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"Go On! What Did Mr. Trudeau Say When You Told Him What To Do With His 9 Million Tons of Wheat?"



What, Indeed? Never notorious for impeccable trade habits, the Soviets now have let their three-year wheat purchase agreement with Canada expire with some nine million tons left unpaid for and undelivered. (See attached news story.) Should the Soviets fail to meet the terms of the June 1966 contract (reportedly it had no stretchout clause), it may cost Canada between $200 million and $300 million. Neither party has publicly conceded default.

The Soviets don't really need wheat this year as they did in 1966 and there are two practical explanations for their foot-dragging: sharp internal Soviet competition for hard currency reserves, and the hope of getting a better deal while international wheat prices stay low. Soviet eagerness for Western business portends against outright default. Rather, the Soviets might try to pressure Canada into accepting soft currency credits, or even a barter arrangement, as part payment. Recall that it was just such soft currency deals that caused West Germany's Krupp industries to hover on the brink of disaster: Krupp became overextended in East Europe, especially in the USSR, and couldn't convert the repayments into hard currency at high enough prices.



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STATEMENT ON FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUGUST 21ST, 1969

THE TRAGEDY OF AUGUST 21ST, 1968 HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT :

A) THE SOVIET LEADERS REGARD NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF COUNTRIES GOVERNED BY COMMUNISTS AS BEING LIMITED, IN THEIR DOCTRINE THEY CLAIM THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, EVEN BY MILITARY MEANS.

B) AS LONG AS COMMUNIST PARTIES DEPEND IN A POLITICAL MORAL OR MATERIAL SENSE UPON ONE OF THE RIVAL INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CENTRES THEY ARE UNABLE TO PURSUE A TRULY INDEPENDENT NATIONAL POLICY.

BUT THE BRUTAL SUPRESSION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE A MORE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL POLICY AND A CERTAIN MITIGATION AND REFORM OF COMMUNIST DICTATORIAL RULE HAVE ALSO PROVEN THE INDOMITABLE ASPIRATION OF MAN TOWARDS LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE COMMUNIST CAMP.

THE COURSE OF POLITICAL EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST STATES AND PARTIES HAVE JUSTIFIED THE CORRECTNESS AND UNASSAILABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL AND OF ITS DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST MEMBER PARTIES.

THERE CAN BE NO SOCIALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY AND NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT FREEDOM.

BRUNO PITTERMANN
CHAIRMAN

HANS JANITSCHEK
GENERAL SECRETARY

Membership of the Socialist International 1951-69

The table below shows the Member Parties of the Socialist International and their status, as reported to the successive Congresses between 1951 and 1969.

Parties	1951	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1966	1969
Aden People's Socialist Party									OM	OM
Argentine Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Australian Labor Party									MP	MP
Austrian Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Belgian Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Progressive Labour Party of Bermuda										OM
British Labour Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Bulgarian Socialist Party in Exile	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Cameroons Socialist Party								MP*	MP*	
Radical Party of Chile										OM
National Liberation Party of Costa Rica									OM	OM
New Democratic Party of Canada[1]	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Czech Social Democratic Party in Exile	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Danish Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Dutch Party of Labour	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Esthonian Social Democratic Party in Exile				CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Finnish Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
French Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
German Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Greek Socialist League[2]	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM		
Hungarian Socialist Party in Exile	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Icelandic Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
All-India Praja Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Irish Labour Party										MP
Israel Labour Party[3]	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
International Jewish Labor Bund[4]	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
World Union of Socialist Zionists[5]	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Italian Socialist Party[6]	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
People's National Party of Jamaica		MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Japan Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Japan Socialist Party							MP	MP	MP	MP
United Socialist Party of Korea									OM	OM
Latvian Social Democratic Party in Exile				CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in Exile				CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Social Democratic Party of Madagascar								MP	MP	MP
Democratic Action Party of Malaysia										MP
Malayan Labour Party			CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	
Malta Labour Party				MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Mauritius Labour Party									CM	MP
Mauritius Social Democratic Party									CM	
New Zealand Labour Party		MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Norwegian Labour Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Revolutionary Febrerista Party of Paraguay									OM	OM
Latin American Revolutionary Popular Alliance APRA of Peru									OM	OM
Polish Socialist Party in Exile	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Romanian Social Democratic Party in Exile								CM	CM	CM
Saar Social Democratic Party[7]	MP	MP	MP	CM						
San Marino Independent Social Democratic Party							CM	CM	CM	CM
People's Action Party of Singapore									MP	MP
Spanish Socialist Labour Party in Exile	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Social Democratic Party of Suedtirol	MP	MP								
Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Swiss Social Democratic Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
Trieste Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP							
United States Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP
United States Social Democratic Federation	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM					
Uruguay Socialist Party	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP	MP				
Democratic Action Party of Venezuela									OM	OM*
Vietnam Socialist Party				CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM
Yugoslav Socialist Party in Exile	MP	MP	MP	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM	CM

KEY

MP = Member Party
CM = Consultative Member
OM = Observer Member
* = Party banned

NOTES

1 *Until 1961 member was Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, which then merged into the New Democratic Party of Canada*
2 *Member was Greek Socialist Party until 1953*
3 *Member was Mapai until January 1968, when Mapai, Ahdut Haavoda and Rafi merged to form the Israel Labour Party*
4 *International Jewish Bund until 1953*
5 *Formerly Zionist Socialist Parties*
6 *Member was Social Democratic Party until 1967, when unification with Socialist Party took place*
7 *Saar became part of the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1957, and Party merged with German Social Democratic Party*
8 *Membership in Venezuela currently suspended*

PRAVDA, Moscow
12 September 1969

"FISHERMEN'S RESERVES"

Fishing ships flying the Soviet flag can be encountered on near and distant seas and on the expanses of the World Ocean. Every year they catch many millions of tons of fish and products of the sea. Our fleet is constantly supplemented with modern ships. Fishing ports are being developed. The equipping of shipyards and other shore enterprises is improving.

In all the fishing basins there are crews that have a complete mastery of the technology of sea fishing and get good catches. The Murmansk refrigerator-ship trawler "Apatit," where the captain and director is Hero of Socialist Labor I. T. Shan'kov, upon returning from the first trip this year to the shores of Southwest Africa, delivered in its hold 43,400 centners of valuable fish output, with a plan of 35,700 centners for the first half-year. The crew obtained good economic indices and conserved fishing armament, fuel, and packaging materials. At the present time it is on a second trip and is also successfully coping with the assignment. There are many such examples. In the Norhtern, Western, and Far Eastern Basins, dozens of ship's crews have already completed their yearly assignments.

And yet the great reserves that the fishing industry has at its disposal have not been put into action everywhere. Some of the fishing ships operate at less than full workload. Too much time is spent in moves to new areas, stays at anchor in ports, and especially for the repair of the ships. Often the ships remain idle, engaging in no fishing operations, because of the poor organization of acceptance of fish by the floating bases [mother ships] and the transport refrigerator ships.

A very important tqsk of the managers of fishing organizations and ship's crews is the putting to an end of the unproductive idle time of the fleet, the increasing of the effectiveness of utilization of every trawler, refrigerator ship, every floating base. The proposals concerning the organization of the work of the fish-catching and fish-processing ships in a new manner are deserving of attention. At the present time the ships operate in uncoordinated way, are subordinate to different administrations, and sometimes the floating bases refuse to accept the fish that has been caught. In the Western Basin it has been decided, by way of an experiment, to assign a group of trawlers to a floating base, so that they can have a single trip plan and so that the responsibility for its fulfillment can be borne not only by the captains of the fishing ships, but also by the floating-base crew. That will make it possible to achieve a better maneuvering of the fishing fleet and the manpower, and will increase the self-interestedness of the crews in the fulfillment of the plans.

Soviet citizens are making increasing demands upon the variety of fish commodities. However, it is not always possible to purchase in the stores, for example, herring or other fish that is constantly in demand. That is why it is necessary to take all steps to increase the catch of the most valuable food fish, to furnish it to the customer primarily in processed form, and to deliver to the trade network more live and fresh fish and more smoked products. Workers in production and in trade have been called upon to study the purchasers' demands constantly. The advertising of fish commodities, especially new types of fish obtained from the ocean-going fleet and various other products of the sea, is in need of fundamental improvement.

A major source of supplying the public with a variety of tasty fish must continue to be found in our internal bodies of water -- rivers, lakes, ponds, reservoirs. For that purpose it is necessary to achieve a sharp increase in their productivity, to organize on a mass scale the artificial reproduction of valuable commercial fish, and to combat more actively the pollution of bodies of water. Unfortunately, new fishing areas, new pond and lake managements are planned and built slowly, and are poorly provided with material resources.

The economic reform is contributing to the increase in the effectiveness of production, and to the improvement in the variety and quality of fish output. Practice shoes that fishing ships and enterprises that operate in the new way make more complete utilization of their reserves and achieve higher economic indices. It is very important that new release prices be established for certain types of fish that are caught which were loss items for the branch. That will contribute to the production of output needxd by the public and will noticeably expand the opportunities of increasing the funds for the development of production and the providing of material incentives at the enterprises. The improvement of methods of planning and economic stimulation as applicable to the specific conditions of the branch is one of the vital tasks of the personnel in the fishing industry.

The present-day technical level of production of fish output demands the broad application of electronics, means of automation, the achievements of chemistry and other branches of science and technology. Much more will have to be done by our scientists, designers, machine builders, and instrument builders. For example, the processing of the caught fish is insufficiently mechanized. The Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances USSR has been called upon to show some concern for the mass production of equipment needed by the people in the fishing industry. The instrument builders are supposed to arm the fleet with improved searching apparatus, means of communication, and electronic navigation equipment.

For months the fishermen are out on the ocean, far from their beloved shores, far from their families, fishing during the summer and during the winter, often in complicated conditions. It is necessary to demonstrate the maximum amount of concern for their labor, their living conditions, their recreation. This includes everything -- the fishing gear, the providing for the cultural and everyday needs of the crews, the regular delivery of mail to the ships, the construction of housing for fishermen, and many other things.

The party organizations on the ships and at the enterprises have been called upon to improve persistently the mass political work among the personnel, to develop the creative initiative of the people, and to work in a well-directed manner to assure that each Communist serves as an example in labor and a pioneer in the competition for the increase of production of fish output and for the preterm fulfillment of the five-year plan.

During these days the people on the ships, at the enterprises, and at the fish farms , together with the entire nature, are serving a labor watch in honor of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, and have developed on a broad scale the struggle for the receiving of Lenin Jubilee Honorary Certificates and Jubilee Medals. The crews of 14 fishing ships in Kamchatskaya Oblast which have already completed the yearly plan have decided to give to the country an additional 140,000 centners of edible fish. Their example was followed by the leading crews of the Northern, Western, and other basins. Let us hope that the present year will be, for the fishermen, a year of great catches and new labor victories!

РЕЗЕРВЫ РЫБАКОВ

Рыболовные суда под советским флагом можно встретить в ближних и дальних морях, на просторах Мирового океана. Они ежегодно добывают многие миллионы тонн рыбы и продуктов моря. Наш флот пополняется современными судами. Развиваются рыбные порты. Улучшается оснащение судоремонтных заводов и других береговых предприятий.

Во всех промысловых бассейнах есть экипажи, которые в совершенстве овладели техникой морского рыболовства, берут большие уловы. Мурманский рефрижераторный траулер «Апатит», где капитаном-директором Герой Социалистического Труда И. Т. Шаньков, вернувшись из первого рейса этого года к берегам Юго-Западной Африки, доставил в своих трюмах 43,4 тысячи центнеров ценной рыбной продукции при плане первого полугодия в 35,7 тысячи центнеров. Экипаж добился хороших экономических показателей, сберег промысловое вооружение, топливо, тару. Сейчас он ушел во второй рейс и тоже успешно справляется с заданием. Таких примеров много. В Северном, Западном, Дальневосточном бассейнах десятки судовых коллективов уже завершили годовые задания.

И все же большие резервы, которыми располагает рыбная промышленность, приведены в действие не везде. Часть промысловых судов работает не с полной нагрузкой. Слишком много времени тратится на переходы, стоянки в портах и особенно на ремонт кораблей. Нередко суда простаивают на промысле из-за плохой организации приемки рыбы плавучими базами и транспортными рефрижераторами.

Важнейшая задача руководителей рыбохозяйственных организаций, экипажей судов — покончить с непроизводительными простоями флота, поднять эффективность использования каждого траулера, рефрижератора, каждой плавучей базы. Заслуживают внимания предложения об организации работы добывающих и обрабатывающих судов на промысле по-новому. Сейчас они действуют разрозненно, подчиняются разным управлениям, иногда плавбазы отказываются принимать добытую рыбу. В Западном бассейне решено в порядке эксперимента прикрепить группу траулеров к плавучей базе, чтобы они имели единый рейсовый план и за его выполнение несли ответственность не только капитаны рыболовных судов, но и коллектив базы. Это позволит лучше маневрировать добывающим флотом и людскими ресурсами, повысит заинтересованность экипажей в выполнении планов.

Советские люди предъявляют возрастающие требования к ассортименту рыбных товаров. Однако в магазинах не всегда можно купить, например, сельдь и другую рыбу, пользующуюся постоянным спросом. Вот почему следует всемерно увеличивать добычу наиболее ценной пищевой рыбы, давать ее потребителю преимущественно в обработанном виде, поставлять в торговлю больше живой и свежей рыбы, копченостей. Производственники и работники торговли призваны постоянно изучать спрос покупателей. В коренном улучшении нуждается реклама рыбных товаров, особенно новых видов рыб океанического промысла и различных продуктов моря.

Крупным источником снабжения населения разнообразной и вкусной рыбой могут и должны оставаться наши внутренние водоемы—реки, озера, пруды, водохранилища. Для этого нужно резко увеличить их продуктивность, в широких масштабах организовать искусственное воспроизводство ценных промысловых рыб, активнее бороться с загрязнением водоемов. К сожалению, новые рыбоводные объекты, прудовые и озерные хозяйства проектируются и строятся медленно, плохо обеспечиваются материальными ресурсами.

Экономическая реформа способствует повышению эффективности производства, улучшению ассортимента и качества

рыбной продукции. Практика показывает, что промысловые суда и предприятия работающие по новому, используют свои резервы, достигают более высоких экономических показателей. Очень важно, что на некоторые виды добываемой рыбы, которые были убыточны для отрасли, установлены новые отпускные цены. Это будет способствовать выпуску продукции, нужной населению, и заметно расширит возможности увеличения фондов развития производства и материального поощрения на предприятиях. Совершенствование методов планирования и экономического стимулирования применительно к конкретным условиям отрасли — одна из насущных задач коллективов рыбной промышленности.

Современный технический уровень производства рыбной продукции требует широкого применения электроники, средств автоматики, достижений химии и других отраслей науки и техники. Здесь еще немало предстоит сделать нашим ученым, конструкторам, машино- и приборостроителям. Например, недостаточно механизирована обработка добытой рыбы. Министерство машиностроения для легкой и пищевой промышленности и бытовых приборов СССР призвано позаботиться о массовом выпуске техники, необходимой промысловикам. Приборостроители должны вооружать флот совершенной поисковой аппаратурой, средствами связи и электронавигационным оборудованием.

Рыбаки месяцами находятся в океане, вдали от родных берегов. Летом в жару, зимой, нередко в сложной обстановке. Необходимо проявлять максимум заботы об их труде, быте, отдыхе. Это и снаряжение, и культурно-бытовое обслуживание экипажей, и регулярная доставка почты на суда, строительство жилья для рыбаков и многое другое.

Партийные организации судов и предприятий призваны настойчиво улучшать политико-массовую работу в коллективах, развивать творческую инициативу людей, целеустремленно работать над тем, чтобы каждый коммунист был примером в труде, застрельщиком соревнования за увеличение производства рыбной продукции, за досрочное выполнение пятилетки.

В эти дни коллективы судов, предприятий, рыболовецких колхозов вместе со всем народом несут трудовую вахту в честь 100-летия со дня рождения В. И. Ленина, развернули борьбу за получение Ленинских Юбилейных Почетных Грамот и Юбилейных медалей. Экипажи четырнадцати промысловых кораблей Камчатской области, уже завершившие годовой план, решили дать стране дополнительно 140 тысяч центнеров пищевой рыбы. Их примеру последовали передовые экипажи Северного, Западного и других бассейнов. Пусть же нынешний год будет для рыбаков годом больших уловов, новых трудовых побед!

NEW YORK TIMES,
September 29, 1969

CPYRGHT

ECONOMIC REFORM GAINS IN HUNGARY

Budapest Acts Cautiously to Try New Ideas

CPYRGHT

BUDAPEST (UPI)—While the reform movement in neighboring Czechoslovakia has been cut short in tragedy and confusion, the Hungarians now blaze the trail in Eastern Europe with fresh ideas and changes.

They do it quietly and cautiously, partly for fear of upsetting the Soviet Union and partly because they know that sweeping or premature reforms of the hated, top-heavy, Soviet-type economy might easily lead to massive unemployment, inflation and anarchy.

So that now, when stock is being taken of the changes begun in January, 1968, the most hopeful conclusion in Budapest is that moves for partial freeing of prices, greater responsibility given to enterprise managements and other innovations have at least not caused any violent dislocations while they have certainly given the economy a new psychological climate.

The gross national product—value of all goods and services—grew by 5 to 6 per cent in 1968, which was markedly less than in 1967 when the growth was 9 per cent. But this was exceptional: besides, the slower growth now can largely be explained by the more general introduction of a shorter working week.

Many Prices Freed

Something like one third of all items sold in shops and many other goods have seen their prices entirely freed from Government control. Other prices are determined by the interplay of supply and demand within set limits at both ends. Yet others have their ceilings fixed by the Government. The prices of a few items, notably essential raw materials, may always be laid down by central authorities.

In principle, it is now left to enterprise managers themselves to decide what they should produce, how much and where to sell it, at home or abroad. State-owned companies negotiate freely with each other for the supply of goods and their marketing, they hire and fire labor according to their requirements and operate by the profit motive.

This year, for the first time, wage levels are freely negotiable.

Increasingly, the national planning authorities will be left only with safeguarding broad indicators and developments, while resorting to credit policy, taxation and other "regulating instruments" rather than direct intervention.

Hungarians now feel that a large measure of economic stability can be maintained by such methods while individual and local initiative is being encouraged as greater responsibilities are afforded to enterprise managements and more rational incentives provided. Rezso Nyers, the father of the Hungarian reform—a basically self-educated man in his forties, known for his rugged common sense and pragmatism—has been given the green light for changes to continue and gather momentum.

Problem Is Huge

The achievements so far are necessarily small if measured against the magnitude of the task of revamping the entire economic structure, making sense of the price system, orientating industry along lines that are most profitable for Hungary and generally placing economic activity on a sound, self-paying footing. Officials and observers in Budapest reckon it might take as much as 10 or even 15 years to attain the broad aims of the new economic mechanism.

But no one can fail to be encouraged by so much, frankly spelled out, awareness of the need to revolutionize (or perhaps counter-revolutionize) the orthodox Communist pattern of Hungarian economy. That this is necessary in order that quality of production, productivity and standard of living can be raised, is plainy accepted by those who matter in Hungarian political circles.

One of the chief yardsticks for measuring the success of the reform must be the extent to which the crushing burden of Government subsidies paid out to uneconomic enterprise can be reduced. According to one source, this amounted last year to $3.5-billion. This was somewhat over the level in 1967, but the difference might have arisen because of new accounting methods.

[redacted]

October 1969

DATES WORTH NOTING

October 17-31	Budapest	7th Congress of (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions, the front that publicly protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year.... and has since avoided the issue. Coincides with anniversary of 1956 Hungarian Revolution (23 October - 4 November).
October 22-27	Sochi, USSR	Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (annual East-West meeting of scientists; locale changes).
October 31	Moscow	1961 -- Stalin's body removed from Lenin's tomb in Red Square and re-buried at inconspicuous place beside Kremlin Wall.
November 14-16	Venice	6th Congress of (Communist) International Federation of Resistance Movements. The FIR conducts anti-West German propaganda in the name of anti-Nazism and extols WW II role of the Red Army and Communist undergrounds. This year's meeting coincides with 30th anniversary of first year of WW II, which was period of Nazi-Soviet Pact.
November 17	Czechoslovakia	30th anniversary of closing down of all Czech institutions of higher learning by WW II Nazi occupation forces, following mass student demonstrations in Prague occasioned by death of a medical student Jan Opletal, killed during student protest against Nazi occupation. Nov. 17 is commemorated annually as International Student Day by the (Communist) International Union of Students which has its headquarters in Prague. Now, however, this Student Day ironically more likely recalls Jan Palach's self-immolation in Prague

		Jan Palach's self-immolation in Prague on January 16, 1969, protesting Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November 29	Albania	25th anniversary of seizure of power by Communist-led National Liberation Front, in wake of German withdrawal, 1944.
end November	Vienna	Conference on European Security and Cooperation sponsored by (Communist) World Council of Peace.

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October 1969

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(24 August - 26 September 1969)

I. Brezhnev Doctrine Embraces China

The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was originally launched in a Pravda article of 26 September 1968 as a doctrinal legitimization of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Speaking at the Polish Communist Party Congress in October 1968, Brezhnev himself confirmed this doctrine, which asserts the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in any way it deems necessary when it decides socialism is threatened in any country within the "socialist commonwealth." While the Soviets have claimed that this doctrine of "limited sovereignty" (in those terms) is an invention of their enemies, they have reiterated it in their own terms at discreet intervals up to the present. From the outset, the doctrine raised speculation not only in the free world, but among Communists, notably the Yugoslavs (quite openly) and the maverick Rumanians (somewhat more indirectly), as to whether the doctrine was supposed to apply to all Communist countries. Until now it strained plausibility to claim that the Soviets had in mind not only the East European Satellites, but also Communist China. But now the Soviets have made it clear that they do indeed embrace China under the protective custody of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

A Soviet journalist, Victor Louis, who among his various functions is also the Moscow correspondent of the London Evening News, wrote what would appear to be an ordinary news commentary for the Evening News of 16 September (full text attached). The article, in ostensibly raising questions as to the applicability of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Communist China, in actuality asserts that it is indeed applicable. What gives his assertion the weight of real authority is the fact that Louis has been widely known and labeled as an agent through whom the KGB, the Soviet secret police organization, has at times deliberately launched policy initiatives carrying the sanction of the Soviet government. For example, last year Louis visited Taiwan and was authorized to invite Nationalist Chinese newsmen to visit the Soviet Union. This move was universally interpreted as a Soviet step toward rapprochement with Nationalist China. Similarly, Louis' present pronouncement can be taken as a Soviet declaration that they arrogate to themselves the right to intervene in Communist China if they deem it necessary in the best interests of "international socialism."

The big question causing concern to all responsible outsiders is whether this inclusion of China might mean that the Soviets will actually act on the doctrine and attack the Chinese. Outsiders to the secret and mysterious realm of Communist inter-relations can only hope that this will not be the case and that the other cold-blooded possibilities outlined by Louis in his article (especially pre-emptive nuclear strikes against China) are nothing more than crude sabre-rattling. Even as a propaganda move, the article is

an unfortunate ploy and again raises the ever more frequently recurring question as to the diplomatic competence of the Soviet leadership. (As an incidental matter, it is surprising that the leading free world Communist parties do not take a stronger stand regarding the conflict, nor offer to mediate it as "honest brokers," and even stranger that they seem to make no effort to find out first hand what is really happening, for example by sending news reporters to the scene.)

How the Louis article fits in the Kosygin visit to Peking, with the aftermath of Ho Chi Minh's death, with the rumored illness of Mao, with the temporary suspension of Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda, and the reports of armed border incursions, and how these all affect the vital question of peace or war can only be speculated upon. Unfortunately, in the closed totalitarian societies represented by the Soviet Union and China, access even to ordinary facts and information is not a public right as it is in the non-Communist world.

II. The Brezhnev Doctrine in Yugoslavia

"In the assessment of present Soviet-Yugoslav relations, both sides stressed the significance which they attach to the principles contained in the 1955 Belgrade Declaration of the governments of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and as reaffirmed during the meeting of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the Soviet leaders in Moscow in 1956, documents which lay down the principles of respect for sovereignty, equality, and noninterference in internal affairs...."

This excerpt from the Soviet-Yugoslav communique resulting from the official visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Yugoslavia 2-6 September appears on the surface to be a concession on the part of the Soviets toward the Yugoslav point of view concerning the proper relations between Communist states. With the stress on "sovereignty, equality, and noninterference" and the absence of a reference to the "duty" of "international socialism" (the formula used to represent the Brezhnev Doctrine), the Yugoslavs won a <u>verbal</u> victory for their point of view over the Brezhnev Doctrine. Whether it was Soviet two-faced cynicism or a matter of substance is debatable, but it should be noted that, first of all, Gromyko was far from renouncing the Soviet doctrine and, secondly, he answered evasively to a pointed question during a press conference in Belgrade in which he was asked whether he regarded Yugoslavia as a part of the "socialist commonwealth" and therefore subject to the Brezhnev Doctrine. By way of answer, he chose to refer to an earlier speech of his in which Yugoslavia was treated separately from other socialist states but was not expressly excluded from the "commonwealth."

Other than this crucial point, the visit seems to have tried to repair the relations damaged by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This was accomplished more by negative moves such as stopping or softening the polemics, and avoiding mention of or taking positions on, issues on which they disagree (e.g. relative Yugoslav detachment from the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Yugoslav promotion of non-alignment, Yugoslav's friendly

relations with the West, etc.). A mutual effort was made to say cordial things about each other and to emphasize what they could of their common ideological platitudes, for example, their common hostility to capitalism, imperialism, the bourgeois enemy, etc. The Soviets hoped thereby to stop Yugoslav doctrinal provocations over the issue of Czechoslovakia and perhaps to enlist support on other international initiatives, while the Yugoslavs may be looking for advantages in trade relations, though keeping a wary eye on the limited sovereignty doctrine.

III. Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev Doctrine

The Brezhnev Doctrine had its origins in the Soviet suppression of "humane Communism" in Czechoslovakia under the now sidelined, former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP), Alexander Dubcek. Czechoslovakia's evolution since Dubcek's ouster and replacement by Gustav Husak last April is an example of the continuing application of the limited sovereignty concept. Dubcek was ousted and Husak installed under the direction of the Soviet Politburo, not by independent Czechoslovak action. The elaborate security and police precautions taken to keep commemoration of the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion under control were undertaken under the watchful supervision of the Soviets. The progressive elimination of all liberals in the party and in positions of public influence of any kind has also been Soviet-directed. The daily events in Czechoslovakia are a sad chronicle of this continuing denial of Czech sovereignty as well as of the basic freedoms of a people. That the main leaders of the 1968 experiment in "humane communism" (at least Dubcek and Josef Smrkovsky, if not Prime Minister Cernik) will suffer further denigration and punishment is not in doubt -- only what the nature of the denigration will be and when it is to take place. To observe the forms of legality, their fate will be made known after a Central Committee Plenum, though the decision, again, will have been made by the Soviets, with the announcement coming from their Czech puppets.

"WILL RUSSIAN ROCKETS CZECH MATE CHINA?"

by Victor Louis

Moscow--Some circles in Eastern Europe are asking why the doctrine that Russia was justified in interfering in Czechoslovakia's affairs a year ago should not be extended to China.

Events in the past year have confirmed that the Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries have the right to interfere in each other's affairs in their own interest or those of other who are threatened. The fact that China is many times larger than Czechoslovakia and might offer active resistance is, according to these Marxist theoreticians, no reason for not applying the doctrine. Whether or not the Soviet Union will dare to attack Lop Nor, China's nuclear centre, is a question of strategy, and so the world would only learn about it afterwards.

'Fraternal Help'

The bombardment of Sinkiang with broadcasts has been under way for months already. Soviet broadcasting time in the Uighur and Kazakh languages has increased considerably. The appearance on Chinese territory of underground radio stations criticising Mao indicates the degree the unification of anti-Mao forces within the country. It is quite possible that these forces could produce a leader who would ask other socialist countries for "fraternal help." It is not hard to continue to draw the analogy with events in Czechoslovakia, for China has its own Slovakia--Sinkiang. The main population of this province is Uighur and Kazakh, and these people have already tried to achieve autonomy three times in the past hundred years. The Slovaks have attained a good measure of autonomy since last summer.

Usually well-informed sources in Moscow were surprised at Western excitement over the Soviet plan to launch an air attack on Lop Nor. Nobody here has a shadow of doubt that Russian nuclear installations stand aimed at the Chinese nuclear facilities. The increasing number of border incidents and the way they are being handled show that the Soviet Union prefers using rockets to manpower. She has a variety of rockets to choose from, depending upon the terrain and other circumstances. For instance, in the case of a Chinese attempt to occupy an island, the whole surface of the island was burned together with any Chinese troops and equipment already ensconced there. National boundaries not marked by great rivers are more difficult to hold, but no doubt a scorched-earth policy will be pursued on Chinese territory each time there is an attack by a small group.

China's military growth has gone almost unnoticed. The detonation of the first Chinese atom bomb on October 16, 1964, coincided with the political explosions in the Kremlin as Khrushchev fell from power. Subsequent atomic tests were mentioned in the Soviet press, but at no great length. Here in Moscow there are no noticeable preparations for war with China. Many Russians are surprised how quickly the theoretical differences with their great neighbour (who is not called our junior brother any more) have developed into a serious threat. Russian readers have been prepared for a possible attack from Mao simply by the reprinting in the Soviet press of long quotations from the Chinese papers.

Tirades

There has been sufficient said to make any one here angry without additional explanation or editorial comment. Previously these tirades were only distributed to party members at party meetings, but now they are considered fit food for anyone's thoughts. Of course, there are still plenty of events going unreported here, which are nevertheless causing the military considerable concern.

It has been learned from Vietnam that the Chinese are withdrawing from the northern part of the country many of their advisers who have gained several years' experience fighting the Americans; they are being transferred to the Sino-Russian border.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1969

Controversial Soviet Newsman Hints Russians Might Launch Attack on China

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 17 — Victor Louis, the controversial Moscow correspondent of The London Evening News, has strongly hinted that the Soviet Union might make a surprise attack on China.

In a dispatch by Mr. Louis, a Soviet citizen believed to have close connections with the Soviet secret police, the suggestion was advanced that whether or not the Russians attacked the Chinese nuclear test site Lop Nor in Sinkiang was only "a question of strategy."

Mr. Louis' dispatch said:

"Some circles in Eastern Europe are asking why the doctrine that Russia was justified in interfering in Czechoslovakia's affairs a year ago should not be extended to China. Events in the past year have confirmed that the Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries have the right to interfere in each other's affairs in their own interest or those of others who are threatened.

"The fact that China is many times larger than Czechoslovakia and might offer active resistance is, according to these Marxist theoreticians, no reason for not applying the doctrine. Whether or not the Soviet Union will dare to attack Lop Nor, China's nuclear center, is a question of strategy, and so the world would only learn about it afterwards.

"The appearance on Chinese territory of underground radio stations criticizing Mao indicates the degree of unification of anti-Mao forces within the country. It is quite possible that these forces could produce a leader who would ask other socialist countries for 'fraternal help.'"

Mr. Louis said it was a common assumption among well-informed sources in Moscow that Soviet nuclear weapons were aimed at Chinese nuclear facilities.

The increasing number of border incidents and the way they are being handled, Mr. Louis said, shows that the Russians prefer using rockets to manpower.

For example, he said, whom the Chinese attempted to occupy an island, "the whole surface of the island was burned together with any Chinese troops and equipment there."

A War of Nerves

By HARRISON SALISBURY

Victor Louis' suggestion that the Soviet Union may carry out a sneak attack on China's nuclear facilities appears to be part of a broadening war of nerves by Moscow against Peking.

Mr. Louis has in the past carried out special tasks in the field of foreign propaganda, apparently at the behest of the Soviet K.G.B., or secret police, or the Soviet foreign office, or both.

His dispatch echoed a circular letter that was distributed to foreign Communist parties and Eastern European Communist governments shortly before Sept. 1 in which Moscow raised the question of a possible pre-emptive strike against China.

Whether Moscow seriously contemplates an attack or is seeking to bring pressure on China by such a threat cannot easily be determined, but the Chinese have reacted as though the threat is genuine.

Brezhnev, Thesis Recalled

Mr. Louis's dispatch put the pre-emptive attack into the ideological framework of the thesis advanced by the Soviet party Secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, at the time of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia when he proclaimed the right of "socialist countries" to intervene in each other's internal affairs.

The doctrine of intervention has been castigated by Peking, which has warned all Communist countries that the doctrine means that Moscow has arrogated to itslf the right to intervene in any country in any manner it desires.

Mr. Louis's reference to a possible attack on Lob Nor and his statement that the "world would only learn about it afterwards" coincided with the Soviet circular letter's suggestion of a sudden attack on Chinese facilities.

Mr. Louis's report of underground anti-Mao radio stations in China is not borne out by other sources. Independent observers believe the stations are situated on Soviet territory and are part of the general war of the airwaves being carried out along the Soviet-Chinese frontier.

His suggestion of a "leader" arising in China who would reequiest Soviet intervention matched what the Russians thought would happen in Czechoslovakia — but didn't. There has been no sign that any pro-Russian Chinese opposition to Mao Tse-tung exists or is likely to rise.

It is not known if the dispatch by Mr. Louis, who last week was the first to report the visit of Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin to Peking, reflects actual discussions in Moscow of military moves. But it seems certain that the Soviet Union wishes to convince Peking of the genuine possibility of a sudden strike. The Russians presumably hope to compel the Chinese to enter into meaningful discussions of Chinese-Soviet differences, with the implicit threat that the alternative is nuclear war.

Meeting With Chou Shown

MOSCOW, Sept. 17 (Reuters) — Moscow television tonight showed the meeting between Premier Kosygin and the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking last Thursday.

The film showed the Soviet Premier walking across the runway at Peking airport toward Mr. Chou. The two men and their aides shook hands briefly, with slight smiles. The next sequence showed the two sitting side by side in a bare room, apparently in the airport building.

The final sequence showed Kosygin and Mr. Chou shaking hands again just before the Soviet Premier's departure. But this time the two men used both hands to grip each other's arm and pumped their hands up and down enthusiastically for several seconds.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 September 1969

Kremlin reviews China policy

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

It is a common assumption in Moscow that "Soviet nuclear rockets are pointed at Chinese nuclear installations," Soviet journalist Victor Louis wrote Sept. 17 in the London Evening News, six days after Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's talks with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai during a brief surprise visit to Peking.

"There is no doubt that the tactic of scorched earth will be applied to Chinese territory whenever there is an attack by a small Chinese group," Mr. Louis continued.

Timing evaluated

"The Soviet Union has a whole gamut of rockets adapted to the terrain and to circumstance. Thus when the Chinese sought to occupy an island [Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River], the whole surface of the island was burned together with any Chinese troops and equipment there."

Mr. Louis's disclosures are disturbing for several reasons: for what they tell about the fighting on Chenpao Island in March; for their timing, coming so shortly after Mr. Kosygin's efforts to reduce tensions between Moscow and Peking ... Middle East,

because of the identity of the author whose close connections with high Soviet agencies are public knowledge.

No ordinary Soviet journalist, the mysterious Mr. Louis has repeatedly been entrusted with important unofficial missions. Earlier this year he twice visited Taiwan and had a long conversation with Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, the son and heir apparent of President Chiang Kai-shek.

When Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, came to the United States with the intention of publishing her first book "Twenty Letters to a Friend," Mr. Louis scurried from one Western capital to another offering publishers what was supposed to be the original version of Mrs. Alliluyeva's manuscript, which the Soviet security police had seized in her apartment.

First report of meeting

It is generally assumed that Mr. Louis's principal is the powerful security police or KGB. The fact that he was the first to report Mr. Kosygin's airport conference with Premier Chou in Peking shows that he has exceptional sources of information.

What Mr. Louis has written about the application of scorched-earth tactics — possibly even nuclear—on Chenpao Island had hitherto never been reported with such precision. On March 21, Moscow Radio called reports about Soviet nuclear action against Communist China "a provocative false rumor."

Another angle brought up in Mr. Louis's recent article was his contention with regard to China that "the Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries have the right to interfere in each other's affairs."

