

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

LE MONDE,  
24 May 1969

### Côte-d'Ivoire

#### TOUS LES DIPLOMATES EN POSTE A MOSCOU

#### CPYRGHT SONT RAPPELÉS A ABIDJAN

Moscou, 22 mai (A.P. Reuters). — Tous les membres de l'ambassade de Côte-d'Ivoire à Moscou ont été rappelés à Abidjan sans qu'aucune explication ait été fournie jusqu'ici par le gouvernement ivoirien. L'ambassadeur, M. Denis Coffi Bile, a quitté la capitale soviétique jeudi et devait être suivi par les cinq autres membres de l'ambassade.

[La Côte-d'Ivoire et l'U.R.S.S. ont noué en 1967 des relations diplomatiques qui ne se sont guère épanouies et qui, à l'occasion, ont même manqué de chaleur. Des polémiques ont éclaté à plusieurs reprises entre les autorités ivoiriennes et la presse soviétique. La « Pravda » et les « Izvestia » ont particulièrement critiqué la politique de libéralisme économique du gouvernement ivoirien.]

LE MONDE,  
1-2 June 1969

### Rupture

#### entre la Côte-d'Ivoire et l'Union soviétique

CPYRGHT

Le dialogue entre Abidjan et Moscou n'aura guère duré que dix-huit mois. Les autorités ivoiriennes, qui avaient attendu sept ans après la proclamation de l'indépendance de leur pays pour établir des relations diplomatiques avec l'Union soviétique, viennent de les rompre. M. Usher Assouan, ministre ivoirien des affaires étrangères, a convoqué le chargé d'affaires d'U.R.S.S. à Abidjan au cours de la matinée de vendredi pour lui signifier cette décision et lui préciser que le personnel de l'ambassade soviétique devrait avoir quitté la capitale avant dimanche soir.

L'initiative ivoirienne était attendue. En effet, il y a une huitaine de jours, la mission diplomatique de Côte-d'Ivoire à Moscou avait été rappelée à Abidjan. Sans qu'aucune raison ait, de part et d'autre, officiellement été donnée à ce départ, on l'interprétait comme une des conséquences de la crise universitaire qui sévit à Abidjan.

CPYRGHT

Commentant cette crise, M. Yace, président de l'Assemblée nationale, secrétaire général du parti unique, avait accusé « certains étrangers », dont il n'avait pas précisé la nationalité, d'avoir induit les étudiants ivoiriens en erreur. A cette occasion, avait déclaré M. Yace, nous dénonçons à quiconque le droit de vouloir inculquer à nos enfants les doctrines de tous ordres en vigueur ailleurs que chez nous et contraires aux réalités de chez nous.

Fondateur et animateur du Rassemblement démocratique africain (R.D.A.), M. Houphouët-Boigny, qui fit durant quelques années route commune avec le parti communiste français, au moment où s'ouvrait la première phase de décolonisation du continent noir, se signale depuis une vingtaine d'années par un anticommunisme vigoureux. Chef de file des États membres de l'Organisation commune africaine et malgache, qui regroupe les pays « modérés » d'Afrique, il partage sur ce point les convictions de plusieurs de ses collègues de l'O.C.A.M., dont M. Philibert Tsiranana, président de la République malgache.

On s'inquiète à Abidjan de l'influence que les diplomates soviétiques auraient tenté d'exercer sur la partie de la jeunesse qui se montre réservée à l'égard du gouvernement de M. Houphouët-Boigny. Mais on assiste surtout avec impatience à l'accroissement de l'activité politique de l'U.R.S.S. dans tout le golfe du Bénin. L'implantation à Lagos et à Kano de techniciens soviétiques chargés d'assurer l'entretien des Mig vendus au gouvernement nigérian, la récente visite d'amitié d'une escadre soviétique dans la capitale du Nigéria, ont amené la Côte-d'Ivoire et l'Union soviétique à s'affronter indirectement en territoire nigérian. En effet, nul n'ignore plus le rôle important que le président de la République ivoirienne joue dans le conflit nigéro-biafrais. Son action personnelle a beaucoup pesé, semble-t-il, dans la décision prise par la France d'intervenir discrètement aux côtés des Biafrais dans la lutte qu'ils mènent depuis deux ans contre les autorités de Lagos.

En prenant l'initiative d'une rupture, les dirigeants ivoiriens ont sans doute voulu trouver un responsable des tensions qui éprouvent depuis près d'un an leur pays. Comme le Sénégal, comme le Dahomey, la Côte-d'Ivoire est en effet soumise à de sourds courants d'opposition auxquels

CPYRGHT

M. Houphouët-Boigny est jusqu'à présent habilement parvenu à faire face sans en triompher totalement. Au demeurant, ni les Soviétiques, solidement installés au Nigéria, ni les Ivoiriens, résolument décidés à poursuivre leur politique de coopération avec les puissances occidentales, ne devraient pâtir gravement de la rupture rendue publique vendredi.

LE MONDE,  
3 June 1969

### Côte-d'Ivoire

#### RÉOUVERTURE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ CPYRGHT ABIDJAN

Abidjan, 2 juin (A.F.P.). — M. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, président de la Côte-d'Ivoire, a décidé de « pardonner aux étudiants contestataires » et de rouvrir l'université de la capitale et les grandes écoles. S'adressant à plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes au stade d'Abidjan, M. Houphouët-Boigny a déclaré samedi : « A tous nous accordons le pardon de la Côte-d'Ivoire. Les étudiants égarés viennent de reconnaître leurs erreurs, de regretter leurs actes, d'implorer le pardon... La Côte-d'Ivoire étant un pays de liberté et d'amour fraternel, il ne saurait y avoir de détenus politiques. »

Le président s'est déclaré « terriblement déçu » par le comportement de certains étudiants, qu'il a qualifiés de « trublions », mais qui, a-t-il dit, ne sont qu'une « poignée d'extrémistes ».

Évoquant le « déchaînement de haine et de jalousie dans certains pays qui souhaitent notre malheur », M. Houphouët-Boigny a déclaré : « Nous ne souhaitons de mal à personne, mais ceux qui nous le souhaitent l'ont à leur porte. »

L'ancien ambassadeur de Côte-d'Ivoire en U.R.S.S. assistait au meeting, mais aucune allusion n'a été faite à la récente rupture des relations diplomatiques entre Abidjan et Moscou. L'ambassade d'Algérie à Abidjan a été chargée de représenter les intérêts de l'U.R.S.S. en Côte-d'Ivoire.

