlooking man, of vigorous build and stout features, which correspond in part to his character, to his liking for sports and to his belief that in a healthy body there must be a healthy mind.

From 6 months of age to 3 years he was reared in Chiloe, the province that he represented in Congress for four terms. And he adores that region, its people and its climate. "The wind and the storms delight me. Nowhere do I sleep better than in Chiloe or feel more rested," he relates. "When I am there and I awaken in the middle of the night and listen to the rain, I go back to sleep placidly. It must be that I

associate the pleasure of the first years of my life, warm, agreeable, full of affection, with the sound of the rain and the wind."

He is the son of Raul Morales Beltrami, a doctor who became an independent representative for Chiloe, later joined the Radical Party and attained high public offices, even nomination as a primary candidate for the presidency of the republic together with Gabriel Gonzalez. His mother, Guillermina Adriasola, was a lawyer and also had a good professional career. When her husband was representative, she accepted the position of consul in the United States. It served Raul Morales in taking his first studies in the city of Los Angeles, California.

He is separated from his wife and lives with his four children. The oldest, Raul, 13 years old, is a very tall, slender boy with glasses. He is a national runner-up in swimming. He calls him in order to present him to me with fatherly pride and later asks him to continue watching television with his brothers and sisters in an adjoining room.

We are in his home, where the Radical senator is recovering from an injury to his foot, the product of a family football game.

When I arrived, he was resting and reading the afternoon newspapers. It was 9 PM and through the window of the sitting room a small mirror of illuminated water was glimpsed.

The senator got up and, resting his injured foot lightly on the floor, headed toward a smaller chair, leaving me the comfortable place that he was occupying moments before. To one side there is a bookcase, to my back, a Gobelin tapestry hangs on the wall.

Raul Morales is quiet and formal in expressing himself. But only in appearance, because a few sentences are sufficient for the Radical enthusiast of anecdotes and funny stories to flourish.

He does not like modern painting. On the other hand, he declares his weakness for classical music "because I cannot succeed in understanding those noises that make up modern music."

"Life cast itself headlong upon me. I have had to work since I was 16 years old, while I was studying. For that reason, while there are violinists, pianists and painters in my family, I was not even able to play the guitar," he states.

He reads biographies of politicians (now he is devoting himself to Lenin) and, like a good Radical, declares himself a follower of O'Higgins and the author of a very

special theory about the sociological significance of the great statesman.

"Your questions are not at all tender," he points out to me, putting on his glasses in order to read. "But there are several that I like very much and I will answer with pleasure."

And he begins to dictate to me directly from a rough draft that he had prepared.

The following are my questions and his answers:

There Is No Radical Candidate

Question: You are aware that by having renounced the Radical Party in the middle of the presidential campaign it will be said that you left that group only in order to support the candidacy of Jorge Alessandri and not that of Allende. Can you give me a less subjective reason for your withdrawal from the PR [Partido Radical; Radical Party]?

Answer: The presidential question, like the political one in general, is not for me a problem of men, but rather of principles and programs. Throughout my entire parliamentary life I have invariably maintained a democratic conduct, adjusting this concept to the spirit and mechanism of our political constitution. This is just as through complete identification with their thinking, I collaborated with all the Radical candidates for the presidency of the republic: Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, Pedro Enrique Alfonso, Luis Bossay, Julio Duran and Alberto Baltra. In my party life I have never had a problem of a disciplinary nature. I have renounced the Radical Party, which has declared as its presidential candidate a truly Marxist citizen, joining the Democratic Radical Party. Since there is no Radical candidate, I must vote for Alessandri, Tomic or Allende. Due to my firm and unchanging conviction that progress is achieved in a democratic process with respect for the law, authority, public order and with the correct functioning of the institutions, I feel that the candidate for the Radical Party is Jorge Alessandri. Besides, he is an independent man and one who has shown throughout his entire life respect for Radicals. Salvador Allende, on the other hand, represents those parties that have taken a permanent position of hatred and aggressiveness against the Radicals. From the persecution that the Radicals suffered when the Socialists were in the government with President Ibanez to the taunts and insults that we received in the last parliamentary campaign. "Nothing with the Radicals" the Socialists said in the last parliamentary campaign. In recent days we have even read statements by Radical senators supporting the candidate of the Socialist and Communist Parties in which they express their "surprise" at the language and statements that they now have to support and

that they would have to suffer in the hypothetical triumph of Allende. They will have to be convinced, now or later, that the Radical Party is only serving as an electoral complement and with "trifling honors."