Moscow hitherto has denied the existence of a "Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty" or the possibility that what allegedly was good for Czechoslovakia also would be good for Communist China.

The Soviet attitude has wavered in this respect. As early as March, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev stated that the Brezhnev doctrine could be invoked to sanction intervention in China under the Warsaw Pact. This statement, made in an interview given to the official Austrian press agency, later was denied in Sophia and Moscow.

Toward the end of August the Soviet Central Committee is reliably reported to have addressed a circular letter to foreign Communist parties raising the question of a possible preemptive strike against China.

Mr. Louis's article in the London Evening News was the first unofficial Soviet airing of this view in the Western press.

One asks why Moscow should have launched Mr. Louis's threatening article at a time when the Soviet press has turned down attacks against Peking. The possibility that Mr. Louis as a private individual should have published this article on his own initiative is ruled out by all observers.

Negative element introduced

Even if his article reached the Evening News before Mr. Kosygin's surprise visit to Peking, its publication could have been stopped.

As matters stand today, Mr. Louis's article has introduced a new negative element into the Sino-Soviet discussion. A newsreel of Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Chou taking leave showed that the two men had come closer to each other's views. The Chinese press and radio no longer refer to the "renegade Brezhnev-Kosygin clique." Mr. Kosygin's name has ceased to be a matter of abuse. Only "Brezhnev & Co." are supposed to be the villains.

Differences hinted

Some "sources" in Moscow seem to have admitted that the Sino-Soviet dispute could be solved and that the border revisions demanded by Peking actually cover only about 40,000 square miles. The more-than-a-million square miles which, Peking says, were ceded to Russia in the past century as a result of "unequal treaties" now are said to have been a political argument and not a formal revendication.

The only valid explanation for the publication of Mr. Louis's article at this particular time seems to be that differences regarding policy toward China continue to exist among the Soviet leaders.

Mr. Louis's presumed principal, the KBG, headed by alternate Politburo member Yuri V. Andropov, is subordinate to General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev rather than to Premier Kosygin. It also is possible that members of the military high command would like to exert pressure on China.

WASHINGTON POST
22 September 1969

Marquis Childs

Moscow Propaganda Masks Status of Sino-Soviet Feud

I CANNOT forecast to you the action of Russia, Winston Churchill said in one of the darkest hours shortly after the outbreak of World War II. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

Even for those most directly concerned with intelligence reports from around the globe the riddle in the mystery inside an enigma is nearly as great in 1969 as it was in 1939. And there has been added the Chinese puzzle. The two are linked together in obscurity, putting in uncertain balance the fate of perhaps a third of the world's people.

Ever since the meeting of Alexei Kosygin and Chou En-Lai in the airport at Pe-

king — the Soviet premier and China's foreign minister —that brief glimpse of the murk, the intelligence specialists have spent hundreds of hours analyzing the meager evidence available. What they (have come up with is, in part,) conjecture, informed theory. For what it is worth, and the specialists frankly acknowledge its limitations, here is their scenario.

The meeting was sought by Kosygin. He acted partly in response to the urgent pleas of the heirs of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. At Ho's funeral they had put the greatest stress on the need to heal the breach between the two Communist giants. The Moscow-Peking feud was a serious obstacle to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. Moreover, it was splitting the Communist camp into two hostile factions.

WHAT MORE impressive tribute to the memory of Ho and his leadership than to make his death the occasion of a peace pact? This was the impassioned petition to both Kosygin and Chou, even as the thousands of Vietnamese filed past the bier of the dead leader. Kosygin went far out of his way for the Peking meeting, and the order promptly went out in Moscow for a downhold on anti-China propaganda.

The Kremlin doubtless had few illusions that a single meeting could put a period to a quarrel so bitter and deep-seated. A second motive had perhaps even more to do with the Soviet premier's readiness to ask for a confrontation and to sit down in a bleak room in Peking's bleak airport with Chou. He was out to demonstrate the Kremlin's determination to walk the last mile in an attempt to end the feud. That will be Moscow's argument with doubting neutrals, such as the Roumanians when the quarrel heats up again.

While Moscow temporarily shout down the propaganda valve, anti-Russian vituperation out of Peking continues almost unabated. How then are the chances of war between the giants appraised when war is defined as the movement of divisions across the border in a pre-emptive strike against China's nuclear installations in Sinkiang?

The odds are somewhere between 45-55 to 40-60 against a war in those terms. The bush fighting along the 3,000-mile border will bring furious outcries from both sides. That will be about the extent of it.

To this, however, an important qualifier is added. China's nuclear-missile program has had setbacks. Yet the time is not far distant —a year and a half to two and a half years — when, with missiles and deliverable warheads, Peking can inflict substantial damage on the Soviet Union. Is it logical to expect, therefore, that Moscow will sit back as the sands in that sinister hourglass run out?

IT IS HERE that the murky light closes down and the mystery deepens. The questions have no hard answers as, for example: Why should it have been only six to nine months ago that the order went out from Moscow to Soviet ambassadors around the world to spread the word of China's threat to peace? At any time during the past five years this alarm might have been sounded.

The diplomatic campaign produced strange and sometimes almost comic results. Not long before Charles de Gaulle stepped down, the Soviet ambassador to France, Valerian Zorin, asked to call on the president to give him a message of the highest importance. The astonished de Gaulle found himself listening to Zorin read a lengthy paper on the menace of China.

Over the years the Soviets have perfected the technique of blowing hot and cold, spreading directly contrary reports at various levels to create as much confusion as possible. They have done this on the quarrel with China, one set of whisperers playing down the feud with the word that the border skirmishes have been greatly exaggerated and the thought of full-scale war absurd. At the other extreme come hints that a preemptive nuclear strike cannot be ruled out. The mysterious Victor Louis, allegedly a journalist with wide official access in Eastern Europe, is the latest to put out this hint.

This might be no more than a guessing game to help intelligence officers pass the time if it did not have such an awesome bearing on the destiny not only of the Chinese and the Soviet peoples, but of all mankind. Whether China is such a profound concern that Moscow cannot enter into serious arms limitation talks is just one aspect of the puzzle that is rather more than a guessing game.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 September 1969

Sino-Soviet Tensions

The sharp escalation of the anti-Chinese propaganda campaign in the Soviet press is bound to heighten world fear of a Moscow-Peking conflict. It seems incredible that the Kremlin can be seriously considering a preventive war against China or even an aerial strike at Chinese nuclear facilities. Yet little more than a year ago it seemed equally incredible that Soviet troops would invade Czechoslovakia. It required only a few months advance indoctrination to make most Soviet citizens accept the "necessity" of "saving" Czechoslovakia; the "Hate China" indoctrination has gone on for almost a decade.

Whatever Brezhnev & Co. may intend, much recent Soviet comment on China has implied that Mao is a paper tiger who could be defeated easily if the need arose. Soviet readers have been presented a picture of a chaotic China in the grip of virtual civil war. Most pointedly, perhaps, the new commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces, rocket specialist Gen. V. F. Tolubko, has recently recalled the Soviet-Chinese border miniwar in 1929. He stressed how easily relatively small Soviet forces were able on that occasion to defeat numerically superior opponents and occupy Manchuria.

More sober minds in the Kremlin must see the monumental loopholes in the hawkish case for preventive war. Whatever the divisions and rifts in Chinese society now, a Soviet attack would almost certainly end them and reunify China's Han majority behind Mao. It is difficult to believe that Mao would not seek to deliver atomic or hydrogen bombs against Soviet cities if his country were the victim of aggression from Moscow. And advancing Soviet troops would run the danger of bogging down in a morass of guerrilla opposition on a scale that would dwarf the United States problems in Vietnam.

These counterarguments cannot be considered decisive, however, because the present Kremlin leadership has repeatedly shown itself addicted to expensive blunders. That leadership bears a heavy responsibility for setting in train the events that produced the short-lived Middle East war of June 1967 with its great cost in Soviet prestige and in Soviet weapons captured by the Israelis.

And last year's invasion of Czechoslovakia proved, above all, how insensitive the present Politboro majority is to the great force of contemporary nationalism. A decision to strike at China would be the most disastrous miscalculation of all, yet, tragically, there can be no guarantee this decision will not be taken.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 August 1969

The Complex Question of Who's Provoking Whom

HONG KONG—"Who knows," a professional China-watcher observed here last week, "there may be no real fighting at all on the Sino-Soviet border. After all, the only thing we have to go on are statements from two governments that lie regularly as a matter of state policy."

The remark underscores the difficulty of assessing responsibility for the clashes that have been occurring this year between Soviet and Chinese Communist forces along the 4,200-mile China-Russia frontier. No third party has seen any of the fighting. The only guidelines outside observers have are claims from Peking and Moscow. Each side charges the other with intrusions, provocations and attacks.

Some fighting there has undoubtedly been. Pictures showing battle sites, dead and wounded are convincing enough for this to be accepted. But deciding which side has taken the initiative must, perforce, depend on circumstantial evidence. On this basis a scenario unfolds roughly as follows.

In long-range, over-all terms the Russians have very likely been acting more aggressively along the frontier than the Chinese. They are far more powerful. They not only have vast nuclear superiority but also much stronger conventional air, ground and naval forces than the Chinese. And a substantial portion of their military potential has by now been advantageously deployed around China's borders. They are thus in a position to take risks, knowing if a showdown occurs the odds are on their side.

No Encroachments

It would be in keeping with behavior the Russians have shown in similar circumstances elsewhere for them to be tough and combative toward the Chinese, regularly making their strength known and felt and showing their intention to tolerate no Chinese encroachments.

It would, on the other hand, be out of character with the prudent way the Chinese Communists have handled their foreign relations, when war or peace with a major power has been involved, for them to provoke the Russians unduly. The Chinese well know that among Soviet leaders there are individuals who would relish justification for military action against China that would humble Mao Tse-tung and smash Chinese nuclear installations. Peking would logically be careful not to provoke such a justification.

This posture, however, would not rule out the Chinese striking back at Russian aggravations and showing by occasional minor thrusts and forays they are ready to fight if pushed too far.

In conformity with their basic posture the Chinese do not appear to have greatly reinforced their Soviet frontier areas. They have fleshed out understrength border units and constructed new defense works, and there were reports this weekend of some new troop movements north, from areas as far south as Canton. But the Chinese deployments do not indicate preparations for attack. Their preparations, on the contrary, fit the Maoist concept of a defensive people's war. The enemy would not be met head on but be sucked in and enveloped by mobile military contingents and the population in general. In readiness for such a strategy, hundreds of thousands of civilian construction corpsmen capable of toting guns and serving as guerrillas have been sent in the last year to Soviet frontier regions.

From the evidence it appears likely it was a Chinese attack that started the fighting at Chenpao (Damansky to the Russians) Island last March 2, seemingly in reaction to a long period of harassment in the area from the Soviets. And following the initial attack, indications are that a Russian "teach-them-a-lesson" counterattack was responsible for the second Chanpao battle.

In the case of the subsequent incidents immediately publicized from Peking and Moscow—one on June 10 on the border between Soviet Kazakhstan and Yumin *hsien* (county) in Sinkiang and the Aug. 13 clash in the same general area—the circumstances suggest Russian initiatives.

Russians Strong

The Russians are particularly strong in the area of these outbreaks, with ample ground, air and rocket forces available and a branch railway running from the Alma Ata line to the Sinkiang border at Druzhba. In this region, distant from their main centers of power, the Chinese are not only militarily weak and lacking a railway link but also politically shaky because of the predominantly Moslem minority composition of the population in Sinkiang.

The fact that the Chinese charge the Russians with moving boundary markers on the Yumin border some time before the Aug. 13 attack would suggest that a local Soviet commander might have taken it upon himself to improve his positions by eliminating a Chinese salient jutting into his area. The commander may have been ready and hit back sharply when Chinese patrols moved in to probe the situation. Reports of relatively heavy Chinese casualties — about 30 killed and 30 wounded, compared with two Russians killed and seven wounded—are indicative of Russian preparedness and superiority in the area.

Besides the major border clashes that have been promptly publicized and made the subject of protest notes by both Peking and Moscow, the Chinese Communists have charged the Russians with almost daily incursions on the ground and in border rivers and frequent reconnoitering aircraft intrusions into Chinese air space. The Russians from time to time throw a similar but somewhat less formidable package of charges against the Chinese.

The Chinese are doubtless not innocent of provocations, but the weight of evidence points to more Russian pressure than Chinese as regards these lesser displays of aggressiveness.

As motivation for their tactics, some observers here believe, the Russians may indeed be preparing for at least a limited attack on Communist China, possibly with a view to destroying nuclear installations and overturning the Mao Tse-tung regime.

For their part, the Chinese seem bent on protecting themselves while keeping anti-Soviet tensions at a high level for domestic political purposes. Mr. Mao's whole campaign against his opponents has been pitched in terms of charges that they favor Russia and Russian-type Communism, and so the more he can depict the U.S.S.R. as an evil, potential aggressor against China the easier it is to smear his rivals.

—TILLMAN DURDIN

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 September 1969

Sino-Soviet war aim minimized

By William C. Selover

Washington

The Soviet Union and Communist China are deadly serious in their tit-for-tat border skirmishes in Central Asia, but highly informed sources here don't believe either side intends all-out war.

Nor does the best intelligence here indicate that the Soviets have any intention of launching so-called "surgical strikes" against China's nuclear bases.

[Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin conferred with Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai in Peking Thursday, Radio Moscow reported, according to the Associated Press.]

[The Russian-language broadcast, monitored here, said the meeting was arranged under mutual agreement and both leaders exchanged frank views on their respective positions.

[The broadcast said the meeting was constructive but did not disclose details.]

Nobody is willing to make flat predictions about the future course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, for little really is known about intentions in this area.

But there is fairly general agreement among experts in this capital that:

- Both sides operate on the basis of rational judgments, each carefully considering the consequences of its own actions.
- They avoid making decisions based on immediate emotional responses.
- They will probably continue rubbing against each other across 4,000 miles of Central Asian borders, but the conflict is not likely to expand beyond that.
- China is not expected to attack the Soviet Union in an all-out offensive, nor is the Soviet Union likely to initiate such attacks on China.

But anyone listening to the shouting that is going on between the two giants these days is sure to get just the opposite impression. The funeral of Ho Chi Minh afforded a clear example of the apparent gulf that has opened between them. High-level Chinese and Soviet delegations managed to sidestep each other during the days of mourning for the Vietnamese leader.

The Soviets now are accusing the Chinese of having launched some 488 border violations along the Sino-Soviet border in the past two months. They assert that this threatens an expansionist war against the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Chinese leaders are telling their population to expect an "inevitable" attack by the Soviet Union against China's nuclear capability.

The Chinese and the Soviets are dealing from the same premise: Each will take no nonsense from the other. This will inevitably produce the kinds of skirmishes and conflicts seen earlier this year.

Experts imagine the Chinese, facing the Soviets, saying to themselves: "When one is faced by a wild beast one must not show any fear."

And the Soviets, facing the Chinese: "We must deal [illegible]"

So the border skirmishes are expected to continue at more or less the same pace, with each side responding in much the same way.

While little is known here about the precise nature of every skirmish that has taken place so far, enough is known to show that neither side is wholly to blame for all of them.

The early-March Chinese ambush, for example, may have been a response to a series of Soviet probes. In mid-March, the Soviets launched a counterthrust. In May, June, and August, the same pattern was repeated.

Both sides could legitimately believe they are right. And, in fact, there are some genuine differences on a border claim, where the frontier shifts with the river as it changes course.

The Sino-Soviet split originally resulted from ideological differences.

These differences intensified from 1956 on through the Khrushchev era, when national interests on each side became paramount.

Recently, experts note, Moscow radio has for the first time urged the Chinese military to turn their arms on their leaders. Ideology didn't enter the argument.

The United States Government believes it is in the best interests of world peace that the Sino-Soviet conflict be contained.

One way American officials believe the U.S. can help is by keeping "hands off," by not giving the appearance of coming to the defense of one side or the other.

Other than that, Washington's hands are virtually tied. Any attempt to take advantage of the situation, officials here agree, would more than likely backfire.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is continuing to press the Soviets for a date to discuss disarmament and to offer small, kind gestures to the Chinese to show them Washington is sincere in wanting to keep out of the squabble.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 August 1969

SOVIET SAYS A WAR WITH THE CHINESE WOULD PERIL ALL

Pravda Editorial Warns It Would Inevitably Involve Use of Atomic Weapons

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 28—The Soviet Union suggested today that a war with Communist China would inevitably involve the use of nuclear weapons and "would not spare a single continent."

A long editorial in Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, was one of the most open efforts by the Soviet Union to gain support for its oft-stated assertion that the Chinese leaders are pursuing a reckless course that endangers not only the Soviet Union but the world.

The editorial appeared aimed at enlarging the Chinese-Soviet dispute from an intra-Communist affair into something that should concern other nations as well.

[In Washington, the State Department discounted reports that the Soviet Union might launch a preventive air strike against Chinese nuclear installations.]

Diplomatic Effort Seen

Some Western diplomats believe that Soviet diplomats may again raise the Chinese issue in various foreign offices as they did last March after the clashes on the Ussuri River. The Western diplomats say they would not be surprised if Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko raised the matter in the United Nations General Assembly when it meets next month.

"The adventurism of the Peking leaders, the atmosphere of war hysteria they are fanning, complicate the entire international situation," Pravda said.

"The use of threats, blackmail and provocations in rela-

tions with the socialist and developing countries, increasing international tensions, making advances to the forces of imperialist reaction, making calls not for peace but for war—all this causes the legitimate anxiety of many peoples and states," it said.

"The military arsenals of the Maoists are filling up with all the latest weapons," Pravda said. "And a war, should it break out in present-day conditions, what with the existing weapons and lethal armaments and modern means of delivery, would not spare a single continent."

Pravda said that Communists and "progressive world opinion" had condemned Peking's course.

"Incidentally," it added, "the more sober-minded representatives of the ruling circles of the capitalist countries also express great concern over the menace to the maintenance of general peace with which the policy of the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic is fraught."

Much of the contents of the editorial had been stated earlier by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the party leader, at the world meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in June and repeated in party and Government declarations.

The additional stress on China's militant policies may cause some apprehension among Soviet readers who are already conscious of the possibility of war as a result of the periodic border clashes. Just yesterday a Soviet weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta, printed a letter from a Chinese youth that said military fortifications were being built in Manchuria "for war with the Soviet Union."

The Pravda editorial again stressed the desire of the Soviet Union to preserve the peace and the ability of the Soviet armed forces to defend the homeland.

"The Soviet Union has never intended to aggravate relations with the Chinese People's Republic," the editorial said. "The situation that has now developed corresponds to the vital interests of neither the Soviet nor the Chinese peoples, the history of whose relations is characterized by close ties and friendship."

Normal Ties Sought

Pravda repeated a former Soviet assertion that "given goodwill, the necessary conditions can and must be insured to guarantee normal relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's republic." Soviet suggestions for talks with the Chinese leaders were recounted.

But the Pravda editorial again warned that "any attempts to speak with the Soviet Union in the language of arms, to encroach on the interests of the Soviet people, which is building Communism, will meet with a firm rebuff."

In analyzing the cause of the friction, Pravda said that Peking was pursuing its "reckless, adventurist policy" to distract the Chinese people from severe internal problems.

"There are many testimonies pointing to the fact that the Chinese leaders are undertaking these actions in an attempt to see a way out of the political and economic blind alley into which they have led the country," Pravda said.

"The policy of the Great Leap and its failure, the destruction of the party, of the organs of people's power, and the establishment of a terrorist military bureaucratic regime of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage in the course of the so-called Cultural Revolution have created in China an atmosphere of political crisis and inflicted great damage to the country's economy."

The party newspaper said again that a "war psychosis" was being created in China and that the population was being alerted for possible nuclear war. On the other hand, it reassured the Soviet people that "there is a great distance between the schemes of the Maoists, their noisy threats addressed to the Soviet Union, and the real possibility of realizing them."

The border clashes, Pravda said, are part of the chain of "hostile actions by the Peking leadership which does not cease its absurd territorial claims on the Soviet Union."

"It deliberately continues to create tension in various sections of the Chinese-Soviet border, engineering the intrusion of armed groups into Soviet territory and creating dangerous situations."

Pravda repeated offers to negotiate differences with the Chinese but stated again that Moscow "has flatly rejected the territorial claims of the Chinese People's Republic."

BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1969

Russia Said To Ask Raid Reaction

Reportedly Considers Attack On Peking's Atom Facilities

By PAUL W. WARD
[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Aug. 27—Reports indicating that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime at Moscow is considering trying to bomb Communist China's atomic installations out of existence are beginning to be taken seriously in the international community of diplomats here.

Chief among them are intelligence reports that Soviet Communist party leaders have been taking soundings on the subject among their opposite numbers in both Eastern and Western Europe.

Contributing also to the sober turn in the speculation here are intelligence reports to the effect that the Soviet Union has doubled its forces along its China border; that they now total about 30 divisions (nearly 500,000 men) as against 15 divisions four years ago, and that they include mobile missile launchers.

State Department officials, citing conflicts in the reports about Soviet soundings of other Communist parties, continue to profess about them a skepticism which also colored a statement William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, made a week ago.

Addressing a group of students winding up their summer employment as "executive interns," Mr. Rogers was asked: "What do you people feel the chances are that the Soviet Union will use a nuclear strike against China."

"I think the best judgment is that probably it will not do so," Mr. Rogers answered.

He added, "The Russians would be faced with a very serious problem because, although if they made a strike against Communist China they could take over a good segment of that area up near Peking—they probably could even take over Peking—but then they would become involved in a land war with 800,000,000 Chinese.

"That would be a very difficult thing for them to handle, and I think they are quite aware of that, even though they have moved military equipment up toward the Chinese border."

Mr. Rogers went on to volunteer a commentary on the possibilities of Peking initiating a Sino-Soviet war.

"The Chinese Communists, I think, realize that they are not really able militarily to cope with the Soviet Union; so we rather doubt that they would initiate a major attack," Mr. Rogers said.

"Very Permanent"

Then, referring to the more than 430 Sino-Soviet border clashes that Peking claims have occurred this year and blames on Moscow, including the latest one on August 13, Mr. Rogers added:

"Our best judgment is that the border clashes and incidents probably will continue to recur. We are convinced the hostility between the two is very deep and very permanent. We are quite conscious, though, of the fact that these border incidents always can flare up into something neither side really intends,

NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1969

and I must say our position as a government is that we hope that doesn't happen."

"There are some people," he continued," who argue, 'Well, it would be a good thing for the United States to let the Soviet Union and Communist China engage in a fairly sizable war. We don't think so. We think warfare anywhere is harmful to the total world community, and we think this kind of war would be injurious to all people, and we hope it doesn't occur."

Other members of Washington's international community privy to the intelligence reports about Moscow's soundings said the reports came first from Italy, then West Germany, and in rapid order thereafter from East European countries.

Three Categories

Speaking of conflicts among the reports, they divided them into three categories, the first consisting of reports that Soviet leaders, as hosts in June to an international conference of Communist parties at Moscow, had merely lectured their guests about "the great threat from China."

The second category comprised reports that the Russians had warned the leaders of just some countries' Communist parties that Peking might escalate the border situation and general hostility to a point where the Russians might have to take military action.

To the third category, the reports' collators assigned those they called the "most extreme" —meaning, they explained, reports that Moscow has been telling its Warsaw Pact allies that the Soviet Air Force might have to "take out" Communist China's nuclear arms installations and wants to know what attitude its allies would take in that event.

The collators professed to know that some of the Soviet Union's East European allies are concerned lest they be called on to aid it in a Sino-Soviet war. They also suggested that the looser language appearing in their recently negotiated mutual defense pacts with the Soviet Union may be a reflection of that concern.

CHINA-SOVIET TALK STARTLES ENVOYS

Diplomats in Peking Divided on Import of Meeting of Chou and Kosygin

By Agence France-Presse

PEKING, Sept. 12 — The disclosure of the talks in Peking yesterday between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union and Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China startled foreign diplomats and observers here. But opinions were divided today on the political significance of the talks.

The meeting was reported here about a dozen hours late, in the middle of the night, in a brief dispatch carried by Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency. The dispatch said merely that the two Premiers had met a Peking Airport and had a frank conversation.

[In New Delhi, the Foreign Ministry said today that communist China was moving its nuclear installations in Sinkiang to a "safer place" in northern Tibet.]

The briefness of the dispatch —eight lines—caused surprise in foreign quarters here, where the initial reaction was to consider the meeting as a historic event in view of the protracted Chinese-Soviet dispute.

This morning, Renmin Ribao, official newspaper of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist party, reported the meeting by printing the Hsinhua dispatch on an inside page. At the same time the paper continued its attacks on the Soviet Union.

Indications were that the Kosygin-Chou meeting took place around 3 P.M. yesterday and lasted about one hour. Asked to comment, Soviet Embassy spokesman here said that they had nothing more to say about the meeting than what had already been stated in Moscow.

However, there was very little indication that the meeting was decided at the last minute and that it probably was a result of an initiative by Mr. Kosygin.

But some observers noted that during the Hanoi funeral of President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, Mr. Kosygin had vainly tried to talk to Li Hsien-nien, head of the Chinese delegation.

Some Foreign observers here saw the meeting at the Peking airport as an 11th-hour effort to prevent Chinese-Soviet tension from reaching a point of no return.

Others felt that the meeting constituted a step toward a de-escalation of tension.

According to this school of thought, the Kosygin-Chou meeting would mark a step toward improved Chinese-Soviet relations, and the continued anti-Soviet propaganda flow would be intended mainly for domestic consumption.

Brezhnev Viewed as Target

Observers are also pointing out that Leonid I. Brezhnev, head of the Soviet Communist party—much more than Mr. Kosygin—seems to have been the chief target of Chinese attacks. The most virulent personal attacks by Peking have been directed at him, particularly after Mr. Brezhnev announced a plan for an Asian collective security system, which was interpreted by the Chinese as an effort to form a military alliance against China.

Those who believe the talks here marked a resumption of a dialogue between Moscow and Peking consider that there is a likelihood of further meetings. The list of differences between the two big Communist powers is lengthy. They include border problems and competition for leadership in the Communist world.

Another point raised by the talks is whether they indicate a change of influence among China's top leaders. There was speculation here today that the more realistic elements of the Chinese leadership had been able to strenthen their position in regard to the left-wing extremists. However, so far there has been nothing to support such a suggestion.

Little Changes in Ties Seen

By TILLMAN DURDIN

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, Sept. 12—Observers here were skeptical today that Premier Kosygin's dramatic trip to Peking yesterday for a meeting with Premier Chou had brought about any improvement in relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The ideological and power rivalries between the two Communist countries are believed to be too bitter and deep-rooted to be softened by what appears to have been a short, chilly airport encounter, in which Mr. Chou is thought to have been a reluctant participant.

The report of the Kosygin stopover by Hsinhua is almost sufficient evidence to justify a negative assessment of the meeting.

The Soviet Premier and his two companions, K. F. Katushev and M. A. Yasnov, members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, were described in the dispatch as "passing through" Peking en route from Hanoi to Moscow.

Chou Was Not Eager

In fact, the Russians were not "passing through." They flew to Peking after having reached Calcutta en route home. Hsinhua apparently depicted them as "passing through" in order to downgrade the importance of their stopover.

Events leading to the Peking meeting are viewed here as indicating that Mr. Chou was not eager to meet Mr. Kosygin. He is regarded as having shown this by flying quickly to Hanoi after Mr. Ho's death and returning to Peking before there was any possibility of encountering the Soviet representatives.

The Russians, on the other hand, give the appearance of having wanted a confrontation with Mr. Chou and of having named Mr. Kosygin their Hanoi envoy with this in mind.

When Mr. Chou showed he was not coming back for the last rites, North Vietnamese leaders — according to Kenzo Nosaka, chairman of the Japanese Communist party — urged the Chinese to agree to a meeting in Peking.

The Chinese, it is believed here, could not refuse, but delayed giving approval until Mr. Kosygin was on his way home. The surmise here is that the Chinese hoped Mr. Kosygin would not accept a belated

appointment and that he was accorded scant cordiality when he did.

Neither the Russians nor the Chinese have given any hint of what was discussed, but since the Soviet Union initiated the encounter, it is probable that Mr. Kosygin stressed the Soviet desire for a general conference to settle border disputes and other problems.

The Chinese so far have not accepted Moscow proposals for a general conference and it is unlikely Mr. Chou did so yesterday. Some observers here say the Chinese do not want a border settlement because of the propaganda value in being able to depict the Russians as aggressors.

There is some speculation that Mr. Kosygin asked about reports that Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, is ill. Some observers here think that if Mr. Mao, who has not been seen in public since May 19, were well, he would have made some public tribute to Mr. Ho last week. It is unlikely that Mr. Chou gave Mr. Kosygin much satisfaction on the question of Mr. Mao's health.

Move for Improved Relations

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 12—Western diplomatic sources said today that they expect the Soviet Union to use the meeting between Premier Kosygin and Premier Chou to support its contention that Moscow wants to improve relations with Peking.

Any further worsening of the already tense relations, the diplomats said, undoubtedly would be attributed to Peking's refusal to continue the dialogue begun in Peking yesterday. They said that Mr. Kosygin's willingness to fly the length of China for a brief conversation would be used by Moscow as evidence of its desire for better relations.

The meeting was the talk of Moscow today. Soviet citizens were known to be asking foreign acquaintances whether the conversation meant that the two nations would be able to resolve their differences amicably.

Every Soviet newspaper reprinted the Tass announcement on the meeting on its front page, and radio programs carried the report.

Because the Tass announcement said the two sides "frankly made known their positions"—a Communist way of saying there was no agreement—and because of the animosity that has developed in the last decade, diplomats were skeptical that the meeting would lead to any substantial improvement in Chinese-Soviet relations.

But the facts that the two leaders met and that their conversation was described as useful led Western diplomats here to speculate that the two nations may be seeking to avoid a major military confrontation.

The average Russian gained the impression that the Soviet leadership regarded the meeting in a positive way and that efforts were being made to improve relations. This is in keeping with the Soviet desire to appear as the rational and peace-loving side in the dispute.

Soviet leaders are concerned about a possible war fear developing among their people and have stressed their desire for negotiations. Moscow has also found that the split with China has led many Communist parties, particularly in Asia, to act more coolly toward Moscow than Kremlin leaders would like.

Diplomats were frank to say they had no idea how the meeting was arranged. The Soviet press, aside from reporting the meeting, carried no articles about China today. This in itself is not unusual, but led to curiosity among observers as to whether the Kremlin had ordered a ban on polemics. If no anti-Peking articles appear in the major press in the next four or five days, such a ban will be assumed.

BALTIMORE SUN
9 September 1969

NEW CHINA-HANOI STRAIN INDICATED

Peking Sends Lower-Level Delegation To Funeral

By PETER J. KUMPA
[Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun]

Hong Kong, Sept. 8—Communist China has sent a relatively low-level delegation to attend the funeral of President Ho Chi Minh, adding to growing evidence that relations between the two countries have been strained anew since the death of the Vietnamese leader.

Heading a three-member Chinese party and government group that left Peking for Hanoi by special plane this morning is 64-year-old Li Hsien-nien, a vice premier and Politburo member, who has been performing the ceremonial tasks of a foreign minister for nearly a year.

Attacked By Red Guard

Vice premier Li is the only member of old guard bureaucrats who survived the purges of the cultural revolution, although he came under scathing attack from Red Guard militants.

But his selection, rather than that the Premier Chou En-lai or another top figure such as the party vice chairman, Lin Piao, is clearly a slight to North Vietnam's collective party leadership.

Totally Unmoved

Premier Chou rushed down to Hanoi last Thursday morning, the day President Ho's death was announced, paid his "tender condolences" and left that afternoon after talks with top North Vietnamese leaders.

From the highly political official message of condolence that Peking sent to Hanoi on President Ho's death, it was apparent the Red Chinese were trying to swing the North Vietnamese back to their harsher foreign policy line on the Sino-Soviet split and on the fighting in Vietnam.

By addressing their message simply to the "Central Committee" in Hanoi, rather than to the senior individuals according to protocol, Peking indicated it believed the situation was fluid and subject to pressure.

Every word out of Hanoi since that indicates the North Vietnamese had been totally unmoved by the Chinese.

They went so far as to show their displeasure publicly by editing out of Peking's condolence message the assertion that President Ho had been a "close comrade in arms of the Chinese People."

On Mao's Wreath

For the highly sensitive Chinese Communists, this would amount to an insult. Peking came back with two more messages calling President Ho the "closest" comrade of the Chinese. Hanoi did not distribute them.

The Chinese followed by emphasizing the phrase in all of their speeches, down to even the inscription on the wreath delibered in the name of Mao Tse-tung to the North Vietnamese Embassy Saturday.

The North Vietnamese appeared to relent slightly today when their official news agency acknowledged that Chairman Mao's mourning wreath delivered to their Peking Embassy did carry the words, "Close comrade in arms of the Chinese people."

But Hanoi dropped from its account of the Saturday meeting parts of a brief speech made by Premier Chou that urged the North Vietnamese to persevere in their war in South Vietnam—in other words, strong suggestions not to make any deals at the Paris peace talks.

Kosygin Staying On

The Vietnamese remain as publicly neutral as they can, but privately they lean towards the Russians who now provide 80 per cent of their military and. Three years ago, the Soviet Union and China split the aid package 50-50.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin, who will outrank the Chinese delegate, is staying on for the Wednesday funeral in Hanoi.

He has payed his respects to President Ho, lying in state in Ba Dinh Hall in the Vietnamese capital, standing in silence after placing a wreath before his glass coffin.

The Soviet leader has held talks with the Vietnamese on "problems concerning United States aggression in Vietnam."

Sihanouk Arrives

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia flew to Hanoi today for the funeral. He is the only head of state to attend the ceremonies.

Romania, like the Soviet Union, is sending its Premier, Ion Gheorghe Maurer. The other Eastern European countries have important but lesser officials.

TELEGRAPH, London
1 Sept. 1969

RUSSIA'S CHINESE BOGEY

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT Russia's round robin to friendly Communist parties, alleging that China is preparing a protracted frontier war and stating that Russia would not tolerate this, was marked "top secret." Moscow seems most anxious that both West and East should share her preoccupation with the Chinese problem. A 13-column editorial in *Pravda* accused China of aggressive intentions and warned the world at large that if war broke out "no continent would be left out." There was also confirmation by the State Department in Washington that it knew of "rumours or reports" that Russia had asked other Communist parties for their reactions to the possibility of a Russian nuclear strike against China's nuclear installations.

Care must be taken to get the Russo-Chinese dispute into perspective. It is obviously of great importance, and might within a decade or two, barring other upheavals in the meantime, become the most important factor in world affairs. For the moment, on the basis of first things first, it ranks behind Russia's military preponderance in Europe, her hold on her satellites, her strategic arms race with America, and the Middle East and Vietnam wars. The balance of evidence at the moment points to a deliberate Russian campaign to exaggerate both the immediacy of the Chinese threat and her own jitters in the face of it.

This enables Russia, in the contest for world Communist leadership, to represent China not only as a heretic but also as a dangerous aggressive imperialist mad dog. It could also be intended to justify a pre-emptive strike if Russia should cold-bloodedly decide to settle the growing Chinese problem while the going was good. In addition, Russia hopes to encourage the West to expect salvation less from its own efforts than from the repercussions of the Russo-Chinese dispute, and to assume that Russia's military expansion is directed against China and not against the West. Such expectations and assumptions remain unwarranted and dangerous.

WASHINGTON STAR
11 September 1969

Gromyko in Belgrade

President Tito, although he has recently cracked down on a number of liberals in Belgrade, is still managing to keep Yugoslavia on an admirably independent, maverick path in the Communist world.

This was made clear, politely but firmly, during last week's visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The visit marked the first high-level contact between Belgrade and Moscow since the Kremlin-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

When that grim event took place last year, Tito was quick to condemn it. He made his position quite clear: "We have expressed our attitude openly before the world, and we shall stand by it forever. The principles of sovereignty, independence, state integrity, freedom and democracy are valid for all countries, regardless of whether they are within blocs or outside them."

