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TWENTY YEARS OF DISSENT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

1949
October--
1954

a) Proclamation of People's Republic of China and flight of armies of CHIANG Kai-shek to Taiwan which left the victorious MAO Tse-tung in possession of the China mainland but not entirely in possession of its inhabitants.

b) MAO's molding of the CCP to the point where dissent became dangerous reached its fine point in the years between 1949 and 1954. Maoist cleansing of party ranks -- called "rectification" -- resulted in the outright killing of 800,000 opponents of his regime. MAO admitted to that number of victims in his February 1957 speech on contradictions (although the figure may be low). Killings were carried out on the grounds that the regime opponents were "enemies of the people."

1955

KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih, dissented from MAO's policies and were tried in secret proceedings conducted by LIU Shao-ch'i and TENG Hsiao-p'ing. Following Stalin's tactics, MAO and his prosecuting lieutenants "proved a long history of dissent and conspiracy" on part of the accused. KAO, JAO and the seven men who fell with them (similar to the anti-party group purge in the USSR in 1957) have never reappeared. KAO, the CCP says, "committed suicide."

1956
December

In a Peking Jen-min Jih-pao (Peoples' Daily - CCP newspaper) article covering Politburo discussions came a second attack on "the fiction of no tension between leaders and led." Disagreements sufficiently serious to be the subject of Politburo discussions are difficult to disguise.

1957
February --
1958

a) In a February 1957 speech MAO opened the door for non-communist criticism of the CCP in an attempt to win over dissenting Chinese intellectuals. This is the famed "hundred flowers and hundred schools of thought" line which was launched for MAO by CHOU En-lai in 1956.

b) Dissenters within the party openly criticized this line as "harmful to the cause of socialism;" the CPSU was violent in its criticism as well and there were even indications that some of MAO's own in the CCP leadership, including LIU Shao-ch'i, were included among the dissatisfied.

c) MAO never admitted that the CCP dissidents to his line were correct in their dire predictions of damage to party unity. He simply halted criticism in practice, supported it theoretically and in the "hundred flowers" revival in 1961 permitted "debate" only on academic subjects.

1958 -- The Great Leap Forward conceived by MAO was a failure by
1960 the fall of 1958. The commune distribution system was
based on the fallacy that psychological and spiritual in-
centives could be substituted for material incentives as
the principal stimulus for production. This fallacy was
a target for criticism outside the CCP and China as well
as inside the CCP. Some of the dissenters in the CCP were
Politburo members including PENG Te-huai and CH'EN Yun.
The latter had been eased out of any real role in the CCP
by September 1959, if not before. PENG's fate (following)
was more dramatic.

1959 a) Marshal PENG Te-huai, China's Defense Minister in 1959,
was the leader of an "anti-party" group in the Politburo
who had written a letter to Moscow criticizing the Great
Leap Forward. His second sin was to resist CCP control of
the Army and the establishment of an "enormous untrained
militia." His third was to protest the growing breach
with Moscow, chief supplier of Chinese modern weapons.

 b) PENG was arrested, underwent intensive reindoctrination
and finally wrote a "confession" divulging his wrong doings
to the CCP. He was replaced as Minister of Defense by LIN
Piao and most of his followers (including Army Chief of
Staff General HUANG K'o-ch'eng) were removed from their
party/government positions.

1961 The growing Sino-Soviet rift became open knowledge in 1961
with the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. There
was dissension within the CCP over China's stand against
Khrushchev's policies even in the Politburo. (This dissent
was part of Defense Minister PENG's crime.) The most notable
of the other dissenters was Politburo alternate member CHANG
Wen-t'ien: his disappearance from the scene since that time
can apparently be explained because of his opposition to
the anti-Soviet views of MAO and his more tractable lieutenants.

1962 The CCP initiated a long-term campaign to combat the deterior-
Early ation of party morale. Demoralization in the ranks of the CCP
was a result of the four years of privation connected with the
Great Leap Forward. Implicit in this campaign itself was
criticism of Chairman MAO since he was the architect of the
policies.

1962 a) CH'EN Yi, Foreign Minister of the CPR, in a series of
August -- speeches during this period placed great stress on "subver-
September sion" in China.

 b) During the same period two Secretariat members were dropped:
General HUANG K'o ch'eng, former PLA Chief of Staff under the

already purged (1959) Marshal PENG Te-huai and General T'AN Cheng, whose department in the Secretariat was believed by China watchers to have failed to curb Army criticism of the CCP.

1964
December --
1965
January

At the Third National Peoples Congress held in Peking, Premier CHOU En-lai's speeches on internal matters clearly indicated continued CCP concern over popular apathy and disillusionment with party programs. (In part this was a hangover from the Great Leap Forward period.) In the same speech CHOU attached signs of capitalism as evidenced in private plots and livestock.

1965
Spring

a) The United Front Work Department chief, LI Wei-han was summarily dismissed. The Department he had headed was party organization responsible for working with intellectuals.

b) The Minister of Culture, SHEN Yen-p'ing and several vice ministers were dismissed. It is believed by China observers that they had failed to bring the intellectuals into line. SHEN's past work was said to have "weakened the class struggle."

1965
November

LO Jui-ching, Chief of Staff of the Peoples' Liberation Army, disappeared from the scene as the PLA was apparently readied for its role in the Cultural Revolution.

1965 -- 1969

Shanghai newspapers launched an attack on WU Han, non-Communist Vice Mayor of Peking and the opening gun in the Cultural Revolution -- now in its third tumultuous year -- was fired.

LE MONDE, Paris
28 August 1969

Soviet Source Says 25 Million Chinese
Were Exterminated Between 1955 and 1965

Literaturnaya Gazeta, the Soviet Writers' Union weekly, devotes half of this week's issue to a series of articles on China and the effects of Maoism. You find the inevitable denunciations of Peking's "anti-Soviet hysteria," but the main body of the dossier deals with the internal situation in the Chinese People's Republic. Everybody is in on the act, humorists and cartoonists as well as reporters and photographers. There are even some documents of alleged Chinese origin, whose authenticity only Literaturnaya Gazeta can vouch for, such as the letter from a Peking high school student called Chuo Yang, on the way out to the country after completing his secondary studies, who writes:

"Like all my comrades, I belonged to the Red Guard. We thought we were making the revolution, that we were doing the right thing. But now, most of the young people's eyes have been opened. Many people no longer believe in Mao Tse-tung. But there are still a lot of people who believe in him, and who do not understand that he is the cause of all China's troubles."

This recurrent theme of "China's troubles" is backed up with reams of statistics. We learn, for example, that "more than 25 million people" were exterminated in the decade from 1955 to 1965, that 30 million more were displaced, and that there are 32 thousand people in the Takla-Makan concentration camp in the Sinkiang desert.

A Power Struggle Among the Present Leaders

With the same abundant seasoning of figures, the Soviet writers' weekly explains that "the spiritual food of the Chinese people" today consists of almost nothing besides the works of Mao Tse-tung, of which 3,126,000,000 copies have already been printed. The cult of Maoism is illustrated with selected examples, including two texts singing the praises of the Chinese chairman published under the title of "Ave Mao," and an item noting that all the gold dust produced in the Nanking and Suchow workshops is now being used to gild busts of Mao and to print the titles on his Little Red Book.

In such a context, political analysis is scarcely concerned with nuances. The writers' weekly accuses Peking of "repeating the cruel history of the feudal despots who ruled by fire and sword." And yet, everything is not all that simple in Chinese politics. Literaturnaya Gazeta says that "we should not take seriously everything Peking tells us about the alleged unity among the Chinese rulers ... We are witnessing a complicated and largely secret struggle for power between two major opposing cliques, a struggle between two clans, that of Mao and his wife, Chiang Ching, and that of Lin Piao and his wife, Yeh Chun." You can glimpse the horizons opened up to future historians and chroniclers by the hypothesis of this summit struggle for power among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

Without searching for over-subtle meaning in these propaganda texts, we can note that they give the Soviet reader a double picture of China. First they are shown a "monstrous" country, subject to an intolerable regime, one that runs against nature, thrust by its leaders into a manner of life that is the antithesis of the aspirations of the Soviet people. While it is de rigueur to make a distinction between the "good" Chinese people and the "bad" Maoists, it is by no means certain that the general Soviet public will notice this nuance, and continue to rein in its racist feelings, which are all too ready to crop out again.

The second image is that of a China by no means as powerful as it claims to be, weakened by its tribulations, and consequently far less formidable than the USSR might once have feared. This theme is relatively new, but it has already been mentioned once, just after the 13 August Sino-Soviet incident on the Sinkiang border. At that time, an editorial in the Defense Ministry journal, Krasnaya Zvezda, said that Peking's mobilization campaign in anticipation of a possible war with the USSR posed no serious threat to the Soviet people.

"It goes without saying," the Defense Ministry editorial went on, "that there is a very great distance between the inflammatory statements of the Peking adventurers and their real capacities." Some observers concluded from this that Moscow is trying to keep the fear of China created by the border incidents and the way they have been handled from generating panic among the people.

LE MONDE, Paris
28 August 1969

CPYRGHT

UN HEBDOMADAIRE SOVIÉTIQUE AFFIRME QUE VINGT-CINQ MILLIONS DE CHINOIS ONT ÉTÉ EXTERMINÉS ENTRE 1955 ET 1965

De notre correspondant particulier ALAIN JACOB

Moscou, 27 août. — La *Literatournaya Gazeta*, hebdomadaire de l'Union des écrivains soviétiques, consacre cette semaine la moitié de son numéro à une série d'articles sur la Chine et les effets du maoïsme. On y retrouve les inévitables dénonciations de « l'hystérie antisoviétique » de Pékin, mais l'essentiel de ce dossier est consacré à la situation intérieure en République populaire chinoise. Chacun y a apporté sa contribution, humoristes et caricaturistes aussi bien que journalistes et photographes. On y trouve même divers documents d'origine chinoise paraît-il — dont on ne peut que laisser à la *Literatournaya Gazeta* le soin de garantir l'authenticité, — telle la lettre d'un lycéen de Pékin, Van Tchou-ouyang, qui, en route pour les campagnes au terme de ses études secondaires, écrit : « Comme tous mes camarades, j'ai fait partie des gardes rouges. On croyait faire la révolution, on croyait bien faire. Mais à présent, les yeux de la plupart des jeunes se sont ouverts. Beaucoup de gens ne croient plus à Mao Tse-toung. Mais il y en a encore assez qui y croient et qui ne comprennent pas qu'il est la cause de tous les maheurs de la Chine. »

Ce thème des « maheurs de la Chine » est développé à grand ren-

fort de statistiques. On apprend par exemple que « plus de vingt-cinq millions de personnes » ont été exterminées pendant la décennie qui a précédé l'année 1965, que trente autres millions ont été déplacées, que trente-deux mille détenus peuplent le camp de concentration de Takla-Makan, dans le désert du Sinkiang.

Une lutte entre les dirigeants actuels

Avec une même abondance de chiffres, le journal des écrivains soviétiques explique que la « nourriture spirituelle du peuple chinois » n'est plus guère composée aujourd'hui que des œuvres de Mao Tse-toung publiées en 3126 millions d'exemplaires. Le culte du maoïsme est illustré à l'aide d'exemples choisis, tels deux textes à la gloire du président chinois publiés sous le titre *Ave Mao*, ou cette information selon laquelle toute la poudre d'or produite par les ateliers de Nankin et de Soutchou est désormais employée à dorer les bustes de Mao et les titres de ses recueils de citations.

Dans un tel contexte l'analyse po-

geants de Pékin de « répéter l'histoire cruelle des despotes téodaux qui gouvernent par le feu et par l'épée ». Tout n'est pas simple cependant dans la politique chinoise, estime la *Literatournaya Gazeta*, qui affirme qu'« on ne doit pas prendre au sérieux tout ce que Pékin raconte au sujet de l'unité qui existerait parmi les gouvernants chinois... On assiste à une lutte complexe, essentiellement secrète, entre les deux principaux groupes adverses, une lutte entre deux clans, celui de Mao et de sa femme Sien Sin, et celui de Lin Piao et de sa femme E. Tiun ». On entrevoit quels horizons ouvre à de futurs chroniqueurs l'hypothèse de cette lutte au sommet de la direction du parti communiste chinois...

Sans chercher une signification trop subtile à ces textes de propagande, on peut relever qu'ils donnent une double image de la Chine au lecteur soviétique. D'abord celle d'un pays « monstrueux » soumis à un régime intolérable, contre nature, poussé par ses dirigeants vers un mode de vie aux antipodes des aspirations du peuple soviétique ; s'il est de rigueur de faire la distinction entre le « bon » peuple chi-

à tenir compte de cette nuance et à refréner des sentiments de racisme trop prêts à renaitre.

La seconde image est celle d'une Chine finalement moins puissante qu'elle ne prétend l'être, affaiblie par ses épreuves et, en conséquence, sans doute moins redoutable que ne pourrait le craindre l'U.R.S.S. Ce thème est relativement nouveau, mais il avait déjà été mentionné, en particulier au lendemain du récent incident sino-soviétique du 13 août dans le Sinkiang. On avait, en effet, relevé à cette époque un éditorial du journal du ministère de la défense Krasnaya Zvezda affirmant que les campagnes de mobilisation de Pékin en vue d'une guerre possible avec l'U.R.S.S. ne constituaient pas en réalité une menace sérieuse pour le peuple soviétique. « Il va sans dire, ajoutait le journal des militaires soviétiques, que la distance est très grande entre les déclarations bruyantes et les possibilités réelles des aventuriers de Pékin. » Certains observateurs en avaient conclu qu'on souhaitait éviter à Moscou que le sentiment de « peur de la Chine » créé par la série des incidents de frontière et par l'exploitation qui en a été faite ne se transforme en panique dans la population.

Comment

CPYRGHT

CHINA'S GRAIN RESERVES

The general reader of *The China Quarterly* may well think it an imposition to be treated to a public debate on so technical a subject as China's grain stocks. May I ask his indulgence in view of the importance of the issue raised by Kang Chao (*The China Quarterly*, No. 37 (January-March 1969), pp. 139-140). The question of the size and movement of the national stockpile is indeed an integral part of any assessment of China's grain policy.

Unfortunately Kang Chao does not define his use of the term stockpile or state reserve. Properly defined, it can only refer to that amount of grain which is kept in government storage beyond the normal stock in the pipeline.

In a country in which different grains are harvested at different times of the year, substantial quantities are bound to lie in godowns in various parts of the country. They do not necessarily form part of a genuine carry-over. It is perfectly possible that 12.69 million tons of "grain reserves" existed in mid-summer 1953 and 28.84 million tons in mid-summer 1957—the time of the statistical change-over from one crop year to the next—but they were not necessarily more than temporary stocks; nor need the apparent increase in "grain reserves" by 16.15 million tons reflect anything more than an early harvest of summer grains in the altogether favourable year 1957.

The "grain reserves" which, according to Viscount Montgomery's account, were completely exhausted by the end of September 1961—and well they might be after two man-made disasters following the Great Leap Forward—are unlikely to have been in the same category as those quoted for mid-summer 1953 and 1957. Difficult though it is, we must try to compare like with like.

In estimating the likely size of government carry-over stocks, it is worth recalling that some four-fifths of China's consumers produce most of the grain they need. Let us assume that present gross supplies of grains (and potatoes in grain equivalent) for human consumption total, say, 150 million metric tons equal to, say, 170 kilos of milled grain (at 80 rather than 85 per cent. average milling rate) per head per year. Against this, the requirements of the consumers living outside grain self-sufficient areas are unlikely to amount to more than, say, 25 million metric tons per annum, or 2 million tons per month, equal to about one-sixth of total grain supplies for human consumption.

Only in very exceptional circumstances will the government have to meet any of the needs of the self-suppliers; its normal concern will be with the regular flow of grains to those who are not self-suppliers. To prevent any breakdown in this flow, the government ought to be able to draw at any time on a minimum reserve of, say, 5 million tons or 10 weeks' supply for those who are not self-suppliers. A stockpile of 10 million tons or 20 weeks' supply would entail a capital investment in grain storage facilities which a country such as China would probably deny itself—except when laying in a strategic reserve designed to meet eventualities other than those arising in peacetime.

As to China's programme of grain imports, this—like the storage programme—ought to be related to the needs of the non-self-suppliers. As Professor Ta-Chung Liu rightly points out, the Chinese Government spends roughly 30 per cent. of its annual foreign exchange earnings on the purchase abroad of, say, 5 to 6 million tons of wheat and flour every year. It does this so as to meet the needs, for a period of 10 to 12 weeks, of those who are not producing the grain they eat; or, to put it in another way, some 25 to 30 million Chinese depend entirely on foreign grain supplies throughout the year.

This is a problem of such magnitude that it can hardly be solved by squeezing every member of the country's 125 million cultivators' families to the tune of 75 calories or so a day. Policies other than those of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution would have to be introduced if a rate of saving even as modest as that of 3 to 4 per cent. of the daily diet were to be extracted from every one of China's grain producers and their families.

W. KLATT.

CPYRGHT

THE IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY MACHINE

CHARLES NEUHAUSER

After more than two years of intense activity, a good deal of first-class melodrama, and an enormous outpouring of rhetoric, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution continues to baffle most observers—and it would appear most Chinese as well. No two students of the Chinese scene seem to agree entirely on what has thus far happened, or on just why it has happened. Nor is the evidence available to those outside the Chinese mainland in any way conclusive; it is at best contradictory, and often misleading. Too much has happened, and too quickly, to form a wholly coherent picture of events. And we are of course much too close to those events to see them in full perspective.

One problem is that a great many forces, pressures and problems have come together to produce the present upheaval. Another is that the main protagonists in China appear to be reacting more or less on an *ad hoc* basis to pressures and currents released by the Cultural Revolution itself—pressures that may have been by no means fully expected and that can be only dimly perceived by observers abroad. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the convulsion do appear to be of major importance and can perhaps be isolated for a tentative examination. One such aspect is the Chinese Communist Party organization itself. For it seems reasonably certain that problems within the party were a major precipitating factor in bringing on the Cultural Revolution,¹ and that the party machine has been a principal victim of the “revolution.” The party has suffered a trauma easily the equal of the Long March, but one from which it is unlikely to recover as quickly or with such élan. Indeed, a better parallel may be the confusion and debilitation caused by the abortive insurrectory movement that accompanied and followed the break with the KMT in the late 1920s.

We should, however, be clear about one thing at the outset: the party as such has not been under attack at any time in the course of the Cultural Revolution. No attempt has been made to deny its central legitimizing role as the “vanguard of the proletariat” and the font of political authority in China. Rather, it is the party machine, the organizational command struc-

¹For an examination of some of these problems, see Charles Neuhauser, “The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 32 (September-December 1967).

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ture, that has been battered out of recognition in the past two years. But it is of course true that in any real political sense the two are inseparable. Political authority has flowed down from the chairman, the Politburo and the Central Committee through the organizational machine to the levels where policy is translated into practice. And an attack on the party machine of the scope and intensity of that which has just taken place must not only undermine the morale of party members but also greatly reduce the stature of the party itself in the eyes of the general populace, and to some extent at least bring into question the very legitimacy of the party as the arbiter of Chinese political and social life.

The attack has been devastating. Of the 11 members and alternates on the Politburo who were politically active in 1965, 8 have fallen by the wayside. Of 11 politically active members of the Central Committee Secretariat, only 3 have survived, and none appears to be performing secretarial work. Of 10 known directors of Central Committee departments and bureaus, only one appears to be active.

The Central Committee itself has been equally hard hit. Some 63 members of the Central Committee promulgated in 1958 were politically active in 1965; of these, 34 (52%), have been shunted aside, vilified and in many cases "dragged out" and disgraced since the summer of 1966. Another 9, or 14%, have been under severe Red Guard attack and apparently are or have been in deep political trouble. Of 72 politically active alternate members of the Central Committee, the figures are 27 (or 38%) and 29 (40%) respectively. While some of these people will no doubt survive the Red Guard assaults or will later be rehabilitated, the scope of the attack can be compared only to that directed against the 1934 Central Committee of the Soviet Party, which in the years of the Great Purge lost some 70% of its members²—although in China the destruction has for the most part been merely political rather than physical.

At middle levels the picture is bleaker still. Only 9 (20%) of the 45 provincial party 1st and 2nd secretaries known to be active in 1965 can be identified today. Of these, many appear in supernumerary roles, and relatively few seem to be performing meaningful political activities. The provincial party committees themselves have not existed as organized, active bodies since February 1967. The same is probably true of the regional party bureaus, of which nothing has been heard since early 1967. Principal party secretaries in the regional bureaus have without exception been shunted aside or "dragged out" and disgraced. At *hsien* and municipal and at *hsiang*, commune and district levels, the situation is probably not much different, although all party committees may not have been formally "dis-solved" as at the provincial levels.

Information regarding the basic levels is spotty and contradictory. It is

²Leonard Shapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 416.

here, of course, that the vast bulk of party membership is to be found. Fragmentary information suggests that party committees and cells in factories have been hard hit. Lane committees and party fractions in production brigades and work teams have probably suffered much less in terms of actual Red Guard assault. Brigades and teams have been formally exempted from Red Guard attack,⁸ but directives from the center apparently no longer carry the weight they once did. Moreover, with the party's command channels short-circuited at the provincial and *hsien* levels, basic-level cadres are probably largely inactive or are operating with the sketchiest of instructions—a situation that in some ways may resemble that of outlying guerrilla groups during the anti-Japanese war. Natural leaders probably remain in command in the rural areas, but this is precisely because they are natural leaders and not because they have the weight of the party behind them.

At the lower levels, particularly in the rural areas, the full impact of the Cultural Revolution may not have been felt until well into 1967—particularly during the upsurge in “revolutionary activity” that took place in April and May of that year. But at the middle and upper levels of the party apparatus, the damage had already been done. The assault on the party machine reached its climax in December 1966-January 1967, and despite bitter arguments about so-called “false seizures of power” in the course of the “January revolution,” essentially little more than mopping up operations appear to have taken place at these levels since that time.

In February, with the demise of the provincial party committees, local power passed into the hands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—essentially to the regional and district military commanders. In most cases it still remains there. The PLA has also assumed many of the party's functions in propaganda work and is performing at least part of the party's former supervisory role in the economic sphere. But this is clearly an unnatural situation. That it has persisted for over a year is a measure of the enormous difficulties caused by the breakdown of the party machine and the resulting fragmentation of institutions of political authority and blockage of many normal channels of political communication. The year 1967 has seen a number of experiments designed to bring a degree of order out of the present chaos through the establishment of new political and administrative institutions. But these experiments, tenuous and hesitant at best, have very largely been vitiated by powerful forces pressing for still more “revolution.”

Nevertheless, in the wake of the turn toward moderation that began in September 1967, a new emphasis on “party-building”—which implies at least a partial rebuilding of the party machine and the rehabilitation of many party cadres—has been apparent. Thus far this effort does not appear to have gone very far. Precisely because it presages a return to normality

⁸*Jen-min Jih-pao (JMJP)*, March 13, 1967.

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it is opposed by those "revolutionaries" who in the past two years have acquired a stake in, and an emotional commitment to, continued ferment; and because it portends a rehabilitation of cadres shunted aside in the Cultural Revolution, it poses a political threat to some of those political leaders who orchestrated and supported the attack on the cadres in the first place.

Yet although the effort at party-building is likely to be slow and painful, it may be possible already to perceive the shape of things to come. While it is clear that some portion of the Red Guards will eventually be drawn into the party, nevertheless at the lower levels a considerable proportion of pre-1966 party members are likely to survive or be rehabilitated. In form, the party structure probably will not look much different from the way it did in the past, although a degree of streamlining and pruning is likely. Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution has exacerbated rather than rooted out divisions within the party, and resentments born in the turbulent events of the past two years will be extremely hard to overcome. Above all, party morale has been shattered and cannot easily be repaired, while the party's claim to unchallenged political authority and political infallibility has at least to some degree been damaged. In these very important respects the consequences of the past two chaotic years are likely to be very great indeed and will almost certainly plague Chinese political life for years to come.

It seems increasingly evident as more material comes to light in the course of the Cultural Revolution that for several years prior to its beginning Mao had felt the Chinese revolution was losing steam, that there was the distinct possibility that "revisionism" of the sort espoused by the post-Stalinist Soviet Union was a threat not only within the international Communist movement but also within China itself, and that the revolutionary ideals for which he had long fought were in danger of becoming lost or downgraded as the Chinese Communist Party became enmeshed in the difficult job of nation-building. Both old party members who had fought against the KMT and newer recruits who had joined the party since 1949 had failed to sufficiently "transform their world outlook": their priorities were wrong. And because this was so, there was a danger that the party would become increasingly divorced from the "masses," whose untapped "revolutionary enthusiasm" remained high.

Mao apparently felt that his plans for releasing this revolutionary potential were being blocked by powerful figures within the party who felt his ideas were anachronistic. Moreover, the party bureaucracy, growing over the years, had itself become a deadweight, with bureaucratic methods stifling revolutionary initiative. It would seem that Mao was at least partly right on both counts, but the important thing is that he believed himself to be thwarted, and felt that something had to be done about it. This meant shaking up the party and removing a number of its important leaders. This

surely was a prime aim of the Cultural Revolution from the start.

That start can probably be dated from September 1965, when Mao gave the signal at an acrimonious work session of the Central Committee for a strong attack in the cultural field against revisionism. But parallel to the well-known attacks on literary figures that followed this meeting there also developed a campaign directed at *hsien*-level party committees, the first such concerted and extended campaign to involve party organizational questions since 1962. Criticism of *hsien*-level party committees reached floodtide in early 1966, but interestingly enough died away abruptly just when the growing clamor against Wu Han and Teng T'o indicated unmistakably that the Peking Party Committee was in deep trouble.

The central charge against the *hsien* committees was that they had become divorced from the masses—that party members had failed to “transform their world outlook,” had succumbed to bureaucratic inertia, and would in consequence have to submit to open criticism at mass meetings in which large numbers of non-party persons would participate. This in itself was unremarkable, but along with the usual Maoist slogans a number of other, rather different ideas were introduced into the discussions in the party press. One was that to eradicate problems at the *hsien* level, party members would have to supervise their subordinates more closely and take into account specific local conditions and special situations in implementing party directives⁴—in effect, *hsien* committees were told to act with greater bureaucratic efficiency and pragmatism. One *Jen-min Jih-pao* article went so far as to suggest that the problem was not “transformation of world outlook” at all, but rather the need for better understanding of work conditions and modern scientific procedures.⁵ Moreover, the press reported that the idea of open criticism of party members by non-party masses was strongly resisted.⁶ Furthermore, in the course of the campaign a new hero was introduced for emulation—one Chiao Yu-lu, a *hsien* party secretary and the first emulation hero not to have a PLA background.

All of this suggests that the campaign was less a Maoist initiative than a rear-guard action on the part of the party bureaucracy to protect itself in the face of growing pressure. This episode suggests several conclusions: first, that problems involving the party organization were at issue from the earliest days of the Cultural Revolution; second, that there was considerable resistance within the party machine to ideas of uninterrupted revolution that would sacrifice the rather pragmatic tasks of nation-building to less clearly focused ideological concerns; and third, that while “waving the Red Flag” of reform of party organizational methods, important ele-

⁴See, for example, “Vigorously Promote Three Major Styles of Work, Strengthen Basic-Level Development of the Party,” *JMJP*, February 8, 1966, in *Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP)*, No. 3643, pp. 1 ff.

⁵“The ‘Leap,’ Something to be Learned,” *JMJP*, January 17, 1966, in *SCMP*, No. 3628, pp. 7-8.

⁶“Correctly Sum Up Historical Experience, Wipe Out Individualistic Thoughts,” *JMJP*, February 13, 1966, in *SCMP*, No. 3648, p. 8.

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ments within the party apparatus—who apparently had some control of the Central Committee's own journal, *Jen-min Jih-pao*—were evidently willing and able to fight to protect party prerogatives, particularly with regard to non-party intrusion into party affairs.

These divisions and tensions became at once more apparent and acute following the fall of P'eng Chen in May 1966. P'eng's political demise led quite naturally to a complete shake-up of the Peking party municipal organization, into which Mao was later to claim "you could not drive a pin." If this were all, however, the implications for the party machine as a whole would not necessarily have been very great or immediate. In fact, because cultural issues were at least formally involved in the protracted dispute that ended in P'eng's fall, a thoroughgoing purge of the party's propaganda, educational and cultural "systems" also could not be avoided. This was a move of cardinal importance, and it had major consequences almost at once. The purge was conducted through the medium of "operation teams" which carried out on-the-spot "investigations" of accused individuals and attempted to lead struggle sessions against them in a manner reminiscent of the land reform program of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was only ostensibly a concession to Maoist principles, for the "operation teams" were directly controlled by the party apparatus, and Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing apparently took a direct hand in running them.⁷ These teams were opposed—often in pitched battle—by less well-organized groups of students responsive to appeals that had begun to appear in the official press calling for unbridled revolutionary ferment.

