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S. Viets Build Schools

CPYRGHT

Education Expands Rapidly

By Harry Trimborn
Los Angeles Times

SAIGON—Teachers are murdered by Vietcong terrorists or killed by the crossfire of soldiers. Students are torn from their studies to join a stream of refugees.

Schools become military barracks or shelter for the homeless. Classrooms, textbooks and libraries vanish in the flames of combat.

Such is the impact of war on education in South Vietnam. Yet amid the turmoil, education flourishes.

There are more children being taught by more teachers in more classrooms than at any other time in the short, turbulent history of the nation.

In 1954, the year Vietnam was split into a northern and southern zone, the number of children attending elementary school in the southern portion numbered 500,000. This year the figure is slightly more than 2 million or 80 per cent of the population in the 6 to 11 year age group.

Hopes for Future

The Ministry of Education hopes to increase the figure to 85 per cent by 1970.

In the last four years more than 700 classrooms were destroyed in the fighting. Yet in the past two years alone, nearly 14,000 new classrooms have been built throughout the country.

Since 1967, about 15,000 elementary schoolteachers have been trained, to bring the total number of teachers in the nation to over 35,000. There are 600 high schools and five col-

leges and universities were generally spared acts of terrorism. Unlike elementary schools in remote and vulnerable areas, high schools and colleges are located in cities which generally remain in firm control of government forces.

Desire for Education

The relatively healthy state of education in the midst of war is due largely to the desire of the people to have their children educated.

"This is the most thrilling aspect of the whole educational program in this country," said Harold Winer, who as assistant director for education for the U.S. AID program here is the chief American coordinator for joint U.S.-Vietnamese educational programs.

"I have never seen a people of any country in which I have worked over the years respond so willingly and so unselfishly to the needs of education. They will do anything, they will give their last piaster to get a school going in their community."

It is this zeal, according to Winer, that keeps the Vietcong from mounting any large-scale, concerted, efforts to disrupt governmental educational programs.

Early in War

"In the early days of the war, the VC made strenuous efforts to disrupt educational programs," Winer said. "They would destroy schools, kill and intimidate teachers."

The terrorism against teachers was part of the Vietcong policy of rooting out pro-government leaders in hamlets and villages. And teachers, by virtue of their positions, were at least potential community leaders.

Where there was no direct violence against teachers, the Vietcong would often force them to witness the executions of other Communist victims.

The terror tactics were largely limited to the elementary schools in rural communities. Teachers at the nation's 600 high schools and five col-

leges and universities were generally spared acts of terrorism.

Unlike elementary schools in remote and vulnerable areas, high schools and colleges are located in cities which generally remain in firm control of government forces.

Fallen Off

Yet violence against schools and teachers in the remote areas has fallen off in the last few years because, according to Winer, the Vietcong has learned that such action is "counter-productive."

"I know of nothing that has aroused the hatred of the people toward VC activity as the destruction of a classroom or the killing of a teacher," Winer said. "The people will sometimes gloss over other disruptive activity, but not when it comes to education and the opportunities it offers for a better life for their children."

While teachers may no longer be singled out for death by the Vietcong, the fear remains. Winer said it was difficult to induce teachers from the cities to take assignments in remote hamlets because of Vietcong activity

No VC Program

Winer insisted that contrary to published reports there is no evidence that the Vietcong has established an educational program for the people, outside the purely political indoctrination courses.

"We have yet to find any place where the VC have organized a fully operating school program," he said. "In contested areas there is generally nothing going on at all. However, in some of the areas where the government has control by day and the VC by night, we do conduct classes during the daytime."

In the secondary schools and in the colleges and universities, the Vietcong makes some attempt to infiltrate the student body for propaganda purposes. Such attempts are feeble and quickly suppressed, Winer said.

THE WASHINGTON POST,
20 July 1969

CPYRGHT

Ministates Raise U.N. Question: What Qualifies as a Country?

By Robert H. Estabrook
Washington Post Foreign Service

UNITED NATIONS—What is the definition of a nation? That, essentially, is what the United States has asked the Security Council to decide by proposing that it take up the admission of ministates to the United Nations—without arousing any detectable enthusiasm for the question on the part of the other 14 council members.

The United States has in mind suggesting in closed session to the Council membership committee an as yet undisclosed checklist based on population, area and economic resources by which the suitability of potential applicants might be judged.

At the root of the problem is that some of the smaller among the 128 present U.N. members can barely afford the \$50,000 minimum annual cost of representation. There are vast differences in population, area and resources among current members—yet under the doctrine of sovereign equality each has an equal vote in the General Assembly.

For example, India, population around 480 million, has nearly 4700 times as many people as the Maldives Islands, population 103,000. The Maldives now operate an embassy in Washington and Ambassador

Abdul Sattar doubles as representative to the U.N. But for a time business with both the U.S. and U.N. was conducted from the Maldives' philatelic agency in New York.

Yet there is a strong possibility that 25 or more additional states, some of even smaller population, may soon seek full U.N. membership unless some other status is devised.

This was one of the considerations behind the July 14 letter from U.S. Ambassador William B. Buffum to Security Council President Ibrahim Boye of Senegal. Buffum noted that former U.S. ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg had raised the issue in December, 1957, and that Secretary General U Thant had taken it up on several occasions.

The letter endorsed Thant's call for a "study of the criteria for membership with a view to laying down the necessary limitations on full membership for the emerging states which are exceptionally small in area, population and human and economic resources, while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the 'micro-states' and the United Nations."

Under the U.N. Charter no membership criterion is established except that a state be

"peace-loving." Theoretically even Pitcairn Island, a British Pacific dependency of "Mutiny on the Bounty" fame with a population of about 90 persons, is eligible for membership. The General Assembly's colonialism committee appears to urge full independence for Pitcairn in a resolution annually submitted to the Assembly.

No one seriously expects this. Some smaller independent entities have deliberately decided not to take on the obligations of U.N. membership—among them Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Auru, San Marino and Western Samoa.

Moreover, size is not necessarily an index to usefulness and influence. Malta, with only twice the area and far less than half the population of the District of Columbia, proposed the study of the seabed that now occupies the world's great nations at Geneva.

But there are rumblings that less qualified applicants may be in the offing—for example, in the West Indies, where the British-sponsored associations are encountering some of the strains of other recent federations. Grenada, with only about 90,000 population, has inquired about observer status

at the U.N. Anguilla, the Caribbean island of 7000 where British troops intervened this spring, had spoken similarly.

From the American standpoint, a potential worry is the Pacific Trust Territory of Micronesia, where several entities might seek separate status without an inducement to association. The colonialism committee already claims jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa.

What accounts for the lack of enthusiasm in the Security Council about taking up the question is that some new countries, jealous of their prerogatives, fear that an attempt may be made to institute a system of weighted voting in the Assembly.

There is little chance any such change would be approved on its face.

But big powers have been reluctant to risk offending smaller delegations whose votes they may need on other issues by seeming to propose a limitation.

A genuine problem exists but it is hard to find diplomats from other countries who believe that the current U.S. move stands much greater chance of success than previous stillborn efforts.

CPMONT, Paris
29 May 1969

According to a Poll Taken by COFREMCA

THREE-FOURTH OF FRENCH OPINION FAVORS KEEPING FRANCE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

According to an opinion poll taken by COFREMCA from 15 April to 15 May at the request of the French Association for NATO (1), 74.3% of all Frenchmen polled believe that France should stay in the Atlantic Alliance, 11.5% believe she should get out, and 14.2% had no opinion.

This poll, which covered 2,250,000 people also revealed that 25.3% of Frenchmen believe that France is still a full NATO member, 21.5% of those questioned failed to answer on this point, and 46.9% of those questioned were in agreement with the statement. "France must remain in the Alliance because, in case of conflict, France has need of the United States."

In reply to the question: "Can the military force actually at the disposal of France assure her an adequate defence?" 59.7% of the answers were negative, 29.2% said yes, and 11.1% had no opinion.

51.7% of those questioned believe that it is in the best interests of France to maintain relations with the United States; 37.1% said they were "pretty much in agreement" with the statement and only 3.1% "disagreed completely."

The COFREMCA poll also brought out some interesting results on opinions about Franco-German relations. To the question: "Is there at this moment a country that is likely to develop into an adversary of France?" 29.8% of the people answered yes, 7.4% named Germany as the country, which trailed after China (9.5%). This tendency was stronger in the north and east of France where 10.7% of all those questioned feared Germany. Elsewhere 57.2% of French opinion, reflected in the poll, estimate that a foreign country represents an "economic danger" to France and among them, 28.4% believe that Germany is the danger.

(1) The French Association for the Atlantic Community (A.F.C.A.)
185, rue de la Pompe, Paris 16:e.

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SELON UN SONDAGE DE LA COFREMCA

Les trois quarts des Français sont pour le maintien de la France dans l'alliance atlantique

Selon un sondage d'opinion réalisé par la COFREMCA entre le 15 avril et le 15 mai à la demande de l'Association française pour la Communauté atlantique (1), 74,3 % des Français estiment que la France doit rester dans l'alliance atlantique, 11,5 % pensent qu'elle devrait s'en retirer, 14,2 % n'ont pas d'opinion.

Ce sondage, qui porte sur deux mille deux cent cinquante personnes interrogées, révèle d'autre part que 25,3 % des Français croient que la France fait encore partie de l'OTAN, 21,5 % des personnes interrogées ignorant la réponse à cette question, 46,9 % des personnes interrogées sont d'accord avec l'affirmation: « Il faut que la France reste dans l'alliance, car on a besoin des Etats-Unis en cas de conflit. »

A la question: « La force militaire dont la France dispose actuellement peut-elle assurer efficacement sa défense ? », les réponses donnent 59,7 % non, 29,2 % oui et 11,1 % sans opinion.

51,7 % des personnes interrogées estiment que l'intérêt de la France lui commande de

rester en relations avec les Etats-Unis: 37,1 % se disent « plutôt d'accord » avec cette opinion; 3,1 % seulement se disent « pas du tout d'accord ».

Le sondage de la COFREMCA fait encore apparaître des résultats intéressants à propos des relations franco-allemandes. A la question: « Y a-t-il au moment un pays susceptible de devenir un adversaire de la France ? », sur 29,8 % de personnes ayant répondu oui, 7,4 % estiment que ce pays est l'Allemagne, qui vient ainsi après la Chine (9,5 %). Cette tendance est encore plus accentuée dans le nord et l'est de la France, où 10,70 % des personnes interrogées craignent l'Allemagne. D'autre part, 57,2 % des Français, selon ce sondage, estiment qu'un pays étranger représente un « danger économique » pour la France, et 28,4 % croient que l'Allemagne constitue ce danger.

185, rue de la Pompe, Paris-16^e.

BOGOTA DOMESTIC SERVICE
3 July 1969 CPYRGHT
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PRESIDENT CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO'S FIRESIDE CHAT

(Excerpts) I wish to devote tonight's chat to two principal subjects. First, to comment on my visit to the United States, and second, to refer to my meeting with the members of the political directorates and the committees which were formed to prepare parliamentary work.

I will merely emphasize some of the chief aspects of Colombia's position, with which I believe the opinion of my countrymen is identified, but which I hope will become firmer in the consciences of all, because I believe that they constitute a good path for the future.

I have not felt it convenient for Latin America, particularly not for Colombia, to weaken the inter-American system, but on the contrary, to strengthen it. The truth is that within this inter-American system there is a large power--the United States--highly superior because of its resources, population, and means, to all the other members of the Pan American community. But we are playing within certain rules of the group which recognize the juridical equality of states. Experience has shown that there have been deviations and that the principles of the inter-American system have not always been followed faithfully. Within this system the deviations can be corrected, seeking perfection, and this is what we must do.

The consequences of an economic policy of continental complementation would be extraordinary, because it is not the same to join poor markets through economic integration as it is to have easy access to a market of the immense buying capacity of the United States.

I fail to see why, when there are protests against international injustices, against the wide gaps between highly industrialized nations and those undergoing development, these protests are directed against the United States, as if there were no other industrialized nations with different political ((word indistinct)). Our problem--the gap--does not only exist with the United States, it also exists with the USSR, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and with all highly industrialized nations.

Naturally, the constant increase of open and latent unemployment gradually created a vast social problem. It increases this gap, this inequality, it causes--as I said in the United States--prosperity to be divided, making a sector of the world very prosperous and making another poorer and more backward. What can we do to reduce this gap? Attack the United States, or cooperate within the inter-American system to seek the development of a better policy? On this, I wish to say something which seems elemental, but which people do not consider. When the United States is mentioned people tend to personify the United States as if it involved one individual--the old image of Uncle Sam with his striped trousers, high hat,

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~~and beard--the rich old Uncle Sam on whose will depends many things, be it the price of coffee, the granting of loans, tariffs, the conditions imposed on navigation, and so forth.~~

We must abandon this simple idea and convince ourselves that in our relations with the United States we must start out with the idea that we are facing a country of extreme complexity. There is not a single will deciding all things. There is an executive branch which is quite strong, there is a Presidential regime, but there is also a Congress which has special powers and whose will is decisive in many cases and which naturally is influenced by the different sectors and interests of the U.S. people. The United States is like everywhere else; there are capital, labor, and regional interests which make themselves heard, which pressure their representatives, the members of the House of Representatives and the senators. There are pressure groups such as those existing among us and in other nations. Therefore, we must work to change our situation, not by saying "the United States simply does not want to give us this or that," but on finding out what we can do in each case, what we can change with the executive branch, and what we must do to create a good public image in the United States.

I have proposed a congress of U.S. and Latin American unions to study the problem of unemployment. The gravity of unemployment in Latin America is a reality which the U.S. workers and union leaders should clearly understand, because their understanding will contribute to the forming of public opinion. I have proposed this congress because I am confident in the generosity of criteria of the U.S. union leaders. Today I agreed with the labor minister to meet him on Saturday and with the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC) and the Union of Workers of Colombia (UTC) to see if we can arrange to hold this Pan American congress of labor unions in Bogota this December.

This idea has been met favorably by Colombia workers and I think it will be met favorably by the workers of Latin America. I think that to oppose this--a policy seeking to open more markets in the nation with the largest buying capacity--is a chauvinistic foolishness. ((This opposition would come)) out of hatred for the United States, because it is said that we will depend more on the United States if we sell them ore. Why are we complaining? We want to sell more, we want to export more. We must seek, through every means, an easy access to U.S. markets, because one has to sell to he who can buy, not to he who cannot afford to buy. It is foolish to think that to create a climate of solidarity to gain more markets means increasing our dependence, that it is sacrificing national autonomy. The international economic policy of Colombia cannot be oriented along those lines and, I repeat, we want to conduct it not only through embassies and foreign ministries, but by contacting the U.S. public and its different sectors and explaining the problem of the nations undergoing development in the continent.

August 1969

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

August 16-23	Helsinki	Youth and Student Conference on Vietnam, sponsored by the (Communist) International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.
August 18-28	Liège, Belgium	7th General Assembly of the (non-Communist) World Assembly of Youth.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	1st Anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, East German, Hungarian, Polish and Bulgarian forces of the Warsaw Pact.
August 24	NATO	20th Anniversary, NATO Treaty (signed April 4) which went into effect in 1949.
August 24	Soviet Union	30th Anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact.
August 25	France	25th Anniversary of the Liberation of Paris by French and U.S. forces, 1944.
August 28	Czechoslovakia	25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising against the Nazi German occupation, 1944.
September 1		30th Anniversary of the beginning of World War II -- Germany invaded Poland from the West September 1; USSR invaded Poland from the East, September 17, 1939.
October 1	China	20th Anniversary, Chinese Peoples' Republic which was proclaimed 21 September 1949 and has since been celebrated 1 October.
October 10-12	Vienna	Conference on European Security sponsored by (Communist) World Council of Peace.
October 17-31	Budapest	7th Congress of (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions -- the front that publicly protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year (and has since avoided the issue).
October 23 - November 4	Budapest	Anniversary of 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

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THE ECONOMIST; London
21 June 1969



No Partnership with Him

It is pretty clear that we are getting close to the limits of coexistence with Mr Brezhnev's Russia

It is time we made our minds up about Mr Brezhnev's Russia. The idea that the Soviet Union under Mr Brezhnev is still basically the same country as it was under Mr Khrushchev is no longer tenable. This week the Russian ambassador in London has apparently been pursuing his government's attempt to get two Russian spies out of a British prison by one of the most blatant pieces of blackmail a major power has resorted to this century. Back in Moscow Mr Brezhnev has got most of the world's communist parties to sign a document which, though it does not specifically mention the invasion of Czechoslovakia, may yet be used by the Russians to justify doing to other people what they did to the Czechs in the name of the "international duty of communists" as laid down in part two of Tuesday's declaration. It is too simple to say that the post-Khrushchev regime in Russia has reverted to the habits of stalinism. The Romans, after their relative relaxation under Claudius, did not get a return to tiberianism. They got Nero. Mr Brezhnev's Russia has much in common with Nero's Rome: not least in the fact that the dominant interest of its ruler has become the preservation of an impossibly inflexible power-structure.

The handful of men in the western world who chiefly have to deal with this phenomenon can no longer escape the question of what their policy towards Russia really is. To some of them this may seem a puzzling question. President Nixon will point out that the United States is already involved in an attempt to work out a joint Russian-American policy for the Middle East, and that it has just told the Russians it will be ready to start negotiating by the end of next month about the number of nuclear missiles the two great powers should allow each other to have. Herr Kiesinger will say that his coalition in Bonn, whatever else it has failed to do, has finally dropped Dr Adenauer's old intransigence about eastern Europe. President Pompidou is probably calculating right now the extent to which he, like General de Gaulle before him, will have to buy the quiescence of the French communist party by tailoring his foreign policy to Russian interests. Don't all these things add up to a policy?

The answer is that they do not, because they are based on an assessment of what is happening in Russia that is now out of date. No doubt many of the things that the western powers are doing at the moment in their relationship with Russia are desirable. Some of them are essential. But it is no longer possible to believe, as it was in Mr Khrushchev's last years in power and in the brief period when Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin seemed to be continuing his policies, that the process of negotiation will create its own momentum: that a deal here, and an understanding there, will broaden out into a general programme of east-west co-operation. The momentum just doesn't exist.

This paper said in November, 1965, that President Johnson ought to take a calculated risk:

It is a choice between an old priority and a new one—to put it bluntly, between picking the Germans as the main people to do business with, and picking the Russians. . . . This paper thinks that on balance the best and most adventurous course for President Johnson to follow in 1966 will be to try to do business with the Soviet Union.

We therefore agreed with his decision to drop the idea of putting German sailors aboard a fleet of missile-carrying ships. We welcomed the speech in October, 1966, in which Mr Johnson offered in effect to accept the existing division of Europe in the hope of encouraging a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. That policy has borne some fruit: it has produced, among other things, the non-proliferation treaty. But it seems clear that, for the time being at least, it is now approaching the end of its usefulness.

The Soviet Union has changed a great deal since 1965. It has decided that it is not going to tolerate—as it then appeared it might—the hesitant experiments with reform that were beginning to take shape in parts of eastern Europe. It has dropped the lid on its own intellectuals. It was reasonable to hope in 1965 that the tide of events in Russia, and therefore in the countries Russia controls, was moving in the direction of a more liberal form of communism that could work in partnership with the capitalist democracies of the west. It has turned out that it was not. The issue, let it be emphasised, is not primarily a moral one. It is not the unpleasantness of the way things are run in Mr Brezhnev's world that makes it hard for the west to co-operate with Russia. It is the fact that the policy of repression to which Mr Brezhnev has committed himself at home inevitably affects the course of action he follows abroad. That showed itself in Czechoslovakia last August. It will presumably show itself just as clearly in the other causes he supports and opposes around the world. If Mr Brezhnev's chief aim in life is to perpetuate the existing power-system in the communist world—and that is surely the explanation of his insistence in calling this month's conference in Moscow—he is unlikely to be an amenable man for the rest of us to deal with.

So long as this state of things continues—and that means until Mr Brezhnev changes Russian policy, or is replaced by somebody who will—it is bound to be reflected in the way the west handles its relations with the Soviet Union. There are only two sorts of subject on which, in these circumstances, it will quite certainly be right to go on negotiating with the Russians. The first is the sort in which no great issue of ideology is involved. That means, above all, the Russian-American talks about missiles; since the aim of

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these talks is to prevent another round of the arms race, and to encourage the non-nuclear countries to stick by the non-proliferation treaty, it is in both sides' interest that the meeting both of them have now agreed to should take place as soon as possible. The second sort of negotiation worth going on with is that which is designed to stop a local quarrel turning into a superpowers' war. The one place where there is any real chance of bringing this off at the moment is the Middle East. It is remarkably hard to see how the United States can bring Israel—or Russia the Arabs—to accept any proposals they might draw up between them. But the mere fact of having worked out their ideas together might help the great powers to stay out of a war if one came; and the fact that the local preponderance of power, which would then settle the issue, seems to belong to Israel is no skin off Mr Nixon's nose.

But that is about it. The recent conduct of the Soviet Union has made it fair to say that, even in these two fields, Mr Nixon should tread pretty warily. Of course, it would be an excellent thing if the missile talks produced an agreement, to be enforced by inspection, that neither Russia nor America will build an anti-missile system or fit multiple warheads into its rockets. But that is not the same as to argue, as some of Mr Nixon's critics are arguing, that the United States should unilaterally stop the development of these two sorts of weapon without some means of checking that Russia has stopped work too. Not long ago that might have looked a risk worth taking. Mr Nixon is likely to be more cautious now. He will be equally cautious on the Middle East. The Americans will not want to give their approval to any formula that did not offer the Israelis effective protection against guerrilla attacks after their hypothetical withdrawal from the Suez canal and the Jordan.