Abidjan, 30 May 1969 (AFP). The announcement of the decision by the Ivory Coast to break diplomatic relations with the USSR really surprised no one in Abidjan where, since the start of the recent university crisis, rumors on this subject have been circulating with insistence. They have never been confirmed nor denied.

On 27 May the political bureau of the government party, the PDCI, (The Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast) stated, a propos of this crisis, "we have proof that certain foreigners have led our children into error. These foreigners will draw little benefit from their activity because we deny anyone the right to interfere in our affairs. We deny to anyone the right to want to inculcate in our children doctrines of all types in practice elsewhere other than in our country and contrary to realities here.

Although not aiming especially at anyone, these accusations were interpreted as being addressed to the USSR. Four days earlier the Ivory Coast ambassador to Moscow, M. Denis Coffi Bile and embassy personnel had in effect left the Soviet capital for Abidjan without giving any particular reason to explain their sudden departure.

So it was in 1966 during the climate of detente between East and West that the Ivory Coast and the USSR established diplomatic relations.

But 2 months after his arrival in Moscow in September 1968, M. Denis Coffi Bile handed the press a violent reply to an Izvestia article which reproached the Ivory Coast in equally violent terms for opting in favor of the capitalist system. Previously, an article of the same tone had appeared in Pravda provoking a spirited reaction from the PDCI.

The deterioration of Ivoirian-Soviet relations became further pronounced following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops which was denounced in Abidjan in particularly strong terms.

Finally, the opposing positions taken by Moscow and Abidjan in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict -- the former siding wholeheartedly with Lagos and the latter recognizing Biafra as independent and sovereign -- was to widen the gulf between the two countries still further.

Observers in Abidjan note also the publication on 22 May by the Soviet Press Agency, Novosti, -- three days after the outbreak of the university crisis -- of a long article concerning the "Ivoirian Experience".

In this article of a particularly harsh tone the Soviet agency wrote: "The puppet Ivoirian regime, already sold, body and soul to imperialism, is meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors by launching clandestine attacks against legitimate governments". And so the Ivory Coast was accused of being responsible for the coup d'etat in Mali against the regime of Modibo Keita.

"Novosti" also accused the Ivory Coast of being "imperialism's main arm destined to exploit the Nigerian crisis and cause the rupture of the unity of African countries". "The relations between the Ivory Coast and Biafran rebels", the Soviet agency added, "only help imperialism which has always been seeking to dominate Nigeria".

# 2 Russian Tactical Errors Lost Moon Race

CPYRGT

By DON KIRKMAN

Scripts-Howard Science Writer

Apollo 11's scheduled July 20 moon landing is virtually certain to win for the U.S. the eight-year moon race Russia is about to lose because it made two monumental "tactical errors" and discovered its space technology couldn't keep pace with the U.S.

That's how space experts here view the race that apparently will end when astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin E. (Buzz) Aldrin Jr., plant the Stars and Stripes on the lunar surface.

The world will never know with certainty what difficulties plagued the Russians' moon program. But U.S. experts think they erred tactically in their choice of techniques and by underspending.

The Library of Congress' veteran Russia watcher Dr. Charles Sheldon believes the Soviets' first and primary error was simply choosing the wrong road to a lunar landing.

This decision was made in the early 1960s at the end of a great international debate over which was the safest method to go to the moon and back. This controversy was so vitriolic in the U.S., for example, it caused bitter argument, in public, between rocket developer Dr. Wernher Von Braun and President Kennedy's science adviser, Dr. Jerome Wiesner.

Dr. Von Braun espoused a seemingly complicated three-stage moonship that would launch a moon landing team from a spaceship orbiting the moon, while Dr. Wiesner argued vigorously for a technique that would have launched the landing team from a module that would have remained in earth orbit.

The argument waxed so hot that Dr. Von Braun and Dr. Wiesner staged a furious shouting match at Huntsville, Ala., while an embarrassed President Kennedy looked on in amazement. Dr. Von Braun's viewpoint eventually was accepted, of course, and became the now familiar Apollo.

Dr. Sheldon believes there is evidence the always-conservative Russians opted for a third moon-landing technique that seemed simple at first glance, but in practice turned out to be too much for their technology.

## BIG SPACE BASE

The heart of the Russian moon landing system apparently is a large space base orbiting near the earth that could be used as a launch pad for their moonships.

Unfortunately for the Russians, rendezvousing and linking a space station's pieces in orbit requires the kind of precise maneuvering that only high-grade electronics, sophisticated computers and excellent communications can produce.


And Russian progress in these vital areas "has been so slow it surprised everyone," Dr.

Sheldon said. He views recent Russian rendezvous maneuvers with their Soyuz 4 and Soyuz 5 spaceships, however, as signs the Russians at last are ready to push ahead.

The Russians, then, may begin assembling their giant space base some time this year, most probably this summer, Dr. Sheldon said. But the base probably will go slowly and the Russians may not be able to land men on the moon until 1971 or 1972.

The other big Russian mistake on the road to the moon apparently was made in 1963 or 1964 when they chose not to invest rubles in a space program similar to the two-man Gemini flights the U.S. conducted in 1965 and 1966.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) expert Pitt G. Thome believes it's



clear Gemini was the turning point in the great U.S.-Soviet space race.

Before the U.S. started flying its Gemini spaceships, Russia's manned space dominance was unquestioned throughout the world. From 1961 thru 1965, their Vostok and Voshkod spaceships and cosmonauts flew rings around the U.S. and scored one triumph after another.

During this period, the Russians orbited the first space man (Yuri Gagarin), the first space woman (Valentina Tereshkova), the first two-man and three-man space crews and the first spaceships to fly in formation. Russians also awed the world with the first "spacewalk" and set the record for most orbits and most days in space (81 orbits in five days).

While this was occurring U.S. spacemen continually were too little and too late. The first U.S. astronaut to venture into space (Alan Shepard, 1961) did so five weeks after Mr. Gagarin and even then didn't go into orbit. The first U.S. spaceman to complete one orbit (John Glenn, 1962) trailed Mr. Gagarin by 10 months and by that time another Russian had circled the world 17 times.