Two issues were at stake here. One involved the question of how the purge was to be conducted—that is, was it to remain entirely an operation run by the party secretariat or was the secretariat to be bypassed, at least in part, in favor of direct action by the "masses," who were in turn responsive to and probably manipulated by forces anxious to shake up the bureaucratic machine—principally Mao himself. The second issue involved the question of who exactly was to be purged. Although some kind of purge could not be avoided, if it could be kept within carefully controlled bounds the damage could be limited. This apparently was what Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing attempted.⁸

There was nothing subtle or indirect about the battles over the conduct of the "operation teams"; the issues were now out in the open. But the course of events had raised the stakes, which were now nothing less than who was to control the party and how it was to be run. Yet at the same time the conflict was personalized, and in such a situation Liu's prestige was no match for Mao's. At the 11th Central Committee Plenum in August 1966 both Liu and Teng were downgraded and removed from effective

⁷"Thoroughly Criticize Our Institute's Operation Team in Carrying Out the Anti-Bourgeois Movement on the Cadre Question," *Cheng-fan Kung-she*, April 16, 1967.

⁸Materials from the Investigations into Teng Hsiao-p'ing's Criminal Activities," *Hung Ch'i* (Aviation Institute Red Guards), May 5, 1967.

power, although no formal censure was publicly pronounced. But by now the struggle had greatly expanded. To this point it had been a contest of giants, in which Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen had been principal protagonists. Now a much wider range of characters was involved. Liu and Teng's closest associates would of course be pushed aside, but the episode of the "operation teams" had undoubtedly deepened Mao's suspicion of the entire party apparatus, which would now have to bear the consequences of his distrust.

The slogan "95 percent of Party cadres are good or comparatively good" had been incorporated into the 16-point decision issued by the 11th Plenum, but it was clear almost at once that it would be honored more in the breach than in the observance. Yet in light of both the size of the impending housecleaning and of the events of the spring and early summer, it was also clear that the party apparatus could not be trusted to purge itself; hence the Red Guards, successors to the semi-organized bands that had battled the "operation teams" in May, June and July. But the Red Guards were a heterogeneous group, composed mainly of youngsters, many of whom were not party members, and initially at least loosely organized and relatively loosely controlled. Moreover, the undifferentiated call to hit at "persons in authority," which now began to be heard, was certain to create a good deal of confusion in itself. Under these conditions, the forthcoming struggle was bound to be a messy affair.

It should not be thought, however, that the attacks on "persons in authority" were a wholly spontaneous manifestation of "revolutionary ferment." Mao and those in his immediate entourage on whom he relied moved quickly to channel and direct the Red Guard movement. The extraordinary number of meetings at which Red Guard groups were addressed and admonished by major leaders was one aspect of this effort. Another was the establishment of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolution of the Central Committee, which clearly was given the task of overseeing and coordinating Red Guard activities. Theoretically subordinate to the Central Committee, this body was soon speaking with an independent and highly authoritative voice.⁹ Its members were all almost entirely dependent on Mao's personal patronage and at this stage at least could be considered extensions of his personality.¹⁰

Measures to control Red Guard activities were varied. The Red Guards were given permission to use the railways and the state telegraphic network for at best nominal charges.¹¹ This was a virtual necessity as Red

⁹For example, directives issued by the central authorities were signed by this body as well as the Central Committee, the State Council and the Military Affairs Commission.

¹⁰K'ang Sheng, however, had been active in party work and may have had some well-placed adherents at lower levels.

¹¹Evidence for this is found in later references to these privileges contained in official documents, e.g., the central directive issued on June 6, 1967, *Shou-ta Hung-wei-ping*, June 9, 1967.

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Guard activities expanded, but it placed the "rebels" in a dependent relationship to the central authorities, who could revoke these privileges at any time, and provided a degree of leverage of Red Guard actions. Official permission was needed for major demonstrations against "persons in authority,"¹² which meant that Red Guard targets had to be officially approved in advance either by authorities on the spot or by the Small Group in Peking. Red Guard newspapers were published on state and party presses, using state stocks of newsprint,¹³ which meant that at least a degree of control could be exercised over what was printed in these papers. Above all, after an initial period of permissiveness, fairly strict controls were established over the collection, collation and distribution of "black materials"—documented charges of wrongdoings to be brought against Red Guard targets.¹⁴ Much of this material could only have come from archives unavailable to the general public; if some of it was "manufactured" for the occasion—as was almost certainly the case—this could only be done by persons with a detailed knowledge of high-level party affairs, which would rule out nearly all the Red Guards themselves. Moreover, leaders of the major Red Guard organizations were undoubtedly in close behind-the-scenes contact with members of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolution, and transmitted instructions from them down to lower levels through an increasingly elaborate organizational structure.

Nevertheless, anomalies were certainly not uncommon. Discipline in the hastily organized Red Guard groups was by no means as well-enforced as in traditional mass organizations, much less as in the party itself. Forged "black materials" were put in use, although usually this probably involved lower-level targets.¹⁵ Unplanned disputes between local "authorities" and militant Red Guards, or between Red Guard groups themselves, frequently escalated, involving peripheral figures and no doubt occasionally leading the central authorities to approve new targets for attack only after the attacks had in fact already begun. In other instances, important leaders in Peking were clearly divided over the question of whether or not the assault on a given individual should be pursued or curtailed.¹⁶ However, these disputes generally involved party figures whose duties did not directly impinge on the management of the party machine. By and large, party secretaries, members of central party organs, and members of lower-level bodies con-

¹²Denial of this permission by local and provincial officials was later considered "proof" of counterrevolutionary activity. See "Accusingly Reveal the Shanghai Municipal Committee's Activity of Planning and Organizing to Surround the Red Guards," handbill, n.d.

¹³Red Guard publications sometimes directly acknowledge use of party and government presses.

¹⁴Central Directive issued January 13, 1967, *Pei-ching P'ing Lun*, 1967.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Chou En-lai, for example, frequently attempted to head off attacks on individuals associated with the State Council. Cf. also the reversal of the attack on Hsiao Hua in January 1967.

cerned with party affairs—the backbone of the party apparatus—were fair game.

Confusion among the Red Guards and their mentors was mirrored by an equal confusion among those under attack. It would be hard to overestimate the shock, anger and dismay felt by party cadres at all levels as the Red Guard attacks widened. In Sian, for example, cadres accustomed to defending and protecting party prerogatives and the sanctity of the party organization felt that the Red Guard attacks on leading party bodies could only be counterrevolutionary.¹⁷ This undoubtedly was a typical reaction. Precisely because the attacks were so widespread, because the Red Guard targets were generally members of the leading local party organs, because the Red Guards themselves stood outside the regular party structure, and because the most militant “rebels” were frequently led by “outsiders” from Peking,¹⁸ the Red Guard movement appeared to be a sinister effort to destroy party prestige and authority and to sweep away entirely the party as an institution. The reaction of the local cadres was violent and extremely hostile. Militant Red Guards were attacked, beaten up and jailed. By October, Mao himself admitted that the movement was largely misunderstood in the provinces, and he called on leading party provincial figures to cooperate with the Red Guards even though they and their subordinates understood the Cultural Revolution only imperfectly.¹⁹

But if individual middle-level cadres reacted instinctively to what they felt to be a challenge to party prerogatives and prestige, most upper-level party bureaucrats in the provincial, regional and important municipal bureaus felt that they understood what was happening all too well. They were the immediate targets of the Red Guard attacks, and they moved to protect themselves as best they could. For them the central question was no longer that of outside interference in party affairs or the rationalization of bureaucratic procedures; it was simply self-preservation. Utilizing the resentment felt against the Red Guards at all levels of the party machine, and probably drawing on a resentment of “outsiders” felt by wider circles of the local populace, the provincial party chieftains organized Red Guard groups of their own, responsive to their own orders and ready to defend the party organs under attack by the militants sent out from Peking. Some “rebel” groups were declared counterrevolutionary.²⁰ Many soon found themselves virtually under siege.

This counterattack was surprisingly strong and sustained; it appears to have virtually stalled the Cultural Revolution for several months. In essence it appears to have been an instinctive reaction to an overwhelming chal-

¹⁷Andrew Watson, “Embattled Armies,” *Far East Economic Review*, April 1967, p. 231.

¹⁸“Revolutionary Masses in Canton Regard their Reception of Revolutionary Young Fighters as a Glorious Political Task,” *Nan-fang Jih-pao*, November 19, 1966, in *SCMP*, No. 3828, p. 9.

¹⁹Mao’s Speech to the October 1967 Work Conference of the Central Committee,” handbill, n.d., partly reproduced in *Yomiuri*, November 7, 1966.

²⁰Kweiyang radio, June 1, 1967.

lenge on the part of provincial party officials; there is no evidence it was centrally directed in any sense. But this show of strength sealed the fate of more than the individual party bureaucrats who organized the counter-attack. When the impasse was broken at the beginning of 1967, the target was not so much individuals within the party as the party machine itself. The call to "seize power," sounded on January 1, 1967, was in effect a signal to dismantle the party structure.

The Red Guard methods of attack were primarily propagandistic. Handbills, wall posters and unofficial newspapers kept up a drumfire of violent criticism of chosen targets. This written propaganda was supplemented by mass meetings, demonstrations, occasional "invasions" of party and state offices, and confrontations with the targets of attack at struggle meetings held under Red Guard auspices. This program put leading party officials under considerable pressure, but it was insufficient actually to dislodge them from their entrenched positions. In any event, the removal of major officials required authorization from Peking.²¹ So long as regional provincial and other local officials remained in office, they kept the most important levers of political authority and administration in their own hands. In their official capacities they could organize Red Guard forces of their own and solve the logistical problem—food, housing and the like—of keeping them in the field. They could, moreover, encourage factory workers and others to make excessive demands on Peking for higher wages and other amenities.²² But to remove these officials wholesale was to invite chaos, for they played a crucial role in administering both the state and the party. Hence, the stalemate in the autumn of 1966.

Mao's solution to this dilemma was drastic. The Gordian knot was cut at the provincial level, where resistance to the Red Guards had been concentrated in the period following the 11th Plenum. Both provincial state governments and provincial party committees ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. Regional party bureaus apparently also vanished at this time. But while provincial state functions were generally taken over by the military after a brief hiatus, the short circuit in the party chain of command was allowed to persist. It has not yet been repaired.

The "January revolution" of course encompassed far more than an assault on provincial "organs of power." But it worked differently in Peking than in the provinces, and differently when applied to state organs than to party organs. In Peking, no assault was launched against either the State Council or the Central Committee as such, although members of both groups fell from power in considerable numbers. Individual ministers and vice-premiers came under attack for "counter-revolutionary" activities, usually within their own ministries. A few members of the State Council—most

²¹Few such decisions have evidently been published, but there are numerous references to central directives on personnel questions in Red Guard publications.

²²It seems likely that this is how the "economism" issue arose.

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notably Chou En-lai himself—escaped unscathed; several other ministers were severely attacked but managed to remain in position; still more were shunted aside.²³ But in no case was a ministry itself “dissolved.” The work of the ministries went forward, although under adverse conditions, for unquestionably a considerable number of lesser functionaries fell to Red Guard assaults, and ministerial functions were frequently affected by Red Guard disruptions within the ministries themselves. Several ministries, particularly those dealing with transportation and communications, were “taken over” by the PLA in February, but work has apparently gone on under loose military supervision.

Party organs in the capital were even harder hit. There have been no recorded announcements of the “dissolution” of central party organs, but no official has been identified performing party functions since January 1967. Subordinate bureaus of the Central Committee seem uniformly inactive. Only one director of a party bureau appears to have survived the onslaught;²⁴ it is likely that some lesser functionaries within the bureaus have also survived, but it is hard to believe that they have much meaningful work to perform. The party’s organizational bureau may be *hors de combat* entirely. The party secretariat has not fared much better. Three secretaries still appear in public, but never in connection with their secretarial functions. None has been identified as a party secretary since January 1967. In fact, virtually no party official was publicly identified in a strictly party role—not even as a member of the Central Committee—between January and October 1967.

Nor can the state provincial organs be identified after January 1967, although no formal “dissolution” was ever announced. A considerable number of provincial governors were attacked and presumably deposed as “among the small handful following the capitalist road,” but minor functionaries probably continued during January to perform their tasks—largely by rote, since it is unlikely that many instructions were transmitted down from Peking. Nevertheless, confusion—or even a considerable degree of chaos—must have attended state business at the provincial level throughout the month. Since the state ministries continued to function in Peking and presumably at lower levels as well, direct-line communications remained relatively unaffected in this sphere. However, some working form of state authority at the provincial level was obviously necessary if decisions made in Peking were to be implemented, or if even routine administrative work was to be performed over any period of time. These considerations almost certainly played a major part in the decision to bring the PLA into the Cultural Revolution, a decision announced on January 23.²⁵ In February, following this move, military control commissions were set up in virtually

²³Lin Piao can scarcely be considered a subordinate of Chou’s, although the Defense Ministry is theoretically subordinate to the State Council.

²⁴Ta’ai Ch’ang, a relatively unimportant figure.

²⁵Central Directive of January 21, 1967, *Tung-fang-hung*, January 31, 1967.

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every province in China.²⁶ These commissions took over the task of civil administration in the provinces, supplanting the provincial governors and supervising the work of state provincial functionaries, many of whom undoubtedly continued to carry on their normal duties. Control commissions may also have been established in the very few provinces that established Revolutionary Committees formally recognized by Peking, although in these cases direct administrative responsibility, if not political power, apparently rested with the Revolutionary Committees.

In many respects this situation resembled that which obtained in the years immediately following the Communist takeover, when military control commissions also ran provincial affairs. But in this case there is one major difference: there are no provincial party committees to check on the work of the control commissions. The provincial party committees were formally dissolved.²⁷ References to them after January 1967 invariably speak of "former provincial party committees." No individual has been identified performing strictly party work on the provincial level. Since January, no communication from the central authorities has been addressed to a provincial party committee: addressees are invariably regional and district military commands, military control commissions, and, where they exist, provincial revolutionary committees.²⁸

A similar situation appears to exist with regard to municipal party committees. The regional party committees and party committees at the *hsien* also do not appear to be functioning, but here the situation is not so clear cut.²⁹ Many *hsien* committees may have been dissolved, but this does not appear to have been quite so formal a process as that which took place at the provincial level. But certainly, so far as can be observed from a distance, no significant work is being performed by either regional or *hsien* committees. In any event, in a party organized in the way it was in China prior to 1967, a complete break in the party chain of command would render organs at a lower level ineffective and organs at a higher level impotent.

Not all members of the various provincial committees were disgraced in January, although virtually all provincial first secretaries active in 1965 were condemned. Several second and third secretaries showed up as members of Revolutionary Committees or "preparatory groups" late in 1967;

²⁶No announcement of the establishment of these bodies was made at the time, although frequent references to the commissions soon began to appear in official and Red Guard publications.

²⁷See, for example, "Record of the Seizure of Power," *Kuangchou Hung-wei-ping*, February 17, 1967.

²⁸Red Guard publications, as well as wall posters, carry the texts of many of these directives, including addresses.

²⁹Regional Bureaus were organs of the Central Committee and therefore theoretically inviolable. Power was "seized" in the "organs directly under" the several bureaus—i.e., in the various administrative departments of the bureaus themselves. Since January 1967 the Regional bureaus appear to have been totally bypassed. Reorganization of the subordinate administrative units now seems to have begun, but the bureaus themselves still have no real political significance.

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but they appeared to play supernumerary rather than leading roles in these bodies. Still more former members of the provincial committees are apparently politically inactive.

The consequences of "seizure of power" began to be felt almost immediately. The Red Guards took their role as "revolutionary successors" very seriously, and in many places apparently attempted to step into the shoes of the party cadres they had displaced. This came close to being an unmitigated disaster on two counts: first, untrained youths proved inadequate replacements for experienced party bureaucrats, and second, the numerous and fragmented Red Guard groups, prone to disputes from their inception, now began to quarrel bitterly over division of the spoils. The Center soon found it necessary to remind the "rebels" of the virtue of humility and discipline.

Since the Red Guards could not perform administrative and supervisory tasks by themselves—and in many cases probably not at all—it was soon clear that many of the cadres so recently shunted aside would have to return to the job. But this raised new problems. First, the cadres themselves were reluctant to resume their old posts; they had just been through the mill, and did not wish to repeat the experience. Second, the "rebels" were not anxious to see them return, since this meant that newly won power and authority would have to be shared. Full of revolutionary rectitude, they claimed that only those who had "rebelled" from the first deserved rehabilitation. Again the Center was obliged to press the line that most cadres were comparatively good, that mistakes could be repeated and corrected, and that it made little difference when an individual cadre had first seen the light.

A further complication arose from the first tentative and rather makeshift efforts to rebuild a viable administrative structure in the provinces. From the first, Peking saw military rule as a temporary expedient to be replaced by something that would invite the active cooperation, support and participation both of a sufficient number of former cadres to ensure efficient administration and of the vast majority of the revolutionary rebels. Not surprisingly, this reconciliation of old and new—the vehicle for which was the Revolutionary Committee—was difficult to achieve.

In the wake of the "January revolution," bodies calling themselves "Revolutionary Committees" sprang up all over China at all levels. Most of these bodies were soon accused by militant Red Guards of being nothing but a false front behind which party "power-holders," who had engineered false "seizures of power," continued to operate. In many cases there was probably more than a grain of truth in these charges, but the party officials involved soon discovered that they were merely operating in a vacuum. Real power now rested in the hands of the military control commissions, who received and implemented instructions and directives from Peking, bypassing the "sham" Revolutionary Committees and allowing them to wither on

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the vine. Only in Heilungkiang, Shantung, Shensi, Kweichow and in the autonomous municipality of Shanghai did Peking recognize authentic Revolutionary Committees. Below the provincial level, authentic Revolutionary Committees were nonexistent.

In form, these new bodies were "triple alliances," that is, they included representatives of the Red Guards (who first had to form a "great alliance" of smaller individual Red Guard groups, which could not send representatives directly to the Revolutionary Committees), "old cadres," and the military. In practice, the military probably had a commanding voice in these bodies, ruling indirectly rather than directly as in the case of the military control commissions.³⁰ But from the start there were anomalies. In Shanghai, the leading figure in fact as well as in form was Chang Ch'ün-chiao, an authentic "rebel" and a member of the Central Committee's Small Group for the Cultural Revolution.³¹ Even more interesting, in Heilungkiang, the first province to establish a Revolutionary Committee, the leading figure was P'an Fu-sheng, an "old cadre" and provincial first secretary before the "seizure of power." P'an and Wei Kuo-ch'ing in Kwangsi were the only provincial first secretaries to survive the January onslaught without significant loss of power or status.³² In the remaining provinces former provincial secretaries were also included as members of the new committees, but they were lesser figures and probably performed little more than symbolic roles as examples of reconciled cadres. Minor functionaries who had formerly worked in the party provincial committees probably continued to perform similar tasks within the new Revolutionary Committees, but the frequent appeals in February and March for "old cadres" to come forward and declare for the Cultural Revolution suggests that persons in this category were not very numerous.

The Revolutionary Committees, insofar as they were more than merely a facade behind which the military made the major decisions, were primarily administrative organs, replacing the former provincial governorates. Many tasks formerly performed by the provincial party committees no longer had such meaning, in any event. Internal party administration obviously was out of the question; the major task of supervising and carrying out propaganda work had very largely passed to the PLA and in some respects to the Red Guard organizations. Supervision of the work of the provincial organs of central ministries could not have been very meaningful;

³⁰The precise relationship of the military to the early Revolutionary Committees is not entirely clear. P'an Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang, and Chang Ch'ün-chiao in Shanghai, quickly assumed the posts of political commissar to the leading military command in their respective areas. P'an has been closely associated with military figures since January 1967, and PLA personnel have played important roles in both areas. The East China Fleet command has been increasingly important in Shanghai in recent months. Wei Kuo-ch'ing acted only as PLA political commissar until the formation of the Kwangsi "preparatory group" in December 1967.

³¹The Shanghai situation has in many respects been unique.

³²Both Chang Kuo-hua in Tibet and Wang En-mao in Sinkiang were commanders of their respective military regions and had troops at their disposal.

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in the economic sphere this responsibility was shared with the PLA.³³ Moreover, the very few Revolutionary Committees in existence in the early months of 1967 had come into being very suddenly; members of the new bodies had clearly been co-opted from above in the heat of the moment. A great deal of sorting out had to be done, particularly with regard to the participation of Red Guard representatives on the committees, for the sudden formation of "revolutionary great alliances" had papered over rather than removed deep-seated differences among the various Red Guard groups.

Indeed, the very existence of the new committees, and more important, the prospect that additional committees would be formed in other provinces, exacerbated these differences and in fact so envenomed the disputes between Red Guard organizations that as a practical matter the formation of workable "revolutionary great alliances" was in most places out of the question. Red Guard groups argued over which individuals were to become "revolutionary" representatives on the Revolutionary Committees, how many representatives from one group as compared to another should be included, and whether or not some Red Guard groups should be represented at all. These arguments were by no means merely academic. They quickly degenerated into free-for-alls, and then into planned, pitched battles. This sort of fighting fed upon itself, making reconciliation still more difficult. The question of "who are our friends, who are our enemies" took on a very immediate meaning.

To these intractable problems was added the continuing issue of the reconciled cadres. The Red Guards were not alone in resenting the possible return of relatively large numbers of former party officials and functionaries to important posts. Those cadres who had early thrown their lot with the "rebels" in hope of winning preferment and rapid advancement were, not surprisingly, resentful of the line advanced in February and March that most cadres were comparatively good no matter when they had first rebelled. And to these problems there was soon added a new issue: As the military took charge in the provinces they handled the Red Guards roughly in the interest of rapidly restoring order. Many Red Guards were arrested; Red Guard activities were restricted and "rebel" privileges withdrawn; and some Red Guard groups were suppressed outright.³⁴ Moreover, the military were making the real decisions at the provincial level. In effect, military regional and district commanders and their subordinates had become a new set of "persons in authority."

This combination of circumstances produced irresistible pressures from below—pressures, in any case, that Mao and his radical friends in Peking were happy to exploit. In February, retreat had proved to be a tactical maneuver; by April, revolution was rampant again. Interestingly enough, the signal for the new lurch to the left was the introduction of the first pub-

³³See n. 25.

³⁴Wall poster reports suggest that this action was especially severe in Tibet.

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lic attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i, and the central issue on which these attacks turned was the question of Liu's approach to the cadre question. "Slavish mentality" and unquestioning obedience to orders were roundly condemned. In practice, this meant that the attempt to rebuild the new administrative structure in the provinces had to all intents and purposes been abandoned. Indeed, with the new upsurge in revolutionary activity this was very largely an impossibility. Moreover, still another complicating factor had been added to the provincial situation. Red Guard attacks were now being directed against the military authorities who were locally in power. The PLA commanders, taking a page from the books of the discredited party leaders, began to organize and encourage some Red Guard groups who would support the regional and district commands.⁸⁶ Clashes between these groups and the more militant Red Guards, who were still manipulated from Peking, very quickly overshadowed the disputes among the militants themselves.

These clashes were the central political fact of the spring and summer, but the underlying issue remained the same: who was to hold power and how was that power to be exercised. Yet for all the fury of the struggle—in July and August the confusion, disruption and factional fighting reached heights that surpassed the chaos of the "January revolution"—very little really changed. A Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee was formed in May, and a single provincial Revolutionary Committee and six "preparatory groups" were set up in the summer, but these bodies were clearly dominated by the military men already running the respective provinces involved; they were in large degree Military Control Commissions writ large.⁸⁶

Furthermore, although important PLA figures came under severe Red Guard attack between April and September, prior to August there was no concerted effort to disrupt the military chain of command as the party had been disrupted in January. Even when the brief, across-the-board assault on the PLA was inaugurated following the Wuhan incident, the consequences to the military establishment were comparatively few. Ch'en Tsai-tao, the Wuhan Military Commander, was dismissed together with his immediate subordinates. Apparently a number of commanders of the military districts immediately adjacent to Wuhan were also sacked, but those men were at once replaced by others of similar background brought in from other military regions.⁸⁷ There was no effort made to "dissolve" either the affected regional or district commands; a shuffling of personnel sufficed. Indeed,

⁸⁶In the spring of 1967, militant Red Guard groups began to attack their opponents for having the support of local military commanders.

⁸⁷This situation was obvious in Tsinghai, where military figures were clearly in command. In Peking, although Hsieh Fu-chih, chief of the new Revolutionary Committee, was a member of the State Council, the situation apparently did not change appreciably from that which had existed since February 1967, when the Peking garrison took over the municipality.

⁸⁸Commands were apparently shaken up in the Hupeh, Honan, Hunan and Kiangsi military districts.

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the assault on the military establishment was almost wholly abortive. The unprecedented apology to the PLA made by leading members of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolution early in September suggests that the Maoist radicals soon recognized that they could not take on the army as they had the party; and PLA resentment and distrust of unbridled "revolutionary" activity almost certainly was a major factor in the sudden decision to curtail that activity in September.³⁸

The downturn in "revolutionary" activity was accompanied by a new effort to deal with the consequences of the "January revolution"—that is, the consequences of the virtual dismemberment of the party. With one conspicuous exception, the methods employed closely resembled those of the previous February; in a sense it could be said that the work of repairing China's administrative and political structure was picked up where it had been left off at that time. As in February, a major effort was made to reconcile and rehabilitate "old cadres," to tame the Red Guards, and to form new Revolutionary Committees. Former party cadres were again urged to step forward, declare for the Cultural Revolution, and take up new duties. Implicit in this appeal was the fact that few cadres had done so in February, and fewer still in the intervening months. But from the Red Guard point of view, what was important was that many cadres who had been politically impotent for nearly a year were likely to regain a measure of authority. Many of these men had scores to settle; moreover, competition for posts and positions would be intensified.

These were volatile issues, and indeed the whole question of what to do about the Red Guards was very probably an explosive one. If they were allowed to remain active, the job of reconstruction and rehabilitation would be immeasurably more difficult; if they were sidelined, large numbers of militants would be alienated, and, more important, their political demise would be virtually an open admission that the Cultural Revolution had run its course. Even more important—critically important—the "rebels" had close connections with leading members of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolution in Peking, and although this group had been weakened in September,³⁹ it apparently could still prevent any move to defuse the Red Guard movement as a whole. Thus, only half-hearted efforts were made to tame the Red Guards. Little real attempt was made to curb or end Red Guard privileges, and, unlike February, virtually no troublesome Red Guard organization was declared counterrevolutionary.⁴⁰ However, some effort was made to end Red Guard disputes by putting high priority on the rapid formation of "revolutionary great alliances," and the PLA was ordered to help in this process.⁴¹

³⁸See the September 5, 1967 speech by Chiang Ch'ing, in *SCMP*, No. 4869, pp. 1 ff.

³⁹The weakening was effected by the political demise of Wang Li and Kiang Feng.

⁴⁰An exception was the "May 16 Corps," but this shadowy organization was not a major Red Guard group.

⁴¹See Central Directive of September 5, 1967, in *SCMP*, No. 4026, p. 1.

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But the "revolutionary great alliances" were merely the first step in the formation of the "triple alliances"—that is, in the formation of Revolutionary Committees. This was made the first order of business.⁴² Nevertheless, progress in this direction was extremely slow, and this in itself is a measure of the continuing difficulties that beset the task of rehabilitation. By February 1968, only six additional provincial Revolutionary Committees had been set up, and only four additional "preparatory groups" had been formed. The pace has subsequently quickened somewhat; by mid-April an additional nine Revolutionary Committees had come into existence. In nearly every case the formation of these bodies has apparently been preceded by elaborate negotiations, almost certainly both in the province itself and in Peking. These negotiations are not conducted publicly, but Red Guard comments on specific situations, while highly polemic, give some idea of the issues involved. The central question seems to be political patronage—the issue that has plagued provincial administration since the "January revolution." In the provinces themselves, disputes appear to center around questions involving the relative merits, importance and prerogatives of individual Red Guard organizations, and, perhaps more important, around the thorny problem of getting both "rebels" and "old cadres" mutually to accept new provincial leaders. In Peking, the problem is to decide just who those leaders are to be.

Until February the decision had been to accept the military figures already running the various provinces as the dominant figures in the new Revolutionary Committees—a decision in effect to postpone more basic political choices. Nearly all of these military men have been under some form of Red Guard attack for months, but even more bitter disputes may center around lesser figures drawn from among the rehabilitated cadres and the Red Guard organizations. Yet even when Revolutionary Committees come into existence, disputes continue. Virtually every such provincial committee—both those formed recently and those that came into being early in 1967—appears to be under attack from without and racked by strains from within. It is unlikely that similar bodies at lower levels, where the committee-forming process has gone on somewhat more rapidly since September, are immune to these pressures and strains.

In the past several months these troubles have apparently intensified. Radio broadcasts in the affected provinces have become increasingly shrill in denouncing "factional" disputes, which are frequently said to extend into "leadership bodies." In late January and early February, *Wen Hui Pao* was especially stern in condemning "factional crimes" which have interfered with the functioning of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, but it is clear that such difficulties are not confined to Shanghai alone.⁴³ For example, some kind of dispute between Cheng Kuo-hua, head of the

⁴²JMJP, December 31, 1967.

⁴³The *Wen Hui Pao* editorials were reproduced by major Peking papers and given national significance.