It will be necessary to handle even these two essential sets of negotiations with considerable care. And when one looks at some of the other things the Russians have said they want to talk about it is even harder to see why the west should accommodate them. They are still putting an extraordinary lot of back-scratching into the attempt to organise what they call a European security conference. The objection to this is not that they are still trying, as they once were, to stop the United States from attending. They have given that one up. It is that the only apparent point of such a jamboree would be to extract from the western countries that turned up a formal and explicit recognition of the present division of Europe, Oder-Neisse line, Walter Ulbricht and all. One can see why the Russians would like this: they want to have their east European dependencies wrapped up and laid on the shelf so that they can deal with China. It

might even be worth taking them up on the idea if they were willing to extend to the west the same degree of co-operation in Asia that they are asking from it in Europe. But there is very little evidence that they are. Their help in bringing the Vietnam war to an end seems to have been, to put it generously, marginal. And the suggestion of a "collective security system in Asia" against China, which Mr Brezhnev threw out last week, is apparently designed to exclude the western powers. The article by Mr Matveyev in *Izvestia* on May 28th, which first produced the idea, mentioned only six Asian countries as Russia's possible partners.

Unless Mr Brezhnev explains that his ideas about Asia are broader-ranging than that, it will be possible to draw only one conclusion. The conclusion is that the Soviet Union wants to pursue its own policy in Asia, for its own ends, while it invites the western world to underwrite its failure in eastern Europe. There is not much there to attract the west's negotiators. It reinforces the impression created by almost everything else the Russians have done in the past year. The Brezhnev regime has let itself be frozen into a preoccupation with the salvaging of its own authority. It is motionless at home, repressive where it has the power to be abroad, and narrowly self-interested in its diplomacy. From such a government it is unrealistic to expect the imagination that would be needed to revive the hopes of real east-west co-operation. So long as it stays in power Mr Nixon and the rest of us will probably have to reckon that we are pretty close to the limits of coexistence.

The New Leader
July 27, 1969

Prague One Year Later

By Donald R. Shanor

PRAGUE

AS THE FIRST anniversary of the Soviet invasion approaches, it has become increasingly apparent that Dr. Gustav Husak's attempt to pacify Czechoslovakia with a policy of *Realismus* is beginning to yield diminishing returns. The question now is whether he will respond to opposition from the unions, intellectuals and liberal Communists with conciliation or with an even tougher line.

Last April, when Husak replaced Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary of the Communist party, his system for restoring order seemed so simple and effective that some people wondered why the Russians had not thought of it sooner. Where his popular predecessor had wavered and compromised in an attempt to save what he could of the progressive platform, Husak began at once to apply "realism" in every field.

That, the 56-year-old lawyer and Party veteran had demonstrated in his eight months as Slovak Party chief, meant realizing the Soviets have five or six troop divisions in his small country and it would not be wise to oppose them too vigorously. Once law and order is restored and criticism silenced, it was implied, the

to pursue the reformist goals of the halcyon period. The contradiction here, of course, is that one of the main objectives of the progressives was freedom to dissent from official policies and to express their criticism openly in free speech and a free press.

Husak's initial success in imposing controls on journalists, writers, students and the Party's lower echelons put the liberals in a mood of despair. The feeling was widespread that the real effects of the August 21, 1968, invasion were finally being felt; that all the maneuvering in the months between had been diversionary games tolerated by the Russians.

But of late the reformers have been cheering up. Husak's repressive actions, they now realize, were taken in situations where it was easy for him to overcome opposition. The battles he has yet to win involve much more complex power relations, and there are even some institutional safeguards on the side of the progressives.

It was simple, for example, to systematically purge those regional Party secretaries and presidium members who were too strongly identified with Dubcek and refused to recant after Husak came to power. In the space of a few weeks, no less than 37 presidium members were ousted, including the powerful Moravian chief, Josef Spacek, who along with Josef Smrkovsky lost his post on the national presidium in the same plenum that demoted Dubcek.

There was a parallel weeding out at the regional Party newspapers. Over the May Day holiday I called on the editors of *Nova Svoboda*, the Party journal in the grimy industrial city of Ostrava in Northern Moravia. All the editors, I was told, were enjoying the long weekend. When the nation returned to work, neither liberal editor in chief Ladislav Bublík nor his leading staff members were at their desks. They had been replaced by apparatchiks with no known jour-

nalistic experience but with political views.

The students proved more intractable. Nevertheless, when the Bohemian and Moravian Students' Union refused to join the National Front and thus submit to Party discipline, it was declared illegal and replaced by a new rump organization formed, among other purposes, to pay off the \$400,000 debt incurred after government support was cut off.

Opposition in the trade unions, meanwhile, has proved much harder to deal with. First the unions circulated the defiant speech of Frantisek Kriegel, who was dismissed from both Central Committee and Party last May for opposing the Husak line. Kriegel had been chairman of the National Front before the invasion and was one of the negotiators of the Moscow agreement in August. His resistance to the Soviets was so open and frank, though, that he was not permitted to sign that document. Soon afterward, his picture disappeared from the capital, the Party ouster being merely the delayed end of his career.

Typewritten copies of Kriegel's speech were subsequently read at meetings in the big plants in Ostrava and around Prague, however, and packed as much anti-Husak punch as his original delivery. The regime branded these gatherings "anarchistic" and said they were based on false information.

It was at this point that Husak acted against the students. Union members in five plants in the Prague area reacted with 15-minute strikes. Again there were recriminations, but no decisive action by the government.

Husak can oust regional leaders, change entire editorial staffs, and cut off student subsidies, but he knows he cannot jail or expel the tens of thousands of defiant workers who have taken part in these meetings. A skilled politician, he has included the chairman of the national union, Jaroslav Holacek, in the Party presidium in the hope

of controlling his liberal inclinations. If opposition gets worse, the labor leader and his lieutenants can be fired.

But a purge cannot reach down to the local level without causing grave political damage to Husak and the Russians. For in the nine months between the advent of the Dubcek reforms and the Soviet invasion, almost every factory in the country took advantage of the new freedom and replaced its entire union leadership. In public meeting after public meeting, the old bureaucrats were voted out of office and new slates put in.

The effect of this was immediately noticeable at the trade-union congress held early this spring. The assembled delegates demanded not only an economic but a political role for labor, and refused to subordinate the movement's power to the Communist party. A draft bill giving the workers far-reaching control in management and production decisions was passed. It is still being pushed back and forth in the government and will probably be either rejected or weakened beyond recognition.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, the congress showed labor's power as well as its determination to quit playing the traditional role of transmission belt for official policy. The later Kriegel meetings and the solidarity strikes with the students further confirmed this change.

If Husak wants meek and complacent unions again, there are plenty of unemployed former union leaders who would be glad to get their old posts back. Yet the change would involve another series of public meetings and an open vote, and it is likely that most of the progressives would be confirmed in their present jobs—or that if they were forced to bow to government pressure, the popular outcry would be worse for Husak than the present opposition.

Still, the regime has not been stripped of all its weapons. A union

official in one of the plants on the outskirts of Prague discussed one type of action it could take against the labor reformers:

"They're going to have to make a couple of arrests in the factories. There's no atmosphere of fear like there used to be. No one is afraid to speak out. Of course, this would mean an end to Husak's promises of not returning to the methods of the '50s. But it may be his only way of dealing with the unions."

One indication that the use of fear as a weapon is under consideration was the arrest of 19 persons, most of them youths, in the North Bohemian city of Teplice, in connection with the anti-Soviet rioting that followed the Czechoslovak hockey victory over the Russians at the end of March. The fact that 150 witnesses are scheduled to be called at the trial or trials points to maximum publicity and may mean that the fate of the defendants is intended to serve as an example to other unruly elements.

Another possible straw in the wind was a recent tough statement by Interior Minister Jan Pelnar against liberals, which evoked memories of the days when the Party leadership equated any form of criticism with treason. He charged that progressives who have left the country, including Professor Ivan Svitak, now at Columbia, "keep in touch with persons having the same objectives and who remained in Czechoslovakia." In Pelnar's view, the designs of native anti-Party forces are "almost identical" to Western intelligence plans "to disintegrate the unity of the Socialist camp."

It is but a short step from such accusations to charges of treason, as many thousands of Czechs and Slovaks can testify from their own experiences at the trials of the late '40s and '50s. More than 5,000 victims of that period have applied for rehabilitation proceedings, and every week the press has a few lines noting the annulment of a sentence

against someone found "in memoriam"—to have been involved in yet another rigged trial.

THE FACT that Husak has chosen to allow the rehabilitations to continue—one of the very few of the Dubcek programs he has kept—is considered a good sign by those who think he will deal with his opposition without the use or threat of terror. Another good omen, they feel, is Husak's own record as a political prisoner in the '50s and his struggle to obtain rehabilitation. A long letter he wrote to former President Antonin Novotny in those days had much the same rebellious significance as the current Kriegel speech. It, too, was circulated in typescript in the factories. If he has forgotten this, which is unlikely, some of his aides have not.

Both the pessimists and the optimists felt that Husak's performance at the recent Moscow meeting of world Communist leaders proved their point. The pessimists pointed to his lavish and frequent praise of the USSR as "the main pillar of the Socialist camp and of the international Communist movement." The optimists' argument was more subtle, being based on what the Party Secretary did not say. Despite what must have been considerable pressure, he did not justify the invasion and even went so far as to tell the forum that the Soviet action was based in part on faulty information about conditions in the other Parties.

"We are often asked the question: Did we have sufficient inner strength to defend Socialist achievements?" Husak observed. "Yes, we had enough strength!"

Justification of the Soviet action would have had the most serious consequences here. It would have given the Russians the proof they want: branding those who were running the government at the time, along with the editors of the clandestine newspapers and the broadcasters at the secret radio stations,

WASHINGTON POST
13 July 1969

Czech Workers Post Attack on

CPYRGH

Husak

Again, personal and political considerations must have had an influence on Husak's decision. After all, he was one of the most important speakers on the rebel Bratislava stations, and, as newly elected Slovak Party chief, one of the most quoted officials in the clandestine press. Indeed, he used the media in his power struggle against the collaborationist former Slovak leader Vasil Bilak.

Of course, there are many examples in the Communist movement of men who repudiated their earlier positions and allies to change their course. The pessimists use as their example Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka, who changed from the reformer of 1956 to the orthodox Party chieftain of 1969. The optimists like to cite the case of Hungary's Janos Kadar, who was put in office by the Soviets but has given his people a more liberal regime than any other outside Czechoslovakia.

PRAGUE, July 12 — Workers at Czechoslovakia's biggest steel mill posted a letter from chess champion Ludvik Pachman that "rudely attacked" Communist Party chief Gustav Husak, the Party daily Rude Pravo reported today.

The paper said some workers at the Ostrava mill, 170 miles east of here, stopped work for two hours to discuss the letter and vote in support of it.

Energetic steps would be taken against the factory union leadership for this "provocative attempt to affect the efforts of the Party," said Rude Pravo.

Pachman, a reformist who was suspended from the Communist Party recently for criticizing its current leaders, wrote the letter to the union

after the factory invited him and other reformists to a forum at the plant.

His letter, in which he defended himself, was pinned to the factory bulletin board, Rude Pravo said.

The paper accused "rightist forces" within the unions of attempts "to push the trade unions into a united front against socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union."

Rude Pravo also reported that a group of conservative Czechoslovak Communists met in Brno yesterday and agreed to enthusiastic applause to send a letter to the Soviet garrison at nearby Olomouc, thanking the Russian army for its help in "liquidating the danger of counter-revolutionary overthrow."

NEW YORK TIMES

CPYRGH JULY 1969 -

Czechoslovakia

The Workers 'Vote' With a Slowdown

PRAGUE—The next act of the Czechoslovakia drama is likely to unroll in the coal mines and foundries of Ostrava and the huge machine shops of Pilsen and suburban Prague. The antagonists are, on the one hand, the hard line faction that is at present in control of the Communist party apparatus and on the other, the sullen masses of workers.

The new Communist party chief, Dr. Gustav Husak, and his ultraconservative allies, who with Soviet backing seized power in April, are talking now in worried tones about carrying "the struggle against right-wing opportunist and anti-Socialist forces into the factories."

The workers say little. The trouble, for the regime, is that they work even less. They have stopped working at many plants and have started returning or tearing up Communist party membership cards.

The extent of dissatisfaction in the party was shown last week when it was announced that the ruling Presidium had replaced the director of its staff college. The announcement said "foreign centers of anti-Communism" had made deep inroads in the country in 1968 and 1969.

"About one half of all the party members in our workshop have openly left the Communist factory cells," a foreman in an engineering plant on the outskirts of the capital reported the other day. "Most of the others don't attend party meetings. We hold our own informal meetings in the canteen, discussing the day's news. The crunch will come when they send us Soviet soldiers disguised as workers."

"Volunteer" members of the Soviet forces stationed throughout the country have already

helpers in some farming cooperatives and factories in Slovakia. The official explanation is that the need of many Soviet soldiers for training or retraining in civilian jobs and Czechoslovakia's manpower shortages provide a splendid opportunity for fraternal cooperation between Socialist nations.

The regime seems still hesitant about opening the factory doors to the hated and despised occupants. Also in the western part of the country, Bohemia and Moravia, industry is far more advanced than in Slovakia and labor is more militant.

"If plant morale and discipline sink yet a little lower, the [Communist party] leadership may decide that every workshop needs its platoon of Soviet 'volunteers' and anything might happen then," the assistant manager of a combine in central Bohemia said. He is a hard core Communist but likes

to define himself with a little less grin "let's say a technocrat rather than a dogmatist."

Angry Retort

When the technocrat was asked for comment on the foreman's tale (no names were mentioned) he became angry and said: "You have not been told the whole story. Their cantier discussions are fine—but they hold them when they should stand at their lathes. Our workers are busy only on Saturdays and Sundays when they build their weekend houses, tinker with their motorcycles or moonlight. We are losing a lot of export business because we just don't work hard enough and we work less and less. Sure, we have no strike at the plant. But what's happening now is—I hate to use the word—sabotage."

Reports reaching Prague from many industrial areas agree indeed that production has impressively slowed down since May. No figures are yet available, but Premier Oldrich Cernik and other spokesmen of the regime have already warned that the drop in productivity has reached alarming proportions.

Doctrinaire Communists have been in charge of the Czechoslovak economy longer than in many other Socialist countries and incentives for labor have remained few and weak. Housing is insufficient and bad, and many consumer goods are scarce or shoddy. The liberal reformers who tried last year to free the economy of the worst constraints were all too soon replaced by conservatives.

The Soviet-led invasion and the fall from power of Alexander Dubcek and other popular liberals have demonstrably sapped working morale, increased absenteeism, loosened plant discipline and voided the prestige of the trade unions. Each one of Czechoslovakia's 60 or so unions carries the word "revolutionary" in its official title, but they are as revolutionary as the bureaucrats who run the economy. The trade unions are not allowed to organize strikes and expected to repress wildcat stoppages.

Nobody has yet been able to prove that the present go-slow strategy in the factories has been planned by clandestine leaders. It may be the expression of a mood or the result of an underground movement. Whatever the reason, the pro-Soviet regime

which managed to purge, censor, silence and isolate dissidents in the apparatus, and among journalists, writers, students and intellectuals seems at a loss how to make the disaffected factory hands work harder.

THE ECONOMIST, London
28 June 1969

Czechoslovakia CPYRGHT

Where the workers like the students

FROM OUR EAST EUROPE CORRESPONDENT

Student power is in its infancy in Czechoslovakia but the students are learning fast. If the Husak regime tries to force student bodies into political neutrality, it will discover it has a tough job on its hands. The experience of the past two years has obliged university students to recognise that political activity cannot be lightly set aside; it has become an integral part of everyday life and, in the words of a student leader, "the qualitative content has been improved."

The Czech students' union was outlawed on June 20th because it had allegedly violated laws protecting the state and made statements, at home and abroad, which were "at variance with the policy of the National Front and the Czechoslovak government." The ban was the culmination of a running feud which began last April when the students' congress in Olomouc, attended by representatives of 60,000 students in 65 faculties, voted against membership of the National Front, an umbrella body through which the party tries to control everything from boy scouts to the non-communist parties. The congress left it to the individual faculties to decide for themselves whether or not to join the National Front and only about half a dozen opted to do so. Economic retaliation followed. The subsidies to student bodies, which amount to more than 7 million crowns a year, were summarily halted after only 2 million had been spent.

This week Mr Toman, chairman of the metalworkers' union, interceded on the students' behalf and tried to discover more precise reasons for the ban on their union. He was given four reasons: that the union refused to join the National

Front; that it had contacts "with the American agent Szulc" (Tad Szulc, former *New York Times* correspondent); that it had made untrue statements to the western press; and, lastly, that the students were running commercial enterprises without paying taxes. This last charge is certainly true, although the students claim that as a social welfare body they are exempt. Before the August invasion, Czech youth was not slow to recognise the potentials of flourishing profit-making businesses—eight separate enterprises to be precise—ranging from an employment bureau and the production of souvenirs to a profitable bar and restaurant and a printing plant.

As Mr Toman's attempted mediation shows, the students have continued to maintain liaison with the trade unions in spite of official disapproval. A meeting of Prague locomotive workers has demanded that the ban on the students' union should be rescinded; and the metalworkers' union was talked out of full-scale strike action only when Mr Toman persuaded them that other methods would be more effective. The presidium of the students' union has condemned the ban as the act of "the bureaucratic power centre which has temporarily seized control in Czechoslovakia"; and an appeal against it has been filed both in the courts and direct to the Czech minister of the interior. In that characteristically Czech foot-dragging manner the union continues to function normally—it is vacation time—until the appeal is heard.

The party, meanwhile, has announced the formation of the preparatory committee of a new student movement for the party faithful. Of eight members of this committee, six are from military officers' academies and the other two are known party stalwarts. Its aim is to "overcome the deficiencies of the former student organisation." It seems improbable that this splinter organisation will enjoy any more popular support than the orthodox journalists' union which went straight to the bottom of the creek when it was launched over two months ago. Much, however, depends on the degree to which the majority of students place material benefits above the political independence of their dissident organisation; for the government has seen fit to hit where it is likely to hurt most.

CPYRGHT
 LONDON TIMES
 19 July 1969

Defiant resolve by Czech students

By RICHARD DAVY

The full text of the defiant resolution passed by the Czech student parliament on July 2 has now reached London. It shows that the Union of University Students of Bohemia and Moravia (S.V.S.) intends to continue work in spite of the ban imposed by the Czech Ministry of the Interior on June 20. The union has appealed against the ban, which means that its activities are not officially illegal until the appeal is rejected, which it almost certainly will be.

A striking point about the document is that it gives full support to the elected leadership of the union, a fairly radical group headed by the president, Mr. Karel Kovanda, which did not enjoy such solid backing until it was subjected to clumsy governmental pressures and attempts to set up a rival leadership with official backing. These pressures rallied students who were beginning to drift back into apathy or who were succumbing to the financial and other temptations of official approval.

The resolution calls on the students to boycott the officially sponsored rival leadership, described as a preparatory committee, and "in the event of the S.V.S. being liquidated to maintain the continuity of the existing organization on the lines of its adopted and generally respected views and organizational structure, and to discuss forms and procedures for further action after the school year reopens".

The resolution rejects the official party line adopted by the Central Committee in May, saying that it negates "the national process of democratization and humanization of our society started after January, 1968, and forcibly interrupted by the intervention of the Warsaw Pact armies in August, 1968".

It appeals to the trade unions to express their views on the attempts to abolish the S.V.S. and to cancel its various agreements with the unions, signed since August last year. (These agreements have been regarded as very significant by students and workers, and as very dangerous by the party leadership.)

There could also be trouble over the resolution's call for special meetings to be held in schools on International Students' Day, November 17, and for "pious manifestations and meetings in schools" on January 19, the anniversary of the death of Jan Palach, the student who set fire to himself in the Wenceslas Square in protest against the abandonment of last year's reforms.

The preamble to the resolution strongly emphasizes the socialist convictions of the students and their desire to "engage themselves through their work in realizing the humanistic goals of socialism" as expressed in the party policy of last year.

In a particularly powerful passage the resolution condemns present policies: "Vast purges and the return of discredited personalities into responsible positions, the attacks on culture, including personal attacks, the banning of magazines, absurd censorship, &c., attacks on the most elementary rights of the working class, banning workers' councils in factories and preparing the abolition of those already in existence, paralysing independent trade union policy, violating basic civil rights, restricting the right of assembly, postponing elections, attempting to replace law with political statements, the speeches of leading politicians—all this forces us to reject the present manner of policy-making, the main feature of which is the exclusion of the working class from the making of decisions concerning society as a whole."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
 10 July 1969

Disaffection rife in Czech party

By Eric Bourne

Special correspondent of
 The Christian Science Monitor

CPYRGHT

Prague

Widespread disaffection exists within the Communist Party here over the hard course of events since Gustav Husak took over the leadership. This is officially admitted here.

Party recruitment in the first quarter of this year was the lowest for any three-month period since 1952. There were also five times as many expulsions, resignations, and drop-outs. These exceeded 21,000—again the highest figure since the '50's.