Policy Without a Plebiscite

Question: Why were you a senatorial candidate for a party whose policy you do not share at present?

Answer: I was a senatorial candidate just as I was a representative during four terms for a "socialist, lay and democratic" party. Long after my election the CEN [Comite Ejecutivo Nacional; National Executive Committee] defined itself as Marxist with a Marxist program, without the intervention of any consultation with the bases of the Radical Party. I should remind you that I went to the CEN expressly for the purpose of proposing a plebiscite and the idea was not even considered. I can confirm the previous with the recollection that, my political position within the party being sufficiently well-known, the party directorate at that time recorded me in first place on the list of Radical senatorial candidates for the Tenth District.

Question: You were violently attacked once in the middle of the Senate by one of your fellow party members when you were a senatorial candidate. During those attacks it was stated that you had been expelled from Freemasonry. Can you explain why?

Answer: I have not been expelled from the order. I have not lost my Masonic rank and I scarcely have the time necessary to take all the steps to reincorporate myself into the works of this very respectable institution.

The Soviet (for Chile

Question: What criticisms does the program of the "People's Union" merit?

Answer: I should point out that we only found out about the program of the "People's Union" when it was published in the newspaper El Siglo. That is, we were notified of a political document of this importance without the possibility of participating in the discussion of the rough draft of the plan or the plan itself.

Only 9 days intervened between the publication of this program and the veto of Baltra. Adding the proposals for "power of the people," "a new institutional order," "a people's state," "the construction of a new economy" and "an international policy for the people's government" to the express subordination of a Marxist candidate to this Marxist

program and -- on the other hand -- knowing the Soviet Union and the systems imposed by the governments of the countries of Eastern Europe, I am forced to conclude that if the so-called "People's Union" wins, we will have in Chile a system exactly like the one that those countries still suffer.

I have always maintained that the major conflict in the world -- and why not in Chile? -- is between democracy and Marxism. Who can best and with greatest clarity represent our democratic system should be the President of Chile on 4 September.

Question: If the Coordinating Committee of the "People's Union" had elected Alberto Baltra as the candidate, would you have remained in the Radical Party?

Answer: I believe that the best political policy is clarity and frankness. This conduct allows one to be authentic in the expression of his thinking, tranquil in his conscience, whatever the attacks may be and -- also very important -- he retains his good friends and good enemies. Except, among the latter, those motivated by hatreds, bitterness or envy.

It is on record with many members of parliament, especially Radical senators of the CEN, that I always harbored strong doubts that a Radical with a Radical program would be acclaimed among the parties of the FRAP /Frente Revolucionario de Accion Popular; Revolutionary Popular Action Front/. Many of my colleagues and the leaders of the party gave me the most absolute assurances that Baltra would be the one chosen together with our program. I must admit that the founders of the Radical Democracy had great vision in pointing out very much in advance that Baltra and the CEN would be deceived by the Communist Party.

Support for Alessandri

Question: Do you believe that your electors will follow you now that you are in the Radical Democracy?

Answer: I am very respectful of what my friends and partisans think. This is a problem of doctrinal awareness that each one must resolve. Let me point out, however, that many Radicals of the Tenth District have already spontaneously expressed to me their rejection of the eventual proclamation of a candidate for the Communist Party and for the Socialist Party, supporting Jorge Alessandri. Others already declared themselves Democratic Radicals, others favored freedom of action and they -- disillusioned -- were also forced to decide to withdraw from any electoral work without detriment to voting for Alessandri.

I believe I have a very intimate knowledge of the provinces of Chiloe, Magallanes and Aisen. I have been with the Radicals and friends of those three provinces "in good times and bad."

I estimate that 80 percent of the Radicals and Radical sympathizers of the Tenth District believe themselves represented by Alessandri.

Question: How will you explain your renunciation to them?

Answer: I will explain my renunciation to my friends, fellow party members and sympathizers in the same way that I explained it to you. I will add, however, that I made known beforehand in all the political circles that I would renounce if the CEN proclaimed a Marxist as the presidential candidate. The candidate Allende admitted it himself in a radio forum.

Question: What percentage of the Radical Party do you believe will abandon the ranks due to being in disagreement with the candidate and the program of the "People's Union"?