In effect, these words constituted a direct challenge to the so-called Brezhnev-Kosygin doctrine of "limited sovereignty." This is the brutal thesis under which the Kremlin arrogates to itself, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, the right to invade and repress with armed force any Communist land that seeks to be its own master, free of Moscow's iron ideological, economic and military rule.

The Yugoslavs, of course, have stood fast against this doctrine ever since their historic 1948 break with Stalin's Russia. Hence their support for those members of the Warsaw Pact — notably the Czechoslovaks and the Romanians — who have had the courage to oppose total Soviet domination. Gromyko had some ambiguous things to say about this in Belgrade, but he did sign a communique supporting — despite the crime against Czechoslovakia — Tito's insistence on principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal national affairs.

In lending his signature to these principles, Gromyko may have had some cynical thoughts. But he may also have felt, and with good reason, that a move against the ready-to-fight Yugoslavs could become a very troublesome business indeed.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 September 1969

Moscow woos Tito and wins a nod

By Paul Wohl
Written for The Christian Science Monitor

A mild flirtation is going on between Moscow and Belgrade.

Moscow is doing the wooing while Marshal Tito sets the stage for ideological rapprochement.

The latest indication of this is seen in Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's talks with his Yugoslav counterpart, State Secretary Mirko Tepavac.

They began on Sept. 2, and were described by Tanyug, the official Yugoslav news agency, as having taken place "in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual respect."

Tass's international service, designed for Soviet diplomatic and military personnel, said the talks are being conducted "in a friendly atmosphere."

The Kremlin's friendly approach to Yugoslavia started five months ago with the visit of Soviet Ambassador Ivan Benediktov to Marshal Tito. Observers believe the Sino-Soviet conflict and the prospect of a Far Eastern war prompted the new approach. The Soviets began to say many friendly things about the Yugoslavs and Belgrade reciprocated.

At the time of Ambassador Benediktov's visit the emphasis in Belgrade was on freedom and democracy, cooperation with Western banks, and sharp criticism of Soviet policies, domestic, and foreign.

Harder line echoed

Now Marshal Tito, in a speech of Aug. 27, has voiced opinions which might have come from Czechoslovak First Secretary Gustav Husak.

"The class enemy has not been eliminated," said the Yugoslav President, according to the transcript of the French press agency. "He lives, he acts, he undermines our society, and hinders social progress. We are submerged by the West with theories, concepts, and conceptions of all kinds, and all are negative."

In the Tanyug version for the West the speech was toned down, but a local broadcast monitored by the United States Information Agency Aug. 28 was very similar to the French version.

"We should not ignore antisocialist occurrences and tolerate the undermining activities of some individuals who are alien to socialism," the Marshal was quoted in the monitored broadcast as saying.

"We must act energetically and in time. We have the right to strike resolutely at those who work against the interests of socialism and to prevent [their] activities."

"Our society has a real democracy, where people speak freely and freely give vent to their initiatives, but it is clear that there must be no democracy for those who act from an antisocialist position. . . . We carry a tremendous responsibility, because the revolution has not yet been concluded."

As a sign of Soviet approval, Pravda summarized Marshal Tito's speech.

On Aug. 20, the Yugoslav weekly, Komunist, welcomed Mr. Gromyko's coming arrival as a token of further cooperation between the two countries in the spirit of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation of 1955. Komunist's hopeful appraisal was broadcast in Russian to the U.S.S.R.

On his arrival in Belgrade, Mr. Gromyko said that "the Soviet Government attaches great importance to the development of relations with Yugoslavia. . . . Both countries are linked by common ideals in striving for socialism and communism and by a friendship tempered in the struggle against the fascist invaders."

'Why have illusions?

On the same day the district prosecutor of Belgrade banned and seized the latest issue of the literary weekly Knijevne Novine, which happened to carry a bitter attack on Soviet political methods. Echoing earlier Yugoslav criticism of Soviet practices, the weekly accused the Soviet leaders of "turning white into black, the dream of a humane socialism into a betrayal of [illegible] imperialist conspiracy, the right to independence into a bourgeois illusion."

Yugoslavia may, temporarily at least, be headed for a stricter course, more acceptable to the Soviet dogmatists. Marshal Tito's latest speech announced "a progressive selection, from bottom to top, of the million-strong Yugoslav League of Communists."

"Why have illusions about this figure?" said the Marshal. "Do not hesitate to chase from our ranks those who shame us." According to the French version, Marshal Tito even spoke of "a purge."

"They say in the West that Yugoslavia gradually is adopting a Western regime. That is what our enemies want, but they are mistaken if they imagine that we will deviate from our dedication to socialism."

If Marshal Tito on this occasion has given in to the urgings of Yugoslavia's old-time Communists, he must have reasons to think such a policy will benefit his country.

Albanian role seen

Haunted by the possibility of a nuclear war with China, the Kremlin needs Yugoslavia to hold down Albania, where the Chinese are believed to have installed rockets. Yugoslavia, in turn, is interested in bringing about a change in the hostile Albanian regime and also may want to obtain concessions from Bulgaria.

These issues will not be mentioned in the final communiqué, but are likely to be behind the current negotiations.

In the long run, though, it is doubtful that Yugoslavia will draw closer to the Kremlin or adopt a true hard-line Communist policy. Once Marshal Tito has taken advantage of the present Soviet overtures, he is expected to resume his policy of independence and to continue his country's balancing act between East and West.

Yet the Tito speech at Zadar, on the Adriatic coast, does remind Yugoslavia and the world that the older leaders in Belgrade and in other countries' national capitals still are Communists at heart and that their collaboration with the West is a matter of expediency.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 September 1969

Soviet and Yugoslavia Pledge to Improve Ties

Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Sept. 6—The first high-level Yugoslav-Soviet talks since the Moscow-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 ended here today with both sides expressing their desire to improve relations and to try to eliminate existing differences.

This readiness was emphasized in a joint communiqué and separately by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at the end of his official five-day visit to Yugoslavia. During his stay he met wth President Tito, Premier Mitja Ribicic, and Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac.

At a news conference, held before hs departure for Moscow, Mr. Gromyko stressed that "both sides have expressed their desire and readiness to work to diminish the existing differences and, even better, to remove them."

However, Mr. Gromyko confirmed that differences regarding "some events and facts" still exist. The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist countries are believed to be the main issues.

Difference of Emphasis

This became clear at a dinner given by Foreign Minister Tepavac in honor of Mr. Gromyko.

While Mr. Tepavac in his toast firmly declared that Soviet-Yugoslav relations must be based on the principles of independence, equality and noninterference, Mr. Gromyko answered that according to the views of his government these relations should be based on the principles of "socialist internationalism."

"Socialist internationalism" is the term used by Moscow to justify the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and it is the phrase with which Moscow is backing the doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist (Communist) countries.

Relations between Moscow and Belgrade were strained after the intervention of Czechoslovakia, which Yugoslavia strongly denounced.

Asked whether the Belgrade declaration of 1955 was regarded still valid by the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko avoided a straight-forward answer. "Certainly," he said, "this declaration has and can have influence on the further development of relations between the two countries."

'Cold War' Ended in '55

The 1955 declaration, signed by the two governments, ended the "cold war" between Moscow and Belgrade and guaranteed the Yugoslavs their independent way.

Asked whether he delivered an invitation to President Tito to visit Moscow, Mr. Gromyko refused to comment, saying that "there are certain questions that cannot be answered precisely at this press conference."

It is known from Yugoslav sources that President Tito would insist first on a visit by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, returning a visit Mr. Tito made to Moscow two years ago.

In a joint communique rounding up the talks just concluded, the principles of sovereignty, equality and noninterference are mentioned as the basis for further cooperation.

"Appraising the present state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations," the communique says, the two sides stressed the significance that they attach to the principles outlined in the Belgrade Declaration, signed by the Yugoslav and Soviet governments in 1955 and confirmed during the meeting of the President of Yugoslavia with leaders of the Soviet Union in 1956 in Moscow.

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 30, 1969

Russia and Rumania

Next on the list?

Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues are showing their displeasure with the Rumanians in a variety of ways. Mr Brezhnev himself failed to attend last weekend's celebrations of the 25th anniversary of Rumania's liberation in the second world war—he sent a comparatively low-level delegation instead—although he went to a similar affair in Poland last month. The Rumanians are being punished for giving President Nixon a chance to indulge in what Mr Katushev denounced at the Rumanian party congress earlier this month as the "perfidious imperialist tactic of bridge-building." On August 20th an important member of the Hungarian politburo, Mr Zoltan Komocsin, made a pointed reference to those who go in for "spectacular political initiatives in their relations with countries responsible for the current political problems in the world." This was a dig not only at the Nixon visit but probably also at Rumania's latest friendly gesture to Israel, the decision to raise the legations in Bucharest and Tel Aviv to the status of embassies.

Rumania's economic policies have also come under fire. A leading Russian magazine recently attacked those communist countries which, "guided by short-sighted nationalist considerations," want to open up more economic doors to the west at the expense of inter-communist trade. And last week the important Soviet party organ *Sovietskaya Rossiya* warned such countries against retreating into their "national shells."

More sinister still are the persistent rumours of Russian pressure on the Rumanians to join in another round of Warsaw pact manoeuvres. All this is taking place against the background of a carefully prepared ideological offensive based on the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for communist countries.

The Russians plainly detest any speculation about the Brezhnev doctrine. It is a slander, said their foreign minister, Mr Gromyko, in his Supreme Soviet speech on July 10th, to allege that Russia and other communist countries stand for some kind of truncated version of national sovereignty. Bourgeois propaganda, Moscow radio echoed him in a Czech-language broadcast last weekend.

The gentlemen protest too much. It is not western propaganda that invented the concept of limited sovereignty. It was Mr Brezhnev himself. In a speech last month in Poland he bluntly reminded his listeners that socialist internationalism meant taking responsibility for the fortunes of socialism not just in one's own country, but anywhere in the world.

Some communists, in eastern as well as western Europe, had hoped that Mr Brezhnev's original formulation of the idea last year was just a temporary expedient to provide an ideological excuse for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government did its best, at the Moscow communist conference in June, to reassure the doubters and the critics that the principle of separate roads to socialism —which implies that each country is fully master of its own future—was still valid.

But the authoritative words of Mr Brezhnev in Poland, and his equally unambiguous words in the most recent issue of the party magazine *Kommunist*, have dispelled these illusions. Communist states have an obligation to act jointly, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, in support of the principle of proletarian internationalism—that basic component which gives the international class struggle its revolutionary character. This is the way the jargon-machine is putting it; and not many east Europeans, in Rumania or elsewhere, will fail to see what it means.

SUNDAY TIMES, London
7 September 1969

Czechs await Moscow's orders

By Our Special Correspondent

Prague, Saturday

AFTER A WEEK of wild and conflicting rumours, the political situation in Prague is more confused than at any time since Gustav Husak become First Secretary of the Party in April.

Just when and how the former leaders Dubcek and Smirkovsky will be banished is still the prime guessing game.

Many Western newspapers reported last week that the Central Committee was already meeting in Hradcany Castle for the vital session at which Dubcek and Smirkovsky will be stripped of their remaining party and government functions. They were wrong.

There was a meeting in Hradcany, but not of the Central Committee. Perhaps even more important, it was of the party's top ideological watchdog, the Commission of Control and Revision. Summoned by the Praesidium only in moments of extreme crisis, it has not met since January 1968. Once in session, it takes precedence over the Praesidium and gives directions to the Central Committee. It is a highly secret body—only its president, Milos Jakes, is known. The members are drawn from the Central Committee, but no-one knows exactly who they are or their number.

The incorrect report that the Central Committee was already in session was due to the overzealousness of a Western journalist who saw the rows of black Tatra cars parked in the castle courtyard and, in his poor Czech, confused the name of the Commission with that of the Committee. He put out the story that the delegates were already in the Orange Hall voting on the dismissal of Dubcek.

Dubcek's future was certainly discussed at the meeting, although no mention was made of him in the Commission's report, published in Rude Pravo today. This communique called for much more vigorous party purges at all levels. It also said that disciplinary investigations have begun into the work of 19 party members, and it condemns the signatories of the 2,000-word manifesto.

This was the document written by the Czech intellectual Ludwig Vaculik, and published in June last year, calling for much faster moves towards democracy. It was perhaps the most provocative document of the "Counter revolution." Among those who signed it were the athlete Emil Zatopek and Vera Caslavska, the gymnast who won four gold medals at Mexico and presented them to Dubcek.

Some observers have been surprised that the Commission made no mention of Dubcek, and have taken this as evidence that there is a split in the Party over the extent of Dubcek's punishment.

It is, however, not at all surprising. The Commission's instructions on his future will be given first to the Central Committee when it meets, probably on September 19. It will be then that Dubcek will have to resign his chairmanship of the Federal Assembly, his post in the Praesidium and, perhaps, like Smirkovsky, even his membership of the Central Committee.

A decision on whether or not to commit him to trial is more likely to come later in the year.

It is possible that the Central Committee will also vote on the future of Husak. Two weeks ago it appeared that his position was being undermined by the thrusts from his deputy, Dr Strougal, and from the extreme right wing. Now it is evident that Strougal is no longer so powerful. Husak also has increasingly dangerous rivals in Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra, both emerging as serious contenders for the first secretaryship.

But it should be recognised that First Secretaries are made in Moscow, not in Hradcany Castle.

In many ways President Svoboda is the key figure in the present political confusion. He has provided a symbol of continuity and legality to all the actions of the past week, and, more important, he has protected Dubcek. It is possible that he may not be able to do so much longer. He is 74 and very tired. He cannot remain President much longer.

TELEGRAPH, London

10 September 1969

Czechoslovakia awaits the purge

By CLARE HOLLINGWORTH

THE people of Prague are waiting with increasing anxiety and impatience to know just what punishment will be meted out to their former national leader, the popular Alexander Dubcek, who has become the symbol of Czechoslovakian resistance to Russian pressure.

They are deeply concerned with the fate of Mr Dubcek and his associates, for they know that the severity of Dubcek's disgrace and punishment will reflect the future policy of Ludvic Husak and the new ruling Praesidium, and also the rigour with which the purges and reforms demanded by the Russians are carried out.

Everybody in Prague is aware of the fight in progress between those members of the Praesidium who would like to see Dubcek and his team merely dismissed from their official positions in the Communist party and State, and a more forceful group which feels that Dubcek should be expelled from the party and banished to a remote mountain village, and the third group of extremists — the hard-liners—who would like to mount a State trial. But even the Russians are reported to be apprehensive about the effects of following such a course, for they have had ample evidence of Dubcek's large and loyal following in the country.

At the moment the vast majority of Czechoslovakian citizens recognise that they must at least pretend to obey the new decrees when they appear, but they are determined to give the Government the minimum support compatible with remaining free, retaining their jobs and party membership and the privileges that go with it.

Widespread fear

Many people are frightened because they now think they expressed their enjoyment of the freedom of the Dubcek régime too openly. Not only have writers, artists and journalists cut themselves off from association with their friends from the West, but some have not returned to the capital from their holidays while others are feigning sickness.

Even those "Vicars of Bray" who are willing to adapt themselves to

the new political line are nervous because they have not yet been told exactly what to think. All that is known is that the Soviet Union has advised Husak to undertake a series of purges and reforms in the Communist party, defence forces, trade unions, Civil Service and Press, and to reorganise the economy of the country to work more efficiently with Comecon—the East European common market under Russian domination.

The party comes first, for everything else depends on this, and with a membership of 1,600,000 it is too large, the Russians claim, and, because it contains disloyal elements and "counter revolutionaries," they insist that it be purged from the top and reduced to 1,200,000, or even one million.

Meanwhile, a beginning is already being made to introduce reforms into the defence forces. After a fortnight's inspection of the Army by a team of Russian officers, led by Gen. Yetishev, they reported that the forces needed "greater Socialist indoctrination before Czechoslovakia would be reliable as an ally."

This has already begun under the direction of a Russian military mission. And some 50 Czechoslovakian political officers have already been dismissed the service.

A new supreme Army and Defence Committee has just been set up to assist the Russian mission in their political task and also to "trim", the defence forces. The Russians would like to see the Army reduced from its present level of 160,000 men—which is now about 70 per cent. below full strength—to around 100,000 men. The threat of redundancy is lowering the morale of the General Staff and, paradoxically, especially of those officers who would be ready to work with the Russians, for many Czechs deliberately chose the Army as a safe career. They now fear they may find themselves either working in a factory or on a collective farm.

It is hardly surprising that the young conscripts are difficult to handle; indeed, they were obviously hanging back behind the police and the People's Militia when brought in to help maintain order during the recent demonstrations, and at times even fraternising with students of their own age-group in the crowd.

The most serious residue of resistance to the Husak régime and the Soviet Union is to be found among the workers, who in many areas have even threatened not to pay their union dues. The union leaders have completely lost touch with the men and women in the factories because they diverted the complaints from the shop floor to newly appointed district committees, which are, in fact, powerless go-betweens.

Thus workers' problems never reached the men at the top. There are, too, open accusations from workers that elections to key posts have been clumsily faked to bring in Husak's men.

The wave of enthusiasm which swept the country when Dubcek's reforms were introduced has completely evaporated and, as no one is dismissed except for political reasons, men and women now arrive late at work, enjoy long coffee breaks and leave early for home.

No one would deny that reforms are urgently needed in the economy, where for too long an overplanned and centralised Marxist control retarded growth almost as much as the pre-war plant. The half-built factories round Prague and other towns bear witness to the many schemes which were begun but, somehow, never reached fruition through shortage of funds, skilled labour or raw material.

In many workshops machines stand idle through lack of spare parts or trained engineers, and a considerable number of collective farms have been forced drastically to cut down their area of cultivation or reduce the number of their livestock through scarcity of labour. Serious food shortages are expected next winter, but the fruit now ripening in the orchards will rot on the trees.

Geared to Moscow

Moscow insists that Prague dovetails its economy into the Comecon system. If the Soviet Union requires trucks or tanks Skoda must manufacture them. Indeed, they can hardly refuse for, even before the Russian occupation, Czechoslovakia imported 98 per cent. of its oil and 92 per cent. of iron ore from the Soviet Union. The actual Russian occupation of August, 1968, severely disrupted the entire distribution network which has not even now fully recovered. During last winter many factories and schools were closed through lack of fuel. Stocks of food, manufactured goods and raw materials have during the past year been seriously run down.

Russian experts are at the moment carrying out an industrial survey with the object of closing outdated and unproductive factories. But it will be extremely difficult for them to increase the production of useful or profitable goods for export unless they supply new machinery, some of which must come from the West. The Czechoslovak Government cannot pay for this. Meanwhile, prices are rising sharply and the housing shortage is having a serious effect on the social life of the nation. The divorce and abortion rates are said to be the highest in Europe. One in three marriages breaks down, many of them as a direct result of overcrowding and living with in-laws.

But undoubtedly the worst feature of life in Prague today is that friends or even the people one lunched with yesterday disappear overnight without trace. Although most of them will, it is expected, reappear, as people have done after previous Communist purges, in months or years, the atmosphere of horror which now permeates the land is all the more oppressive because of the freedom enjoyed 13 long months ago under Dubcek.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 September 1969

Husak as Moscow's Man

Gustav Husak, Moscow's man in Prague, is doing a good job against his countrymen. On the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, he saw to it that all proper measures were taken against anti-Kremlin demonstrations.

Husak also has seen fit, and this is of more than passing significance, to start a smear campaign against Alexander Dubcek, his predecessor as leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The cry has gone out, too, against Josef Smrkovsky, who spoke so eloquently, last year, against the Kremlin's pressures to keep the Czechs and Slovaks in their place—meaning particularly in a position of absolute subservience to the Soviet Union.

What we are seeing now, under Husak, is another act in the Czechoslovak tragedy. People like Dubcek and Smrkovsky are being sacrificed and destroyed—perhaps even physically—because the big wheels in Moscow do not want, and will not tolerate, any trend toward national independence among the "fraternal" allies of the Warsaw Pact.

It all appears to be slightly on the gruesome side, ideologically and otherwise. Which is par for the course for the things that happen behind the Iron Curtain.

SUNDAY TIMES, London
31 August 1969

Husak may be sacked—despite his kowtowing

By Our Special Correspondent, Prague, Saturday

THE CASE of arrested British tourist Graham Tope is causing considerable anxiety to all foreign visitors to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs have not allowed any British official to see him in jail and have not yet given details of the alleged offence.

Tope, who was on a camping holiday, was arrested during riots in Wenceslas Square ten days ago on the eve of the anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Under new laws anyone may be detained for 21 days without trial and during this time he has no right to see anyone. Mr Tope, a 26-year-old electronics technician, has another 11 days at the mercy of the police before he can expect even summary justice.

Dr Husak's position here is still quite unclear a week after his Government suspended the rule of law. It is possible that he has agreed to play along with every demand of the Kremlin in order to retain his position as party leader and his latest speech at Banska Bystrica suggests that he is prepared to make almost any concessions to this end.

He declared in the speech that the invasion could in no way be termed a hostile act and that the Russian troops came to help the people of Czechoslovakia.

Despite this kowtowing, however, it appears increasingly likely that he will be dropped in favour of his deputy, Dr Strougal, at the September meeting of the Central Committee due to be held during the next two weeks.

For this week has seen the first attack on the principle of rehabilitation of those condemned in the show trials and excesses of the fifties.

Radio Prague and Rude Pravo have both abused Josef Pavel, who was Minister of the Interior under Dubcek until the Russians insisted on his removal after the invasion. Apart from renewing the criticism of the restrictions he imposed on the secret police, the attacks have hinted that he was justly imprisoned in 1951 and wrongly rehabilitated in 1963.

It is very likely that the Czechoslovak Government is now going to revive the practice of show trials and party purges: to this Husak could just have agreed. But he can never accept or sanction a reversal of the process of rehabilitation. He was himself rehabilitated in 1963 after being imprisoned in 1954 on charges of bourgeous nationalism arising out of his conduct of the Slovak national revolt in 1944.

It is almost certain that Dubcek will be stripped of his remaining functions at the forthcoming plenum. He will lose the chairmanship of the National Assembly, he will be removed from the Praesidium, and he may even lose his membership of the Central Committee.

Attacks on him have grown this week. The most bitter have come from Radio Prague, one of whose directors is Bohus Chnoupek, the Minister of Information under Novotny: during the invasion he was in Moscow.

He is said to have remarked at a recent reception: "I will not be content until Dubcek is a chauffeur at the Central Committee building."

It now appears that Dubcek will be fortunate if that is all that happens to him. The Radio has carried several interviews with anonymous "men in the street" who have complained that Dubcek should be made to accept full responsibility for his errors of last year.

Meanwhile journalists in Czechoslovakia are finding conditions very difficult because everyone is terrified to speak. The authorities seem determined to make things more difficult, and the expulsion of Michael Hornsby, correspondent of The Times, is probably only the first of many.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 September 1969

PRAGUE MAY TRY LIBERAL LEADERS

Czech Prosecutor Returns From Talks in Moscow

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Sept. 6—Preparations for possible prosecutions as well as purges of leaders and supporters of the 1968 liberalizing experiment appeared today to be underway in Czechoslovakia.

Indications of such legal steps came in an official announcement that Prosecutor General Jan Fejes and his two deputies returned this morning from consultations in Moscow with the Soviet Prosecutor General, Roman A. Rudenko, and his staff.

The Czechoslovak press agency C.T.K. said Dr. Fejes and his associates had discussed with their Soviet counterparts "several questions relating to mutual cooperation."

Disciplinary Action Due

"The visit to the Soviet Union," the agency said, "will help solve topical problems awaiting the Czechoslovak prosecution system."

Dr. Fejes, return from Moscow followed last night's announcement in Prague by the party's Control and Auditing Commission, its disciplinary body, that "bearers of right-wing opportunism" must be eliminated from the party and that proceedings against 19 unnamed members had already begun.

But the communiqué added that "the commission thinks it necessary to implement legal measures consistently." This was taken to mean that the party believes that criminal action against those accused of "antisocialist" and anti-Soviet attitudes must be taken in addition to their removal from the Communist ranks.

The Control Commission suffered party discipline in 1967 when he led a writers' revolt that seven months lated led to the liberalization under Mr. Dubcek.

Among the first signers were Jiri Menzl, a film director, Jan Werich, actor, and scores of writers, playwrights, composers and artists.

Signers Are Listed

To break down opposition among intellectuals, artists and scientists, the regime has created a "Leftist Front" that is expected to counter the influence of the liberal-minded Academy of Sciences.

Today, the party's newspaper Rude Pravo published a proclamation by 50 members of the Leftist Front, charging that numerous scientific and artistic institutions and social organizations had disassociated themselves from "their socialist duty" early in the nineteen sixties.

This appeared as a reference to the groundwork for reform that had been laid by the Economics and Philosophy institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Before and after the invasion, the 10,000-member academy loomed as a bastion of liberalism.

vision made no mention of the fate of Alexander Dubcek, ousted last April as the party's First Secretary, its statement after a two-day session in Prague made it clear that he and other leaders faced dismissal from the posts they still hold.

Mr. Dubcek has been under attack for allowing a situation to be created under which, in the new leadership's view, the invasion was necessary. He remains a member of the party's Presidium and chairman of the National Assembly.

Josef Smrkovsky, a top progressive leader in 1968, lost last spring his seat on the Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Assembly, but still acts as the head of one of its two chambers, the House of the People, and is a member of the party's Central Committee.

That the final blow may come when the Central Committee meets later this month was suggested in this passage in the Control Commission's announcement:

"It is particularly important that the apparatus, facilities and insitutions of the party be made firmer and more capable and that right-wing opportunistic and anti-Soviet people leave them. At the same time, functions should be entrusted to all honorable and courageous Communists, including those who were blackened and discriminated against in the past for their Marxist-Leninist and internationalistic attitudes."

Intellectuals a Target

This week's decisions by the Control Commission and other developments in Prague also indicated that the progressive Communist intellectuals who spearheaded the 1968 reform would be among the first to be purged, if not to be further punished.

The commission said that on the basis of its investigations it would institute "disciplinary measures" against the "authors, initiators and organizers" of the "2,000 Words," a manifesto issued in June, 1968.

The manifesto, which was signed by tens of thousands of Czechoslovaks, urged the defense of the reforms already gained and a rejuvenation of the party. The Control Commission called it a counter-revolutionary appeal.

Its drafter was the 43-year-old Ludvik Vaculik, a well-

NEW YORK TIMES
6 September 1969

PRAGUE INDICATES PURGE HAS BEGUN

Party Disciplinary Unit Says Liberal 'Opportunists' Are to Be 'Called to Account'

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Sept. 5 — The Czechoslovak Communist party opened today what appeared to be a widespread purge of "right-wing opportunists" who figured prominently in the 1968 liberalizing experiment.

While the announcement by the party's disciplinary body, the Control and Audit Commission, pledged that all those who had supported "antisocialist forces" would be "called to account," the new pro-Soviet

leadership seemingly failed to reach a decision on Alexander Dubcek, the party's former First Secretary.

Category Is Broad

A communiqué by the commission, whose chairman is Milos Jakes, a hard-liner of long standing, said that disciplinary proceedings would be initiated against 19 unidentified members who "have grossly infringed the discipline and the statutes of the party and acted out of right-wing and opportunist positions."

Almost any of the 1968 leaders could be included in this broad category, but the commission went even further in apparently setting the stage for party purges when it said that "all the responsible members who have not fulfilled their tasks" or who held a "hesitating attitude" must be "called to account."

Indications in Prague, whose radio station broadcast the conclusions reached by the commission in a two-day session tonight, were that differences of opinion about Mr. Dubcek were so profound that a decision would be left to the plenum of the party's Central Committee, which is expected to meet later this month.

The commission itself could not institute proceedings against Mr. Dubcek, who still holds a post in the party presidium and is chairman of the National Assembly. But it had been believed that it would make recommendations to the Central Committee.

Word from Prague through Communist sources tonight was that the commission was unable to agree on a recommendation, presumably because of Mr. Dubcek's still considerable popularity. He was replaced as first secretary by Dr. Gustav Husak in April.

Husak May Go to Moscow

Persistent reports from Prague said that Dr. Husak might fly to Moscow before the central committee's session for consultations on Mr. Dubcek as well as Josef Smrkovsky, former National Assembly chairman and another top leader of the 1968 liberalization movement that culminated in the Soviet-led invasion.

The emphasis in recent days in the tightly controlled Czechoslovak press and radio has been that Mr. Dubcek's actions in the spring and summer of 1968 created a situation that made invasion both inevitable and desirable from the viewpoint of preserving socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The only names mentioned in the control commission's communiqué were Zdenek Braun and Vladimir Kolnistr, who were expelled from the commission for their "right-wing opportunist activities."

The commission also decided, the announcement said, that "in all the party, state and economic organs it will be ascertained with the greatest speed and accuracy who is responsible for gross violations of the political line."

Disciplinary proceedings also will be instituted, the commission said, against the "authors" and "organizers" of what it described as the counterrevolutionary manifesto known as the "2,000 words."

BALTIMORE SUN
15 September 1969

Refugee Amnesty Ends For Czechs

Prague, Czechoslovakia, Sept. 14 (Reuters)—An amnesty for the safe return of the thousands of Czechoslovaks who left the country after the Soviet led Warsaw Pact invasion last year will expire tomorrow amid growing fears this country's borders with the west may be closed.

The government has given no hint of what measures it will take when the amnesty expires, but the foreign ministry said September 2 that people who did not return or at least legalize their stay abroad would face charges of having unlawfully left the country. This may include confiscation of their property here.

At least 50,000 are estimated to be outside Czechoslovakia at the present time. Few have taken advantage of the amnesty decreed in May and designed to halt costly losses in skilled workers and professional people to the sorely-pressed national economy.

30 A Day To Austria

In Austria, officials have said that about 30 Czechoslovaks seek asylum there every day, and about 3,500 are in refugee camps.

In an effort to convince emigrants that they can still return safely to their homes and jobs, passports for travel to the west have been issued with little difficulty in the year since the Warsaw Pact invasion August 20-21, 1968.

But some leading reformists reportedly have had applications for exit visas refused recently.

While Czechoslovaks have been able to travel to West Germany and Austria without much hindrance, travelers returning to this country said they were carefully searched by border guards.

The government now appears to have three courses open to it:

1. Close the borders to all but official travel to the west or drastically increase the cost for exit permits.

2. Issue a statement starting legal proceedings against people outside the country. This might be accompanied by an order confiscating all their property in Czechoslovakia, which in the case of houses could be redistributed to meet a chronic shortage.

3. Extend the amnesty.

The last option, although remote, may be thought necessary to reverse the "brain drain" which has left many areas short of doctors and trained workers.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 September 1969

DUBCEK IS OUSTED FROM PRESIDIUM IN A CZECH PURGE

Ex-Party Chief Also Loses Assembly Posts but Stays in Central Committee

By HENRY HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Sept. 28 — The Czechoslovak Communist party announced today that Alexander Dubcek, its former chief, had been excluded from the ruling Presidium and would also be removed as chairman of the Federal Assembly.

In what seemed a reluctant concession to the continuing popularity of the 47-year-old

hero of the Czechoslovak reforms, he was allowed to retain his seat in the party's policy-setting Central Committee.

In a broad purge, 29 progressives were ousted from that body, and three of them were also expelled from the party.

In a Central Committee now packed with conservatives, Mr. Dubcek will be isolated. Informants in Prague said tonight that the feeling was widespread that he would eventually be ousted from the committee.

Husak Report Published

The Central Committee authorized the personnel shifts on the recommendation of Dr. Gustav Husak, who succeeded Mr. Dubcek last April as the party's First Secretary.

In a report to the Central Committee that was published tonight, Dr. Husak portrayed Mr. Dubcek as weak and wavering, incapable of stemming "right-wing opportunistic forces" inside the party and anti-Communist and counterrevolutionary forces outside it.

Dr. Husak also denounced the "gross violations of laws" in the nineteen fifties when Stalinism lingered on in Czechoslovakia.

The Dubcek leadership "wasted a great historic chance" of redressing past mistakes, Dr. Husak said.

At his recommendation, the Central Committee passed a resolution formally justifying the Soviet-led invasion that smothered the reform experiment under Mr. Dubcek.

Smrkovsky Loses Posts

Among those who were expelled from the Central Committee was Josef Smrkovsky, who was closely associated with Mr. Dubcek last year in the liberalization and who more recently served as his deputy in the Federal Assembly and as chairman of its House of the People. The party announced that Mr. Smrkovsky would also lose his assembly posts.

Among those who were stripped of party membership was Lieut. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik. He was the Central Committee's security chief under Mr. Dubcek and irritated Moscow in July, 1968, when he charged that the Warsaw Pact alliance was dominated by Soviet officers, and advocated a reorganization.

The two other former Central Committee members who were ousted from the party were Alfred Cerny, once a party district secretary in Moravia, and Vaclav Slavik, an official of the central apparatus. Both were critics of Moscow.

Together with Mr. Smrkovsky, nine others were "expelled" from the Central Committee, and, in a semantic distinction, 19 more were said to have been "released" from that body at their own request.

Among those who were expelled were Jiri Hajek, who was Foreign Minister at the time of the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968; Frantisek Vlasak, a former planning minister, and Milan Hubl, former director of the party's staff academy.

Those who were permitted to resign included Bohumil Simon, a popular secretary of the Prague city party under Mr. Dubcek, four progressive women members, and three members of the Academy of Sciences, which party dogmatists denounced recently as a center of liberalism.

The party statement said that the Central Committee had recalled Mr. Dubcek from his function as a Presidium member and directed the Communist deputies in the Federal Assembly, who make up the vast majority, to recall him from his post as chairman.

Mr. Dubcek's place in the 11-man Presidium was taken by Josef Kempny, a 49-year-old Moravian technician, who has lately headed the Central Committee's Ideologial Commission.

Mr. Kempny, a conservative, was also named as a Deputy Premier in the new Czechoslovak government. It was announced yesterday that Oldrich Cernik remained the Premier.

Mr. Cernik was closely allied with Mr. Dubcek last year, but recently turned publicly against him. He is also a member of the party's Presidium.

Mr. Kempny is expected to succeed Stanislav Razl as Premier of the Czech state government.

Among conservatives added to the Central Committee was Pavel Auersperg, who was close to Antonin Novotny, the former party chief and President.

Vladimir Koucky, another former associate of President Novotny, was appointed Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.

The Cabinet changes involved mainly economic departments. Among those who left the government was the Foreign Trade Minister, Jan Tabacek, who has favored increased exchanges with Western countries.

Conservatives Tighten Hold

Diplomatic sources in Prague said the Government shuffle had strengthened the hold of conservatives over the state administration and placed doctrinaire economic planners in key positions.

The personnel changes were the result of a dramatic two-day plenary meeting of the Central Committee that ended at 2 A.M. yesterday. In the process this body reduced its size from 180 to 165 full members.

A Central Committee resolution published tonight attempted to rewrite history by formally annulling official party actions before and after last year's invasion.

Among these was a Presidium manifesto issued at dawn on Aug. 21, 1968, just before Soviet security men were to arrest Mr. Dubcek and his principal aides. The declaration denounced the invasion "as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between socialist states, but also as contrary to the principles of international law."

This declaration was "non-Marxist," the Central Committee resolution said. "The entry of the allied troops, under the situation that arose in the summer of 1968, was motivated by the interests of the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia against right-wing, antisocialist and counterrevolutionary forces."

Thus, Prague has at last officially justified the Soviet occupation. Dr. Husak has been under mounting pressure from Moscow to produce such a formal exoneration.



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October 1969

THE "DETENTE" IN CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Statements by two recent Cuban defectors (copies attached) emphasize the increased influence which the Soviet Union has gained over Castro and his government, and thus highlight a marked -- if perhaps temporary and superficial -- improvement in Cuban-Soviet relations since the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Cuban-Soviet Differences

Prior to August 1968 Cuban-Soviet relations had steadily deteriorated, with a number of diplomatic affronts occurring between the two countries. They were divided on the fundamental, ideological issue of how to achieve a Communist revolution in Latin America. The Cubans attacked the Soviet program of trade and aid to Latin American governments which were involved in suppressing Cuban-supported revolutionary groups, and Castro himself charged the Soviet leaders with adhering to doctrines which had become obsolete.