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Szechwan "preparatory group," and Liu Chieh-ting, chief "rebel" representative and number three man on the group, may be one cause for the long delay in the formal establishment of a Revolutionary Committee in that province.⁴⁴

Moreover, as the process of consolidation and rehabilitation goes on, differences between "rebels" co-opted into leadership organs and those on the outside tend to increase. As early as May 1967, warnings were issued to "revolutionaries" who had been elevated to leadership positions not to assume the officious airs and bureaucratic ways of the party officials they had displaced. The Shantung Revolutionary Committee actually issued a code of behavior designed to correct such abuses.⁴⁵ Still more important, "rebels" in responsible positions now have something to protect. They and the Revolutionary Committees are apparently being criticized by Red Guard groups who have either been squeezed out in the formation of the new committees or who feel that they are under-represented on them. Nearly all provincial Revolutionary Committees appear to be under pressure of this sort,⁴⁶ and as it continues leading "rebel" figures such as Chang Ch'ün-chiao, head of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, find themselves less and less spokesmen for "revolutionary" interests and more and more conservators of the status quo.⁴⁷

The glue holding all these disparate forces together still appears to be the military, but the PLA has itself tended to become a participant in, rather than an arbiter of, the political infighting. Moreover, an army of less than three million can scarcely perform the administrative and political functions of a party of 20 million indefinitely. It is in this context that the tentative steps toward restoration of a functioning party machine must be viewed. For the major way in which the recent effort at rehabilitation differs from that of February is that on this occasion not only are individual cadres to be reconciled, but apparently the party machine is, at least in part, to be rehabilitated as well.

Since late November increasing emphasis has been placed on the task of "party-building," which is now said to be an integral part of the "strategic plan" introduced by Mao in September.⁴⁸ Leading figures are again being identified by their party titles; discussion of the party's central role in Chinese political life is again being emphasized. "Party-building" itself was listed as a major task in the 1968 New Year's Day *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial. Much of the discussion of the party's role and functions in the official press

⁴⁴In December, Liu was apparently downgraded—he dropped several places in official reported name lists—and seldom appeared in public with Chang Kuo-hua. In February he was restored to his number three ranking.

⁴⁵Peking radio, June 22, 1967.

⁴⁶Kweichow, Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia radio broadcasts have denounced attempts to undermine the authority of their respective Revolutionary Committees.

⁴⁷Shanghai has taken the lead in denouncing "anarchism and factionalism" and in fact sounds much more anxious about these phenomena than does Peking.

⁴⁸The issue was first discussed at length in a series of *Wen Hui Pao* editorials.

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and radio has been remarkably vague and general, but several salient points do stand out. One is that the long-postponed 9th Party Congress will apparently be held,⁴⁹ at which time a new party constitution will apparently be adopted and such leading "renegades" as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen will be formally excluded from high office.⁵⁰ A second is that party cadres are eventually to form the "core and backbone" of the Revolutionary Committees—which means that the party's bureaucratic structure will have to be restored in fact if not in name.⁵¹ A third is that party officials in the military will probably play an extremely important part in the task of "party-building."⁵² A fourth is that while considerable numbers of Red Guards will obviously be allowed to enter the reconstituted party, they will not be brought in *en masse* but will have to undergo a thorough screening; former party cadres will also have to be screened, but it is apparently contemplated that reasonably large numbers will survive this process.⁵³ Finally, the party bureaucracy will be streamlined.⁵⁴

It should be emphasized that this scenario represents less a fully accepted program of action than it does the pious hopes of those elements in the national leadership that have been pressing most strongly for a restoration of order and rationality and an end to unbridled "revolution." While some general consensus has probably been reached at the Center with regard to an *eventual* reconstitution of party life, a program that so obviously assumes the virtual end of the Cultural Revolution certainly cannot be popular with large numbers of "revolutionaries," nor with those elements at the Center who are most closely bound up with them. Transfer of real political power to party factions within the Revolutionary Committees must deeply upset many activists who quite naturally expect that, should it occur, the score will be settled wholesale by embittered "old cadres"; some efforts are apparently under way to reassure "revolutionaries" on this matter.⁵⁵

But this question is merely the symptom of a more basic problem, namely, who will have control over the screening process when "party-building" really gets under way. If the Red Guards are to have a real voice in the process of rehabilitating party cadres, the process of rebuilding the party machine may be delayed indefinitely. While this is not likely to occur, the issue probably has not been settled definitely, almost certainly because the central leaders in Peking themselves cannot agree on the matter.⁵⁶ Some

⁴⁹AFP, February 17, 1967.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹JMJP, October 21, 1967.

⁵²Since the first of the year, frequent references have been made in official media to the role of military party committees in "party-building."

⁵³Kweiyang radio, February 27, 1968.

⁵⁴Harbin radio, January 16, 1968.

⁵⁵"Mao-Study" classes now being held all over China under PLA auspices are at least partly designed to reconcile Red Guards to reconciled cadres.

⁵⁶In the autumn of 1967, wall posters claimed Mao had stated that Revolutionary Committees were to be set up throughout the country by February. AFP, November 24, 1967.

straws in the wind have begun to appear, however. In February Revolutionary Committees were acting up in Hupeh, Hopeh and Honan, apparently without the usual, laborious, prior negotiations at the provincial level.⁵⁷ Although the Honan and Hupeh committees are dominated by military figures, both include prominent party officials who were under very severe Red Guard attack at the height of the "revolutionary" movement. And in Hopeh the situation is even more interesting: The new committee is headed by Li Hsueh-feng, former head of the party's North China Regional Bureau and successor to P'eng Chen as First Secretary of the Peking Party Committee. Both he and his deputy, Liu Tzu-hou, were disgraced in late 1966; Liu Tzu-hou was "dragged out" and paraded by Red Guards in early 1967. Their rehabilitation hardly seems a victory for "revolutionary activists."

These recent rehabilitations are spectacular because they resurrect men who had not simply faded into political limbo, but who had been quite clearly disgraced. Yet while this development is almost certainly of considerable significance, it probably is not decisive. The level of violence and disruption is still high in nearly all areas of China, and the arguments over place and position as well as over the future of the Cultural Revolution still go on.⁵⁸ Furthermore, for all the recent smoke about rehabilitation of cadres, there still appears to be very little fire: positive information indicating that much has yet really been accomplished in this direction is lacking. Also, there is as yet no sign that the party chain of command has in any way been restored; nor is there any indication that preliminary steps have been taken to prepare for the 9th Party Congress. However, articulation of a restored organizational structure for the Young Communist League appears to have advanced rapidly since February.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, on the basis of what has in fact occurred in the past few months, some speculation about the future shape of events is probably in order. In the first place, if the party is to form the "core and backbone" of the Revolutionary Committees, a party structure not noticeably different from that which previously existed is bound eventually to emerge from the rubble. This process has not yet really begun, but the outcome is not really in doubt. The crucial issue is the staffing of the structure.

Here, too, changes may not be as great as once seemed likely. Since in both February and September the fires of revolution were banked at least in part because it was generally recognized in Peking that the administrative costs of continued ferment were too high, the argument for experience and

⁵⁷No "preparatory group" had been previously established in Hopeh, Hupeh and Honan are less clear-cut cases.

⁵⁸The fall of Acting Chief of Staff Yang Ch'eng-wu in late March seems to be in some way related to problems within the Revolutionary Committees. His purge was followed by a general attack on "rightists" and "double-dealers" who had "wormed their way" into the committees. This was accompanied by a denunciation of a tendency toward "reversal of verdicts"—i.e., indiscriminate rehabilitation of cadres.

⁵⁹Harbin radio, March 2, 1968.

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administrative ability is likely to carry considerable weight as the party bureaucracy is restaffed. Many old faces are likely to reappear in high posts, although there may be some transfer of party personnel from jobs in the state bureaucracy to party work. At middle levels, the need for experience will probably also play an important role, but perhaps not quite so many cadres will return to the jobs they previously held. It seems quite possible that there may be room for some upward mobility at this level, and second- and third-ranking officials may inherit important posts. In any event this seems a reasonable possibility, but it is no more than that. At the basic levels, the situation is even more obscure. A considerable number of cadres in the rural areas probably have survived the Cultural Revolution relatively unscathed, but it is at this level that the greatest infusion of Red Guards is likely to occur. Perhaps a fairly high personnel turnover can be expected in urban areas, but here again we enter the area of pure speculation.

Those leading party figures who have been assigned major roles as villains in the course of the Cultural Revolution almost certainly can be counted out of the picture permanently. Those who have been denounced by name in official publications (as opposed to Red Guard papers and wall posters) or in radio broadcasts are clearly beyond the pale. It is most likely that such thoroughly reviled figures as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing (neither of whom have yet been denounced by name), P'eng Chen and T'ao Chu will not even be given roles as "teachers by negative examples," but will be excluded entirely from public life.⁶⁰ If the recent events in Hopeh and Hupeh are any indication of what is to come, however, at least a few officials disgraced and humiliated by Red Guard attacks at the height of the Cultural Revolution will finally be rehabilitated—although they may be demoted and given lesser responsibilities.

Far fewer of the Red Guard rank and file are likely to be admitted to party ranks than seemed likely several months ago.⁶¹ Many, but by no means all, of those Red Guard leaders who have been co-opted into the various Revolutionary Committees are likely to survive,⁶² but their relative standing vis-à-vis "old cadres" and, at least temporarily, military figures on the committees is by no means settled. And the same is true of those relatively few party cadres who threw in their lot with the Red Guards and thereby earned the title of true "leftists." The battles on these issues are quite clearly still going on.

There have been enough twists and turns in the Cultural Revolution to make all predictions hazardous, but if the picture just outlined has much validity it is surely a picture of Thermidor. This is not to say that Mao from the start has been conducting a charade and that many of the party

⁶⁰A wall poster claim, but likely to be true.

⁶¹Wall posters claim that Hsueh Fu-chih made a statement along these lines in November 1967.

⁶²Two "revolutionary" members of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee were apparently dropped from that body in February.

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personnel apparently disgraced in the past two years were never in any real trouble at all. It seems quite likely that circumstances—primarily the sustained and unexpected resistance to the Chairman's initiatives—have pushed Mao onto paths he did not originally expect to travel, but the battles of the Cultural Revolution have been real battles, and the victims real victims. Mao won most of the early battles, but only by escalating the war, and the consequences of his victories have been so grave, and the complications they have engendered so extensive, that in the end they have not been victories at all. It is hard to believe that there are not very considerable strains within the central leadership in Peking at present. These strains may account in part for the slowness and hesitancy of the reconstruction process. One major aspect of this process, "party-building," is beset by disputes involving such questions as whether or not revolutionary enthusiasm or pragmatic administrative qualities ought to be a primary qualification for high party office, and whether or not non-party masses ought to endorse the qualifications of party cadres. But these were the questions at issue when the Cultural Revolution began. We have come full circle.

Yet even if we assume that these questions will be settled with a certain degree of compromise and adjustment, according to the general terms outlined above, there remain several major issues regarding the relationship of the party bureaucracy to the other elements of the Chinese Communist system. The most important of these involves the future relationship of the party to the state bureaucracy and to the military establishment.

Neither problem is new, but both are likely to arise in acute form in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Strains involving the interrelationship of the state and party bureaucracies are almost certain to arise in the Revolutionary Committees. These are administrative organs, supervising many of the functions and services previously performed by the provincial governorates; yet they are increasingly responsible for such ostensibly party-controlled functions as supervision of propaganda, and they have apparently taken under their wings such party-controlled organizations as the Young Communist League. Moreover, party fractions are to be the "core and backbone" of the committees. There is bound to be a confusion of functions here surpassing anything seen in the past.⁶⁸ In the central ministries, however, the situation is different. These organs have continued to function in the past year, while the party apparatus has been out of business; party supervision and control for all practical purposes has ceased. Reassertion of that control is not likely to be easy; furthermore, Chou En-lai, who today appears to be a more powerful figure than ever within the inner policy-making group, is unlikely to be overawed by any successor to Teng Hsiao-p'ing, as he may on occasion have been in the past. It is possible, but by no means certain, that he may resist a full reassertion of party

⁶⁸Cf. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 810 ff.

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control over areas within the purview of the State Council.

Problems involving party-PLA relationships are obvious. The Cultural Revolution has certainly not disposed of the old professional-political officer dichotomy, and in some respects the professional wing of the PLA has been strengthened. Former commissars whose ties were primarily to the party rather than the army have nearly all long since left the scene; most of the commissars now active appear to be largely the creatures of the several military region and district commanders.⁶⁴ And those are the men who in most cases are still running China's provinces. Moreover, no officer known to be a member of the PLA's General Political Department has appeared in public in the past several months.⁶⁵ Yet it is the party committees within the various military commands that will bear the major burden of "party-building," for this is the only party "system" in any sense operative; rather than having been destroyed outright, it has merely been atrophied.⁶⁶ In this situation, professional military problems are likely to get a sympathetic hearing initially, but it is hard to believe that as the new party structure is articulated, politics will not attempt to reassert itself over the gun.⁶⁷

Beyond these problems there is the even more fundamental question of party morale. The Great Leap Forward certainly had a deleterious—indeed, virtually traumatic—effect on large sections of the party; it seems likely that the Cultural Revolution will have an ultimate effect many times greater on party morale at all levels. Thus far cadres have shown a great, although perfectly natural, reluctance to "step forward" and resume their tasks. Even after the Cultural Revolution is concluded, not many are likely to perform with much enthusiasm or initiative. And animosities engendered in the course of the "revolution" are likely to linger for years. These animosities may prolong the "revolution" itself for some time to come, but the job of picking up the pieces once it is over is likely to be arduous in the extreme. The party organizational structure will probably be restored, but in this sense it is safe to say that the Chinese Communist Party will never be the same again.

⁶⁴Most of these men appear to have made a career in the PLA rather than in the party bureaucracy. When commanders and commissars appear together, pride of place is given to the commander.

⁶⁵Hsiao Hua, head of the GPD, fell in late August 1967. This entire development has interesting implications with regard to Lin Piao's relationship to the PLA.

⁶⁶Frequent references to military party committees began to appear in official media early this year. There has still been no mention of other party organs. Of course the army chain of command, to which the military party committees are related, has remained intact throughout the Cultural Revolution.

⁶⁷This may have been a factor in the fall of Yang Ch'eng-wu.

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The recent upheavals of "the cultural revolution" have made it harder than ever to get reliable statistics on China. This economist reviews the available facts and concludes that "Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there is the unresolved problem of feeding and clothing the millions. . . . The cultural revolution has in the last two years moved to the issues of the people's livelihood. . . ."

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Communist China: The Economy and the Revolution

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

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COMMUNIST CHINA has published only one statistical manual: a slim, retrospective volume entitled *Ten Great Years*, covering the years 1949-1958. The figures for 1949-1952 are not very reliable because of the modest state of statistical science in the country at that time. The data for 1953-1957 (the First Five-Year Plan period) are probably the best of the lot, but even here numerous technical difficulties arise. Figures for 1958 (the first year of the "great leap forward," 1958-1960) were so exaggerated and fanciful that even the Chinese later declared them to be totally misleading. No comprehensive statistics have been published since 1959. Since 1966, the information blackout has been complete. One could go so far as to say that the amount of quantified information emanating from Peking in the last three years would fit comfortably on a sizable postage stamp.

For a while (1961-1965) the Mainland press carried much interesting discussion about the economy. Here and there one could pick up a suggestive datum, a hint on what was going on in the fields of agriculture, industry and trade. After 1965, this type of reportage was replaced by inspirational articles extolling the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The language of these essays has become frozen by Maoist ritual. For a time, a study of the provincial press yielded some valuable information on leadership attitudes, since it was one of the principal media through which instructions from the center were relayed to local authorities. In 1967, the export of provincial newspapers was banned. The Communist party's theo-

retical organ *Hung Chi (Red Flag)* ceased publication on November 23, 1967. In 1967 and early 1968, Red Guard wall posters could be resorted to in order to gain some idea as to the progress of events, but this source more often than not was contradictory and sensationalist. In any event, curbs were put on foreign correspondents' jotting down items from this wall literature.

Businessmen and tourists supplied some news but, here again, the information was of limited value. Travel routes were at all times strictly controlled, exception being made for Communist sympathizers and others whose conclusions about China had been arrived at beforehand. Following the outbreak of the "cultural revolution," the number of foreign visitors in China declined sharply.

There is, therefore, a serious problem here. Although Western economists have been trained by Stalin's secrecy complex to deal with this sort of censorship, the thoroughness of the informational blackout is unparalleled in the history of any modern nation. The figures used in the present article are Western estimates—informed guesses—based on tidbits of news issuing from the Mainland.

SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A number of general principles about the Chinese economy should be kept in mind.

The designation, "planned economy," does not apply to China. Like the rest of Chinese society, the economy in the past 19 years has been run by a series of short-term expedients, typically assuming the form of mass campaigns. The only period which fits the designation of planning is 1953-1957. Commu-

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China's First Five-Year Plan, which explained in various ways, among which policy disagreements within the top leadership should certainly be included. The major stages of shifting policy were the rehabilitation period (1949-1952), the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the liberal interlude (late 1956-1957), the great leap forward (1958-1960), the period of retrenchment and rebuilding (1961-1965), and the great proletarian cultural revolution (1966 to the present). Each stage contained a number of minor substages, some of them mutually contradictory. Each stage also revealed policy shifts from right to left and back again depending on whether emphasis was placed on economic calculation or ideological euphoria. The cultural revolution, for example, shows at least seven such swings in the revolutionary pendulum. To some extent, these movements are consciously directed by the leaders on the theory of alternating tension and relaxation. Increasingly, however, the swings appear to be spontaneous and uncontrollable.

Like other underdeveloped economies, the Chinese economy is not fully integrated. There is a considerable element of localism and local self-sufficiency in the mechanism. To some extent this is a legacy of the past which the Communists have tried to eradicate. On the other hand, not a few measures taken by the Communists since 1958 have tended to encourage local economic autonomy. The interesting point about this is that it enables the economy to withstand upheavals at the center, to keep on functioning locally in spite of confusion at the top.¹

The Chinese economy is "aidless." It has never received any grants from abroad and the last long-term (Soviet) loan was received in 1954. China's external economic contacts are based on cash (mostly hard cash) payments and short-term credits for the purchase abroad of specified items. Two-thirds of the country's trade is presently carried on with "capitalist" powers.

At least since 1961, the Chinese economy has not been "Marxist-Leninist" in the Stalinist sense. In the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe the Stalinist economic priorities were—and to some extent still are—heavy industry, light industry, agriculture. China's official priorities after 1960 have been: agriculture, light industry, heavy industry. This departure from the orthodox pattern was largely dictated by the urgent need to feed and clothe a rapidly increasing population.

In evaluating the performance of China's economy one must constantly bear in mind the cultural gap between Western and Chinese conceptions of life. It is difficult enough to understand the workings of totalitarian systems when one has not been exposed to them directly and for considerable periods. It is even more difficult to grasp the elusive qualities of a totalitarian system imposed on a society whose values are very different from ours, and whose language loses more than the usual share of meaning in translation. There is no civil or criminal code in China today, nor are there any codes in other areas of law. The whole body of Chinese Communist law takes up just 600 pages of rather large print,² and most of the "laws" are, in fact, administrative decrees, many of them applying retrospectively. The General Code of Laws of the Ch'ing Dynasty made it a criminal offense to "do what you ought not to do." The Chinese, moreover, have a capacity for separating the public from the private face, so that noisy expressions of obeisance on the part of private individuals must at all times be viewed not only in the context of a system of fear but in the light of a special ethic which existed long before Mao and Marx.

AGRICULTURE

At the end of December, 1966, the cultural revolution was extended to economic life. Red Guards and Maoist workers' formations ("revolutionary rebels") were ordered to take over offices, factories and farms. At this juncture, the upheaval in the "superstructure" (politics and cultural life) invaded the "base" (the economy). Since that time, there have been several shifts to the left and right, but the important point is that the revolutionary turmoil is now common to both political and economic life and directly affects the growing of grain and the making of steel.³

¹ See Jan S. Prybyla, "Why Communist China's Economy Has Not Collapsed After Two Years of Cultural Revolution," in J. S. Prybyla (ed.), *Communism at the Crossroads* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968).

² Albert P. Blaustein, *Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China* (South Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962), and F. Kalinychew, "Democracy and Legality," *Izvestia*, February 12, 1967, p. 4.

³ Jan S. Prybyla, "The Economic Cost," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1968, pp. 1-13.

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Which all the interesting and vital...
 traneous matter is discarded, China's fundamental problem is seen to be what it has always been: how to feed and clothe a growing population. The economic answer to this problem lies in modernization, that is, the breaking out of the limits imposed on productivity by traditional methods of production, and the application of modern science and technology to the economic process. There are various ways in which this can be done. However, because the margin between food and mouths to feed is extremely narrow, the range of options is for all practical purposes restricted to one: the development of agriculture. During the relatively pragmatic period, 1961-1965, the Chinese Communists recognized this constraint and applied themselves to promoting agriculture and industries directly serving agriculture, including light industries supplying the peasants with consumer goods. The importance of this sector is, of course, further enhanced by the fact that about 80 per cent of the Chinese people derive their living directly from the soil. Help from abroad must for the time being be ruled out.

There are two hard figures to go on. The first is the 1953 population figure of 583 million, the second is the grain output figure for 1957 which reads 185 million metric tons. Both figures seem reasonable and they have been repeatedly endorsed by official China. The rate of natural population increase since 1953 is subject to dispute. Estimates range from 1.4 to 2.5 per cent per annum.⁴ If the lower rate is taken, China's population in 1957 would be 615 million. The 2.5 per cent rate is probably too high. Taking a more reasonable rate of, say, 2 per cent per annum, the 1957 population would be 631 million. Assuming a 1957 population of 615 million and a domestic grain output of 185 million tons, the per capita grain availability in 1957 works out at 0.3 tons. If the 2 per cent rate is assumed, the per capita grain availability in 1957 would be 0.29 tons.

Now, if we assume that the average rate of population increase from 1953 to 1967 was 1.4 per cent per year, China's population in 1967 would be 707 million (and 770 million, if the 2 per cent per annum rate is assumed). Western estimates show that grain output in 1967 was 190-200 million metric tons.⁵ To this must be added 5 million metric tons of imported grain, giving either 195 or 205 mil-

figure (707 million) and the higher grain availability figure (205 million tons), the per capita grain availability in 1967 works out at 0.29 tons. If the higher population figure is taken (770 million) together with the higher grain figure (205 million tons), the result is a per capita grain availability of 0.27.

All this may sound involved, but the conclusion is simple: per capita grain availability in China was practically the same in 1967 as in 1957, and this on the most favorable assumptions. There appears to have been no visible improvement. It should be noted, of course, that the fact that the Chinese Communists have managed to keep up with population growth is in itself an achievement not shared by all underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, the result should be qualified at least in three ways.

The 1967 harvest was exceptionally good. In fact, the cultural revolution has so far unfolded in good weather, unlike the great leap forward. There are indications that in the last two years water conservancy projects have been neglected and that there has been an increase in illegal chopping down of trees by peasants. One is inclined to assume that the Chinese have not yet won their age-long battle against the elements, and that any serious adverse change in weather is likely to affect agricultural output in much the same way as it did in the past.

Grain distribution in 1957 was probably better than in 1967. One of the known effects of the cultural revolution has been the disruption of rail transport. It is possible, therefore, that local shortages of grain have developed and that this may, in turn, have repercussions on labor productivity and the production of livestock.

There have been reports of widespread theft from storage bins and of illegal distribu-

⁴ R. M. Field, "How Much Grain Does Communist China Produce?" *The China Quarterly*, January-March, 1968, pp. 105-107; L. D. Tretiak, "Population Picture," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 4, 1968, p. 14.

⁵ The 1957 figure for population is based on the 1953 census. The 1957 figure for grain output is from *Ten Great Years*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 119. The 1967 grain figures are estimates by O. L. Dawson cited in E. F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution," in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China* (Washington: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1967), Vol. I, p. 93; *The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review: China, North Korea, Hong Kong*, April, 1968, p. 7; and E. F. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 93. For further discussion of Mainland China's population problem, see the article by Thomas Dow, Jr., in this issue.

tion of grain to peasants by officials opposed to the Maoist line. It is also possible that the quality of storage has suffered and that, therefore, loss of grain in storage has been higher than in 1957.

One could validly object that grain availability is only one measure of food supply, and that there are other commodities which should be taken into account. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and other agencies have tried to quantify the problem in face of official Chinese silence, but the results are at best tentative. It is possible to say, for example, that rice output, which was 86.8 million metric tons in 1957, reached about 88 million tons in 1966, that soybeans, which were at 10 million tons in 1957, reached perhaps 11 million tons in 1966, and that is all.⁶ It is possible that the increase in the output of grain crops and other crops was due in part to increased per acre yields—which would be reasonable in view of the increased application of chemical fertilizers—but the evidence at this stage is rather uncertain.

The overall conclusion which emerges is that a per capita grain availability of 0.3 metric tons or thereabouts represents a satisfactory present level, but that it will be increasingly difficult to maintain this level in the future unless (a) a determined effort is made to raise per acre yields, extend the cultivated area and keep floods and droughts in check, and (b) the natural population increase is brought under control. This demands some hard thinking unhindered by dialectical mysticism. There seems to be, frankly, very little room left for the kind of ideological calisthenics which the Chinese have enjoyed for the last three years.

A final note about clothing, which means primarily cotton. The Chinese these days are not given to conspicuous consumption in the matter of apparel. The millions are drably but cleanly dressed. Cotton output appears at present to be inadequate to cover anything but the most modest requirements of domestic consumers and state exports. Total cotton production in 1957 was 1.64 million metric tons. By 1966, it had probably declined to 1.3 million tons.⁷ If, as the Chinese claim, cotton output in 1967 was better than in the previous year (let us assume a 20 per cent improvement), it may now be roughly back where it was in 1957.

And so in this area too, there is little room left for ideological revivalism. There is

rather an urgent need for economic rationality, as Mao's Communist opponents have repeatedly said.

FOREIGN TRADE

China's foreign commerce is the one sector about which the outside world has relatively reliable information, simply because it is possible to get at trade figures issued by China's partners. The country's total imports and exports are in the \$3-\$4 billion range, which is not very much by world standards, but is crucial for China. Again, shorn of interesting but somewhat irrelevant incidentals, foreign trade is important for the Chinese because it enables them to get chemical fertilizers and chemical plants and some industrial equipment which they lack, as well as wheat to fill the gap between inadequate and minimum nutritional standards. The chemicals, plants and wheat come overwhelmingly from the Western industrial countries and Japan. Australia, Canada, Argentina and France are the major wheat suppliers. A million tons of imported wheat costs the Chinese \$50-\$60 million in hard currencies, so that the annual expenditure on this item runs these days into some \$250-\$300 million.

Since the wheat deals are settled in cash or on a short-term credit basis, the Chinese have to be very careful about their foreign exchange reserves and about the way their trade balance shapes up each year. What China's foreign exchange (i.e., hard currency reserve) position is at present, is anybody's guess, but there are clues.

The Chinese have at all times scrupulously settled their foreign debts, even in the face of unfraternal provocation by the Soviets. They have paid promptly and in full, thus establishing for themselves a good name, if not a credit rating, in the world. Mainland China today has no outstanding debts, except the usual short-term ones, which are settled in the normal way.

To pay for essential imports, the Chinese have made a determined effort to promote exports of agricultural commodities (e.g., rice) and light industry products (e.g., cotton fabrics, cement, simple consumer goods).

China's foreign trade balance (commodity account) has usually been in slight surplus.

⁶ E. F. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 94 and Economist Intelligence Unit, *op. cit.*, Annual Supplement 1968, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.* Cf. *China News Analysis*, (Hong Kong), No. 691, January 12, 1968, pp. 1-7.

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In this way, a small inflow of foreign currencies has been assured over the years.

An important source of foreign exchange has been China's trade with Hong Kong. The Chinese supply most of the goods and services (including water) which the Hong Kong population needs daily and buy very little from the colony. The surplus is settled by Hong Kong in pounds sterling.

Invisible payments (i.e., the services account), such as freight and insurance and the servicing of loans, are settled by hard currency remittances from overseas Chinese. It is estimated that overseas Chinese remit about \$150 million to Mainland China every year, although the amount has no doubt fluctuated and has probably dropped to half that sum in each of the last three years.

In some years, recourse has been made by the Chinese to bullion sales, especially of silver. From 1959 to 1962, China sold in London about \$50 million worth of bullion, and there have been no sales since. In 1965 and 1966, the Chinese bought some gold in London, possibly as a hedge against the expected devaluation of the British pound, in which China's foreign exchange reserves are mainly held. China did not join in the rush on gold at the end of 1967 and in early 1968.⁸

Since the early 1950's, but especially after the break with the Soviet Union, the Chinese have extended credits to various non-Communist developing countries. Most of these loans have been tied to the delivery of Chinese-made goods, although there have been a few instances of emergency foreign exchange loans. As a rule, the loans are interest-free and directed to specific projects in the beneficiary countries.

One of the disturbing side effects of the cultural revolution has been a decline in Chinese exports and a concurrent rise in imports, resulting in a trade deficit of some \$50 million in 1966 and about \$200 million in 1967. The drop in exports is probably traceable in the first place to disruption in Chinese ports and confusion on the railroads, and also to production problems in industry. Less significantly, the cultural goings-on have strained China's relations with a number of trading partners, including Hong Kong.