Answer: In the last parliamentary elections the Radical Party won 313,559 votes. Before the last convention, in which there were some people expelled and some who renounced, and before the renunciation of Baltra, the Radical Party recorded 54,658 members, of whom the year 1968 contributed only 15,135. Researches into the Radical Party have recently been made which will surely be made known at some future time. These acknowledge the real Radical votes. That is, of 313,559 votes, a figure greater than 70 percent is in favor of Jorge Alessandri.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
15 April 1970

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The voters in Chile may take a turn to left

By B. J. CUTLER
Scripps Howard Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile — Next Sept. 4 Chile has a chance of taking a unique role in history — as the first country freely and democratically to vote itself into communist bondage.

This development clearly would be a disaster to the literate and likeable Chilean people. On the international level it would be a setback to U.S. policy, a body blow to democracy in Latin America, and a great windfall for the Soviet Union.

Fortunately, it is only a possibility, not a probability as of this date, that Chilean freedom will commit electoral suicide.

Instead, there is a better chance that this country, left of center and with half its 9.5 million population under 21, will do something equally paradoxical: elect as president a conservative born in the 19th century.

According to polls and politicians, the current favorite is Jorge Alessandri, 73, Chile's president from 1958 to 1964, an engaging, stubborn, independent bachelor backed by the landowning and business classes. It is reckoned that Mr. Alessandri would slow up but not reverse the nation's drift toward socialism.

"Don Jorge," as the candidate is called, reads the Paris newspaper Le Monde and admires France's former president Charles de Gaulle. His father, Arturo, was twice a respected president of Chile.

Despite his eccentricities, he is running a shrewd campaign. He has stayed aloof from political parties, sensing that Chileans are fed up with the old politics, and projects a knowledgeable, fatherly image. Both local and foreign businessmen are rooting for him.

His most dangerous opponent is Salvador Allende, 62, a doctor, senator, and candidate of

the communists, socialists and four other leftist parties. Mr. Allende, making his fourth run for the presidency, is himself a socialist. In Chile, tho, socialists are to the left of and more extreme than communists.

Mr. Allende has made frequent trips to Cuba and is an admirer of Castro's. He stands for nationalizing (probably without compensation) every fair-sized business the government does not now own. He is virulently anti-American, views U.S. foreign aid as "imperialistic," and would put Chile's close relations with Washington in a deep freeze.

A leading campaign aide of Mr. Allende's recently said that after the election "enemies of the people will be put up against the wall." It was later denied that this was the candidate's policy.

Many Chileans cannot take Mr. Allende seriously as a communist threat. They point to his

middle-class origin, bourgeois house, sailboat, \$250 suits, and Mercedes auto (in a country where the tiniest minicar costs \$3,000). He has taken to exuding respectability and has grown a mustache so as to appear avuncular, like Don Jorge, on television.

The third candidate in the race is Radomiro Tomic, 52, nominee of President Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Tomic tends toward socialism, but in a democratic framework. Tho he would increase the state's role in industry, he would pay for what he took over.

A less than wily campaigner, Mr. Tomic has been promising austerity, discipline, hard work and national sacrifice — to a happy people! As a result he is running third even tho he might be expected to benefit from President Frei's impressive record of land reform and advancing education.

At present, polls give Mr. Alessandri 39 per cent of the vote to 32 per cent for Mr. Allende and Mr. Tomic's 23 per cent. All experts warn, however, that "anything can happen between now and September."

Under the law, a candidate needs more than 50 per cent to win outright. Otherwise congress elects the president, traditionally choosing the front-runner.

This year, however, politicians are gossiping about 40 per cent as the magic figure. If old Mr. Alessandri reaches that point, congress will elect him.

But if Don Jorge drops below 40 per cent and Mr. Tomic comes in second, there is a strong possibility that the Christian Democrats, who are strong in congress, will throw the election to their own man. Thus Mr. Tomic cannot be ruled out.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 May 1970

President proud of six-year record

CPYRGHT

Santiago, Chile

Eduardo Frei Montalva views his six-year presidency as one of "incredible change" for the Chilean nation.

With presidential elections just four months away and with the end of his term another two months after the election, President Frei is obviously pleased with many of the results of his moderate social and economic reforms. He clearly feels he is leaving the presidency with the nation in better condition than when he took over.

Activities outlined

In the course of a wide-ranging interview, the Chilean President ticked off his own assessment of his six years in office. It includes:

- "Extraordinary improvement" in the field of education with facilities now available for 96 percent of school-age children. Eight years of basic education is available for the overwhelming majority of Chilean children. Enrollment in the national university is up from 32,000 to 82,000.