## GAP WIDENS

The gap between the U.S. and Russia widened in 1963 and 1964 with the high-flying Russians setting all the previously mentioned records. In contrast, the best the U.S. could mus-

ter was a one-day space flight (Gordon Cooper, 1963) at the tag end of its "Mercury" space program.

Then, in classic tortoise-and-hare fashion, the Russians inexplicably stopped launching spaceships in the spring of 1965. For two years no Russian orbited the earth.

It was at precisely this moment the U.S. launched its first two-man Gemini capsule. For two years, while the Russians stood on the sidelines, 10 consecutive Gemini space ships blasted off from Cape Kennedy, each one carrying out a mission more difficult than the last.

In rapid succession, U.S. astronauts learned to work and walk in space, zoom from one orbit to another, rendezvous and fly spaceships in formation, dock with rocket stages, live in weightlessness for up to two weeks, and land so accurately their splashdowns could be seen on worldwide television.

"Gemini put us ahead," Mr. Thome said. "We learned most of the things we needed to know to go to the moon during Gemini."

Dr. Sheldon pinpoints the flights of Gemini 6 and Gemini 7 in December 1965 as the turning point in the U.S.-Russian moon race. In a brilliant display of daring and space maneuvering, Gemini 6 and 7 flew nose to nose within one foot of each other, proving U.S. astronauts could fly spaceships with incredible accuracy.

As a bonus, Gemini 7 completed 220 orbits during 14 days, smashing the Soviets' proudest space record.

#### MUTUAL DISASTERS

Both nations suffered space disasters in 1967 — the U.S. losing astronauts Gus Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee in the disastrous Cape Kennedy launch-pad fire that gutted the first Apollo moonship, and the Russians in April when cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov was killed in the crash of Russia's new Soyuz 1 spaceship.

In retrospect, the Russian disaster apparently was the more technically crippling. It took them 18 precious months to correct their spaceship's deficiencies, extending the Russians' absence from space to more than three-and-one-half years.

Thus, it wasn't until last October that the Russians could get back into space with Soyuz 3 and they found they must master most of the space lessons the U.S. learned during Gemini.

The Gemini experience, then, is the reason the U.S. was able to make such enormous strides after NASA last fall declared the Apollo moonship repaired and ready to go again.

In rapid succession, four Apollos have performed with near perfection in the last eight

months and Apollos 8 and 10 blazed the path to the moon for those who will follow in Apollo 11.

What the Russians will do if Apollo 11 ends the moon race is uncertain. A National Aeronautics and Space Council expert thinks the blow to their pride may be so severe they may forego sending men to the moon "until the U.S. suffers another space disaster."

Dr. Sheldon, on the other hand, sees an orderly Russian moon program consisting of the flight of an unmanned spaceship to the moon this year, construction of the Russians' space base, and a manned landing in 1971 or 1972.

NASA expert Thome has a third view that predicts the Russians will swallow their pride and send men to a lunar landing this fall in a surprise maneuver that would see the Russians flying direct from the earth to the moon and back without using a space base.

#### HOPE FOR U.S. FAILURE

Mr. Thome believes the Russians have a vigorous moon landing program and still are rooting for the U.S. to fall flat on its space face in the next four weeks.

He makes much of the fact that the Russians purchased more than 3,100 moon pictures from NASA last year — photographs better than anything the Russians were able to take with their unmanned Luna spaceships.

These pictures, Thome feels, are being used by the Russians to pick sites for moon landings and possibly to select locations for permanent manned lunar bases.

The very fact that the Russians were forced to come to the U.S. for the pictures emphasizes the technological gap the Russians have faced in their moon race with the U.S., he added.

Like their poor moon pictures, Russian space equipment has been crude and the results have showed it. Said Mr. Thome:

"Many of the Soviet space flights have been scientifically useless because their equipment has been poor, particularly the equipment of the spaceships they sent to Venus, the moon and to study cosmic rays."

Dr. Sheldon agrees with this assessment and thinks the much-delayed Russian monster rocket the world has been anticipating for the last three years also is a victim of poor Soviet technology — in this case, Russian inability to build large rockets that perform with unfailing reliability.

Dr. Sheldon also thinks there is very little chance the Russians will attempt to send men to Mars.

"That's too big, too risky and too expensive for them," he said.

SOVIET REMARKS ABOUT SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN SPACE

KHRUSHCHEV, 1957 -- Soviet satellites in the vanguard

The United States had also announced that it was preparing to launch an artificial earth satellite, calling it Vanguard--that's right, Vanguard. We announced that we intended to launch an artificial earth satellite of the earth. Now everyone can see that the creative efforts of Soviet science and technology have been crowned with success. After the appearance of a small Soviet moon, certain U.S. statesmen stated that they had never thought of competing with the Soviet Union in the creation of an artificial satellite. This is how they speak now, when our Sputniks are flying around the globe. It appears that the name Vanguard reflected the confidence of the Americans that their satellite would be the first in the world. But experience has shown that it was the Soviet satellites which proved to be ahead, to be in the vanguard. -- Speech at jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet marking the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 6, 1957; Moscow radio broadcast, November 6, 1957.

KHRUSHCHEV, 1957 -- Socialism has won

The launching of artificial earth satellites is a kind of culmination of the competition between socialist and capitalist countries. And socialism has won it. -- Interview with Brazilian journalists Victorio Martorelli and Tito Fleuri, November 21, 1957; TASS, December 5, 1957.

KHRUSHCHEV, 1958 -- Soviet science must hold first place in the world

Soviet scientists have made us happy with their great discoveries and scientific achievements. The first atomic power station in the world was built in our country, and the largest accelerator of microparticles in the world. Soviet scientists, working in cooperation with engineers, technicians, and workers, created the first artificial earth satellites and were the first to send their instruments into the cosmos. The Russian word "sputnik" has now entered the languages of the entire world.

All of this has been done by the intellect and the talent of Soviet scientists of the older generation and of the young Soviet scientists and engineers reared by our higher educational establishments. Soviet science and our higher educational establishments must always hold first place in the world. It is a matter of honor for Soviet scientists to hold the leading place in all branches of knowledge. -- Speech at a Kremlin reception for Soviet intellectuals; Moscow radio broadcast, February 8, 1958.