The Soviets in turn charged the Cubans with endangering the whole Latin American Communist movement, not only by encouraging armed revolution in countries where conditions were not ripe, but by downgrading or ignoring the role of the orthodox Communist parties as a progressive element in their respective countries. They claimed Castro's theories ran counter to Marxist philosophy, and openly protested Cuba's calls for revolution in the hemisphere.

In January 1968 several prominent pro-Moscow Cuban Communists, known as the "Escalante microfaction," were jailed for allegedly having collaborated with Soviet, Czech and East German officials in an effort to gain support for the "microfaction" and to realign Cuban foreign policy more closely with that of the Soviet Union. This was interpreted as a clear warning to the Soviets not to interfere in internal Cuban affairs. Subsequently the Cubans refused to attend the Soviet-sponsored consultative meeting of Communist parties in Budapest, while at the same time they undertook to expand trade and other contacts with Western Europe in an attempt to reduce their economic dependence on the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets unduly dragged out their annual trade negotiations with Cuba, the level of their economic aid to Castro remained at a high level.

Trend Toward Accommodation

Castro's public support of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 -- while grudging and evidently made under great pressure -- was surprising since the Cuban press had been somewhat sympathetic to the Czech liberalization movement before the actual invasion and there was an immediate and widespread revulsion in Havana against the Soviet-led intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless Castro supported the Soviet action as "politically necessary," and there followed an

increasing number of favorable references to the Soviet Union in the Cuban press. Cuban diplomatic and military missions subsequently visited Moscow, where they were warmly received in the fall of 1968.

The Soviet press generously praised Cuba's domestic progress on the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution, while at the same time stressing the vital Soviet role in Cuba's progress. The technical aid and trade agreements negotiated early this year, and involving over 300 million in aid and some 900 million in trade, attest to the Soviets' continuing heavy investment in and assistance to Cuba.

In contrast to the Cuban refusal to attend the Budapest conference in 1968, in June of this year Cuba sent Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, as an observer to the World Conference of Communist parties in Moscow. Rodriguez' speech was curious in that on the one hand he seemed intent on making clear that Cuba's presence did not mean she was ready to abandon her freewheeling methods of the past three years, while on the other hand his remarks seemed aimed at pointing up the continuing Cuban-Soviet detente. Thus he dissented from major portions of the conference document, and yet he praised Soviet aid and support of "anti-imperialist" struggles. Apparently believing that Cuban attendance was worth it, the Soviets not only tolerated Cuban attacks on many of their stated positions, but even made glowing references to Cuba in conference speeches and documents.

Likewise, the Soviet message to Cuba on the sixteenth anniversary of its National Day (July 26th) was used by the Soviet Union to convey an impression of improved Soviet-Cuban relations. The traditional congratulatory cable from the Soviet leaders to Castro and Dorticos was considerably longer and warmer than the 1968 message; it claimed relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding were becoming "broader and more active." At the same time there was a spate of articles in the Soviet press which praised Cuba's "building of socialism," and expressed general satisfaction with Cuba's internal developments.

Although the Soviet press also covered in glowing terms the mid-summer visit of Soviet naval units to Havana, Cuba itself appeared little impressed. Following the TASS announcement in early July of the visit to be made by the fleet, there were only two brief items in the Cuban press, and Castro did not mention the visit in a two-hour speech he made in mid-July, only about ten days before the Soviet fleet arrived. Even though this visit coincided with the 26th of July anniversary, an occasion which ordinarily should have prompted an unusually warm reception for the Soviets, there were no special ceremonies. On the contrary, Castro invited the visiting admiral and some 700 of his officers and men to mark the anniversary by working in the cane fields. Obviously Castro did not want to appear as a Soviet puppet on this occasion, nor to have it interfere with the start of harvesting the 1970 sugar crop with its ten-million-ton-goal.

Most important for the other countries in Latin America has been the apparent change in Castro's thinking concerning any more immediate attempts to export the Cuban revolution, a change which has probably done the most

to earn him Soviet approval and even cautious acceptance by some Latin American governments. Since the dramatic failure and death of Ché Guevara in the ill-fated Bolivian insurgency two years ago, and the misfortunes and poor prospects of other Cuban-supported guerrilla movements, Castro may well have decided that conditions for a Cuban-style revolution do not now exist in most of Latin America. Furthermore, this decision may well have been reinforced by his own domestic economic difficulties, combined with strong pressure and economic threats from the Soviet Union. (In fact, the former Cuban diplomat, Agustin Sanchez Gonzalez, who recently defected from his post in Geneva, Switzerland, has stated that the Soviets have put an economic squeeze on Castro, forcing him to adopt a more pro-Soviet posture. However, Mr. Sanchez Gonzalez could not confirm the statement of a former Cuban intelligence officer, Orlando Castro Hidalgo, who defected earlier this year, that an agreement had actually been drawn up in 1968 which commits Cuba to a pro-Soviet line.)

Other evidence that Castro may be re-thinking his strategy is that the Cuban press has toned down, if not entirely eliminated, propaganda on revolution in the hemisphere, and little has been heard from or about the "revolutionary" Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). Never very large or impressive to begin with, it has seldom been mentioned in press or radio broadcasts, and there are no signs that the group is even still active. Castro himself has not publicly discussed revolution in Latin America in almost two years, even when commemorating an event directly connected with past guerrilla accomplishments. Instead, he has tried to extend Cuban influence by contrasting Cuban achievements in public health, education, social welfare and agriculture with those of other Latin American countries, suggesting that the Cuban example in these fields should be followed. Recent and most convincing evidence of the re-thinking of Cuban strategy was Castro's mid-July speech referred to above, which launched the 1970 sugar harvest. Contrary to his earlier calls for immediate revolutionary action, he said that Cuba could wait for revolution elsewhere in Latin America for "10, 20, 30 years if necessary." He even implied that there may be more than one means of revolution, citing the coup d'état by the Peruvian military forces as having revolutionary implications.

Concurrent with the absence of calls to revolution has been the absence of Cuban attacks on the orthodox Communist parties of Latin America, and Cuba has already demonstrated it will cooperate, at least in limited fashion and in prescribed conditions, with old-guard Communists. This was seen in the emergence, in early 1969, of the United Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH), formed by the merger of the Moscow-controlled Haitian Party of Popular Accord (PEP) with the pro-Castro United Haitian Democratic Party (PUDA), and now supported by both the Soviets and Cubans.

Finally, there is evidence that Castro has perhaps decided to try to establish normal relations with other Latin American countries, with trade agreements reportedly being discussed with Chile and Peru. While Castro doubtless looks to the Latin American countries as lucrative trading partners who would help reduce Cuban economic dependence on the Soviet Union, he may also have decided to take a leaf from the Soviets' own book, and try his hand at subversion through the more classical means of commercial and diplomatic missions instead of by violent revolution.

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Octubre 1969

LA "DETENTE" EN LAS RELACIONES CUBANO-SOVIÉTICAS

Las declaraciones formuladas por dos diplomáticos cubanos que abandonaron sus cargos recientemente indican hasta qué punto la Unión Soviética ejerce influencia sobre Fidel Castro y su gobierno, a la vez que subrayan un progreso notable--quizá temporal y superficial--en las relaciones cubano-soviéticas desde la invasión y ocupación rusa de Checoeslovaquia.

Discrepancias entre Cuba y la URSS

Las relaciones entre Cuba y la URSS venían deteriorándose progresivamente con anterioridad a agosto de 1968 a consecuencia de una serie de afrentas diplomáticas entre ambos países. El punto fundamental que los dividía era la forma de llevar a cabo una revolución comunista en la América Latina.

Los cubanos atacaron el programa soviético de comercio y ayuda a los gobiernos latinoamericanos que reprimían a los grupos revolucionarios apoyados por Cuba, y hasta el propio Fidel Castro acusó a los dirigentes soviéticos de adherirse a doctrinas obsoletas.

A su vez los rusos denunciaron públicamente a los cubanos por arriesgar el movimiento comunista latinoamericano con sus llamamientos a la lucha armada en países

donde no existían aún las condiciones propicias. Asimismo, se quejaron que Cuba menospreciaba o ignoraba el papel que los partidos comunistas jugaban en sus respectivos países como elementos progresistas. Las teorías de Fidel Castro eran, afirmaban, contrarias a la filosofía marxista.

En enero de 1968 un grupo prominente de comunistas cubanos de tendencia prosoviética--la "microfacción" de Escalante--fue encarcelado por haber colaborado con funcionarios soviéticos, checos y alemanes del este. El propósito era ganar apoyo para la "microfacción" y reorientar la política exterior cubana hacia una posición más cercana a la de la Unión Soviética.

Se interpretó este acontecimiento como una advertencia clara a la URSS para que dejara de inmiscuirse en los asuntos internos de Cuba.

Con posterioridad los cubanos se negaron a asistir a la reunión de consulta de los partidos comunistas celebrada en Budapest y patrocinada por la URSS, y comenzaron a desarrollar su comercio con Europa Occidental a fin de reducir su dependencia económica en la Unión Soviética. Pero a pesar de que la URSS prolongó excesivamente las negociaciones comerciales anuales con Cuba, el nivel de ayuda económica al régimen de Fidel Castro se mantuvo al mismo alto nivel.

Tendencia hacia el Acercamiento

El apoyo público de Castro a la invasión y ocupación de Checoeslovaquia por la Unión Soviética en agosto

de 1968--aunque de mala gana y sin duda bajo gran presión--causó sorpresa debido a que la prensa cubana había reflejado cierta simpatía hacia el movimiento liberal checo antes de la invasión. Es más, en La Habana se registró una gran repulsa inmediata a la intervención rusa en los asuntos internos de Checoeslovaquia.

Sin embargo, Fidel Castro calificó como "políticamente necesaria" la acción soviética, y a partir de ese momento la prensa cubana comenzó a publicar un número cada vez mayor de referencias favorables a la URSS. Subsiguientemente, una serie de misiones militares y diplomáticas visitaron Moscú, siendo recibidos con entusiasmo en el otoño de 1968.

La prensa soviética elogió efusivamente el progreso doméstico de Cuba en ocasión del décimo aniversario de la revolución cubana, aunque subrayando al propio tiempo el papel fundamental que jugaba la URSS en el progreso de Cuba.

Los convenios comerciales y de ayuda técnica negociados a principios de este año (más de 300 millones en ayuda y unos 900 millones en intercambio) son testimonio de la intención rusa de continuar su enorme inversión en Cuba.

Contrastando con la negativa cubana a asistir a la conferencia de Budapest en 1968, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, miembro del secretariado del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, fue enviado como observador a la Conferencia Mundial de Partidos Comunistas celebrada

en Moscú en junio de este año. Su discurso resultó ser ambiguo, pues por una parte se empeñó en demostrar que la presencia de Cuba no significaba que ésta fuera a abandonar los métodos independientes practicados durante los últimos tres años, y por la otra denotó la "detente" cubano-soviética. De la misma forma se manifestó en desacuerdo con la mayor parte del documento de la conferencia, pero alabó a la URSS por su "ayuda económica" y su apoyo a las "luchas antiimperialistas".

Estimando que la presencia de Cuba lo ameritaba, la Unión Soviética estuvo dispuesta no sólo a tolerar los ataques cubanos contra muchas de sus posiciones declaradas, sino a referirse en los términos más entusiásticos a Cuba en los discursos y documentos de la conferencia.

De igual forma el mensaje soviético a Cuba con motivo del décimosexto aniversario del 26 de Julio fue utilizado por la URSS para señalar el progreso en las relaciones entre ambos países.

El cable tradicional de felicitaciones que los dirigentes rusos enviaron a Fidel Castro y Osvaldo Dorticós fue mucho más extenso y cálido que el de 1968. El mensaje afirmaba que las relaciones de amistad, cooperación y mutuo entendimiento eran cada vez más "amplias y activas". Al propio tiempo la prensa soviética publicó una serie de artículos elogiando la "construcción del socialismo" en Cuba y aprobando el desarrollo doméstico de la Isla.

Aunque la prensa soviética se refirió en términos entusiásticos a la visita de unidades navales de la URSS a La Habana a mediados del verano, los cubanos no se mostraron muy impresionados. Al anuncio de la visita, hecho por la agencia TASS a principios de julio, siguieron sólo dos breves notas en la prensa de Cuba. El mismo Fidel Castro no hizo mención de la visita en un discurso de dos horas que pronunció a mediados de julio, apenas diez días antes de la llegada de la flota.

A pesar de que la visita coincidió con el aniversario del 26 de Julio, ocasión que normalmente hubiese significado una bienvenida cálida a los rusos, no hubo ninguna ceremonia especial.

El único acontecimiento fue la invitación de Fidel Castro al almirante ruso y a cerca de 700 oficiales y marinos bajo su mando a celebrar el evento cortando caña en la Provincia de Matanzas. Era obvio, pues, que el primer ministro cubano no deseaba aparecer como títere de los rusos o permitir que la visita interfiriera con el inicio de la zafra de 1970 y su meta de diez millones de toneladas.

De mayor importancia para los países de América Latina es el cambio aparente en el pensamiento del dirigente cubano en cuanto a nuevos esfuerzos encaminados a exportar la revolución cubana en un futuro cercano...quizá la razón de la aprobación soviética y de la aceptación cautelosa por parte de ciertos gobiernos latinoamericanos.

Desde el fracaso del "Che" Guevara y su muerte en

la malograda aventura [illegible] hace dos años y los fracasos y escasas perspectivas de otros movimientos guerrilleros apoyados por Cuba, es probable que Fidel Castro haya decidido que las condiciones para una revolución "a la cubana" no existen en casi ninguna parte de Latinoamérica. Además, este cambio de política puede haber sido reforzado por las dificultades económicas internas de Cuba en combinación con fuertes presiones y amenazas económicas por parte de la Unión Soviética.

(Agustín Sánchez González, ex diplomático cubano que abandonó su cargo en Ginebra recientemente, hizo mención de las presiones económicas que sobre Castro ejerce la Unión Soviética para obligarlo a adoptar una postura más favorable a la URSS. Sin embargo, Sánchez González no pudo confirmar la declaración hecha por un ex oficial del Directorio General de Inteligencia de Cuba en Francia, Orlando Castro Hidalgo, quien al solicitar asilo político dijo tener conocimiento de un acuerdo firmado en 1968 mediante el cual Cuba se comprometía a seguir la línea prosoviética.)

Otra prueba de que Cuba puede estar modificando su estrategia es que la prensa de ese país ha disminuído notablemente la propaganda a favor de la revolución continental y ya casi ni se oye hablar de la OLAS (Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad). A este organismo "revolucionario", que no resultó ser ni muy grande ni muy impresionante, apenas se le menciona en

la prensa y la radio y ni se sabe si aún continúa en activo.

El propio Fidel Castro hace casi dos años que no se refiere a la revolución latinoamericana en sus discursos, ni siquiera en aquellos pronunciados a razón de algún acontecimiento relacionado con pasados triunfos guerrilleros. Por el contrario, ha querido extender la influencia cubana contrastando los éxitos de Cuba en salud pública, educación, bienestar social y agricultura con los de otros países latinoamericanos y sugiriendo que el ejemplo de Cuba en estos campos debe de ser seguido.

Pero la prueba más convincente de la nueva orientación cubana fue el discurso que el dirigente cubano pronunció a mediados de julio con motivo del inicio de la zafra azucarera de 1970. En contraste con sus anteriores llamados a la acción revolucionaria inmediata, dijo que Cuba podía esperar "diez, veinte o treinta años si es necesario" por otras revoluciones en la América Latina. Hasta llegó a sugerir que quizá haya más de un medio para hacer revolución, concediéndole al régimen militar del Perú ciertas bases revolucionarias.

Junto a la ausencia de consignas revolucionarias se encuentra la supresión de los ataques cubanos contra los partidos comunistas tradicionales de Latinoamérica; Cuba ya ha demostrado que cooperará, por lo menos en forma limitada y en condiciones preestablecidas, con los comunistas de la vieja guardia. La nueva línea salió a relucir clara-

mente con la creación en principios de 1960 del Parti Democratique Haitien (PUCH). Formado por la unión del Partie d'Entente Populaire (PEP), controlado por Moscú, y el procastrista Pati Union de Demokrat Aisiin (PUDA), el PUCH recibe ahora el apoyo tanto de Cuba como de la Unión Soviética.

Finalmente, hay motivos para creer que quizá Fidel Castro ha decidido normalizar las relaciones de Cuba con otros países de América Latina mediante supuestos acuerdos comerciales con Chile y Perú.

Aunque es indudable que el primer ministro cubano contempla a los demás países del hemisferio como ventajosos socios comerciales que ayudarían a reducir su dependencia económica de la URSS, también cabe la posibilidad que haya optado postergar la revolución violenta en favor de una vieja táctica rusa: la subversión a través de las misiones diplomáticas y comerciales.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1969

'Cuba more Sovietized'

Defector from Castro intelligence network says 1968 pact binds Havana to Moscow line

By a staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A Cuban intelligence officer, who defected to the United States earlier this year, says that Premier Fidel Castro signed an accord with the Soviet Union in 1968 which commits him to a pro-Moscow line.

The assertion, it is felt, would explain the noticeable pro-Moscow line being followed by Cuba—a trend which began at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last August.

According to the defector, Orlando Castro Hidalgo, the Cuban-Soviet agreement requires the Cuban leader to mute his criticism of the Soviet Union and of Moscow-oriented Communist parties in Latin America.

In return, the Soviet Union agreed not to diminish its economic support of Premier Castro's government and also to provide some 5,000 technicians to work in a variety of fields to support Cuba's lagging economy.

These disclosures are part of the testimony being given by Mr. Castro Hidalgo, who is no relation to the Cuban Premier. It was learned from informed sources that he left his post as protocol officer of the Cuban Embassy in Paris late in March of this year and sought asylum for himself and his family at the United States Embassy in Luxembourg.

Since then, Mr. Castro Hidalgo has been undergoing extensive questioning together with explaining an attaché case full of documents he carried with him when he arrived in Luxembourg.

Mr. Castro Hidalgo now is in the United States under protective custody.

The Christian Science Monitor learned of Mr. Castro Hidalgo's presence in the United States, and as far as is known this is the first mention of his defection and his disclosures to United States officials.

It is understood that the Cuban Government has asked the French Government for assistance in returning both Mr. Castro Hidalgo and the documents he brought with him when he defected. But Cuban sources would make no comment on this subject nor admit that Mr. Castro Hidalgo had defected when asked for comment.

Informed sources here say that Mr. Castro Hidalgo has been a veritable gold mine of information on developments in Cuba. Although he was not a major official in the Cuban Government, he apparently had considerable access to documents and other intelligence materials as a part of the Cuban intelligence service in [illegible]. That service, according to Mr. Castro Hidalgo's testimony, is put at the disposal of the Soviet Union under terms of the 1968 agreement. Known as General Directorate of Intelligence (or DGI after its Spanish initials), the service has been extending its operations in Europe recently.

According to Mr. Castro Hidalgo, this growing Soviet influence in Cuba was the reason for his defection.

Betrayal seen

In his own way, Mr. Castro Hidalgo sees this increasing Soviet influence, brought on by Premier Castro, as a betrayal of the Cuban revolution and the goals for which he personally fought both in the Sierra Maestra and afterward.

Mr. Castro Hidalgo, in his testimony, says that his immediate superior in the Paris Embassy, Armando López Orta, returned from Havana last January with word of the Cuban-Soviet treaty and this pronouncement:

"Somos más sovieticos" (We are more Sovietized).

According to Mr. Castro Hidalgo's version of the accord, which has remained secret until now, the Soviet Union for its part agreed to keep up the level of economic assistance which has been flowing to Cuba in the past several years. That aid is computed in official circles here at something in the neighborhood of $350 million yearly.

Technicians provided

The Soviet Union, it is understood, also agreed to increase badly needed petroleum shipments to Cuba, to purchase more of Cuba's production of nickel ore, and to send some 5,000 Soviet technicians to advise the Castro government in the fields of science and technology.

These technicians, Mr. Castro Hidalgo says, are to be used in providing support in agriculture, mining, atomic energy, fishing, and military fields.

However, some Soviet assistance in the DGI is part of the agreement.

To informed sources here, this aspect of the secret agreement is particularly significant in that the DGI is understood to have [illegible] activities

formerly handled by foreign service officers.

In light of the general reduction of Soviet intelligence [illegible] elsewhere in Western Europe in recent years, the presence of a Soviet-oriented Cuban intelligence system is regarded by informed sources here as important.

Claim confirmed

Mr. Castro Hidalgo claims to have been part of that system and the documents he brought out confirm this claim.

But the documents are of even greater importance — although they do not contain the text of the Soviet-Cuban agreement.

Moreover, taken together with his testimony and known facts about situations in Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere, the United States has learned a great deal about Cuba and its activities through Mr. Castro Hidalgo's defection.

The defector was a DGI operative in Paris. He states that he helped organize and operate a clandestine apparatus in the French capital aimed at providing Latin-American revolutionaires and guerrilla leaders with money, false passports, and hideouts during their travels to and from Cuba.

According to Mr. Castro Hidalgo, the Paris center for the DGI conducts operations into South America, while the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City coordinates operations in Central America and the Caribbean.

As far as guerrilla activities in Latin America are concerned, Mr. Castro Hidalgo says that the secret Cuba-Soviet accord makes no specific mention of their role — presumably leaving Premier Castro free to operate much as before in the question of armed insurrection throughout Latin America.

Conflicts apparent

There are apparent conflicts between the Soviet Union and Premier Castro over this question, but Mr. Castro Hidalgo says that Havana's support for the "export of revolution" to Latin America is not diminished by the accord.

However, the DGI is reported to have told its people that there must be a more meticulous screening of Latin Americans before they are put into the pipeline for guerrilla training in Cuba. It is also understood, according to Mr. Castro Hidalgo's testimony, that Cuba has decided not to send out military leaders to aid Latin-American revolutionary groups until these groups have reached a significantly high state of development.

Implicit in the Castro Hidalgo testimony is awareness on the part of Cuban officials that the guerrilla effort led by Ernesto Ché Guevara made a number of errors.

It is understood that Mr. Castro Hidalgo's disclosures of Cuban plans and the names of agents and others working for Havana throughout the world has been an important development in United States intelligence activities.

The presence of Mr. Castro Hidalgo and his family — a wife and two small boys — was confirmed by the Department of State, although it would give no further details.

Mr. Castro Hidalgo is [illegible] born in Puerto Padre, in Oriente Province in the eastern part of the island. His mother and five younger brothers and a sister still live on the island.

He joined Premier Castro's 26th of July Movement in March, 1957, fighting mainly in the Sierra Maestra. After Premier Castro came to power, Mr. Castro Hidalgo stayed with the Army and served in campaigns against guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains and against the invaders at the Bay of Pigs.

His schooling has been somewhat sparse. He left in the middle of secondary school and since then has been largely self-taught. He talks slowly, measuring his words carefully, and has an air of self-confidence and sophistication.

Selected for training

Selected for intelligence training by the Castro government in 1965, Mr. Castro Hidalgo got a grounding in both intelligence theory and tactics and guerrilla warfare practice. He also was given training in language prior to being sent to France in March, 1967.

His wife, Norma, had originally been on a list of those Cubans desirous of emigrating to the United States under the provisions of a Cuban-United States accord—but took her name off the list when she married.

It is understood that the fact that her name had been on the list was discovered by Cuban intelligence people in Havana and that an investigation of the situation was under way at the time the family defected to the United States Embassy in Luxembourg. Sources here say that she played something of a role in leading to the defection, but at the same time, Mr. Castro Hidalgo had his own reasons for defecting.

Other disclosures

Among other disclosures made by Mr. Castro Hidalgo arethese:

- Col. Francisco Caamaño Deñó, the leader of the 1965 Dominion revolution, is now in Cuba and that he arrived there shortly after Mr. Guevara's death at the hands of the Bolivian Army in October, 1967. At first Cuban officials thought they would use the Dominican officer as a replacement for Mr. Guevara, but since that time there has been no evidence that they have done so.

- Guyanan Prof. Dr. Walter Rodney, whose presence in Jamaica last year caused a furore, was helped by Cuban intelligence forces in Paris to travel to Cuba by way of both Paris and Prague.

- Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service now regarded as being run by DGI elements, was involved in a plan to infiltrate pro-Cuban agents into the ruling military junta of Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru.

- The names of Cuban intelligence agents in Chile—together with the concern on the part of Premier Castro and his associates that Eduardo Frei Montalva, Chile's reformist president, was usurping Premier Castro's place and influence in Latin America.

STATEMENT OF AGUSTIN SANCHEZ GONZALEZ

I decided to leave my diplomatic post, as Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires with the Cuban Permanent Delegation to the UN at Geneva, and not return to Cuba because I was convinced that to continue would no longer serve a noble and patriotic purpose. I have lost all hope that Cuba can be effectively extricated from the domination of Soviet influence.

During my recent visit to Cuba, from May to June of this year, I witnessed a scene of anguish and desolation. Another thing that set things in the right perspective for me were my trips abroad where I saw the reality of the situation in Communist Bloc countries, something which was quite different from what I was led to believe from Castro's propaganda.

I did not break with the regime because I had lost the wealth and privileges which in fact I have never possessed. The lot of the poor people in Cuba has never really improved and now is continually worsening. I earned a University degree on the strength of my own efforts despite the financially disadvantaged circumstances of my family. The regime for its part has foreclosed all possibilities for me to develop myself professionally. It has sought only to convert me into a mere tool of the State.

I heartily repudiate service to a regime which enslaves my country and which is making of Cuba merely another colony of Imperial Russia. I do not want my daughters to suffer the tragedy of growing up in a society where the human being loses all the attributes of humanity. They have the right to live in liberty.

An incredible state of chaos and misery reigns in Cuba today. From an already exhausted people they exact twelve hours of work each day without the most elemental compensation, through coercion and constant political indoctrination. But even in these circumstances the regime has failed to overcome the crisis in food supply for the people, which now is desperate. The indecisiveness of middle-level officials, who are immobilized from fear of incompetence, has produced disastrous consequences. Cronyism is the worst of the latest vices. The bureaucracy and the Establishment enjoy the privileges which are denied the rest of the population. One is allowed only to concur in the line put forth by the regime; any other intellectual expression results in persecution.

Aid from Moscow, reinforced following Castro's support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, is the condition without which the regime could not subsist. Yet, while the common people lack food, medicine, adequate clothing and shoes, the wealth of Cuba continues to flow abroad in a vain effort to subvert the Latin American continent.

In a sense I am a child of the Revolution, but even I have come to realize that the Revolution has failed because it has been diverted to goals which are no longer consistent with its original ideals.

DECLARACIONES DE AGUSTIN
SANCHEZ GONZALEZ

Un estado increíble de caos y miseria reina hoy en Cuba. A un pueblo ya agotado ellos le extraen doce horas de trabajo al día sin la compensación más elemental mediante la coerción y el constante adoctrinamiento político. Pero aún bajo estas circunstancias el régimen ha fracasado en superar la crisis del aprovisionamiento de comestibles para el pueblo, que ya se encuentra en una situación crítica.

La indecisión de funcionarios intermedios inmovilizados por el miedo o la incapacidad ha traído consecuencias desastrosas. El favoritismo es el peor de los últimos vicios. La burocracia y los organismos gozan de privilegios que son negados al resto de la población. Uno solamente puede aceptar la línea del régimen; cualquier otra expresión intelectual conlleva la persecución.

La ayuda de Moscú, aumentada trás el apoyo de Fidel Castro a la invasión soviética de Checoeslovaquia, es la condición sin la cual el régimen no podría subsistir. Pero mientras que el pueblo cubano carece de comida, medicinas, ropa y zapatos, la riqueza del país sigue llevándose al exterior en un vano esfuerzo por subvertir el continente latinoamericano.

En cierto sentido yo soy hijo de la Revolución, pero he llegado a comprender que la Revolución ha fracasado

porque se ha orientado hacia metas que ya no son consistentes con sus ideales originales.

Yo decidí abandonar mi cargo diplomático como Consejero de Embajada y Encargado de Negocios de la Delegación Permanente de Cuba ante las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra y no regresar a Cuba porque estaba convencido que ya no servía a una causa noble y patriótica. He perdido la esperanza que Cuba pueda ser rescatada de la dominación e influencia soviética.

Durante mi reciente visita a la Isla en mayo y junio de este año presencié un cuadro de desolación y angustia. Asimismo, durante mis viajes al exterior pude apreciar la realidad de la situación en los países del bloque comunista, realidad que resultó ser bastante distinta de lo que dice la propaganda castrista.

No me separé del régimen porque había perdido riquezas o privilegios que de hecho nunca tuve. En realidad, la suerte del pobre pueblo cubano nunca ha mejorado y ahora empeora progresivamente. Yo obtuve un título universitario por mis propios esfuerzos, a pesar de las circunstancias económicas desfavorables de mi familia.

Me niego rotundamente a servir a un régimen que subyuga a mi patria y que ha convertido a Cuba en una colonia más de la Rusia Imperial. No quiero que mis hijas sufran la tragedia de crecer en una sociedad en la que el ser humano pierde todos los atributos del género humano.

Ellas tienen derecho a vivir en la libertad.

WASHINGTON STAR
14 September 1969

'REVOLUTION EXPORT' DROPS

U.S. Aides Say Castro Is 'Pulling in His Horns'

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Latin America Writer of The Star

Premier Fidel Castro, plagued by his failures and under pressure from the Soviet Union, has sharply de-escalated Communist Cuba's role as a base for exporting guerrilla warfare and revolution to other Western Hemisphere nations, official U.S. sources have concluded.

"He's pulling in his horns and, for all practical purposes, appears to be going out the revolution-export business," according to a usually well-informed source on Cuban affairs.

The U.S. sources believe that Castro's perceptible withdrawal from the policy of acting as supply base, financial supporter and ideological preceptor for leftist violence in other Latin nations has been due to two factors:

- The disasters suffered by his guerrilla organizations operating in Bolivia, Haiti, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Argentina and earlier in Peru and Columbia.
- Strong pressure from Moscow, which has taken the line that it is better to try to win control of communism in Latin America through elections while the Soviet Union improves trade relations with the region rather than through violence generated by native or imported activists.

No Change of Heart

This does not mean that Castro has a change of heart and is moving toward rapprochement with member nations of the Organization of American States.

He still bombards Latin America with an unremitting flow of radio propaganda in Spanish, Portuguese, Creole and several indigenous dialects.

He also continues to maintain training camps and cadres of other Latin nationals, including Puerto Ricans, to be ready to take advantage of any fluid political situation that might arise.

It is well known in hemisphere capitals that Castro has a force of 2,000 well-trained para-military activists, a sort of Cuban foreign legion. This elite corps maintains a high state of readiness but is no longer being used as a staging outfit for guerrilla warfare or violent subversion in Latin America.

There also are several other camps scattered over Cuba where bands of men from Latin countries continue training as they have been since Castro eight years ago began plotting the overthrow of numerous governments.

These bands are said to range in size from platoon to company-size units. They have their own national leaders, such as Haitian Communist Rene Pestre who commands 300 men, but are trained, paid and controlled by Castro's men.

Castro's evident abandonment of the active infiltration of urban or rural guerrilla units into Latin countries and of funneling supplies or cash to those already operating in Latin lands does not mean that active subversion will cease altogether, sources indicate.

The leftist anti-government factions active in Latin America can and do support themselves by bank robberies and extortion and will continue to function whether Castro backs them with cash and men or not.

There is a strong nationalistic hue to many of the leftist organizations now active in such places as Brazil, Uruguay, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Venezuela. Such organizations as the Tupamaros of Uruguay, Yon Sosa's young gang in Guatemala, the Douglas Bravo unit in Venezuela and others are by no means dependent on Castro for their existence.

In the view here, Castro's decision to soft-pedal his export of subversion is closely related to his failures, as well as to Russian pressure.

Lost Heavily in Bolivia

Fidel lost both faith and stature when his guerrilla units were crushed in Bolivia, where he lost 20 Cuban experts as well as Ernesto (Che) Guevara, and more recently when several cells of infiltrators were rolled up in Haiti by President Francois Duvalier's security forces.

Other guerrilla bands have been either beaten or are on the run in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru and Argentina.

But Moscow's increasing influence in Havana is believed to be the more compelling factor. Agustin Sanchez Gonzalez, the defecting Cuban diplomat, said last week that Cuban foreign policy cannot contradict the designs of Moscow.

Sanchez said Moscow has imposed its will, presumably including its "peaceful" policy toward Latin America, by applying the economic squeeze on Castro.

Aiming for a 10-million-ton sugar crop in 1970, Castro needed more financing and renovated equipment for the harvest — and his 10-year agreement for subsidized sugar sales to the Soviet Union runs out next year.

It is believed Russia was able to use the carrot-stick technique on Cuba, which is uncertain that the Soviet sugar agreement will be renewed on such favorable terms as Havana now has.

By moving to a de facto cessation of exported subversion, Castro also eliminates one of the stumbling blocks to resumption of normal relations with the OAS nations and the United States.

The second condition hinges on removal of all Soviet military personnel, who are still in Cuba although at about half the 5,000-man peak of six years ago.

A third condition for better relations — the continued presence of Castro in control of Cuba's 6 million people — is hardly negotiable.

WASHINGTON STAR

Cuban Visit Disenchanting

By IRWIN SIGALE
Special to The Star

NEW YORK — It was an eye-opening summer for the youngest of a Cuban truck driver's seven children — a young man who made it big in Fidel Castro's diplomatic corps but who has now given it up to join a half-million of his countrymen in exile.

For 32-year-old Augustin Sanchez Gonzalez, living and working thousands of miles from Cuba, a trip home might have been a time of nostalgia and renewal. There would be visits with his 70-year-old father, his mother and the five brothers who know more about cigar-making and shoe-repairing than diplomacy.

And so he went, taking a leave in May from his post as charge d'affaires of Cuba's United Nations mission in Geneva, Switzerland. "I was shocked by the situation I saw in my country; it was simply painful," he related here yesterday in a quiet, unemotional voice. What he saw back home, he added, "convinced me that I was not serving a just cause."

But the story told by this law school graduate and former prosecuting attorney was not only of the "anguish and desolation" he found in his homeland before he returned to Geneva in July. It was also of what he called the subjection of Cuba to "total domination" by the Soviet Union.

Seen as Russian Colony

When Premier Castro praised the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last year, he was marking a major turning point in Havana-Moscow relations. They have grown steadily warmer ever since. So warm, in fact, that Sanchez charged Castro "is making of Cuba merely another colony of imperial Russia." Now, he said, "Cuban foreign policy cannot contradict the designs of Moscow."

According to Sanchez, the Soviet Union put an economic squeeze on Castro, forcing him to adopt a more pro-Soviet stance. Sanchez said he knew nothing of any formal pact along those lines as reported by another Cuban diplomat, Orlando Castro Hidalgo, who defected last March.

"But it is evident," he said, "that the noose of the Soviet Union tightened right after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and undoubtedly the Castro regime needed to take some steps to see that it was supplied with equipment for the sugar harvest. Some pressures were applied before the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Castro regime was encountering some difficulties. . . ."

The Castro government's plans to carry out the 1970 sugar harvest required the renovation of the sugar mills and greater financing from the Soviet Union. Difficulties arose when these demands were made to the Soviet Union. It was necessary to send high-level delegations to Moscow, and this course was made easier after the invasion of Czechoslovakia with Castro's surprising support of the invasion.

The 1970 sugar harvest, which began two months ago, in the earliest start on record, is the most vital one yet for Castro, who has staked "the honor of the revolution" on Cuba's ability to produce 10 million tons of sugar. That would be more than twice the output in the recently ended 1969 harvest. Sanchez said that despite official propaganda, few people in Cuba believed the goal would be met.

Cuba depends on sugar exports for about 90 percent of its foreign exchange, and Castro has hinted that the island may be in danger of failing to meet its sugar export commitments.

Unhappy Over Collaboration

One of the points made by Sanchez as he talked with newsmen in a Manhatten hotel suite was that "undoubtedly Cuba will have difficulties" in living up to trade agreements with Western European countries. Sanchez' specialty was foreign trade, and he was involved in some of Cuba's commercial dealings with Western countries. More than 20 percent of Cuba's trade is with the West.