- "A significant solution" to Chile's housing shortage, with 480,000 families (perhaps as many as 2.5 million people) now living in new housing that did not exist six years ago.

President Frei is obviously pleased with many results of his moderate social and economic reforms.

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

CPYRGHT

- "A successful and peaceful process in "Chileanizing" the nation's vast copper industry through which the Chilean Government has taken a majority ownership in the Kennecott and Anaconda copper facilities here. It was nationalization without incident, with no work stoppages, with no slowdown in production, and with no lag in other foreign investment."

- "A major industrialization effort reducing by at least one-half Chilean dependence on foreign products." This effort included a 70 percent boost in textile production, the development of a growing petrochemical industry, the export of \$14 million worth of automobile parts yearly to Argentina, and doubling the nation's hydroelectrical capacity.

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Land distributed

- An agricultural reform program in which more than 2 million hectares of land has been distributed to Chileans through various plans and through which rural people have been mobilized in a number of cooperatives, labor syndicates, and other ventures to become more effective rural workers.

- A failure to control inflation — "lamentable and a serious problem for all Chileans"—with rates in 1969 running to 29 percent per year.

- A greater effort still needed to bring about institutional, administrative, and governmental reform in Chile. This was particularly the case in relations between the executive and the legislature, an area in which President Frei found difficult going.

For Mr. Frei, his years represent a "gigantic effort to bring about significant change and reform for Chile" and the tone of his interview suggests his general feeling of accomplishment albeit mingled with some disappointment such as the issue of inflation.

But in this election year, not all Chileans would agree with Mr. Frei's own assessment. From both the right and the left have come major criticisms of the Frei years. For conservatives, President Frei and his moderately leftist Christian Democratic Party have

moved Chile too far into uncertain paths and away from Chile's traditional politics and economics.

More action sought

For more radical groups, including Communists and Socialists, and dissident Christian Democrats, the Frei reforms have not been radical enough. There are complaints that despite the appearance of reform, the Frei program has permitted business, banking, and other industry to continue operating much as before Mr. Frei came to office in November 1964.

As if to answer these criticisms, President Frei in his interview cited a recent poll which he said demonstrates the general popularity of his government.

The poll showed that in answer to a question about how the Frei years should be rated, Chileans voted 70 percent in favor of the Frei program (viewed as excellent, very good, and good) while only 24 percent saw it as so-so, and another 6 percent saw it as poor.

Important gains

Moreover, on balance, there does seem to be considerable agreement among Chileans that many of Mr. Frei's efforts have long been needed. In areas such as road building, facilities now link Chile's north with its south some 300,000 miles distant. In the field of education, as Mr. Frei noted, only a handful of school-age children do not now have schools. This is opposed to the 300,000 or more when he came to office.

And Chileans admit that in a nation with a growing population, 3.1 percent per year, these achievements are important. Moreover, the Frei government is seen even by its severest critics as one of Chile's most honest.

At the same time, Mr. Frei also noted in his interview that some of the reforms and programs of the past six years will not bear fruitage until after he is out of office. One obvious example is the copper program in which Anaconda's Chuquicamata and La Exótica mines and Kennecott's El Teniente mine begin returning sizable profits to the Chilean Government only toward the end of this year as the Frei government leaves office.

Moreover, Mr. Frei is proud that his reforms have been carried out in a democratic climate. At one point in the interview, he said "I very much lament" the radicalization of Latin America and the military trends now in evidence on all sides."

Trends surveyed

As to Chile's own militarist problem, with three plots having been disclosed within the past six months, President Frei said he does not see the situation as "very grave" but it is one Chile cannot ignore.

Finally, in regard to Cuba and Chile's recent announcement of the sale of \$11 million worth of agricultural products to the government of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, Mr. Frei said that the sale was in line with Chile's traditional trading patterns and that it has the support of most sectors of Chilean opinion. But Mr. Frei said that any ultimate decision on Cuba is up to the "American family of nations and Chile will not take unilateral action on such a question."

He did seem to urge, however, that this is the time to reconsider the issue—and it was obvious from his remarks that he watches quite closely the words and actions of Dr. Castro with whom he has had a somewhat heated dialogue in the past.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

7 May 1970

Chilean presidential race shapes up as two-step affair

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Santiago, Chile

CPYRGHT

Chileans expect two presidential-election contests this year as the nation votes for a successor to Eduardo Frei Montalva.