Because of the continuing need to import wheat (in 1968 wheat imports are likely to exceed 6 million tons), there is here again no room for ideological exuberance. Most West

European countries are eager to trade with Mainland China. Whether their eagerness will be rewarded depends to a considerable extent on China's ability to put her own house in order quickly. Even Mao Tse-tung, in his brief spells of economic rationality, has come around to this view. A Red Guard poster in Canton quoted him as saying that

this nationwide disorder, including military disorder, is to occur for the very last time. After that, the nation will return to peaceful order, and the world will once more be in the hands of revolutionary rebels. The Central Government this time deliberately allows the existence of this nationwide disorder.⁹

There is a *non sequitur* in this (i.e., the revolutionary rebels are the agents of disorder), but it is at least more sober than the statement made by Wu Fa-hsien, Commander of the Air Force, in August, 1967: "in implementing Chairman Mao's directives we must completely disregard whether we understand them or not."¹⁰

INDUSTRY

Industry, as well as agriculture, has been plagued throughout 1967 and the better part of 1968 by problems of labor discipline. The authority of professional managers and local government officials in charge of plants, offices and farms has been undermined, and in numerous instances the professionals have been replaced by inexperienced mixed committees of workers, rehabilitated cadres and the military. In addition, the workers have been torn by factional disputes, some siding with the Maoist revolutionary rebels, others with the anti-Maoist officials. By the latter part of 1967, the original issues had become blurred; personal vendettas appear to have been at least as important and frequent as ideological positions in causing clashes in factories and offices. The summer months of 1967 were especially violent and bloody; armed clashes were reported daily from most

⁸ J. S. Prybyla, "Communist China's Foreign Exchange," *Queen's Quarterly*, Winter, 1965, pp. 519-527; Economist Intelligence Unit, *op. cit.*, (Annual Supplement, 1968), p. 11; *China Trade Report*, monthly issues.

⁹ Quoted in *Union Research Service* (Hong Kong), January 19, 1968, p. 80 from *Red Guards* (October 23, 1967) a newspaper edited by the Red Guard Combat Unit of the 4th Field Army, Red Guard Canton General Headquarters.

¹⁰ Quoted in L. D. Tretiak, "Less Fighting Talk," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 11, 1968, p. 46.

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industry. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500060001-5
 now on this side, now on that.¹¹ Instances of absenteeism and resort to go-slow tactics have often been mentioned in press, radio and wall poster reports.

It seems fairly clear that industrial production was little affected by the early ideological and power struggle phases of the cultural revolution in 1966. One gets the impression that output of most major industries in that year was somewhat better than in 1965, although this is exactly what it says: an impression. The Chinese have published no industry-wide production figures, and Western estimates are based on scattered information from various plants and localities and on the general tenor of the reports. It is possible that in 1966 China produced about 10 million tons of crude oil (1.5 million in 1957, and about 8 million tons in 1965), perhaps 40 million tons of iron ore (16 million tons in 1957), perhaps as much as 12 million tons of steel (up a million tons from 1965), and about 250 million tons of coal and lignite (130 million tons in 1957, and perhaps 210 million tons in 1965).¹² The figures, to repeat, are informed guesses and the most one can say is that in 1966 there was no discernible evidence of an industrial crisis, and probably some improvement.

The picture changed radically in 1967, after the cultural revolution was carried into the economy. A new note of urgency and worry was struck in Mainland reports, side by side with the usual references to "great upsurge" and "unprecedented achievements." A socialist recession appears to have developed rapidly, gathering momentum as the troubled months dragged on. The situation seems to have deteriorated further in 1968, as the longer-term effects of the cultural upheaval began to be felt, chief among them the lack of competent leadership at the plant level, and worker restlessness.

The signs pointing to a deteriorating situation in industry may be summed up as follows:

1. In the winter of 1967-1968 a serious coal shortage developed partly because of fights, skirmishes, riots and strikes in coal mines. At the Lungmen colliery in Loyang, for example, "civil war" had raged for six months prior to February, 1968. Similar trouble had apparently hit the Fushun collieries in Liaoning Province, a major source of coal for the key Anshan steel works. Fac-

ionalism and anarchism reigned in the coal mines of Shansi Province. Since China is almost wholly dependent on coal for the running of her industry and railroads, shortages in this sector were bound to have adverse repercussions throughout the industrial economy.¹³

2. There have been practically no reports in 1967 and the first half of 1968 from some of China's most important industrial areas of Szechwan and Kansu. Even during the cultural revolution, when information of any kind was scarce, good performance would have been praised to the skies as a manifestation of the inspirational power of Mao Tse-tung's thought. A similar information blackout was imposed on the once much vaunted Taching Oil fields. For about two years previous to 1967, Taching and the "Taching spirit" were the themes of a mass propaganda campaign illustrating the economic benefits to be derived from Mao study. It is an interesting comment on the sort of data one gets out of China these days that, in spite of millions of words written on the subject of Taching, the field's exact location is not known to this day.

3. Anarchism, factionalism, groupism, sectarianism, "mountain-topism," and all the other sins attributed to those who oppose the cultural revolution, have been mentioned in connection with the Anshan steel works and in the steel city of Wuhan. A month after the installation of a Municipal Revolutionary Committee in Wuhan (March, 1968) "acute class struggle" was still being talked about on the radio and in the press.

4. Urgent calls to "make revolution thriftily" were being broadcast in the spring and summer of 1968. These appeals were addressed primarily to factories and farms.

5. Railroad transportation has been seriously disrupted in 1967 by strikes, sabotage and pitched battles between warring factions of railroad workers and between workers and students. Particularly disturbing for the Chinese has been the paralysis which gripped the important railway junction of Cheng-

¹¹ See, for example, reports from the Chinese press in *Union Research Service*, January 16, 1968, p. 57 ff.

¹² *Ten Great Years*; also Arthur G. Ashbrook, "Main Lines of Chinese Communist Economic Policy," in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Vol. I, p. 25; R. M. Field, "Chinese Communist Industrial Production," in *op. cit.*, Appendix C, Table 9.

¹³ *China News Analysis*, No. 697, January 23, 1968, pp. 1-7.

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show, but trouble from other centers has also been reported, if in veiled language.

6. Most analysts seem to agree that the crucial chemical industry has been affected by disruption in supplies and by labor discipline problems. Almost complete silence has surrounded the cement and construction industries for months.

It is reasonable to assume that one of the major issues in dispute between the Maoists and their opponents—between romantic, guerrilla Communists and the party and government bureaucrats, technicians, and managers in charge of the day-to-day conduct of economic affairs—has been and remains to this day the question of economic incentives. Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there is the unresolved problem of feeding and clothing the millions.

The Maoist utopians believe that increases in production and productivity are a function of the political will, that asceticism and unshakable political faith can literally move mountains, that apparently insuperable problems can be solved if only the spirit is willing. Material incentives, the normal human desire for a better life now, are seen by these people as dangerous manifestations of petty bourgeois flabbiness.

The Communist pragmatists deny this and see in it an invitation to disaster. The dividing line between the two groups is perhaps not clear, but it is there. From a violent struggle at the top of the Communist pyramid, the cultural revolution has in the

last year moved to the basic issues of the people's livelihood, and has increasingly become a question of physical survival. The gap between minimum material needs and availabilities is still being met partly by imported grain, but more and more by a leftist philosophy of poverty which finds in destitution and self-denial the supreme human virtue.

The trouble is that even the slightest manifestation of empiricism, in the state of China's present madness, is branded as Soviet-type revisionism. The time to reverse gear is now no longer an academic question; it is an absolute necessity if so-called socialism in China is to survive, and beyond that, if China is not to plunge once again into bitter interne-cine warfare.

¹⁴ Colina MacDougall, "Nothing to Boast About," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 25, 1968, pp. 221-223.

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CHINA REPORTING SERVICE
18 September 1968

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"Bumper Crop" Claims Doubted

PEKING'S CLAIMS of "bumper" harvests of early rice have been received with considerable doubt by some qualified agricultural observers. They point out that the term "bumper" does not rank very high on the scale of past Chinese harvest claims and may be an attempt to cover up a mediocre, if not poor, crop.

Conspicuously absent, so far, has been any comparison with previous years. And unlike last year's early rice harvest claims,

no mention has been made of expanded acreage or increased unit yield. Additionally, provincial reports on the early rice harvest have been similarly vague and stressed successes of various communes and brigades rather than province-wide increases.

These observers believe that this year's actual production of early rice, because of severe weather and other problems, is somewhat below the 1967 crop. Rice is the staple food for most of the Chinese people. Early rice harvests in South and Central China and the central-south coastal regions—where

usually account for about 15 percent, or 25 to 30 million metric tons of China's total annual grain production.

Floods, Frost, Drought

New China News Agency (NCNA) claimed that "bumper" rice crops had been collected in Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces and in Shanghai municipality. These main early rice growing areas together account for about 80 percent of early rice production.

Although NCNA claimed the "bumper" early rice crops followed good harvests throughout the country last year, the official

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news agency also reported that drought conditions had been delaying seed germination in some areas in Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechwan and Anhwei provinces." NCNA added that "part of the early rice in Kwangtung, Fukien, Kiangsi and Hunan provinces suffered as a result of floods" (see chart).

Although NCNA glossed over the severe weather problems, Kwangtung, the most important early rice province, suffered drought and frost at the time of spring transplanting plus torrential rains, serious flooding and a lack of sunshine during normal grain filling and maturing stages.

Worst In Memory

Earlier, official provincial radio broadcasts had reported that the summer floods in some provinces this year were the worst in living memory. In Kwangtung province alone, for instance, more than 100,000

had died or been injured by floods.

Drought conditions were also reported by the official press from Inner Mongolia, Heilungkiang, Shantung and Honan provinces, mainly in the northern part of China (see chart).

Along with the absence of harvest comparisons with previous years, there was also a conspicuous silence on expanded acreage or increased unit yield, indicating that there was little, if any, acreage increase over 1967.

Although NCNA also reiterated the claim of "bumper" harvests of winter crops, observers believed they were no better than the mediocre 1967 harvests. In 1967, China's total early and late rice production was estimated at 86,400,000 metric tons. Taken together, the latest harvests of winter crops and early rice seem to have definitely fallen below those of last year.

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
18 September 1968

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SEVERE rains, floods, frost and drought have hurt crops in mainland China.

Farm Problems Plague China

ONE OF THE most serious and persistent economic problems for China's leaders is how to increase the populous nation's agricultural productivity.

The acuteness of the problem becomes evident when it is realized that agriculture in China accounts for almost 50 percent of the national income, employs about 80 percent of the labor force and provides a major proportion of the country's exports. Additionally, the size of the yearly harvest vitally affects consumption, industrial production, capital investment, revenue, foreign and retail trade and other economic variables.

An estimated 11 percent of China's land area is now cultivated, and about 40 percent of it is probably double-cropped. The total sown area is roughly equal to that in the United States. However, almost all tilled land is located in the eastern half of the country, where there are sizable areas with 50 percent or more of the land under cultivation.

These areas include nearly all of the North China Plain and the valley of the lower Yangtze below Wuhu as well as parts of the Manchurian Plain and the Szechwan Basin. The amount of land in cultivation in the rest of eastern China varies widely.

But it generally averages below 30 percent, and it typically occurs in sinuous and relatively narrow bands along the river valleys and on the immediately adjacent slopes.

New Lands Opened

The cultivated area of China has fluctuated within relatively narrow limits during the past 15 years. Although new land has been brought into cultivation it apparently has not been sufficient to offset the losses caused by greatly expanded urban and industrial areas, as well as the construction of a large number of reservoirs, and a number of physical factors such as salinization and erosion.

Most of the new land has been opened in Northeast China and in Sinkiang by state farm and military resettlement projects. Although a potential for opening new land for cultivation remains, most land that is not already in use is in marginal agricultural area. Aridity, altitude, short growing season, and other physical factors discourage farming there.

A reluctance of the Chinese Communists to invest in costly, large-scale land reclamation projects also has limited the ex-

pansion of land under cultivation. Most plans for significant increases in agricultural output, therefore, have been geared to improving yields.

Basic Problems

The further expansion of irrigation and multiple cropping may increase output. However, a substantial improvement in agricultural productivity appears to depend more on the greater use of chemical fertilizers and the use of improved seed.

Basic to all plans for increased agricultural production is the need for better land management and coordination of the land and water conservancy programs.

Rice Dominates South

The most significant division in China is that which separates the rice-growing southern provinces from the northern provinces that specialize in wheat and small grains. Within these two broad groups a large variety of other crops is grown.

Rice is dominant almost everywhere in South China, where about 35 to 80 percent of the cultivated land is irrigated. In

(from Chinese Communist press and radio as indicated)

"In medical and health work, put
the stress on rural areas"

Mao Tse-tung, quoted by NCNA,
January 15, 1969.

During the Cultural Revolution, in an attempt to correct the imbalance between town and country in the field of medical care, the Chinese authorities launched a drive to move doctors and nurses from urban to rural areas. As a consequence, urban hospitals were left short-staffed and standards declined.

In addition, the number of so-called "barefoot doctors" increased, but many of these poorly trained doctors do not know their limitations and have consequently endangered their patients lives.

The cooperative medical care system intended to improve rural medical facilities is already suffering from shortages of drugs and a mediocre service.

The regime has made a sustained attempt to discredit the "bourgeois" attitudes of city doctors and to reform their outlook and doctors have been subjected to political indoctrination and even physical harassment. Various disruptions during the Cultural Revolution have also caused shortages of drugs and a decline in standards of public health.

In an attempt to overcome difficulties caused by lack of facilities in rural areas and the desire of many doctors to return to the cities, the authorities, with some assistance from Army doctors, have emphasized the use of Mao's thought as a medical aid.

The opening shot in the latest campaign to send medical personnel away from the urban areas and into the countryside came before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in an instruction from Mao Tse-tung in June 1965 which said:

"Urban hospitals should retain some doctors who have graduated for one or two years and who are not very experienced. All the others should go to the countryside."

By March 1968 this already sweeping directive had been extended by the Central Committee, with the instruction that all 1966-67 graduates from medical schools were to go to the countryside. This provoked a strong reaction from the young graduates concerned, many of whom resisted it on the basis of Mao's June 1965 directive - only to be told that Mao's ideas were "lively,

flexible and changeable, and should not be interpreted too narrowly."

Available evidence suggests that these directives have been rigorously applied and Chinese urban hospitals have lost virtually all their trained doctors and that the nursing staff and trainee doctors are doing what they can to cope with this unprecedented situation. Certainly there is abundant evidence of a massive influx of medical personnel into the rural areas.

The New China News Agency (NCNA) on December 7, 1968 reported that in Heilungkiang over 3,600 medical personnel had recently settled in rural areas and that over the past two years over 8,400 had done the same.

Kweiyang Radio on December 8 said that thousands of public health workers had gone to settle in the rural areas of Kweiyang.

NCNA on December 12 stated that in Kiangsi 11,000 medical workers had already settled in rural and that 10,000 more would soon be going.

Canton Radio on January 4, 1969 reported that so far 5,000 medical workers in Kwangtung had gone to rural areas and that "in some cases whole units have been moved to the countryside."

Travelers from China reported in January 1969 that because so many trained nurses had been sent to rural areas, patients in Canton's hospitals were required to enlist the help of relatives to look after them. In one Canton hospital, it was reported in December that, about one third of the staff had been sent to the countryside and therefore treatment was only available to outpatients from 7:30 until 12:00.

In October travelers reported that 50 per cent of the staff at the Canton Peoples Hospital had received a directive to proceed to rural areas.

"Barefoot Doctors"

In addition to the dispatch of trained medical personnel from the cities to the rural areas, the Cultural Revolution has witnessed a great increase in the numbers of the so-called "barefoot doctors." The People's Daily of September 14, 1968 and Red Flag No. 3 both published a joint "investigation report" entitled: "The orientation of revolution in medical education as seen from the growth of 'barefoot doctors.'" It described the organization of medical facilities at commune and brigade level and made suggestions for the reorganization of medical education. This report described "barefoot doctors," as mainly young peasants with education up to junior middle-school level, who have been trained in a variety of basic medical practices either by two month courses at commune health clinics or on the job with the help of commune doctors. After two years experience they are said to be able to prescribe about 100 medicines, perform acupuncture, cure measles, pneumonia, pleurisy and diagnose appendicitis. During the Cultural Revolution the number of "barefoot doctors" has increased.

The People's Daily and Red Flag articles proposed that in the future, medical schools should take their students from among the "barefoot doctors" and other rural health workers who will return to the countryside after training.

Cooperative medical care

A further measure - cooperative medical care - intended to improve the medical facilities in rural areas was described in the People's Daily of December 5, 1968 as something new which has emerged during the great proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The paper described how this scheme has been organized in Loyuan commune, Hupeh Province. On the basis of actual medical expenses in the past it was decided that each person should pay an annual cooperative medical fee of one yuan. In addition each production team should pay 10 fen (cents) from its collective welfare fund for each member who subscribed to the medical service. Except those suffering from chronic ailments, each commune member should pay 5 fen for every treatment and be given free medicine.

Canton Radio reported that a similar system had been established in Kwangtung. There, each person was to pay 25-30 fen a month, forwarded twice a year by the production team to the collective where any deficiency would be made up from the collective welfare fund. The members were each to have a card entitling them to medical treatment at the brigade public health center. The cooperative system has also been inaugurated in several areas.

The system however seems to have come up against obstacles. Travelers reported in December 1968 that at one Kwangtung commune the system had been started but that most farmers had not joined and if they were sick would see private doctors. This was said to be because the new system suffered from a chronic shortage of drugs and that the service was very mediocre.

Army aid

Two communes, one near Peking and the other in rural Kwangtung, have both been "helped" by the PLA to establish a cooperative medical system according to NCNA on January 15, 1969 and Canton Radio on January 11, 1969. It was not clear whether PLA help was necessary because of opposition to the scheme or because there was such a shortage of qualified medical personnel that only the Army could provide the necessary medical expertise.

The "revolutionization" of urban medical staffs

Along with the drive to send medical personnel away from the cities in order to improve the situation in the rural areas during the Cultural Revolution there has also been a sustained attempt to discredit the "bourgeois" outlook of medical practitioners who wished to "stay in big hospitals

and become great doctors" (Canton Radio, November 6, 1968). Many doctors have accordingly been required to spend much valuable time in Mao-study. Travelers from Canton reported in early 1968 that it was common to see a line of outpatients waiting for up to two hours outside a hospital while doctors read from the "little red book;" at the People's hospital in Canton it was reported in September 1968 that the staff had to study Mao from 8:00 until 8:30 every morning.

Other doctors have been criticized and humiliated. In Canton hospitals, according to travelers reports, so many doctors and other medical staff have been "struggled" against that Worker-peasant teams had taken over the running of the hospitals.

In the Kwangtung Provincial People's Hospital all cleaning work was carried out by doctors under criticism according to reports in October. The doctors wore labels around their necks reading "Guilty of manslaughter by negligence during medical treatment."

In another Kwangtung hospital patients reported that 12 of the 16 doctors previously employed in the obstetric ward and outpatients section were assigned to the rural areas, and were replaced by six school drop-outs who are expected to learn the profession by experience and observation. In the same hospital the nurses and cleaning staff have also been interchanged, in accordance with a directive calling for the "re-education" of trained medical staff. Doctors who tried to point out the harm unskilled treatment could do to patients were criticized. When the staff of the Kwangtung People's hospital were informed that they were required to go to rural communes for farm work by April 30, many doctors protested at the number of patients who would be neglected if they went. They, too, were criticized.

Shortages of medicines

Disruptions in the pharmaceutical industry and of the transport system during the Cultural Revolution resulted in an acute shortage of medicines in many areas. In Kwangtung in early 1968 it was reported by travelers that drugs had been short since late 1967, especially supplies of streptomycin, penicillin, chloromycetin and tetracyclin. In May 1968 a shortage of medicines was reported in Tientsin.

Drugs were reported to be in short supply in Kwangtung, especially in Canton, from July until October 1968. Travelers in September said that due to the serious shortage, patients at Canton city hospitals were advised to attend hospitals for treatment until supplies returned to normal.

Decline in public health during the Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution has also apparently contributed to a decline in public health standards: refuse and nightsoil collections were curtailed and rubbish was allowed to pile up in the streets. Mass meetings, rallies

and long marches assisted the spread of infectious diseases. Reports of epidemics of cerebral and spinal meningitis have been numerous.

Shanghai Radio on January 21, 1968 published a notice on sanitation with particular emphasis on meningitis prevention methods. An Australian student who visited China in early 1968 saw a Peking general hospital notice board listing precautionary measures to be taken against type-B meningitis. Travelers from Kwangtung reported in early 1968 that since the beginning of 1967 type-B meningitis had been evident in Kwangtung having been spread by individuals participating in the movement to "exchange experiences." The disease was also reported, by travelers in May 1968, in Kiangsu where the death rate was rising because of shortages of doctors and drugs.

Mao's thought as an aid to medicine

On April 18, 1960, the Central Committee issued a directive on health work in which it was stated:

"It is wrong to regard health work as a piece of isolated work. Health work is vital because it benefits production work and study."

In the spirit of this directive the authorities have sought to stress the political aspects of health work and the importance of putting Mao's thought in command. Many of the city doctors and medical staff sent to rural areas have encountered difficulties in coping with the lack of facilities and in changing their "bourgeois" desires to remain in city hospitals where they feel their talents would be put to better use. The emphasis on the use of Mao's thought as a medical aid is designed to overcome such doubts and difficulties.

The New China News Agency on December 4, 1968 reported that in Kansu, a rural medical team had "performed a caesarian section with only six artery forceps and one scalpel," and that "a throat specialist of another team successfully extracted a stone weighing 12 gr. and measuring 5 mm. in diameter, from the bladder of a commune member."

The report added:

"All this proves that Mao Tse-tung's thought, once grasped can work wonders."

NCNA on December 10, 1968 broadcast a People's Daily report on a tumor operation in which it stated:

"The concept of 'incurable diseases' is not in line with the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

Medical personnel who, thus inspired, have undertaken risky and dangerous treatments are acclaimed by the press and radio. Army doctors have featured prominently in such exploits and are evidently serving a propaganda purpose in being specialists in the impossible.

On January 30, 1969, NCNA reported that doctors and nurses at Hsinhua Hospital attached to Shanghai No. 2 Medical College recently saved the life of Chou Teh-ming, a worker whose heart had stopped beating for 23 minutes after an electric shock. On arrival at the hospital the patient received cardiac massage and artificial respiration but he did not respond. He was then given an injection of adrenaline despite "bourgeois conventions and old medical 'textbooks'" which rule this out in cases of electric shock because it causes strong contractions which may go into uncontrollable fluttering and result in death. Twenty-three minutes after the patients heart had stopped, it started to beat again. Five minutes later he took his first breath.

Sining Radio on December 5, 1968 carried an account of an operation by an army mobile medical team on a commune member suffering from a tumor of the liver. Although the team were "understaffed and insufficiently equipped," they determined to overcome all obstacles with the help of Mao's thought. First they cabled the hospital for instructions on how to handle the operation and having received them, the team prepared for the operation.

"Lacking anesthetics, the team consulted the masses about measures for anesthetizing the patient.... On September 23 the teams studied Chairman Mao's quotations.... They were thus much encouraged. Members of the team took their pre-arranged positions and carried out the surgery while Chairman Mao's quotations set to music were sung.... The operation ended successfully."

On November 3, 1968 NCNA acclaimed a PLA medical team using new acupuncture techniques on deaf mutes at the Liao Yuan school for deaf mutes. They tried an important acupuncture point formerly called a "forbidden point" by specialists, because to insert the needle that far "would endanger life." After acupuncture for half a month 32 of the 157 deaf mutes could shout "Long live Chairman Mao."

Hofei Radio on December 5, 1968 reported that the Anhwei Provincial hospital had accepted a post-natal cardiac ailment complicated by fibrillation. On her second day in hospital her heart stopped. The medical personnel on duty applied heart massage and artificial respiration for 25 minutes with no success. The medical staff feared to perform open-heart massage on such a frail patient fearing that she would die, but

"the workers propaganda team and revolutionary leading group organized everyone to study Chairman Mao's teachings on ridding oneself of weak thinking and repudiate Liu Shao-chi's line of having experts manage hospitals."

Open-heart massage was then carried out successfully.

Peking Radio on April 7, 1968 reported that PLA dispensers with no advanced medical training had operated on a child's crushed hand keeping politics in command.

People's Daily on July 9, 1968 in a report on a Shanghai hospital stated:

"Quite a few nurses can do appendectomy and hernia surgery. In the neurosurgery department there are some nurses who ... as a result of being steeled in practical work have mastered the surgery of removing brain tumors which formerly could only be done by doctors who had had special training and a long period of experience."

Warning To China's Nuclear Scientists.

Chien San-chiang, Director of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences since 1958, has been denounced as a "capitalist-roader and secret enemy agent" who must be "toppled." (Canton Red Guard newspaper, Red Flag Bulletin, No. I, June 1968.)

This attack on Chien, one of China's leading nuclear scientists who, although he studied and worked abroad between 1937 and 1948, has since held a number of political as well as scientific posts, reflects the changed official attitude towards scientists and technicians seen in Mao's recent instructions on technical training (Peking Radio, July 21) and in reports on the experiences of the Shanghai Lathe Plant in adopting new training procedures.

The emphasis in technical training is now to be on practical labor at ordinary factory or agricultural worker level as opposed to theoretical research which is said to divorce intellectual workers from the masses. Foreign influences and revisionist views such as those attributed to "China's Khrushchev" (Liu Shao-chi) are to be resisted.

The relevance of the latest instructions to scientists has been clearly underlined. On July 21, the People's Daily, commending an investigation report on the Shanghai Lathe Plant prepared by the New China News Agency and Wen Hui Pao, urged scientific research departments and "leading units" to read it carefully as a "sharp weapon for further criticizing and repudiating" Liu Shao-chi's "counterrevolutionary revisionist line in science and technology."

Wen Hui Pao warned on July 26 that the situation in scientific and technological circles was "not satisfactory," and complained that "some people" sought to put work first, indulged in personal ambition, relied too heavily on foreign textbooks and conventions, and did not move beyond the library or laboratory. They did not intend to follow the direction indicated "long since" by Mao for science and technology. The newspaper also complained that a "number of so-called experts, extremely politically reactionary and completely ignorant in their work," had "usurped leadership over science and technology."

And in research bureaus, the strata were "strictly defined" and the "newly emerging forces," (presumably the revolutionary workers), were suppressed. In short, the structure of scientific and technological departments had become a "hotbed for the breeding of revisionist intellectual aristocrats."

Wen Hui Pao warned on July 26 that some scientific and technological units had abandoned the task of "consolidating and expanding" revolutionary great alliances and three-way alliances. Instead of struggling against

"capitalist-roads," they were divided by "civil wars." A Special Edition of Materials (published jointly by two Canton revolutionary groups and recording Chou En-lai's meeting on April 20-21, with representatives from the National Defense Scientific Commission, the Military Control Commission, the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building and the Chinese of Sciences), disclosed that the "violent struggle of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building was connected with the factionalism of the Scientific Commission." **Both these departments are thought to be concerned with China's nuclear program.**

Wen Hui Pao laid down certain tasks for scientific and technological circles. They were to

"combine revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation with the purification of the class ranks, with the task of struggle-criticism-transformation in individual units and with the rectification of the party organization, and carry mass criticism and repudiation through to the end."

This sterner attitude contrasts with that revealed in the 16-point decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Cultural Revolution, adopted on August 8, 1968, which laid down that during the cultural revolution,

"the policy of unity-criticism-unity should be continued toward those scientists, technical personnel, and working people so long as they are patriotic and work actively without opposing the party and Socialism, and so long as they have no improper association with foreign countries. Those scientists and technical personnel who have made contributions would be protected. Assistance may be rendered in the gradual transformation of their world outlook and work methods." (NCNA, August 8, 1966)

"Red v. Expert" campaign continues.

Laboratories have also become a target of the new wave of the "Red versus Expert" battle now being waged in China. In 1963-65 during the period of recovery from the three previous years, necessity caused greater reliance on expertise, but currently the emphasis on the leading role of workers has given rise to a new prestige for "Redness." Consequently purchases of technical equipment and money spent on proper research facilities in 1963-64 are now being condemned as bourgeois and counterrevolutionary.

Eight workers at a silk weaving mill in Soochow, Kiangsu Province, who wrote a report on their investigations at the mill's laboratory (New China News Agency (NCNA) on October 31, 1968), said that since it was set up in 1963, the laboratory had been controlled by a "handful of capitalist-roads and reactionary bourgeois technical authorities" who believed in "letting experts run the plant":

"These fellows were so free with money that they bought a good deal of apparatus blindly, regardless of whether it was needed or useful."

The workers also condemned the "appalling extent to which the laboratory placed itself above the masses," and concluded:

"The laboratory staff have gone down to do productive work on the shop floor where they are being reeducated by the workers."

The story of the laboratory at Chuchou Tientsin Locomotive and Rolling Stock Works was told by Changsha Radio (October 30). This laboratory was established in 1958 at which time it was quite simple and in regular touch with the workers. But in 1964, encouraged by official emphasis on "expertness," the "reactionary bourgeois technical authorities" spent 8,000 yuan on "a fine-looking laboratory" in the main building of the works and they also built a second laboratory.

"These persons also made a big thing of buying instruments, trying several of the same kind at one time."

The laboratory personnel were

"gravely divorced from production, sitting around in their laboratories and going in for so-called creation, invention, scientific research and theorising? They always reckoned themselves superior to the workers."

The report ended:

"The laboratory staff must take it in turns to do production and steel workers must take it in turn to work in the laboratory."

Victory for Maoism in Past Decade?