Soviet economic aid to Cuba, including sugar subsidies, is believed to have reached $450 million to $500 million last year.

Sanchez told of unhappiness in the Cubans' foreign service over a virtual requirement that all Cuban diplomats "collaborate with Cuban intelligence service." He added, "This is a situation that the diplomatic corps in general repudiates." Sanchez disclosed that "some collaborations" were required of him, but he indicated that he did not follow through on one assignment to contact certain Latin Americans in Geneva and evaluate them as prospective intelligence agents.

Sanchez, his wife and their two daughters, 7 and 5, disappeared from their Geneva apartment about Aug. 14 and arrived in the U.S. about Aug. 25. Sanchez refused to tell how or when they contacted U.S. authorities. He said he was pondering his future but had made no decision about a job or a place to live. The State Department in Washington confirmed that he had been granted political asylum.

Describing the conditions he found in Cuba, Sanchez said, "There is no democracy. There is no freedom. There is persecution. The jails are full. There is hunger in Cuba. Medical assistance is lacking. Cuba is a big jail . . . work is done under pressure and threats, in very long work days without incentive of any kind. It is forbidden to travel abroad. Ideas are persecuted, and in the end you have to agree with the imposed line. And there is a general mood of chaos in the country.

". . . While the common people lack food, medicine, adequate clothing and shoes, the wealth of Cuba continues to flow abroad in a vain effort to subvert the Latin American continent."

Asked why he waited this long to defect, since some of the conditions are not now, Sanchez replied, "The situation in Cuba has been deteriorating progressively. Many young men like me, who were practically born with the revolution, who had great faith in Fidel Castro and who love their soil, have not found it easy to abandon their country."

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October 1969

ANATOLY KUZNETSOV

On 30 July it was announced in London that Anatoly Kuznetsov had evaded his KGB escort and asked to be allowed to stay in Great Britain. Kuznetsov is the most prominent defector from the Soviet Union since Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, and is the most noted author to renounce the Soviet Union during the entire post-World War II period. Kuznetsov is also noteworthy because he is of the generation of the "new Soviet man," having been born in 1929 and raised solely under the Communist system, and because his success as a writer entitled him to well-above-average living conditions.

Kuznetsov's defection received voluminous coverage in the news media. The attached press clips and transcript of a TV interview cover the essential elements of Kuznetsov's story, particularly his statements concerning the suppression of writers and the role of the KGB (secret police) in the USSR.

Kuznetsov's background and career in the USSR were sufficiently unblemished for the KGB eventually to give him permission - however begrudgingly -- to travel abroad. His father and mother, of working class origin, had risen to engineer and teacher, respectively. Kuznetsov left school for financial reasons in 1952 and worked in construction while finishing high school at night. He entered Moscow's famed Gorky Literary Institute in 1954 and, after alternating his studies with dam construction work in Irkutsk, Siberia, graduated in 1960 at the age of 31. Kuznetsov's writing is characterized by realism, and it is difficult to categorize him as a liberal or a conservative, although his descriptions of reality, especially in *The Fire*, have provoked vigorous criticism from Soviet conservatives.

The highlights of Kuznetsov's career to date have been his novels *Babi Yar*, published serially in the youth magazine *Yunost* in 1966, and *The Fire*, published in *Yunost* in 1969. *Babi Yar* is a novel which documents the massacre by the Nazis of the Jewish population of Kiev in 1941. *The Fire* portrays the demoralization and self-centeredness of a town with a large metallurgical plant.

Kuznetsov's reasons for defecting are forcefully stated in three letters he wrote to Soviet organizations, and in several of the attached articles in British and U.S. newspapers. The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia was the event which triggered his resolve to defect. For Kuznetsov there remained after that no hope that he could somehow manage to overcome the restrictions placed on his freedom to write in the USSR.

I. Articles by Kuznetsov

A. "Kuznetsov Condemns the Tragedy of Russian Writers," Daily Telegraph, London, 14 August.

B. Letters sent by Kuznetsov to the Soviet Government, the Communist Party of the USSR and the Union of Writers of the USSR, Daily Telegraph, London, 4 August.

C. "My First Encounter with Communist Censorship," Daily Telegraph, 7 August.

D. "A Writer's Problems Under Soviet," Daily Telegraph, London, 17 August.

E. "Russian Writers and the Secret Police," Daily Telegraph, London, 10 August.

F. Reactions of Russian people to Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, Daily Telegraph, London, 21 August.

II. Interviews

A. "What Russians Think," interview by David Floyd, Daily Telegraph, London, 24 August.

B. TV interview "The Ordeal of Anatoly Kuznetsov," CBS, 2 September.

C. Harrison Salisbury Interview in New York Times, 24 August.

III. Articles about Kuznetsov

A. "Russian Is Granted Asylum," by David Floyd, Daily Telegraph, London, 31 July.

B. "Russian Defector," Man in the News biographical background by Israel Shenker, New York Times, 1 August.

IV. Background of Struggle Between Soviet Regime and Intellectuals

A. "Soviet Writers are Facing a Painful Dilemma," by Leopold Labedz, London Times, 1 August.

B. "Why Kuznetsov Fled," by Edward Crankshaw, London Observer Review, 3 August.

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C. "P.E.N. Congress May Discuss Censorship of Soviet Writers," by Henry Raymont, New York Times, 12 August.

D. "Soviet Pianist Says He Dare Not Go Back," by John Ezard, Manchester Guardian, 21 August.

E. "Notes and Comment," The New Yorker, 13 September.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
4 August 1969

I.A.

Kuznetsov condemns the tragedy of Russian writers

BOOKS WERE BURNED UNDER STALIN: NOW MINE WILL BE

Anatoli Kuznetsov, the 40-year-old Russian author who sought asylum in Britain last week made public his reasons for leaving Russia in a statement published exclusively in The Sunday Telegraph *yesterday. The text of the declaration, part of three letters by Kuznetsov, also published in* The Sunday Telegraph, *is given here.*

My Explanation: You will say it's hard to understand: Why should a writer whose books have sold millions of copies and who is extremely popular and well-off in his own country, suddenly decide not to return to that country—which, moreover, he loves?

The Loss of Hope: I simply cannot live there any longer. This feeling is something stronger than me. I just can't go on living there. If I were now to find myself again in the Soviet Union, I should go out of my mind.

If I were not a writer, I might have been able to bear it. But, since I *am* a writer, I can't. Writing is the only occupation in the world that seriously appeals to me.

When I write I have the illusion that there is some sort of sense in my life. Not to write is for me roughly the same as for a fish not to swim. I have been writing as long as I can remember. My first work was published 25 years ago.

In those 25 years *not a single one* of my works has been printed in the Soviet Union as I wrote it.

Went on hoping

For political reasons the Soviet censorship and the editors shorten, distort and violate my works to the point of making them completely unrecognisable. Or they do not permit them to be published at all.

So long as I was young I went on hoping for something. But the appearance of each new work of mine was not a cause for rejoicing but for sorrow. Because my writing appears in such an ugly, false and disshapen form, and I am ashamed to look people in the face.

To write a good book in the Soviet Union—that is still the simplest thing to do. The real trouble begins only later, when you try to get it published.

For the last 10 years I have been living in a state of constant, unavoidable and irresolvable contradiction. Finally I have *simply* given up. I wrote my last novel *The Fire* with no feeling left in my heart, without faith and without hope.

Could no longer write

I knew already in advance for certain that, even if they published it, they would ruthlessly cut everything human out of it, and that at best it would appear as just one more "ideological" pot-boiler. (And that is, incidentally, exactly what happened.)

I came to the point where I could no longer write, no longer sleep, no longer breathe. . . .

The Tragedy of Russian Writers: What is valuable in literature is what is new, what contains something which is artistically original. A writer is above all an artist who is trying to penetrate into the unknown. He must be honest and objective, and be able to work in freedom. These are all obvious truths.

These are the very things which writers are forbidden in the Soviet Union.

Artistic freedom in the Soviet Union has been reduced to the "freedom" to praise the Soviet system and the Communist party and to urge people to fight for Communism.

The theoretical basis for this is an article which Lenin wrote 60 years ago on "The Party Organisation and Party Literature," which laid it down that every writer is a propagandist for the Party. His job is to receive slogans and orders from the Party and make propaganda out of them.

This means that writers in Russia are faced with the following choice:

(a) Simply to go along with this idiocy—to let their brains and their consciences have no effect on their actions. If Stalin is on top, then praise Stalin. If they order people to plant maize, then write about maize. If they decide to expose Stalin's crimes, then expose Stalin. And when they stop criticising him, you stop too.

Spiritual cripples

There are so very many Soviet "writers" who are just like that. But real life will not forgive a man who violates his conscience. Those writers have all become such cynics and spiritual cripples and their hidden regret for their wasted talent eats away at them to such an extent that their wretched existence cannot be called life but rather a caricature of life.

It would probably be difficult to think up a worse punishment for oneself than to have to spend one's whole life trembling, cringing, trying fearfully to get the sense of the latest order and fearing to make the slightest mistake. Oh, God!

(b) To write properly, as their ability and consciences dictate.

It is then a hundred to one that what they write will not be published. It will simply be buried. It may even be the cause of the author's physical destruction.

It is a sad thought that Russia has long and deep "traditions" in this connection. The best Russian writers were always persecuted, dragged before the courts, murdered or reduced to suicide.

(c) To try and write honestly "as far as possible." To choose subjects which are not dangerous. To write in allegories. To seek out cracks in the censorship. To circulate your works from hand to hand in manuscript form. (But not anti-Soviet works, because then they'd arrest you!)

To do at least *something*! A sort of compromise solution.

I was one of those who chose this third way. But it didn't work for me. The censors always managed to bring me to my knees. My anxiety to save at least something from what I had written, so that something would reach the reader, meant only in the end that all my published writings were neither genuine literature nor utterly contemptible but something in between.

They were some kind of unlikely product of a deal between the censorship and an author's conscience.

However much I protested or tried to prove some point, it was like beating my head against a wall. Literature in the Soviet Union is controlled by people who are ignorant, cynical and themselves very remote from literature. But they are people with excellent knowledge of the latest instructions from the men at the top and of the prevailing Party dogmas.

I could not force my way through their ranks. Yevtushenko managed to achieve a little in this way, Solzhenitsyn managed a little more, but even that is all over now. The cracks were noticed and cemented up. Russian writers go on writing and keep hoping for something. It is a nightmare.

My Mania: So far a quarter of a century I went on dreaming about a happy state of affairs which is unthinkable for a Soviet writer—to be able to

write and publish his writings without restriction and without fear. Not to c[illegible] song. To have no thought for Party instructions, government-appointed editors and political censors.

Not to start trembling at every knock on the door. Not to be hiding his manuscripts away in a hole in the ground almost before the ink on them is dry.

MSS in jam-jars

Oh, the number of holes I have dug in the ground to conceal my jam-jars full of "dangerous" and "doubtful" manuscripts. I couldn't keep them in my desk because whenever I wasn't there my flat could be broken into and searched and my manuscripts confiscated, as happened with Solzhenitsyn and many others.

My writing desk in fact had no drawers at all. The Russian earth itself served as my desk and my safe.

It became a real mania for me to be able to see my writing published in the form in which I had written it. I wanted to see it just once, and then they could do what they liked with me. Yes, in that sense I was a sick man, I was a maniac.

I Dissociate Myself: As a boy I saw books being burned in Russia in 1937, under Stalin. I saw books being burned in 1942 in occupied Kiev, under Hitler.

And now it has pleased God to let me know in my own lifetime that my own books are being burned. Because now that I have left the Soviet Union my books will of course be destroyed there too.

Name renounced

Some books or other are always being destroyed there, so why should my books be an exception? In fact I pray that my published works *should* be destroyed down to the very last one. [illegible] I actually wrote and wanted to say to my readers, that means, after all, that they are NOT MY books! I dissociate myself from them.

And so:

I hereby, publicly and definitively, dissociate myself from everything which has been published under the name of "Kuznetsov" in the USSR or has appeared in translation from Soviet editions in other countries of the world.

I solemnly declare that Kuznetsov is a dishonest, conformist, cowardly author. I renounce this name.

I want to be, at last, an honest man and an honest writer. All my writings published from this day onwards will bear the signature "A. Anatol." I request you to regard only such works as being mine.

What Do I Hope For? In recent years I have, from time to time, locked securely in my room, permitted myself a treat: I wrote as I pleased. It was a painful and unusual experience. It was as if, in a world where everybody went on all fours, somebody, shut in a cellar, had stood up and walked upright.

Then for some months I dug my manuscripts up from their hiding place in the grounds, photographed them and buried them again. I have succeeded in bringing those films across the frontier with me—thousands of pages on film, everything I have ever written in my life.

They include my known works, such as *Babyi Yar*, but in its *true* form. They also include things that could not be published in Russia. And some that I doubt whether I shall be able to publish in the West.

But now I have at least the hope. At least . . . .

In [illegible] works of Kuznetsov but of a quite different author. Not a Soviet author and not a Western author, not a red one and not a white one, but just an author living in this 20th century on this earth.

And, what is more, a writer who has made a desperate effort to be in this century an honest writer and who wants to associate himself with those who strive for humanity in the present wild, wild, wild life of this mad, mad world.

Yours,

A. Anatol.

Author knows he can write freely

MR. DAVID FLOYD, Communist Affairs Correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Sunday Telegraph,* was questioned on the radio programme, "The World this Weekend" yesterday, about the first public statement made by the Russian author, Anatoli Kuznetsov, 40, since leaving the Soviet Union.

Of the author's decision to renounce his name and dissociate himself from everything published under it, Mr. Floyd said: "He wants to make clear that what he wrote in the past was not his writing."

It had been a mixture of what Kuznetsov wanted to say and what was forced on him by the Russian authorities. "Henceforth, he knows he will write freely and completely and say everything he wants to say."

Asked how Kuznetsov was living, Mr. Floyd said: "He is very well. He is very glad that [illegible] he has made in his letters to the Russian leaders and the Soviet Government and in his statement have got over clearly."

Precautions taken

Kuznetsov had released to Mr. Floyd copies of letters he sent to Moscow in which he formally resigned from the Soviet Communist party and the Union of Writers of the USSR.

Questioned about possible Russian attempts to get Kutnetsov back, Mr Floyde said that precautions had been taken, although what the Russian authorities would like to do or what they would do in practice could not be assessed exactly.

"They seem to have been very cross and would like access to him. I do not think they would persuade him to change his mind."

A man who had gone to such trouble to prepare his departure was not likely to be moved by meeting "some secretary from the Soviet Embassy."

Year's preparation

In his letter to the Soviet Government, Kuznetsov revealed that he took the decision to flee a long time ago and prepared to carry it out for a whole year.

About the life he saw Kuznetsov leading, Mr. Floyd said he thought the author would have some money in the bank and the means of living for several years.

"I would have thought he would be successful. A great problem for him is how long he can go on writing and how long he will retain the spirit of his own culture and literature. This is a big poblem but Kuznetsov had no choice."

DAILY TELEGRAPH
4 August 1969

I.B.

'I beg, do not persecute my mother'

BELOW in full are the three letters sent by Anatoli Kuznetsov to the Soviet Government, the Communist party and the Writers' Union.

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Declaration:

After much serious reflection over many years I have arrived at the complete rejection of Marxism-Leninism.

I consider today that this doctrine is utterly obsolete, rigid and naïve. It is utterly incapable of resolving the contradictions in society today, and, what is worse, it has led, continues to lead and threatens to go on leading to frightful social tragedies.

I can no longer remain a member of the Communist party which bases its policy on this doctrine. I request you to release me from membership of the CPSU.

I hereby withdraw from my duties as party secretary of the writers' organisation of the Tula region. I have left my party membership card there.

(Signed)

Kuznetsov, Anatoli Vasilevich
Member of the CPSU since 1955.

London, Aug. 1, 1969.

★

To the Union of Writers of the USSR. Declaration:

I, a member of the Union of Writers of the USSR since 1959, have written a number of works in which I have tried to be guided by the principles of "socialist realism." But with every work I have written conditions have become more restricted and difficult.

After long reflection and much practical experience I have come to realise the utter falsity, stupidity and reactionary nature of "socialist realism."

The most frightful failures and the periods of complete prostration which descend on official Soviet literature are due, I am firmly convinced, to the imposition on it by dictatorial means of "socialist realism," and in

particular of the doctrine of the "party content" of literature.

I no longer wish to remain a member of the Union of Writers of the U S S R. I request you to release me from membership and from my obligations as deputy-secretary of the Tula regional writers' organisation.

(Signed) ANATOLI KUZNETSOV.
London, Aug. 1, 1969.

★

To the Soviet Government.

I am remaining in Britain so as to be able to carry on in freedom the work which is the very essence of my life—literature.

I took this decision a long time ago, after having thought about it carefully, and I have been preparing to carry it out for a whole year.

Nobody else knew about this but me. Conditions of life in the Soviet Union, where everybody is obliged to spy on everybody else and where hypocrisy prevails, does not allow anyone to take the risk of entrusting a single person with such a secret.

Moreover, I was twice refused permission to travel abroad. I realised that a third refusal would mean that I would never be allowed out of Russia.

For that reason I made preparations at the same time to cross the frontier by swimming under water. I have to mention all this so as to make it clear just how serious a matter it was and that no one else was, or could be, involved in my plans.

I beg the Soviet Government not to persecute my mother, my son, my wife or my personal secretary. It is bad enough for them already, and it will be worse still, because my earnings were their only means of support.

I beg you not to confiscate their possessions and not to deprive them of their accommodation. I swear that they knew nothing at all.

I have informed the Soviet Embassy in London that I have not the slightest desire to meet any Soviet official. I request you to send instructions to the Embassy that I should be left in peace.

Strictly personally, for my own part, I have decided that if ever it should be possible for me to meet any Soviet officials or to offer them my hand, it will not be before the U S S R grants complete freedom to Czechoslovakia and withdraws its troops from there forever.

If any organisation in the U S S R has any financial claims on me under any contract, I undertake to pay them off in the course of a year on receipt of a proper account.

I also wish to apologise for the deception to which I had to resort in order to obtain permission to leave Russia. It was a deception forced on me. You yourselves created the conditions in which it is impossible even to go abroad without trickery.

(Signed) ANATOLI KUZNETSOV,
Aug. 1, 1969.

TELEGRAPH, London
7 August 1969

I.C.

MY FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH COMMUNIST CENSORSHIP

The two faces of a Soviet novel

By A. ANATOL (Anatoli Kuznetsov)

JUST over 10 years ago I was an utterly unknown student at the Literary Institute in Moscow. I wrote and offered to the magazine *Yunost* a novel about a young man who went to work in Siberia. I described the life there as it really was (I had myself worked on construction sites in Siberia), with its hardships and its poverty, but also with a young person's obstinate faith that things would improve and that some good would come ultimately of it all.

The editors of *Yunost* liked the novel very much. But there could be no question, they said, of publishing it. It would not get through the censorship. The authorities would ban the magazine if it printed the novel and I would be arrested or, at the very least, my prospects of a career as a writer would be gone for ever. Life in Siberia had to be shown in the brightest colours so that young people would go there to work.

But the most important objection was that if my novel were published Western propagandists would seize on it and shout: "Look: here is an honest piece of reporting from the Soviet Union itself—see how frightful it is to live there."

True, there was still a possibility of rescuing the novel, they said. The rules of "Socialist realism" permitted an author to reveal a little of the blemishes in Soviet life, but only if it was made clear that they were minor defects soon to be removed, while the work as a whole must be infused with optimism and Communist ideology.

★

It would be possible, they said, to remove the more gloomy passages from my novel, "The Continuation of a Legend," to add some more cheerful passages and, by means of a few slogans, to give it the necessary spirit of Communist optimism. Then, maybe, they would print it.

More experienced writers advised me that this was the way to do it: that I must try to get at least something across to the reader and that readers in Russia knew perfectly well how to distinguish between what an author has written out of sincere conviction and what he has written simply to satisfy the authorities. Everybody does it, they said.

But I couldn't bring myself to do it. For a long, long time the novel lay there without the slightest hope of being published. But then I forced myself to write some additional passages, which were so out of keeping with the style of the rest of the book and so ridiculously optimistic that no reader was likely to take them seriously. But I was young and inexperienced, and such work did not satisfy the editors. They turned the novel down altogether.

I suffered a great deal, quarrelled with everybody, became almost hysterical, and finally moved out of Moscow. Then one day, quite by chance, I bought a copy of *Yunost*, opened it and couldn't believe my eyes: my novel had been published. I read it through on the spot and what I read made my hair stand on end.

Quite without my knowledge or agreement, someone had done the crudest hatchet job on my novel, cutting, re-writing and adding. The novel had now been given as ideologically optimistic a tone as anyone could wish. I remember bursting into bitter tears of pain and frustration.

And so my "Continuation of a Legend" was sent off around the

world. It was translated into more than 30 languages; it was praised in the Soviet Press; it was included in reading lists for Soviet schoolchildren. Imitations of my work started to appear. Later still the critics began to describe me as the originator of a new way of depicting young people in Soviet literature.

Apparently there must have been something human left in the novel, because even in its new form people liked it. It was especially popular in Czechoslovakia, where it went through five or six editions, if I am not mistaken.

But that was later. Before that came the great scandal. Louis Aragon [the French Communist author] sent us from France a copy of an anti-Soviet book, "L'Etoile dans le Brouillard," which turned out to be a translation of my novel.

I was summoned to appear before the Foreign Commission of the Union of Writers. In icy but highly meaningful silence they handed me the book along with a translation of the preface to it. The translator, M. Chaleil, had written that, of all the Soviet books he had read, my novel had moved him most because of its truthfulness and sincerity and he recommended people to read this account by a young, honest, author from the Soviet Union itself, revealing how frightful life was there.

I was then put into an office, where I sat under lock and key, turning over the pages of "L'Etoile dans le Brouillard" and thinking. I had a fairly clear idea of what had happened. M. Chaleil had simply not bothered to translate those optimistic chapters which had been forced out of me, and had merely summarised them with the comment that they were poorer in quality than the other chapters.

He had understood me precisely. (It was only later that I learned that he had once been a missionary in China and, through no fault of his own, had fetched up in a concentration camp in Siberia in the very same parts as I described in my novel. He was rescued by the International Red Cross. That was why he understood so well what I was saying).

The French edition was the best of all of them. And I sat there wondering what would happen now: would they close down *Yunost*, would they arrest me or would they simply bring my career as a writer to an end once and for all?

[illegible] led into another office.

"Well?" they asked. "So you've written an anti-Soviet book?"

"Chapters have been cut in the course of translation" I muttered.

"Then you can just sit down and write a complaint. Aragon will print it in his *Lettres Françaises*, and he wants you to make a statement to the French courts. Maybe it will be possible to sue the publisher."

I was handed a pen and a blank piece of paper and they dictated to me the text of my complaint. I was utterly overcome, my hands were shaking, and, no matter how I tried, I can still not recall a single sentence of that letter. They took it straight off me and the Foreign Commission sealed it and sent it off.

Meanwhile I was allowed to go away with orders to turn up the next day with a reasoned, indignant protest for publication in the *Lettres Françaises*.

I have lived all my life in Russia and know no other way of life. And life there is such that only he survives who is constantly looking out for himself.

"The Continuation of a Legend" was my first novel, my first book. It was only because of it that I was accepted into the Union of Writers. I was living in a student hostel where I was not allowed to have my wife with me, so that for years we moved from place to place with no possessions and because we had no home for eight years we could not allow ourselves to have a child. But now, as a member of the union I had some hope of getting a flat. Moreover, I was due to present my final thesis at the Institute and the novel was to be part of it.

★

In those days the fuss about Dudintsev's "Not By Bread Alone" and Pasternak's "Dr Zhivago" was fresh in people's minds. Pasternak's tragic fate is well known. The affair of Sinyavsky and Daniel still lay ahead.

I did not produce my complaint the next day—I couldn't get myself into the right frame of mind. I wonder if you have ever had to cut a calf's throat? You are sorry for the animal but you stimulate in yourself the necessary cruelty. It is only the first time that it's really horrible to stick the knife in; later [illegible] the calf and the blood excite in you the spirit of the slaughterman and you stab fiercely until the animal dies.

In much the same way I spurred myself to write the standard Soviet phrases of hatred and I managed to produce my protest, entitled "Literary Robbery." Actually it was I who had suffered robbery at the hands of *Yunost*, yet I was accusing the French publishers of doing it to me. The distortion of my work had been committed in Russia yet I was declaring the Abbé Chaleil's translation to be a distortion.

My protest appeared in the *Literary Gazette* in Russia and in the *Lettres Françaises* in France, and many other papers wrote about it.

One day I was suddenly called to the Foreign Commission, rushed out to a restaurant and seated at a well laid table at which about a dozen gentlemen were drinking, eating and talking French. I was terribly badly dressed, ashamed of my ignorance of the language, and couldn't understand why I was sitting there, when my neighbour leaned across and said in Russian: "Why do you sit there so rudely without opening your mouth? You are meeting your lawyer from Paris. Say something!"

In the end the lawyer, M. Ambré, talked to me for about 10 minutes, informed me that my case was to be heard in France, and appeared to promise that I might be required to appear in person. With that he departed to inspect the sights of Moscow, to buy classical music on records, and that was the last I saw of him. Presumably he didn't take to me, because about six months later a friend rang me up and shouted: "Read the papers, your case is on in France!" I realised that it was being heard without me.

I rushed off to buy the papers and bought them every day to follow with curiosity my case in the French courts. I was especially pleased with the frequency with which M. Ambré said: "When I was in Moscow and had my meetings with M. Kuznetsov. . . ."

I was equally surprised to learn that M. Maurice Garçon, a member of Académie Française, was appearing on my behalf. And it was also from the newspapers that I learned of the court's verdict and the damages of 1,000 francs awarded to me.

I never received a copy of the verdict nor did I receive the 1,000 francs. I still don't know to this day what happened to them. But my friends poked a lot of fun at me because of them, and asked to see the money.

I still do not know who organised that court case so skilfully. Louis Aragon? But his name did not figure in the newspapers. At all events, once it was over I was included in a delegation of writers going to Paris in connection with the Soviet exhibition.

In Paris I was taken immediately to see Aragon But he seemed not to take to me and avoided talking about the case.

As I left him I asked some passers-by where the Ministry of Justice was. I went up to it, stood there for several minutes and, with numbness in my heart, asked myself: "Shall I go in? Shall I tell them?" Then I recalled Russia, my mother, my wife and son, whom I loved so much, and I turned and walked away.

I came to the conclusion then that it was my great misfortune to have been "born in Russia with brains and talent," but that my fate had been decided the moment I wrote that complaint under dictation. If you say "A" you have to say "B," and I was caught and condemned to live as all Soviet writers live—that is, keeping silent, looking out for themselves and still trying to get something across to the reader. This was only fair, but I did not imagine that conscience can cause such terrible pain. I did not think that one's conscience could be so frightful a burden.

I am enclosing this detailed explanatory note with my letter to the French Minister of Justice.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 August 1969

I.D.

Anatoly Kuznetsov, the Defector, Tells of a Writer's Problems Under Soviet

The following article, "My Diary in the Other World," is by the 39-year-old Soviet author who sought refuge in Britain two weeks ago, maintaining that he could no longer work under repression. Mr. Kuznetsov says he has culled passages from his diary, smuggled out of the Soviet Union on microfilm, to show how the Communist system affects a writer.

By ANATOLY KUZNETSOV

Even before I began to think of fleeing from the Soviet Union, I used occasionally to jot down my thoughts, just for my own purposes, without any hope of their ever being published. It was like sobbing into one's pillow, so that no one should see or hear or even suspect what was going on.

Last week, while I was taking prints from the microfilms I smuggled out of Russia, I started reading through those jottings and it occurred to me that, after all, they were a worthwhile document in themselves. They do not reflect just the state that I myself was in at the time; they reflect the attitude of literally all thinking people in Soviet Russia.

I put them onto film because I thought that they might come in useful to me when I was working on future novels in Britain. But I think you will agree that they in themselves speak eloquently about life in Russia.

SPRING, 1967

It is difficult for people who have never had to live under a dictatorship or the terror of a fascist regime to understand the great silence that has descended on the Soviet Union. The only people who have the right to speak in Russia today are liars, people who have consciously allowed themselves to be brainwashed, or just plain idiots.

There is no political debate in the Soviet Union, none at all. There is only official propaganda. There is no philosophy because the Marxism. That is not philosophy, but simply propaganda.

There is practically no real literature, no writing of real quality, in Russia today. That is to say, it exists only in that branch of writing that remains within the limits of propaganda. Any word of criticism directed against the system or even only expressing some doubt about it or some small part of it is impossible. Because of this there is no literary criticism.

This is nothing new. There have been in the course of the history of mankind many periods of brutal dictatorship, but there has never been a dictatorship that has held such vast numbers of people so firmly in its grip as the one that exists today in the Soviet Union.

That most normal, most fundamental and natural of desires — to speak the truth, or at least to say what you think — is a forgotten, unrealizable dream. Throughout his conscious life a man lives in fear of saying something he should not say. And I can no longer live like this.

Every word that I put down here is a cry of pain, of truth, of sincerity and of suffering, because I am hardly likely ever to know whether my words are published. But I shall go on writing because that is the only way that I have a few minutes when I can breathe freely.

SUMMER, 1967

The Soviet Union is a fascist state. The intellectuals in Russia are among the most unfortunate intellectuals in the world, if not the most unfortunate. I do not have in mind those venal cynics and cretins produced by the Soviet system, I use the word "intelligentsia" in its original and proper sense.

Being part of the intelligentsia, the writer is in a particularly painful situation. Because, while an ordinary intellectual person can see and understand everything and yet remain silent, the writer, by virtue of his very profession, is forced to say "I cannot remain silent!" It is as impossible to have a writer, in the true sense of the word, in Russia as it is to have a wild lion in a circus. Russia is in fact one gigantic circus in which the animals sit in cages, while the life of society is one long performance in the ring.

AUTUMN, 1967

It was a sad day for me when I was born in Russia. The world is so vast, yet I had the bad luck to come into it in that long-suffering country. But the fact of being born here will affect the whole of my life. So much for your place of birth!

It means that I have been condemned to fear for the whole of my life. From the age of 5 I have been living in a state of fear: the famine of the early thirties, the arrests, trials and deportations of the years 1937 to 1939, then the war with Germany and the horrors of the post-war period and constant fear, plus enforced silence.

This is not just my personal lot; it is the fate of all who are born in this Russian land, cursed by God for goodness knows what sins. All of them, those who command and those who are regimented, those who punish and those who are punished, are afraid. Because they are all afraid of each other. And those who fear most of all are the dictators themselves.

WHAT THEY DO WITH MY NOVELS

My first novel, "The Continuation of a Legend," was turned down unanimously by the editorial board of the magazine Yunost. Outside in the corridor they took me by the hand and said: "Marvelous job! But you know the way it is."

I was staying with my mother in Kiev when I discovered that my novel had been printed in the magazine in an abridged version [in 1957]. I learned that the editor in chief, Valentin Katayev, had said: "What a pity, after all, it's a good novel. Like it or not, we'll publish it: Let them shut the magazine down if they wish!"

That's what he said, but then they made about 50 cuts and changes, without of course the knowledge or agreement of the author.

Then a miracle happened. The "Legend" unexpectedly took the fancy of the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, the editor of which at that time was Aleksei Adzhubei [Nikita S. Khrushchev's son-in-law]. That was a very important development. Other papers followed Adzhubei's example. And Yunost was not shut down.

I offered my second novel, "In Your Own Home," to the same magazine Yunost. The verdict was: "Extremely talented, but Soviet life is described in frightful terms. Needs some brightening up."

I took the manuscript back and submitted it to Novy Mir [a liberal magazine]. But Aleksandr Tvardovsky [the editor] told me he had read it right through in a single night and had derived great pleasure from it, that it was as striking a piece of writing as Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," but that it could not be published. I should have to wait. Then he asked why I had done so much "lacquering" [deliberately optimistic writing to please the censor]. I ought not to write half the truth but all of it, he said.

I said: "For my part I can write all of it, but will you print it?" He said: "That has nothing to do with you. For the time being we are not going to print it as it is."

I took my manuscript back and went off with it to the magazine Molodaya Gvardiya — the very opposite of Yunost — where I had one hope. The two magazines are like cat and dog.

If one turns you down, you go to the other, not forgetting to say its rival has rejected your manuscript. That is what I did. They handed me my manuscript back with a warm handshake and with thanks for the pleasure it had given: "It is absolutely brilliant, but we cannot, of course, print it. You know how it is."

Then I took my manuscript to Oktyabr [a conservative literary magazine] the very opposite of Novy Mir. I told the editor, Vsevolod Kochetov, where, how and why it had been turned down. He

spent a long time reading it. Finally he asked me to come and see him.

"I don't understand," he said, "where Tvardovsky found the lacquering in this, or what sort of lacquering Yumost wanted. I write things much more critical than this myself and have no fears. But we are not going to print it. It's written far too badly."

So I put the manuscript away in a cupboard.

A year later, I had a telephone call from someone at Novy Mir: "If you will agree to a few cuts we will print the novel." All right, better have something published than nothing at all, I agreed.

More Cuts Requested

I had always respected Novy Mir. I decided to put up with it and leave it to them. Then the phone calls to my home in Tula began. Every day or two: "We shall have to cut this passage and that chapter." At first I protested, then groaned: Do as you please, only take my name off it. From then I felt numb and indifferent. They succeeded in persuading me to leave my name on it. The only thing I achieved was (don't laugh) that they did not put "Anatoly Kuznetsov" but "A. Kuznetsov."

A third of the text was cut and the idea behind the novel changed through 180 degrees. When anybody started a conversation about it, I always replied: "I do not discuss it. It is not my work."

Meanwhile the book [in 1964] sold hundreds of thousands of copies was declared one of the 10 best Soviet books about life in the country, and was awarded a diploma by the Central Committee of the Communist youth organization& which I did not bother to go and receive.

Story of 'Babi Yar'

Instead I wrote my third novel, "Babi Yar." From the very first I did not offer the full text to anyone because it clearly suggested that there was no difference between Hitler's fascism and Soviet fascism (I did not try to prove this, but to my surprise that is what emerged.)

I submitted an inoffensive text in which, it seemed to me, the censorship would not find the slightest thing to object to.

At Yunost they said with one voice that it was a great work, but they demanded that I make cuts. I said: "No, I won't let it be changed. Give me my manuscript back."

"No," replied the editor, Boris Polevoi. "We shall not return the manuscript; we shall print it with cuts."

I shouted: "Give me my manuscript; it's my manuscript!"

When they refused I grabbed it and rushed out onto Vorovsky Street. I tore the manuscript to shreds and stuffed the waste-paper bins in Vorovsky Street full of them, all the way down to Arbat Square. Only later did I realize that I had torn up the second copy and had left the original with them.

They telephoned me in Tula to say that there would be no work for me to do, that all the correcting had already been done, and that when it appeared there would be a note saying that the novel was being published in an abridged form. They reminded me that otherwise I would have to return the advance I had received under my contract. I agreed because there was no other way out.

Then I received the proofs with all the changes made. I could no longer stop the machine once it was going: I would have to pay for the resetting, and in those days I was up to my ears in debt.

They printed it, with a note saying: "Magazine version," which meant nothing to anybody.

It was very odd to hear later from many knowledgeable people that, if it had been held up another month, even "Babi Yar" would not have been published in any form whatsoever. The situation changed. It appeared that I had been lucky and that I ought to thank Yunost. In 1967 the novel was not reprinted. Permission to reprint was refused.

On one occasion they cut a whole sentence out of something that Ilya Ehrenberg had written. When he learnt of it he was furious. The editors said in self-justification: "It's just one little sentence, a very small thing." He shouted: "And when they castrate a man they also cut out a very small thing."

In the same way absolutely everything that was published under my name was castrated.

You spend your life acquiring a certain skill, striving, laboring, achieving something in art and breaking some new ground, and then they destroy it all for you, calmly and deliberately, and pick on the very things that cost you so much effort and of which you were so proud as a writer and an artist.