KHRUSHCHEV, 1958 -- Legends dispersed like smoke

The creation of the Soviet artificial earth satellites has demonstrated convincingly the high level of development of science and technology in our country, the level of Soviet industry, culture, and education. The legends invented by our enemies about the scientific and technical backwardness of the Soviet Union have been dispersed like smoke. Who will believe such legends now? Each man in each country of the world can now see with his own eyes the truly fabulous Soviet stars! That scientific and technical achievement of our people, of our scientists, engineers, technicians and workers, has forcefully revealed the advantages of the socialist system. Only the socialist system, which has set free millions and millions of people, has given people an opportunity for full manifestation of their creative abilities, has created conditions for mastering science, art, and all achievements of human culture. -- Speech at a Kremlin reception for Soviet intellectuals, Moscow radio broadcast, February 8, 1958.

KHRUSHCHEV, 1958 -- Taught conceited American leaders

Just as a mother is happy when she teaches her child to pronounce its first word "Mama," so we take pride in our successes, having taught some conceited American leaders to pronounce very distinctly that it is the Soviet Union, that is the country of socialism, that must be caught up with in the level of scientific development and in the level of training scientists and engineers. -- Speech at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, April 9, 1958; Moscow radio broadcast, April 10, 1958.

KHRUSHCHEV, 1959 -- Majestic event in building communism

In the first days of the new year, 1959, the first year of the seven-year plan, Soviet scientists, designers, engineers, and workers achieved a new exploit of worldwide importance, successfully launching a multistage cosmic rocket in the direction of the moon. The Soviet people are filled with patriotic pride for their beloved motherland which is marching at the head of modern scientific and technical progress and blazing a trail into the future. All progressive mankind rejoices with us in this great scientific exploit. Even the enemies of socialism have been forced, in the face of incontrovertible facts, to admit that this is one of the greatest achievements of the cosmic era and a new triumph of the Soviet Union. The creation in our country of the first artificial earth satellites, the launching of the Soviet cosmic rocket--which has become the first artificial planet of the solar system--signifies a whole epoch in the development of mankind's scientific knowledge. It is a majestic event of the epoch of the building of communism. -- Speech at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, January 27, 1959; Moscow radio broadcast, January 28, 1959.

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Peking, June eighth (HSINHUA)--The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has imposed a naked fascist rule of terror in the country to intensify its oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of the Soviet people. It has set up a large number of "lunatic asylums" and concentration camps throughout the country, turning it into a big prison.

According to incomplete figures, there are more than 100 prisons and concentration camps in little over 40 areas in the Soviet Union. Among them, 8 concentration camps are located in the Altay Territory, 6 in Krasnodar Territory and 7 in Vitebsk Region. It was revealed that in the Dnepropetrovsk Region of the Ukraine there are ten prisons with more than 50,000 inmates, a figure higher than that under the rule of the tsars. The Soviet revisionists also have many concentration camps for various kinds of "political prisoners" in Karelia, Murmansk, the northern border areas, the islands on the Arctic Ocean, the northern and eastern parts of Siberia and in the Far East. Many concentration camps for life-long imprisonment have been set up in the south-eastern part of Yakut, in Novaya Zemlya and other places. There are more "lunatic asylums" than prisons and concentration camps throughout the country.

By means of concentration camps, prisons and "lunatic asylums", the Soviet revisionist renegade clique exercises fascist dictatorship over the broad masses of the Soviet people and genuine revolutionaries, ruthlessly torturing and maltreating them. The inmates of concentration camps live in hunger and cold and are refused treatment when they fall sick. Moreover, they are compelled to do manual labour beyond their power. Anyone who shows the slightest discontent or resistance would be cruelly beaten up by the special agents who interrogate them. Thousands upon thousands of the Soviet revolutionary people have been tortured to death.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique attempts to suppress the resistance of the Soviet people with concentration camps and by other most barbarous means. But the Soviet people who have a glorious tradition of revolutionary struggle cannot be suppressed. In the final analysis, the persecution of the revolutionary people can only arouse them more extensively to rise in a fiercer revolutionary struggle. The Soviet people are fighting against the revisionist renegade clique in various ways. There is a just struggle and is therefore bound to be victorious.

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July 1969

THE COMMUNIST SCENE  
(24 May - 20 June 1969)

1. World Communist Conference Perpetuates Rift.

The World Communist Conference of 75 Communist parties held in Moscow 5-17 June served as a formal confirmation that the new rift created in the world movement by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia less than a year ago is a permanent one. All parties of any consequence, both those supporting the Soviets and those critical of them, reiterated their expected positions, producing few surprises either for the Soviets or for the curious outside world.

Fourteen parties, including Rumania and Cuba, withheld full approval of the hackneyed and long-winded declaration which was the main product of the conference. These are the bolder parties which are able to face up to the threat of Soviet reprisals (mostly withdrawal of financial support) and are an indeterminate fraction of those which would dissent if they could do so with impunity. When one considers that five ruling parties--from China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, and Yugoslavia-- and a number of free world parties--most notably the Japanese--refused even to attend, it is obvious that Moscow is far from being able to claim unity in the Communist camp, much less undisputed leadership of it. In fact, calculating the membership of dissenting parties one arrives at the startling conclusion that, by conservative estimate, Communists at serious odds with the Soviet Union number 23,000,000 or more, thus more than half of the world's estimated 45,000,000 Communists.

The parties critical of the CPSU argued on a number of grounds. The Rumanians criticized the attacks made on China. The Australians\* criticized the invasion of Czechoslovakia, pointing to the damage done the international movement by this act. The influential Italian party protested the invasion and continuing suppression of Czechoslovakia, the attacks on China, and the attempts of the CPSU to dictate to other parties. All insist more or less vehemently that the independence and sovereignty of parties are more important than loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the idea of international Communist unity (summed up in the expression "proletarian internationalism"). In one sense, the crux of the crisis in the movement is this demand for self-determination regardless of Soviet wishes or needs.

But there is an even more fundamental division: the difference between the Soviet form of Communism and the different notion of Communism emerging in the non-Communist world. More and more parties, living and struggling for viability in an arena of freely competing political ideas are at long last recognizing not only that Soviet Marxism is irrelevant to their own situation, but also how sterile, even reactionary, the Soviet practice of Communism is.