The first contest, now gathering momentum, is a three-way race in which no candidate is likely to receive the required minimum vote of 51 percent.

Thus, a second contest would be necessary. This one would be in the National Congress where legislators would have to choose between the two candidates with the most votes.

For Chile, such an event would not be unusual. It has happened frequently before. Mr. Frei's high 1964 poll of 55 percent which propelled him and his Christian Democrats to the fore was unusual in the context of normal Chilean politics.

Only three candidates

The present candidates, narrowed from eight as the year began, are Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, Radomiro Tomić Romero, and Salvador Allende Gossens. They represent a wide spectrum, and are familiar figures in Chilean politics.

Mr. Alessandri is a former president, serving for six years before the Frei win in 1964. The 73-year-old bachelor, Mr. Alessandri is running on a ticket representing an amalgam of traditional conservative parties now known as the National Party.

Those parties failed to field a candidate in the 1964 contest and subsequently merged to form their present alliance. The general feeling here is that Mr. Alessandri is stronger than the party itself.

Mr. Tomić, a founder of the reformist-minded Chilean Christian Democratic Party along with Mr. Frei, is a former Chilean ambassador to Washington.

Considered somewhat to the left of Mr. Frei politically, he has in recent weeks been much more in line politically with the mildly leftist Frei program and has climbed somewhat in the opinion polls.

Polls show even race

Dr. Allende, an almost perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist and Communist parties in Chile, is himself leader of the Chilean Socialist Party. A trained physician, he garnered nearly 40 percent of the vote in the 1964 race with Mr. Frei.

Dr. Allende's supporters claim he should do as well if not better this time, his fourth bid for the presidency. In this election, he also has the support of a large group of Radical Party voters and some dissident Christian Democrats.

Opinion polls here, some of the most sophisticated in Latin America, show the three running a fairly even race at this moment, four months before the Sept. 6 election. Each is given slightly more than 30 percent of the vote.

Whether such tallies hold up through election day is hard to guess. But more and more Chileans are gearing themselves to a second presidential contest—this time in the Congress.

There are all sorts of opinions current on just how such congressional voting would go. No single party controls a simple majority in the Congress and thus the general feeling is that somehow there would have to be a political deal involving supporters of

the candidate who emerged third in the general poll.

There also is a feeling here that it is still too early to see any particular trend. Maybe by the end of June, say some, such a trend will have emerged. But not now.

Some problems solved

The issues in this year's elections are considerably different from those of 1964. Then, education, housing, and other social needs were uppermost.

But the Frei government has solved those problems in some considerable measure. In Mr. Frei's six years, more than 600,000 children have been added to the educational system and now 96 percent of all school-age children are afforded an eighth-grade education.

In housing more than 2.5 million people (roughly a fourth of all Chileans) have found new housing.

The issues this time include inflation, which for years has been out of control here and which Mr. Frei has not been able to curb. Last year, it ran at 29 percent. That is more than former President Alessandri's last year in office, but less than his earlier years—a fact that Christian Democratic supporters of Mr. Tomić are using in an effort to somewhat blunt the inflation issue.

Other issues are high unemployment, taxes (which are being collected as never before), and a growing middle-class concern over the question of law and order. More robberies, muggings, and the like have occurred in recent months than at any time in memory, say Chileans who have prided themselves on being a peaceful and law-abiding society.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 July 1970

Red Takes Lead in Chile Election Drive

BY JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff Writer

There are storm signals flying throughout the Western Hemisphere over the latest readings of the trends in Chile's upcoming presidential election which indicate that Marxist candidate Salvador Allende is a strong favorite to collect the largest vote.

At the beginning of this year, polls and pundits figured Jorge Alessandri, the septuagenarian conservative candidate, would lead the three-man field on Sept. 4 with slightly more than 40 percent of the vote.

The estimate then was that Allende was trailing with more than 20 percent and Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomić was third with about 20 percent.

The picture has changed drastically now, according to close watchers of the Chilean electoral scene. Allende appears to have surged into the front with Tomić second and Alessandri a poor third.

Allende is not considered strong enough to gain the necessary 50 percent plus one of the vote required for clear-cut victory, however. If no candidate gains more than half the

total vote, a runoff of the two front runners is held in the Chilean Congress.