It is credibly said, moreover, that the pace has quickened, that the decline in membership is now much higher.

CPYRGHT

There is also an extensive movement to withhold party dues. In some area organizations this involves up to 30 percent of the members. Dr. Husak has admitted to poor attendance at many party meetings called to take up the task of rebuilding discipline and to make the personnel changes required to eliminate "liberal" influence.

There have been refusals to "take a stand" on the leadership's efforts to implement the stern measures sanctioned by the Central Committee following the change at the top. It has not been easy, often, to find candidates willing as well as competent to take over from the reformers.

From the dogmatists' point of view a smaller, more disciplined party would be preferable to the mass party (1.5 million) in which progress is made by a small majority—even though its ability to in-

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being at least, has been shattered.

But the disenchantment reaches beyond the party into every sphere of Czech life — workers, intellectuals, and youth.

The radical reforms in factory management and the new authority foreseen for the labor unions prior to the invasion — workers' councils to help determine working conditions somewhat akin to the Yugoslav model or, at least, matching the enhanced role of the Hungarian unions — have all been shelved.

To this has been added the burden of an austerity program, an antiinflation move which the government could not avoid under the present economic stress. But higher prices, cancellation of the "13th month" — the bonus on the yearly earnings — and the curbs on wage increases until productivity improves have all fanned the political bitterness.

Efforts by party groups on the workshop floor—outnumbered 5-1 in some cases—to combat "anarchic tendencies" and gain control of union organizations in some of the biggest plants here have failed.

There is the same threat of withheld dues, as in the party, as a gesture of political protest. A crop of brief stoppages in support of the banned Czech student union showed that the solidarity between workers and youth is not yet broken.

The student union was dissolved last month because of activities "at variance with the policy of the National Front and the government."

Spate of tough oratory

The student presidium called the ban an act of "the bureaucratic power center which has temporarily seized control of the Central Committee" and announced an appeal to the courts.

The outcome is predictable. But the students seem not to have lost all heart. They still wear emblems as symbols, not of "opposition" to Czechoslovakia's "socialist" state but of "resistance" to the occupation and the status to which they see their coun-

human face" reduced.

They have shown no greater response to the government's plan for a new union than the Czech journalists to the proposal that they create an officially approved body in place of their own formerly militant organization.

Despite all its campaigning — and a spate of tough oratory recently by Dr. Husak, Lubomir Strougal, the "gray eminence" at the head of Czech party affairs, and others — the leadership is not thus far "communicating" with or reaching Czech public opinion.

Students and factory workers apart, ordinary people also just do not accept the view they are being asked to swallow of the "mistakes" of the reform movement and the iniquities now being attributed to some of its leading figures as an exculpation of the Soviet "anxiety."

Officials disturbed

Talk in public — in the cafés and on the trams—has in no way been subdued. It is striking evidence of continuing unity and of how deep the promise of the "Prague spring" penetrated into the hearts and lives of the vast majority of the nation.

Even those reform-minded officials, loyal party veterans who accepted Dr. Husak's "realistic" view of the situation and the course he advocated as the only way out of the crisis, are disturbed by the extremes of language and what may be termed a lack of "public relations" in the way it is now presented.

"Firm leadership is one thing," one official remarked. "I did not expect it to be like this."

The Soviet charges of "counterrevolution" — though neither they nor anyone else has yet identified its leaders — the "antisocialism" and "rightist opportunism" of many leading reform champions have all been conceded.

Only endorsement of the invasion itself—that it was "justified"—is still withheld. But Rude Pravo, the official party daily (now completely in the hands of the dogmatists), came close to the mark June 24. It described

Czechoslovakia is 'normal' again but seething

Anti-Russian feeling of today is as intense as anti-Nazi feeling of the past

By STUART S. SMITH

GUSTAV HUSAK has "normalized" Czechoslovakia to the extent that it is once again an outwardly orthodox Soviet satellite, but under the surface this occupied country seethes with anti-Russian animosity.

The cold war may have abated as far as the rest of Europe is concerned, but the Czech and Slovak peoples hate Soviet agents and their local collaborators with all the intensity of their hate for the Nazis a generation ago.

Not just youth

Leaflets written by a students-and-workers group and currently being distributed in Prague call upon the country's populace to celebrate August 21, the first anniversary of the Warsaw powers' invasion "boundless

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scorn for the Moscow overlords and the Husak lackey."

But it is not just the politically active youth and workers who are involved in the continual campaign to rebuke the Russians. Czechoslovak citizens in general, and especially the children, take every opportunity to show their contempt.

A few weeks ago a 15-year-old Czech boy went on a vacation trip with his high school class to a small Moravian town near the Polish border. Shortly after his arrival he sent home a postcard which read:

"Dear mom and dad, we got here O.K. Opposite the station there are a lot of Russians—a whole pigpenful. In the evening they come to our restaurant and get drunk. Then they start shouting and shooting for the fun of it. They keep on yelling: 'Everything for our beloved country.' See you soon. Love, Jiri."

Hungarian feelings

The anti-Russian feeling in Czechoslovakia is much stronger than it is in other East European countries because the Soviet troops shot up so many Czech and

Slovak cities—including Prague, Bratislava, Pilsen, Brno—with little or no justification.

Hungarians, although embittered over the Russians, can occasionally be made

to admit that the 1956 uprising, during which many Soviet soldiers were killed, was a provocation the Kremlin could hardly ignore. The Czechs and Slovaks, however, swear they will never forgive Russia for stabbing their country in the back just a few weeks after the Prague party and government leadership had once again sworn allegiance to Moscow and the Warsaw Pact.

Russian courses in school

During the past several weeks Czechoslovak pupils from all over the country have been driven to Prague to see an old play at the Children's Theater. The line which always gets the best hand is an anachronism someone surreptitiously wrote into the dialogue: "Why does our National Museum have the chicken pox?" The reference is to the machine-gun bullet scars which still disfigure the museum's facade and which liberal Czechoslovak leaders swear will be left as a reminder of last summer's invasion.

Czechoslovak schools are having a hard time getting pupils to take the compulsory Russian courses. Even before the invasion the children complained that they resented learning a language they had virtually no use for. They pointed out that even though the Soviet Union was an allied country it was almost impossible for Czechs or Slovaks to get visas to travel there on private trips. Since the invasion, of course, no one wants to anyway.

Not long ago a Russian-class teacher in a Prague school held a test for his 24 pupils. Only seven turned up. The others were suddenly sick.

The situation is so bad that even *Rude Pravo*, the official Czechoslovak Communist party newspaper, can no longer overlook it. It is disgusting, the paper wrote recently, that whenever the Soviet Union is mentioned in school, a loud hum or buzzing breaks out among the students.

Another issue of the paper carried a letter from a 12-year-old boy who wrote: "Burning Soviet flags expresses the feelings of our people."

WASHINGTON POST

CPYRGHT July 1969

CPYRGHT

Czech Exiles Despair of Return Under Husak

Washington Post Foreign Service

GENEVA, July 16—The coming to power of the hard-line regime of Gustav Husak has increased the flight of Czechoslovaks from their homeland, and has uprooted many exiles already settled in Western Europe, leading them to set out on a second migration, this time overseas.

Officials in international refugee organizations here attribute the new movement of Czechoslovaks from Europe to the Western Hemisphere, Australia and South Africa to the loss of hope among them of returning home when the situation inside Czechoslovakia improves.

A few months after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on Aug. 20-21 last year, the flow of emigrants settled down to about 600 a week, according to figures here. With the advent of the Husak government in the spring, the tally jumped to about 800 and before the summer is out it is expected to rise to 1000.

It is estimated that a total of 80,000 Czechoslovaks have emigrated in the last 11 months, almost all of them legally departing on tourist permits to other Communist bloc lands and hence making their way to Austria—or to Switzerland, West Germany and Austria on passports which the Czechoslovak government has hitherto granted fairly freely.

The emigrants have been of a very high level of skill, ability and education and hence eminently employable. Some 10,000 have found jobs in Switzerland, including 200 doctors, and 15,000 in West Germany. Between 7000 and 8000 have gone to Canada.

Meantime, the quota of 10,200 political refugees that the United States agrees to accept each year was filled in the fiscal year ending June 30, mostly by Czechoslovaks. It is expected to be filled again in the present year.

As of last month, there were 13,532 Czechoslovaks in refugee camps, mainly in Austria and West Germany, awaiting processing for migration and

resettlement. As distinct from the fugitives of the period immediately following World War II, officials believe there will be little trouble in finding new homes and good jobs for all but a few of the Czechoslovaks.

Countries Interested

Canada, Australia and South Africa seem eager for Czechoslovak workers, a large proportion of whom are skilled or are professionals, and some South American countries have also become interested.

"The labor-hungry countries used to get their muscle from the steady flow of Yugoslavian emigrants," a refugee official explained here, "and now the Czechs supply the brains they want."

The resettlement problem is, to some degree increased by those Czechoslovaks who have decided to leave Europe now that the Husak regime spells the end of hope for a renewed "Prague spring." Many

ones, had tried to settle near their homeland, dreaming of a return in the months or years to come, officials explain.

Now, they say, the inquiries are flowing in, even from emigrants who have found good jobs in Western Europe, about possibilities for work and resettlement in lands beyond the ocean.

Czech Official Urges Reducing Penalties

PRAGUE, July 16 (AP)—Justice Minister Vaclav Hrabal of the Czech Republic called today for lighter penalties against persons who try to leave the country illegally.

In an interview in the military newspaper *Obrana Lidu*, Hrabal said the "social danger" of persons fleeing the country is overrated. He said it should not be considered a serious antistate act punishable by years in prison, but should be dealt with as a violation of, with much lighter punishment.

Prague's Leaders Crack Down Slowly

By Kenneth Ames

Special to The Washington Post

PRAGUE, July 11—Officials here believe that the joint Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership under Gustav Husak and Lubomir Strougal is in no great hurry to mold the Party, government and judiciary to its conservative pattern but is prepared to achieve this by stages, without resorting to dramatic or sudden political purges.

As one editor commented, "They will ultimately get all they want without the need for revolution."

Miroslav Galuska, the liberal Czech Cultural Minister, this week became the latest victim in the gradual but inexorable shift back towards orthodox communism. Galuska was forced to resign after disputes concerning tighter con-

trol of cultural affairs. Specifically, he opposed the increasing predominance of exchanges with the Soviet Union.

The trend towards conservatism, called by many Czechs "Stalinism," is unmistakable. In the Party ideological school, the grass-roots Party committees, the mass media and the labor unions, progressives are being replaced by hard-liners.

The new system for controlling the trade unions is a particularly significant move, a first step to getting a sullenly resistant labor force back to work to start production moving again.

There is open opposition to this in factories, with frequent spontaneous, brief strikes. In fact, there is little need for strikes since virtually the whole country is conducting a

permanent, undeclared sit-in strike.

Visiting several plants the past few weeks, this reporter prudently resisted liquid hospitality forced on him by managers in the early morning. Commented one: "If you were not here we would already have done some serious drinking."

Liquid Equipment

Bottles of vodka, slivovitz, wine and brandy have now become essential equipment for the majority of offices and factories. One union member explained, "We punch our time cards in the morning and then adjourn for the rest of the day to the tavern just outside the factory gates. Unfortunately the newspapers are now unreadable again, so we normally play cards."

But there is already a determined move to "tighten discipline." The big CKD engineering works in a Prague suburb, which has always displayed huge portraits of President Ludvik Svoboda and former progressive leaders Alexander Dubcek and Josef Smrkovsky on its factory gates, was forced to remove them early this week.

Newly painted slogans appear on walls in provincial towns and villages: "Dubcek, Smrkovsky, we believed what you told us. We still trust you." Nowhere, in nearly 1000

cities of recent driving Bohemia and Moravia, did reporter see a single portrait or slogan supporting Husak or Strougal, who assumed power after the reformers had been worn down by the effects of the Soviet occupation.

"Administrative Measures"

If political and economic order is not soon restored, political experts believe, the conservative leadership, at present a minority force, will be obligated to resort to harsher methods. If replacement of key persons by their own chosen supporters does not bring a change of attitude, they will be forced into "administrative measures," a euphemism for jailing.

Strougal this week took an obvious step in this direction by taking over complete control of the People's Militia and coordination of military and secret police services.

He also explicitly stated there would have to be greater powers for state prosecutors, adding darkly, "The ranks of our supporters will grow, but not without certain measures which we may be forced to use."

Strougal's reference to his growing number of supporters can be seen on the repeated television accounts of Party meetings in provincial centers. The missionary zeal of these audiences is written large on their glowing faces—the fanaticism of a minority group seeing the prospect of a taste of power.

LONDON TIMES
28 June 1969

Prague rebels call for day of mourning

From MICHAEL HORNSBY—Prague, June 27

A remarkable document now circulating in Prague and signed by "students and workers" calls on Czechoslovak citizens to observe a 10-point plan to turn August 21, the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion, into a "day of mourning". It advises against general strikes on the ground that "the treasonous clique" now in power "would make use of them for the further limitation of our freedoms" and recommends instead "boundless scorn for the Moscow overlords and the Husak lackeys".

It is impossible to say how widely the document is circulating and how much support it has. Many clandestine leaflets of a similar kind have been passing from hand to hand in recent weeks containing speeches of rebel politicians and resolutions of disgruntled workers' organizations. This form of underground information system is the classic Czechoslovak response to times of censorship and was prevalent during the Nazi occupation.

The student-worker appeal says: "There are also other ways of drawing the attention of the world to the fact that we are fighting still for socialism with a human face. We have agreed on the issuing of directives whose observation will amply demonstrate to the world that we have not forgotten the day of shame and that we shall never reconcile ourselves to such visits [of the Soviet troops]."

"It is the duty of all loyal citizens of our nations to observe the following directives on August 21:—

- "Do not use transportation means even to go to work. An exception is made for working people who have to use the train to go to work. It is necessary to walk demonstratively to work. The old and the sick should avoid unnecessary trips.
- "Do not go to cinemas and theatres. In this way we shall relieve the actors of the need to act in comedy pieces on this day of mourning.

- "Refrain from all purchases in shops. Buy all the necessary foodstuffs the day before.
- "Decorate where possible the graves of all the victims of the shameful occupation.
- "Buy no daily newspaper or magazine.
- "Visit no coffeehouse or restaurant. Coffeehouses where there is dancing must remain empty so that bands are not obliged to play gay music.
- "Decorate the memorials of all famous historical personages.

"Exactly at 12 a.m. cease all activity at machines and every other place of work for five minutes to honour the victims of the occupation and the new terror.

"Cars should come to a halt and put on their lights. Other transport vehicles should also be at a standstill.

"Inform your friends and relative abroad about the actions which are being prepared and ask them to propagate similar actions throughout the world. It is necessary to appeal to world institutions to proclaim August 21 as the day of shame."

The signatories of the appeal ask everyone who receives a copy of it to pass these directives on "to at least five of his true friends". We believe that you will not fail, just as you did not fail in the August days", it says.

The appeal praises Dr. Kriegel, the former Praesidium member recently expelled from the party for denouncing the invasion, and other "modern heroes of our nation" for defending the "truth concerning the real intentions of the uninvited guests".

DAY OF SHAME

We are nearing the sad anniversary of the contemptible occupation of our country by the armed forces of our so-called friends. Quislings, led by HUSAK, INDRA, KOLDER, and others of their ilk, are trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the Czech people and to legalize the occupation of August 21 as a fully justified and necessary action by "our friends." For this reason it has been found necessary first of all to eliminate from the leadership of the state and of public life those individuals who have until now prevented such crassness, even at the price of personal freedom, safety and material security.

This new generation of heroes of our people, led by Dr. KRIEDEL, PACHMAN, ZATOPEK, HAVEL, and many others, have proudly and fearlessly taken their place in the front rank of resistance against the mercenaries of the STROUGAL-AUERSBERG clique, and are bravely defending the holy truth about the real intention of our uninvited guests.

Our peoples will never forget the sacrifice of our dear sons Jan PALACH and Jan ZAJIC. Their self-sacrifice cannot be in vain. We workers and students, are firmly resolved to remain in firm fraternal alliance, in order together to inform the public of the actual state of affairs.

CPYRGHT

Dear friends! Husak and his followers have taken over the leadership of our state in order to bring it to the point of which the August 21 Occupants tried

in vain to bring the Czech and Slovak peoples. The Husakovites have been abandoned by our fourteen million citizens who have deep scorn in their hearts. The history of the world has firmly shown that treason will not remain unavenged. On the day of the sad anniversary of the occupation of August 21, 1968, we must once more show and remind the world of the shameful deed perpetrated upon us by the Soviet Union. We are not able to defend ourselves with a weapon in hand. Let us defend ourselves, therefore, with hate, with unbounded contempt for the Soviet overlords and their Husakovite lackeys. We are not in favor of proclaiming a general strike. The traitors' clique would use the strike for further measures and limitations upon our freedom. We must, however, let the world know that we are continuing our fight for socialism with a human face. We have agreed on a number of measures, which will sufficiently prove to the world that we have not forgotten the DAY of SHAME and that we will never agree to similar visits. It is the duty of all faithful comrades, citizens of our nations, to be guided on August 21 by the following rules:

1. On the way to and from work, do not use vehicular transport; the exception is those who have to come to work by train. As a demonstration, the journey to work should be on foot. Old and sick people should forego unnecessary travel on this day.
2. Do not visit cinemas and theatres. In this way, actors will not be forced to perform in comedies on the day of mourning.
3. Do not do any shopping. Necessary groceries can be bought in advance.
4. As far as possible, we will decorate the graves of all victims of the occupation.
5. Do not buy newspapers or magazines.
6. Do not visit restaurants or cafes.
7. We shall decorate monuments of all famous historical personages.
8. At the stroke of noon, we shall cease work at machines and in all places of work for a period of five minutes to honor the memory of the victims of the occupation and of the new terror.
9. Passenger cars will also stop and turn on their lights (at noon - trans.). Other transport will also stop.
10. As far as we are able, we shall bring the planned actions to the attention of friends and acquaintances abroad, and call on them to propagate similar actions throughout the world. It is necessary to call on world public institutions to use their influence that August 21 be proclaimed at the DAY OF SHAME.

In order to make this action effective, the guidelines above must be distributed so that they may reach all the people. Censorship and control of the press prevent such action, and therefore it is the national duty of every individual to transmit the guidelines to five real friends. We believe that you will be up to this task, just as you were up to it in the days of August.

Together toward victory --

Karel Kyncl's Statement at the June 2 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Prague Municipal Committee of the Communist Party.

Comrades:

The essential purpose of the recent Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) Municipal Committee meeting in Prague was merely to approve resolutions supporting the decisions of the CPCS sessions. At our April meeting, we passed a resolution declaring our "complete agreement" with the decision of the April Plenum. At that time, I voted against the resolution. One of the main reasons for my stand was the formulation "complete agreement." As a member of this body, I was expected to express my complete agreement with something of which I had only very superficial information and with something that I, in fact, did not know.

I did not become a party member yesterday. There were times when I enthusiastically voted for similar formulations without the slightest hesitation. I shall never stop blaming myself for that -- and I shall never do it again.

The situation last Saturday was very different indeed. Comrade Simon gave us some facts about the May session of the CPCS CC; how we are to interpret these facts was very eloquently explained to us by the First Secretary of the CPCS CC on Saturday afternoon, at the meeting of the AKTIV of party officials in Prague 9, at the CKD works in Prague, which took place on the same premises where, nine months ago, the allegedly illegal party congress was held.

On Saturday, I could not say that I did not possess enough information to decide on how to vote. This made my decision much easier: whether I should raise my hand or not; while, on the other hand, awareness of the fact that I was, as a Communist functionary, co-responsible for the future of our party made things much more difficult for me. On Saturday morning, Comrade Husak used "the language of the May Plenum" -- to repeat Comrade Matejka's words when the latter thanked Comrade Husak for his speech. What was the language of the May Plenum, as reflected in the speech of the Comrade First Secretary? At Prague's CKD works, Comrade Husak analyzed the causes of the critical situation, or to be more precise, situations, through which our party has passed in recent years and especially in recent months. I listened and I could not believe my own ears. I was horrified that a highly educated Marxist -- as Comrade Cernik characterized Comrade Husak in the eulogistic part of his address -- could describe in such shallow, superficial, and cheap words an enormously complicated, and since August clearly distorted, development. It was unbelievable to me that a highly educated Marxist -- and Comrade Husak is one, despite everything -- could so calmly and without blinking an eye pass over such details as, for example, the answer given by our party to the well-known Warsaw Letter of last July. An answer for which he himself, in fact, voted. I could not believe that, only 10 months later and without the slightest reservation, he could back the content of that letter, with which he had so fundamentally disagreed 10 months earlier.

this with merely a brief remark that he had misunderstood the forceful intervention in August of last year, when every child knows that it is one of the fundamental reasons for the crisis in this country and in this party.

I was horrified when I heard the highest party representative, who himself went through a bad personal experience in the fifties, compare the weeklies Reporter and Listy with Radio Free Europe.

I was horrified to hear from his lips gross invectives against the best representative of our learning and culture while saying at the same time that the CPCPS must not isolate itself from our intelligentsia.