\*Plus at least nine others: Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Rumania, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Before the invasion, free world parties saw in the Czech experiment a progressive development, an evolution and continuity in Marxist practice which could become a model for free world, or at least European Communism. The Soviet throttling of the experiment by military force became the watershed separating the Communist stream in most of the free world from the sluggish current of Soviet Communism. More and more free world parties are recognizing, or will have to recognize, that their survival as an effective political force depends on their independence from the CPSU, on evolving their own programs and tasks. No longer can Moscow (much less the ideologically even more primitive Peking) be considered the main center of Communist wisdom, theoretical or practical. If Communism is to be viable in the Western world without Soviet subsidy it will have to evolve in the direction of Togliatti's "polycentrism." It may even be that the Conference marked the beginning of a "second great schism," as one Western journalist has suggested.

But even this notion of several centers of international Communism appears to be an obsolescent concept. The trend is more toward complete fragmentation of the world movement into individual parties, each with its own peculiar problems which cannot be solved by adherence to some abstract international doctrine, but by concentration on the local scene. The indications are, however, that even parties which are thinking ahead along these lines will take a long time to unload the doctrinal ballast which now prevents them from effectively competing in a democratic society. Most still adhere to a belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat and they continue to preach the necessity for violent upheaval in their society, before or after seizure of power. Further, in many respects they continue their automatic obeisance to Moscow and in their own propaganda and policies act in effect as arms of Soviet foreign policy.

In the light of the emerging trends in international Communism, it would seem very impractical for the Soviets to attempt to restore some sort of organizational control over the world movement, and there are few signs of such an effort. Yet events of the past year show that the Soviets view the world through lenses which distort the image in strange ways, and it is not difficult for them to make a case for a latter-day Comintern which would restore their position of unquestioned command over the movement.

## 2. Escalation of the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Bombast or Bullets?

The one move at the World Communist Conference which came as a surprise to most observers was Brezhnev's blunt and wide-ranging attack on the Chinese Communists. It was clearly a breach of contract by the Soviets since in the pre-conference negotiations with parties suspicious of Soviet motives (such as the Rumanian and Italian ones) it had been agreed that China would not be attacked. Though the attack may have been a planned and cynical betrayal of the Soviet promise, it may also have been a last minute decision prompted by considerations of overriding importance to the Soviets. This latter explanation seems more likely since breaking the agreement gave other parties an opportunity to discuss the issue of Czechoslovakia -- a subject which the Soviets devoutly wished to avoid and which Husak obligingly declared unfit for discussion by fraternal parties. It may be that since the conference had originally been

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planned years ago for the purpose of reading the Chinese Communists out of the world movement, the Soviets decided they had to salvage at least something of the original design and thus used the platform of a 75-party conference to denounce the Chinese. However, they were unable to prevail and the final document issuing from the conference does not mention China in any derogatory way.

During the conference both the Soviets and Chinese expended more than their usual considerable energies in their propaganda war, partly to make sure they retained the allegiance of their international Communist allies and did not lose any by default. Another consideration for both the Soviets and Chinese is the attitude of their own people. Invoking the spectre of a predatory China (or, from the Chinese point of view, a predatory Soviet Union) undoubtedly plays on real popular fears and thus is ideal for spurring a benighted, apathetic population into greater support for the policies of the privileged ruling caste.

Speculation has inevitably risen that the border conflict has escalated to a more serious level than is generally recognized. The speculation is fed by the fact that Soviet Far East ambassadors have suddenly been recalled to Moscow for consultation, and by reports from Swedish news sources that 100,000 more Soviet troops have been dispatched to the "sovereign" state of Mongolia and deployed along the border. Rumors about possible preventive strikes by the Soviets are being heard more and more.

### 3. The Czechoslovak Dialectic

Communists used to be fond of claiming that the dialectic process, or conflict of opposites, is the universal law governing not only nature but the development of society. As naive as such an explanation of social processes is, it is one way to characterize recent developments in Czechoslovakia where a dialectic between official repression and popular insistence on freedom continued to operate. Gustav Husak has been performing well for his Soviet mentors, even though he seems unready to restore the full force of a Novotny-style police terror. At the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) Central Committee Plenum on 29-30 May Husak forced through purge of the liberals in the party's leadership, which was the beginning of a purge throughout the Party. Those removed were replaced by conservatives, most prominent among whom was Lubomir Strougal, notorious Interior Minister under Novotny and now Deputy First Secretary. He had previously been a member of the Central Committee. Strougal is widely considered a contender for Husak's job, and is apparently being held in reserve by Moscow in the event Husak does not perform satisfactorily in his drive to restore orthodoxy. The party purge was paralleled by continuing pressure on journalists and newspapers critical of the regime, the strengthening of the secret police, and dissolution of organizations outside the direct control of the party. Symbolic of this gradual return to Stalinism was the fact that the program of rehabilitating victims of the Stalin era slowed down noticeably. As if dialectically, various sectors in the population still found the moral resources to resist the encroaching Stalinism. Among the Central Committee liberals most hated and feared by the Soviets was Frantisek Kriegel (now purged from the party

July 1969

altogether). He had the courage to speak out with full and critical frankness at the Plenum that decided on his purge. His speech (text attached) was mimeographed and clandestinely distributed by sympathetic fellow citizens, among them rebellious trade unionists. Earlier, workers boldly resisted the authorities by occupying a union hall to prevent a pro-Soviet rally scheduled to be held there in commemoration of the Soviet liberation of Czechoslovakia. Writers and journalists in various small ways are resisting regime pressures to make them conform and are even putting forth demands of their own for restoration of some journals earlier suppressed by Husak.

4. Briefly Noted:

a. Soviets Plotting New International Mischief

The Soviets announced at the last session of the World Communist Conference that they will now try to organize a World Anti-Imperialist Congress, involving presumably all the leftist forces they can muster. To this end, they have already set up a preparatory commission consisting of representatives of 13 (unidentified) Communist and workers' parties.

b. Soviets Now Intervene in Non-Communist Finnish Politics

On the heels of their efforts to straighten out the Finnish Communist Party and prevent it from splitting into a Stalinist and a modernist wing, the Soviets again bluntly meddled in Finnish political matters, this time in the internal affairs of the Social Democratic Party. At the party's triennial congress in Turku, Finland 6-8 June, three candidates were contending for election to the top job of party Secretary General. The Soviets evidently decided that none of the three suited their taste and declared them non gratae through Pravda. They did so by reprinting a Finnish left-wing socialist newspaper attack on each of the candidates and headlined the Pravda article: "Rightist Tactics."