Who does the destroying? First, people who understand as much about art as a pig does about oranges. Who, in place of brains, have a collection of quotations, and fear.

It is even worse when your own colleagues and writers do the destroying. In "Babi Yar" I described the Ukrainian officials who worked under Hitler's recruiting Ukrainians for Germany and sending them off to the Gestapo. You couldn't get around your "own" people in their embroidered shirts, as you could get around the Germans.

Polevoi Is Criticized

In the same way people like the editor of Yunost, Boris Polevoi, a writer known throughout the world, knows his own colleagues. You cannot get around Polevoi, because he will see things the censor will miss. He will immediately mark your best passages with thick green pencil: "Cut" or "Unsuitable." Everywhere the first censors are the so-called writers, the cynics who do not even bother to conceal this fact.

I told Polevoi to his face: "You are a frightful cynic." His face broke into a smile of self-satisfaction and he simply said: "Yes," and he added: "So what? You think you're going to write and I'm going to carry the can? The writing is yours, the backsides are ours."

Everything I have written exists in three versions. The first is the genuine original. The second is the one cut and amended for the Polevois. But it doesn't get through. So the third version emerges, colorless, banal, cheap and, above all, cowardly. This is the version that reaches the reader. It becomes known to the world as "Soviet literature."

THE COST OF 'SAMIZDAT'

Is there a way out? "Samizdat" [circulating typewritten copies] is still all right for publishing poetry. But how many copies of a novel can I publish in that way? If I pay the typists, maybe 100 copies at the cost of terrible effort — a pathetic gesture that cannot compete with the millions of copies of the poor stuff published under the same name.

And you'd be arrested for it at once. The end of you as a writer. The lone soldier against the gigantic machine.

Private printers do not exist, of course. An underground print shop would be betrayed by agents.

Then comes the most frightful part of it for a creative writer. I begin to feel that I am getting stupid. I am losing any ability I had.

Then there is the darkness, the lack of information, the ignorance of what has been achieved in the West. I have heard of the names of Françoise Sagan, Camus, Kafka, and so forth. I have heard, but never read. Somewhere people are discovering things, seeking new forms and ways of writing, moving forward, arguing, while I keep banging and banging away without achieving the slightest breakthrough.

A CRY OF PAIN

Nov. 7, 1967. The 50th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet state.

I walk around, sit down, stand up and keep thinking about the same thing. I feel as if I were in prison. I am incapable of writing. I have no hope of seeing my writing published, now or in the future. I am condemned to write and publish to the end of my life only what they permit.

I sit down to write, but the only thing I can type is this pathetic complaint to nowhere.

I used to be able to, but now I can't. If I write, then to whom am I writing? Why am I writing? I already have sufficient "literary" works to my name. Not that I wrote them myself. Kind people gave me a hand.

The profanation of literature. Is that now prostitution? But it is far worse than the good, straight-forward, second-oldest profession. To yield one's body for an hour or so for money — what a trifle! But they make you prostitute your mind, your whole being, your skill and your talent. For a bowl of soup, a pair of trousers, for [illegible] permission to

lick the plate upon the master's table or even to travel abroad — in a group under the surveillance of the secret police.

The complete victory of the Soviet system. The 50th anniversary of the nightmare. Illuminations on the streets. From morning till night formal meetings with Niagaras of speeches and boasting. Inspiring military parades. The disciplined "celebrations" of the people. The military parade of death-dealing instruments for intimidating mankind.

If you want to save yourself you won't succeed by just keeping silent. You will shout the same stuff until you're hoarse. Shout hurrah, clap your hands. Otherwise they will notice at once that you are not "reacting" and they will ask you why.

An ordinary prison is a primitive affair. You are put there and there you sit. You can even try to escape.

A spiritual prison is much more serious. An attempt to escape is out of the question: They will catch you. There's nowhere to flee.

With this profanation and prostitution of my talent I am getting stupider. I am gradually turning into Ionesco's Rhinoceros. I feel the hardening on my forehead. I feel sick, sick of it all! I don't want to be a rhinoceros. Will some good person not help me?

In the third movement of Shostakovich's 10th symphony you hear the cry of the horn. And in reply you hear the wind rustling across the open spaces at night. Nothing but the rustling. And the horn repeats the cry again and again to the very end. Help! Kind people, if there are any still left in the world!

People and Places

Following are identifications of personalities and institutions cited by Anatoly Kuznetsov in his article "My Diary in the Other World":

ADZHUBEI, Aleksei I., 45 years old, Soviet editor and a son-in-law of Nikita S. Khrushchev; editor of Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1957-59; editor of Government newspaper Izvestia, from 1959 until Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964; since then on staff of Soviet Union, an illustrated monthly published in several languages.

EHRENBURG, Ilya: Soviet novelist (1891-1967).

KATAYEV, VALENTIN, 72, Soviet novelist; editor of the literary magazine Yunost, 1955-62.

KOCHETOV, Vsevolod A., 57, Soviet novelist; editor, Literaturnaya Gazeta, then a literary daily, 1955-59; since 1960, editor of Oktyabr, conservative literary monthly.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, daily newspaper of the Komsomol, the Young Communist League.

MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, literary monthly of the Young Communist League.

NOVY MIR, liberal literary monthly, edited by Aleksandr Tvardovsky.

OKTYABR, conservative literary monthly, edited by Vsevolod Kochetov.

POLEVOI, BORIS, 61, Soviet novelist; since 1962, editor of Yunost, literary youth monthly.

SAMIZDAT, literally "self-publishing house," slang term used for surreptitious circulation of typewritten copies of forbidden works.

Soviet writer whose work was published briefly in Soviet Union (1962-63) and has been banned since then; widely published abroad.

TVARDOVSKY, Aleksandr T., 59, Soviet poet; since 1958, editor of Novy Mir, liberal literary monthly.

VOROVSKY STREET, 52, address of the editorial office of Yunost.

YUNOST, youth-oriented literary monthly published by the Soviet Writers Union.

TELEGRAPH, London
10 August 1969

I.E.

RUSSIAN WRITERS AND THE SECRET POLICE

The fugitive author tells how the K.G.B.'s tentacles 'reach like cancerous growths into every branch of life in Russia'

By ANATOL (Anatoli Kuznetsov)

This article, written in Russian by the author, has been translated by DAVID FLOYD. Copyright in the translation, as in the original, is strictly reserved.

IT is a frightful story that I have to tell. Sometimes it seems to me as though it never happened, that it was just a nightmare. If only that were true. . . .

The Soviet system remains firmly in power in Russia, thanks only to an exceptionally powerful apparatus of oppression and primarily thanks to what has been called at various times the Cheka, the G.P.U., the N.K.V.D., the M.G.B. and the K.G.B.—in other words, the Secret Police or the Soviet Gestapo.

Everybody knows that the number of people murdered by the Secret Police runs into many millions. But when we come to reckon the number of people who are terrorised and deformed by them, then we have to include the whole population of the Soviet Union. The K.G.B.'s tentacles reach, like cancerous growths, into every branch of life in Russia. And in particular into the world of Soviet literature.

I do not know a single writer in Russia who has not had some connection with the K.G.B. This connection can be one of three different kinds:

The first: You collaborate enthusiastically with the K.G.B. In that case you have every chance of prospering.

The second: You acknowledge your duty towards the K.G.B., but you refuse to collaborate directly. In that case you are [illegible] and they want deal, and in particular of the prospect of travelling abroad.

The third kind: You brush aside all advances made by the K.G.B. and enter into conflict with them. In that case your works are not published and you may even find yourself in a concentration camp.

How all this works out in practice I shall explain by reference to my own experience. As a matter of fact a similar story could be told by any Russian writer who is even slightly known. But

to live, and how to keep quiet.

*

IN August, 1961, I was preparing for the first time in my life to travel abroad, to France. I had been included in a delegation of writers. It was a most impressive experience, because in the Soviet Union the only people who are allowed to travel abroad are those with "clean" records, who have been thoroughly "vetted," who have not been in any trouble at their work or in their political activities, who have never in their lives consulted a psychiatrist, who have never been before the courts, and so on and so forth.

What is more, the whole process of getting one's papers in order lasts many months and requires a mass of references, questionnaires, secret signatures and confidential advice on how to behave. By the time a person has gone through this procedure he is so intimidated and tensed up that the trip begins to seem like some religious ritual.

I had already gone through this intimidating procedure and was packing my case when someone telephoned to say that people from the Secret Police were going to visit me. A couple of men appeared and showed me their identity cards. They made a few jokes, chatted about literature, then got down to business:

"You realise, of course, why we've come. One of our comrades will be travelling as usual, with your delegation. But it will be difficult for him to cope on his own. So you will help him. You just keep an eye open to see that nobody slips away and stays abroad, to see who talks to whom, and to see how people behave."

"No, I don't want to," I said.

"You must."

"Let somebody else do it."

"Others *will* be doing it."

"I don't want to."

"Well, then we shall have to reconsider . . . in that case what's the point of your going?"

I remained silent, quite overcome. And the two men started to explain to me that this was the most usual and most natural thing: no group of tourists and no delegation could do without its "comrade" and the voluntary assistants attached to him. The Western world was devilishly cunning, and we had to be incredibly vigilant. Either I would undertake to maintain contact with the "comrade" or else my trip would be cancelled and I would never be allowed to travel anywhere abroad. The "comrade" would be a very pleasant person, and he would approach me himself, saying: "Greetings from Mikhail Mikhailovich."

Our delegation consisted of some 15 writers and editors of Moscow magazines, and we all gathered at the harbour in Leningrad to embark on the liner Latvia. I looked at each of the delegates and wondered: which one of them is it? The person in charge of the delegation was a woman from Intourist (the Soviet Government Tourist Organisation) who kept counting everybody as if we were chickens. Maybe she was the "comrade"?

But when we were aboard the ship it was one of the editors who came up to me and, with a crooked grin, said "Greetings from Mikhail Mikhailovich".

He was a boorish fool, who spied openly and cynically on everybody, who also kept counting up the delegation, and who listened greedily to every conversation. But I noticed that some of the writers were also keeping their eyes about them, especially a certain Sytin, who now holds one of the key jobs in the Soviet film world. Of the 15 members of the delegation, one was from Intourist, one was the "comrade" and at least five were "voluntary assistants." Later I came to understand that this was the usual arrangement.

If five people are travelling abroad, at least two of them are informers. If two are travelling, at least one must be an informer. And if there's only one person, then he is an informer on himself.

Perhaps some other Russian writer will also, like me, be reduced to blind horror and will wrench himself out of the control of the K.G.B. and reveal what they did to him. Perhaps Yevtushenko will one day tell of the conditions on which he was allowed to travel round the world and the reports he had to write.

Ordered to write

Because we are all obliged to write reports after a trip abroad. I was ordered to write one after my trip to Paris. I went through agonies trying to guess what our "comrade" would write, so that I would agree with him. On one occasion someone had turned up late for the bus, and the "comrade" had been green from fright. I described that incident in detail and others like it. I devoted about half the report to reporting on myself, because that is essential—where I had gone, whom I had met and what had been said.

But my report wasn't to the liking of someone high up. Eight years passed before I was again allowed to travel abroad, this time to Britain. You will now learn the price I had to pay for that.

I lived the whole of those eight years in Tula, and throughout that time the "comrades" kept coming to see me. When I came to inquire of other writers it appeared that this was the most ordinary occurrence — they went to see everybody—*everybody*. And it depended on the extent of the writer's decency as to which of the three categories of collaboration he would choose.

They would ask me gently and politely about my life, about what I was working on, what my friends Yevtushenko, Aksyonov, Gladilin and others were doing, what they were saying and what sort of people they were. At first I said only favourable things and spoke highly of them. But, they objected, Yevtushenko was committing mistakes, I was not watching carefully enough, I must provoke him to argument and report what was really going on inside him. They started to talk to me more sharply and to use threats.

At this I could take no more. I shouted at them that it was not proper behaviour and I asked them to keep away from me. I said I didn't see anything bad around me, no conspiracies and nothing anti-Soviet. If I did see anything, then I would ring them up. And with that they vanished!

I couldn't believe my luck. So that, it seemed, was the way to talk to them. After all, what could they do to me? I was already a well known writer, my books were being published in 40 different countries, and I could permit myself the luxury of having nothing to do with such characters!

How very wrong I was! I was simply transferred to the second category.

MY home in Tula was open to everybody. One day there appeared a very pleasant young man, Yuri Ganin, a student at the Polytechnic Institute, who unburdened himself to me at great length. He told me that he and his fellow students were being taught how to make missiles and were made to sign terrifying documents about the preservation of state secrets. He said he had dreamt of being an inventor, but instead of that he was obliged to work out according to special "man-kill" formulas, how many missiles were needed per thousand human lives.

The Soviet Union was, in his opinion, a Fascist country. The students, he said, were publishing a hand-written magazine and were being arrested. Finally he burst into tears. I tried to calm him. Through his tears he screamed that he would produce the magazine himself. I said that was stupid and that he would prove nothing like that.

Now I tremble . . .

Not long afterwards somebody phoned me and asked me to meet him on the square outside. It was one of the "comrades" I knew, who invited me to sit on the bench and said: "Why didn't you ring us up? Somebody reveals state secrets to you and tells you various formulas, gives you information about underground papers, and you simply object that that is not the right way. What is the right way, then, in your opinion?"

I tremble when I write now about that conversation on the bench in the square. For me it was like a red-hot frying-pan. I was forgiven and allowed to go, but I was *warned*.

From that time in 1963 I was regularly followed. Not, of course, that I was an anti-Soviet element or that I was intending to organise some plot. On the contrary, I was a member of the Communist party, a recognised Soviet writer, and I wanted only one thing: to go on writing. But I had automatically to be followed, because I came in the second category.

Then I took a room in Yasnaya Polyana Square [the Tolstoy Estate] where I wrote a novel. I became friendly with the scholars working in the Tolstoy Museum and they were very kind to me, especially the intelligent and attractive Luiza Senina. One day she came to my room and told me she had been appointed to follow every step I made and report every word I said. But, she said, I was a good and trusting person and she couldn't do it any more; she was having nightmares.

One of the "scholars" at Yas-

naya Polyana was an officer of well-known fame in the K.G.B. and everybody, from the Director down to the guides, had to report to him. Every foreigner who visited Yasnaya Polyana was kept under specially strict surveillance. The fact that I had taken a room there was especially suspicious and they were trying to get something out of her about me. What was she to do? She would be sacked!

I was particularly shaken by the fact that this was taking place on the revered territory of Tolstoy's Estate. "Well," I said, "let's try and save you; let's make something up together."

I did not succeed in saving her. On the contrary, out of inexperience I wrecked her life. One day in the café the K.G.B. officer in civilian clothes sat down opposite me and started joking and asking odd questions. I looked him straight in the face and said: "Listen, by dint of pure logic, I have realised that you are from the Security and that you're interested in me. So let's talk like man to man. What do you want to know? You ask the questions and I'll give you straight answers. It'll be easier for you and for me."

He was terribly embarrassed and started muttering that he was not interested in me personally, that I was above any suspicion, that I had well-known friends in Moscow, that they sometimes behaved rather strangely, and that in general my circle of acquaintances . . . .

Later, in his own time, he reached his own conclusions. Luiza Senina was dismissed after a frightful row, was given a hopeless reference, and was a long time without work until she was given a job as a librarian in some trade school, where she still is today.

I hurried away from Yasnaya Polyana as if a curse had been laid on it. But wherever you live you still have contact with people. Young writers kept coming to see me, bringing their works with them. There was one very sweet girl, a student at the Teachers' Institute, Tanya Subbotina, who came along in this way and then one day asked me to go outside on the street with her.

Once she was sure we were alone she said she had been forced to come to me and told to try to become my mistress and report on everything I did. Otherwise they threatened she would be turned out of the Institute. She was not doing very well there, and they could well have done it.

Heavens above! I have recounted only two incidents, because they are no longer secret and everything is already very known. Poor Tanya got completely confused and told everything to her "comrades."

But I was struck with the way people would immediately tell me everything, warn me and give me advice. I cannot say any more, so as not to harm them. After all, they are *there*, they are not to blame; they are the victims.

A stranger phones

There are others whom even I do not know. A stranger phoned me from a call-box at a tram stop and told me what was in my letters to my mother and which foreign magazine I had at home: "What on earth are you doing? Don't you realise that all your post is opened? That your neighbours on both sides and above you are watching you? That your phone conversations are recorded?"

He gave no name and hung up. Thanks. But I just couldn't understand: what was the point of this horror? I was writing literary works and had no intention of engaging in political activity. I was a writer. What do you want from me? That I should stop to think before every word I said on the telephone?

In fact, on one occasion the telephone at home started tinkling in an odd way. I took off the receiver but heard no ringing tone, so I started banging on the rest. Suddenly a tired voice at the other end of the line said: "Please, don't keep banging, have patience. We're switching you over to another recording machine. It's a complicated system—you understand . . ."

Later an electrician appeared and changed the electricity meter, fitting a new one, freshly sealed, with a microphone, no doubt. Just try living in a flat, knowing that every word you say is being listened to and recorded.

In 1967 I locked up my flat and went off on a long trip. Two days after I left, in the middle of the night there was a fire in my study and everything in it was destroyed. The firemen who came to the scene prevented the whole flat from being destroyed, though never discovered what caused the fire. But my papers and manuscripts escaped by a real miracle: literally on the day of my departure I had moved the cupboard with the manuscripts into another room, intending to move my study there on my return.

After that I kept my manuscripts buried in the ground. Another reason was that, whenever I left my flat for any length of time afterwards, I recognised by various signs that someone had been in the flat in my absence.

I frequently asked various top people to help me to go abroad—but without much hope. I wanted to see the world. They were always ready to promise me, but that was the end of it. Others went travelling, but not me.

Then, unexpectedly, the Paris publishers Les Editeurs Francais Réunis invited me to spend a month in Paris as part of the payment for my "Babi Yar." I thought that the authorities must understand at last that I was no enemy, so I made my application and started to go through the procedural marathon. I got right to the end of it only to be told that the Union of Writers had no money for my trip. I declared that there must be some misunderstanding, that I was going at my own expense. Then they told me in a whisper that it was simply that the authorities in Tula had formally sanctioned my departure, but that Safronov, the propaganda secretary, had said by telephone that I should not be allowed to go.

I said in my statement [published in *The Sunday Telegraph* last week] how my writing was maltreated. But they also deformed my whole life. I couldn't speak on the telephone; I practically stopped writing letters; and I saw an informer in every one of my acquaintances. I began to ponder: what sense is there in such a life at all?

Here is an extract from my diary in October 1967. "I have not been able to sleep for several days now. I am just a great lump of nostalgia. I turn over in my mind what I have written and compare it with what I would like to write and what I could write. I see before me years and years of life in which I could have got to know and study and understand and create so much and which have been wasted on what it is frightful to think about. . . .

"When I quote what I wrote in 'Babi Yar' I feel like an ant, cemented up in the foundations of a house. All around there is nothing but stones, walls and darkness. To live to the end of my life with this feeling of being stifled, in this state of being buried alive . . ."

That was just after the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Solzhenitsyn's writings were no longer being published. The process of rehabilitating Stalin had begun.

I had my own troubles. There was an unpublicised row over "Babi Yar". They suddenly decided that it ought not to have been published. At *Yunost* they told me that it was practically an accident that it had ever appeared at all and that a month later its publication would have become the question. In any case they forbade the reprinting of it.

Before the writers' congress to which I was to be a delegate from Tula, Solzhenitsyn sent me a copy of his famous letter [in which he denounced the censorship]. I spent several nights thinking it over. At home they wondered what was the matter with me. I said: "Solzhenitsyn is inviting me to commit suicide with him."

Yes, I could not find in myself the courage, and I probably fully deserved Solzhenitsyn's contempt. I simply did not attend the congress. I signed no protests, either then or later. I saved my own skin and kept out of things. Others were expelled from the party and from the Union and were no longer published. But they continued to publish me, and the "comrades" resumed their kindly and friendly attentions.

How movingly they explained to me that the situation among the intelligentsia was very complicated. That people as tense as the writers, however clever they were, were in revolt and they did not want to resort to tough measures. . . . I had done very well, they said, not to sign any protests; that was not the business of an artist. But I ought to try and influence my misguided friends and make them understand that if they did not stop causing trouble, then . . . well, you understand.

I went from town to town trying to keep out of the way of these "comrades", from Moscow to Leningrad, to Kiev. Many people there probably remember my asking: What are you going to do; what is the way out; what is there to hope for? Nobody knew anything. Intelligent people in Russia feel only horror. There is nothing but darkness ahead.

On the night of August 20 1968, Russian tanks entered Czechoslovakia. I spent several days listening to the radio. Many people in Russia wept during those days. It marked, they said, the turn to Fascism.

It came over me somehow of itself. I realised that I could not remain there any longer, that every day, every month and every year would see only a piling up of horror and cowardice inside me. . . .

Like a prison

But Russia is as well defended as a prison. Just read Anatoli Marchenko's remarkable "Evidence". He wanted only one thing: to get out. They caught him 40 yds. from the frontier and threw him into the same camp as Daniel. Marchen-

ko's description of that *present day* concentration camp is enough to make your hair stand on end.

Then I received another invitation, this time from America, from the Dial Press, who had allotted 5,000 dollars for my trip. I began to attend all the meetings in Tula. I presented Safronov with signed copies of my books and I always turned up on time for talks with the "comrades" and spent six months fixing my papers for America.

Then I was turned down again, with the explanation that the Dial Press had published Solzhenitsyn as well as me and they were therefore enemies. It was clear from certain details that once again it was the K.G.B. who would not let me out. This coincided with some fierce criticism of my latest writing in the Press.

Now I began to feel myself run down and hemmed in like a wolf. I went down to Batumi [in the Caucasus] to study the lie of the land. The whole of the holiday coast of the Black Sea is under the strongest guard. When darkness falls patrols drive everybody away from the water. Searchlights play over the beach and the sea. Radar installations detect even a child's ball floating on the surface of the sea.

But I had made up my mind to swim under water to Turkey with the help of an aqualung, entering the water before the patrols appeared and pushing in front of myself an underwater raft with spare oxygen containers. I would swim by compass just one night, otherwise I would be detected in the morning by the helicopters that were about like flies. I had trained myself to swim without stopping for 15 hours. I started on the building of my raft.

It was frightening all the same. I imagined myself being cut in two in the darkness by a submarine at full speed — they are about the place like sharks. Or I would drown . . .

So I decided to make one last desperate effort to obtain permission for a trip abroad. I no longer thought of anything but getting out, at any price.

Night and day I had going round in my mind only that: to get away, away, away from that monstrous country, from those scoundrels, from that K.G.B. Let me get out, even to the Antarctic, even to the Sahara, so long as they are not there.

I just could not go on. It was stronger than me; it was the animal instinct for self-preservation, probably— I was at least a living being. I wrote in "Babi Yar" that by the time I was 14 I should have been shot 20 times, that I was still alive practically by a miracle, a sort of misunderstanding.

So there we are: according to the rules of the K.G.B. I should now be shot for the 21st time. If only because I went straight at them and got out. If only because I am writing this. And I shall go on writing, as long as there's life in me.

Now listen to what the Russian writer, Anatoli Kuznetsov did. He said to himself: "You have to imagine that they are the Gestapo and think what they like most of all. Informers are what they like. Fine. So they'll get a real piece of informing." I hinted to the "comrades" that it seemed as though an anti-Soviet plot was being hatched among the writers. They were really impressed and believed me. They demanded some facts, and of those I had a head full.

My report revealed that the writers were preparing to publish a dangerous underground magazine called "The Polar Star" or "The Spark," but they were still arguing about the name. I said that the people who are going to publish it included Yevtushenko, Aksyonov, Gladilin, Yefremov, Tabakov, Arkady, Raikin, etcetera, etcetera. I said they were collecting money and manuscripts. The first number would start with academician Sakharov's memorandum. I very much wanted to add that they also intended to blow up the Kremlin, but that would have been too obvious an exaggeration. I was transferred to the first category.

That's how I came to be in Britain. I brought a copy of my report with me, photographed on film, because it is the most remarkable work I have ever written. The rest was easy. Only six months' filling in forms, a promise to write a novel about Lenin, just one personal agent—Andjaparidze—and I didn't have to go swimming in the Black Sea. (Who knows? — maybe they'll have got radar that operates even under water). On July 24 I got out of Russia on the same plane as Gerald Brooke, and I don't know which of us was the more moved, as he looked out at the blue sky.

I managed to get out and I'm still alive. You can try me if you wish. I have still not come round; I still feel as if I lay on the edge of a sea, groaning, exhausted and bleeding. But it is the sea. I have got away—from them.

Forced cowardice

I now believe that the main reason why many highly intelligent and able people do not escape from there is because the Soviet régime has forced them to commit such cowardly acts that no amount of repentance can absolve them. There is no way out.

But, really, what would you say if you learned that Leo Tolstoy had been a Secret Police agent and had written reports on all the foreigners visiting his Yasnaya Polyana? Or that Dostoyevsky informed on his best friends? Would it be possible after that to have any respect for their works, however brilliant they were? I personally have no answer to that question. The only thing I can say is that Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy did not live in *Soviet* Russia.

If you are a citizen of Soviet Russia you *automatically* cannot be a 100 per cent. decent person. Cowardly silence or half-truths —are those not lies? I have told you only about myself. But, believe me, there are very many others who could tell a similar story. Let me leave it at that.

Thank you—the good people of Britain.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 August 1969

I.F.

Kuznetsov Recalls the Reaction of Russians to Invasion of Czechoslovakia a Year Ago

The following article is by the 40-year-old Soviet author who sought asylum in Britain last month, maintaining that he could no longer work under repression. He describes here the reactions he saw among the Russian people after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia a year ago.

By ANATOLY KUZNETSOV

It seems as if it were only yesterday that we heard the voices of the radio announcers choking with emotion and excitement, the conflicting reports and then, all at once, the wailing of all the sirens in occupied Prague.

In Russia on Aug. 21, 1968, the majority of people felt as though world war had broken out. The very air seemed to smell of gunfire. People went around with long faces, all asking the same question: "What's going on in Czechoslovakia?" Many wept as they listened to their radios.

The day Prague protested with all its sirens I started my preparations for leaving Russia. It was not until a year later and at great cost that I succeeded, but Prague's sirens still echo in my ears just as vividly as if I had only just come away from the radio set.

Brave, good people of Czechoslovakia—I am a citizen of the country that has occupied you; I know that country and I was there on Aug. 21, 1968; I would like to tell you a few facts.

The Soviet Union has at its disposal all the media of communication, from the smallest printing press to a fantastic network of radio jammers. It isolates the Soviet people from the rest of the world and has the job not only of suppressing the slightest sign of discontent, but also of drumming into everyone the belief that he is living the best possible of lives.

These machines came into action with renewed force after Aug. 21, 1968. The occupation of Czechoslovakia, the arrest of its leaders, the threats of a repetition of the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, the intrigues and the plots — all this was presented as a gesture of great humanism, brotherhood and salvation.

People were forced to turn up at meetings so that the newspapers could demonstrate to the world the

"unanimous, nationwide approval" of the aggression. These were strange, dreary meetings at which people listened with sad, worried faces to the official speakers reading prefabricated texts of resolutions that approved the actions of "our wise Communist party and Soviet Government."

Such ritual is a familiar, integral part of life in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the seizure of Czechoslovakia was such a brazen act, and affection for the people of Czechoslovakia so genuine and strong in Russia, that there had to be some additional explanations.

Thousands of propagandists were sent round the country to tell people by word of mouth:

"West Germany was preparing to invade Czechoslovakia. If our tanks had not gone in, the German tanks would have been there the next day. But we managed to get there first and saved Czechoslovakia."

I heard this said dozens of times.

Information from the West does not reach the great mass of the population in the Soviet Union, and Russian suspicion of the Germans is understandable. But the important thing was that this false explanation was communicated in a sort of confidential form, whispered in your ear, so to speak.

And the Soviet people are accustomed to a state of affairs in which, if what is said openly is usually false, what is said in closed meetings can sometimes contain a little truth.

I was amazed occasionally to hear the most honest and apparently experienced people say with a shrug and a sigh: "It's terrible that we had to send our tanks into Czechoslovakia. But we had to save them from the Germans."

Briefing by Party Aide

Among the Soviet politicians who made many journeys at that time between Moscow and Prague was the First Secretary of the Communist party, the "boss," of the Tula Region, Ivan Yunak. In October, following one of these trips, he held a closed meeting to brief propagandists and editors on how to speak and write about Czechoslovakia.

I was present. Yunak had just returned from the Kremlin and was in a good mood. His speech added up to this:

"We have, comrades, dealt with Czechoslovakia. Order has been restored. It is true we have had to leave Dubcek there for the time being. But he is not, of course, the right man. He is not our comrade. When passions have subsided a little he will be replaced.

"You can refer more frequently to people like Indra and Husak. As for Smrkovsky, on no account: he is not one of ours, he is a shady character.

"There will, of course, still be many difficulties, but it is already in the bag. It is our country. You ought especially to stress the great discipline and humanity shown by our troops. Only a single accident, which was blown up in the West: A woman standing near a window was killed by mistake."

Göring's Awkward Comment

The writer Boris Polevol was at this time about to reissue one of his books that was an account of the Nuremberg trial of German war criminals. With a sarcastic gesture he told me:

"It's enough to drive you mad! The censor has demanded that I make some cuts. You would think it was pretty old stuff — the book's been printed many times. But it appears that I quoted a conversation of Göring when they annexed Czechoslovakia in 1939. He said something like: 'Arrest the Government, compromise the others. Form another government. Then have them issue a program and make some declaration. And keep tanks at all the crossroads.'"

I asked him: "Are you going to cut that out? After all, it is part of history."

Polevol laughed: "I've already cut it. Today that would be a trump card in the hands of our enemies. We mustn't put cards in the enemy's hands, so we have to cut things out of history. And it's right to do it. We must make use of such facts as suit our purposes and not the enemy's."

Thus in the Soviet Union the truth is whatever helps the cause of Communism.

Thinking people in Russia, and primarily the intelligentsia, were nevertheless well aware of the true situation in Czechoslovkia. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the poet, sent off a telegram of protest to the Soviet Government in a moment of rage but then went and took it back, or so I was told by an official of the secret police. Others were more consistent.

And then, suddenly, something unheard-of happened. People started to refuse to vote at meetings.

Slogans on the Walls

Many letters of protest were written, bearing the signatures of well-known scholars, writers, professors and so forth. Slogans were chalked on the walls in many towns and on the statues in Leningrad: "Brezhnev out of Czechoslovakia!" "Barbarians out of Czechoslovakia!" It had never happened before.

Leaflets also began to appear in large numbers. And finally a demonstration took place.

True, it was a very small demonstration — seven people altogether: Larisa Daniel, Babitsky, Delone, Pavel Litvinov, Dremlyuga, Fainberg, and Gorbanevskaya. But in Russian terms they were acting in the same way as the Christian martyrs of ancient times, deliberately sacrificing themselves so as to "demonstrate that not all the citizens of our country agree with the use of force that is being practiced in the name of the Soviet people."

They carried banners saying "Shame on the invaders" and "Hands off Czechoslovakia" for a minute or two before they were seized. They are now in Siberia.

Leaflets Circulated

But all Russia heard about them and respects their bravery. Tula, where I lived, learned about them from leaflets, or rather handwritten notes, that were dropped into letter boxes. I photographed one of them and brought it with me: "Friend! The Government has violated the Constitution by arresting participants in a demonstration against the occupation of Czechoslovakia on Red Square. Long live freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly! Please reproduce and circulate."

The secret police have been really shaken by what has happened this year. They are demanding permission to reintroduce Stalin's methods. There are numerous dismissals from work, punishments, arrests, trials, imprisonments and the country is boiling with protest.

Before I left for Britain I was given this advice at the central office of the Communist party in Moscow: "If you are asked about Czechoslovakia, don't say anything. Don't give any interviews; say you are too busy. If you really have to, let your interpreter do the talking for you."

TEA ROOM
24 August 1969

WHAT RUSSIANS THINK

A. ANATOL (Anatoli Kuznetsov), the Soviet writer now in Britain, reveals the hopes and fears of ordinary Russians. What is the chance of a popular explosion? Do they believe their Press? What do they really think of Communism? Are they afraid of China? Interview by DAVID FLOYD.

"THEY are all 'hawks'." With these words Anatoli Kuznetsov, the Russian writer who a few weeks ago evaded his secret police guard and chose freedom in Britain, summed up his view of the present leaders of Russia.

Kuznetsov does not share the view common among Western observers of the Soviet scene that the men in the Kremlin are divided into "hawks" and "doves", into those who want to be tougher towards the rest of the world and those who want to be more friendly. As far as this intelligent and sensitive Russian can see, they are all "hawks".

What, then, was going to happen in Russia? Would there never be any change for the better, towards greater internal freedom and democracy? Kuznetsov is not optimistic:

"An explosion—that is to say, a nation-wide revolt capable of overthrowing the present Soviet regime—is impossible. The machinery of oppression is too powerful for that. Nor can I see much hope for the gradual 'democratisation' of the regime, because there is no real political life at all in the Soviet Union in the Western sense of the term. But there is the very real possibility of a new reign of terror, such as we knew under Stalin and such as the Russian people have known so many times in their history.

"Many people still hope that here may emerge an intelligent, civilised, humane leader, and then, they think, all would be well. But among the present leaders there are none who enjoy any popularity with the people as a whole. Nevertheless people go on hoping.

"I would be inclined to say, however, that Russia is more ready for a new Stalin and a new Beria [Stalin's secret police chief] than for an intelligent and humane leader. In the course of history Russia has been through many more bad times than good and she is ready for anything. That is, of course, a pessimistic view. I should be very happy if I were proved wrong."

Passengers to an unknown place

The population of the Soviet Union, says Kuznetsov, play no part at all in the making of Soviet policy. "Policy is made by a very small number of people in Moscow, and the rest of the population get to know about their decisions only after the event. The whole population is interested in politics but only in the sense of wondering what on earth the very small group of leaders will think up and do next.

"The attitude of the population of the Soviet Union to the policy-makers in the Kremlin is like that of passengers on a ship whose destination they do not know. The Soviet man-in-the-street has no influence at all—and doesn't believe he has any influence—over the direction of the Soviet ship of state. He would very much *like* to have some influence but that, for him, is beyond his wildest dreams."

But did the ordinary people in Russia not have some say in local politics?

"Good heavens, no, never. Whether it is a question of major issues of policy or small ones the ordinary citizen finds himself in the position—at best—of a person who is simply informed what is going to be done with him. Sometimes, as I said, they don't even bother to inform him."

What about the few brave spirits who had dared to protest against official Soviet policy—people like General Grigorenko, Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel and others?

"The further you go from Moscow the less is known about such protests, and I have not heard of any signs of open support for them in other cities and towns. But there have been other forms of protest in provincial towns.

"For example, there is a very widespread movement in the Ukraine which demands national independence for the Ukraine. Periodically there is an outburst of discontent in some town or other, as was the case, for example, with the workers in Novocherkassk. There were similar incidents in Tula, but on a smaller scale. But on the whole the position in Russia is just the same as it was described so vividly a hundred years ago by the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko: 'All is silent, in all languages. . . .'"

But did the Soviet people not make any use of the apparently democratic institutions they had?

"Officially, on paper, everything's fine. There are the so-called 'deputies,' the Supreme Soviet, local Soviets, which in theory are supposed to direct the foreign and domestic policy of the country. But that is pure show. All the deputies are simply puppets, who vote obediently in favour of everything that is put before them."

What, then, do the people of Russia believe in? What are they striving towards? Do they believe in Communism?

"I am afraid that 90 per cent. of the people in Russia no longer believe in any kind of Communism. It is a long time since there was any revolution or revolutionary spirit in Russia. It is a firmly-established imperialist state of a special kind unknown in history. Communism is taken seriously by practically no one; it only provokes ironic and sad smiles.

"All the same, the majority of people in the Soviet Union continue to use the term, simply because they have got nothing else. They argue like this: 'What is there left for us to do? —to turn back again to capitalism? No—it has been shown to be no good. And what can we do that is new? Maybe we shall find something. But I must say that our efforts to find something are not very good—nothing but stupidities and failures. But maybe an intelligent and decent leader will appear. Then everything will be all right.'