If the opening of the Ninth Congress marks a victory for Maoism over China's more pragmatic theorists, the events of the past decade—the "hundred flowers" campaign, the abortive economic "great leap forward" and the development of the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union (all of which reflect Mao's guiding hand) were largely responsible for the disturbed political climate which forced its continual postponement. In August, 1966, Mao told the Central Committee: "We have been preparing for a congress for many years; in all likelihood it will be held at a suitable time next year". However, he clearly had great difficulty in making sure of majority support for his views, and the formation of the new organs of power, the revolutionary committees, was continually delayed by factional disputes, so that they were not completed at the highest administrative level until September, 1968. Even today less than half of the provinces claim to be "all-Red", with revolutionary committees at all levels. These difficulties may have been the reason why Hsieh Fu-chih laid down in 1967 that the congress should start from national level, with the party committees being formed afterwards at the provincial and county levels—a reversal of the old pattern in which provincial congresses came before the main event. It means that the top party organs are no longer supported by a broad-based pyramid of reliable local organisations. The fact that many local broadcasts still refer to persisting factional disputes, the prevalence of the theory of "many centres" and continuing support for Liu Shao-chi's policies, indicates that there are many problems ahead in rebuilding the party at the lower levels.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1969

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JAPANESE STUDY FINDS CHINA'S GROWTH RATE STUNTED BY 3 YEARS OF TURMOIL

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 18—

Asian analysts see the economic legacy of the Cultural Revolution in Communist China as a stunted growth rate, a sharp decrease in the supply of trained specialists required for industrial development and a decision to gamble that moral inspiration can supplant material incentives throughout society.

These conclusions are drawn in an exhaustive survey of the Chinese mainland economy prepared by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and made available here.

Even if the political turmoil that has gripped China for three years now subsides, the report states, the economic growth rate in the future can be no more than 4 per cent annually.

During Communist China's first five-year plan, 1953-57, the economy grew at an annual rate of 8.9 per cent. This was the heyday of Chinese economic growth, benefiting from large-scale Soviet aid.

The second half of 1968 saw the start of a return to normal economic activity, after the confusion of the purge of the governing bureaucracy launched by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, but the scale of industrial and agricultural production last year is estimated at only slightly above the levels of 1965.

One of the most striking effects of the Cultural Revolution detailed in the 76-page report is the loss to the economy of 400,000 specialists who would have completed training in 1967-68 if schools and technical institutes had not been closed to the students, could take part in the cultural revolution.

tion.

Included in this estimate are 90,000 teachers, 50,000 doctors and 140,000 industrial technicians whose skills would be considered crucial to an expanding economy.

"As a long-range forecast, the reform of the school system and the strong tendency toward 'being red rather than expert' are considered likely to have adverse effects in the future on the training and supply of technical specialists," the Japanese report said. "The slighting of basic research will have particularly great effects in matters of military technology."

The Japanese analysis, intended primarily for scholars and economic policy planners in Tokyo, draws on data supplied by Chinese Communist officials and, more important in the estimates and reports of Japanese

and other Asian traders after visits to the mainland. It is believed to be more thorough than any similar analysis prepared in the West.

Tokyo, like Washington, does not recognize Communist China but, unlike the United States, Japan conducts and is trying to enlarge trade with the mainland Chinese. In both 1967 and

1968, Japan carried on the largest trade of any non-Communist nation with Communist China.

Though the supply of physical resources for industrial development is considered ample, the capital investment available to exploit those resources is deficient, according to the Japanese analysis.

"Internal investment in 1965 was only slightly over the amount of 1956," the report said. "There are no figures for after the Cultural Revolution, but judging from

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the fact that basic construction came to almost a complete standstill, the decrease in amounts of investment must have been very large.

"Coupled with the low productivity in the agricultural sector, and in view of the estimate of six months to one year for industrial production to regain the level of before the Cultural Revolution, an increase in

the investment level can hardly be expected for some time to come.

"The basic problems of the Communist Chinese economy are: (1) Low productivity of agriculture is limiting the development of industry, and (2) increasing the size of the work force keeps the problem of un-

employment constantly unsolved."

Unable to push forward rapid economic development through capital and technical investment, the Japanese analysts stated, Chinese authorities "groped for a reform of human nature through the Cultural Revolution as a method of settling the economic problem."

"The material incentive poli-

cy, introduced after 1962, was criticized as 'revisionist,' and in its place mental incentive was emphasized," the report said. Participation of the masses in the management of enterprises was promoted. As a result of this, nobility of the spirit is coming to be stressed more than scientific and rational judgment."

THE ECONOMIST MAY 17, 1969

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Small hops forward

FROM A CORRESPONDENT

Mao has had his congress. But there is little evidence that this formal victory means a return to the economics of the 1958 Great Leap Forward. The old maoist goals remain: the cult of the commune, of self-sufficiency, of decentralisation of industry, of political as against material incentives. But the reckless urgency and naive optimism with which they were once pursued seem to have gone—perhaps, now that Mao is 75, gone for good.

The economic disruptions wrought by the cultural revolution never matched those of the great leap, but there has been a toll. The recovery in industrial production during the early 1960s was actually accelerated in 1966, despite the initial launching of the cultural revolution, but in 1967 output probably fell by between 10 and 20 per cent. The slide has since been halted, but even on the most generous interpretation industrial production at the end of 1968 was reckoned to be little higher than in 1965, and only some 50 per cent higher than in 1957.

True, agricultural production has been blessed by good weather and spared the full impact of the cultural revolution. Many China-watchers now reckon that the population numbers no more than roughly 720 million and that annual grain output in the past four years has reached 190 million to 200 million tons.

These figures imply that increased availability of fertilisers and agricultural machinery has more than offset blunders

in management, and that China may have been able to use part of its imports of western wheat since 1964 to rebuild its depleted reserves. In this period China has also restored its reserves of hard foreign exchange, perhaps by now to nearly \$1,000 million, the equivalent of eight months' imports from the West. But, on any estimate, grain output per head is still below the 1957 level. Moreover, China has now had seven good harvest years; and its crops tend to suffer from bad weather three years in every ten.

In the recent spate of national campaigns, the most important include: a massive movement of people back to the countryside (perhaps a fifth of the urban population over the next few years); the transfer of responsibility for basic education and health programmes in rural areas to the brigade or commune level; the decentralisation of factories producing fertilisers, pumps and farm machinery; and the narrowing of wage differentials in both industry and agriculture.

All this has a very maoist ring. But, in present circumstances, the redistributing of population and the decentralising of selected industries make some economic sense. Even before the cultural revolution compounded the difficulties, the creation of new jobs in the cities was lagging behind the increase in their populations; and an underemployed urban population costs more to maintain than a rural one. And, at a time when the weakening of administrative machinery and the drop in industrial production must have curtailed the central government's ability to mobilise resources, it makes budgetary sense to shift some of the burdens of social welfare and capital investment on to the shoulders of local authorities. Moreover, there is no sign that the decentralisation of industry is being pursued recklessly.

although new factories are being set up, as well as existing ones handed over, backyard furnaces are evidently out.

The campaign to squeeze wage differentials has gone farthest in industry. The elimination of bonuses and reduction of skill differentials has evidently meant a real drop in income for many workers. In agriculture, the giving of points for correct political thinking has been introduced, but this is apparently being applied with some flexibility. There is no hard evidence that it will have serious disincentive effects.

Far more ominous are the reports coming from the countryside of a renewed emphasis on communes and brigades rather than on the smaller production teams; of consolidations at all three levels into larger units; of payments in kind in lieu of a portion of wages; and, worse still, of interference with private plots and with the marketing of the peasants' "sideline" production.

There are two qualifying factors, however. First the new emphasis on the brigade and commune may in practice merely mean making these units financially capable of running the newly decentralised schools and clinics. There have been reports of brigades taking a larger slice of the income of production teams (13 per cent instead of 7 per cent, in one instance). But there have been no signs of the brigade or commune again becoming the basic rural accounting unit. Second, the other reports of more radical socialisation drives have been confined to a few provinces, and usually only to a few communes or counties. These reports suggest experimental schemes, not national campaigns. By Chinese standards it all suggests that, for the present, the maoists are being allowed only to tinker with things, not to leap in without testing the waters.

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The doubtful existence of a new China

By Richard Harris

STATE OF DISARRAY

Reports from Peking agree that a new atmosphere is about in the Chinese capital. The cultural revolution has not been ended by the ninth party congress and may never now be formally wound up, since the evil spirit of capitalism will always be abroad. But for the ordinary people the political load has been lightened. Foreigners find that shop assistants are more polite; the train journey can be accomplished without the loudspeaker blaring out the thoughts of Mao set to music or otherwise; and if there are any political posters left in Peking they flap unregarded on out-of-the-way walls. The cymbals and gongs that herald yet another demonstration are no longer heard.

All this might suggest a new start in China. Are not ambassadors going back to their posts after more than two years' absence? Does this not mean that China is resuming its contacts with the outside world? Such assumptions are altogether too sanguine. A new China of some kind may be taking shape after the ninth party congress but its outline is not visible and its existence must remain in doubt. The truth is that the long-awaited ninth party congress told us very little, offered no prospects, and thus far has given birth to nothing. As simple proof of this one might take the daily English bulletin of the official New China News Agency. In the eight weeks since the congress ended the headlined items in this bulletin have been as follows: 13 dealing in retrospect with the congress itself and the campaign for unity in China; 17 attacks or angry notes exchanged with the Russians, and other attacks were on the United States (3), India and Bulgaria (1 each). Occasions of support were one each for Vietnam, Albania and Tanzania. On 11 occasions no items of news was worth headlining.

That is to say not one single prominent item has dealt with current events in China, or future events, or economic plans, or anything to suggest that internal conditions have taken a new turn. Nor was there anything in the congress itself that promised change. Where the eighth party congress in 1956 invited delegates from all over the communist world, the ninth had none; where the eighth published all the speeches in a volume of 1,000 pages, the ninth has given only the text of Lin Piao's report and the revised constitution: where the eighth set forth future economic plans, the ninth offered a justification and a defence of the cultural revolution; and where the eighth had no future plans.

It seems almost as if these things can wait while Chairman Mao, after all the effort of the past three years, satisfies himself that China has been saved for a doctrine which is now precisely laid down, even to the hyphens: "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought". One recalls Lin Piao's remark early in the cultural revolution that "Chairman Mao's experience in passing through many events is more profound than that of Marx, Engels and Lenin. No one can surpass Chairman Mao in his rich revolutionary experience".

Nevertheless the abiding impression is that China is still in a fair state of disarray. The theme of unity proclaimed at the congress is being pressed energetically and with an almost anxious forgiveness. There begins to seem no limit to those who, if they show the right attitude, can work their way back into the fold. "Those who committed serious mistakes but are not incorrigible" should be kindly treated; "those who committed the errors characteristic of the capitalist-roaders in power but are not absolutely unrepentant" is another category that would seem to collect those who fell through the mesh of the first definition.

One of the difficulties is that those who were the first to declare for revolutionary Maoism resent taking back into the ranks those they criticized; nevertheless they are told that they should "warmly welcome those comrades who have caught up from behind". The gatherings at which this campaign of reconciliation and unity is being pressed are provincial party conferences at which some kind of accommodation is being hammered out between the old party organization and the new revolutionary committees. What will come out of it it is impossible to say. "Unity in some units is not consolidated", we read; elsewhere "bourgeois factionalism" is as rampant as ever; revolutionary committees still have to be told that it is "positively impermissible to consider well-intentioned criticism from the masses as sabotage by the enemy".

The divisions in the country, in the centres of political power at least, seem as bad, if not as violent, as they were during the cultural revolution. If the revolutionary committees which are supposed to be the Maoist representative bodies are to be anything more than loggerheads it says very little for the

success of the cultural revolution in substituting for a corrupted bureaucracy dedicated revolutionaries in the image of Chairman Mao.

How then is China ruled today?

"Well not by the Chinese Communist Party at least", said one close student to whom I put the question in Hong-kong a few weeks ago. Certainly at the centre this seems to be true. China's inner cabinet must now be regarded as the standing committee of the political bureau in which Mao, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai are the awkward triumvirate backed by Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's faithful secretary and spokesman, and K'ang Sheng, the shadowy, ex-Comintern, ex-intelligence chief. Three men over 70, two in their sixties. There is an obvious gap between these five and the rest of the political bureau, made up mostly of army officers who have been picked by Lin Piao, plus Mrs. Mao and Mrs. Lin. It does not look a body to compare in experience and homogeneity with the men who formed the old political bureau.

The same is true of the central committee. The committee elected at the eighth party congress in 1956 were men of long revolutionary experience in party, army and government; men whose positions for the most part gave them power. The new central committee is very different. Almost half of the total of regular and alternate members are military, many of them men of power in the military regions and revolutionary committees they head, but not possessed of power at the centre by their membership of the central committee. The rest is made up of survivors of the old committee—too old and too ineffective in some cases to represent a threat—together with battle heroes, Tibetan liberated serfs, revolutionary ballet dancers and model peasants, members of a Maoist chorus to fill up the back of the stage.

So an oligarchy at the centre of Mao, Lin and Chou, has somehow to hold the loose reins that reach out to the provincial revolutionary committees and the refurbished provincial party organization. Coaxing and exhorting rather than sharp orders promptly obeyed will be the manner of rule in Mao's new China—but then the cultural revolution revealed how much this had been true of Mao's old China too. It will not be exceptional or necessarily disastrous. The impulse to unity will remain strong in China where it has been inculcated for centuries past. An oligarchy nor any political foundation; had such a concept

existed the opposition to Mao would have swept him aside long before 1966. Thus the struggles that continue at lower levels are struggles for power at the provincial level as the old cadres and the new rebels compete. Whatever leaders emerge will certainly go on paying tribute to Mao and his thoughts while firmly adapting Mao's instruction to the conditions of their own area and the realities they face as rulers.

NOTHING STANDARDIZED

As for the transformation of society that Mao dreams about there is little that can be said for the moment. The gulf between town and country, between intellectual and peasant, between ruling bureaucrat and obedient masses,

will not have been obliterated by three years of shouting, still less by the millions of discontented secondary school and university graduates who have been "sent to the countryside". New plans for education, reshuffling the structure of communes, the approved size of the private plot, revising the peasants work points, self-help in a new health service—on all these fragments of information come from different parts of the country and the only conclusion is that nothing is yet standardized. The probability is that nothing ever will be standardized while a man who dislikes institutions and has no real idea of how they function stands alone at the centre insisting that he and he alone must be the symbol and the guide of the new China.

YOMIURI, Tokyo
20 February 1969

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REALITY---RED CHINA IS 2ND-RATE POWER

By Edward Neilan

Communist China's economy, for all the regime's propaganda trumpeting about its dynamism, is Asia's prime stretcher case.

In this 20th year of communist rule on the mainland, there is not even the slightest hint available that China's present leaders have come up with a solution to the problem of the nation's plodding economy.

"The Thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung" have perhaps motivated some workers at lower levels but there are no clues in production figures to suggest that the chairman's pep talks have obtained results beyond short-term hypnosis.

Communist China's economic stagnation is all the more shocking when viewed from the free world's second biggest producer in terms of gross national product (GNP).

The result is that Communist China, which looks very strong and foreboding on the map, is really a second-rate power. It simply does not have the economic wherewithal to be otherwise.

These considerations are increasingly important as more and more discussions are being held on the future of Asia, the US role in Asia, and the concepts of one, two or three Chinas.

Communist China's economic growth is expected to creep along at an unspectacular four

percent for the next few years, according to a report by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

The Japanese report concurs with information available in Hong Kong to the effect that a measure of political stability is returning to China after the tumultuous cultural revolution.

But its agricultural production in 1968 is believed to have fallen short of the 1967 level of 2,000,000 tons. This is due partly to floods and drought in different parts of the country last June and July and to the shortage of fertilizer.

Industrial output is estimated to have dipped by 10 to 15 percent last year.

Some comparisons and trade figures help reveal the plight of China's economy.

One example is steel output. China's production is around 12,000,000 tons annually or about one-fifth of Japan's production.

Annual oil consumption figures are revealing also. Per capita usage of oil in China is eight to 10 gallons, compared to 1,800 gallons per capita in the US, 800 gallons in the Soviet Union and 260 gallons in Japan.

China's modest progress in industry, furthermore, has been mostly borrowed from abroad. Complete "turn-key" plants have been set up but these

have apparently not made a demonstrable effect on the economy.

The World Bank estimated China's per capita income in 1966 at \$95. That's below the figures for such countries as Cambodia, Ceylon and Thailand.

Nationalist China, by contrast, had a per capita income of \$189 for 1966 and \$209 for 1967.

China's foreign trade declined in 1968 for the second straight year, a development directly traced to the cultural revolution.

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), surveying Communist China's trade with its most important non-communist trading partners, noted a 17.8 percent decline in China's total trade in the first six months of 1968.

Exports fell by 13.5 percent and imports dropped by 22.1 percent in that period. The trend for the last half of 1968 suggests no upturn.

Trade with communist countries also has slowed. UN figures show that trade between the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1968 fell to five percent of its peak level in 1959.

Less aid to North Vietnam. Peking's cutback of aid to North Vietnam has been widely interpreted as an indication of China's displeasure at Ha-

noi's participation in the Paris peace talks. But it is entirely possible, in view of the sober production figures for last year, that the cuts were made partly out of necessity.

And what about food?

The problem to end all problems—population growth—keeps increasing no matter what programs Peking tries. The difficulties in feeding 750 million people are sharpened by domestic production sluggishness and the trade imbalance that is growing as China imports food.

The question arises of China's long-range potential for economic power and political strength. But the answer does not come easily. It could be that China is involved in a downward spiral with which the present regime cannot cope.

All of these points loom as important in realistic evaluations of China's future, both politically and economically.

Questions such as these arise: Can the free world afford to bring China back into the world? Conversely, can it afford not to?

These questions about the future potential of China can be debated another day.

On the firmer ground of present-day realities, the verdict has to be that Communist China now is a second-rate power with fourth-rate economic management.—CNS.

Mao joins the Red pantheon, but his revolution isn't over

By PETER I. KUMPA

Mr. Kumpa is chief of The Sun's Hong Kong Bureau.

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Hong Kong

IN the early, conspiratorial days of communism, party congresses were held so that opposing factions could slug it out and decide the next stage of the revolution. In recent years, ruling parties have staged elaborate congresses to give mechanical approval to major decisions already reached by a small inner circle of career bureaucrats and theoreticians.

The ninth national congress of the Chinese Communist party apparently had elements of the old and the new.

Because of the time involved (24 days), the rumor-proof secrecy (no one discovered in which building meetings were held) and the visible preparations, which seemed to have anticipated a shorter meeting, it is reasonable to conclude that there was disagreement. The untidy state of the party just before the congress virtually guaranteed conflict.

As the congress publicly produced exactly what was expected of it, it could be described as staged. There was more planning evident, however, in the noisy celebrations of hundreds of millions of Chinese this past week in the sweaty hysterical spectacle that ancient land produces.

Mao exalted

The hoarse throats and the hypnotic chanting slogans that marked the "victory" of the congress were largely saluting the one man who still dominates China with his will and personality. He is Mao Tse-tung, at 75 the deified father-figure of the country.

Mr. Mao was continued as the leader, the party chairman. Better still, the congress elevated him officially to the same exalted philosophical rank as Marx and Lenin, a promotion that the Chinese can take pride in, and the rest of the Communist ruling parties (except the Albanians) can reject.

The congress gave China a new faith. It was not called "Maoism," which would be too simple and undignified. Rather it was called "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought." And it confirmed Lin Biao, the quiet military strategist with the heavy eyebrows, the most faithful conduit of Chairman Mao's ideas, as his successor.

More of the same

Disposed of was a potential issue, the illegality of the forced takeover of the party during the cultural revolution. The congress legitimized the new rulers.

For the future, the congress promised China more of what it has had during the past several years. The cultural revolution was "victorious" but not yet ended. Massive campaigns of ideological education were going to be dosed out as cures for all the country's ills.

This was all that was produced in three sober, largely sterile communiques, the new and somewhat vague constitution and finally the list of 279 names that comprised a new central committee.

Egalitarian dream

The congress was, of course, much more than that. With gale winds of change blowing through China, it appeared to be one of the last, great scenes in the second revolution of Mao Tse-tung. Nearly 20 years before, Chairman Mao had proclaimed the People's Republic of China, the fruit of a guerrilla revolution and civil war, for which he could thank hated foreign invaders and a softened and corroded Nationalist opposition. Though Chairman Mao led it, that was a revolution from below, relying on the masses of millions of poor or disaffected Chinese.

A complex man, Chairman Mao has simple but utopian goals. Not only has he worked to restore China to its ancient greatness but he was also driven by the dream of an egalitarian China, free from the hated exploitation of the past—a land where the worker and peasant would be as cultured as the intellectual who would also do manual labor.

Hatred had driven Chairman Mao to despise mandarins of any persuasion. He considered them a bureaucracy out of touch with the people, snooty intellectuals quoting classics, seeking special pay and special privileges.

Stumbled on "great leap"

Success in guerrilla war, in mass education and in propaganda techniques had convinced Chairman Mao that he could "remold the majority into new men." He believed that subjective will could be turned into objective force. With something like 500,000,000 backward, superstitious peasants living barely above subsistence in a tired land, China profited by a Mao preaching the impossible.

Chairman Mao's techniques worked until the "great leap forward" when his economic policies plunged China into economic despair.

Near famine was averted by the bureaucrats who turned to pragmatic, rational

policies to pull China slowly back together. Chairman Mao never admitted his error but fought back to wipe out exactly what he feared would ruin his purist dreams.

Peasants were thriving with their private plots, private pigs and private markets. Workers were getting incentive pay rather than laboring for the ideological glory. The party was full of experts and managers, drifting from Chairman Mao's idealized contact with the masses. Chairman Mao never saw nor wanted to see that China was progressing, just as he never cared to see Russian progress. All he could see was his egalitarian vision being destroyed by his old comrades in arms.

Party defeated

By 1962, he was striking back. What the outside world saw as a conflict between ideologues and pragmatists was the beginning of Chairman Mao's second revolution. By 1966, Chairman Mao along carefully ripped off the head of the party he had built and slashed at its innards, using Red Guard students and his mass techniques of rebellion.

The giant party of 18,000,000 members that controlled every aspect of Chinese life fought back, but in the end it fell defeated. Down went most of its leaders, Liu Shao-chi and others, denounced as traitors. History was rewritten to show they had opposed Chairman Mao for years, when all they had done in fact was to jolly him along.

Chairman Mao had to call in Lin Biao and the army to maintain order. The military is still there, on farm and in factory, to put down resisting "class enemies." The chairman had to entice back cadres, who finally restored some semblance of administration through the "three-way" revolutionary committees, along with the military and some of the revolutionaries. But it took two long years.

Rebuilt in Mao's fashion

The process was to toughen "millions" of Chairman Mao's "heirs of the revolution." The price was a setback in industrialization and a loss of faith in the country's youth and the planting of savage rivalries deep in China's fabric. It cost Chairman Mao whatever faith the

intellectuals had in him.

Still the more difficult task was the rebuilding of the party, for nothing else has been able to run China's 700,000,000 people. The rebuilding has to be done from the top. The congress was the beginning of that process, but it is being done in Chairman Mao's way. This will not be easy, for the congress showed it could agree on honoring its old leader but nothing else.

It said nothing about education, agriculture, health or industry. For its Politburo, it could not even agree on a pecking order below Chairman Mao and Mr. Lin. Prescribing more and more Mao-study, it seemed as if the 75-year-old leader had decided to start all over again to convince the country of the righteous-

ness of his ways.

Time, it seems, has caught up with a figure as heroic as Chairman Mao has been for his China. His ideas are essentially rooted in the past. He talks of modernization, but he opposes just what China needs: the experts to run a modern economy. Chairman Mao's ideal of politically loyal workers who think and intellectuals who work just is not good enough. Undoubtedly, Chairman Mao was told this behind the closed doors of the ninth congress. From what was said, publicly, he is not convinced.

Communist China therefore faces an uncertain unstable future. Chairman Mao's heirs today are a group of unknown, inexperienced, unsophisticated military men. And it is too late to have a third Maoist revolution.

THE ECONOMIST

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CPYRGHT

Mao, Lin and the Maomen

The great man and his chosen heir naturally came out on top again at China's ninth party congress—but there was quite a bit of a dust-up in the lower ranks of the communist hierarchy

Almost everything about China's ninth party congress was predictably Maoist. Lin Piao's political report, 24,000 words long, which was published on Monday, was a catalogue of familiar Maoist themes, from the need for ceaseless class struggle at home to strong support for revolution abroad. The new party constitution, essentially the same as earlier draft versions, was a Maoist prescription for an anti-bureaucratic bureaucracy. And the new party leadership, selected last week, was similarly dominated by Mao and his men. But which men they would be was anything but predictable.

The publication of the membership roster for Peking's new central committee ended the mystery about the prolongation of the congress to 24 days. Nine of these days were evidently occupied by a complex and controversial election process. Instead of the expected routine translation of the 176-man congress presidium into the central committee, the new central committee emerged as a greatly enlarged body of 170 full members and 109 alternates which did not even include 36 members of the presidium. And the most startling thing about the new central committee was that for the first time in Chinese communist history it was presented, not according to rank, but, except for Mao and Lin, in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order. Both the increased size and the unhierarchical order suggest that the selection of the committee was marked by serious disputes which could be resolved in no other way. But the unprecedented omission of ranks may also be a Maoist innovation to promote a "democratic" party style. This explanation gained credibility on Monday when the central committee, in its first plenary session, elected a new politburo. And, lo and behold, the politburo was in non-rank order.

CPYRGHT

The politburo also confounded China-watchers by departing from the pattern of the past, like an established leadership. Four provincial representatives were added to the group, three military commanders from Nanking, Shenyang and Anhwei, plus the little-known deputy chairman of the Honan revolutionary committee who had not even made it on to the presidium. Among the leaders who were booted downstairs were the foreign minister, Chen Yi, two economic planners and three top-ranking soldiers.

The results of the considerable changes in the politburo and the central committee are to strengthen the clasped hands of Mao and his constitutionally designated successor, Lin Piao. The surprisingly small standing committee of the politburo surrounds the pragmatic prime minister, Chou En-lai, with the cultural revolutionary inner core of Mao, Lin, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. (What was it that made Mao stop short of including his wife?) In the full politburo, nine out of 25 are full-blooded cultural revolutionaries and nine of the ten military members can be considered political comrades of Mao and Lin.

The central committee membership in itself does not look overwhelmingly Maoist. Some 40 per cent are military and about a quarter are old cadres. Assuming that the 40-odd unknowns are most likely to be revolutionary types, the Maoists would constitute up to one-third. But given the unwieldy size of the committee, its membership is not likely to make much difference. The politburo will be stronger than ever and the politburo is a secure Maoist instrument.

What will the Maoists use their enhanced power to do? Lin Piao's political report did not make this clear except, of course, for continuing to saturate the Chinese people with Mao Tsetung thought (Mao's name is now denuded of its hyphen, apparently to make it an equal partner in the triumvirate, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought) "The wide dissemination of Mao Tsetung thought," said Lin, was "the most significant achievement of the great proletarian cultural revolution."

If the full flush of the cultural revolution is now over—and the congress does signify an end of some sort—the struggles which it stirred up are not. Lin juggles the same contradictory instructions that the Maoists have been issuing for over two years: class struggle must continue; the proletariat must criticise the bourgeoisie and fight anti-Maoists on the left and the right; the ranks must be purified and the party must keep on "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh." But at the same time Maoists must carry out a conciliatory policy towards their enemies, particularly old cadres and intellectuals, most of whom can be re-educated. But again, "we must for ever remember this lesson: whoever opposes chairman Mao, whoever opposes Mao Tsetung thought, at any time and under any circumstances, shall be condemned and punished by the whole party and the whole nation." And what if the class enemies stir up trouble again? "Just arouse the masses and strike them down again." In other words, strike up another cultural revolution.

Lin's is not a dove-like statement. But apart from its revolutionary rhetoric, it provides few concrete guidelines to policy. On economics, Lin sounds a moderate note, asserting that revolution should not replace production though it must command it. And while he uses the slogan "new leaps

model. Curiously, Lin spares hardly a word for what would logically seem to have deserved a central place in the speech : the reconstruction of the party. He makes no attempt to resolve the crucial questions of whether the party will constitute an apparatus distinct from the revolutionary committees and whether an effort will be made to overcome military dominance at the local level.

On foreign affairs, Lin employs similar revolutionary language and balances similar contradictions between the need to struggle and a willingness to coexist peacefully. He is much more bitter in his attacks on the apostate Russians than on the Americans. But in his one discussion of specific policy he reveals that the Chinese have already had some exchanges with the Russians about their border problems—started by a Kosygin telephone call to Peking—and are considering a Soviet proposal for what are described as consultations.

In all its massive text, the Lin Piao report says little that is new and settles none of the basic problems raised by the cultural revolution. As a statement of general principle, it is in the Maoist style, for Mao does not choose to concern himself with detail. A more programmatic policy document may be produced by a national people's congress which is rumoured to be in the works. But with the leadership stripped of most of its administrators and planners, there may be nothing but moral imperatives issuing out of Peking for some time to come.