The Finns have learned that the price of ignoring such warnings is economic and military pressure by the Soviet Union, which is nothing short of blackmail. Under the circumstances, the Social Democrats decided that to go against so express a Soviet wish would bring nothing but grief not only to the party, the largest one in Finland, but to the whole country. Sadly they took the heavy-handed hint and elected an unknown non-controversial Social Democrat to the post of Secretary General.

NEW YORK TIMES,  
18 June 1969

# West European Reds See a Loser Rein

CPYRCH BY DAVID BINDER  
Special to The New York Times

BONN, June 17 (Most of 20)

Communist parties in Western Europe believe that the international Communist conference in Moscow marked a new stage of greater independence from the dictates of the once-omnipotent Soviet Communist party.

There also appears to be a consensus among the leaders of the 3.3 million Western European Communists that the strongest trend in their section of the "international movement" is toward concentration on their domestic situations rather than on the international "tasks" proclaimed by Moscow.

These impressions were gathered in a sampling by correspondents of The New York Times in a number of capitals.

The chairman of the 2,500-member Norwegian party, Reidar T. Larsen, said he thought that "Communist parties are freer to express standpoints of their own." At the Moscow conference, he noted, his party and nine others criticized the 1968 Soviet-bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia.

"There is an especially strong impulse, particularly in the Western European parties, to orient themselves toward national conditions and to believe in their own strength," he added. "They are more independent of Moscow, and this trend will continue."

### 'Independence Recognized'

Carl H. Hermansson, head of the 29,000-member Swedish party, which sent only an observer delegation to Moscow, echoed those sentiments, saying the conference confirmed that the "independence of individual parties is recognized."

The 12,000-member Dutch Communist party showed its independence by refusing to send a delegation. It has spoken since then of "the so-called international conference." According to a report from The Hague, the party "does not want to choose between Moscow and Peking, but rather to solve Dutch problems" through attempts at a popular-front policy.

The French party, the second largest in Western Europe with 425,000 members, disappointed many Frenchmen by failing to reiterate its condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In fact, the somewhat divided leadership was preoccupied with the presidential election and is more concerned with national politics than with the great affairs of the international movement. On the other hand, the French party was reported to be clearly bent on maintaining "close ties with Moscow" regardless of the Czechoslovak issue.

In contrast, the 1,615,000-member Italian party, the largest in Western Europe, lived up to its independent reputation by resisting Moscow's demands for silence on Czechoslovakia and for collective condemnation of the Chinese Communist leadership. The gap between the French and Italian parties, nominally allied for some years, has apparently widened.

The British Communist party, numbering 35,600 members, also underscored its independence by repeating condemnations of the invasion and declining to sign the Moscow conference's final documents until they could be studied by its Executive Committee.

### Democratic Pluralism

In varying degrees the Finnish, Austrian, Belgian and Spanish parties displayed independence at Moscow, as well as their overriding interest in a kind of democratic pluralism within the international movement. Their stress was on facing domestic problems in their own way without subservience to the Russians.

Asked whether the parties regarded the Moscow meeting as a victory for Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, some Times correspondents reported that the mere fact of the gathering of 75 parties gave Moscow a certain advantage in its struggle with Peking. But they added that the display of disunity was unprecedented. A party spokesman in Rome said there had been no winners or losers.

A Yugoslav Communist informed on the tribulations of the international movement said the Moscow meeting showed not the decay of world Communism but its transformation toward even greater diversification. He also remarked on deep contradictions evident at the conference.

"Although it was called a meeting against imperialism,"

Moscow was the internal issues of the movement, with the criterion being not so much anti-imperialism as support for Moscow against China.

"Second, it showed that imperialism is not as big a danger for the movement as China and that imperialism was only a pretext for the confrontation with the Chinese.

"Third, Brezhnev did not dare analyze the situation in the movement. He only spoke about strengthening the Soviet Union. That is a sign he will not last long.

"Finally, his lack of response to the Italians shows he is weak regarding the Western parties and can only perform with strength in Eastern Europe."

WASHINGTON STAR  
8 June 1969

VICTOR ZORZA

## The Kremlin's Can't-Win Position

Whatever happens at the world Communist meeting in Moscow, the Kremlin cannot win. If the meeting agrees to a joint declaration of principles, this will contain so little of what the Kremlin has been demanding as to constitute a defeat for it. And if the Kremlin does, against all odds, get the sort of declaration it wants, then a number of important parties will refuse to endorse it, thus producing a formal split in the world Communist movement.

The Italian delegation, for instance, has been instructed to do everything it could to change the Soviet draft. But if this should prove impossible to achieve during the conference, the delegation has been formally authorized to refuse to

This was no doubt intended as a warning to the Kremlin that, if it does not give way, the Italians and a number of other parties will hold out to the very end. The British delegation has gone even further. It has announced that it is not authorized to sign any docu-

because it up to the party executive at home to make this decision. The executive would not meet until after the conference.

Czechoslovakia is the underlying issue, but this does not mean that the argument is about inserting into the conference document a clause that would condemn—or justify—the invasion. The Kremlin knows that it cannot get an endorsement of the invasion, and its critics know that they cannot get a condemnation of it, into the document.

Czechoslovakia is the underlying issue in a much broader sense, because the invasion gave expression to the Kremlin's claim to know what is best for the world Communist movement, and to act accordingly. This is what the other parties want to deny to the Kremlin, because they fear that they might themselves come to harm if they accept the Soviet claim.

Thus Rumania would expose itself to a future invasion, while the Italian party would expose itself to defeat at the polls. "Can one defend freedom in France," the Communist presidential candidate, Jacques Duclos, was asked in a television interview, "while at the same time approving of the intervention in Prague?"

Ho tried to evade the question. The Italian party, on the other hand, is using the Czechoslovak issue to extend the debate to basic matters of principle. It believes that the Soviet draft tackles the problem of relations between Com-

unist countries in a way to the realities. Moreover, it carries the attack right into the Soviet camp, and refuses to accept "without reservation" the rosy picture of the situation inside the Communist countries conveyed by the Soviet document.

In other words, Italian communists insist that the Kremlin should put its own house in order before it presumes to instruct them on what communism really means. The definition of socialism in the Soviet draft, they maintain, "does not correspond to the type of socialism" which they want to establish in Italy.

Yet, whatever concessions the Kremlin may ultimately make—and it already has conceded that each party may follow its "own road" to socialism—it cannot really afford to give to the other parties what they are demanding.