I was horrified when I heard how Comrade Husak described, in haughty and arrogant terms, the life-long work in the party of Comrades Kriegel, Vodslon, and Sik -- and I literally shuddered when Comrade Husak debased himself by indulging in a tasteless play on words -- "Kraglovani-Krieglovani" (1) doesn't Comrade Husak realize that his own second name lends itself so well to a similar play on words. (2)

However, form is a matter of personal taste, tact, and civilized behavior. Much graver is the essence of what Comrade Husak said about the work of these Comrades who, in his words, which I do not consider witty, were sent on vacation by the Central Committee. All he had to say about their work, and, I would like to repeat, specialized work for the party to which they have devoted their lives, was arrogant jokes. I know some of the expelled Comrades well. Permit me to say here, at the Plenum of the Party Municipal Committee, that, in my view, the time will come when these expelled Comrades will be considered to represent one of the few assets which our party will be able to claim before a discriminating public opinion which will be passing judgment on the period in which we now live. Unfortunately, this will not be the first time. And only last year, after January, Comrade Husak himself represented such a positive asset, after years of persecution.

What I have just said is also a recollection of the fifties -- a reminder which, according to Comrade Husak, one of those who have now been sent on "vacation" made at the May Plenum. With an enviable disregard for the facts, Comrade Husak described it on Saturday afternoon as mere panic. He declared that not a single person has been arrested in this country or transferred to another job for political reasons. It is true that nobody has been arrested thus far, but if Comrade Husak says that nobody has been transferred to another job for political reasons, this is not only a disregard for the facts, it is clearly not true.

Each one of us gathered here could present a shorter or longer list of people who have been transferred to another job for clearly political reasons, not for reasons of specialization. The list could be headed, for example, by Professor Jiri Hajek or Josef Smrkovsky, who could be following by a number of people from the Ministry of the Interior, and dozens of journalists from the party and other periodicals could bring up the rear.

(1) Kraglovat, Odkraglovat -- get rid of, assassinate Communist character assassination.

(2) Husa -- goose; Husak -- gander

Are, therefore, the fears that there might be some form of a return to the fifties mere panic, or do they have some foundation?

When I listened on Saturday afternoon to the broadcast transmission of the meeting of the AKTIV in Prague 9, I was also reminded of the fifties by something else. When the announcement of the purge in the Central Committee was greeted with wild applause and the chanting of "long live the CPCS," I remembered similar reactions with which many Communists welcomed the reports on the just punishment of the "traitors, conspirators, and bourgeois nationalists," one of whom was also Comrade Husak. Obviously he did not remember this, probably because he did not hear the applause and the chanting in his prison cell. I should like to remind him that, at that time, other Party representatives positively appraised the mood of the party masses, as he did on Saturday afternoon. In short, I listened on Saturday afternoon to Comrade Husak's speech and I recalled the Marxist rule that the ends and the means must be dialectically closely linked. The thought of what the ends must be if the means used in his speech are in dialectical unity with them, gave me the shivers.

Comrades, the date of my joining the Party is recorded as 1 June 1945 on my membership card. This means that yesterday I have an anniversary: the 24th anniversary of my enrollment in the Party. This is three years more than half my whole life. I realize that my membership in the Party will not outlast this jubilee by much if the speech delivered by Comrade Husak on Saturday really represents the language of the May Plenum, as Comrade Matejka has described it. The reason for this will not be that I shall tear up my membership card in some theatrical gesture. I shall not do this, because I value this card too much. I shall not voluntarily give up my card; rather, those -- as Comrade Husak has described them -- "genuine Marxists" will have to take it away from me, those who are now likely to enter the fray with high-flying banners, after this May Plenum. I shall defend my membership card against them -- although I am not so naive as to believe that I am likely to succeed in this. The fray, which they are now apparently about to enter with flying banners, will not be a conflict of ideas and opinions; it will not be a debate in which he will emerge as the victor who can defend his views on the grounds of Marxism-Leninism. It will be a normal brawl in which whoever has the most power and wields the biggest stick will gain the upper hand. For these so-called genuine Marxists who talk of nothing else but Leninism are not even able to answer the simplest questions, such as, for instance, how the supposed limited sovereignty of a state and the events of August 21 can be reconciled with the first constitution of the USSR, which expressly guaranteed the right of the union republics to self-determination and even to secession. Incidentally, I am not at all surprised about our one-and-only Marxists. There is no answer to these and similar questions. And it is much simpler to answer them by a punch in the nose.

Lastly, I have to reply to an argument which now daily appears in Rude Pravo and which Comrade Husak also used on Saturday afternoon. This is the argument that, before a Party office adopts a decision, a Party member may freely and democratically discuss the problem concerned and express a differing opinion, but that once the decision has been made, it becomes as binding as the law itself on a Party member.

The first thing I miss in our Party today is precisely a free and democratic discussion. Nowadays, decisions are adopted after a parody of free and democratic discussion.

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And as far as the binding nature of such decisions is concerned, may I ask a question of Comrade Husak? He perhaps regarded the Party -- as a model who, despite all facts proving the contrary, regarded him [Husak] as a traitor and bourgeois nationalist until he was rehabilitated for the sole reason that this was the opinion of the Party leadership and of First Secretary, Comrade Novotny? If he does regard such a man as a model, I am sorry; I would regard such a Party member as an unthinking member of a herd!

And another small incident. When I was working as a foreign correspondent I once interviewed a young American who had refused to obey the order to go to Vietnam. He refused to do the duty of a citizen of the U.S. In his defense, he quoted a part of the judgment of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg which had tried the Nazi war criminals soon after the end of the war. All of the defendants there had said that they were not criminals, since they had merely carried out the orders of their superiors and acted in accordance with the then valid laws of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Tribunal, in which a Soviet judge also sat, rejected this defense and declared in its verdict that a person who carries out an order that is contrary to the most fundamental principles of humanity, sound reasons, and morality, is fully responsible for his actions and does not have the right to push responsibility off to a higher authority. Well -- this young American referred to this judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, but the American court rejected this defense and handed down the maximum penalty.

At that time, I expressed great indignation about this in a commentary I broadcast, and I was highly commended by the then highest Party authorities because of this indignation.

My indignation was not meant as a gesture and I have maintained it to this day. Therefore, from the position of this indignation and from the position of Marxism, today I shall vote against any resolution of the Municipal Committee of the CPCS which approves the results of the May Plenum of the CPCS CC.

I regard these results as a tragedy for our Party and -- since our Party is in power -- as a tragedy for this state.

WASHINGTON POST
10 July 1969

Czech Journalist

PRAGUE—Karel Kyncl, a reform-minded journalist who last month attacked Czechoslovak leaders for compromising with the Soviet Union, has been stripped of Communist Party membership, the Czech news agency CTK reported. It said he will be investigated by the Party.

Kyncl's speech followed a similar one by another reformer, Frantisek Kriegel of the Party Central Committee, who also lost his Party membership. Neither speech was reported in the press, but copies were circulated in leaflet form.

CPYRGHT

LOS ANGELES TIMES
CORKY 1969



"Come on, be serious now—the imperialists fear our unity!—
Perhaps I said that wrong . . ."

THE PHILIPPINES HERALD
CORKY 1969

CORKY TRINIDAD



"And so, another World Communist Conference for
Unity has come to a close . . ."

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Red Unity Conference A Disaster Despite Kremlin's Protestations

By Victor Zorza

LONDON (NANA)—It would be unfair to ignore the Kremlin's insistent claims that the World Communist Conference was a striking success. There is nothing left, therefore, but to acknowledge that the estimate given by this columnist recently of the conference's prospects was wrong.

I had said that whatever happened at the Moscow meeting, the Kremlin could not win. If the meeting agreed to a joint declaration of principles, this would contain so little of what the Kremlin had been demanding as to constitute a defeat for it. And if the Kremlin did get the sort of declaration it wanted, I argued, then a number of important parties would refuse to endorse it, thus producing a formal split in the World Communist Movement.

But the only sense in which this analysis was wrong was that it posed two mutually exclusive possibilities — that either the declaration would be unsatisfactory to the Kremlin, or that it would be satisfactory to it but some parties would refuse to sign it. What happened in the end was that the declaration was both profoundly unsatisfactory to the Kremlin, and that a number of parties refused to sign it.

The refusal to sign by such parties as the Italian, the British, and others, and the signing "with reservations" by still others, is a matter of public record, and the Kremlin's apologists can do nothing to disprove it.

Fourteen out of the seventy-five parties represented at the meeting comprise this new "opposition," mainly from the right, and this leaves out of account the Chinese and other parties on the extreme left. Ideologically, the Russians remain at the

But it is precisely the Soviet claim to act as the power center of the World Communist Movement that has been firmly rejected by the Moscow declaration, in common with a number of other Soviet claims, thus making it clear that the final conference document comes nowhere near the version that the Kremlin had been pressing so long on the other parties.

That Moscow wanted to be explicitly recognized as the

Rome of the Communist movement is clear, first of all, from the pre-conference warnings by such "opposition" parties as the Romanian and the Italian that no Communist party or state could now claim to act as the center for the others.

The debate continued even during the conference itself, when Janos Kadar sought to convince the "opposition" that the proper acknowledgement of the role of the Soviet Union was "not merely a question of sentiment," but was crucial to the success of the struggle against "imperialism." In order to succeed in this struggle, the Communists needed unity, he argued, and a "correct relationship" with the Soviet Union—the recognition of its leading role—was the necessary basis of such unity.

Kadar was quite right in saying that this was not a sentimental issue—it is, indeed, a basic issue of the power relationship in the Communist world. In the 1960 International Communist Declaration, all the parties acknowledged that the Soviet Union was "the universally recognized vanguard of the World Communist Movement," and this gave the Kremlin the basis for its frequent attempts to impose its will on the other parties. No wonder, therefore, that this formula was so bitterly disputed during the preparations for the Moscow conference.

The challengers seemed to have lost much ground when

ways anxious to stress its loyalty to the Soviet Union, announced that the draft of the declaration to be presented to the conference gave clear recognition to the "decisive role" of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps it did, but by the time the conference had finished with it, the declaration made no mention of the "decisive" role of the Soviet Union, but, instead, announced quite unequivocally that "there is no leading center of the International Communist Movement."

The struggle over this formula illustrates the Kremlin's long retreat, during a series of preparatory meetings, from the exposed positions which it had chosen so unwisely at the start. In order to get any declaration at all, the Kremlin accepted during the preparatory meeting hundreds of amendments from the "opposition" parties, so that not only the Soviet Union's "role" but many other Soviet-inspired formulations had to be abandoned.

During the conference proper, a further 30 amendments were accepted, out of the 70 submitted by various delegations, in a final effort by the Kremlin to secure a unanimous vote on the declaration.

Had it not been for these concessions, there would have certainly been more than 14 dissenters. But the Kremlin's chief objective was to bring the Italians back into the fold, and its failure to achieve this is a measure of the disaster which has befallen the Communist movement. For the Italian party, in opposing the idea of a single center, has long played with the notion of "many centers" of which Rome—the true Rome—might perhaps eventually become one.

This would lead to a form of "polycentrism" in which the Western Communist movement could return to the social democratic traditions from which it had sprung. As Communists have always made clear, they fear social democracy more than any other po-

as to compete for the support of like-minded people. Communists have usually attacked more ferociously than they have attacked both fascists and capitalists, because they knew that the former presented the greater danger to them.

In the future, the Kremlin will have to attack the Italian-led right in order to compete with it for the allegiance of Western Communists to the one and only true faith.

For the Italian party's gravest objection to the declaration is that it is "contrary to the type of socialist society which we are asking the working class of our own country to fight for."

Basic Issue

No disagreement could be more basic than this. The Kremlin already hardly bothers to conceal its view that "the type of socialist society" that the Italian party proposes is no better than capitalism. And the Italian party sees the neo-Stalinist trend in the Soviet Union as a betrayal of what it regards as true socialism. These are grounds for a political and ideological struggle as bitter as any in the history of communism.

As for the declaration itself, the leader of the Italian party, Luigi Longo, said even before the conference that it was so vague as to be virtually meaningless.

The further search for compromise at the Moscow conference made it even more vague. As another Italian Communist leader said, the declaration reveals "an open conflict between statements of principle and concrete facts" which shows an inability of the part of the Communist movement to adapt itself to new conditions. He had in mind the principle of sovereignty and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and many other such inconsistencies, in both foreign and domestic policies of Communist countries.

The Spanish Communist party declared before the conference that "if there is an abyss between reality and what appears in the declaration, then this document will be compromised from the start."

And so, indeed, it is. This, then, is the declaration that the Soviet leaders proclaim as a great success. They are welcome to it. All true well-wishers ought to join this columnist in sending their congratulations.

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NEW STATESMAN, London
27 June 1969

Drawn Match at Moscow

K. S. KAROL

For twelve days, the delegates of 75 communist parties debated in the Kremlin's St George's Hall behind open - or nearly open - doors. Accredited Moscow correspondents, used to the monolithic mystery of preceding conferences, were staggered by this change in the customary habits of the Communist world. They learnt that several parties had dared publicly to announce that they disagreed with the Russians, and that the fires of excommunication did not descend on their heads. The like had not been seen in Moscow for 40 years; it was a striking, indeed a spectacular, advance. But never, in all those 40 years, has the communist movement been shaken by so profound a crisis. With all due respect for the new methods it is, above all, the content of the debate which must concern us.

The size of the crisis was illustrated by the composition of the conference. In 1960, at the previous meeting, the Russians declared that there were 36 million communists in the world. In 1969, parties representing at least 20 million members - from China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Indonesia (since then, of course, decimated) - were missing. The others had spent five long years arguing whether it was worth meeting at all. It all started, in fact, in February 1964, when Mikhail Suslov presented his party's Central Committee with a long 'theoretical' report on the Maoist heresy. Krushchev sent copies to all the communist parties, including the Chinese, and invited them to attend a conference in Moscow on 15 December of the same year. The Chinese replied that he was not empowered to call conferences, and made a few unfriendly comments on the tiresome Soviet habit of handing out decrees to foreign communists. The other Asian parties reacted in similar fashion. Togliatti's memorandum on the subject, published after his death in 1964, said squarely that the conference could not hope to resolve internal differences, but would only aggravate them, weakening the anti-imperialist movement which needed Chinese participation more than ever. Two months later, Krushchev fell and his plan seemed to have been shelved.

It was, however, resuscitated by his successors in March 1965, since when the parties have exchanged, literally, tons of correspondence. It was not until January 1965 that the plan took on a more concrete form. This was the moment when Red Guards were besieging the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the Russians, outraged, called on their foreign comrades for assistance. They insisted on a choice between these 'hooligans' who had lost all sense of respect, and the motherland of the October Revolution. Chinese bad manners helped to persuade the

foreign comrades to abandon their reticent posture, and the conference machinery began to grind once more. But the preparatory meetings in Budapest and Moscow were laborious to say the least, and time passed without a date being fixed. By last summer, however, they seemed on the verge of agreement; and then Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia. The idea of a conference once more seemed hopeless; but the Russians were committed to it, and offered a new compromise. The meeting would not condemn anyone; not the Chinese, nor the Albanians, nor the Yugoslavs. It would not even be asked to approve the Warsaw Pact's 'fraternal assistance' to Czechoslovakia. This compromise appeared to close the doors on any discussion whatever, reducing the conference to a kind of formal demonstration of unity by parties which were willy-nilly tied to Moscow.

But reality proved different. On the second day an illustrious unknown, Mr Macielle (in the name of a party which is not exactly famous for its vigorous approach to theoretical questions, the Paraguayan CP) spoke of 'the great Chinese problem'. Later the same day, the Australian delegate, Aarons, equally rashly raised the Czechoslovak question. Mr Ceausescu's appeals to the comrades to keep to the rules went unheard. Mr Brezhnev then fired a series of red bullets against the Chinese - 'who want war' - and his Warsaw Pact allies could hardly do less. Tongues were loosened at last, and by the end of the conference even the San Marino delegate, Gasperoni, speaking 'in the name of a big party in a very small country', was arguing openly with the faithful Latin-American cohorts who, as we all know, are very small parties in big countries. In the end, paying homage to 'great socialist China', he refused to sign three-quarters of the final document. The delegate from the Dominican Republic went even further, announcing that he would sign nothing and that the communiqué was 'fit for priests and social democrats'. There was not much respect, and no religion, left in St George's Hall. It was the Italian CP that inflicted the most grievous wound on Mr Brezhnev. This, after all,

is a big party in a big country, and its intellectual prestige among communists everywhere has been enormous since the days of Antonio Gramsci. Now its delegate, Enrico Berlinguer, demolished stone by stone the ideological edifice so carefully built up by the earlier conferences. He pointed out with regret that there had been no mention of contradictions within socialist society, that no concern had been shown over the principles outraged by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and that the far movement

was a piece of propaganda that could not be taken seriously. Finally, he said that

was prepared to sign only the section which proclaimed the need for a struggle against imperialism; in other words, he took the stance of the proverbial preacher who was 'against sin'.

So, at a glance, the conference ended up pretty badly for the Soviet leaders. They came away neither with a condemnation of China nor with silence on Czechoslovakia; all they got was the publication in their press of a number of 'subversive' ideas, contained in summaries of speeches from rebellious delegates. However, Mr Brezhnev must have figured out the risks he was taking in assembling this conference, and probably he is less disappointed than most people think. He knows that the Soviet people have short memories. Togliatti's famous memorandum was published in *Pravda*, but this did not prevent Brezhnev from driving all those who backed the Italian viewpoint out of East European communist parties. While Berlinguer was holding forth in Moscow, they were hard at work in Prague expelling men like Frantisek Kriegel and many others who were saying no more than the Italian delegate on the subject of the invasion. In Moscow, non-conformist intellectuals are in jail for the same offence. When the Soviet leaders called the conference, they had a precise purpose: they wanted to get world communists to swallow their pill, and in this they succeeded - though on conditional terms. In the future, they will be able to invoke 'scientific Marxism' to justify their repressive internal measures and their anti-Chinese crusade. After all, nobody at the conference queried their credentials as communists. Nobody protested when they talked about the struggle against imperialism while acting as watchmen of the status quo throughout the world.

Here we have a glaring insight into the poverty of all the speeches made during these dozen days of free debate. Logically, the delegates in St George's Hall should have concentrated on the condition of the Soviet bloc, since they agree to link their fate with it and to undergo the vicissitudes of its career. Now, ever since 1960 the bloc has consolidated itself by abandoning the promises of the period of de-Stalinisation. Nobody talks any more about the age of affluence which was supposed to usher in a communist society by 1980, nor about the advent of democratisation. As a friend from Prague said to me ironically, we ought to ask Mr Brezhnev to publish the *Diktat* which he presented to the Czechoslovak CP last August, for it tells us far more than all the speeches on polycentrism about where the USSR stands today. One might also have asked Mr Ceausescu about the hours of anguish through which he lived while Soviet troops were massed on his frontiers. But nobody talked about that. The dissidents were cool about the final document, disclaimed responsibility for any future Soviet

as a vicious class enemy,
but implied that meaning-
Washington would be wa-
comed.

parties. The unifying
theme would be "anti-im-
conference. Western im-
perialism is the bogey,
mainly the United States.

Kremlin Lost Battle for Communist Unity

Moscow Summit Showed Above All That World Parties Are Going Their Own Way

BY RICHARD RESTON
Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—Reformation brought religious revolution to the Church in the 16th century and political revolution to the Communist movement in the latter part of the 20th century.

If medieval Christendom had its heretics, reformers and dissidents, so too does the Communist world of today.

If the names of that earlier period were Martin Luther, John Calvin and John Knox, today for communism, according to the gospel of Moscow, they are Mao Tse-tung in China, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, Enrico Berlinguer in Italy, Fidel Castro in Cuba and many others.

Message of Summit

As the Vatican lost the battle against reform and new centers of Christianity outside Rome, the Kremlin likewise is losing the struggle against alien ideological dogma and new centers of communism outside Moscow.

That is the message of these past two weeks and nothing illustrates the point better than the recently concluded world Communist party summit conference. Moscow has had its meeting, the first one in nine years. It has put forward communism's blueprint for the future.

The real question now is what did it all mean—the endless speeches, the political self-massage, the missing parties, the agreements and disagreements, the boasts about the glo-

ries of communism and the tiresome attacks on the West.

Moscow summoned this conference to demonstrate a Communist movement united behind a strong and inspiring Soviet leadership.

Opposition Voiced

But in the end the meeting demonstrated just the opposite.

Five of the world's 14 ruling parties were not even here to participate in the discussions. These included China, seemingly more preoccupied these days with a Sino-Soviet dispute which has turned to bloodshed along its common border with the Soviet Union.

Of the parties attending the conference, 14 of the 75 voiced opposition in one form or another to the Kremlin view of the future as set forth in the main working document. It is estimated that the 61 parties signing the document represent in numbers only about one-third of the world's total party membership.

As a guideline to the future, the position paper provides something less than inspiration, let alone a clear understanding of where this movement is going, or even where it wants to go. It is a document which means all things to all men, to be interpreted in any way any party chooses.

Cuba welcomed the passage on peaceful coexistence as a license for the free export of violent revolution. The Soviet Union

Forced to Concede
Faced with growing political disarray inside their own camp, the Kremlin leaders, if nothing else, were forced to concede that Communist parties must now resolve their own problems in different ways. All parties have equal rights and "there is no leading center of the international Communist movement," states the Soviet-inspired view to the future.

For the Kremlin, that is quite a concession, a remarkable change in Soviet attitudes since the last international conference a little less than a decade ago. It is change, even though Moscow sometimes chooses not to uphold the principle, as was the case during the Soviet-led invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia last August.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership in effect has admitted that other leaders are competing for center stage in the Communist world, or what students of Soviet affairs would call the trend to polycentrism.