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China

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Cultural revolution or counter-revolutionary coup?

by WANG MING

The author of this work, Wang Ming, is a veteran of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese people's struggle for socialism. He was a member of the central leadership of the party through the years of arduous and perilous underground struggle against the bloody repression by which Chiang Kai-shek tried to destroy the Party physically by murdering scores of thousands of the finest sons of the working class—thousands of them by beheading in public without even the pretence of a trial. From January 1931 until January 1935 Wang Ming was the First Secretary of the Party under the illegal party name of Chen Shao-yü.

In January 1935, in the course of the famous Long March, Mai Tse-tung became First Secretary and Wang Ming was assigned to the position of representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Communist International. In that capacity he participated actively in the preparation of George Dimitrov's famous report to the 7th World Congress and he was elected by the Congress of the Executive Committee.

Wang Ming worked as the representative of the Chinese Party in the world centre of the Comintern until that body dissolved in 1943. After that he continued, by decision of the leadership of the Chinese Party, to be its representative in Moscow. He negotiated and arranged the details of the decisive assistance that was extended to the Chinese revolution by the Soviet Union. Throughout those years he continued to be an active member of the leadership of the CPC and he was re-elected to its Central Committee at its 8th Congress in 1956.

While, constitutionally, Wang Ming is a full member of the Central Committee of the CPC, he is not able to play an active role in the Central Committee of the Party in China today. Those who read this document will readily understand why.

China is at present in the grip of an unprecedentedly crucial moment of the sharp struggle between two lines: a struggle between the line of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and the line of anti-Marxist Maoism and bourgeois nationalism, between the Chinese Republic's socialist development and the anti-socialist development of China.

In the latter half of 1966, relying on military units which he had deluded and on the hungweiping and tsaofan organizations that had been set up by deceit and under pressure brought to bear by him, Mao Tse-tung used the screen of "cultural revolution" to launch an anti-communist anti-popular counter-revolutionary military coup and establish a personal reactionary military dictatorship. At the close of July 1967 he sent paratroops and warships to strike at the bloody retribution against the working people of Wuhan. He followed this up by sending the 40th and 47th armies and another five divisions against the revolutionary workers and revolutionary military units in Canton, causing enormous bloodshed among the revolutionary masses with such heavy weapons as artillery, tanks and so forth. To this day Mao Tse-tung constantly uses armed force against Communists and working people now in one place now in another. As a result, in the summer of 1967 a situation began to emerge in China which could cause the counter-revolutionary military coup to develop into an anti-people's civil war.

An unparalleled tragedy has overtaken the Communist Party and the long-suffering Chinese people in consequence of the counter-revolutionary crimes of Mao Tse-tung and his group. The gains of the Chinese revolution are threatened with total annihilation. The building of socialism in China faces complete collapse.

In domestic policy the Maoists are doing their utmost to drag China onto the dismal road of political reaction, economic chaos, cultural retrogression and poverty. In foreign policy they use all their resources to drag China onto the reactionary and dangerous road of hostility for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, split the world communist and working-class movement, subvert the national liberation, social-progressive and democratic movements and also the world peace movement, and provoke another world war.

At the same time thousands upon thousands of Communists and Young Communist Leaguers, workers, peasants and intellectuals, officers and men of the PLA and of the public security forces, and foremost youth and juveniles have selflessly risen against the Maoist counter-revolutionary military coup and Mao Tse-tung's personal dictatorship. They have risen in defence of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party and the legal state authority, in defence of the gains of the Chinese revolution and the cause of socialism. In contrast to Mao Tse-tung and his group they aim to put China, in domestic policy, on the bright road of political freedom, economic fluorescence, cultural progress and a happy life, and, in foreign policy, on the road to win progress, world security, on the road of friendship, co-operation, alliance and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the road of unity and co-operation with the world communist and working-class movement and with the national liberation, social-progressive and democratic movements, the road of concerted struggle with all the peoples for world peace, to avert another world war.

At the very outset of the so-called "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung and his group had openly proclaimed that it was a life and death struggle between two roads, between two classes, between two lines. Countless facts show that the anti-communist, anti-Soviet, anti-popular counter-revolutionary Maoist group is indeed a "handful of people in authority taking the capitalist road," that they are in fact championing the interests of the bourgeoisie and pursuing a reactionary, bourgeois policy.

The leaders and cadres of the Party, state, military and mass organizations who are in the front ranks of the anti-Maoist revolutionary struggle are the real revolutionaries who are following the socialist road, and they are indeed championing the interests of the workers, peasants and intellectuals and pursuing a proletarian revolutionary policy.

Judging by indisputable facts and on the basis of my own experience gained in the struggle against the thought and policy of Mao Tse-tung in the course of decades, I should like first and foremost to say that the blame for the present catastrophic state in which the CPC and China now find themselves devolves primarily on Mao Tse-tung, on his thought and policy and his extremely self-centred, extremely careerist, criminal calculations.

At first Mao Tse-tung and his group shifted and dodged, claiming that Mao Tse-tung was accomplishing only a "cultural revolution," whose purpose was to "safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat," "safeguard the socialist system," and "avert the restoration of capitalism." They said that the "cultural revolution" was aimed only at a "handful of persons in authority in the Party taking the capitalist road" and "champions of the bourgeois reactionary line," only against "counter-revolutionary revisionists," "traitors" and so on.

However, facts are stronger than demagoguery. They cannot be twisted. Let us see what Mao Tse-tung is really doing.

TEN MAJOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY MAO TSE-TUNG IN CHINA

1. He is trying to expunge Marxism-Leninism from the minds of the Communists and working people of China and replace it with the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist thought of Mao Tse-tung.

He insists that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung must capture all ideological positions," that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung are the highest instructions in all spheres of life," that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung are the absolute authority" and so forth. At the same time he declares that Marxism-Leninism is "obsolete" and trumpets that "the world has entered a new epoch—the epoch of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

He has banned the reading of Marxist-Leninist literature. He burns progressive Marxist-Leninist literature. He calls Marxism-Leninism "revisionism" or "dogmatism." Earlier he had called Marxist-Leninists "dogmatists," now he calls them "counter-revolutionary revisionists" and persecutes and destroys them. He has made the persecution and destruction of Marxist-Leninists ideologically, politically, organizationally, spiritually and physically the principal means of eradicating Marxism-Leninism in China. Although at times he is compelled to use such an authoritative term as Marxism-Leninism as an honourable tag in the

sale of his sinister anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist "thought" in China and abroad, everything he is doing proves that in effect he is using the screen of Marxism-Leninism to destroy Marxism-Leninism. Actually he is replacing Marxism-Leninism with the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist reactionary "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

2. He is smashing the Communist Party of China and preparing to replace it with an essentially anti-Communist party which will be "Communist" in name only.

In a tatzupao written by him personally on August 5, 1966 he proclaimed the slogan "open fire at the headquarters," which was the signal for the rout of the CPC. He crushed the CC CPC that was elected by the 8th Congress of the CPC. According to reports from various sources, of the 174 members and alternate members of the CC CPC nearly four-fifths have been subjected to repression. All the members of the Political Bureau of the CC and its Standing Committee as well as of the Secretariat of the CC, elected prior to the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CC, with the exception of Mao Tse-tung and a few persons from his group, have been brutally persecuted on the basis of all sorts of false accusations. They include the Deputy Chairman of the CC Liu Shao-chi, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, the General Secretary of the CC Teng Hsiao-ping, members of the Political Bureau Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Chen Yi, Peng Chen, Tan Chen-lin, Lu Fu-chun, Lieu Po-cheng, Tung Pi-wu, Li Hsien-nien, Li Ching-chaun, alternate members of the Political Bureau Ulanfu, Chang Wen-tien, Lu Ting-yi, Po Yi-po, members of the CC Secretariat Wang Chia-hsiang, Tang Cheng, Teng Tzu-hui, Huan Ke-cheng, Lo Jui-ching, Tao Chu, Wang Jen-chung, Liu Ning-i, Li Hsueh-feng, alternate members of the CC Secretariat Yang Shangkun, Hu Chiao-mu and Liu Lan-tao. All these comrades were without foundation accused of "counter-revolutionary revisionism," branded "traitors" and "elements against the three" ("elements opposing Mao Tse-tung, the Party and socialism") and subjected to cruel repression, persecution and insults. Of these some were "defiled," others "defeated," still others "overthrown," arrested, killed, declared as deserving to be "burnt alive," slandered, insulted or publicly humiliated. Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai, who was also Deputy Chairman of the CC until the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CC, was likewise repeatedly declared by the hungweings as deserving to be "burnt alive." From Tao Chu, who

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was elected a member of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CC, has been subjected to brutal repression, while Nieh Hung-chen, Hsueh Hsiang-chen and Yeh Chien-ying, who were elected members of the Political Bureau, have fallen into disfavour. Mao Tse-tung is destroying Party committees and CPC cells of all levels. Wherever it has been possible he has sent hungweipings, tsao-fans, the military and the police mercilessly to smash territorial bureaux of the CC CPC, provincial, municipal, district, county and regional Party committees, and Party cells at workshops, factories, mines, transport organizations and rural production teams, and also brutally to persecute and destroy leading functionaries and cadres of the Party committees.

The persecution and physical annihilation of Party leaders, cadres and rank-and-file members has become Mao Tse-tung's main means of destroying the CPC.

Mao Tse-tung and his group have dealt our Party a severe blow such as the international imperialists, the Peiyang warlords or the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei could not inflict in the course of decades. But they have not been able to destroy the Party, which has nearly 25 million members and enjoys tremendous prestige and the all-round support of the working class and the whole people.

Although in issuing orders and instructions for all sorts of sinister actions Mao Tse-tung still demagogically uses the name of such an authoritative organ as the CC CPC, it is nothing more than what is correctly described in a Chinese proverb, which says: "Where the skin is lost what is the hair to cling on to?" Since Mao Tse-tung has already routed the Communist Party of China and its leading organs—the CC and its Political Bureau—how and on what grounds can he still call himself Chairman of the Military Committee of the CC CPC? Since these organs of the CPC have, in effect, ceased to exist, on what grounds does Mao Tse-tung commit acts of villainy in their name? What right does Mao Tse-tung have to use the name of the CC CPC to guide the so-called "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs at the CC CPC" to all sorts of anti-communist, anti-popular, counter-revolutionary crimes? Who gave Mao Tse-tung the right to convene the so-called 11th and 12th "plenary meetings of the CC CPC"? No matter how much he tries to use the signboards "CPC" and "CC CPC" to

mask his real face, all his actions betray him as an anti-Communist from head to toe. His group is incontestably an anti-Communist clique. He bends every effort to destroy the CPC as a genuine Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary Party of the working class, a Party that emphatically opposes the reactionary thought and policies of Mao Tse-tung in general, and his counter-revolutionary military coup masked as a "cultural revolution" in particular.

He plans to organize a false Communist Party of his supporters to supersede the former real CPC. A campaign to "prepare" for the so-called "9th Congress of the CPC" was conducted for this purpose last year. Actually these were not preparations for the 9th Congress of the CPC but only preparations for an assemblage of anti-Communists of Maoists.

The decision of the so-called "12th Extended Plenary Meeting of the CPC" was published recently in Peking. This, as everybody knows, was a plenary meeting without the participation of the overwhelming majority of members and alternate members of the CC CPC. Instead, it was attended by members of the so-called "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs," representatives of the hungweipings and tsao-fans, of the provincial "revolutionary committees" and of military leaders favoured by Mao Tse-tung. Incidentally, Mao Tse-tung granted all of them the "right of a casting vote" of members of the CC CPC. The decision stated that the so-called "9th Congress of the CPC" would be convened in the immediate future. On the one hand this decision proclaimed that delegates to this "congress" must be those who were utterly devoted to Chairman Mao and to his thought, those who had shown this devotion in the course of the "cultural revolution," i.e., those hungweipings, tsao-fans and military who had been particularly vicious. On the other hand, it was announced that there would be another purge of Communists, Young Communist Leaguers, foremost workers, intellectuals and peasants at every office, factory and educational institution, in every people's commune and in every family. Moreover, the draft of the so-called "New Rules of the CPC" to be submitted for endorsement to the coming "9th Congress" have been circulated. This is a monstrous anti-Communist and anti-democratic document.

Mao Tse-tung's notorious thesis of "removing the old and absorbing the new," which has been given wide pub-

licity in recent months and has now been formally included in the above-mentioned "draft Rules," is a cynically frank admission of the fact that he is preparing to make away completely with the real Communist Party of China and replace it with a new false Communist Party, which he plans to use to further his personal aims. All this irrefutably proves that the so-called "9th Congress of the CPC" will be, in fact, a gathering of Mao Tse-tung's toadies even though a small group of leading functionaries and cadres of the CPC are to be allowed to attend in order to hide its real face with the purpose of misleading the Chinese people and public opinion abroad. But their participation cannot in the least change its true, anti-Communist nature. "Delegations" from foreign pseudo-Communist parties will most certainly attend this gathering. It will indeed be a conclave of traitors and renegades of all hues, who together sign an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, anti-popular tune under the direction of Mao Tse-tung.

A new Maoist anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, reactionary party, "Communist" in name but anti-Communist in substance is to be formed at this gathering. Mao Tse-tung reckons that this is the only kind of party which he can use as a blind tool to prop up his tottering imperial throne and pursue reactionary domestic and foreign policies. He calculates that this is the only kind of party that can be used as an obedient tool for the continuation of the sinister work he has bequeathed to Lin Piao, the successor he has himself appointed. Judging by reports from various sources, after this false Communist Party is formed Mao Tse-tung plans to follow the example of his predecessor and teacher—the Judas Trotsky—to set up an anti-Communist, counter-revolutionary Maoist "International." I am deeply convinced that not only Chinese Communists and the Chinese people but also Communists and their friends throughout the world take a firm stand against these machinations of Mao Tse-tung.

3. He has smashed state organs of the democratic dictatorship of the people and is replacing them with the machinery of his personal reactionary military dictatorship.

Mao Tse-tung tried to use the slogan of the destruction of the old bourgeois state machine as a pretext for crushing the constitutional state organs of people's power in China. He has completely paralyzed the higher legislative body—the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, both of which had been elected in accordance with the Constitution. The Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, members of the Standing Committee and most of the deputies of the NPC have been savagely persecuted on all sorts of false accusations levelled at them by Mao Tse-tung.

To all intents and purposes, the State Council, which is the highest organ of executive power in China, has also been paralyzed. More than two-thirds of the Premier's deputies have been relieved of their posts or arrested, and the remaining deputies have been slandered and attacked by the hungweipings and tsaofans.

With the exception of the Defence Ministry and a few other offices, the ministries and state committees subordinated to the State Council were placed under the control of hungweipings and tsaofans and then an integrated military control was established over them. Many high-ranking officials of the State Council and Ministries have been killed, wounded, baited until they lost their health or subjected to other repressions in the form of unbearable, humiliating or health-destroying hard labor.

Provincial and lower people's congresses and people's councils have been made away with, and legal organs — people's courts and people's procurator's offices of all levels—have likewise ceased to function. Their heads and cadres have been either persecuted or physically destroyed. The exceptions are the members of the national bourgeoisie in all legislative and executive bodies. They have not been touched at all by Mao Tse-tung.

Mao Tse-tung has elected to liquidate the Party backbone and foremost representatives of non-Party people in organs as the cardinal means of destroying these organs of power. In planting so-called "revolutionary committees," Mao Tse-tung counted on creating a weapon of his personal military dictatorship. Their paramount task is to persecute and annihilate Communists, Young Communist Leaguers, revolutionary servicemen and foremost workers, pe-

sants and intellectuals. As soon as a so-called "revolutionary committee" was set up, hungweipings led by the chairman of the "revolutionary committee" publicly smashed the signboards of the local CPC committee and of the people's committee.

This was followed by the publication of notices ordering all officials of local Party organizations and Communists as well as cadres of the organs of power to register at the "revolutionary committee" within three days and await further sanctions. Arrest, exile, imprisonment or murder awaited many of those who registered and also those who did not register but were later discovered. Communists who headed provincial or other local Party organizations or people's committees and charged with being "counter-revolutionary revisionists," "traitors" or "Soviet spies" were brutally executed at public rallies in many localities where so-called "revolutionary committees" were formed. Are these not typical features of an anti-communist coup of any counter-revolution?

The key role in the "revolutionary committees" is played by military people whom Mao Tse-tung still manages to delude. The so-called "Leftist elements" (hungweipings and tsaofans) are merely their assistants, while the few former Party and administrative cadres who have been recruited with the help of the "tripartite alliance" slogan play the role of supernumeraries. In spite of Mao Tse-tung's having proclaimed the slogans of "struggle against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" and "defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat," all his actions prove the reverse: behind the screen of "defending the dictatorship of the proletariat" he is destroying the people's power and replacing it with his personal reactionary military dictatorship.

4. He is inflicting harm on the People's Liberation Army, splitting its ranks and employing it as a blind tool for his own personal ends directed against the Party and the people.

Mao Tse-tung has used part of the PLA as an instrument of the counter-revolutionary coup and reactionary personal military dictatorship, concentrated part of the PLA on seizing power from Communist Party and the people's government, killing Communists, workers, peasants and intellectuals; incited one

part of the PLA against another part and ordered the PLA to pursue his reactionary policy of "three supports"* and "two military measures."***

He utilized the abolition of military ranks as a means for isolating in one blow the marshals, generals and officers who held no military posts from any contact with the army. Mao Tse-tung has purged and persecuted marshals, generals, officers and sergeants of the PLA. Of the nine marshals, all except Lin Piao have been subjected to brutal persecution and indignities and some, for example, Marshals Peng Teh-huai and Ho Lung, have even been arrested.

The number of generals and admirals of the army, navy and air force removed from their posts and persecuted, runs, according to incomplete data, from 70 to 80. According to information from various sources, among those purged are four Deputy Defence Ministers, the Chief of the General Staff and several of his Deputies, Chief of the Operational Department of the General Staff and his Deputy, Chief of the Central Political Administration and two of his Deputies, three Deputy Commissars of the Public Security Forces, three Deputy Commanders, the Commissar and First Deputy Commissar of the Navy, the Commander, four Deputy Commanders and three Commissars of the Artillery, seven Deputy Commanders, the Commissar and two Deputy Commissars of the Air Force, Commander of the Armored Forces and his Deputy, three Deputy Commanders and Deputy Commissar of the Railway Forces, Deputy Commander

* Three supports: "support of the Lefts," meaning support of the hungweipings and tsaofans, "support of industry" and "support of agriculture", which means the establishment of military control over the country's entire economy.

**Two military measures: "military administration," which signifies the establishment of a military regime in the cities and countryside, in factories, offices and educational establishments to watch the workers, peasants, intellectuals and students and persecute them: "military training", which means that the entire population, young and old, is forced at the point of the bayonet "to study Mao Tse-tung's thought" and that military drill is introduced in schools and higher educational establishments.

of the, Engineers, Assistant Chief of the Anti-Aircraft Forces, five Deputy Chiefs, the Commissar and Deputy Commissar of the Central Administration of the Logistics Service, and so on.

Still more commissars and political workers were persecuted among the medium-rank and junior officers. More than half of the personnel in the General Staff and the Central Political Administration of the PLA have been removed from their posts and persecuted; the removal and persecution of the commanders of the Peking Military Area and the Peking garrison was even reported on two occasions. The facts show that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao not only carried through a mass purge, persecuted and annihilated the higher commanders and commissars and also the commanders and political workers of all ranks in the former First, Second and Third Field Armies, which they have always regarded as an alien body, but they also purged, persecuted and annihilated, group after group, the higher commanders, commissars, commanders and political workers of the former Fourth Field Army whom Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao did not trust or who Chiang Ching thought did not obey her orders.

They are ruthlessly purging the communist backbone of the PLA and are planning to replace wholesale the cadres of Communists and members of the Young Communist League in the PLA with the new men tried and tested in the course of the "cultural revolution". All this is being done to make it easier for Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Chiang Ching to usurp all the power in the PLA and to convert, in a conspiratorial way, the People's Liberation Army, created and led by the Communist Party, into their personal anti-communist hordes directed against the people.

They have already set up special army units directly subordinated to the "headquarters of Mao Tse-tung". It is only with the help of these units that Communists, the population and "unreliable" detachments of the PLA are suppressed and the "revolutionary committees" in the localities are protected. All this demonstrates the fear of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters in face of the dissatisfaction mounting in the army. Indeed, the commanders, political workers and soldiers of the PLA will not be able to tolerate for long the present situation. Sooner or later they will rise up to fight against Mao Tse-tung and his group, for the restoration of a genuine Chinese Communist Party and the building of socialism in China.

tion; he has disbanded the Young Communist League of China and is replacing it with the reactionary organization of hungweipings.

On the one hand, Mao Tse-tung has disbanded the Young Communist League and the Young Pioneer Organization and is brutally persecuting the leaders of the YCL and the Young Pioneers, their functionaries and YCL members. On the other hand, utilizing the military and the police as the leading core and backbone of command, he has by coercion and deception compelled part of the university students and secondary and elementary school pupils to organize in hungweipings and to play the part of the storm detachments in villifying, hounded, insulting, beating up, arresting and killing people and in arranging arson—all according to his wishes—to act as small fry, as bullies who shed their blood to stage the "rebellion" and the seizure of power he wanted.

He has compelled millions of young people and children to waste their valuable time, to drop their studies, to undergo moral corruption and to lose their health and life. He has committed a grave crime, crippling the growing generation of the Chinese people. He has wounded the soul of tens of millions of fathers and mothers anxious for the fate of their young sons and daughters.

Those whom Mao Tse-tung and his group wanted abused and insulted were abused and insulted on their orders by the hungweipings at their assemblages. Those whom Mao Tse-tung and his group wanted purged or ousted from office were, on their orders, marked down by the hungweipings, who, at their rallies and demonstrations demanded that they be purged or ousted from office. Those whom they wanted beaten up, were, on their orders, beaten up by the hungweipings. Those whom they wanted to arrest, on their orders were arrested by the hungweipings. Those whom they wanted to kill, on their orders were killed by the hungweipings. The books they wanted to burn and the historical monuments they wanted to destroy, on their orders were burned and destroyed by the hungweipings.

But all these actions, committed by them through their puppets, just as the "campaign to rectify style" and other false "mass movements", staged by Mao Tse-tung in the past, are demagogically pictured by them as a result of applying the "line of the masses", that is, "the line from the masses — to the masses", as some kind of "big democracy" of the masses, as a "real mass movement"

asses." But all their demagogy cannot deceive anyone. When the hungweipings were sent to commit their infamies, Mao Tse-tung and his group repeatedly and openly declared that no one, no institution or organization, including military institutions, had the right to interfere in the actions of the hungweipings or stop them, because the hungweipings were the "little initiators" and "the vanguard" which was carrying out the "cultural revolution" under the personal guidance, the personal organization and personal leadership and command of Mao Tse-tung. Similarly, the hungweipings, too, often shouted that Mao Tse-tung was their "supreme commander-in-chief," that they were the "guards commanded by Chiang Ching."

Replacing the Young Communist League and Young Pioneer Organization, by hungweipings and hunghsiaopings, Mao Tse-tung thereby wanted not only to abolish the assistants and reserve of the Communist Party, but also to abolish the most politically conscious, the most organized vanguard of the youth and children, the vanguard richest in revolutionary traditions, in order to make the young people and children easily susceptible to his fraud and convert them into his personal reactionary tool for any crime.

Today many hungweiping detachments have escaped this control and millions of young people have become aware of the criminal character of the "cultural revolution" and the reactionary nature of Mao Tse-tung's "thought." The Mao Tse-tung group is brutally suppressing them, sending millions of young men and women to remote areas and to the countryside in order that they should not be able to raise a rebellion against Mao Tse-tung and his group in the cities under the selfsame slogan "a rebellion is a just cause!"

But this does not save the situation, because they can raise an anti-Mao "rebellion" not only in the cities together with the masses of workers, but also in the villages, together with the peasant masses. There is no doubt whatsoever that China's younger generation cannot tolerate for long the present situation. It will necessarily rise up more and more to struggle against the baneful regime of Mao Tse-tung and his group, for a bright future for themselves and their country.

6. He is attacking the working class and splitting its ranks. He has disbanded the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Mao Tse-tung is breaking up the Party

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of the working class—the Chinese Communist Party. He has disbanded mass organizations of the working class—the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and trade unions of all levels, is brutally persecuting the leaders, functionaries and rank and file of the trade unions.

Mao Tse-tung is openly advocating a reduction of wages. He has abolished piece-rates and bonuses. He openly calls for lowering the living standard of the working class to that of the rural population. On the pretext of "the struggle against counter-revolutionary economism," he is against improving the life of factory and office workers, is arresting and killing all who advocate an improvement in the life of factory and office workers.

Ignoring the difficult living conditions of the workers, he pursues the so called "combination of industry, agriculture and military affairs," compelling the workers, in addition to their jobs, to engage also in agriculture and undergo military drill. He has sent to each industrial, mining and transport enterprise military units for permanent billeting in order to institute military control over the workers and other employees and bring military pressure to bear on them. Before their shift starts, workers and other employees are forced to recite and sing "quotations" in front of Mao Tse-tung's portrait. This is called "asking Chairman Mao for directives;" at the end of the shift, they also recite and sing "quotations"—"report to Chairman Mao about their work for the day." Military men make use of every free minute to compel the workers and other employees "to study Mao Tse-tung's thought," depriving them of an possibility of resting.

By coercion and deception he forces part of the workers and other employees to organize into so-called tsaofans, to attack the overwhelming majority of the workers and other employees at factories, mines and on transport as conservatives and reactionaries, to rebel against them and capture power from them. This splits the unity of the working class and causes conflicts in their ranks.

On many occasions Mao Tse-tung has falsely proclaimed that "in conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat there are no grounds within the working class for necessarily splitting into two irreconcilably hostile camps." But the question is asked, who split the working class into two irreconcilably hostile camps? Was it not Mao Tse-tung

and his group? The aim pursued by Mao Tse-tung in splitting the working class is, on the one hand, to prevent the working class from being a solidly-knit and united foremost leading force in China's political and social life and, on the other, to prevent the working class from acting as a solidly-knit and united force against the counter-revolutionary military coup of Mao Tse-tung.

Recently, under the demagogic slogans that the "working class must lead everything" and "the proletariat must exercise its dictatorship in the entire superstructure, including all the spheres of ideology and culture," Mao Tse-tung has forcibly organized so-called "workers' brigades for the propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's thought." Actually these are a kind of detachment of storm troopers who act merely as assistants of military units in suppressing the intelligent youth; they have nothing in common either with the "leadership of everything by the working class" or with the dictatorship of the proletariat. This venture of Mao Tse-tung is foul mockery of the ideas of scientific communism about the leading role of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Though Mao Tse-tung resorts to various methods of blackmail and deception in an attempt to rally the working class under the banner of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" to support his reactionary rule, the facts show that the working class of China wishes to rally only under the banner of Marxism-Leninism so as to fight unitedly against the anti-Marxist "Mao Tse-tung's thought" and the anti-communist, anti-proletarian Mao group.

7. He is persecuting the working peasants and is ruining socialist construction in the countryside.

Mao Tse-tung is shifting responsibility for the failure of the people's communes in the countryside onto rural cadres and the peasants. Since 1962, he, under the guise of the "movement for socialist education," has been effecting brutal persecution of the peasants, named the "four purges" (that is, "purge of ideology, purge of politics, purge of organizations and purge of the economy").

In the course of the so-called "cultural revolution" he has even further stepped up the endless indignities, arrests and killing of the cadres and members of rural people's communes, has broken up the Party, Young Communist League and administrative organizations of the people's communes, production teams, and so on.

He, as before, adheres to the erroneous division of the middle peasants into three sections: higher, average and lower, constantly compelling and provoking the so-called poor and lower middle peasants to hound the so-called average and higher middle peasants; he is wrongly ousting the well-to-do middle peasants from the middle-peasant ranks and destroying them as the main representatives of capitalism in the countryside.

All this is ruining the internal solidarity of the peasants, undermining their labor enthusiasm and impeding the development of socialist agriculture.

He, far from abolishing the system of the food tax, far from establishing single rational rates and purchase prices of farm produce, even decided to raise the food tax, increasing thereby the burden borne by the peasants. Moreover, he is also applying the notorious "combination of industry, agriculture and military affairs" compelling the peasants, in addition to farming, to engage in industrial production and undergo military drill. He sent military units for permanent billeting in the countryside in order to institute military control and supervision over the work and life of the peasants. Members of peasant families, men and women, aged and young, are forced every day to waste much time in memorizing "quotations" and "studying" Mao Tse-tung's thought, robbing the peasants of rest after arduous work.

On the pretext of fighting against "counter-revolutionary revisionism" he is rejecting the system of workday units, based on the principle of payment according to work done, and also material incentives—rewards for increasing production. Under the cover of the notorious slogan of "reliance on one's own forces," the state does not render the necessary financial, economic and technical assistance to collective farming which was just getting under way, assistance to the peasants who lead a wretched and hard life. As a result of Mao's pursuing this entire wrong policy China's agriculture, as hitherto, is extremely backward and the life of the peasants remains poor and hard.

But the working peasants cannot tolerate such a situation for long. They necessarily will rise up more and more to resolute mass struggle against Mao Tse-tung for improving their material and cultural standards.

8. He is destroying culture and education, destroying the cultural heritage, persecuting and annihilating the intelligentsia.