Thus the verbal recognition of each party's right to its "own road" is invalidated by the Kremlin's insistence that each "road" must nevertheless contain certain basic elements that are common to all. Among these is "the leading role of the party" and "the dictatorship of the proletariat" which means, in effect, that Communists everywhere must work for the one-party

power of the kind that prevails in the Soviet Union.

These are some of the principles which the Kremlin insists must be enshrined in the Moscow declaration. If western Communists accept this, they will do considerable damage to their own electoral chances. But if the Kremlin leaves it out of the declaration, it will do even greater damage to its own claim that the dictatorship of the Communist Party is a universally valid principle which justifies its monopoly of power in Russia.

It was to preserve that principle intact that its troops marched into Czechoslovakia. To abandon it would be to prepare the ground for new "reformation" movements in other Communist countries, and ultimately perhaps in Russia. But to insist on a principle unacceptable to the western parties would lead to a schism of the same kind that already exists between Russia and China. It is a dilemma which no compromise can solve, for any compromise formula would be used by each side to claim that its own answer is correct, and this would only lead to further quarrels, more and more bitter, just as in the dispute with China.

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CPYRGHT

Repeated attacks on China, which is boycotting the summit, not only endanger the conference itself, the Romanian party chief said, but aggravate the problems faced by Communists everywhere.

"Accusations, blame, labelings and invectives—by whomsoever—can only lead to the sharpening of the tension and the deepening of disagreements," Mr. Ceausescu said.

#### Second Such Call

It is the second time since the conference opened last Thursday that Romania has called for a halt to the continued polemics against China. So far, the appeals have been ignored.

Observing that Romania is "highly worried" over the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Peking and the armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet frontier, Mr. Ceausescu said:

BALTIMORE SUN,  
10 June 1969

## Romania To Stay At Summit Despite Its Attack On China

CPYRGHT

By BRUCE WINTERS  
(Moscow Bureau of The Sun)

Moscow, June 9—President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania today deplored the atmosphere developing at the World Communist Congress, but said his delegation would remain here to fight for unity among all Socialist states.

Speaking on the fourth day of the first "red summit" in nine years, the Romanian party lead-

er again questioned the wisdom of convening the conference, in view of the tensions within the Communist world.

#### View Confirmed

Recalling Romania's earlier position that conditions were not favorable for such a gathering, Mr. Ceausescu said: "Today we must say that, unfortunately, life has confirmed the correctness of our party's viewpoint."

"As I have already declared in public and as I have told the Chinese comrades, we do not agree with the accusations made by them against the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

"At the same time, we have ties that we do not agree with their accusations against the Chinese Communist party."

Mr. Ceausescu's lengthy statement at today's morning session carefully went on to spell out in detail Romania's independent views on an entire range of world issues, including the touchy subject of "limited sovereignty," a concept devised by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In a reference to that doctrine, first voiced by Mr. Brezhnev, the Romanian leader said:

"Any weakening of internationalist solidarity harms the cause of each country and our common cause, but the principle of internationalism cannot be invoked in any way for the nonobservance of other principles, for interference of any kind in the internal affairs of a Socialist country or of a fraternal party."

"Essential Condition"

"The sovereignty of the Socialist countries in no way contravenes Socialist internationalism but, on the contrary, is an essen-

tial condition for the strengthening of their solidarity, of their freely consented and conscious collaboration in the fight against imperialism."

He likewise defended Romania against charges of nationalism

which, to Communists, means that a party is abandoning its international outlook for selfish, internal reasons. Romania's independence, particularly in foreign affairs, has caused the charge to be made more or less openly by several parties.

"Nationalism and national insularity are foreign to the Romanian Communist party and people, while the ideas of internationalist solidarity, in their correct understanding and presentation, are dear to us," Mr. Ceausescu said.

But he made it plain that Romania would continue evaluating world events based on its own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, rejecting dictates from any party.

NEW YORK TIMES

15 June 1969

# Moscow, by Omission, Papers Over Some Conflicts

CPYRCH

MOSCOW—The 75 set speeches in which 75 leaders of Communist parties are repeating 75 well-known positions at their current Moscow meeting will be followed this week by the equally predictable signature, without significant amendment, of a document which could have been gleaned from the recent files of Pravda.

The gathering which will have lasted about two weeks, unmarked by debate or any change in anyone's point of view or any decision on common action, bears the title of the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. This will sound imposing when the document and speeches appear in Soviet propaganda, and that is the principal purpose of the conference.

In the view of conference sources, the goal of the meeting, long sought by the Soviet Union, is to reassure Moscow that despite the decentralizing trend in world Communism—and particularly despite the Soviet-Chinese break—there still exists a world movement and that Moscow is its center.

For that reason, Moscow has made Communist China the dominant theme of most of the

speeches by its clients although the document with which the speeches nominally deal does not mention China. In this way, the sources believe, Moscow is having its cake and eating it: Omitting China from the final document has permitted the parties that oppose a condemnation of China to attend, while denouncing China in the speeches has given Moscow what it wants.

## Claim to Unity

The consensus of Communist observers here is that in the conference the Soviet Union is coming as close as it can to its former position of unique leadership of the world Communist movement. It can now claim that a party which attacks the Soviet Union brings down upon itself the wrath of the bulk of the movement. In its broadsides against China, observers say, Pravda will henceforth be able to pepper the verbal assault it has been making for some years with such phrases as, "As the vast majority of the Communist and workers' parties of the world declared at the Moscow conference . . ."

The other principal subject before the conference will also not raise its divisive head in the document. It is the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia was cited by name only by the sharpest opponents of the Soviet invasion of that country—by such parties as the Italian, British, Australian and Austrian—and by a few of the invasion's strongest supporters. Others, such as the Rumanians, have not named Czechoslovakia but have made it clear that their principal difference with Moscow is over Moscow's revamped doctrine of "Socialist Internationalism." Moscow holds that this doctrine entitles Socialist countries to intervene in other Socialist countries in fulfillment of undefined international Socialist duty.

In a speech last Monday that remains the most discussed statement of the conference, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania accepted the principle of Socialist internationalism but said it must not be used to vitiate such other principles as sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of other countries. Mr. Ceausescu said that his party did not believe that meetings such as the present one should "establish directives and normative lines." Their purpose is rather to provide for a free exchange of views, "after which each party can independently decide on its conduct," he said.

He also disputed the need for rest of the Communist movement. "It is not necessary to have any leading center," he said.