This Congress is dominated by the Christian Democrats. Traditionally, the Congress always gives a runoff victory to the front runner in the popular voting but it may not be that way in September.

Some observers believe that if Allende heads Tomić by less than 5 percent margin, the Congress would award the presidency to Tomić. But if Allende produces a solid lead, it is believed the Congress would award the presidency to the Marxist.

No official of any hemisphere government is likely to express his concern for attribution, but the specter of a Marxist Chile, especially a freely elected Red regime, is appalling to Washington and every capital in the hemisphere except Havana.

Non-communist world politicians are fond of saying that no people anywhere in the world have ever voted themselves into the hands of a Marxist government. If Chile does so, the election would be regarded as a political and propaganda disaster.

Allende is a Socialist, which

in Chilean terms means that he is closer to Mao than Moscow, and is allied with the relatively tame Communists. He says he would immediately renew diplomatic relations with Cuba and expropriate the remaining interests of the U.S. copper companies in Chile.

Tomic is a much more unpredictable man than Allende but he, too, plans eventual expropriation. Alessandri says that Chile cannot afford such expensive adventures and

ought to concentrate on development.

The impact on Chile's neighbors is a matter of deep concern. Chile is surrounded by right-wing military regimes who would be unable to look on indifferently to a Red Chile.

Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia all have reason to fear an Allende victory and Peru, for all its talk of social reform, is basically a military junta government that would be equally fearful of a militant Marxist regime on its border.

WASHINGTON POST
20 July 1970

Candidate Alessandri:

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By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, July 19 — For-

mer President Jorge Alessandri, at 74 an austere father figure on the right of Chile's left-tilted politics, described last week what he sees as his destiny to save the nation from demagogues.

Alessandri is campaigning, but only reluctantly, for votes in the presidential election Sept. 4. He rather believes that the people are campaigning for him. Many are, and they may turn out to be enough to elect him.

The son of a famous president, Alessandri stands opposed to all the characteristics usually associated with Chilean politics: He talks little, is unaffiliated, and is disdainful of ideology. He encourages comparisons to France's Charles de Gaulle, and Alessandri's view of his role is similar.

In a rare interview, Alessandri summed up the changes he plans for the free-swinging democracy: "A child who knows his father is strict has fewer bad habits."

He would reverse what he sees as an irresponsible shift leftward in this lonely civil state among South America's military regimes. He would be

80 at the end of another six-year term, and over half the 10 million people here are under 30. He senses a call for return to paternal discipline.

"The government party is stimulating these (leftist) ideas with a tolerance that creates fantasies among the people concerning the true possibilities of the country," he said.

"The Christian Democrats and the Marxist parties are in a competition in demogogy."

Competing with Alessandri for the presidency are Radomiro Tomic, candidate of the ruling Christian Democrats, and Salvador Allende, of the Marxist-dominated Popular Unity Front. Both are on the left in Chile's political lineup.

Although Alessandri is an independent, as he was during his presidency from 1958 to 1964, the conservative National Party is devoted to his cause.

While he concedes a role for parties, he feels it should be limited, along with the role of the congress. "The tasks of the parliament are to legislate and to oversee, but not to intervene in public administration."

The Chilean system provides great power for the president, but the congress intervenes wherever it can. Alessandri said one of his first

acts would be to legislate the right to dismiss any legislator who overstepped the lawmaking function.

In the likely event that the present congress failed to cooperate with him—the conservatives have the smallest bloc representation—Alessandri said that on being elected he would use a new law allowing a plebiscite. He would ask the people to vote out the present congress, and if they did not he would resign.

While polls and speculators give Alessandri a good chance of winning the largest plurality, few expect him to win a majority. If no one wins a majority the present congress will choose between the two front-runners.

The politicians that clog the halls of Santiago are at a loss to explain Alessandri's popularity. Despite his age, he has toured the country through most of its interminable length. "I had a formidable success in the north, which they say is leftist," he commented.

Asked to explain what appears to be a basic leftward movement here, he said:

"I cannot say if the country has changed or not because it lives in such great disorder... the government creating such organizations as popular

participation and agrarian reform for political proselytizing."

On the other hand, he said, many of the changes made under what current President Eduardo Frei has called the "revolution in liberty" were begun in the previous Alessandri administration.

"The spectrum in Chile is completely different (from that) in the United States," he said. "I would be on the extreme left in the United States. I am in favor of social legislation and of private enterprise under the control of the state." His competitors see no role for private enterprise.