Confusion about the way ahead

"As for the more intelligent, thinking people—here you have a state of chaos and great confusion in Russia. Some of them believe that it still may be possible to have, in the phrase invented by the Czechoslovak Communists, a form of 'Communism with a human face,' that is to say, a decent, more democratic, more liberal society, even though still ruled by the Communist party. Others pin their faith in science and the scholars — that they will become so influential in society (scholars like Academician Sakharov, for example) that they will be able to find some solution. Very many turn to religion, more and more every day.

"Nevertheless, the majority understand nothing and do not believe in anything. They simply see that everything seems to be going wrong, that there seems to be nothing very good ahead of them, and that there's nothing left to do but save their own skin, which is what each one does, as best he can, in accordance with his own principles and his own desire to live."

Turning to Russia's relations with the rest of the world, Kuz-

netsov emphasised that Soviet citizens were dependent on the State-controlled Press for all their information about foreign countries and that their opinions about those countries were conditioned by official propaganda. Their only independent sources of information were foreign radio broadcasts, which are heavily jammed by the Soviet authorities. The attitude of Soviet people to the other great world power, America, varied greatly.

"Thinking people believe that the Soviet Union is the most likely one to provoke a third world war and that America is only defending herself and the Western world. Others consider that there's nothing to choose between America and Russia: that they are two monsters, and that nothing good is to be looked for from America.

"Still others simply swallow the official propaganda line that America is a dangerous imperialist country which thinks of nothing else night and day but how to attack Russia and enslave her."

When it comes to China, however, it appears that the Soviet people and their Government are of one opinion.

"The attitude of people in Russia to present-day China is extremely cold and unfriendly. That is, to the policy of the leaders in Peking. I personally have not met a single person in Russia who can see even the slightest good in China. People understand that China is not so well armed as the Soviet Union. But what impresses people is the vast population of China.

"The way the Soviet man-in-the-street thinks is this: 'Of course, China would not succeed in defeating us.' But those irresponsible, mad leaders of China may well attack the Soviet Union. We shall defend ourselves and we shall be victorious, but it will be a tremendous, frightful war.'

"People in Russia are terribly afraid of such a war. What's more, the less educated, simple people are more afraid than are the thinking people.

"The more intelligent people in Russia realise that Soviet policy has produced a situation in which Russia seems to have enemies on all sides and very few friends in the world.

"But the ordinary people—the factory workers and farm workers—cannot see this. They have absolutely no objective information and, although they greatly regret that the Russian people's prestige and the reputation of the Russian soldier has been so shaken, they still believe that there was simply no other way out for the Soviet Government and that the Government's policy is the only guarantee of peace. And peace is all the ordinary man wants."

TEXT OF ANATOLY KUZNETSOV
TELEVISION INTERVIEW (CBS)

II.B.

 September 1969

MORLEY SAFER: This man's name is Anatoly Kuznetsov. He is forty-years old, one of the Soviet Union's leading novelists. On July 30th of this year, Anatoly Kuznetsov, on a trip to England, escaped from his Russian guard and defected. In the lining of his coat, he had sewn this film, copies of the original manuscripts of his novels.

Kuznetsov (through interpreter) That there is the whole of my life. These are my real books, not the ones as they are named to the reader.

SAFER: This is the story of a man who got away and there are men in this building who would like nothing better than to get their hands on him. This is the Soviet Embassy in London. Anatoly Kuznetsov will have nothing to do with it.

Kuznetsov spent his adult life in a schizophrenic twilight zone, trying to both an honest novelist and a Soviet citizen.

His best-known work in the West is the novel "Baba Yar", an account of the Nazi massacres in the Ukraine in 1942.

Kuznetsov's story is made of the stuff of classic spy fiction. But it is brutally true. It involves the Soviet secret police, the KGB, a shabby hotel in the West End of London, the Apollo, a favorite place for the Soviet Embassy to put up visiting delegations, and sex, too, among the seedy strip clubs of Soho. It is a story of escape and betrayal. Like many good thrillers, a newspaper man is involved -- the London Daily Telegraph's Soviet Affairs Editor, David Floyd, the man in the middle.

Someone had given Kuznetsov Floyd's name. Kuznetsov now lives in hiding. He prefers to be called by his first name, Anatoly. Kuznetsov, he says, was the man who wrote what he was told to write, and he wants to forget him. But he emerged from hiding to tell his remarkable, sometimes sickening story of life in the Soviet Union.

The interpreter is David Floyd, the man who took Kuznetsov in from the cold.

I know that the Soviet Embassy was very anxious to talk to you, and you've flatly refused to do so, even in the presence of British Foreign Office people.

INTERPRETER: I am afraid of them, even in the presence of British officials and even at a distance, I am afraid of them.

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS News special. "The Ordeal of Anatoly Kuznetsov" with CBS News correspondent Morley Safer.

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ANNOUNCER: Now, "The Ordeal of Anatoly Kuznetsov" with CBS News correspondent Morley Safer.

SAFER: Anatoly Kuznetsov, when did you decide to leave the Soviet Union?

INTERPRETER: The decision to leave I took on the morning of the 21st of August last year.

SAFER: That was when Soviet troops went into Czechoslovakia?

KUZNETSOV: Da, da.

SAFER: But there have been many things in the past twenty years and more, equally horrible. What was so special about Czechoslovakia?

INTERPRETER: Well, probably for me, personally, that was the last drop.

After that I really didn't have any faith left, or any hope.

SAFER: All right, there you are, a Soviet citizen who decides to leave Russia. What do you do?

INTERPRETER: Of course, it's very difficult to leave the Soviet Union. Very few people travel outside the Soviet Union.

First of all, if there is a dossier on you with the police, then you won't get out anyway. You've got to have a very good reputation at work.

You've got to make frequent statements about your political loyalty, your love for the party and the government. You must be psychologically and nervously in good form, fit. If you've consulted a doctor, and especially if you've consulted a psychiatrist, you would never be let out. And then for five or six months you fill in a mass of different forms.

You particularly have to put down what people near to you, close to you, you leave behind in Russia. A bachelor has very little hope of getting out. A man with a family has better chances. Then he has children left behind and people related to him.

Sometimes they will tell you to follow the activities of the people who go with you because they very seldom let you out alone. You have to go out in a group. In my case, they attached a special personal agent to me.

I had no permission to leave.

I once made a journey in 1961 to France.

Since then, for eight years, they wouldn't let me out.

Foreign publishing houses invited me out.

I was invited to Paris by a French publishing firm at their expense, with their money. And it looked as though they were going to let me out. Then the secret police got in the way, and I wasn't released.

Then I was invited to New York by the Dial Press publishers.

They wrote a long letter. They promised to put up five thousand dollars. And then once again, at the very last moment, they wouldn't let me out.

So then I decided to get out at any price. I got ready to try and swim out underwater because it's very difficult, this tremendous guard on the frontier everywhere. I took a lot of chances, and I was very scared.

I trained myself to do this. I trained myself to swim underwater.

I can now, for example, swim for fifteen hours underwater. Because what I had to do was to swim under the water and do it in one night and only if it were bad weather.

I just got a letter from another Russian who actually did manage to do it by swimming. He got out to Turkey in the end.

There he met up with a Soviet frontier guard who had also got out to Turkey. And the frontier guard explained to him it was only a miracle that he had got out at all. Lots of people tried, but they all get caught.

The Russian authorities don't only have radar equipment on the surface. Which is good enough even to detect a child's ball floating on the surface. But they also have hydro-radar locators, underneath the water. And they would have caught me. They would have detected me.

SAFER: So you decided against swimming out, and you made one more attempt to come out legally?

INTERPRETER: I made my last, my third effort to get out legally so that I would -- I decided to try to fit in with what the secret police wanted.

I knew if they didn't let me do so, then I would never get out. Well, I succeeded, but at a very considerable price.

SAFER: What was that price?

INTERPRETER: As I said, I had to demonstrate in some way my loyalty -- not only my loyalty, but my anxiety, my willingness to work with the secret police.

They persecuted me for eight years. They demanded that I should inform upon my friends who were writers -- Yevtushenko, Axionov. These are all my friends. I refused.

So then they developed a great dossier on me. They got people to attach themselves to me, pretending to be friends.

They got women to try to become my mistresses.

A lot of these people told me what was happening and warned me about it.

My telephone was bugged, my letters were opened. I think there were microphones in my rooms. They knew absolutely everything about me. I had two copies of the magazine "America".

Suddenly some completely unknown person rang me up and said, "Why on earth do you keep those foreign magazines in your home? It's already written down in your dossier."

So then, in desperation, I decided to show them that I had changed my ways, that I would improve -- behave differently.

What you have to do, I said to myself, is to just pretend to yourself, believe that this is the Gestapo. I must escape from the concentration camp. What do they want in order that they should believe me? That I should inform on my own friends. That would be fine. Let them have their informer. I composed what was probably the most striking, the most -- finest piece of writing in my life.

I said that these writers like Yevtushenko, Axionov, and a group of others right down to some actors in the comedy theatre were getting ready to produce and publish frightful underground magazines. That they've got an underground print shop, that they're gathering manuscripts together and money for the job.

Oh, how the secret police were pleased with this, which was a pure fiction.

I even thought I might put in that they were actually planning to blow up the Kremlin but then I thought that they'd see through that. But it didn't matter. They have no sense of humor. They took it all seriously.

SAFER: Then what did you do?

INTERPRETER: I decided to write a really persuasive application. There's a terrific campaign there going on at the moment preparing for the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth.

If you [illegible] wanted to write a novel about Lenin and how he created the Communist Party in London.

And I would just have to go and visit all the places where he'd been in London.

SAFER: You created a kind of phony project in a way?

INTERPRETER: Well, I made it -- it was a very detailed plan, too. So then, they started to work with me and said that they'd let me go to England and that maybe they would give me some secret task to perform secret mission, that just before I left from -- left Russia -- I should telephone and I would probably get my secret instructions. But, you know, I took a chance and I didn't bother to ring up.

SAFER: Anatoly, do you feel any guilt about what you wrote and reported about Yevtushenko and the others?

INTERPRETER: Of course, I do. It's by no means excluded that they may have had difficulties. I wrote about it immediately as soon a I was here in the Daily Telegraph. So that the KGB over there should know what I'd done. But it was a false project. Yes, of course. But this is such an ordinary, everyday thing with them that this isn't going to surprise anybody.

SAFER: Yet, you know that Yevtushenko was once greatly admired in the West and many of his poems were against the Soviet system. So, perhaps, there were some grains of truth in what you reported to the KGB.

INTERPRETER: No, of course not, he has no plans to start an underground print shop.

SAFER: So there you are on a plane with your shadow and you arrive in London. Then what do you do?

INTERPRETER: Well, you find a room in a hotel, which was booked for us either by the Soviet Embassy or people who were very close to the Embassy. I don't have the right to choose a hotel myself.

SAFER: Then you have a plan?

INTERPRETER: We always, when we come on these trips, have several sheets of paper containing the program of what we are to do and a copy of this remains behind in Russia.

SAFER: What I meant was a plan to evade the authorities.

INTERPRETER: Well, that's a different question.

SAFER: Tell me about that.

INTERPRETER: Well, my first problem was to get a few hours of freedom when my agent, my watchdog wasn't with me. I didn't manage to get that for four days. He never took his eyes off me.

SAFER: You must have been a desperate man.

INTERPRETER: No, no, no, I'd studied him pretty carefully. I knew his weaknesses.

SAFER: What were they?

INTERPRETER: We went walking around London and he, like any young man, he was simply amazed at the beautiful women, the pretty girls, the short skirts, the mini-skirts. I noticed the effect this had on him and I worked on him with a view to suggest that he should visit the strip-tease shows. You had to become a member and he wrote himself in as a Yugoslav citizen.

In Russia we are strictly forbidden to visit anything like strip-tease or get mixed up with women. We have to sign a paper saying that we shan't do this.

In this way, both of us, both I and my watchdog became criminals. So this introduced a certain amount of confidence between the two of us. We agreed with each other not to tell on each other.

When he told that in the evening he absolutely had to meet certain people, that I should have to sit in the hotel, then I said much better if I were to go and have a look at another strip-tease and if it looks all right, then we can both go along there another time.

He hesitated for a moment. Then, he agreed. And I said if I don't come back for rather a long time, he shouldn't worry.

And he went off and, while I went off to a telephone kiosk -- telephone booth. I telephoned the Daily Telegraph, tried to get in touch with David Floyd who speaks Russian. I meanaged to get hold of him and we meet -- we met.

SAFER: What did you say to him?

INTERPRETER: I told him I wanted to stay in London. Asked him to help me because I didn't know English, that I wanted to hide away from my watchdog, my KGB man. This was a very dangerous step to take. They've got their agents all over the place, dl over the world. They used to tell me with a smile that they had agents in all parts of the world in the most incredible places. Just places you just couldn't imagine.

They suggested that I might perhaps go to a police chief and this police chief might in fact be a Soviet agent. This was just theoretically.

So I looked for somebody in whom I could be -- of whom I could be quite certain. He quickly understood what was the matter and he helped me and and I shall be grateful to him for the rest of my life.

SAFER: You know that some Western writers, the American writer William Styron, have described what you have done as "despicable," both in informing and, in fact, in leaving the Soviet Union.

INTERPRETER: If Mr. Styron thinks that way, well, I'm happy to offer him my flat in Tula (?) -- let him go and try it. They still don't understand just what the Soviet Union is.

If Thomas Mann or Bertolt Brecht had been faced with the dilemma of leaving Germany of living under Hitler, what would they have said then? They left Germany, after all. If they -- if they had had to save themselves at any price to get away from the Gestapo, in any case, this is a question which I myself can't decide.

I ask myself, after all, what would people say if they learned, say, that, well, Dostoevski, say, had written and informed, even falsely, but had informed on his friends?

I don't know what to answer -- I can only say that neither Dostoevski nor Tolstoi nor Turgenev, none of them lived in Soviet Russia. Yet Daniel, Sinyavsky and Pasternak did live in the Soviet Union.

So you would be advising a Russian writer, simply because he's Russian, to live in a concentration camp. I have a small hope that not living a concentration camp I may be able to say more. I don't know.

SAFER: What were your feelings as a Soviet writer during the trials of Daniel and Sinyausky?

INTERPRETER: Horror.

SAFER: Did you want to speak out for them?

INTERPRETER: I didn't have the courage to do that.

SAFER: And where would you be today if you had spoken out?

INTERPRETER: If I'd done it really actively, I should be alongside them now. Or I should -- they would simply not have published me or I shouldn't have been able to come out of the country.

SAFER: The Soviet authorities said that you left for the most tawdry of reasons, that you left a pregnant mistress behind.

INTERPRETER: Well, I learned about this from the Soviet press. I don't yet know what they're talking about. It was Boris Palevoy who wrote about this and apparently he knows more about this woman than I do.

SAFER: You know, Anatoly, human nature's a very funny thing. No one really likes a turncoat. How do you feel about that?

a conformist? What can I do? I was born in Russia. I was born in Russia. I lived there 40 years and I know no other life. And the moment came when I could no longer live that way. What do you advise me to do? Commit suicide? I thought about that.

ANNOUNCER: "The Ordeal of Anatoly Kuznetsov" will continue in a moment.

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ANNOUNCER: Here, again, is Anatoly Kuznetsov with CBS News correspondent, Morley Safer.

SAFER: You know, Anatoly, at the very beginning, a great many people outside the Soviet Union had great hopes for Communism. What went wrong?

INTERPRETER: Communist doctrine, Communist teacing is very attractive. And it grew out of good convictions and beliefs. But life, it appears, is a good deal more complex than it appeared to the founders of Communism. And we see ancient history being repeated again. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Thanks to Communism, that road has become many miles longer.

I only have to mention the name Stalin and you rebound to agree with me. If that is possible -- if it's possible to have millions of victims completely, senselessly, that means that the idea itself is no good.

SAFER: But how is it that the Russian people with their great sense of nationality, great sense of being Russian, how on earth were they so easily cowed?

INTERPRETER: Oh, there is in Russia a long, long tradition of tyranny. See, if you were born in a concentration camp and your parents were born in a concentration camp and your grandpartents were born in a concentration camp, you see, you no longer imagine any other life. First of all, the czars oppressed Russia. Then came Communism.

There was that little short period, that intermission in 1917, between February and October, that was so small that you can really write it off.

SAFER: Well, there was another brief intermission, a tiny crack of light created by Khrushchev a few years ago. What went wrong there?

INTERPRETER: No, no. That was only just a nuance, just a shade. I personally didn't take that seriously. That was really just as if in that concentration camp you just make slightly more human conditions.

INTERPRETER: You're banned from writing letters and receiving parcels, say, and then, for a time, you're allowed to write letters and then allowed toreceive parcels.

And, see, some people took it all seriously and thought that very soon the doors were really going to open. No, no, no, the Soviet regime can not possibly open the doors properly. It seems to me at the moment, when I think about it, it's like some nightmare, some frightful dream.

It's like -- life is like some constant, unbroken theatrical production. Never say out loud what you really think but what you ought to say.

There are, of course, some people who do say what they think. But these are just people who are not very bright people who are just using set phrases of official propaganda.

But a thinking man finds it very hard there. And it's a terrible system of universal informing, universal following. You cannot trust a single person there. It's quite possible for a son to inform on his father. Or a wife on her husband. Not to mention what friends can do to friends.

SAFER: What gave you the idea, the sense that it might be any idfferent in the West?

INTERPRETER: They isolate us all from foreigners but we read books. And sometimes we're able to travel abroad. In order to know a little bit more about the world, I specially learned Polish. See, you can buy Polish newspapers in Moscow and they tell you more about the world than Russian newspapers do.

And then, after all, once I was actually in Paris. Nine years ago. Well, then, I also became a criminal.

I got away from my group once in Montmartre and got to know an artist, who was painting modern pictures. I asked him wehther he was allowed to pain pictures like that. He just laughed. I went home with -- he showed me his pictures, said he'd won some prizes for them. I said this is just a fantastic life. This is just trmendous happiness. He took me to the window. He lived up in an attic, right at the top.

He said, look, it's all right here -- why the hell do you want to go back to Russia? Why don't you stay here with me? I'll paint what I like and you can write what you like. And a glasss of milk will be -- we'll have enough for a glass of milk.

SAFER: Why didn't you do it then?

INTERPRETER: Pitifully frightful for a person who's born in a concentration camp -- it's too sudden. I'd left my wife whom I loved in Russia, my son. Son who was only just born then. I listened to it as if it was like a fairy tale, something fantastic, you see.

SAFER: Did you brood on that when you got back to Russia?

INTERPRETER: All thinking people in Russia think about this and brood on it. See, it's very difficult. We Russians are very fond of our country. Every single emigrant is really suffering from a sort of nostalgia. And then, of course, it's especially frightful for a writer to cut himself off from his people.

SAFER: Yet, as a writer in the Soviet Union, you were a member of a very select group of people. What I'm really trying to get at is that you sat around with other writers, thinking men, and intellectual people, what on earth did you talk about?

INTERPRETER: Mostly unpublished. It was just one long complaint. One of them'd say he'd written a novel and so they won't publish it. Or else they'd publish it in such a frightful form that he's simply desperate.

SAFER: Isn't that dangerous, though?

INTERPRETER: Yes.

SAFER: Well, just where do you draw the line in these conversations? Can you really ever trust each other?

INTERPRETER: A hundred percent, you can't trust anybody. You have to carry on your conversations like this. Now, you say, this is very bad and this is bad and this is bad but these were all mistakes. But altogether, we are Communists. We just think that there are little small mistakes committed in Russia.

SAFER: Anatoly, I've read everything you've written and one word keeps coming up in almost every article. The word "cynicism." Could you expand on that?

INTERPRETER: I am at this moment a very fortunate person. I am for the first time in my life saying what I really think. Many, many people in Russia think exactly the same as I do. I'm responsible for my words. I know what I'm saying. Insofar as we have to live in that theatre, every single person has a sort of collection of phrases which he speaks and says officially, publicly, and a corresponding collection of actions.

Insofar as to a normal human being it's extremely difficult to lead such a double life.

SAFER: What are the rewards for that cynicism?

INTERPRETER: Well, of course, he gets the possibility of living more richly than others, be better off than others. He can buy commodities, special things, special shops. He will be allowed to travel, travel abroad. He may receive decorations, official state medals, state prizes.

SAFER: Do any of your colleagues place any real value on these awards?

INTERPRETER: No. On the whole, we're pretty cool towards the sort of rewards you get.

My novel "Baba Yar" was put forward for a state prize. They used to be called Stalin Prizes. But when this was reported in the newspapers, a lot of very decent people began to change their attitude toward me for the worse.

Fortunately for me, I didn't get the prize.

SAFER: The Soviet authorities were very unhappy with your novel, "Baba Yar". Now I know that book, and it's a simple account of how the Nazis slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Jews and Ukranians in the Ukraine. What on earth did they object to in that?

INTERPRETER: There were three main objections to the book.

But in the first place, there is a great deal of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. And "Baba Yar" is primarily concerned with the murder of Jews.

The Soviet officials prefer not to talk about this.

Then, my novel went rather further than this. It begins with talking about the beginning of the war and inquiring why there was such a terrible defeat at this time.

The truth of the matter is that a great many Soviet citizens and espcially Ukranians waited for Hitler as a liberator.

Then it turned out that the Germans were offering them the same kind of terrorist regime as Stalin. So the people found themselves between two fires, between the hammer and the anvil. The ordinary citizen preferred his own, Russian form of terror.

And the third objection on the part of the censor was purely literary quality. My literary method.

They considered that they knew better than I how I should write.

Consequently, they did such an enormous number of cuts and changes that the novel in fact was turned upside down. And all my novels have been treated in the same way.

So I'm always faced with the dilemma of printing at least something or publishing nothing at all.

But in the end it became so objectionable to me what they were going to print that I simply reject the whole of it.

SAFER: Now, in coming out you didn't really come out alone. You came out with everything you'd ever written. How did you achieve this?

INTERPRETER: I'm a bit of an amateur photographer. And I took pictures of all my manuscripts. I put them onto film. I'll show you some of them. I've got them here. That's roughly -- that's the sort of thing. Just ordinary film.

I managed to get six sheets -- typing sheets onto each exposure. You see, if I brought it all out as actual manuscript, well, it would make something like five or six cases, five or six -- so I squeezed it and wound it up really tight and it didn't take up much more room than a cizarette pack.

But I hid it inside my jacket. And that really were the whole of my possessions, the whole of my property with which I came out of Russia. And that there is the whole of my life. These are my real books, not the ones as they areknown to the reader.

SAFER: You've left your homeland. As restricted as it was, it was your home. Do you think you'll be able to find the things that you're searching for in the West or will you always remain Kuznetsov, the man who left?

INTERPRETER: Of course, I am making an absolutely desperate effort to turn myself into another person.

I don't like it when people call me Kuznetsov. This is a compromise name.

Only the future will show whether I can be a real artist and writer and a person.

SAFER: We in the West have all sorts of problems -- Vietnam and other things that are tearing our society apart. Have you ever thought about any of these things?

INTERPRETER: Yes, of course.

I consider that the war continues in Vietnam only because of the Soviet Union.

As for America, there are a lot of thinking people in Russia who think the same as I do. But rather less as far as Vietnam is concerned.

SAFER: As a thinking man in the Soviet Union, did you regard the United States as a threat to peace, as a threat to yourself?

INTERPRETER: I've been living too short a time in the west and have too little information. I have no knowledge at all of America. I very much want to go there.

But now, and for a long time, my personal opinion is that the real aggressor in the modern world is the Soviet Union.

They don't conceal their aims. They say that Communism's spread all over the whole world, that the -- after all, the Western world, including America, defends itself.

SAFER: You know, even here in the West, one of the great conflicts at the moment for writers is a writer's commitment, a writer's involvement in politics. Do you feel that even here you must engage yourself?

INTERPRETER: Oh, God, how I'm tired of all that. I don't want to have anything to do with politics.

You put me political questions, but my answers are the answers of a dilettante.

I really like writing, writing literature.

But there I got to the point where I felt I couldn't live there any more; I couldn't do it there. So I'm going to try to do it here. That's all I'm hoping for.

SAFER: You call Russia a concentration camp. Yet you left your own family back in that concentration camp. Do you fear for them?

INTERPRETER: Very much indeed.

crime?

INTERPRETER: I have no doubt about that.

SAFER: And so you feel some guilt over that too.

INTERPRETER: Da.

SAFER: Well, even here in the West you're living under strain, under great tension.

INTERPRETER: Da.

SAFER: How long can a man go on living like that?

INTERPRETER: I don't know.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 August 1969

II.C.

Kuznetsov Backs Soviet on China

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Aug. 20—The Soviet writer Anatoly V. Kuznetsov celebrated his 40th birthday Monday and formally ended his career. The same day the new non-Soviet writer, A. Anatol, was officially born. It was a sybolic act that combined deadly seriousness with irony.

On the eve of his birthday Mr. Kuznetsov, with a few friends, conducted a small memorial service for the dead in a quiet English villege. A jigger of vodka was drunk, respe were paid to the late author Comrade Kuznetsov, and a toast offered to his successor, Mr. Anatol.

Thus, Kuznetsov — or Anatol, as he henceforth will call himself—has marked his departure, for good or for bad, from the Soviet world he left three weeks ago and his entry into the non-Communist world, where he hopes his creative talents can find a fruition denied by Soviet repression, censorship, fear, conformism and banality.

An Intense, Nervous Man

Mr. Kuznetsov is an intense, nervous man. He has begun to smoke English cigarettes and he lit one after another as he sat in a private dining room of the Royal Air Force Club on Piccadilly and spoke in vivid and descriptive Russian of the responsibilities that rest on his shoulders as he tries to make a literary career in the west.

His thick-lensed glasses and the sandy hair that he kept rubbing back from his forehead gave him more than a passing resemblance to Dmitri Shostakovich, the composer.

Seriousness is the word for Mr. Kuznetsov. He is serious as he relates the year's planning that went into his break from the Soviet Union; serious as he points to his muscled shoulders and tells how he trained himself to swim underwater in a harebrained scheme to escape via the Black Sea; serious when he talks of friends and family left behind in the Soviet Union; serious when he talks of the hopes and fears—the fears predominating — that he says prevail in his country.

Critical of China

The great fear of the ordinary Russian today is China, Mr. Kuznetsov said. Russians fear China, he said, and they fear Mao Tse-tung and fear that Mr. Mao is intent on making war on Russia and that war cannot be avoided. The danger, he insisted comes entirely from the Chinese side. The Soviet Union, he is cetain, would never make war on China, but Mr. Mao seems determined to attack.

When his view of the situation was mildly challenged, Mr. Kuznetsov waved his arms in excitement. He said he knew where the responsibility lay. On this question the Soviet press is telling the truth, he felt. He had only to read an article or two from Jenmin Jih Pao, the Peking newspaper, to understand that China wanted war. Mr. Kuznetsov said Mr. Mao was a madman like Hitler. The writer said he had learned enough about Hitler in the Ukraine during World War II.

The fear of war, Mr. Kuznetsov said, is general in the Soviet Union. No one escapes it, he added, the ordinary people, the workers, the peasants, the writers like himself. He said the fear of war deepened the gray outlook of Soviet society, the hopelessness that he said pervaded the intellectual community, the frustration making the life of ordinary men and women.

Decision Was Not Easy

The decision to leave was not taken lightly, he said.

He was close to tears when he told how he deliberately set about to destroy his 9-year-old son's love for him so that the boy would not be heartbroken at his departure; how he coldly walked away at the station from his youngster and the child's grandmother, not waving good-by; how rudely he treated his wife, from whom he has long been separated, to make cetain she would feel no regret at his going.

He said he coolly accepted a shopping list "a yard long" from his secretary to take with him to London so she would not suspect that he intended not to return. He recalled that he talked in detail about plans for a new novel, about getting a new apartment, so that no one would suspect his plans.

"It is no light matter to leave your country," he said, rubbing a tear from his eyes with a clenched fist. "You have to think of many things. I was cruel to my son. I reprimanded him. I slapped him. He loved me very much. I could not bear to do it. But I could not have him mourning for me."

Mr. Kuznetsov said he did not expect the West to understand easily what life was like in Russia, particularly for a writer. To those who might think he should have stayed behind and worked from within to change Russia, he has a simple answer.

"I have read that the American writer William Styron thinks that I should not have left," he said. "Well, I have this offer for him. My rooms in Tula are vacant. Let him take them and live in the Soviet Union for a year and then see what he thinks. Please, he is welcome."

Mr. Styron, who visited the Soviet Union last year, said recently that Mr. Kuznetsov's de-

fection had "an overtone of selling out."

Mr. Kuznetsov shook his head when he was asked about the charge made by his editor, Boris Polevoi, of the you magazine Yunost, that he had "abandoned" his wife and son and also the pregnant woman "whom he promised to marry."

"You know," Mr. Kuznetsov said, "My wife left me three years ago for another writer. She went to study in Moscow. The other woman Polevoi mentions is my secretary—a very nice woman, a very good woman. She knew nothing about my intention to leave. As for her being pregnant—that I heard for the first time from Boris Polevoi. I guess he had to put that in to add a little flavor to his statement."

Mother Lives in Kiev

Mr. Kuznetsov, who was born in Kiev on Aug. 18, 1929, was 12 years old when the Nazis came. His mother once was a grade-school teacher.

She still lives in Kiev, in the same cottage his grandfather built in swampy Kurenevka. It is not far from Babi Yar, the ravine where the Nazis slaughtered tens of thousands of Jews as well as lesser numbers of Ukrainians, gypsies and others.

His grandfather, Fyodor, born in 1870, the same year as Lenin, and to his dying days a rabid foe of the Communists, has long since died. So has his grandmother, Marfa, a woman who died illiterate but whom the grandson adored as a saint. A devout believer in the Russian Orthodox faith, the grandmother secretly took her grandson to church and had him christened.

"I remember my grandmother with great respect," he said. "She taught me humanity."

Father a Communist

His father, Vasily, was an engineer and a party member. He was "a real Russian type" from Kursk who joined the Red Army and fought against the Whites. He was a policeman when he married Mr. Kuznetsov's mother. Later he became a member of the Kiev City council but before World War II he separated from his wife. He spent the war in Gorky, working there until he retired. He died a little more than two years ago.

The boy Anatoly grew up in Kiev and lived by his wits as a street urchin under the Nazi occupation.

While he now repudiates his novel, Babi Yar, which related the horror of the extermination of the Kiev Jews, he affirms that it is a documentary work.

He maintains that every fact in it is a true fact; that every experience is a real one; that many Kiev residents, his grandfather included, awaited the the Germans with intense anticipation and welcomed their arrival.

Mr. Kuznetsov attended secondary schools in Kiev. In 1952 he was sent with many of his comrades to help build construction projects of the Stalin era. He worked on the hydroelectric and irrigation project at Kakhovka in the Ukraine for two years. Then he went to Moscow and began his literary studies at the Gorky Institute, finishing in 1960.

Was Married in 1960

That year he married Irina Marchenko and they went to live in the city of Tula, about 100 miles south of Moscow, once famous for its manufacture of samovars and cannon, now an industrial center of 400,000 population.

He had hoped to stay in Moscow, but that is no easy matter for a Soviet citizen. Either he had to be studying there, or to be born there, or to be ordered to Moscow to work. He could qualify on none of these counts. So he went to Tula where he had the good fortune to get a three-room apartment in a building that had just been put up.

Tula, he said, is not a bad place to live. It is close enough to Moscow so you can do your shopping there. That is much better than places farther in the provinces.

Everyone in Tula, he recalled, goes to Moscow for any important shopping — clothing or household goods from GUM, the department store on Red Square; cosmetics from the specialty shops on Petrovka or Kuznetsky Most; food delicacies either from Gastronom No. 1, the former Yeliseyev store on Gorky Street, or at the GUM grocery department.

Local Tula facilities are primitive, as they are in all small and medium-sized Soviet cities.

"You have to buy in the peasant market," Mr. Kuznetsov said. "There is no meat or eggs in the state stores. But the peasant market is very expensive. The average worker in Tula earns the equivalent of $3.30 a day. A pound of meat costs $2, a chicken costs $5.50. For 10 eggs you pay $2.20."

City Has Four Restaurants

The city of Tula has four restaurants — "one for every 100,000 people," Mr. Kuznetsov points out. Privately owned automobiles are virtually nonexistent. One device that he used to throw off suspicion that he was not returning to Russia was to apply to buy a car. With good fortune a person's name may move to the head of the waiting list within four or five years.

If the hallmark of ordinary Soviet life is banality, he reports, that of the Soviet intellectual is frustration and fear.

"The mood of the intelligentsia," he said, "goes down, down, down, down. It has been that way since the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Then came Czechoslovakia. That was the big turning point. Now what can anyone do? What can anyone write?"

"When two writers meet they say to each other, 'What are you doing? What is your mood?' But the answer is the same. The mood is bad. There is nothing one can do. Everyone is in the same boat. No one can publish anything worthwhile. It is a very gloomy outlook. People feel they must save themselves if they can."

Yevtushenko in Bad Mood

Mr. Kuznetsov describes the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko as being in a "very bad mood" and unable to decide what to do.

What could he have done if he staved on in the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov asked himself? Would it have made sense for Thomas Mann to stay in Hitler's Germany? Or for Bertolt Brecht. He did noth think so.

"I don't want to go to a concentration camp," he said frimly.

What are Mr. Kuznetsov's plans? The first is to learn English. He landed in Englad knowing hardly one word of English. Intensive English courses are first on his list. That and the preparation of one of his novels, in the original, uncut, uncensored form for translation and publication. Then, to work.

He knows how difficult this will be. He recalls the statement of Boris Pasternak when Nikita S. Khrushchev was trying to force the poet to leave Russia after he had been awarded the Nobel Prize in 1958. Pasternak said he would die if he left Russia, that he could not write outside his homwland.

But Mr. Kuznetsov believes that he can. He recalled the other Russian Nobel Prize winner for literature, Ivan Bunis, who went to Paris at the time nearly half his life outside his homeland.

And he recalled, too, Alexander Herzen, the Russian writer, critic and revolutionary of the 19th century who came to London and founded the publication Kolokol (The Bell), which kept the cause of freedom alive in one generation after another of young Russians fighting to overthrow Czarist oppression.

There were, Mr. Kuznetsov thought, enough precedents — exile is hardly something new for a Russian writer.

DAILY TELEGRAPH LONDON

RUSSIAN IS GRANTED ASYLUM

Soho ruse to get to Daily Telegraph

By DAVID FLOYD,
Communist Affairs Correspondent

ANATOLI KUZNETSOV, the Russian author who disappeared in London on Monday, was granted asylum in Britain last night. He said he could no longer work as a writer in Russia and feared reprisals if he returned.

The 40-year-old author who vanished from his Kensington hotel on Monday night was given permission by Mr. Callaghan, Home Secretary, for a "permanent stay" in Britain. The Home Office said: "This is not political asylum . . . it does not apply in this case."

Earlier yesterday the Home Office had said that Kuznetsov was admitted for a short visit, "and until that visit is over there is no reason for us to be concerned." There was no comment last night from the Russian Embassy.

'SENSATIONAL' BUSINESS

Kuznetsov made his way to Fleet Street and *The Daily Telegraph* office, only to find no one available who could speak Russian. But in the end he got through to a Russian-speaking member of the staff on the telephone and told him he wanted to see him urgently on "sensational" business.

He managed to give the correspondent's address to a taxi driver, and arrived at his home later in the evening. He was very tense but quite sure of himself. He was not going to return to Russia, he said. He had made up his mind about this before leaving Moscow the previous week.

He was told that the decision to stay in Britain must rest with him, and he was warned that the life of an emigré was not easy.

He said nothing would persuade him to go back to Russia where he found it impossible to work as a writer.

Mother left

Kuznetsov has left his mother, 65, in Kiev. She has survived life under Stalin and two years in Kiev occupied by the Germans during the last war.

Kuznetsov described his experience at that time in his best known novel, "Babi Yar."

Kuznetsov's wife left him some time ago, taking his nine-year-old son with her. A report from Moscow yesterday said she had gone on holiday in the south of Russia.