Puzzling Question

One of the most bewildering questions about this summit conference is why the Kremlin insisted on a meeting which only confirms the full-blown political reformation now under way in the Communist world. Beneath all the ideological clatter, the answer seems to be that without the meeting the move toward diversity, toward a further dilution of Soviet influence, would have grown worse.

Accordingly, the conference constituted a major Kremlin move to stem a political tide that is splintering the movement from within. Whatever the momentum of this conference, the Soviet leaders hope to continue it through a series of continuing bilateral and re-

But if the struggle against imperialism seems the only unifying thread, Communists have these days, it is noteworthy, then, to record divisions

even on this question. Romania argued, for example, that the entire emphasis of this latest Communist encyclical is out of step with present day realities. And the Soviet leadership cannot really expect to be taken seriously when it argues on the one hand the evils of Western imperialism and on the other the spirit of East-West detente.

No knowledgeable Western expert here believes that this conference can do anything more than temporarily slow the move toward greater Communist diversity and away from strictures of Soviet influence.

What this conference has produced is a catalog of what the movement hates — imperialism. The main document talks about the unity of Communists. But if there is such unity, it also should have contained something about the goals and objectives, specifically what this movement should and should not be.

No Walkouts

However, it was felt that the Soviet leaders probably are relieved with the way these past two weeks have gone. No parties walked out of the meeting as did Romania at one of the earlier preparatory sessions. Perhaps more important, there was a minimum of embarrassment to the Kremlin on its two most serious crises, China and Czechoslovakia.

While there may be relief on this, it can also be said that the Kremlin has failed to resolve any of the really critical problems now confronting the Communist world, summit conference.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
CPYRGHT 19 June 1969

MOSCOW HOME-TRUTHS

The one indisputable achievement of the world communist conference of 75 parties in Moscow is that it met at all. Mr Khrushchev had planned it in 1962 to get the better of China which was disputing Moscow's primacy and denouncing his policy of "peaceful co-existence," but he was unable to go ahead with it. After his ouster in 1964, Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin had toyed with the idea of patching up with China, and it was not until the fury of the Chinese cultural revolution had convinced them that the schism between Moscow and Peking was final that they set about holding the preparatory meeting at Budapest in February 1968. Rumania had walked out of it when it was criticised for not toeing the Soviet denunciation of Israel. The World Conference initially scheduled for last November seemed to be much of a gamble after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August had been roundly condemned by the West European Communist parties and others further afield. Even within the East European bloc Rumania had openly criticised the invasion. Moscow could not very well shelve the conference without further loss of face, but by postponing it till now it has not succeeded in muting the criticism.

The world conference was made possible only by Moscow agreeing at Budapest to drop its claim to leadership of the world communist movement and any critical reference to China from the working document for the conference. Though it was recognised that unquestioned obedience to Moscow was a thing of the past, the Soviet leaders had billed the conference as having the objectives of forging the unity of Communist parties and reinforcing the anti-imperialist struggle. On this latter point all participants appear to have agreed, even though only 70 of the 75 have signed the main document setting out a programme of action of which the first step is to call an anti-imperialist Congress. This is the only tangible gain for Moscow. But this is of little worth when several members of the conference decried Soviet imperialism in Czechoslovakia, despite the plea of Dr Gustav Husak, who replaced Mr Dubcek as First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party, that the Soviet intervention is an internal matter and should not be

raised. More, Rumania among them, were angered by the attack on China at the conference in contravention of the basic understanding and Mr Brezhnev, who joined in the attack, finally thought the better of backing the East Pakistan party's kiteflying of a resolution condemning China. Czechoslovakia and China have been the ghosts at the conference, one present and the other hovering across the Soviet border.

The Moscow conference has only underlined how the world Communist movement is riven by the ideological clash between Moscow and Peking and their national interests as in their border conflict. No less significant is it that the Soviet-backed prescription for relations between Communist parties, with its hint of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty and the right to interfere in the affairs of another country, has been rejected by some of those subscribing to the main Moscow anti-imperialist document. Rumania remains a protestant in the East European bloc, having appended its signature with reservations and not wanting to walk out of the conference for fear of consequences. Against this disarray in the Communist world, the one good thing to be said for the conference is that the differences have not only been aired but publicised as well in the record of the proceedings to be issued. If Moscow has not secured a vote of confidence in Kremlin's leadership, it has at least countenanced democratic stirrings at the conference.

The conference was attended by some interesting delegations. These included those from East Pakistan, Nepal and the Philippines. The Communist Party of India was well represented but its leader, Mr Dange, appears to have stirred a hornet's nest at home by appealing to the World Communist parties to mediate between the CPI and the CPM and promote Communist unity in India. It is possible that this appeal was addressed to fraternal parties, such as the Rumanian, with which the CPM has reasonably good relations. Nevertheless, it does seem strange that differences between Indian political parties should be sought to be resolved not in Delhi or Bombay or elsewhere in the country but through third party intervention abroad.

CPYRGHT

MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Tokyo
19 June 1969

EDITORIAL

Role Of World Red Summit

THE recent World Communist Conference which closed on June 17 apparently proved not so productive as the Soviet Union confidently anticipated at its opening.

For instance, the number of participating parties this time was fewer than in the previous meeting in 1960. In addition, while the previous conference adopted the Moscow declaration which might be regarded as a joint platform for international Communist campaigns, no such active character was seen in the four-part document adopted at this year's meeting concerning communism's basic aims. Furthermore, the document was signed by only 66 of the 75 participating parties.

It can be easily concluded from these facts that the International Communist movement has already lost its past iron-clad solidarity and begun showing a trend to diversity. Such a trend was clearly observed in the course of the conference. For example, Romania definitely opposed any denunciation of Red China, and Italy made a frontal criticism of the Soviet armed invasion of Czechoslovakia.

It might be said that the Soviet Union's attitude toward their criticism was always compromising throughout the conference. This is reflected in the difference between the basic document and its original draft reported earlier.

The censure of Red China which was indirectly mentioned in the original draft, and the assertion of limited sovereignty which was emphatically explained in the draft, were omitted from the formal document. Instead, only the anti-imperialist drives were stressed in the document as the sole banner of the Red bloc. This indicates that the Soviet Union had to make a concession by taking into consideration that a consensus can hardly be gained among the participating parties, should it stick to the problems connected with Red China and limited sovereignty.

It is worthy to note, however, that the above outcome had been predicted even before the opening of the conference. It may safely be said that the Soviet Union opened the conference although fully aware that the number of participants would be fewer, and that the convention would be thrown into confusion if the problems of Red China and limited sovereignty were taken up.

If so, what was the true intention of the Soviet Union in deliberately opening the conference under such a "disadvantageous" situation?

We think that the key to this riddle lies in the statement of Leonid I. Brezhnev, secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party. In his speech on June 7, he sharply condemned Red China as attempting to split the anti-imperialist forces.

The fact that Brezhnev openly hit Red China before the world Communist leaders might be interpreted as suggesting that the Soviet Union intended to utilize the conference as a preliminary step to deal with the Red Chinese issue.

At the same time, it might be said that the issue was one of the incentives to the trend of diversity in views among the other Red parties.

DIVERGENCIES AT THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

- | | |
|---|--------|
| A. Parties Present and Absent | Page 1 |
| B. Parties which Attacked Peking | Page 3 |
| C. Mentions of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia | Page 3 |
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A. PARTIES PRESENT AND ABSENT

Thirteen parties which had attended the 81-member world communist meeting in 1960 were absent from the roster of parties contained in the final conference communique carried by Soviet media on 17 June. They included, along with the Chinese and Albanian parties, those of the DPRK, DRV, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, and Iceland. The deficit was partially made up at the latest meeting, at which 75 parties were represented, by the attendance of five parties newly recognized by Moscow as CP's in the years since 1960--the West Berlin SED and the parties of Lesotho, Puerto Rico, Nigeria, and Guyana--as well as two unnamed "clandestine" parties.

Western news sources have identified the two "clandestine" parties as those from the Philippines and from Nepal. The latter was also identified by Western press sources as the "illegal" party mentioned in the final communique of the Budapest consultative meeting in February-March 1968.

The communist parties of Cuba and Sweden, full participants in 1960, held "observer" status this time. Both, however, addressed the conference.

The following is the list of participating parties provided in the final communique on the conference, the full participants arranged in Russian-alphabetical order with the two observer parties at the end:

Communist Party of Australia
Communist Party of Austria
Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria
Communist Party of Argentina
Communist Party of Belgium
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Bulgarian Communist Party
Communist Party of Bolivia
Brazilian Communist Party
Communist Party of Great Britain
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
Communist Party of Venezuela
United Party of Haitian Communists
People's Progressive Party of Guyana
Communist Party of Guadeloupe
Guatemalan Party of Labor
Communist Party of Germany
Socialist Unity Party of Germany
Communist Party of Honduras
Communist Party of Greece
Communist Party of Denmark
Dominican Communist Party
Communist Party of Israel
Communist Party of India
Jordanian Communist Party

People's Party of Iran
Communist Party of Northern Ireland
Irish Workers Party
Communist Party of Spain
Italian Communist Party
Communist Party of Canada
Progressive Party of Working People--Cyprus
Communist Party of Colombia
People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica
Communist Party of Lesotho
Lebanese Communist Party
Communist Party of Luxembourg
Party of Liberation and Socialism (Morocco)
Martinique Communist Party
Mexican Communist Party
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
Nigerian Marxist-Leninists
Nicaraguan Socialist Party
Communist Party of Norway
Communist Party of East Pakistan
People's Party of Panama
Paraguayan Communist Party
Peruvian Communist Party
Polish United Workers Party
Portuguese Communist Party
Puerto Rican Communist Party
Reunion Communist Party
Romanian Communist Party
Communist Party of Salvador
San Marino Communist Party
Syrian Communist Party
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of the United States of America
Sudanese Communist Party
Tunisian Communist Party
Communist Party of Turkey
Communist Party of Uruguay
Communist Party of Finland
French Communist Party
Communist Party of Ceylon
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Communist Party of Chile
Swiss Party of Labor
Communist Party of Ecuador
South African Communist Party

"Two underground parties,"
unnamed for "reasons of
security"

Communist Party of Cuba (observer)
Left Party-Communists of Sweden (observer)

The following is a listing of the 50 parties, in the order in which their delegates spoke, which according to Soviet accounts leveled explicit attacks at the present Chinese Communist Party leadership. At least some of the six parties whose delegates spoke on the first day of the conference--those of Venezuela, Finland, Lebanon, Haiti, Jordan, and Ecuador--could have been expected to join in attacking the Chinese if their delegates' turn to speak had followed the Paraguayan CP's initial attack during the second day's session.

Paraguay	Sudan
Poland	Belgium
France	Costa Rica
Salvador	India
USSR	Great Britain
West German KPD	Guadeloupe
Denmark	Luxembourg
Uruguay	Mongolia
West Berlin SED	Nigeria
East Germany	Israel
Chile	Greece
Ceylon	Nicaragua
Bulgaria	Syria
East Pakistan	Iran
Iraq	Dominican Republic
Hungary	Honduras
Argentina	Guyana
Switzerland	Turkey
Canada	San Marino
Brazil	Lesotho
Italy	Guatemala
Portugal	Bolivia
Czechoslovakia	Puerto Rico
Peru	Panama
United States	South Africa

C. MENTIONS OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The following is a breakdown of the 14 parties whose spokesmen mentioned the August intervention in Czechoslovakia, divided according to the anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet tenor of their statements on the issue.* The listings in each category follow the order in which the delegates spoke. TASS sources are identified; PRAVDA's versions were substantially the same in all cases except, as indicated, in coverage of the Belgian CP speaker's remarks.

* While the conference speech by French CP Secretary General Waldeck Rochet on 7 June did not mention Czechoslovakia, AFP reported another member of the delegation, Secretary Marchais, as telling reporters at the Moscow press center on the 10th that his party "continues to disapprove" of the August intervention but refrained from bringing up the subject at the conference in deference to the Czechoslovak party's wishes. TASS' account of Marchais' press conference omitted these remarks.

ANTI-SOVIET (8)

CPYRGHT

Australia

[Aarons] "also said that when the Australian delegation openly says that the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was wrong, it does so not because it wants to interfere in the internal affairs of parties that had taken that position." (TASS, 7 June)

Austria

"During the preparations for the conference, the Communist Party of Austria agreed that the events in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not be on the agenda, since it is now impossible to overcome differences on this question" (TASS, 10 June)

Switzerland

"Proceeding from the same principles [rejection of CCP splitting activities], we cannot also approve of the actions of five Warsaw Treaty member countries in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." (TASS, 11 June)

Spain

"We Marxist-Leninists must also take a critical position if we believe that negative phenomena exist in some socialist country. This happened when five Warsaw Treaty countries took action in Czechoslovakia last year. Our disagreement with this is known." (TASS, 11 June)

Italy

"Precisely this concept [the independence of each party] prompted Italian Communists to take a position on the Czechoslovak events: from solidarity with the new course started in January 1968 to disagreement with the entry of troops of five Warsaw Treaty countries into Czechoslovakia." (TASS, 11 June)

Sweden

"We believe [autonomy of each party] to be the main principled question, particularly against the background of the critical discussion which followed the movement of troops into Czechoslovakia in August last year, from which we dissociated ourselves, like some other communist parties." (TASS, 12 June)

Belgium

The peace movement in Belgium "was injured by such negative factors as sabotage of the struggle for peaceful coexistence carried out by the Chinese Communist Party and anti-Sovietism both from the left and the right. After the military action in Czechoslovakia, these trends were able to carry out their propaganda on an even wider scale." (TASS, 12 June; the reference to Czechoslovakia was omitted from the report of the speech in the 16 June PRAVDA)

Great Britain

"Touching in this connection [interparty relations] on the events in Czechoslovakia, the speaker said: We do not want to interfere in anybody's internal affairs, but there is no doubt that the important decision of five socialist countries to bring troops into Czechoslovakia had profoundly influenced every communist party. We have stated our disagreement with that." (TASS, 13 June)

PRO-SOVIET (6)

Salvador

"Comrade S.C. Carpio expressed disagreement with the appraisal of the developments in Czechoslovakia given by the representative of the Communist Party of Australia. Our party, he said, which is directly fighting against imperialism and knows from its own experience the insidious nature of its methods, qualifies the assistance given by five socialist countries to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia as necessary and timely." (TASS, 7 June)

Hungary

The Hungarian party and Government "have never said that they could remain indifferent to events in Czechoslovakia." They "were guided in all their activities by the principles of internationalism, by the sense of solidarity, and by nothing else, at every stage of the events in Czechoslovakia. We are interested in one thing only: we want the problems in Czechoslovak society to be settled in a socialist way." (TASS, 11 June)

Czechoslovakia

"The leadership of the communist parties of neighboring allied states, Husak went on, gradually lost faith in the ability of the leadership of our party in the situation to stop that crisis development [the rise of "right opportunist" forces]. Then came the well-known events in August. In these conditions the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia found the way out in the signing of the [26 August 1968] Moscow protocol, which is logically connected with the well-known Bratislava statement of 3 August 1968." (TASS, 12 June)

Costa Rica

[After attacking the speeches of the Australian, Spanish, and Italian CP delegates, Manuel Mora said:] "Imperialism . . . cunningly conducts subversive work in secret from the masses, as a rule. In this situation, abstract application of principles is impermissible, since in this case they might turn into an obstacle for our cause. We bore this in mind when the events in Czechoslovakia took place. . . . The socialist world has not broken any of our principles, since it was forced to take measures to defend socialism and world peace." (TASS, 12 June)

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for their own policy, the world parties "also have international obligations, because they are responsible to the workers' movement as well. . . . D. Urbani stressed further that the Communist Party of Luxembourg had fully and unconditionally supported the measures of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries last August in Czechoslovakia." (TASS, 13 June)

Guyana

"Speaking about the question of the movement of troops of socialist countries into Czechoslovakia, which was raised by some of the delegates, the speaker turned down the assertion that this step was a violation of sovereignty or rejection of the right to democratic development. . . . C. Jagan supported the point contained in the speech" of Gustav Husak, "the point about the class content of sovereignty, about the fact that the rights and duties of socialist countries are linked inseparably," (TASS, 15 June)

D. RESERVATIONS ON THE MAIN DOCUMENT

The CPSU's Boris Ponomarev, presenting the main document to the conference on 16 June in behalf of the editorial commission, declared that the commission had received "more than 70" proposals for amendments from 24 parties and adopted "fully or partially about 30," according to TASS. All the proposals, he said, "were most thoroughly discussed." TASS' and PRAVDA's daily diaries of the proceedings and accounts of the speeches reflected some of the controversy over the document, but were vague at times in indicating the nature of the objections raised. In the final session the dissenting parties took actions ranging from refusal to sign all or part of the document, to deferral of action, to agreement to sign despite their reservations.

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While the conference issued no list of signers of the main document, the final communique carried by TASS on the 17th listed five parties--the Dominican, Australian, Italian, San Marino, and Reunion CP's--as failing to sign the full document, stating that the Dominican party did not support any of it while the other four signed only the third section outlining the program of anti-imperialist struggle. But TASS' presentation left the impression that all the rest signed, and the picture was in fact more complicated.

CPYRGHT

The 18 June PRAVDA account of the final discussion session on the evening of the 16th reported statements by the Norwegian and British CP delegates that they would defer final decisions on signing any part of the document until the next sessions of their parties' leading bodies. The British party, following an executive committee session, subsequently made known its decision not to sign.

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of the Norwegian delegation was apparently absent at the windup of the conference; Copenhagen radio on the 13th reported that delegation chairman Larsen had ~~already returned home, having charged--though no such charge was reflected in TASS' account of his remarks--that~~ criticism of China at the gathering constituted "a breach of promise." Delegation member Pettersen spoke for the Norwegian party in the final discussion of the document.

CPYRGHT

The Reunion delegate apparently shifted his position twice during the proceedings: He served notice on the 14th that his party, like the British and Norwegian, would defer a decision until after the conference was over; on the 17th the final communique listed Reunion as signing only Part III; but PRAVDA's account the next day listed the Reunion delegate as signing the entire document, with reservations. The small Reunion party has a history of assertiveness: at the February-March 1968 consultative meeting in Budapest the Reunion delegate opposed making public the episode that led to the Romanian walkout, and TASS reported his "abstention" on that meeting's adoption of its final communique.

CPYRGHT

In sum, available information indicates that at the windup of the Moscow conference three parties--the Dominican, Norwegian, and British--in addition to the Cuban and Swedish observer parties had not signed the document; of the three that declined to sign, one announced a final decision and the other two deferred decisions. Three parties had signed only Part III--the Australian, Italian, and San Marino CP's.

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Of the 67 parties that signed the full document, at least 14 had expressed substantial reservations. PRAVDA's 18 June account of the evening session on the 16th, at which a number of parties explained their final positions, names the Moroccan, Reunion, Romanian, Spanish, Sudanese, and Swiss parties as stating a decision to sign while registering reservations. The Soviet record, partially filled out by scattered materials from other communist sources thus far available, identifies eight more that had expressed substantial complaints about the document--the Austrian, Belgian, Chilean, Costa Rican, Guatemalan, Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Northern Ireland parties.

The objections ranged from the Italian party's view that the document was too "exhortative and propagandistic" and the Romanian view that it overestimated the threat from "imperialism," through specialized complaints relating to Latin America and the Middle East, to the hardlining Costa Rican complaint that the draft did not condemn the Chinese and the Nicaraguan view that it should have condemned "splinter actions."

A definitive compilation of the objections to the document as finally adopted is not possible at this juncture because of the haziness of Soviet reporting on some of the debates, the incompleteness of available material from other communist sources, and the fact that some objections raised in the course of the debates were presumably accommodated in amendments or withdrawn. The listing below records identifiable substantive expressions of reservations, gleaned from the public record. The parties are grouped according to their actions on the final day--the single party that announced a final decision not to sign, the two that deferred decisions, the three that signed only Part III, 14 that signed the two observers and hence nonsigners.

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Party

Nature of Reservation

Final Action

NONSIGNER: FINAL DECISION

CPYRGHT

Dominican Republic

Sanchez "opposed the formulation of the road of revolution contained in the document under consideration, and first of all the formulation about the peaceful road." (TASS, 14 June)

"Would not sign"
(TASS, 14 June)

CPYRGHT

"The document conceals real attitudes within the socialist camp and canonizes the national policies of a number of communist parties' policies which we do not share." (PRAVDA, 18 June)

"Would not sign"
(PRAVDA, 18 June)

CPYRGHT

NONSIGNERS: DEFERRED DECISIONS

Britain

"Concerning the draft main document," Gollan said, "the conference delegates undoubtedly know that our executive committee will make final decisions on our attitude to the document after our return." (PRAVDA, 17 June) The document was not mentioned in the 13 June TASS report of Gollan's speech.

"Final decision" would be made at "next regular session" of party executive committee. (PRAVDA, 18 June)

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Executive committee "unable to give its assent to the document as a whole." (British Communist MORNING STAR, 30 June); reported by Prague radio but omitted in TASS report of executive committee statement, both on the 30th.