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To "defend the absolute authority of Mao Tse-tung and of Mao Tse-tung's thought," he is destroying the precious national cultural heritage accumulated and preserved in China throughout the milleniums; he is also seeking to wipe out the influence of progressive foreign culture. He is burning Marxist-Leninist literature published in China and other countries, destroying progressive books of national and foreign origin. He is destroying the works of classics and contemporary writers and artists: novels — from Cervantes, Balzac and Ibsen to Leo Tolstoy, Gorky and Sholokhov; poems — from Homer, Dante and Heine to Whitman, Hikmet and Neruda; musical compositions — from Mozart and Beethoven to Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich; the works of Shakespeare, Gogol and Tagore, paintings of Leonardo da Vinci, Rembrandt, Picasso and Siqueiros — all this is regarded by Mao Tse-tung as objects which have to be destroyed.

He prohibits the showing of plays and films of different countries in China. Even Chaplin's films and Paul Robeson's records have been placed under a strict ban by him.

He is destroying the works of the classics and contemporary writers and artists of China: poems — from Chu Yuan, Tao Yuan-ming, Li Po, Tu Fu, Po Chu-i, Lu Fang-weng to Hsiao San and Ai Ching; novels — from Lo Kuang-chung, Shih Nai-an, Wu Chen-en, Tsao Hsueh-ching to Ting Ling, Lao She and Chao Shu-li; plays — from Kuang Hanching, Wang Shih-fu to Mei Lan-fan, Tien Han and Tsao Yu; musical compositions — from Yu Po-ya, Tsai Wen-chi, Chi Kang to Nieh Erh, Hsi Hsin-hai and Huo Lu-ting; paintings — from Su Tung-po, Chen Pan-chiao to Chi Pai-shih and Hsu Pei-hung; works on history — from Ssuma Chien, Ou-yang Hsiu to Lu Chen-yu and Hou Wai-lou — all this is regarded by Mao Tse-tung as objects which have to be destroyed.

All plays and films, which have not been revised by Chiang Ching and do not extol Mao Tse-tung have been banned by him. Artists beloved by the entire people like Chou Hsin-fang, Yan Hui-chu and Pai Yang are persecuted by him.

He has dug up the graves of ancient Chinese thinker Confucius, the national hero Shih Ko-fa, the world renowned painter Chi Pai-shih, the well-known leader of the CPC and man of letters Chu Chiu-po, burned the memorial

museum of the hero of the Tai Ping revolution Li Hsiu-chen and destroyed the monument to the great revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen and the monument to the world-renowned poet Pushkin.

Mao Tse-tung is destroying Buddhist and Taoistic temples and pagodas which are of great cultural and artistic value, desecrating and destroying Moslem mosques. He has inflicted on the Chinese nation losses in the sphere of culture which are incalculable and irreparable.

Under the guise of "struggle against authorities" he brutally persecutes prominent intellectuals in all fields of knowledge. He mercilessly baits philosophers, historians, economists, lawyers, medical workers, mathematicians, chemists, physicists, biologists and other scientists and specialists in social and natural sciences. Under the pretext that literary and art workers of the 1930s followed the so-called "Wang Ming line" and the trends in Russian literary criticism and that the literature and art of China were not in accord with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, all CPC officials and prominent non-party literary and art workers of the period from the

1920s to 1960s inclusive were dubbed "counter-revolutionary revisionists" and "counter-revolutionary black bandits"; they were subjected to arrests, beatings and humiliation, forced to march through the streets wearing dunce caps condemned to hard labor or killed.

Under the slogan "seize all the positions of public opinion," Mao Tse-tung routed newspaper and magazine offices throughout the country, and arrested, humiliated and exiled to hard labor or killed newsmen. More than 500 newspapers and magazines have been closed down.

To prevent the intellectuals from offering him organized resistance, he dissolved and routed the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the All-China Association of Educational Workers, the All-China Journalists' Association and other mass professional and scientific organizations of the intellectuals.

Under the slogan of struggle against the "counter-revolutionary revisionist system of education" he, in effect, stopped the work of all educational institutions in the country. Mao Tse-tung harshly persecutes and annihilates educationists, he has burnt the bulk of the textbooks and decided greatly to shorten the period of study in all educational

establishments and to turn all higher, special and military-political schools into short-term courses (from a few months to a year) of the Kanda type that existed from the close of the 1930s to the beginning of the 1940s in Yen-an. He forces young people and children to read less and even not to read at all. He has instructed all educational institutions to replace scientific and literary text-books with his book of "Quotations" and "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung."

Already in the beginning of the so-called cultural revolution the hungweipings acting on Mao Tse-tung's orders burned text-books on various subjects and named their former teachers and employees of educational institutions "counter-revolutionary black bandits" and "revisionists"; they humiliated them in all manner of ways, subjected them to public dishonor and beatings and assassinated them. As a result studies in China's educational establishments cannot be resumed to this day. This situation is exactly what Mao Tse-tung had planned. Only in such a situation can he, on the one hand, direct a great mass of the hungweipings into the army (according to available information 500,000 have already been sent there) and thus gradually change the composition of the officers and rank-and-file of the PLA, and, on the other, send servicemen into educational institutions of all levels so that henceforth primarily only two subjects, "Mao Tse-tung's thought" and military training, should be taught.

This discloses his great fears of intellectuals and of knowledge. That is why he not only persecutes and exterminates the best part of the Chinese intelligentsia, but also pursues a policy of stupefying the people thus preventing the younger generation of China from becoming knowledgeable people and turning them into a crowd of fools. Knowing only Mao Tse-tung and his thought they can become no more than the blind tools of Mao Tse-tung and his group and would be ready to fulfil all their wishes and suffer any sacrifice for their sake.

In destroying culture and the cultural heritage, in annihilating the intellectuals and enforcing the policy of stupefying the people Mao Tse-tung has committed incomparably greater crimes than Chin Shih-Huang-ti (first emperor of the Chin dynasty) who in the 3rd century B.C. burned books and buried alive several hundred Confucianists for which he was

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cursed by the people for all times. In the 20th century there are many more intellectuals in China and they are much wiser than the intellectuals of the 3rd century B.C.; they will assuredly find appropriate ways of punishing Mao Tse-tung, the present, second Chin Shih-Huang-Ti, this most despotic of all the despots in China's history.

9. He conducts a barbarous great-Han chauvinistic policy with regard to the national minorities and annihilates their revolutionary leaders and cadres.

Following the traditions of the reactionary regimes of Chinese feudal emperors, the Peiyan warlords and Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung uses military-police forces to decimate national minorities; he steadfastly enforces a policy of great-Han chauvinism which finds its expression in discrimination, disparagement, repressions, forcible assimilation or resettlement and disrespect for the faiths, customs and traditions of the national minorities.

At the outset of the so-called cultural revolution he sent numerous hungweiping detachments from Peking to Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Ningsia, Chinghai, Tibet, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow and other regions inhabited by national minorities where they destroyed temples and mosques, insulted the believers, committed murders and arson, "rebelled" and seized power. He used military units deceived by him to annihilate cadres and ordinary citizens — Mongols, Tungkangs, Chuangs, Tibetans, Tais, Miaos and others. Mao Tse-tung arrests and persecutes Party, administrative and military leaders of the Mongol, Uighur, Tungkang and other peoples. He tests atomic and hydrogen bombs in regions inhabited by the national minorities, caring little for their health or lives.

He dispatched military units consisting of national minorities to Canton to attack the workers and the troops remaining loyal to the revolution, and incited them to fratricidal slaughter making cat's paws of other people to be able to fish in muddy waters.

These crimes of Mao Tse-tung are alien to Marxist-Leninist national policy and a betrayal of proletarian internationalism. They evoked not only vigorous resistance and armed struggle of the national minorities, but also opposition to his reactionary policy and compassion for the national minorities on the part of those local Party and administrative workers and servicemen of the Han people who adhere to the Marxist-Lenin-

ist internationalist tradition. Accordingly in some regions inhabited by national minorities, the leaders, cadres and the masses of the Han people* have been rallying together with the national minorities for joint resistance against Mao Tse-tung.

10. He does everything to protect the national bourgeoisie and co-operates with domestic and external reaction.

According to Mao Tse-tung's theory of "new democratism," the bourgeoisie is a class which exercises dictatorship jointly with the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. In his explanation of the national flag of the CPR—red with five stars—he says that the bourgeoisie is an equal member of society just as the working class, peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore he attaches particular significance and grants special privileges to the national bourgeoisie in the spheres of policy, economy and social status.

In the economic sphere, immediately after the country's liberation Mao Tse-tung acceded to the demands of the national bourgeoisie and allowed them to retain capital and profits, thus fostering the development of capitalism. In 1956, after the establishment of the joint state-private administration of industry and trade he decided to pay an annual five percent guaranteed profit to the capitalists for a period of 5-7 years. In 1962, upon the expiration of this term, Mao Tse-tung decided to prolong the payment of profits for another five years. This period has also expired and he has once again decided to continue paying out profits for another . . . 10 years.

At the same time the administration of all state-private enterprises in effect remained in the hands of the capitalists. Occupying the posts of directors, managers, engineers and so forth, capitalists receive salaries several times higher than those paid to other people holding the same jobs. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, at the time when the so-called new democratic policy was being put through, representatives of the bourgeoisie made up a considerable part of the People's Political Consultative Conference. A considerable number of them also held the posts of heads and their deputies in the Central People's

*There are more than 50 nations and nationalities in the CPR. The Han nation accounts for over 90 percent of the total population.

Government Council and the State Administrative Council, in its ministries and committees. On top of that they had a fairly large number of official posts in the consultative councils and administrative bodies in all major, medium and small towns.

The national bourgeoisie retained a very important place in China's political life even in the period of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism and after the Constitution was adopted. Statistics show that out of approximately 1,260 deputies of the National People's Congress (NPC), the country's highest organ of power, 260 were representatives of the bourgeoisie. It is common knowledge that deputies of the NPC are not elected by a direct vote. Nominally they are elected at provincial meetings of people's representatives. In fact, however, they are all selected by Mao Tse-tung. As a result of this selection the national bourgeoisie which numbers less than a hundredth part of the country's population held over a fifth of the seats in the NPC, while the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie comprising over 90 percent of the population had less than four-fifths of the seats.

There is a fairly large number of the bourgeoisie occupying posts of deputy-chairman and members of the Standing Committee of the NPC. In the State Council and its ministries and state committees many of the heads and deputies are from the bourgeoisie. Moreover, they hold an even larger number of important posts in the People's Congresses and People's Councils in all towns. For example, Jung Yi-jen, a big capitalist, who annually gets over 3,000,000 yuan in profits, is a deputy of the NPC and member of its Standing Committee; he is deputy of the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress and deputy-mayor of Shanghai.

In the course of the so-called cultural revolution workers, peasants and the intellectuals had been and are being subjected to brutal repressions on the part of the hungweipings, tsaofans, the army and the police, and only the national bourgeoisie continues to live as before, and as before receives profits and exploits the people. Foreign correspondents after visiting China and seeing the life of the Chinese bourgeoisie, unanimously agree that in the China which is living through the so-called "cultural revolution" the bourgeoisie is the sole flourishing and contented class. It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie, in the course of all its major conferences, has always sent telegrams of

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greetings to Mao Tse-tung calling him "beloved father and teacher" and thanking him for his profound solicitude and all-round care.

As regards the facts of Mao Tse-tung's connivance with internal and external reaction there are more than enough of them. We shall only mention some of the more striking ones.

Mao Tse-tung had an exceptionally high opinion of Li Chi-shen. After the formation of the CPR Li Chi-shen was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. What sort of a man was Li Chi-shen? He was a notorious hangman. After Chiang Kai-shek had betrayed the revolution of April 12 (1927) in Shanghai, Li Chi-shen on April 15, 1927 betrayed the revolution in Canton and in the course of three days executed more than 5,000 Communists, revolutionary workers and students. Therefore, at a solemn reception on the occasion of the formation of the CPR a veteran Party member upon seeing Li Chi-shen and others of his ilk, hit the table with his hand and exclaimed: "This is an outrage! Old revolutionaries are valued less than non-revolutionaries, and non-revolutionaries are valued less than counter-revolutionaries."

Mao Tse-tung is on friendly terms with Li Tsung-jen, he made Li Tsung-jen his honoured guest and the guest of all the country. What sort of man is Li Tsung-jen? He is also a notorious hangman who together with Wang Ching-wei betrayed the revolution of July 15, 1927 in Wuhan. Within a few days they executed tens of thousands of Communists and other revolutionary workers and students. He is war criminal No. 2 who had replaced Chiang Kai-shek as president in order to bring the anti-communist, anti-popular, counter-revolutionary civil war to a conclusion.

A loyal flunkey of U.S. imperialism he fled to the United States after the defeat of the Kuomintang in the civil war and stayed there for 15 years. Upon Li Tsung-jen's return to China in 1965, Mao Tse-tung organised official welcomes and receptions in his honour in Peking and other cities at which Li Tsung-jen widely propagandised the slogan "to fight against imperialism it is necessary to fight against revisionism" which he had brought from the United States. In fact, Mao Tse-tung made him his adviser for anti-Soviet, anti-communist and anti-popular affairs.

Mao Tse-tung admired Chang Tung-sung. What sort of a man is Chang

Tung-sung? Chang Tung-sung taught the notorious history of Western philosophy. His book "History of Western Philosophy" praises to the skies the reactionary-idealistic philosophers of the west. Marx's name is mentioned on the very last page. "As regards the philosophy of K. Marx," it is stated in the book, "it simply merits no discussion. For only the insane can believe in his philosophy."

At a joint meeting of the leaders of the central ministries and committees held a few days prior to the official proclamation of the CPR, someone suddenly informed Mao Tse-tung: "Chang Tung-sung has arrived!" A joyous smile spread across Mao Tse-tung's face and he said for all to hear: "That's great! That's great! Chang Tung-sung has also arrived! He is a veteran of the Peiyang and Yanchiu groups and on top of that he is a prominent professor. Since he has come to us he at least should be given the post of member of the Central People's Government Council." I told him there and then: "Chairman Mao! This man still needs to be looked into. The veterans of the Peiyang and Yanchiu groups had not only always opposed the Communist Party but even the Kuomintang at the time when it was still participating in the revolution."

Several days later the name of Chang Tung-sung was on the list of members of the Central People's Government Council. A short while later public security organs discovered that he and his son were American spies and had a secret radio station in their home specially for maintaining contact with the U.S. secret service.

On November 25, 1965 Jenmingjihpao published an account of how Mao Tse-tung and his wife congratulated the writer Anna Louise Strong, propagandizer of Mao Tse-tung's thought in the U.S.A. on her birthday and published a group photograph. The newspaper mentioned that all the Americans on the photograph were friends of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching. The past of some of these people is still unclear. Among them were L. Early and Epstein who, as is well known, were advisers and friends of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Sung Mei-ling and have now become the advisers and friends of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching.

Mao Tse-tung is striking a secret diplomatic deal with the U.S. imperialists. The Chinese and American ambassadors have already had 134 meetings in Warsaw. Both sides have made the subject of their talks a complete secret from the

Chinese and American peoples and from the world public. A U.S. State Department representative frankly admitted that Washington and Peking have been maintaining direct contact ever since the Geneva Conference of 1954 and that although the U.S.A. has no official diplomatic relations with Washington, the successes that have been achieved at the Warsaw talks by far surpass those achieved by Britain and other countries who have diplomatic relations with Peking. It is clear from the above that the secret diplomatic deal between China and the United States has already attained considerable scope and level.

Such are the 10 principal crimes committed by Mao Tse-tung within the country. These crimes are proved by incontrovertible facts. These crimes cannot be refuted by any verbal artifices of Mao Tse-tung and his group. These 10 crimes demonstrate with especial clarity and precision that Mao Tse-tung is engaged not in some kind of a "cultural revolution," but in an armed counter-revolution, an anti-communist counter-revolutionary military coup directed against the people. Even at the time when the vaunted "cultural revolution" was only getting under way, Marxists-Leninists of all countries pointed out that the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution," launched and led by Mao Tse-tung personally, far from having anything to do with either the proletariat or culture, or the revolution, was indeed spearheaded against the proletariat, against culture, against revolution; far from having anything in common with Marxism-Leninism; it was spearheaded against Marxism-Leninism; far from resembling in any way the policy of a Communist Party and a socialist state, it was spearheaded against the Communist Party and socialism. The entire course of subsequent events has increasingly demonstrated the absolute correctness of such an appraisal.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in his speech at a meeting with electors on March 11, 1967, already concretely pointed out: "The legend about the 'proletarian cultural revolution' is merely clumsy camouflage of a policy alien to Marxism-Leninism." "This looks more like a reactionary coup." In his speech on September 8 of the same year at a brotherhood meeting in Budapest he once again noted: "What has been named the 'cultural revolution' by the Mao

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Tse-tung group would be more correct to call counter-revolution." Subsequent events in China have fully corroborated the exceptional correctness of this Marxist-Leninist evaluation.

These 10 crimes also demonstrate very clearly that the aim of the so-called "cultural revolution" effected by Mao Tse-tung and his group is not "to safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat," but, on the contrary, to abolish people's rule in China; not "to safeguard the socialist system," but, on the contrary, to undermine the foundation for building socialism in China. These 10 crimes show with exceptional clarity and precision that the object against which the "cultural revolution" is spearheaded is not "a handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" and not "carriers of the bourgeois reactionary line," not "counter-revolutionary revisionists" and not "traitors," but, on the contrary, it is the Marxist-Leninist Chinese Communist Party which unites in its ranks about 25 million members; it is the Young Communist League of China which unites in its ranks about 30 million members; it is the All-China Federation of Trade Unions which unites in its ranks over 20 million members; it is the millions of leaders, cadres and activists of Party, administrative, military and various other institutions and organisations, including schools, higher educational establishments, industrial, agricultural and transport enterprises; it is the majority of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of the entire country. According to incomplete data, the number of people persecuted, arrested and physically annihilated by Mao Tse-tung and his group in the course of the "cultural revolution" exceeded five million long ago.

And, lastly, these 10 crimes prove with exceptional clarity and precision that indeed the so-called "handful of persons in authority taking the capitalist road" and "carriers of the bourgeois reactionary line" are no one else but Mao Tse-tung himself and his group! The facts show, and all recognise, that the anti-communist and anti-popular Mao Tse-tung group consists only of a few people. And among them the person closest and most trusted by Mao Tse-tung is his wife Chiang Ching. That is why Mao Tse-tung is forced himself openly to praise her as the only person who really understands well, propagates and applies Mao Tse-tung's thought in general and his thought in the sphere

of literature and art in particular. That is why he has appointed her formally the deputy, and actually, the chief of the so-called "group for cultural revolution affairs" and commander-in-chief of hungweipings. That is why he artificially put her in the third place, so far after Lin Piao, in the Mao hierarchy. And that is why public opinion in China and foreign observers unanimously agree that Chiang Ching remains the only person Mao Tse-tung could really trust in everything.

Here indeed is a handful of persons! The persons who committed 10 such crimes, the persons who are breaking up the Communist Party, the people's government, the trade unions, Young Communist League, and so on and who are protecting the national bourgeoisie

politically and economically — are not these the persons who really take the capitalist road and carry the bourgeois reactionary line! To this day they abuse, and take cover behind, the name of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Council of State, the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, are sending troops to suppress and annihilate workers, peasants and intellectuals, to attack leading Party, administrative and military bodies and crush their cadres; they are administering the "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs of the Central Committee of the CPC," under whose command the hungweipings and tsafans daily and everywhere insulted, beat up, arrested and killed people. Are not these really the "persons in authority"? Are the men who committed 10 such crimes not real counter-revolutionary revisionists and traitors to the revolution?

That Mao Tse-tung and his group have tacked on to Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsia-ping and others the labels they fabricated, such as "a handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" and "carriers of the bourgeois reactionary line," is a political trick with concealed aims.

These aims are, first, to blame Liu and Teng for the various mistakes and crimes committed by Mao Tse-tung over a number of years in home and foreign policy and thereby make Liu and Teng the scapegoats.

Second, Liu and Teng were for many years colleagues of Mao Tse-tung and know of the many crimes and unseemly secrets of Mao Tse-tung in internal and international affairs; that is why Mao is trying to liquidate Liu and Teng as living witnesses.

Third, another still more important aim is to tack on to Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsia-ping and Tao Chu labels of "Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" and on this pretext to liquidate Liu, Teng and Tao themselves and then arbitrarily tack on a label of "supporters of Liu, Teng and Tao" to all persons whom Mao Tse-tung and his group intend to persecute.

The real objective of their call—necessarily to link together "big criticism" of the "top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road" with the campaign of "struggle, criticism and transformation" in all the country's institutions and organisations, is to utilise the slogan of "struggle against the handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" as a screen and pretext

for persecuting and destroying Party cadres in all institutions and organisations throughout the country.

By decision of the unlawful so-called "12th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC," Liu Shao-chi was removed from all the Party and state posts he held and "expelled from the Party for ever" on the basis of absolutely false accusations entirely fabricated by Mao Tse-tung himself. Mao Tse-tung followed this up by another, wider, still more slanderous campaign in the press, radio and at meetings and rallies all over the country under the slogan of "launching a struggle of unusual scale and depth against the top traitor, top scab and top spy of the Kuomintang, imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Liu Shao-chi, and his supporters in all the localities." This once again most clearly reveals "the tiger's aspect and snake's soul" of Mao Tse-tung as an unprecedentedly bestial and absolutely brazen plotter.

Communists and other upright people throughout the world are raising their wrathful and just voice in protest against such foul persecution by Mao Tse-tung of the Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic Comrade Liu Shao-chi.

Mao Tse-tung acted in a similar way during the so-called "campaign to rectify style," started in February 1942. Making use of the military power he usurped in the Party and the difficult international situation during the early period of the Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union, Mao Tse-tung began this campaign which formally was called the "campaign to rectify three styles" (that is, the Party style, style of education and literary

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style); actually it was a campaign of "four antis" (that is, anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern, anti-Soviet and anti-Party).

For what purpose did Mao Tse-tung need that campaign? In preparing it and in the course of conducting it, Mao Tse-tung himself repeatedly said that by carrying out the campaign he wanted to achieve three aims: 1) to replace Leninism by Maoism; 2) to write the history of the Chinese Communist Party as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone; 3) to elevate the personality of Mao Tse-tung above the Central Committee and the entire Party. Why did he have to do it? He himself replied: this would give him two opportunities: first, to capture the chief leading place in the Party leadership and all power in the Party in his own hands; second, if he already has taken the first place in the Party leadership, no one should ever be able to oust him.

To achieve these ends he did the following in this campaign: 1) he declared Leninism to be Russian Marxism suitable only for leading the Russian revolution and unsuitable for leading the world and the Chinese revolution; 2) declared that the leadership and assistance of the Communist International to the CPC was entirely wrong; 3) declared that the all-round support given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet Union to the Communist Party of China and to the Chinese Revolution was not only "invalid" and "ineffective" but even "harmful"; 4) accused the entire Party of "non-recognition of Maoism" and of "loyalty to Leninism and the Communist International" and of "adherence to the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union."

And who was to blame for all this? Mao Tse-tung held that the blame lay with all the leaders and important cadres of the Party who had studied in the Soviet Union and spread the influence of Leninism, the Comintern, the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union in China. Their main representatives were Wang Ming, Ching Po-ku, Chang Wei-tien, Wang Chia-hsiang, Kai Fang, Yang Shang-kun, Chu Jui and others. And who was to blame for supporting these Comintern men? Mao Tse-tung held that these were Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Hsien Ying, Teng Fa, Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung and others.

And who was the "top man" to blame? Mao Tse-tung held that this was Wang Ming. According to his statement, Wang Ming was the "main representative of Russian Marxism and the line of the

Comintern in the Communist Party of China." Wang Ming was the "principal adherent and defender of the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union in China." Wang Ming was the "principal foe of Maoism in the CPC." But how was the struggle against Wang Ming to be waged and linked with the struggle against the absolute majority of the leaders, Party cadres and members?

For this Mao Tse-tung artificially divided the entire Party into two groupings—the "dogmatic" and "empiristic" and at the same time united them as one target of his attack. He placed all the Communists who had studied in the Soviet Union or engaged in ideological and political work and also those who socially originated from the intelligentsia into the so-called "pro-Soviet and dogmatic Wang Ming grouping. All the Communists who engaged in practical work or who were of working-class and peasant social origin he placed into the so-called "empiristic grouping." At the same time he declared that the empiristic grouping was a "captive and assistant" of the dogmatic grouping.

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung held that in order to write the history of the CPC as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone it was necessary not only not to recognise the services of Leninism, the Comintern, the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union in the history of the CPC and the Chinese Revolution. It was necessary to deny that any leader, any Party functionary or member had rendered any service to the CPC and the Chinese revolution. According to Mao Tse-tung's statement, it was particularly necessary:

1) to deny the services rendered by Chu Chiu-po in the struggle against Right opportunist Chentuhsuism and also the services of the extraordinary August Conference of the CPC (1927) which approved in its decisions this struggle and the services of the Comintern leadership which was the direct sponsor of this conference and to proclaim the line of the August CPC Conference to be a "Chuchiupoist Left opportunist line";

2) to deny the services rendered by Wang Ming in the struggle against the Left adventurist line of Li Li-san and also the services of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, sixth convocation (January 1931), and the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (May 1931) which approved this struggle in their decisions and to declare the line of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee a "Left opportunist line of Wang Ming";

3) to deny the services rendered by Wang Ming in putting forward the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front and the services of the 7th Comintern Congress which approved this policy in its decisions and to declare this policy of the anti-Japanese national united front, a "Right-wing capitulatory line of Wang Ming."

According to Mao Tse-tung's statement, if the services of other persons in the history of the CPC and the Chinese revolution were recognised then "there would be no Maoism," "the history of the CPC as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone would be impossible" and there would be no "especially high and unshakeable place of Mao Tse-tung in the CPC." In keeping with his conspiratorial plan, Mao Tse-tung first of all struck the main blow at Wang Ming—not only ideologically, politically, organisationally and morally, but also physically (at the beginning of this campaign Wang Ming had already been gravely poisoned by toxic preparations).

Mao Tse-tung also struck blows of different severity at the absolute majority of the leaders, cadres and Party members. Employing diverse methods of deception, slander, threats and coercion he compelled all of them to admit that they were either dogmatists or empiricists, that is, "captive and assistants of the dogmatists" and that, of course, all without exception carried out the above mentioned so-called "Left" or "Right" line of Wang Ming. Moreover, by similar methods and cruel torture he compelled a considerable part of the Communists and YCL members to confess that they were "traitors," "counter-revolutionaries" and "spies of the Kuomintang, the imperialists and the Soviet Union." Many of those who did confess to being such criminals were arrested or killed or committed suicide. This continued for more than three years.

As a result of this campaign, the 7th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, 6th convocation (April 1945), under the pressure of Mao Tse-tung adopted a "Resolution on Some Historical Questions of the CPC." This was the first official document falsifying the history of the CPC in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's concepts. Following this the Rules, adopted by the 7th Congress of the CPC (April-May, 1945), forcibly included recognition of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the only guiding ideas of the CPC. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung succeeded in capturing the top leading post (at the 1st Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, 7th convocation, he

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for the first time was "elected" Chairman of the Central Committee) and all power in the Party, in creating a cult of his personality, and establishing his personal dictatorship in the CPC which relied mainly on the support of army units.

After the 7th Congress and until the so-called cultural revolution, for more than 20 years, Mao Tse-tung constantly conducted campaigns under different names. But their chief content, chief aims, chief methods and chief objects of attack in the main were the same as in the first "campaign to rectify style" of 1942-45.

The first "campaign to rectify style" was a rehearsal of the so-called cultural revolution. The various campaigns which followed it, were to one or another extent direct preparatory measures for the "cultural revolution." During this time in view of the many fundamental mistakes and repeated failures and defeats of Mao Tse-tung's home and foreign policy and especially in view of the obviously reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature of these campaigns and the "cultural revolution," even men who were closest and most loyal to Mao Tse-tung as, for example, Liu Shao-chi, Hu Chiao-mu, Tan Chen, Tao Chu, Lo Jui-ching, Ho Chang-kung, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i, Chou Yang and others, one after another became his enemies and victims. These facts graphically show that Mao Tse-tung, notwithstanding his frenzied terror and perfidy, is today even more isolated and is in a really unprecedented desperate position.

Similarly Mao Tse-tung has slyly branded Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Lo Jui-ching and others as "army persons in authority taking the capitalist road," not only to utilize this as the pretext, for persecuting them but also in order to be able arbitrarily to brand as "supporters of Peng, Ho and Lo" any military leaders and army cadres whom he intended to persecute.

Similarly, as early as 1962 Mao Tse-tung ordered Chi Pen-yu to write an article slandering as "traitor" the national hero of the T'ai P'in revolution Li Hsiu-cheng who heroically perished at the hand of the national traitor Tseng Kuo-fan; thereby Mao Tse-tung initiated the so-called "campaign of struggle against traitors." Following this, Chu Chiu-po, well-known leader of the Chinese Communist Party who heroically perished singing the "Internationale" at the hand of butcher Chiang Kai-shek, was classed among the "traitors." Next a list of "traitors" was

compiled which included more than 2,700 leaders and important cadres of Party, administrative, military educational and mass organizations whom he had long ago planned to destroy.