Business interests and land owners and the influential Mercurio newspaper chain are supporting Alessandri. Even among these groups one encounters dismay with his performance in the early '60s, when inflation was even more rampant than at present.

The present inflation, he said, is caused by "the tremendous state spending and wage increases." He said he would cut wage increases and simultaneously end production-cutting strikes, a task that no Chilean president has carried out yet. His prescription: paternal strictness, as quoted above.

Chile's Father Figure

WASHINGTON POST
19 July 1970

Campaign In Chile Drifts Left

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Foreign Service
SANTIAGO—Chile is ap-

proaching another election which could vote a Marxist government into power, a novelty that six years ago focused international attention on this country and its persistent democracy.

Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei won the election six years ago. If he could run in the contest Sept. 4, he probably would win again. But whoever wins of the one conservative and two leftist candidates, one point is clear: Chile's leaders are moving steadily left, to the point that probably a majority of them seek socialism in some variation.

The election will show whether the 3.5 million voters in the 10 million population are following the leadership. In all likelihood the two leftists will together command a majority.

This is the lineup:

- Salvador Allende, 61, Marxist Socialist running for the fourth time after three defeats. Six uncongenial parties form a Popular Unity Front behind him, but by far dominant is the Communist, generally conceded to be the best-organized party here. In 1964, with a less ample coalition, Allende received 39 per cent of the vote.

- Radomiro Tomic, 56, former ambassador to Washington, chosen from the left wing of Frei's ever-splintering Christian Democratic Party. Tomic has pitched his campaign consistently to the left of Frei's "revolution in liberty" program. It more resembles the Allende approach. Frei won last time with an overwhelming 56 per cent.

Chile Shifts Left as Veteran Politicians

Vie for Presidency

- Jorge Alessandri, 74, independent conservative who preceded Frei in the presidency. The economic standstill under him was a major factor in the leftward turn of 1964, when the conservatives reluctantly voted for Frei to avoid Allende. There was no measurable conservative vote in '64 but the National party revived as Frei reforms took hold and left-wing political violence increased.

If No Majority

If none of the candidates wins a majority, the congress must choose between the two leaders when it meets Oct. 24. The result should be clear before then. The congress is not up for election. Presently it includes 45 backers of Alessandri, 75 Christian Democrats, and 80 members of Allende's front.

The combinations in a congressional vote could be limitless, and this is just the sort of political speculation that brings otherwise shabby Santiago alive as is not the case in other Latin American cities.

Campaigning actually started two years ago when Tomic resigned his ambassadorship to seek the party nomination. It is climaxing in a flood of paint that has slapped slogans on every adobe wall, scandals, outrageous charges in the press that is simultaneously free and bought, and a genuine concern about political violence.

For all its verbal violence, Chile has been as free of organized political intimidation as it has been of military takeovers. Now it has the former and is worried about the latter.

Three years ago some of the extreme leftist youth who barraged university classrooms with polemics, from Maoist to Castroist but never really Chilean, began to act out their calls for violent revolution.

They formed under the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR from its Spanish initials). They said violent revolution was necessary to defeat entrenched oligarchy and U.S. interests here, and they have robbed some banks and been caught in some rather elementary guerrilla schools.

Unlike Argentina and Brazil, where similar movements act underground against dictatorships, Chile is so easygoing that at first nobody paid much attention. The government seemed intent on avoiding the embarrassment of having to prosecute students.

The incidents have been few, and so probably are the MIR activists. People with friends on the fringe between the most leftist socialists and the MIR give estimates from 300 to 3,000.

Some MIR activists clearly seek to disrupt the election, but many must be inclined to help the Marxist parties in their strongest yet bid for the presidency, because the incidents have been few.

They have been enough to provoke a sharp reaction from the camp of Alessandri, who is running hard on the law-and-tranquility issue. The national police, widely respected on a continent becoming infamous for brutal law enforcement, have conflicted with demonstrating students and three deaths resulted recently.

Left Predicts Repression

This has provoked denunciation from the left, which predicts repression and a police-military coup should Allende win. Ricardo Lagos, a U.S.-trained economist and general secretary of the University of Chile, cites recent

entries into the campus by police as illegal and contributory to a growing disrespect for the country's once-sacred juridical system.

Lagos is socialist, elected to his post, and typical of a class of young Chileans dedicated to expansion and redistribution of the country's limited wealth.