CPYRGHT

Norway

Larsen stated that his party's delegation "agrees with some of the amendments proposed for the documents discussed at the conference and that it has a number of suggestions dealing chiefly with the main document. Attention must be concentrated on its third and fourth sections." (TASS, 10 June)

Decision at "next plenum" of party. Pettersen said "we have no power to sign or approve this document." (PRAVDA 18 June)

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

<u>Party</u>	<u>Nature of Reservation</u>	<u>Final Action</u>
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PARTIAL SIGNERS

Australia	<p>Aarons said his party "cannot sign the document as a whole, since it disagrees with some of the principles set forth in the document and since there are no substantial theses and principles in it." The document "disregards certain important phenomena in relations between socialist countries which negatively influence our entire movement." (TASS, 7 June)</p>	<p>CPYRGHT Signed Part III (PRAVDA, 18 June)</p>
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Italy	<p>Berlinguer said "the document's style is often more exhortative and propagandistic than analytical" and underestimates the difficulties, failings, and rifts which have occurred in the socialist camp and in the workers movement and fails to examine their causes." (L'UNITA, 12 June) TASS on the 11th and PRAVDA on the 14th reported only that Berlinguer "criticized" the main document and confined his support to Part III.</p>	<p>CPYRGHT Signed Part III (PRAVDA, 18 June)</p>
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San Marino	<p>Gasperoni "stated that his delegation approved only that part of the document which expresses the program of our common struggle against imperialism." (PRAVDA, 18 June)</p>	<p>CPYRGHT Signed Part III (PRAVDA, 18 June)</p>
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SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS

Austria	<p>Muhri said his party "agrees with the draft of the main document but at the same time is in favor of improving it further taking into account the opinions expressed in the discussion." The Austrian CP "suggests including, in the part of the main document containing the call for the struggle against racialism, a phrase directed against the reactionary essence of anti-Semitism." (TASS, 10 June)</p>	<p>Signed</p>
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SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)

Belgium	"The Belgian delegation's opinion is that the conference is more the beginning than the end. Despite the imperfection of the documents, which are the fruit of long discussions, it will adopt them." [TASS, 12 June]	Signed
CPYRGHT	"Despite the many positive sides of the main document, we are not completely satisfied with it. However, it is an acceptable basis for discussion. It cannot in any way hamper the political work or cause harm to the independence of any party." (PRAVDA, 16 June)	CPYRGHT
Chile	Corvalan said his party would not insist that all its amendments be accepted, but "there are some statements we would have wished expressed another way." Chile would have preferred substituting "armed or nonarmed road" for "peaceful or nonpeaceful." (EL SIGLO, 11 June) PRAVDA's account omitted this specific objection.	Signed CPYRGHT
Costa Rica	Mora said he would prefer the document to "contain less hesitations in the approach to great problems of the present-day revolutionary movement. We cannot understand why we must keep silent about the policy of the present leaders of the Communist Party of China." (TASS, 12 June)	Signed CPYRGHT
Guatemala	Martinez wanted "more precise formulas to express the dialectic correlation between peaceful coexistence and the revolutionary process." He was "not completely satisfied" with the portions on Latin America. (PRAVDA, 19 June)	Signed CPYRGHT
Mexico	Verdugo approved the document's "main orientation," but "we continue to believe it is necessary and possible to improve it by adopting certain amendments which were submitted during the preparatory commission's work and at the conference itself." (PRAVDA, 17 June)	Signed CPYRGHT

Party

Nature of Reservation

Final Action

SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)

Morocco

"We have expressed ourselves in favor of stressing the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. . . . We believe, Comrade Ali Yata said, that this inalienable right, one which is not subject to any doubt, has all the same not found sufficient reflection in the main document. This has also compelled the delegation to make certain reservations. However, fully recognizing our responsibility, Ali Yata concluded, we are signing this document proceeding from the spirit of the unity and cooperation of all fraternal parties--both those present and those absent--and from our unwavering faithfulness to proletarian internationalism." (PRAVDA, 18 June)

Signed

CPYRGHT

Nicaragua

Santos "noted that it was the opinion of his party's Central Committee that the draft main document should include principled provisions on the need to expose and condemn all splinter actions within the communist movement, whatever their origin, on the attitude of communist and workers parties to the CPSU and the Soviet Union . . . , on the duty to condemn the rightwing deviation just as the 'leftwing' one." (TASS, 14 June)

Santos "spoke about the unanimous approval by the party Central Committee of the documents discussed at the conference." (TASS, 14 June)

CPYRGHT

Northern Ireland

Murphy "said the delegation of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland would have drafted this document in a more concise form, since the main struggle both in northern and southern Ireland is directed against imperialism. Nevertheless, the Communist Party expressed readiness to support the conclusions contained in the document and to apply them whenever possible in the conditions of its country." (TASS, 16 June)

Signed

CPYRGHT

Reunion

Verges "expressed a reservation in respect to the main document of the conference. He said the document contained a certain understatement of the possibility of rapid and at times decisive changes in those areas of the world where the

Party "would adopt a decision" on the main document "after the end of the conference." (TASS, 14 June)

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SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)

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national liberation movement acts." (TASS, 14 June)

"Approved Part III" (TASS 17 June)

"It contains insufficiently precise formulations" on "relations between the socialist countries and the communist parties, and this allows them to be interpreted arbitrarily. The delegation subscribes to reservations regarding the characteristics of the situation in the Near East."

"Empowered to sign the main document on condition that the reservations set forth be noted and made public."

(PRAVDA, 18 June)

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(PRAVDA, 18 June)

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Romania

"Our party conceives of international reunions of communist and workers parties not as forums called on to draw up programmatic documents which are compulsory for all parties and to establish directives and norm-setting lines." (Ceausescu, Radio Bucharest, 9 June)

Ceausescu said his party "adopts the document in its present form."

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(AGERPRES, 16 June; PRAVDA, 18 June)

"We cannot refrain from referring to the fact that in the document, especially in chapters one and two, wordings have remained which are not clear enough and may create confusion. . . . As an example in this respect, we refer to the way in which in some paragraphs the problem of the divergencies existing among socialist countries as well as among the communist and workers parties is dealt with. Consequently, the impression can be created that these divergencies are due to the activity of imperialism--and this in our opinion is not realistic--and that the possibilities for imperialism to divide the international working class movement are overrated." At the same time, the impression can be created of a certain underrating of the capability of the socialist countries, of the communist and workers parties, to repel any action of imperialism and its propaganda directed against the unity of the socialist countries and the unity of the communists and the working class movement the world over.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Nature of Reservation</u>	<u>Final Action</u>
<u>SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)</u>		
Romania (Continued) CPYRGHT	"As to the Middle East, we have set forth our standpoint and do not dwell on it now, although we consider that it would have been well for the document to deal more clearly with this problem, too. (Ceausescu, AGERPRES, 16 June) The 18 June <u>PRAVDA summarized the substance of Ceausescu's remarks, but muted his reservations on the Middle East.</u>	
Spain	Carillo said his party "expressed serious reservations about certain points which it would like to be more in accord with reality. The document, he specified, is not some 'program charter' outlining a 'general line.' It is the result of an extensive discussion containing a number of important new elements. At the same time, the draft has ambiguities and obvious omissions. These and other causes make the conference different in character from the conferences of 1957 and 1960." (TASS, 17 June)	The party "has decided to sign the document so as not to leave room for doubt regarding its firm adherence to" <u>the world movement.</u> (PRAVDA, 18 June)
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Sudan	"The delegation expresses a reservation on one sentence where reference is made to 'full' implementation of the Security Council resolution [of 22 November 1967 on the Middle East], because the resolution contains serious defects particularly with respect to the Palestine problem. We, as communists," Suridzh said, "act on behalf of the ultimate interests of our peoples and must reveal defects in decisions of an international character, decisions arising out of specific conditions." (PRAVDA, 18 June)	"Supports and will sign the main document." (PRAVDA, 18 June)
		CPYRGHT
		CPYRGHT

<u>Party</u>	<u>Nature of Reservation</u>	<u>Final Action</u>
<u>SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)</u>		
Switzerland	Lechleiter said "the fact that some parties are not taking part in the work of the conference indicates that it is not yet possible to work out a single document which could become the common, scientifically founded political and ideological platform for all the parties. . . . We believe it is necessary to make specific a number of wordings of the document which are too general and inaccurate, so as to avoid different interpretations. A number of such wordings idealize relations between parties of socialist states, which is not in accord with the present situation." (TASS, 11 June)	"Approves the document with the aforementioned reservations." (PRAVDA, 18 June)
CPYRGHT		
<u>OBSERVERS</u>		
Cuba	Rodriguez argued that the document should have given greater stress to "self-criticism" and should have pointed out "the weaknesses of the workers' movement in the developed capitalist countries." He disputed the statement that the Latin American communist parties "head the democratic forces and . . . fight courageously . . . for the attainment of revolutionary changes," a description which "does not correspond to reality with regard to certain Latin American communist parties." Insufficient stress had been placed on the role of "bourgeois reformism" in U.S. strategy in Latin America.	Status precluded signing

<u>Party</u>	<u>Nature of Reservation</u>	<u>Final Action</u>
<u>OBSERVERS (Continued)</u>		
Cuba (Continued)	<p>While Cuba backed the document's concept of peaceful coexistence, it held that the defense of peace should not be the main aim of the anti-imperialist movement: "the anti-imperialist forces must establish as the essential aim of their actions the defeat and elimination of imperialism."</p> <p>Although the Cuban party favors outlawing nuclear weapons, so long as this is not achieved "our view-- which is very well known to those attending the conference--on the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons will remain unchanged." [Cuba is on record as objecting to the nonproliferation treaty] [GRANMA, 12 June] Soviet accounts registered the substance of Rodriguez' objections, including his swipe at the orthodox Latin American communist parties.</p>	CPYRGHT
Sweden	<p>Werner said "we believe that the document circulated has substantial shortcomings from the point of view of coverage and analysis of the situation in the world. Omitted are important questions concerning evaluation of revolutionary strategy in the 'third world.' . . . The thesis reading that each party itself should have the decisive say in the affairs of its own people was not formulated very precisely." [TASS, 12 June] A report of the speech in the 18 June PRAVDA says only that Werner "made several remarks about the conference's main document."</p>	Status precluded signing CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 July 1969

Two Ways of Going to the Moon

The launch of Apollo 11, like the launches of the other Apollo spacecraft before it, was beautiful, as they say on television. It was so precise, so error-free, that you could not entirely appreciate the technical prowess that went into it. And because it got off to such a magnificent start, it is also easy to overlook the quiet, cool courage and confidence of the men in the capsule and the men in charge on the ground. On hand were a Vice President, a former President, quite probably a quorum of both houses of Congress, a huge turnout of foreign envoys and no end of dignitaries and expert observers, not to mention representatives of the press of this country and 54 foreign lands. It was, in short, a wide open affair—and, accordingly, wide open to embarrassment, or worse, if anything had gone wrong. And this is not only a tribute to NASA and to our whole space effort but a commentary of some consequence on the contrasting ways in which the two great space powers of this planet approach the great adventure in space.

For there are now two spacecraft racing across the sky toward the moon. One was launched on a mission with the whole world looking on and the objective explicitly set forth in advance. The other, Russia's Luna 15, was launched in secret on a mission yet unknown, and it is this contrast, rather than any qualitative comparison between what we are setting out to achieve and what the Russians are setting out to achieve, that is significant. It would be childish to fault the Russians for trying to slip their moon shot in ahead of ours, as if the moon was somehow ours this week. It was largely our decision to make a race of this and just as we would very much like to win this race, so it is

natural for the Russians to try to steal some of our thunder if they can.

That is not the point about the Russian performance that augurs ill for the long pull. What is disappointing is the Soviet continuing insistence on secrecy, whether it stems from national security concerns or a lack of confidence in its own abilities. In any case, not even Col. Frank Borman, Commander of this country's first circumlunar mission, was given a hint of the plan for Luna 15 in his otherwise friendly conversations with Soviet space officials.

So we do not know what the Russian spacecraft is up to, except for the fact that it will reach the moon while Apollo 11 is still on its way. According to the best guesses of space experts here, it may land, scoop up some lunar soil and return to earth. If it does, the Russians will have upstaged Apollo 11 to some extent and won some part of the race they and we embarked upon less than a decade ago.

But that isn't the point, either. The world can judge, if it feels the need, whether Apollo 11 or Luna 15 was the more spectacular affair, the more difficult and the more scientifically useful of the two. Over the long haul, as man presses on in his exploration of the universe, this judgment may not matter much, for mankind, with all the problems confronting it and drawing upon its resources, will be the loser unless the spirit of contest gives way to open collaboration among all those with a contribution to make to the unlocking of the secrets of space. In the meantime, Apollo 11 will stand as a symbol of a nation that dares to operate openly and is willing to share its successes, its failures and its knowledge with every man.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
15 July 1969

Moscow Stays Officially Silent

On Mission of Lunar Probe

Unofficial sources in Moscow said yesterday that the unmanned Soviet space probe heading for the moon probably will go into lunar orbit, send a robot capsule to the surface and rejoin the parent ship for a flight back to earth with samples of moon rocks and soil.

Westerners in Moscow and elsewhere have speculated in recent weeks that such a feat would be attempted in an effort to upstage the Apollo 11 flight, but there was still no official confirmation of any details of the Luna 15 flight, beyond the announcement that the moon probe was successfully launched early Sunday.

Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank Observatory in England, does not believe that Luna 15 will bring back soil from the moon.

Lovell, whose observatory has picked up signals from Luna 15, said he expected the Soviets to eventually recover rocks with such unmanned spacecraft, but "it is unlikely the Russians can do this by the testing of systems in one exercise."

"I think this is the beginning of a new series of Russian lunar probes going to lead up to the recovery of moon rocks without the

intervention of man," he said.

A West German space scientist suggested that Luna 15 is probably a test for an eventual direct moon landing without the help of a landing module.

Heinz Kaminski, director of the Bochum Space Research Institute, based his deduction on two articles that appeared June 13 in the Soviet magazine Cosmic Analysis, published by the Moscow Academy of Science.

Luna 15 should reach the moon by Wednesday, and the Apollo 11 capsule blasts into orbit from Cape Kennedy.

The terse Soviet announcement of the Luna 15 flight said only that the probe would continue studies of the moon and of space close to the lunar surface.

The Soviet Union has never before put a craft in orbit around the moon and returned it to earth, nor has it performed any capsule uncoupling and recoupling operations in the vicinity of the moon.

But the unofficial sources in Moscow said experiments with a retrievable capsule, the unmanned equivalent of the Apollo moonbug, have been carried out on earth.

SOVIET LAUNCHES UNMANNED CRAFT TOWARD THE MOON

Observers Believe Attempt May Be Made to Land and Return to Earth

5TH IN LUNA PROGRAM

Western Sources Doubt That Russia Has Capability to Achieve Such a Feat

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 13—The Soviet Union launched an unmanned spaceship toward the moon today, just three days before the scheduled blastoff of America's Apollo 11 on a manned lunar landing mission.

The launching of the Luna 15 mission appeared to observers here as a deliberate effort by the Soviet Union to steal some of the moon publicity away from the United States and demonstrate that it is still much in the space business.

As usual, few details were released on the latest Soviet space venture.

Tass, the official Soviet press agency, said that at 5:55 A.M. Moscow time (10:55 P.M., Saturday, Eastern daylight time) a rocket carrier carrying Luna 15 was launched.

It said that Luna 15 "was launched to the moon from the orbit of an artificial earth satellite."

The Aim of the Flight

"The aim of the flight is to check the systems on board the automatic station and to conduct further scientific exploration of the moon and space near the moon," the announcement said.

The announcement's wording was vague enough to leave room for any possible speculation, and Moscow was buzzing

with all varieties tonight.

Some observers believed Luna 15 was a sister ship of the Luna 14, which circled the moon in April last year but did not return to earth.

Others thought Luna 15 might be an ambitious effort by the Russians to land an unmanned spaceship on the moon and then return it to earth, possibly with some rocks from the moon's surface.

If this were indeed the case, the Soviet Union could beat the United States in the "race" to bring samples from the moon to the earth.

Attempt Has Been Hinted

Communist correspondents for the last four months have been advising some of their Western colleagues here that the main Soviet effort would be such a space venture. But their predictions as to when the Soviet Union would launch such a mission have repeatedly been wrong.

Some correspondents had said that a launching was scheduled for July 10, and when this launching did not take place, they said that the Soviet Union would wait until after the Apollo 11 mission.

Some Western diplomats have said that a "scooping" operation to obtain lunar soil samples appears beyond the Soviet capacity at the moment. These observers contend that the Russians lack the ability to launch a vehicle heavy enough to contain a craft that could reach the surface of the moon and then take-off again.

American officials were somewhat concerned that Luna 15, whatever its mission, might present a hazard to the Apollo 11.

The view was fairly general, however, that the Soviet Union, knowing in advance what Apollo 11 planned to do, would not interfere with it.

Tass said that at noon today, Moscow time, Luna 15 was about 41,000 miles from earth. "There is a steady radio communication with the station," Tass said. The vehicle's equipment was said to be functioning normally.

The first in the Luna series was launched on Jan. 2, 1959. It passed within 3,728 miles of the moon and then went into an orbit around the sun.

Luna 2, launched on Sept. 12, 1959, was the first probe to hit the moon, and Luna 3, launched

on Oct. 4, 1959, was the first to photograph the moon's far side.

Subsequent Luna space shots emphasized attempts to make "soft landings" on the moon, with Luna 9, in February, 1969, making the first such landing.

None of the Luna series have ever returned to earth.

The unmanned Zond 5, launched last September, and Zond 6, last November, circled the moon and returned to earth. This led observers to believe then that the Russians might be planning a manned orbit of the moon.

Earlier this year, a Soviet astronaut, Lieut. Col. Alekséi A. Leonov, was quoted by Japanese newsmen as saying that he expected that rocks from the moon to be exhibited by the Soviet Union at the 1970 world's fair in Osaka, Japan, and that an unmanned craft would pick them up.

But there was no evidence in the Tass announcement today that Luna 15 would attempt to do this.

For the last week, the Soviet press has been focusing on the Apollo 11 mission, with one newspaper running the photographs of the three astronauts who make up its crew—Neil A. Armstrong, who is a civilian, and Col. Edwin E. Aldrin Jr. and Lieut. Col. Michael Collins, both of whom are in the Air Force.

Borman Met Podgorny

The recent visit of Col. Frank Borman, the astronaut, and his family also provided the occasion for many articles on America's space efforts. After a 40-minute meeting in the Kremlin between Colonel Borman and President Nikolai V. Podgorny, the Soviet leader was quoted as wishing President Nixon and the American people success with the Apollo 11 mission.

Colonel Borman was repeatedly asked by American newsmen during his stay here whether he knew of any Soviet space venture in the near future, and he always indicated that he had no knowledge of any.

So far, the new Luna mission has received scant publicity here, merely being reported on regular news broadcasts, without the serious tone that is reserved for major space achievements.

If usual Soviet practice is followed, little will be made known about the mission until it achieves its objective or ends its mission — with Tuesday afternoon probably being the earliest that any substantial amount of information will be released.

NEW YORK TIMES

14 July 1969

CPYRGHT

NASA Officials Fear Russians Are Trying to Upstage Apollo

By RICHARD D. LYONS
Special to The New York Times

CAPE KENNEDY, Fla., July 13—Space agency officials appeared concerned and a bit alarmed today that the latest Soviet lunar flight might be a dramatic attempt to upstage America's scheduled launching of a lunar mission on Wednesday.

They fear that the edge will be taken off the Apollo 11 mission, however successful, if the Soviet Union lands on the moon an unmanned spacecraft that scoops up lunar soil, then blasts off from the surface and returns to earth.

The Apollo mission is intended to land two men on the moon and bring back samples of the lunar soil.

Col. Frank Borman, the commander of the Apollo 8 flight around the moon last Christmastime, who returned last week from a trip to the Soviet Union, said here today it was his "guess" that this was, in fact, the mission of Luna 15. He said Russian space experts he met in Moscow last week "had made references to it."

The Air Force officer asserted that "it will be a great feat" if the Russians bring back a sample of lunar soil, but added: "An unmanned machine certainly will not take the edge off Apollo 11."

Other experts familiar with the Soviet space program said, however, that they believed that the Soviet flight was aimed more at scooping up propaganda, rather than lunar soil.

"The Russians may have figured that they could keep the world guessing and take the edge off the fact that they were not attempting a manned landing on the moon," one said.

He pointed out that the last Soviet moon flight, Luna 14, occurred 15 months ago.

"Why launch Luna 15 now rather than a month or two ago?" he asked. "It obviously had some connection with Apollo 11."

However, space agency officials here are known to be concerned about the effect that such a mission would have on the attention focused on Apollo 11. For 10 years an argument has raged over whether unmanned space exploration would be not only less risky but also less costly and just as fruitful from the scientific standpoint as manned space flight.

Commenting on Colonel Borman's statements, a high official of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration said the agency had known "for some time" that the Soviet Union "had the technical capability to undertake such a mission."

He emphasized, however, that the exact nature of the Luna 15 mission was still obscure, as did Dr. Thomas O. Paine, the agency's administrator.

Dr. Paine said here: "We hope that the juxtaposition of two lunar missions in such a close time frame points out the desirability of close cooperation in space between the Soviet Union and the United States."

Colonel Borman, appearing on the National Broadcasting Company's program, "Meet the Press," said that unmanned lunar probes were worthwhile but there is no substitute for human judgment.

Experts familiar with the Soviet space program were less certain that an automatic lunar soil sampling station was the objective of Lunar 15, despite Colonel Borman's acknowledged expertise and recent talks with the Russians.