In reality, all of these persons are the flower of the Chinese people, the finest sons and daughters of the Communist Party of China, worthy fighters of the great army of world communism who have been reared in the spirit of the great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, who have for decades been tried and tested and schooled in revolutionary battles against international imperialism and internal reaction. Such criminal actions, falsification of the "corpus delicti," slander of upright people with the object of elevating himself and trampling upon others—these are Mao Tse-tung's favourite foul ways and perfidious methods.

Fourth, Mao Tse-tung deliberately and with great pomp pictures the counter-revolutionary military coup, effected by himself and directed within the country against the Communist Party and the people and also against the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, as a struggle for "seizure of power" between his group and the so-called "supporters of Liu and Teng." Similarly, the general movement of resistance, in the entire Party and the entire country, aroused by his counter-revolutionary military coup, he also deliberately pictures as a struggle for "seizure of power" between the so-called "supporters of Liu and Teng" and "supporters of Mao and Lin," thereby trying to mislead the people of his country and world progressive opinion, to prevent them from divining the essence of Mao Tse-tung's counter-revolutionary military coup.

Fifth, one of the artifices frequently employed by Mao Tse-tung is that he not only abuses in the vilest terms the various abominable crimes actually committed by himself, but even shifts the blame for them onto the victims of his attacks and persecution in order to distort the truth and to mix black with white.

In other words, it is because Mao Tse-tung himself and his group are really the notorious handful of persons in authority taking the capitalist road, the carriers of the bourgeois reactionary line, it is because they themselves are the counter-revolutionary revisionists and traitors that they, like a thief who shouts "stop thief!", fraudulently repaste the labels of these crimes onto the backs of others in order to conceal

their own real visage of anti-communist, anti-popular, anti-Marxist and anti-socialist counter-revolutionaries.

It is because the slogan of struggle against the so-called "handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road," put forward by Mao Tse-tung for plotting purposes, has such an intricate and perfidiously treacherous content that he and his group tirelessly repeat that this slogan indicates "the main direction of the struggle" in the vaunted "cultural revolution." They openly extol this slogan as the "great strategic plan" of the so-called "cultural revolution" elaborated by Mao Tse-tung well in advance.

In the course of the "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung issued so-called "latest instructions" such as "we must fight egoism and criticise revisionism," "combat clannishness" and so forth as the main trend in continuing the "cultural revolution" in an attempt to reduce the steadily mounting discord and split within the Maoist group and, in particular, among the hungweipings and tsao-fans; to charge cadres of Party, administration, military and mass organizations of all levels who oppose Mao Tse-tung with "revisionism" and also "egoism" in

order to have an additional pretext for slighting or persecuting them; to use the bugbear "egoism" against non-Party workers, peasants and intellectuals inasmuch as in their case it was more convenient than the bugbear "revisionism." But the main thing was that he aimed to use these slogans to mask what for the entire nation were the increasingly evident ugly features of the counter-revolutionary military coup, which he was accomplishing for the sake of his own extremely egoistic, careerist interests and those of his wife and other members of his group.

Developments upset his expectations. They showed that the louder Mao Tse-tung called for a struggle against "egoism" and "clannishness" the clearer he revealed the substance of these slogans and the more obvious it became that none other than Mao Tse-tung was the egoist No. 1 and that his group personified premier clannishness founded, besides, on an abuse of state power.

What, according to his explanations, does the "struggle against egoism" mean? That "unselfishness" should triumph. What does "unselfishness" mean? "The loftiest unselfishness means boundless devotion to Chairman Mao." And what does "devotion" mean? It means "vowing to defend to the last breath Chairman Mao's status as the supreme leader."

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Therefore, despite the fanfare surrounding the publication of these slogans, he failed to stimulate the lauded "great unity of the whole country" or the notorious "unity of the three sides" and he failed to reduce the split and conflicts among the hungweipings and tsaofans. All he did was to increase the split and the bickering among the forces forming his immediate mainstay; moreover, all he achieved was that those in whom political consciousness, Party conscience and a sense of justice still live are rising against Mao Tse-tung and his group, who are committing any crime for the sake of their egoistic interests.

The so-called "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs of the CC CPC" consisted of 17 persons handpicked by Mao Tse-tung. Twelve of them have been subjected to repression, and only five are left. Even people like Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, Mu Hsin and Ling Chieh, who had displayed exceptional zeal in the "cultural revolution," found themselves in disfavour, and today one after another they are declared to be "counter-revolutionary black bandits" who have opposed the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, the "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs" and Chiang Ching.

Yang Chen-wu, Acting Chief of the PLA General Staff and commander of the Peking Military District, Yu Li-chin, who was recently appointed Political Commissar of the Air Force, and Fu Chun-pi, commander of the Peking Garrison, have likewise been declared "double-dealing counter-revolutionaries" who had opposed Mao Tse-tung, the "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs" and Chiang Ching.

These facts best of all bear out the aforesaid.

No matter what cunning Mao Tse-tung and his group resort to in their demagoguery and no matter what masks they put on, whether it be the "cultural revolution," Marxist-Leninist "Leftist" verbiage, the slogan "struggle for power of two groups" or any other new screen which they may yet conjure up, they cannot hide the truth about their anti-Communist, anti-popular counter-revolutionary military coup. The ten crimes committed by their hands are ten indictments which they themselves have inscribed.

FIVE MAJOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY MAO TSE-TUNG IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. Let us now see what crimes Mao Tse-tung has committed in the sphere of international policy.

1. He frenziedly attacks the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

He organised a siege of the embassies and other diplomatic offices of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia in China, insulted the leaders of these countries and caused the manhandling and baiting of diplomats and members of their families. Like the Peiyan warlords and Chiang Kai-shek he in effect does not recognise the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state, openly threatens its sovereignty and lays claim to its territory. He persists in his frenzied opposition to joint action with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the rendering of assistance to the Vietnamese people in order to repulse United States aggression, and seeks to undermine the Vietnamese people's bonds of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, thereby encouraging U.S. imperialism to keep escalating the war of aggression in Vietnam. He spreads slanderous rumors, insulting and undermining the prestige of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, thereby encouraging provocations against the KPDR by aggressive United States troops and the South Korean puppets. Besides bringing trade and economic pressure to bear on Cuba after the manner of the U.S. imperialists, he engages in subversive activities against the Communist Party and revolutionary Government of Cuba. He openly proclaims his intention of "demolishing" the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, constantly fans anti-Soviet hysteria in China and fosters hostility for the Soviet Union.

Mao Tse-tung savagely attacks the CPSU and the Soviet Union because the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, founded and reared by Lenin, has the longest history, the most extensive experience, the most imposing achievements and the greatest prestige, because the great Land of Soviets, created by Lenin and embodying Marxism-Leninism, is the world's first social-

ist country with the longest history, the most impressive achievements and the greatest might, because led by the CPSU the Soviet Union is indeed the mightiest and most reliable mainstay of the world revolution and of world peace, that it is indeed the most enduring and consistent revolutionary bastion of the struggle against imperialist cliques and reactionaries of all the capitalist countries headed by the U.S.A.

Mao Tse-tung has turned frenzied anti-Sovietism into his banner of struggle against Marxism-Leninism, against the Communist and Workers' Parties, against socialism and communism, against the world revolution and peace in order to gain the approval and understanding of the imperialist clique headed by the U.S.A. and obtain the possibility of collaborating with it.

Another reason for the violence of his attacks on the Soviet Union and the CPSU is that the Great October Revolution has witnessed its 50th anniversary. The Great October Socialist Revolution and its brilliant achievements in the building of socialism and communism over the past 50 years have opened the vista of a bright future for all mankind. This is the greatest force inspiring the working class and all other working people throughout the world. It is the greatest force inspiring the CPC and the Chinese people, who are at present afflicted by a great tragedy.

Through furious anti-Soviet campaigns Mao Tse-tung seeks to rupture the long-established, traditional friendship and fraternal relations between the Communist Parties and peoples of China and the Soviet Union. He is beset by a harrowing fear that the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will learn of the immense achievements, which the Soviet people, led by the CPSU, have attained in the course of the fulfilment of the new Party Program and the decisions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, in the building of communism, in the struggle for world peace and in rendering support to the communist and working-class movement in different countries and to the national liberation and social-progressive movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

He is exceedingly afraid that the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will learn that the material and cultural life of the Soviet people is steadily improving, that they are gradually moving from the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" to the principle

of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," in other words, that they are moving towards a prosperous and happy life under communism.

Mao Tse-tung is extremely afraid that if the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people learn the truth in all these questions they will see clearer the gross absurdity and perniciousness of the so-called "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and of his policies. They will then inevitably and unanimously demand that China take the correct Marxist-Leninist road of socialist construction and of the struggle for peace, which has been followed by the Soviet Union. After appreciating all this they will rise with greater determination, on a larger scale, in a more organised manner and in greater unity against Mao Tse-tung and his "thought," against the counter-revolutionary coup of Mao Tse-tung and his group. That is precisely why anti-Sovietism has become the focal point of Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy and the core of his policy at home.

The armed provocative attack of the Mao Tse-tung clique on Soviet frontier guards of March 2 on Soviet territory on the Damansky Island in the Ussuri river and in this connection the new anti-Soviet racket in China and abroad accompanied by outrageous territorial claims to the U.S.S.R. are not accidental events. Internally, they represent an attempt by Mao Tse-tung to distract the attention of the Chinese people from the incredible and growing difficulties of a political and economic character arising out of the consequence of the so-called "cultural revolution," as well as the preparation for the carrying through of the so-called "Congress of the CPC" in an atmosphere of exceptional anti-Soviet, anti-communist hysteria.

Externally, this armed provocation and anti-Soviet propaganda ballyhoo represents an act of assistance to the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist sorties of the ruling circles of the U.S.A. and of the German Federal Republic, in particular in regards to the Bonn venture to carry through presidential elections in West Berlin of March 5 and even more so serves as an encouragement to the revanchist claims of Bonn to reshape the map of Europe. It also represents an attempt to interfere with the International Conference of Communist and workers parties which aims to achieve the strengthening of the unity of the world communist and workers' movement and the unity of action of all anti-imperialist forces.

Simultaneously these facts clearly show the absurd, shameful, adventurist and dangerous point reached by the anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism of Mao Tse-tung.

2. He venomously attacks the Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers' parties of all countries.

He goes to extremes to intensify his splitting and subversive activities against the overwhelming majority of the militant contingents of Communists in different countries, organises a fifth column to combat Communist and Workers' parties, openly slanders them, calling them "counter-revolutionary revisionist" parties, and publicly proclaims his intention of "destroying" them. He has slandered the Karlovy Vary Conference which was attended by representatives of 24 Communist and Workers' parties, calling it a "conference of scabs and traitors," and he has called the leaders of each of these parties "a handful of traitors and scabs." The Budapest Consultative Meeting, attended by representatives of 66 Communist and Workers' parties, has been named by him "the Budapest farce," while the parties which attended it have been called a "handful of traitors and scabs."

In Western Europe he concentrates his attacks mainly on the largest and most influential Communist parties. He not only maliciously attacks Comrade Waldeck Rochet and other leaders of the French Communist Party but also slanders the late Maurice Thorez, the great fighter for communism. He not only maliciously attacks Comrade Luigi Longo and other leaders of the Italian Communist Party but also slanders the late Palmiro Togliatti, who was another great fighter for communism.

At the same time he fiendishly attacks the heroic Communist Party of Spain and its glorious leader Comrade Dolores Ibarruri, a party which is in the forefront of the struggle against fascism. He intensifies subversion and splitting activities against the Communist parties of the U.S.A., Canada and Latin America as well as against the Communist parties of the Arab countries. He makes a special effort to split and undermine the communist movement in Asian countries neighbouring on China. The Communist Party of Indonesia which came under the influence of Mao Tse-tung's "Leftist" and reactionary ideas, suffered a tragic defeat as a result of which millions of Communists and non-Party workers, peasants and intellectuals suffered horribly. Mao Tse-tung drew no

lesson whatever from this. Instead, he imputed the blame to the leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia, who died heroically.

He ceaselessly engages in splitting and subversive activities against the Communist parties of India and Ceylon, causing enormous difficulties in their work. In the case of the Communist Party of Japan, which urged Mao Tse-tung to create a united front of struggle against U.S. imperialism and came out against the Maoist anti-Soviet "united front," he did not confine himself to open slander and splitting and subversive activities. He organised Chinese residents in Japan into hungweiping gangs in order to manhandle Japanese Communists and attack and destroy the building housing the Society for Japanese-Chinese Friendship; he bribes hooligans and Trotskyite elements to attack offices of the Japanese Communist Party. In Peking, acting on his instructions, hungweipings beat up and seriously injured alternate member of the Presidium of the CC CPJ Itiro Sunama, correspondents of the CPJ newspaper, as well as Japanese students. Moreover, he openly proclaims his intention to "demolish" the CPJ and calls for the liquidation of top leaders of the CPJ, comrades Sandzo Nosaka and Kendzi Miyamoto.

Thus, Mao Tse-tung mouths "Leftist" verbiage about a "world revolution" but in fact engages in splitting and subversive activities with the object of "demolishing" the foremost contingents heading the revolutionary movement in different countries; he speaks of a "struggle against the imperialist clique and reactionaries of all countries headed by the U.S.A." but does exactly what the U.S. imperialists and all reactionaries want but cannot do.

A striking example in this respect is his attitude towards the developments in Czechoslovakia. He and his group level dirty slander and fabrications at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as against the healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and among the Czechoslovak people, thereby directly and openly pouring grist on the mill of U.S. and West German imperialism and of the counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist forces within Czechoslovakia.

3. He plans to split and undermine the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, pursuing a policy of openly pressuring the developing countries of Asia and Africa.

He does his utmost to split and undermine the Afro-Asian unity movement and the movement for solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the joint struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. He is, in fact, helping to put into effect the imperialist design of crushing the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America one by one. He makes every effort to undermine the friendship and unity of the national liberation and social-progressive movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as with the international communist movement, thereby seeking to isolate the national liberation and social-progressive movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America and deprive them of the all-round assistance of the socialist countries and the international communist movement. Mao Tse-tung keeps talking about support and assistance for the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but no sooner does U.S. imperialism undertake aggression against any Asian, African or Latin American country than he, in effect, sides with U.S. imperialism.

When Vietnam was made the target of armed aggression by U.S. imperialism, instead of taking joint action with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to help the Vietnamese people repulse this aggressor, Mao Tse-tung directed his efforts towards slander and provoking a rupture of the Vietnamese people's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to isolate the Vietnamese. Similarly, in 1962 when Cuba was confronted with armed aggression by U.S. imperialism, instead of taking joint steps with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend the Cuban revolution, Mao Tse-tung concentrated on slander and on provoking a severance of the Cuban people's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in an effort to force Cuba into isolation and thereby help U.S. imperialism to smash her.

When the Arab states were subjected to U.S. imperialist stage-managed Israeli aggression, instead of taking joint steps with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to help the Arab states, Mao Tse-tung directed his efforts towards slander and provoking the breaking off of the Arab countries' friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to isolate them and thereby facilitate U.S. and Israeli aggression.

At a time when the vast majority of countries have applied economic sanctions to the South African Republic, which, created by the British imperialists and colonialists, proclaimed barbarous apartheid as its policy at home, Mao Tse-tung acts at one with the U.S. and British imperialists. He has used this opportunity to promote trade with the South African Republic, not only purchasing chromium ore from that racist Government but selling it armaments and munitions, thereby helping in the repressions against the indigenous population of the South African Republic. In effect, he sides with the white racialists, vivid testimony of this being his vitriolic outpourings against Martin Luther King, the late leader of the civil rights movement, of the movement against poverty and against the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam. This man, who enjoyed the respect and affection of all American Negroes, was called by Mao Tse-tung "a tool in the service of the reactionary ruling groups in the U.S.A."

During the "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung still further intensified his policy of pressure founded on barbarous great-power chauvinism with regard to developing Asian and African countries, which had recently shaken off imperialist rule. The reactionary "thought" of Mao Tse-tung is exported by compulsion with the help of Chinese diplomatic representatives and technical experts to countries like Nepal, Cambodia and Ceylon. Mao Tse-tung forces citizens of other countries to wear badges with his portrait, infringes upon the sovereignty of other states, and interferes in the internal affairs of other countries, thereby giving rise to interstate conflicts and development that seriously harm relations between states. Vis-a-vis India he not only frequently provokes armed frontier conflicts but proclaims his intention to organize armed uprisings in India with the purpose of overthrowing the Indian Government.

In Burma he organizes Chinese residents into hungweiping gangs in order to provoke armed conflicts and bloodshed; in addition, he is hatching out plans for an armed invasion across the Burmese frontier and the organization of armed uprisings to overthrow the Burmese Government. Protesting against Mao Tse-tung's interference, through Chinese diplomats, in their internal affairs African countries like Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Burundi have already broken off diplomatic relations with China. In Kenya and

Tunisia, as well, Mao Tse-tung has used Chinese diplomats for openly circulating documents discrediting the governments of these countries and propagating the reactionary "thought" of Mao Tse-tung. This has brought diplomatic relations between China and these countries to the brink of rupture.

The policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung with regard to developing Asian and African countries is fully in line with the Great-Han "Celestial Empire" policy of the Chinese feudal emperors. Its substance is that a foreign state must become either a vassal of the "Celestial Empire" or its enemy. Having become the victims of Mao Tse-tung's insults, the Asian and African countries have

replied to him by word and action that they have no desire to be vassals of Mao Tse-tung.

4. He plans to provoke a U.S.-Soviet and world war.

At the Moscow International Meeting in 1957 he openly pressured for a nuclear war which would destroy from one-third to half of mankind. In documents attacking the world communist movement, published in April 1960, he continued to call for a nuclear war, which could destroy the entire world. He constantly shouts that the "atomic bomb is a paper tiger," that the "hydrogen bomb is a paper tiger," that atomic and thermonuclear war is not "terrible at all."

The purpose of all this is to demoralize the world anti-war movement and instigate a world war. He constantly comes out against any action taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the international stage to relax international tension, avert a world war and secure peaceful co-existence and peaceful conditions for the building of communism and socialism. His objective is to undermine world peace. He slanderously accuses the leadership of the Soviet Union of "modern revisionism," of "capitulating to U.S. imperialism," of "U.S.-Soviet collaboration in order to rule the world together." The motive underlying these accusations is that in upholding the interests of the Soviet people and of all mankind, the leadership of the Soviet Union does not accept his mad proposals for the unleashing of a U.S.-Soviet and world war.

The main reason for Mao Tse-tung's constant displeasure with the U.S. rulers is that, being aware that by starting a thermonuclear war against the U.S.S.R. they would be signing their own death warrant, they do not dare to begin a

thermonuclear war against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, while the presidential campaign in the U.S.A. was under way in 1964, Mao Tse-tung openly called upon the American people to vote for the leader of the "hawks" Goldwater, who shamelessly urged war against the U.S.S.R., a world war. Inasmuch as Mao Tse-tung's plan to provoke a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear war cannot be realized to this day, he has turned his hopes on some local war growing into a U.S.-Soviet and world war.

For that reason he welcomes the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and wants it to continue as long as possible and acquire the largest possible scale. He welcomed the frontier conflict between India and Pakistan and opposed the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement of the differences between the two countries. For that reason he came out against the Tashkent talks and the agreement that was signed there. He welcomed Israel's war of aggression against the Arab states, a war inspired by U.S. imperialism, and was opposed to a halt of the Israeli forces and a cease-fire as preliminary steps towards abolishing the consequences of the aggression and restoring peace in the Middle East.

He does not give up hoping that the imperialists should continue fanning the flames of local wars in many parts of the world and that in the long run they would flare up into a raging conflagration of a U.S.-Soviet and world war. But his hope that local wars would develop into a world war have still not materialized and now he is endeavouring to incite it himself. He has already turned the Sino-Indian border into a major base from which he can stir up international tension and provoke military incidents between states whenever he wants to. He is trying to create a similar situation on the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese borders. He has repeatedly announced his intention of annexing the Mongolian People's Republic and seizing part of Soviet territory and carried out acts of provocation on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. In the future such provocations might increase in scale and become more numerous.

He has frankly stated that one of the aims of the so-called cultural revolution is preparation for an international war and that one of the aims of the hungweiping movement is likewise preparation for an international war. What is this international war for which Mao

Tse-tung is preparing? Were he preparing for a war against imperialism he would have never started a counter-revolutionary military coup, which was internally directed against the Communist Party and the people and externally against the Soviet Union and the International Communist movement, as a means of preparing for war. On the contrary, considering that he regards the anti-Soviet, anti-communist, anti-popular counterrevolutionary coup as a preparation for an international war, it is clear that his entire activity not only does not foreshadow some sort of international war against the U.S. imperialism, but, on the contrary, is designed to promote the anti-Soviet, anti-communist plans of the U.S. imperialists and to curry favor with them with expressions of loyalty.

In recent years he has been extending a hand of friendship to the neo-nazi and militarist ruling circles in West Germany. In the sphere of commercial and economic relations with China, the F.R.G. has already surpassed Britain and France and now holds first place among the European countries. The West German Government is co-operating with Mao Tse-tung in the armaments field and is sending specialists to help him expand the war industry, particularly the production of nuclear weapons and rockets. According to reports from different sources, Mao Tse-tung and Bonn are intending to establish closer political ties. It is common knowledge that co-operation between Mao Tse-tung and Bonn rests on anti-Sovietism, anti-communism, disruption of peace in Europe and Asia and incitement of a world war. Hence it is vital that the Chinese people and peace supporters in all countries should keep a vigilant eye on Mao Tse-tung's intrigues. In the current situation when he is beset by increasing difficulties and has to face ever gloomier prospects Mao Tse-tung, spurred on by his extreme selfishness and extreme nationalistic fanaticism can really plunge China into a reactionary and adventurist international wars.

Why is Mao Tse-tung so impatient to provoke a U.S.-Soviet and world war? Because he views it as a means of attaining his extreme individualistic and selfish aims. He believes that if he would succeed in provoking a U.S.-Soviet and world war, he would not only attain his goal of "killing two birds with one stone," but would also see his dream of "winning twice on one stake" come true. What he means by "killing two

birds with one stone" is that he wants a war in which while destroying the U.S.S.R. and the international communist movement, both deeply hated by him, the U.S.A. would also be destroyed together with other states whom he deeply envies for having a higher level of economic and scientific development. His dream of "winning twice on one stake," if it were to come true, would permit him to spend the remainder of his years enjoying the longed-for life of a sovereign and ruler of that part of China's territory where, according to his imagination, "there would still be people," while at the same time he would make an attempt to realize his age-old dream of becoming the "master of the world" and instituting his rule over it on the ruins left in the wake of a world thermo-nuclear war.

5. In the economic sphere he is severing all ties with the world socialist system and transferring them to the capitalist camp.

This, above all, is clearly seen in the changes that have taken place in China's foreign trade. In 1950, right after the country's liberation, China's foreign trade still bore the old semicolonial features: 74 percent was with the capitalist countries of which 50 percent fell to the share of the imperialist states, while the share of the socialist countries and the U.S.S.R. was 26 and 23 percent respectively. By 1959, China's foreign trade had undergone radical changes: all foreign commerce with capitalist countries "dropped" to 32 percent of which the imperialist states accounted for 23 percent, at the same time trade with socialist countries went up to 68 percent including 60 percent with the U.S.S.R. Here we have a clear manifestation of the distinguishing feature of the foreign trade of a socialist country. But by 1967, the situation in China's foreign trade became even worse than in 1950: commerce with the non-socialist countries went up to 80 percent including 57 percent with imperialist states, while trade with socialist countries fell to 20 percent of which only 7 percent was with the U.S.S.R. Today China's chief trading partners are not only Britain and the countries of the British Commonwealth — Canada, New Zealand and Australia — not only Japan and West Germany but also the U.S.A. which Mao Tse-tung daily showers with invectives and curses but with which he has established economic ties through Hongkong. Thus, in the sphere of foreign economic relations China has once again become dependent on im-

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In the beginning of the 1960s, preparing to curtail economic ties with socialist countries Mao Tse-tung launched intensive propaganda of such thoughts as "reliance on one's own forces" and "rejection of outside assistance." Today facts show that they were a pretext for severing foreign economic ties with the world socialist system and going over to the capitalist camp. He views as necessary economic co-operation with the capitalist world as part of his platform of "reliance on one's own forces," and economic ties with the world socialist system as unnecessary "outside assistance." All this is striking indication of the fact that in the sphere of foreign policy, just as in the sphere of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung has taken the road of political and economic rapprochement with the bourgeoisie directed against the proletariat and the working people, that he is supporting capitalism and is against socialism.

Such are the five principal crimes actually committed by Mao Tse-tung in the international sphere. There are indisputable facts proving these crimes, and they cannot be disproved by whatever demagoguery Mao Tse-tung and his group may resort to. The crimes of Mao Tse-tung and his group in international affairs just as in China's internal affairs, merely play into the hands of imperialist circles and reactionaries in all countries headed by the U.S.A. Therefore they have been welcomed in imperialist countries with unfeigned pleasure. Former U.S. President Johnson, former State Secretary Dean Rusk, former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara repeatedly spoke in favor of hastening the adjustment of U.S.-Chinese relations and establishment of U.S. co-operation with Mao Tse-tung in the Far East.

A conference of U.S. specialists on the Far East frankly declared that the White House is staking on Mao Tse-tung because his victory in the cultural revolution would be in the interests of the U.S.A. Expressing hopes for the establishment of co-operation with Mao Tse-tung, the U.S. Government has not only permitted U.S. publishers to issue Mao Tse-tung's "book of quotations" and sell them in the U.S.A., but has also sanctioned their export, thus helping Mao Tse-tung to spread his "book of quotations."

It is universally known that Spain's fascist secret police and the neo-nazi West German secret service more than anything else fear the publications of the Spanish and German Communist Parties or any other Communist litera-

ture and prohibit their dissemination. Nonetheless, they do not ban the anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda materials put out by Mao Tse-tung. On the contrary they help spread these materials and even frequently reprint them. All this leaves no doubt as to who are Mao Tse-tung's friends today and against whom their joint efforts are directed.

No matter how Mao Tse-tung and his group shift and dodge and no matter what screen they set up around themselves — whether it be the slogan of "struggle against modern revisionism" or the slogans "spur the world revolution" and "support the national liberation movement," and no matter what double-dealing they engage in under the mask of "we are against the U.S.S.R. and against the U.S.A." in order to camouflage their anti-Sovietism and their make-believe struggle against U.S. imperialism, no matter what old and new intrigues they may employ to conceal their activity — they cannot cover up the real character of their anti-Soviet, anti-communist and man-hating crimes in international affairs. The five crimes they have committed, are five indictments written with their own hand.

Inasmuch as such 10 major crimes inside the country and 5 major crimes in international affairs were perpetuated on the initiative, under the personal supervision and on instructions of Mao Tse-tung, he has become not only an enemy of the Communist Party of China but also the common enemy of the international communist movement. He has become not only the enemy of the Chinese people, but the common enemy of the entire progressive and peace-loving humanity.

Mao Tse-tung spares no effort to commit every kind of infamy chiefly for the sake of achieving his extremely egoistic goals, namely while he lives he wants to preserve his unlimited imperial rule in China and to prevent anyone from overthrowing his power. And when he will leave this world nobody will be able to make him pay for the terrible crimes he committed during his lifetime. Yet facts show that his intentions are not destined to materialize and that everything will be totally unlike his expectations.

Mao Tse-tung is aware of his real position and realizes the dangers arising from his hostility towards the Communist Party of China and the international communist movement, towards the whole Chinese nation and all progressive and peace-loving mankind. He can be likened with a coward who is

walking in a cemetery at night and trying to dispel his fright by whistling. He requires a daily dose of sedatives. And so on his instructions Chinese newspaper editors daily give a great deal of space to articles describing how the Changs, Wans, Lis and Chaos throughout their country "dearly love Chairman Mao," how they are "devoted to Chairman Mao" and wish him "long, long years."

They also publish other stereotype eulogies, which can only evoke a feeling of disgust and loathing. This is supplemented by false reports allegedly coming from abroad that in all countries citizens A, B, C, D, etc. "dearly love Mao Tse-tung," that they are "devoted to Mao Tse-tung," and his "thought" and that they wish him "innumerable years of life." All this is just as shameless and absurd as his personal deification as the "sun," or all the all-seeing and omnipotent "living god". All this is just as comical and ridiculous as his claims that his "thoughts" are a talisman capable of "miraculously and immediately transforming any wish into reality," and that his "Three Old Articles," "Book of Quotations" and "Selected Works" are a "Magic Encyclopaedia" or "sacred books." All this is by no means a sign of his strength, but of his extreme weakness. It shows his morbid fear and desperation of a person held in a vice of difficulties at home and abroad, of a man abandoned by his near ones and associates, a man who in solitude faces a dismal future.

No matter what Mao Tse-tung invents or does to elevate or praise himself, to deceive or soothe himself, historical facts prove that only one destiny awaits a man such as Mao Tse-tung is today, and that destiny is inevitable defeat, which neither charlatanism, incantations, demagoguery, slander, nor resort to killings, arson "rebellions," "capture of power" or other like methods can avert. Such is the irrevocable law of historical development. And such will be the inevitable end of Mao Tse-tung, of his "thought" and of his policy.

Why has Mao Tse-tung fallen so low? It is by no means an unexpected phenomenon but the inevitable outcome of the natural evolution of the thought and policy of Mao Tse-tung over the decades. All this has its ideological and theoretical as well as historical and social roots. But these questions have to be studied separately.

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