Kuznetsov managed to get permission to leave Russia only because he undertook to write a book about Lenin. He would not have been allowed to come abroad for a less orthodox purpose.

Czech shock

Kuznetsov said he finally made up his mind to leave Russia a year ago when the Russian armies marched into Czechoslovakia. He said the invasion shocked the whole of the Soviet intelligentsia, the great majority of whom were today opposed to the Soviet régime.

Back to hotel

After arrangements had been made for him to go into hiding Kuznetsov made a brief return visit to his Kensington hotel to collect his typewriter ("my old favourite"), copies of his published works and some Cuban cigars ("they are so cheap in Moscow"). He narrowly missed running into Andjaparidze.

In the period between going into hiding and being granted asylum Kuznetsov's main anxiety was for the members of his family left in Russia.

He had made ample financial provision for them before leaving. But he was afraid they would be arrested and their property confiscated when it was known that he had decided to stay in Britain.

Manuscripts saved

Kuznetsov managed to bring out of Russia the complete manuscripts of all his works, which have so far been published only in censored version, as well as manuscripts of two unpublished novels.

He photographed hundreds of pages of texts on 35mm film and carried the film sewn into the lining of his jacket. He spent most of yesterday sorting the films out and preparing them for processing.

Kuznetsov's great ambition is to continue his writing without any of the restraint imposed by censorship or Communist party control.

Growing hostility

He had every reason to seek freedom for his creative abilities

STRIPTEASE VISIT

When Kuznetsov left his hotel on Monday afternoon determined to "choose freedom" all he had to help him was the address of *The Daily Telegraph* in Fleet Street and the name of a member of the staff who, he was told, spoke Russian.

He had spent the early part of the afternoon viewing striptease shows in Soho along with George Andjaparidze, aged 26, his translator and secret police agent.

He had convinced Andjaparidze that he was a loyal Soviet citizen, and that his main concern was to find himself a prostitute. The two men agreed to go about their own business for the rest of the day.

in the West. His starkly realistic [illegible] of life in Russia were meeting growing hostility from the official critics.

Even those of his works which were issued by the state publishing houses were printed only after large sections had been cut out by the censor. Like many other of the younger generation of Russian writers today, Kuznetsov was known to have written several works [illegible] to be published in Russia.

Kuznetsov arrived in London last Thursday with a visa for a two week visit.

He was here ostensibly to collect material for a book on Lenin's life in London. His visit was sponsored by the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR and the British-Soviet Friendship Society, both controlled by the Communist Party.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 August 1969

III.B.

Russian Defector

Anatoly Vasileyevich Kuznetsov

By ISRAEL SHENKER

ANATOLY VASILYEVICH KUZNETSOV, the Soviet author who defected in Britain Wednesday, was born Aug. 18, 1929, hard by Babi Yar, the ravine in Kiev where tens of thousands of the city's Jews were to be massacred by the Nazis in 1961. Although the Soviet Government regularly memorializes the Nazis' victims, it said little about Babi Yar and left the place itself unmarked, as if there could be nonplaces as well as nonpersons.

Man In the News

It was left to a pair of non-Jews—Mr. Kuznetsov and the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko—to assume the burden of mourning for Babi Yar's Jews.

In his poem "Babi Yar," Yevtushenko began by noting that "No monument stands over Babi Yar," and concluded by admitting that "all anti-Semites must hate me now as a Jew—for that reason I am a true Russian."

Stood Where Thousands Died

He had written his poem just a few days after visiting Babi Yar with Mr. Kuznetsov. "We were standing where hundreds of thousands of people had once writhed and screamed in the throes of death," Mr. Kuznetsov wrote after that visit.

He was 12 years old when the Germans came to Kiev. His father was a policeman, and his mother, a schoolteacher, became a factory cleaning woman. He shined shoes, sold cigarettes, and worked long hours for a sausage maker. Several times he was about to be deported to Germany, but escaped. The sound of machine-gun fire from Babi Yar lingered in his ears—"a dread sound that cuts its way into my memory forever."

At 14 Anatoly Kuznetsov (pronounced kooz-NYETS-off) began to write sketches of what he had seen, and painstakingly noted all that he could remember of Babi Yar. When his mother came across the material he had hidden, she wept and said that one day it might be a book.

Mr. Kuznetsov studied writing in Moscow at the Institute of Literature. In 1946 his short stories—which had appeared in Pionirskaya Pravda, the Communist party paper for children—won a national prize.

In 1952 he went to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station in the Ukraine to work as carpenter, bulldozer operator, and writer on the plant paper. He also worked for a time as ballet dancer and artist. It was at Kakhovka that he met Mr. Yevtushenko.

First Book in 1957

In 1955 Mr. Kuznetsov became a member of the Communist party, and the next year went to Irkutsk, in Siberia, to work as a cement mixer.

His first book, "Continuation of a Legend: Notes of a Young Person," appeared in 1957. When it appeared in French translation he sued the publisher for distorting his book to make it appear anti-Communist, and for issuing the translation without his permission.

He graduated from Gorky University in 1960, and the next year published "On a Sunny Day," a book for children, and "Selenga," a collection of short stories. "At Home," another novel by Mr. Kuznetsov, came out in 1964.

Then he revisited Kiev. As the terrible memories of the massacre returned, he realized it was time to write the book on Babi Yar.

At first he tried to shape the facts into a literary form, recalling the words of the novelist Honoré de Balzac—"as foolish as a fact."

But then he began writing it "just the way it had all been, and immediately I knew that was it." The result—in 1966 — was a documentary novel in which "nothing was invented," a work in which Balzac's foolish facts became a soaring remembrance.

Since no book is published in the Soviet Union without Government permission, it could also be taken as an official admission of sorts that Mr. Yevtushenko had made a valid case.

Just a week ago, Mr. Kuznetsov's name turned up on the masthead as a member of the editorial board of Yunost magazine, which has a circulation of 2.1 million and is popular among the young in part for its flirtation with notions unpopular with Soviet officials.

Change in the Masthead

At the same time, three prominent Soviet writers were dropped from the board. One [illegible] Yevtushenko, who [illegible] critical of the Soviet [illegible] of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Kuzn[illegible] most recent novel—"The Fire," dealing with demoralization in a town with a metallurgical [illegible] was published in the March and April issues of Yunost. The book was criticized in a number of minor Soviet publications for failing to portray the "positive aspects" of Soviet life.

Mr. Kuznetsov has been living in Tula, about 100 miles from Moscow. As far as is known here, his wife is still in Tula. She did not accompany him to London.

Dial Press, which published "Babi Yar" here, invited Mr. Kuznetsov to visit the United States last February, but he wrote to say that he was so busy with the forthcoming publication of "The Fire" that he had to drop plans for the visit. A spokesman for Dial Press said that the company was holding royalties for Mr. Kuznetsov.

LONDON TIMES
1 August 1969

IV A

The strains of communist life in Russia

Soviet writers are facing a painful dilemma

By LEOPOLD LABEDZ

Mr. Anatoly Kuznetsov's decision to stay in Britain can be best understood against the background of Soviet literary history, particularly in its present phase.

It is now a decade and a half since Ehrenburg's *Thaw* gave its name to the hopes of Soviet writers, and Pomerantsev's article "On Sincerity in Literature" indicated their basic preoccupation. Since then, there have been many ups and downs, periods when writers were allowed a greater degree of latitude alternating with times of stricter party control of literature.

However, these 15 years of cyclical ebb and flow have also witnessed the progress of disenchantment among the literary intelligentsia, whose hopes were dashed as they became increasingly and acutely aware that they were still facing only two prospects: either to be the obedient servants of the regime (with a somewhat greater degree of personal security than Stalin's "engineers of human souls"), or to be its victims if they showed themselves too deeply concerned with Pomerantsev's first prerequisite of the literary vocation.

It is a cruel dilemma. During the past five years of "collective leadership" in the Kremlin, continuous efforts have been made to bring the writers to heel. Their position was made more difficult by the tightening of censorship, a more intolerant publishing policy, restriction of foreign contracts, the persecution of nonconformist writers like Sinyavsky or Solzhenitsyn, and, not least important, a series of trials *pour décourager les autres*.

It should not be surprising that the earlier cautiously hopeful mood of the more liberal Soviet writers has given way to melancholy or even to outright despair.

The idol of Soviet youth, the poet-chansonnier Bulat Okudzhava, who recently said in conversation with an Italian journalist that Soviet literary society was made up of masks, and complained bitterly that he was "tired of living", reflects this more general mood, which reached its nadir last year after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Like other occasions of this kind, it has affected Soviet writers profoundly. The decision to invade spelt the end not only of Czechoslovak hopes for a "socialism with a human face" in their country, but also of hopes for some "liberalization" in the Soviet Union itself.

Soviet writers were torn between their "patriotic" and their "liberal" loyalties. Many of them realized the gap which existed between the attitudes towards Czechoslovakia prevalent among the more enlightened milieux of the intelligentsia, and those among the population in general. The hostility shown by the crowd to the courageous lonely demonstrators in Red Square led by Larissa Daniel, was not without wider significance.

But if "patriotic" fervour (or blackmail) inhibited some and brought home to others their isolation, it did not completely stop literary manifestations, however discreet, of disapproval of the invasion.

It took two months of intense effort by the authorities to produce an "open letter" (which appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta on October 23, 1968) in which a number of second-rate writers expressed their support.

But the signatures of three members of the secretariat of the board of the Soviet Writers Union (all the others signed the "open letter"), were conspicuously missing: those of Alexander Tvardovsky, editor of the liberal literary monthly Novy Mir, of its previous editor, Konstantin Simonov, and of the famous novelist, Leonid Leonov. Alexei Kosterin, a member of the Writers Union, had returned his party membership card—"to free myself from party discipline which deprives one of the right to think". This was his last public act; shortly afterwards he died.

Deprived of any outlet, even for expression in an Aesopian form, liberal protests are increasingly taking an unofficial form, either as "underground" literature, or as writings and documents published abroad.

As other avenues of expression have gradually been blocked, there has been a remarkable increase in the circulation of Samizdat, the literature being copied by hand and passed on from hand to hand. Some of these writings find their way abroad; but what has been published outside the Soviet Union is only a part of the innumerable stories, essays, poems, and letters of protest circulating inside the country.

There is now a regular periodical, distributed clandestinely, which tries to keep track of the underground publications and unofficial materials, as well as of events not reported in the official Soviet press. It is called Chronicle of Current Events; the first issue appeared on April 30, 1968, and its most recent, no. 7, on April 30, 1969.

The Chronicle provides information about matters which often do not reach either the Soviet or the western press. For instance, the issue of December 31, 1968, (no. 5), gives a review of Samizdat for 1968 which reveals the extent to which the intensified campaign to bring dissident intellectuals to heel, and the harsh reprisals taken by the authorities, are being countered by their boldest representatives. They continue their literary activities and their protests despite the repressive climate; the price to be paid may include the loss of livelihood, exile, or imprisonment, or such mild routine measures as forcible confinement in mental institutions.

The authorities were not slow to warn the writers again and again about the limits on their rights of expression. They were reminded that their "inalienable right of criticism" does not include permission for "unrestricted fault-finding of an anti-Soviet kind" or for "slandering socialist reality and weakening the class-consciousness of the Soviet people" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, May 29, 1969).

There is a renewed insistence on conformity with the rigid interpretation of the doctrine of "socialist realism", with its principles of *narodnost* and *partiinost*, and on the need for writers to create more "positive heroes"—those paragons of virtue who make the readers yawn.

Writers who in the past have shown a tendency towards less than 100 per cent conformism, are under pressure or attack. The rumours of Tvardovsky's dismissal from the editorship of Novy Mir persist. So far, despite pressure, he has refused to resign.

That other "liberal" journal Yunost (Youth), which has now lost from its editorial board not only Vasily Aksionov, Evgeny Evtushenko and Victor Rozov, but also Anatoly Kuznetsov (nominated as one of their successors), is unlikely to continue for long on its old lines.

There are many other straws in the wind, such as the sharp criticism by Pravda (on June 30, 1969) of the editors of the Short Encyclopaedia of Literature. Pravda was particularly incensed by the encyclopaedia's entries on Boris Pasternak (which mentioned *Doctor Zhivago* without any abusive comment) and on Osip Mandelstam (which mentioned that he was twice arrested and "perished after his second arrest"). Like the editor of Yunost, the chief editor of the encyclopaedia, Alexei Surkov, was a Stalinist who mellowed somewhat in the post-Stalin period and came to be regarded

by his more diehard colleagues as a defector from their camp.

In general, the present climate has emboldened the diehards like Kochetov, Sofronov, and Chakovsky, who have control of important journals and magazines (Oktyabr, Ogonyok, Literaturnaya Gazeta). The more liberal "official" writers have to censor themselves even before the work is done for them by the official censor. It is not surprising that some of them are finding their relaxation in drinking more than is good for literature.

For the time being this policy of cool repression has a somewhat contradictory effect on the younger writers. The earlier, rosy expectations having failed, those of them who write for Samizdat have no longer any need for self-censorship or Aesopian language. They can, therefore, be more explicit, abandoning that inevitable Orwellian ingredient of the Soviet-style printed word, doublethink. They may come to realize the full meaning of the verse by Akhmateva:

To lose the freshness of words—
and the singleness of feeling
is for us the same as for the
painter to lose his eyesight.

If the Soviet authorities were to clamp down on Samizdat, the number of literary defectors might increase. Unless, of course, guided by the internal logic of censorship, the Soviet Government were also to stop even the occasional visits of Soviet writers to foreign countries. In which case the words of Zamyatin will become once again topical: he said in 1921 that so long as Russian literature has to tremble at the sound of every heretical word, it will have "only one future, its past".

THE OBSERVER REVIEW
3 August 1969

IV.B.

WHY KUZNETSOV FLED

All the time he would be under heavy, nagging, sometimes threatening pressure to write the sort of books and articles he did not wish to write, books and articles designed to present the official image of the Soviet Union, which has no correspondence with any sort of truth.'

by EDWARD CRANKSHAW

KUZNETSOV is an exotic-sounding name. To English ears it seems not quite real. It belongs to another world: anything might happen to a man called Kuznetsov. But to the Russians it is one of the commonest of names. Kuznets means Smith.

On the face of it, this Russian Mr Smith, Anatoly Kuznetsov, was more comfortably circumstanced than many of his fellow writers in the Soviet Union. His novels, 'Babi Yar' and 'Fire,' made quite a stir and had a readership of hundreds of thousands—not at all unusual in Russia, but enviable by Western standards. At 39 he was an established member of an admired and respected élite, enjoying the luxury of a room of his own in Moscow and a proper home in the comparatively easy-going provinces well away from the blighting shadow of the Kremlin.

It is true that he had been under fire for 'ideological laxity' and for dwelling too much on the seamy side of Soviet life; but these were only warning shots across the bows, not broadsides to sink and destroy: the sort of thing that all Soviet writers of any distinction encounter from time to time and know how to take in their stride. And, as though to emphasise that he was being rebuked more in sorrow than in anger, more for guidance than for punishment, he was recently appointed to the editorial board of *Yunost* (Youth), a magazine with a circulation of more than two million and a good record for resisting the grosser imbecilities of a reactionary establishment. He was luckier here than the spirited and brilliant Aksionov, who was dismissed from the board at the same time—as was Yevgeny Yevtushenko, now, for all his marked talents for running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, confined to kennels.

On top of all this, at a time when the Soviet Government is thinking more than twice about allowing writers out into the West, Kuznetsov was sent here to collect material about Lenin's life in London. The world was at his feet. Provided he was careful about what he published, he could have gone from strength to strength, profiting from the lessons spelt out by the bitter experience of a number of respected colleagues — the imprisonment of Sinyavsky and Daniel, the silencing of Solzhenit-

syn, the slow crushing of the meteoric poet, Voznessensky.

Yet now, by his own choice, he embarks on the life of a rootless emigré in a foreign land whose ways are alien, perhaps in some particulars repellent, and whose language he cannot speak. For all practical purposes, he finds himself a visitor to another planet. He is cut off from everything he has ever written about or ever felt about. He has to speak and read through an interpreter; he has to write through a translator; and he knows nothing of the people for whom he must now write. It was a terrible decision.

Since he felt compelled to make it, evidently the reality of his situation was very different from the picture presented to the outsider looking in on his career only a few days ago. And indeed this is so. No matter what he may himself tell us of the reasons for his great decision, anybody with any understanding of the current situation of the Soviet intellectuals and artists knows that the picture was false in detail and in general.

Kuznetzov was published and admired—but everything he published had first to be carefully censored by himself, then mauled by the official censor before it appeared. Almost without a doubt it was only a part of his output that he published. He will have written other books for his own satisfaction and to circulate by hand among his friends and admirers—a practice institutionalised almost into an industry under the name *Samizdat*, self-publishing. And all the time he would be under heavy, nagging, sometimes threatening pressure to write the sort of books and articles he did not wish to write, books and articles designed to present the official image of the Soviet Union which has no correspondence with any sort of truth. Even when not writing, he would be required, day in, day out, to connive in a sort of officially inspired conspiracy of lies—lies designed for no other purpose than to sustain in their positions of authority the ruling gang and their innumerable dependants and supporters, the party functionaries, the apparatus men.

There are only two ways to avoid entanglement in this conspiracy: to be silent and thus abandon any hope of building a career, even of making a living except a menial one; or to protest openly, at the risk of probable imprisonment and certain exile to some remote region.

Others beside Kuznetsov must from time to time have been tempted to cut themselves off from Russia, but until lately they could still hope for better things. It has been only during the past three or four years that the pressures on the independent mind have gathered crushing weight. It was only with the invasion of Czechoslovakia a year ago that it became finally clear to those who hoped that the new repression brought about by fear and uncertainty in a mediocre and divided leadership might be a passing phase was, in fact, irreversible for as long ahead as could be seen.

Czechoslovakia was the closing of a door to all ideas of 'socialism with a human face,' in the Soviet Union as well as in Prague. The experience was traumatic for many socialist intellectuals. It meant the end of a dream that had been sustained with greater or lesser optimism for the 15 years since Stalin's death.

Under the collective government presided over by Malenkov, then under Khrushchev, exciting things had happened. Some who had been silent for years found their voices; many who had compromised at last spoke out truly and firmly about the shamefulness of their compromise; young men and women, poets above all, sprang up in numbers, reproaching their elders for their pusillanimity and declaring, in effect, that the only thing to fear was fear itself. Stalinist hacks with a vested interest in the repression of their more gifted colleagues withdrew into themselves and sulked. There were still plenty of them about, typified by the scurrilous and almost unreadable novelist, Kochetov; by Chakovsky, who was to come much later to England and explain on BBC Television how necessary and desirable it had been to confine those well-known traitors, Sinyavsky and Daniel, to the camps.

At first they kept quiet. Hope rose very strongly. The Soviet Union was waking up. Khrushchev himself needed the writers, the whole of the intelligentsia, in his own fight for power and in his desperate efforts to break the country out of the Stalinist paralysis, and harness its best minds to the job of making a success of the economy. The writers in particular he needed for the support they could give him in his de-Stalinisation campaign, which was also a campaign against those colleagues who wanted to pull him down. It was for this reason that he personally encouraged Solzhenitsyn and allowed him to publish his first short novel, 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,' an exposure of the penal labour camps, presented by Khrushchev as Stalin's camps—and Molotov's and Malenkov's and Kaganovich's.

But Khrushchev, who had the sense to see that unless the Soviet Union was to stagnate until it became a backwater of history he must allow the mind to expand and drag the best thinkers, the best dreamers out of hiding, never had any intention of giving them a totally free rein. He aimed at a sort of Stalinism without terror. And except for one or two direct and crudely threatening interventions, which usually occurred when he himself was under extreme pressure from the opposition in the Kremlin, he tried to achieve a sort of balance by allowing the liberalisers a little rope, then, when they threatened to take too much, encouraging the Kochetovs to fight back.

So it went on, two steps forward, one and a half steps back, for 10 years. Things were happening all the time. Things were said and done, books were published, which would have been unthinkable under Stalin; and although from time to time the party came down heavily, there was no real fear. Above all, the intelligentsia was sorting out its ideas, discussing freely, preaching decency, and responding in a greater or lesser degree to the imperious demands of the very young for something more than decency.

I remember during this time being worried by the complete openness with which the young would speak, even to total strangers and foreigners at that. Again and again I would ask: 'Is it really wise for you to talk like this? Shouldn't you be more careful?' And always, by these youngsters who had never known life under Stalin except as schoolchildren, I would be regarded

with amused or indignant patronage. 'How can you be so dense? Certainly things are far from all right. We have a long way to go. But we know where we're going. We have to fight bureaucracy, we have to fight obscurantism. Very well, we shall fight. But they will never be able to hurt us again.'

I am speaking of young men and women who were in their late teens and their early twenties in, say, 1955. Some of their contemporaries are now in prison or in exile after mock trials held in secret. Kuznetsov would himself have been 25 in that year. Perhaps he felt like that, too. The mood persisted at least until 1963, when Khrushchev, fighting for his own political life, clamped down.

After 1964, when Khrushchev fell, things went dead. Nobody knew what the new Government would do. The new Government did not know itself. For nearly two years they fought and manoeuvred among themselves, tried to sort out the muddles in the economy, and marked time. There were no policy initiatives of any kind. But in this period of uncertainty the security police, the KGB, were assuming a new authority. And in February 1966 they made a demonstration with the mock trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, who had been arrested some time earlier for publishing books, impossible to publish in Russia, under assumed names in the West. We know what happened. They were savagely sentenced, and the transcript of the trial, which was smuggled to the West, and published as 'On Trial' in 1967, showed the world the new mood the Soviet intelligentsia was up against.

Many of their colleagues, and many other members of the Soviet intelligentsia, scientists, engineers, university professors, protested with various degrees of emphasis and publicity. For Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, it seems to have been the last straw which determined her own decision to break with Russia. But the real protest came chiefly from the very young. And it took a special form. Under Khrushchev the protesters had demanded freedom: Pomerantsev, with his celebrated declaration on sincerity in literature; Tvardovsky, who held open the pages of the review *Novy Mir* for the best of the young writers (at this moment he is under great pressure to resign); Ilya Ehrenburg, many more besides, argued the necessity for freedom of expression if literature was to live, and the Soviet Union to mature, almost as though it were a new idea to be carefully and lovingly explained, nurtured, cherished.

The young men and women of the protest movement in the sixties argued differently. Ginsburg and Galanskov, who protested against the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and were themselves arrested and condemned for their pains; Kaustov and Bukovsky, who protested against this action, only to be arrested in their turn; the young Litvinov and Daniel's wife Larissa, who protested against everything that had gone before and were finally arrested and sent into exile for demonstrating against the invasion of Czechoslovakia; a group of young people in Leningrad who were sentenced for distributing books published abroad; the Ukrainian journalist Chornovil, who lucidly protested against the trial and sentencing of Ukrainian patriots—all these and many more who have suffered in the last three years did not bother to argue about the desirability of freedom of expression.

They took this for granted. They did not bother to argue about the crassness and imbecility of the party bureaucracy; they took that for granted. One and all they based their stand on the written Constitution of the Soviet Union, Stalin's hollow mockery of a Constitution with which he successfully confused the world in 1938.

This was a new approach. It did not get them very far. They were permitted to discuss and argue and agitate among themselves, but as soon as any of them got together to appeal to the public at large the police closed in.

And the public at large did not help. Materially, things are better than they used to be; further, people no longer get taken away in the middle of the night and shot or sent to rot in the camps for grumbling among themselves or making subversive jokes. They are safe provided they do not kick demonstrably over the traces. They have suffered much in their lifetimes, and they are content to be alive, with enough to eat and some consumer goods to queue for in the shops. They want only a quiet life. In their comfortable philistinism they have no sympathy for these hotheads and silly idealists with their vapourings about freedom and sincerity and self-expression. Live and let live and the devil take the hindmost is the unheroic mood.

The dissident intellectuals soon found that they were very much alone. Most of their university contemporaries were intent on making some sort of a career, which meant keeping their heads down and doing what they were told. The highly paid scientists, engineers and all the rest might, and did, and do, criticise aspects of the regime with extreme bitterness and sympathise warmly with the young protesters; they might hope that one day there would be enough of them in positions of influence to shift the balance of power in the Kremlin. But they knew that they could do nothing now when it came to the crunch.

How lonely the protesters were, their sympathisers, too, was borne in on them with intolerable impact by the crushing of the Czechoslovak movement towards the light. Many were appalled. Many refused to sign the obligatory letters declaring solidarity with the party and the Government in this action. But to the mass of the Soviet people in the cities (the peasants have barely heard of Czechoslovakia) it seemed that the Czechs deserved what they got. They were a nuisance, irritating foreigners to be put in their place. And they showed what they felt when Litvinov and Larissa Daniel and a handful of others demonstrated in Red Square: the demonstrators were set upon and abused by ordinary Muscovites even before the police could get to them. They were committing the worst sin. They were rocking the boat.

The last notable flare-up was that remarkable letter (first re-

ported in THE OBSERVER on 15 June) addressed to the United Nations by a group of patriotic Russians who had formed themselves into an Action Group for the Defence of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union, listing, as examples of the movement back towards Stalinism, all the trials mentioned above and many others. This sort of movement will go on, at any rate underground. But activities of this kind, so long as the present Government holds together and can keep the masses quiet and marginally content, are doomed.

This is the depressing and complex situation on which Kuznetsov decided to turn his back. He tried in his books, as all his best contemporaries are trying, to improve Soviet society by exposing some of its corruption, not to overthrow the system. He failed, as they are failing, and came away.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 1969

IV.C.

P.E.N. Congress May Discuss Censorship of Soviet Writers

By HENRY RAYMONT

The Soviet Government's repression and censorship of liberal authors, described in the recent series of articles by Anatoly Kuznetsov, is likely to emerge as a key subject of the International P.E.N. Congress to be held next month in Monton, France.

Arthur Miller, the Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright who is international president of P.E.N. — an organization of poets, playwrights, essayists and novelists—said in an interview yesterday that he would press for an extensive debate of the conditions that led to Mr. Kuznetsov's defection to the West.

The 39-year-old Soviet author, who received asylum in Britain on July 30, denounced the Soviet authorities for having forced him and other liberals to adapt their manuscripts to Communist party guidelines and to spy on one another for the K.G.B., the state security services.

Mr. Miller said he would submit the issue to some 700 authors from more than 50 countries, including several from Eastern Europe, who are expected to attend the congress.

Some Opposition Expected

"I think that Kuznetsov's articles provide an urgent reason to examine freedom of expression all around the world, not only in the Soviet Union," he declared.

Though there might be official opposition from some Eastern European delegations, Mr. Miller anticipated overwhelming support from the P.E.N. membership for a broad discussion of the Kuznetsov case.

Mr. Miller has just completed a book on his meetings with the intelligentsia during a trip to the Soviet Union last year in which he recounts some of the fears generated by Government surveillance. The book, "In Russia," will be published by Viking Press in the fall. It will contain 100 photographs taken by Inge Morath, Mr. Miller's wife.

William Styron, another author who visited the Soviet Union last year, reluctantly acknowledged yesterday to "rather mixed feelings" about Mr. Kuznetsov's denunciation of the plight of Soviet writers for fear of the consequences it may have for the liberal dissenters who remained behind.

"I agree 100 per cent with what he had to say," Mr. Styron said from his summer home in Martha's Vineyard. "Certainly the Soviet Union is the last place on earth where a writer can live with any sense of freedom or indpendence.

"Yet I cannot help wondering what effect his actions will have on the other writers who are still there. Perhaps betrayal is too strong a word, but the whole thing has an overtone of selling out when his fellow sufferers are likely to face increasing repression as a result of his own liberation."

'Desperate to Get Out'

Mr. Styron, who won a Pulitzer Prize last year for his novel "The Confessions of Nat Turner," said that during his three-week trip to Moscow and Tashkent he had found the oppression of liberal writers so intolerable that "I became desperate to get out again."

But he said he had decided not to write about his experiences because he believed the Soviet Government would level reprisals against any author he had associated with during the visit.

"In evaluating Kuznetsov," he said yesterday, "it is important to keep in mind that such courageous writers as Aleksanr Solzhenitsyn, Yevgenia Ginsburg, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, are defying censorship and repression in their own way and even willing to suffer imprisonment for their convictions."

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
21 August 1969

IV.D.

Soviet pianist says he dare not go back

By JOHN EZARD

Vladimir Ashkenazy, the Soviet pianist who was granted permission to live in the West in April, 1963, has disclosed that he does not feel safe in returning to Russia.

Mr Ashkenazy, one of the world's foremost pianists, broke a six-year silence about his personal status in an exclusive interview with the "Guardian." He contradicted as "travesty of the truth" a Russian claim that he can move freely in and out of the Soviet Union. He and his wife, he said, were kept in Moscow against their will for some weeks "in a state of acute anxiety and distress" during their first—and last—return visit in May, 1963.

This was less than two months after he decided to remain in London while on a concert visit. At a holiday bungalow in Palea Epidaurus, Greece, he said he believed he was probably only able to return to London from Russia because of the personal intervention of Mr Khrushchev, then Prime Minister.

Since then he had been "completely unable to trust" the authorities to let him leave Russia if he went there again.

Mr Ashkenazy, now 32, repudiated "carefully - fostered fiction" that he spends half of each year in Russia, but he stressed that he only decided to take this step after the Soviet claim was reported in the "Guardian" on August 1. "When an official Soviet spokesman says I move freely between Russia and the West, as I only wish I could, it is a gross and unfair distortion of the truth."

In a letter to the "Guardian" sent soon after the Soviet claim, he said that he and his wife's guaranteed exit visas were not honoured in Moscow. They had lived under the "very real fear that we would never be permitted to leave again. Despite the fact that our child (Vovka, then two years old) was in London at the time."

Invited to clarify this during the interview at Epidaurus he said that he and his wife subsequently realised they had fallen into "what you could call a kind of trap" by accepting the visas.

They were subjected to a bureaucratic cat and mouse game as soon as they reached Moscow. He was told by the then head of cultural relations at the Ministry of Culture, Mr Stepanov: "You are a Soviet citizen. You may not go." He was reminded by implication that the visas were "bits of paper."

He "lost all hope" of leaving and, deeply depressed, played unscheduled recitals to order. But he was braced to persist in his appeals to the Ministry of Culture by his wife Dody "who gave me an incredible example of how you can behave under stress."

Finally the Minister of Culture, Mrs Furtseva, let them go—by the "kindness" of Mr Khrushchev as a senior unnamed source later told him.

Talking during the interview of his earlier life as a pianist in Russia and of what led to his decision to leave, Mr Ashkenazy said:

he was "tried" at the Ministry of Culture after his first American tour in 1958, accused by his tour escort "who was probably briefed by the KGB" of expressing a liking for modern painting and music—and banned from further foreign tours for three years;

that the ban was renewed in 1962 after his marriage to a non-Soviet girl he met as a student at the Moscow Conservatoire that he was forced to play in the 1962 Tschaikovsky international competition, which he won;

that his wife was compelled by a threat to his career to take Soviet citizenship and become a "moral hostage" for him;

and that what tipped the scale in their decision to leave was a last-minute attempt by the authorities to stop his wife joining him on his 1963 British visit.

He said: "Since I always had a bad conscience about my wife's sacrifice of her freedom of movement, our marriage would have been distorted and under stress had we stayed in Russia."

A prodigy

Mr Ashkenazy's feat as a young prodigy in coming second in the Chopin international competition in Warsaw at the age of 17, and winning the Queen Elizabeth international piano competition at Brussels at 18, and the Tchaikovsky competition, is still central to the world prestige of Russian music.

Even in the West, he has remained one of "good boys" among Soviet artists abroad. He maintained from the start—and convincingly insisted at Epidaurus—that his motives were non-political and entirely centred round his family.

The main motive behind his detailed repudiation of the Russian claim appears to have been a sense that Russia was not matching his own reticence—and was, indeed, exploiting it. "I will be glad to know that people who care know the facts," he said.

He did not feel that his father, mother, or sister, who still live in Moscow, would be endangered by his action in "putting the record straight." He said: "These are not Stalin's times in Russia any more."

His father is a successful variety pianist-accompanist. His sister is studying to be a musician or music teacher at the Pedagogical Institute in Moscow.

'Access' to Russia

The text of Mr Ashkenazy's letter was:

Dear Sir,

In the "Guardian" of August 1 an article appeared regarding Mr Kuznetsov's decision to remain in England. In this article reference was made to my own free "access" to and from the USSR.

The relevant paragraph read as follows: "The Russian argument is that Mr Kuznetsov would 'probably' have been granted a period of residence abroad if he had applied in Moscow. The recent examples cited are Valeriy Tarsis, a far more savage critic of the regime than Mr Kuznetsov, and the pianist Mr Vladimir Ashkenazy, who moves freely between Moscow, Iceland, and Britain."

Since the statement about my movements is substantially

incorrect, I feel it is desirable for the record to be put straight.

I left the USSR for the last time on July 2, 1963, and since that day have at no time returned. There would always have been the strongest emotional reasons for me to do so since I have left behind me my parents and sister. But I have not yet felt satisfied that the Soviet authorities would allow me free movement to and from the Soviet Union.

To indicate that this has not been sheer alarmism on my part, it should be pointed out that my last and only return visit to Moscow after I had decided to stay in Britain (May 14 to July 2, 1963) was undertaken only after the Soviet Embassy in London had issued for my wife and me a guaranteed exit visa from the USSR with the endorsement that we would be allowed to leave whenever we wished.

This visa was not honoured for some weeks and we spent this period in Moscow in a state of acute anxiety and distress with the very real fear that we would never again be permitted to leave again in spite of the fact that our child was in London at the time. No sane person would wish to run such a risk a second time.

To say, therefore, that I "move freely between Moscow, Iceland, and Britain" is certainly a travesty of the truth.

Yours faithfully,

Vladimir Ashkenazy

THE NEW YORKER
13 September 1969

IV.E.

SOME months ago, Mr. Kingsley Amis was informing readers of the letters column in the London *Times* that the Soviet poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko had behaved dishonorably toward Olga Ivinskaya; now Miss Lillian Hellman tells us, in our *Times*, that Anatoly Kuznetsov, the Soviet novelist who recently sought political asylum in London, behaved dishonorably toward Yevtushenko. Mr. William Styron, meanwhile, has wondered in an interview if Kuznetsov's defection wasn't a "selling out." *We* wonder if writers enjoying the freedoms of the United States and the United Kingdom shouldn't refrain from passing judgment on their brethren in Communist states, who must try to function and survive under bizarre and tortuous restrictions unimaginable to a Western writer. A simple sigh of thanks for our blessings might be more in order. The plight of the artist under Communism, never pleasant, is worsening; the only thing going for him is the enthusiasm that difficulty engenders, and the knowledge that he is—whether or not he falls short of the heroic standards upheld by Miss Hellman and Mr. Amis—a custodian, for millions, of a certain human flame, of certain human capacities for expression, exaltation, formal control, and creative joy.

We are moved to these remarks by a letter that has been passed on to us. Its recipient is a young American writer, its sender a Czech girl now living in exile who happened to like a book the man had written. "There in Prague, we used to exhibit our paintings on Charles Bridge," she wrote him. "Our paintings were probably bad, because we were just seventeen or twenty, but we loved them, because through them we were perceiving the world. And there we discussed life and death, eternity and matter, and the confluence of things, and everything. We were so terribly happy there in the midst of the paintings and the light, on that stone bridge saturated with centuries of history. It was as if we were watching the sea; everything was as if grown together with the earth—it had the same kind of symmetry. I do not know whether you can imagine all this, but it was immensely beautiful. So beautiful that one did not sense other people or life, and felt removed from one's own body and sensed only the words, surrounded by the paintings. Or those crazy chases when the cops tried to prevent us from selling the paintings. (Because Czechoslovakia is a Communist country and only the state is entitled to sell and exploit.) It used to be a happy chase through the crooked streets of the Little Quarter. We shouted out of sheer happiness at seeing the clumsily moving cops. And the immense feeling of happiness when we ran, tired, into a pub, clutching our paintings to our breasts. That was our world. It was not necessary to read so much in those times, because one could learn about the world through one's friends."