The experts pointed out that it had been known for years that in the Soviet Union the lunar landing launching "windows"—that is, those times of the month that are most propitious for moonshots—are six to seven days ahead of those at Cape Kennedy. This would place the best time for a Soviet attempt at three or four days ago, when there were rumors in Moscow that an automatic soil scooping attempt was going to be made.

Perhaps Another Plan
The experts said the Soviet statements to Colonel Borman could have been for a mission

that was supposed to have been launched last week and not to the one that went up today.

The essence of the counter-argument against an automatic soil sampling station was that Luna 15 was nothing more than another Soviet lunar orbiting flight. Even this type of mission, which has been accomplished by both the United States and the Soviet Union, would have a propaganda effect because it would, however momentarily, deflect the focus of world attention from the Apollo 11 flight.

Technical experts such as Dr. George Mueller, a NASA associate administrator who is a propulsion expert, said last week that it might be possible for an automatic spacecraft to land and pick up material. But he said he strongly doubted that the craft would return to earth.

Lack of Propulsion

The key to the argument against return is propulsion. If the spacecraft descended directly, as the American Surveyor ship did, it would need an enormous propulsion system to blast off and return to earth. It would be almost like landing a huge rocket backward and then taking it off again without launching pad, gantry cranes and especially men to help.

If the Russians were to put a craft into lunar orbit, detach a smaller pickaback spacecraft to the surface for a soil pickup, then blast it off for a rendezvous and docking with the mother craft, the weight would be less but the timing would be extremely complicated and perhaps impossible.

Sir Harrie Massey, chairman of the British National Committee for Space Research, said in Britain that he believed that Luna 15 "was not of very special significance."

In Washington the State Department issued a statement saying that while the Russians "have not yet stated the intent of the mission, we welcome this further exploration in space and wish them every success in man's effort to better understand the world around him."

NEW YORK TIMES
28 July 1969

REDS HELD GLUM OVER MOON FEAT

Strains and Embarrassment
Reported in Soviet Bloc

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, July 27 — Well-informed Eastern European sources report that the triumph of Apollo 11 and the performance of the Soviet Luna 15 spacecraft caused lively controversy within the Moscow leadership and strains throughout the Soviet bloc.

The debate and recriminations are said to involve Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party.

Gloom and embarrassment over the landing of the United States astronauts on the moon and the apparent crash of the unmanned Luna 15 craft on the moon's surface are said to have hung heavily over talks

that Mr. Brezhnev conducted with Eastern European leaders in Warsaw last week.

Mr. Brezhnev and President Nikolai V. Podgorny of the Soviet Union conferred there from Monday to Wednesday with Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish Communist party chief, Dr. Gustav Husak, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party, Premier Willi Stoph of East Germany, and other high officials of the three countries.

The occasion was the 25th anniversary of Communist rule in Poland. Soviet proposals for a collective security system to guarantee the status quo in Eastern Europe and the implications of President Nixon's visit to Rumania, scheduled for Aug. 2 and 3, were understood to have been major topics of the Warsaw meeting.

The Communist leaders gathered in Warsaw were said to have been disturbed by reports reaching them of the enthusiastic reactions across Eastern Europe to the feat of the Apollo astronauts.

Live television coverage, via communications satellite, was provided by the state networks of several Eastern European

countries, not including the Soviet Union, which showed delayed videotapes of the astronauts on the moon.

The public response, taken as indicative of lingering and latent sympathies for the United States and its way of life, was reportedly strongest in the technologically most advanced countries of the Soviet bloc—East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Interest Is Widespread

Mass interest for the Apollo 11 mission and some public gloating over the Luna 15 episode were noted also in Poland, Hungary and Rumania, according to information available here.

Communist officials responsible for mass media in the Soviet bloc are understood to be worried that many newspaper writers, editors and broadcasters in the area may have gone out of their way to show goodwill toward the United States in connection with the Apollo 11 success.

It is reliably disclosed that news media in various Eastern European countries have been requested by the Communist authorities to stress, in reporting on President Nixon's present tour of Asian countries, what is viewed as United States aggression in Vietnam.

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REUTERS
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Thieu Sets Terms to End War Plans Parley To Establish Two Parties

SAIGON, April 7 (Monday) — South Vietnamese President Thieu proposed a six-point peace plan today, including the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces and the setting up of an international control system.

The President said he would call a conference of all leading political figures in a few days to work out the basis for setting up two national political parties.

One would be for the government—headed by himself—and one for the opposition.

At the opening of a new session of Parliament, Thieu said he would guarantee political rights to former Vietcong members once peace is secured.

"Those now fighting against us who renounce violence and respect the laws will be welcomed as full members of the national community," he said. "As such they will enjoy full political rights and assume the same obligations as other lawful citizens under the national constitution."

Thieu listed his six points for peace as:

- Communist aggression should stop.

- North Vietnamese troops and cadres should be completely withdrawn from South Vietnam.

- The territories of the neighboring countries (Cambodia and Laos) should not be violated or used by North Vietnamese as bases and staging areas for aggression.

- South Vietnam should adopt a policy of national reconciliation.

- Reunification of the two Vietnams to be decided by the free choice of the entire population through democratic processes.

- An effective system of international control and reliable guarantees against "the resumption of Communist aggression."

Thieu said economic and cultural exchanges between North and South Vietnam could be explored—"together with other intermediary measures of peaceful coexistence"—pending reunification of the two countries.

He pledged that if North Vietnam withdraws its "subversive" forces and there is a drop in the level of infiltration and violence, South Vietnam "will ask its allies to remove their forces."

He said Hanoi should pull out troops stationed in Cambodia and Laos and should also dismantle military installations there.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 April 1969

Saigon's Aide in Paris Supports Supervised Vote With Vietcong

PARIS, Monday, April 7.—Pham Dang Lam, South Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks, said today that his country would accept general elections under international control with the participation of the Vietcong when the fighting halted.

Mr. Lam made the statement in an interview published by the Paris morning newspaper, Le Figaro.

The offer to give the Vietcong a role in elections was regarded by observers as a diplomatic initiative.

Mr. Lam strictly qualified his offer by stating that the Vietcong, the National Liberation Front, must "change their label" to enter any elections. He said that since "the Communist

ally forbids Communism," it therefore forbids the Front, which claims kinship with Communism, he added.

Coalition Regime Opposed

But, he continued, "nothing prevents the Front's people and their partisans from taking part in general elections if they change their label."

He strongly rejected the idea of a coalition Government, saying

"elections whose results we accept in advance, after which those who were elected would name the government of their choice."

"We sincerely hope that the political struggle will replace the war," Mr. Lam said. "We are ready, as soon as the combat stops, to accept general elections, under international control if necessary, whatever the circumstances."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 June 1969

Hanoi rebuff on parley jolts India

By Ernest Weatherall
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

The Indian Government is puzzled over North Vietnam's abrupt request that Foreign Affairs Secretary T. N. Kaul postpone his talks in Hanoi.

Earlier it had been announced that Mr. Kaul would be going to Hanoi and Saigon to "explore the possibilities of speeding up the Vietnam peace talks in Paris." This marked the first time India, which chairs the International Control Commission, has taken an active part in trying to end the Vietnam conflict.

India's position on the Vietnam war, during past years, has closely followed that of the Soviet Union: The United States should stop bombing the North, pull out its troops, and let the Vietnamese decide for themselves.

But there now appears to be more sympathy for the American position in Vietnam. It began with President Johnson's decision not to seek office again. The bombing halt and recently the proposed withdrawal of some American troops won Indian approval. On the other hand, Hanoi has not made a single concession.

Now the shooting down of New Delhi's attempts to begin peace talks has convinced many Indians that Hanoi inflexibility is prolonging the war.

CPYRGHT

THE VIETNAM GUARDIAN, Saigon
12 July 1969 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3

SAIGON DARES NLF TO FACE ELECTIONS

PRESIDENT LAYS DOWN 6 « PRINCIPLES »

CPYRGHT WARNING OF LIMITS TO PATIENCE

SAIGON (VNG) — President Nguyen Van Thieu Friday offered to let the National Liberation Front «participate» in elections and to let them sit on an electoral commission «if they renounce violence and pledge themselves to accept the results of the elections.»

He also promised that the Government of Vietnam «will abide by the results of the elections, whatever these results may be.»

The new offer came in the form of a six-point set of proposals contained in a national address «on the restoration of peace» in Vietnam.

The President also ticked off eight «repeated acts of good will for peace made by the allies.»

But he warned that «there is a point beyond which we shall get tired of making unilateral acts of good will.»

He also pointed out that «there is an obvious connection between free elections, supervised withdrawal of

non-South Vietnamese forces and an end to violence and terrorism.»

Six points

The gist of the six «principles» on which free elections could take place :

— All political hues including the NLF... can participate... if they renounce violence and pledge themselves to accept the results of the elections;

— An electoral commission which could include the NLF could be set up «to make sure the elections would be conducted in all fairness...»

— An international body should supervise the elections;

— «We are prepared to discuss with the other side

the time-table and modalities» for election;

— «There will be no reprisals or discrimination after the elections ;»

— «The Government declares that it will abide by the results of the elections, whatever the results may be. We

challenge the other side to declare the same.»

The President said he was renewing «the offer of private talks with the «NLF», without preconditions, to discuss the above and any other questions, toward the restoration of peace and national reconciliation.

« The other side should not misconstrue our desire for peace as a sign of weakness. It should not be induced by our repeated acts of good

will into believing that it has only to remain adamantly negative for us to accept eventual surrender.»

Gestures of good will

The eight gestures of good will the President mentioned:

— Pre-Paris contacts with non-involved parties for the purpose of negotiations ;

— Agreement to partial bombing halt of North Vietnam in March, 1968 ;

— Agreement to total bombing halt of North Vietnam in November, 1968;

— Agreement to let « NLF » sit with Hanoi in Paris;

— Agreement to attend Paris talks in spite of enemy hostilities;

— Agreement to simultaneous withdrawal by allies and communist aggressors;

— Offer by President Thieu in March of this year for private talks ;

— Agreement to redeployment of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

He noted that none of these gestures had met with any sign of reciprocal acts on the other side.

BALTIMORE SUN
21 July 1969

12 July 1969

VIET REDS URGE STEPPED-UP WAR

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Calls Made On Anniversary Of Geneva Peace Pact

CPYRIGHT BY EDWARD K. WU

[Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun]
Hong Kong, July 20—The Communists in North and South Vietnam marked the 15th anniversary of the Geneva peace agreement today with renewed calls to step up the war in the South. The official Hanoi newspaper, *Khan Dan*, in a commemorative editorial entitled "Persist In and Promote the Fighting, Advance Toward Complete Victory," said the Viet Cong had "advanced powerfully and steadily, with new posture, new strength, new military situation and new international position."

In its clandestine hideout in the South, the self-proclaimed provisional revolutionary government issued an anniversary communique today urging continued fighting until not a single American soldier is left.

The editorial and the communique, broadcast by the Vietnam News Agency in the North and monitored here, coincided with the lull of fighting in the South which is widely speculated as preparations for a new wave of attacks.

They also rejected President Nguyen Van Thieu's proposed free elections, alleging that they are counter to the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva accords in Indo-China.

They supported President Ho Chi Minh's appeal made on the eve of the anniversary of the Geneva agreements in which he said: "So long as United States troops and the puppet administration remain in existence in South Vietnam, really free and democratic general elections will be absolutely impossible."

President Ho repeated the accusation that the U.S. sabotaged the 1954 Geneva accords which provided for the holding of free elections in July, 1956, to reunify the whole of Vietnam.

He again called for a political solution in the South by accepting the National Liberation Front's 10-point program, which included the formation of the provisional coalition government to organize free election.

Noting that American defeat is "already evident," Mr. Ho said: "The people throughout Vietnam are determined to carry on and step up the resistance war, with the firm resolve to fight and win, till the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops and till the total collapse of the puppet army and administration. . . . Not the withdrawal of 25,000 or 250,000 or 500,000 men, but a total, complete, unconditional withdrawal."

Reviewing the situation of "from success to success" in the past 15 years, the North Vietnamese president added:

"The armed forces and people in the North have defeated the U.S. war of destruction.

"The armed forces and people in the South are defeating the U.S. local war."

The *Nhan Dan* editorial described Mr. Ho's appeal as an embodiment of the "steel-like determination" of the Vietnamese Communists to fight till complete victory regardless of hardships.

Thieu Moves Toward Peace

President Thieu's proposal for an electoral commission and supervised free elections in which the National Liberation Front could participate as a party represents a most encouraging and major advance by Saigon to a more flexible negotiating position. It deserves far better than the hasty, negative response it immediately received from the other side in Paris.

Although the Thieu statement does not go all the way toward accepting the Communist demand for a provisional coalition regime, it clearly moves in this direction by offering shared responsibility in the crucial electoral process to which both sides are committed. This is a significant modification of the tough position voiced by the Saigon leader in Seoul last May and again last month after the Midway conference when he insisted: "There will be no coalition government, no peace cabinet, no transitional government, not even reconciliatory government." Mr. Thieu has now unmistakably signaled that he is ready to negotiate.

The Thieu proposals are sufficiently broad as to leave ample room for fruitful bargaining if the Communist representatives are prepared to abandon the rigid stance they have assumed in Paris. If they do not do so, the world will have every reason to disbelieve Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's assurances that Hanoi and the Front are indeed "ready" for a political settlement.

To spur a positive Communist response, Washington and Saigon could strengthen President Thieu's promising initiative on the political front by reciprocating recent Communist moves toward reducing the level of military activity in South Vietnam. In addition, President Thieu could underscore his declaration of good faith by acting now to broaden his Government and by calling a halt to the prosecution of those who advocate the policy of reconciliation he himself has now in statesmanlike fashion embraced.

ASSOCIATED PRESS
18 July 1969

S. Vietnam Renews Call For Reunification Vote

SAIGON, July 18 (AP)—South Vietnam called again today for reunification of North and South Vietnam through free elections under international control.

The appeal was made in a Foreign Ministry statement marking the "Day of Shame," the anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 which ended the French Indochinese War and divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel.

The agreements called for the country to be reunited by elections in 1956. South Vietnam did not sign the agreement and in 1956 would not agree to elections.

President Thieu has proposed reunification through "free choice" of the people of the North and South. The Foreign Ministry statement today, which in essence repeated this statement, said: "The Republic of Vietnam solemnly asks North Vietnamese authorities to discuss directly and seriously . . . reunification of the South and North through internationally controlled general elections. Pending reunification, the two sides should meet to discuss closer ties between the two sides."

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EDITORIAL

ESCALATING PEACE EFFORTS

The end of the Vietnam war seems neither far off nor in sight. It does not seem far because Washington is bent on a process of military de-escalation. But it is not in sight for Hanoi has so far turned its back on escalation towards peace. The United States wants to get out of the mess that has become the Vietnam war and it is unwise not to allow an exit. Unless the effort to de-escalate the war is reciprocated, the conflict could degenerate into a situation that will further threaten world peace and stability. Hence the importance for both sides to realize that the solution to the Vietnam problem is political and not military.

The cost of the war is astronomical. To date the war has cost an estimated 700,000 lives and \$ 1.300 billion. Though the heaviest burden of the war has been borne by the Vietnamese people, the United States has not been spared punishment. The United States has so far spent nearly \$ 300 billion. Its casualty record reads 33,000 killed and 200,000 wounded. Vietnam has hurt the U.S. not only at the war front but also on the home front and around the world. No wonder then that the U.S. wants to get out of Vietnam. The war has proved a severe punishment to the punisher.

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: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3

TEGEGNE YETESHAWORK

SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1969

United States started bombing North Vietnam in February 1965. Ethiopia opposed and condemned this bombing. The raids against the North were totally halted last October and the cessation of the bombing helped launch the Paris peace talks. The fact that the talks have continued is an indication that no achievement has been made after one year and does not furnish much cause for comfort. The United States now has announced that it will unilaterally reduce its troop strength in Vietnam by withdrawing 25,000 soldiers. This should be welcomed as a catalyst to the peace effort going on in Paris.

In the last four years, the United States has initiated or supported 20 major peace efforts in Vietnam. North Vietnam and its allies deserve credit for reciprocating the bombing halt by showing up in Paris for peace talks. Another opportunity for a reciprocal action is now offered in the troop reduction just announced. The war in Vietnam is being waged by the forces of capitalism and communism, and they are these forces that must tacitly agree to peace without victory. The people of Vietnam have had wars for over two decades. Let them have peace for a change.

Various peace efforts are trying to end the 10-year old war in Vietnam. The combatants have manifested a measure of willingness to bring about a negotiated settlement by holding peace talks in Paris. What has been done for peace in the last one year is good, but it has not been enough. Both sides must now make bigger and better efforts by initiating and reciprocating in a de-escalation of the war. The world in general and the non-aligned states in particular must help bring about a negotiated settlement by crediting initiated peace efforts and by encouraging reciprocity.

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25 June 1969

Top Hanoi Aide Spurns Nixon Moves

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

PARIS, June 24—North Vietnam's chief strategist in Paris rejects in advance any compromise with the Saigon regime for using a mixed commission of Communists and non-Communists to organize a special election to decide South Vietnam's political fate.

Opposition to any form of compromise involving the



United Press International
LE DUC THO
... "vicious circle"

present government in Saigon—on which the Nixon Administration has pinned its hopes for a diplomatic settlement of the war—was expressed yesterday by Hanoi Politburo member Le Duc Tho.

In an interview with The Washington Post, Tho equally ruled out any form of international supervision or participation in an election test in South Vietnam. He similarly brushed aside any prospect for formal or tacit agreement to reduce the level of fighting so long as the Nixon Administration tries "to proceed from a position of strength" to end the war.

The harshest language was aimed at President Nixon personally.

Mr. Nixon's "personality" and his deeds since he has been in office, said Tho, have revealed a "warlike nature" that has produced a policy reflecting "the most warlike military circles in the United States."

Tho said that in the five months since President Nixon has been in office he has engaged in "futile . . . maneuvers" that "can be compared to building castles in the air."

Now time is running out on the President, said Tho.

"Mr. Nixon finds himself in a vicious circle. He wants to withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam but he fears that the puppet army and the puppet administration will collapse. But if Mr. Nixon is determined to pursue the war, U.S. casualties will increase . . ."

"The intention of Mr. Nixon is to stay in Vietnam in order to build up the puppet army and administration that will permit the prolongation of the war. But I think that time is not on the side of Mr. Nixon."

"Now . . . what has Mr. Nixon been able to achieve in his last five months at the conference table? We may say that he has achieved nothing."

The essence of Tho's attack has been reverberating for some weeks here across the conference table.

But what Tho added was a highly personal attack from the leading Communist policymaker on this scene, who is one of the highest-ranking colleagues of North Vietnamese President, Ho Chi Minh and a veteran revolutionary whose words carry special weight in Hanoi.

Tho's apparent objective was to maximize the pressures of American dissent and war frustration mounting on the Nixon Administration, to put pressure on Washington to accept the Vietcong-North Vietnam ten-point plan for ending the war—most especially, to abandon the present South Vietnamese regime.

The thrust of Tho's remarks was intended to show no ray of hope; no way around yielding to the demands of the Communist side.

His comments appeared to support the prevailing allied strategy assessment that the Communist side is determined, at least in the next few weeks of these talks, to show a totally uncompromising posture in order to stimulate more American and international demands on the Nixon Administration for a change of policy. The question among allied strategists is whether, after a time, the Communist side will shift to a more flexible negotiating stand if U.S. policy remains unchanged.

Others Expound Theme

Normally, Tho rarely speaks in public here, but now officials on the Communist side of the negotiations have joined in expounding a similar theme. Tho's official title is "special adviser" to North Vietnamese delegation chief Xuan Thuy. But the white-haired Tho, a man of dignity and evident power, is recognized as the dominant strategist facing U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as he did Lodge's predecessor, W. Averell Harriman, who was much impressed with him as an adversary.

Tho indirectly confirmed, in a recent remark when he referred to a discussion with Lodge, that he has talked with Lodge privately, at least once. In the interview, however, when asked if he saw any prospect for surmounting the negotiating barriers here by further private talks with Lodge, Tho said:

"We think that private meetings do not constitute a decisive factor in settling the problem. If the U.S. is not serious and has no good will, whatever private meetings there have been and how many private meetings there may be, they cannot settle the problem."

Tho also said:

"In the previous month, Mr. Nixon spread rumors to the effect that there were many secret meetings between us and the United States Administration and that a settlement was about to be reached. But the truth is not so.

"On the 19th of June," Tho added, "Mr. Nixon also hinted at a settlement between two or three months. His intention is to create hope among the American people. But the fact is that no progress at all has been made in the meetings. In fact, our positions are very far apart."

(What Mr. Nixon said, at his White House news conference that day, was: "Now we are down to substance" and "the two sides are far apart. But we believe that the time has come for a discussion of substance and we hope within the next two to three months to see some progress in substantive discussions.")

Tho, speaking in Vietnamese at his delegation headquarters here in suburban Choisy-le-Roi, with a North Vietnamese interpreter translating his words into English, developed the theme that all responsibility for the impasse in these talks rests squarely on President Nixon.

"The personality of Mr. Nixon," said Tho, speaking partially from written notes, is especially important because "the President of the United States is in a position to make decisions on war without having the consent of the Senate and the House of Representatives."

That reference was one of many scattered through Tho's comments that appeared to be acutely and adroitly aimed at appealing to the sensitivities of Mr. Nixon's war critics.