He leads a university group leaving Monday for Cuba, underwritten by the University of Havana.

Another in the group of young and leftist leaders is Jacques Chonchol, who once ran Frei's agrarian reform. He quit the government when he felt the program was not allowed to move fast enough, and he took a left faction out of the Christian Democratic Party and into Allende's front.

Chonchol said he believes that should Allende win, Chile's multiparty electoral system will endure. It is not clear how many of Allende's backers desire, and his detractors are convinced that his election would be the last here.

Allende's constant references to Cuba as a model encourage this belief, although Cuba has become a rallying issue rather than a divisive one in the campaign. Alessandri, too, said he was in favor of the Chilean exports to the Communist country that constitute the first main break in the U.S.-backed economic boycott.

Even the arch-conservative big landowners are forming a mission to Havana, where they hope to sell their products at good prices.

Redressing Balance

Chile, as one diplomat put it, has tried under Frei to redress the balance between equality and liberty, and many of the results, while

beneficial for most Chileans, have inevitably been disturbing to the old order.

While the agrarian reform has put only one-fifth of the 100,000 promised families on lands that will be their own, at least 100,000 peasants now belong to unions—and to the money economy. Before Frei, virtually none did.

Education reform has resulted in so many new classrooms and teachers that the country probably now fulfills the old glib claims of literacy among over 80 per cent of the people.

Housing construction has been astonishing, closing a gap that is widening in every other South American country.

Bigger changes may have occurred in the minds of the citizenry. When Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes toured the province down at Chile's tip, on the Straits of Magellan, he spoke to some peasants on an agrarian reform farm about the possibility of industry coming to the zone.

A big peasant, one of the small minority in Chile clearly descendant in part from the original Indians, stood up to declare that the people wanted no industry unless they owned it.

"That would never have happened in the past," said Valdes with pride.

On the other hand, the Christian Democrats alienated many potential followers by their arrogance and tendency to take every advantage offered to cement themselves in power. As always in administration changes here, when they came in they took over several press organs. Papers here are many and varied, and all beholden to a party or ideological tendency—or if they switch sides, it is because they are up for sale weekly.

Financing of the campaign is a puzzle. Outlays for radio, TV and paint-bucket advertising run into

multiple millions. The Communists finance some costs by the profits gained through the industrial concerns owned by the party.

Capitalistic Communist

Indeed, the Chilean Communists are ever a paradox.

Enrique Kirberg, who is, rector of the state technical university, is a Communist Party member, a capitalist and a Zionist simultaneously. He owns an electrical firm and drives a Mercedes.

During the last six weeks, the Moscow circus, ballet and orchestra have turned up in Santiago, while during the whole of the non-election year of 1966, only the circus came by. Chile's Communists have been absolutely obedient to the Soviets, and the implied picture is of a party of flute players and clowns rather than pragmatic seekers of power.

The Bengal tigers with the circus, by the way, ate 200 pounds of prime beef daily in a country that for half the month does not allow itself beef because it is mostly imported.

By the anguished accounts of businessmen, the Christian Democrats have demanded heavy contributions to finance their propaganda. One kickback case, involving import of 400 Spanish Pegasus buses, threatened to splash into full scandal.

But on good authority it can be said that the matter was hushed up when \$100,000 of the \$450,000 payoff that was to have gone to the government party was diverted to Allende's campaign.

It stayed out of the papers, but not out of the cafes. The blemish is particularly telling since the Christian Democrats from start presented themselves as the clean party in Chile's often-stained politics.

In all this, charges of U.S. intervention have been fewer than usual. Lately, though, the leftist press has insisted that the CIA pays for a series of ads comprising the "campaign of terror," an effort to frighten voters away from violent Marxists.

The lack of anti-Americanism is due in part to Chile's having bought majority ownership in the big copper companies—the left would take over the rest—and the embassy's having shrunk from its former massive role under the exigencies of the Nixon low-profile doctrine.

It is no accident that the favored Chilean art is verbal. As one can learn completely only by reading all the dozen capital dailies, a great deal is said—if little done—on many issues every weekday.

Nothing happens from noon until 2, it must be added. That is the period of the siesta, a national habit that—like inflation—Frei vowed to eliminate. He lost those two revolutions to the stronger will to liberty.

The question now is whether liberty will survive. Many are betting that should Allende be elected, there will be much agitation but few fundamental changes. They simply doubt that he is capable of the effort necessary to change Chilean traditions.