The most important new element in Tho's comments was his seeming off-handed rejection of the most sensitive objective in the Nixon Administration's attempts to nudge the Saigon government into negotiating range of the Vietcong.

This is the potential offer by the Saigon regime of a new form of "political settlement" which was referred to on June 19 by President Nixon—reportedly to Saigon's high irritation because Mr. Nixon publicly anticipated its action. This offer centers on the so-called mixed-commission approach to an election as an alternative to the Communist demand for outright replacement of the Saigon regime by a provisional coalition government, which would then conduct its own election for an entirely new government system.

Denied by Saigon

The Saigon government today denied reports that such a plan, to allow Communist membership on an election board, is even in the offing.

There have been growing doubts that the Communists will participate in an election that the Saigon government helps to organize. Those doubts have increased considerably since the Vietcong announced earlier this month that they have formed a provisional revolutionary government as an outright "legal" challenger to the Saigon regime.

Tho virtually brushed the whole question aside. There is no room whatever for such an approach, he said, in view of the ten-point political program of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong. That program is now the program of the new NLF government, as well as the program of North Vietnam.

"As I have pointed out," he said, "in the ten-point overall solution, general elections are to be organized by a provisional coalition government. And only in this way can fair and democratic elections be held. No other body than this provisional coalition government can organize fair and democratic elections."

Tho was similarly inflexible on the question of international supervision of any election. He said:

"The general election is an internal affair of the South Vietnamese people. There can be no international supervision under whatever form to supervise these elections because such supervision would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people and such

supervision would not respect self-determination of the rights of the South Vietnamese people."

In his indictment of Nixon Administration policy, Tho singled out, as formal Communist statements here have done, President Nixon's speech at the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, on June 4. In the speech, Mr. Nixon firmly defended the necessity of American military strength to preserve global stability and assailed critics of U.S. military power.

"This statement of Mr. Nixon," Tho charged, "has revealed the warlike nature of Mr. Nixon" and shows "that Mr. Nixon is still pursuing a policy of positions-of-strength on all problems of the world . . . these words by Mr. Nixon have been embodied in his policy in Vietnam, on the battlefield as well as at the conference table."

Tho said that "the U.S. has been continuing to exert maximum military pressure on the battlefield. The amount of bombs and ammunition it used during the last five months can be said to have exceeded the bombs and ammunition used in every other period since the beginning of the war . . ."

Claims NLF Strong

He said that "from the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam" on Nov. 1 "to January, 1969, the U.S. was of the opinion that the NLF forces, on the battlefield have been weakened and that the NLF forces have not been in a position to carry on their activity, and that is why the U.S. has intensified its own activity."

"But the reality," he continued, "is that NLF forces have not weakened in any way. In February, the Front intensified the war just to give an answer to the intensified attacks of the U.S. . . ."

Tho claimed that there have been more "counter-attacks" than the allied forces have admitted.

He said, "In the month of February when we counter-attacked the enemy powerfully, Mr. Nixon made noisy statements about this, threatening the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. But after his threats were revealed [to be] in vain, now that our people are increasing their counterattacks against

the enemy, Mr. Nixon is keeping quiet . . . and a number of papers under the influence of Mr. Nixon have not spoken about these counterattacks. Mr. Nixon's intention is to conceal the truth."

Tho was asked for comment on recent statements by Harriman that the Communist side was prepared for a "disengagement" last November. Harriman said he and his then-deputy in Paris Cyrus R. Vance, believed that when the North Vietnamese pulled the bulk of their troops out of the northern provinces of South Vietnam this represented "a political action on their part."

But because North Vietnam never has admitted officially it has any troops in the South, Tho did not respond directly to the issue. He said:

"As to the comment made by Mr. Harriman, I think every person has a right to give his own comment and I have no remarks on Mr. Harriman's comment."

Tho, tracing his version of the history of the Vietnamese war, said the U.S. is now engaged in duplicating its "failures" of the last 15 years.

The U.S. was defeated in the "special war" it conducted before introducing its own massive forces into South Vietnam, said Tho.

Now, he added, "after four years of local war, which failed, the United States wants to withdraw gradually and build up the puppet army and administration to shoulder the main responsibility of the war while the U.S. stands aside, commanding and aiding the puppet army and administration to carry on the war. In other words, the United States wants to revert to the special war as before."

Sees Effort Doomed

But this is also doomed, said Tho. "The U.S. has started to try this," he added. "This can be seen at the Dakto battlefield, Xuanloc and Bienhoa. As can be seen from these cases, the U.S. has let the puppet forces [be] directly defeated and the U.S. had to come as reinforcement and saving forces . . ."

"We can say that this was the first step of de-Americanization or 'Vietnamization' of the war, and that this first step of the maneuver has failed . . ."

Tho was asked to comment on the recent proposal by former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford for a withdrawal this year of "about 100,000" U.S. troops as part of a general pullout of all American combat forces by the end of 1970."

He replied that "If Mr. Clifford desires to withdraw U.S. troops more rapidly than Mr. Nixon from South Vietnam then I realize that there is to some extent a positive aspect in his statement. But there is a very important point; that is that Mr. Clifford still wants

to maintain in South Vietnam the U.S. Air Force and logistic troops to help the puppet troops to de-Americanize the war. This is the wrong point in his position."

An equally "wrong point" in Clifford's position, said Tho, is that "only after the withdrawal of what he called the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam will the U.S. withdraw all its forces . . . As for us, we demand the U.S. troops and the troops of its allies be rapidly withdrawn from South Vietnam without any conditions being imposed."

Tho nevertheless made it evident, as he did at a reception here Thursday night, that despite what he claims to be a total lack of movement in these talks on the part of the United States and South Vietnam, his delegation has no desire to break them off.

Even when asked if the allied and Communist sides here are "further apart than ever on political questions" as a result of President Nixon's latest show of support for the Saigon government, Tho avoided any characterization of absolutely impenetrable deadlock.

THE WASHINGTON POST

11 July 1969

CPYRGHT *Text of Thieu's 'Comprehensive Offer'*

Following is a partial text of South Vietnamese President Thieu's speech proposing a commission to arrange elections in South Vietnam:

... this war cannot be permitted to last indefinitely. It should be ended one way or another. We, the peace-loving people, would like to solve this war by way of reconciliation.

To move the negotiations forward, I feel that a major initiative is needed. To that effect, we are willing to make, as another act of goodwill, a comprehensive offer for the political settlement of this conflict.

Both sides in this struggle have said that the internal affairs of South Vietnam should be decided by the South Vietnamese themselves, in a free and democratic fashion.

The only way for the people of South Vietnam to exercise their right of self-determination, to participate in public affairs, and to determine the future of the country, is through elections in which they can genuinely express their choice, free from fear and coercion.

In this spirit, free elections can be based on the following principles:

1) All political parties and groups, including the NLF which is now bearing arms

against us, can participate in the elections if they renounce violence and pledge themselves to accept the results of the elections.

2) To make sure that the elections would be conducted in all fairness, an electoral commission could be set up, in which all political parties and groups, including the NLF now fighting against us, could be represented.

The electoral commission will assure equal opportunities in the campaigning to all candidates.

It will also enable all political parties and groups to participate in watching the polls to see that people vote absolutely freely, and in watching the counting of the ballots to see that they are honestly counted.

3) An international body is to be established to supervise the elections, and to make sure that the elections are held under conditions fair to all.

4) We are prepared to discuss with the other side the timetable and the modalities under which the elections will be held.

5) There will be no reprisals or discrimination after the elections.

6) The Government of Vietnam declares that it will abide by the results of the elections, whatever these

results may be. We challenge the other side to declare the same.

The other side claims that it controls 80 per cent of the population of South Vietnam. We say that they dominate by force only a small portion of the population. Let these claims be put to the test of elections. If the other side really believes its own claims, and really stands for the right of self-determination of the Vietnamese people, there can be no reason for it not to accept our offer of genuinely free elections, in which they can participate without discrimination, not only in the voting but also in the control of the counting of the votes, with international supervision.

To be meaningful elections should be conducted under conditions under which the South Vietnamese people can exercise their choice, free from fear and coercion.

Thus, there is an obvious connection between free elections, supervised with-

drawal of non-South Vietnamese forces, and an end to violence and terrorism.

Today I renew the offer of private talks with the NLF, without preconditions, to discuss the above and any other questions, toward the restoration of peace and national reconciliation.

The other side should not misconstrue our desire for peace as a sign of weakness. It should not be induced by our repeated acts of good will into believing that it has only to remain adamantly negative for us to accept eventual surrender.

We are fighting for a just cause and in self-defense, and we are becoming every day stronger. We shall not grow tired in this struggle. In fact there is a point beyond which we shall get tired of making unilateral acts of goodwill. Hanoi will then have to bear all the consequences of the protracted war, and it has to assume full responsibility for the sufferings that it imposes on the people in both parts of Vietnam.

REUTERS

6 April 1969

Hanoi Finds No Progress

HONG KONG, April 6 (Reuters)—The Paris peace conference on Vietnam, after holding 11 sessions in 2 months, continues to mark time, the North Vietnamese newspaper the Dan said today.

The Hanoi daily newspaper said that the lack of progress was the fault of the United States for refusing to discuss what it termed the fundamental problems—an end to United States aggression and the total withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

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August 1969

CPYRGHT

LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICAPeru's Land Reform Law

On 24 June President Velasco of Peru announced major land reforms that provided for expropriation and redistribution of all major landholdings in Peru, including those owned by U.S. companies. Under the new decree land holdings will be limited, thereby doing away with the large holdings of the wealthy and the extremely small plots worked by peasants. The maximum size for privately owned lands will range from about 75 acres in the mountain and jungle areas to approximately 370 acres in the coastal areas and up to 3700 acres for natural pasture lands. New, small landowners will be encouraged to join in cooperatives. Large estates will continue to operate as units, but estate workers will share ownership and control.

Only two days after the program was announced, the government started taking over the vast holdings of W. R. Grace and Company of New York. These plantations, which will be operated as cooperatives, produce about 17 per cent of Peru's sugar. Since officials of the company have been assured that fair compensation will be made for the expropriated property and that other industrial operations will not be affected, the company has announced its support for the reforms.

The Peruvian government has promised compensation for the expropriated property, partly by paying in cash and partly by issuing 20-year non-transferable bonds for the land; the bonds may then be exchanged for shares in new industrial investments provided shares of equal value are purchased for cash. Both skepticism and apprehension have been expressed as to the underlying motives of the military regime in announcing such sweeping reforms, as well as to the indications of other extensive and radical changes to be made in the entire economic and social structure of the country.

Land Reform Elsewhere in Latin America.

The problems created by land ownership in Latin America are well known and are not unique to Peru. Although redistribution of the land, such as outlined by the Peruvian government, is important in any program of land reform, it is only one aspect of the problem. Other questions include the use made of the land -- whether it is cultivated or lies fallow; the nature of land tenure -- whether farm workers are held in near-serfdom or live in independence and dignity; the education and social welfare of the peasants which, if increased, would help to close the great gap which separates them from the small ruling elite; the development of unsettled or under-developed land; and increase in agricultural production, both for domestic consumption and for export. The goals are therefore both social and economic, with the ultimate effect of restructuring the social, economic and political life of a major part of the nation.

Although it has taken many years to reach a national consensus in each country on the desirability and nature of such reforms, these goals are now codified in reform laws in practically every Latin American country. A few countries started their reform programs years ago, with Mexico as the best known example. However, it has been mainly in the past decade that most countries have passed laws to promote reform.

The impetus which led to their adoption came partly from a slowly developed recognition of the problem and its solution, and partly from encouragement by international agencies such as the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization. But the decisive push has come from violent protest by the peasants: invasions of private and public lands by peasants determined on reform or revolution.

In general, however, significant action on agrarian reform laws has not been taken because of a variety of factors: Often proposed reform has been too broad in scope; instead of focusing on a few key issues, it has tried to change the rural tenure pattern, economy, society and technology of the country all at once. Inaction has also resulted from a lack of funds, as reform has frequently foundered on the financial inability of a government to provide the necessary capital to facilitate and accelerate reform. Finally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases inaction has been mainly because of a temporary lessening of pressure from disgruntled peasants. This respite, in turn, is due to various factors, including the failure of Castroism in Latin America, the pitiful example of Communist-directed agriculture in Cuba, the time needed to digest the partial gains already made, and the hope raised by the passage of new reform laws in numerous countries.

However, the respite will undoubtedly be brief if rapid and tangible progress is not made in carrying out the promises of the reform laws. The population explosion in Latin America will double in twenty-five years the number of peasants seeking land -- but the amount of arable land cannot be doubled. The rapidly growing population will also urgently need food to eat, which can be produced only as a result of a revolution in the agricultural methods of the continent. Adding to these problems, improved communications and rising literacy levels will make the peasants ever more conscious of the social and economic inequities they suffer and of the promises of extremists to eliminate them.

26 June 1959

Velasco Asserts Land Reform Will Be Applied Without Favor

LIMA, Peru, June 25 (AP)—The Government of President Juan Velasco Alvarado today announced the details of Peru's sweeping new land reform law. It limits the size of landholdings, strengthens small and medium landholders and opens a way for the conversion of large landholdings that produce crops used by industry into cooperatives.

General Velasco said that the law would be applied without favor to particular groups, and that it would "end once and for all the unfair social order that has kept peasants in poverty and iniquity."

Crowds in the Plaza de Armas at the Presidential Palace sang songs and danced last night when the President said "the lands will be for the peasants." They shouted "Bravo! Bravo!" when he proclaimed that native communities no longer would be called "indigenous" but "peasant communities."

American Concerns Affected

The law will involve the expropriation of foreign-held lands, including holdings of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining concern and W. R. Grace & Co., which has sugar and paper interests in Peru.

The complex law establishes a Government bond issue for a total of \$375-million.

The Government will use the bonds along with cash payments as compensation for the lands and properties taken over. Cattle and agricultural equipment will be paid for in cash up to a certain value, with the balance of the payment in the Government bonds.

Bonds that the Government issues in payment for these properties can be accepted immediately at 100 per cent of their value if they are invested in industry and if half the value of the total investment is made in cash. The Government hopes by this means to channel the wealth of the large landholding families into industry.

The expropriated lands will be sold to cooperatives, peasant communities, agricultural societies of social interest and persons previously judged qualified. Land can be granted collectively to groups of peasants who will be obliged to construct the respective cooperative or agricultural so-

Price Will Fluctuate

The price of each grant will be made through a buy-sell contract, with right of eminent domain for a price that will be fixed according to the economic capacity of the agricultural unit that receives the grant. The sale price will be paid in 20 annual quotas, beginning with the date the land is awarded.

To be considered for a family plot, a peasant must be a citizen of Peru, 18 years of age, head of the family, a peasant without land and a resident in the area.

The Government will give technical and credit assistance with priority to cooperatives, peasant communities and agricultural societies, which also will be given preference in direct export of their production to the foreign markets that pay the best prices, once national needs have been satisfied.

The average minimum plot size will be seven acres, the Government said.

Industrial agrarian properties—defined as agricultural land, the produce of which is a major source of material for an industry—will not be divided or separated under the law, but rather will be operated as units by cooperatives.

A few hours before President Velasco's announcement, the Government charged that the National Agrarian Society, an organization of big landlords, planned to "carry out an intense campaign by television to stop the implementation of the reform, to halt sales of agricultural products to create a shortage, to start strikes against production and marketing, to block roads with the aim of disturbing transportation and to request support of sugar workers to cooperate in sabotage."

The society rejected the Government's accusation, saying it strongly protested "these statements lacking in wisdom and seriousness."

A Correction

The International Basic Economy Corporation does not expect to be affected by the Peruvian Government's agrarian reform bill, spokesmen for the company said yesterday.

It was erroneously reported in The New York Times yesterday that the agrarian reform measures outlined by Peru's military junta Tuesday would involve properties owned by I.B.E.C., a New York concern.

The spokesmen said that the company's interests in Peru consist of an insurance concern, a poultry-breeding operation, housing developments (which are sold with the land beneath them to the public) and a supermarket chain.

"Neither operation involves any appreciable amount of land," the spokesmen said, "and therefore we do not expect to be affected by the agrarian reform measure."

The company has long been associated with the Rockefeller family, which created the

world-wide organization to stimulate development of poorer economies. However, it is now a publicly owned concern in which Governor Rockefeller owns "less than one-half of 1 per cent of the shares," the company added.

WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1969

Peru to Seize U.S.-Owned Properties

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LIMA, June 24 (UPI)—The Peruvian government announced today it will expropriate all major land tracts now privately owned and divide them among the people, including vast lands owned by such U.S. investors as the W. R. Grace Co. and New York Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller.

President Juan Velasco Alvarado promised "just compensation" for all landholders, foreign and Peruvian, whose properties will be turned over to the peasantry under an agrarian land reform.

Velasco announced the general objectives of the land reform program that will affect millions of dollars worth of U.S.-owned as well as Peruvian-held property in a nationwide television address.

His voice repeatedly broke with emotion. His immediate audience at the Presidential Palace interrupted his speech with applause and shouts of "Bravo!" and "Viva land reform!"

The land reform law, Velasco said, "will be applied throughout the country, without privileges and with no exceptions. Only in this manner will a coherent agricultural development be possible."

This made it clear that all of the major U.S. investors in Peru would feel the bite of the reform law, a development which swept far beyond even the most pessimistic predictions of diplomatic observers here.

[Under Peru's previous agrarian reform law, the Velasco government earlier expropriated agricultural land holdings of the Cerro Corp., a U.S.-based firm engaged chiefly in mining. The company did not oppose the move, and was compensated for its holdings.]

Last October, the government seized the properties of the International Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, without compensation. Peru maintained that IPC had never legally owned its Peruvian oilfields and therefore owed the government about \$690 million in past profits.

The United States responded to the seizure by suspending economic aid to Peru's share of the U.S. sugar import market. It has postponed full cancellation of these items until August, in hopes a settlement can be reached between Peru and IPC.

Relations were further worsened by Peru's seizure of U.S. fishing boats in waters it claims are under its sovereignty. The United States recognizes only a 12-mile limit, against the Peruvian claim to 200 miles, and has cut off arms sales to Peru in retaliation for the seizures.

Among the U.S. firms standing to be hit hardest by the new law is the Grace Co., which apparently will lose its vast sugar plantations at Paramonga and Cartavio. Diplomatic sources said the Grace holdings "will be in the millions of dollars."

About 40 per cent of Peru's sugar production is estimated to come from U.S.-owned plantations.

FROM: AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

The titles in this bibliography have been carefully selected. Even though they total slightly more than 150, they represent merely a small fraction of the items thoroughly pertinent to the subject that might have been included. Such a list seems especially short if it is compared with those in the two most comprehensive bibliographies in the field, one edited by Accioly Borges and the other compiled and edited by Carroll, which contain 1,164 and 1,072 items, respectively. Moreover, the titles included here are by no means limited to those given in these two excellent sources.

In determining specifically which publications to include, out of the welter of possibilities, there were many complexities to be faced and many decisions, some of them rather arbitrary, to be taken. Perhaps a brief mention of some of the basic criteria used and of exceptions made will enable the reader to evaluate more adequately the results of the endeavor. First, it was considered essential to give preference to items that may be said to have professional standing—represented by the books, monographs, and articles in recognized journals in such fields as economics, history, geography, and sociology—over those that appeared in newspapers or in popular magazines, or the many that have been circulated merely in mimeographed form.

Next, it was thought preferable to concentrate largely upon publications of a substantive nature, to which the reader might go for additional analysis and description of problems and programs, rather than to use much of the space for bibliographies, guides, and other aids to research. The two most recent and comprehensive bibliographies were included, however, because they are lists that greatly surpass and outmode all earlier compilations.

Because the bulk of the pertinent material is of recent origin, a preference was given to studies published since 1950. Nevertheless, an intensive search was made for earlier background materials, and a considerable number of the more significant early items was included. Likewise, despite the fact that much of what has been published on the subject of agrarian reform in Latin America deals with matters in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia (for which Carroll includes 184, 106, and 75 titles, respectively, in contrast with only 4 for the Dominican Republic and 7 for Panama), an attempt was made to represent all of the widely divergent sections of Latin America.

It was assumed that most of those who read this volume will find additional reading on the subject of agrarian reform more accessible and more useable if the materials are in English. Therefore, in this bibliography preference was given to books, monographs, and articles written in that language.

Even so, however, the predominance of those who write in Spanish or Portuguese, among those who have made fundamental contributions to the exposition of matters related to agrarian reform in Latin America, is so great that approximately two-thirds of all the items in our list are available only in one or the other of these languages.

Finally, particular attention was given to the inclusion in this compilation of titles to works by Latin American economists, historians, geographers, and sociologists who have established enviable reputations for competency in their respective fields, and to works by their fellows in the United States and Europe whose names have come to figure prominently in the study of Latin American peoples and societies.

In conclusion it should be indicated that many of the books in our list themselves contain substantial and selected bibliographies relating to land tenure and the size of agricultural holdings, to the highly institutionalized and frequently antiquated systems used for extracting products from the soil in parts of Latin America, to locality groupings and community organization and development, and to other matters closely related to agrarian reform in the area under consideration. In this respect the books by such authors as Fals Borda, Fernández y Fernández, Ford, Horne, Leonard, McBride, Mendieta y Núñez, Nelson, Senior, Smith, C. C. Taylor, and Whetten are especially valuable.

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