#### Collection of Platitudes

But with the two principal issues before the world movement — China and Czechoslovakia — omitted from the final document, the result will be largely a collection of platitudes engaging no one to anything.

Those who will not subscribe to it are objecting not against any single statement in the document but against its over-all Moscow emphasis and against the very idea of common policy statements where no common policy exists. This view holds for the Rumanians. It is a fair assumption that Rumania would not sign the document if she were

not a member of the Soviet system of alliances, if she did not share a common border with the Soviet Union, and if she did not retain a vivid memory of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

These considerations make the difference between the Rumanian decision to go through with the motions as part of a majority and the Italian refusal to sign. Enrico Berlinguer, Deputy Secretary General of the Italian party, said that in the Italian view a monolithic approach to Communism would be "not only erroneous but utopian."

Mr. Berlinguer, while criticizing the policies of the Chinese and their hostility to the Soviet Union, said the Italian party opposed any "excommunication" from the world movement and considered it wrong to answer polemics with counterpolemics. Referring to the document the conference will adopt, he warned against the papering over of differences and declarations of unanimity based on "vague formulas capable of diverse interpretations." In the long run, he said, sham unity makes divergences worse by seeking to hide them.

The conference will leave the Communist movement pretty much where it was before. It will neither narrow nor deepen the breaches. But for a power grouping that lays claim to an ideological theme, an occasional demonstration setting out a common ideology may be used to sustain the claim.

—HENRY KAMM.

BALTIMORE SUN  
16 June 1969

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## Red Summit '69: A Joke Is Telling

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(MONEY BUZZER OF THE SUN)

Moscow, June 15—In the press center of the world Communist congress, a Romanian journalist tells a joke about a telephone conversation between President Nicolae Ceausescu and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Party's general secretary.

Mr. Ceausescu, the story goes, calls Moscow to inform Mr. Brezhnev it will be possible for Warsaw Pact troops—including infantry, armored and airborne units—to hold maneuvers on Romanian soil.

"And, comrade, what part of Romanian territory can we use?" the Russian leader asks. "Moldavia"

Mr. Ceausescu answers: "Moldavia."

Once part of Romania, Moldavia was permanently grafted onto the Soviet Union after World War II, an annexation many in Bucharest still resent but one not likely to be overturned.

The anecdote, in its way, typifies the rather free-wheeling atmosphere that has developed at this conference since it opened June 5.

A frankly give-and-take mood has uncovered sharp divisions of opinion among the 75 assembled parties. These divisions in themselves indicate how far many of the parties have matured politically from the old orthodox notions of the pre-war Comintern, which ran the Communist movement under Kremlin direction in Moscow.

With the conference roughly half over, it has become apparent that a majority of delegates want no return to iron-fisted Soviet hegemony over the Socialist camp.

#### Blind Obedience

Blind obedience to Kremlin diktat, once the litmus test for Marxist-Leninist purity, is giving way to more independent national views—in fact, a complete recasting of individual party responsibilities under the theory of proletarian internationalism.

Because change within the Communist movement occurs at a glacial pace, it needed this worldwide gathering to sharpen the focus on events since the

clan last met, in November, 1960.

That summit session, for example, labored 20 days in absolute secrecy, without a single public notice a meeting was even under way.

A final communique papered over the then-incipient rift between Moscow and Peking, and the conference itself was dominated by that strong-willed showman, former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

The current meeting is opposite in almost every respect.

Although newsmen cannot attend the sessions themselves, full texts of major speeches, including those sharply critical of Soviet policy, are available at the press center in several languages within 24 hours. Three-hundred fifty journalists are accredited to the conference.

#### Moscow-Peking Crisis

The deepening Moscow-Peking crisis is being dealt with openly and far from harmoniously. While still a central figure, Mr. Brezhnev has been challenged repeatedly and, in some instances, his philosophy has been rejected outright.

The Soviet view of internationalism, which inspired the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia, has been discredited by those Communist critics who want no part of Kremlin domination.

Of those, Mr. Ceausescu has been the most eloquent. As the head of a ruling government, his statements are an inspirational beacon among the smaller parties as yet striving for power. He told the delegates last week:

"Nobody should pretend to be the holder of the magic key with which to find answers to all the problems.

"It is necessary to start always from the truth that what was just yesterday can become obsolete, out of date today and



Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2  
not an answer anymore to the demands of the historical process.

**The Forms Of Struggle**

"It is necessary to keep in mind that the forms of revolutionary struggle which proved valid in certain circumstances cannot be mechanically applied

to other historical conditions of stages of development."

To this plea for an up-dating of Marxist belief, Mr. Ceausescu added Romania's appraisal of how best the worldwide Communist movement could be strengthened.

"The better each party fulfills its responsibilities toward the working class and the people to which it belongs," he said, "the greater will be the confidence of the masses in its policy, the more powerful its role as the vanguard, the greater the prestige of the Communist and working-class movement.

"This represents the main contribution of each party to the common cause of socialism and communism, to the strengthening of the international power and cohesion of the Communist and working-class movement."

Instead of showcasing Communist unity, the conference thus far more clearly reveals the movement's diversities—the fact that in the nine years since the last summit session, new forces have arisen that bring into question those concepts revered by the old Bolsheviks of another generation.

**Conference Priority**

The publicly stated conference priority, for example—unity in the struggle against imperialism—has been reversed so that delegates now find themselves preoccupied with internal problems implied by China and Czechoslovakia rather than the threat of capitalism.

Accordingly, several parties, again led by the Romanians, believe the principal summit draft of a statement against imperialism is out of step with reality, polemical rather than analytical and inconsistent with the nature of things as they are.

For the Kremlin, this poses a dilemma: every compromise fashioned in unity's name dilutes Moscow's leading role, but to the degree Moscow fails to yield, the Communist movement itself loses just that much credibility as an alignment of free states offer-

ing an alternative to Western thought. This ultimately may prove too high a price for Russia to pay.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 June 1969

# World Reds End Moscow Parley

By HENRY KAMM  
MOSCOW, June 17—

The meeting of most of the world's Communist parties, convened among much discord, ended today with a communiqué hailing it as "an important stage on the road of strengthening the cohesion of the Communist movement."

However the editor of a leading newspaper from a Communist country, commenting on the 13-day series of speeches said: "the circus is over, and it was a bad one."

The comment reflected the consideration that the conference demonstrated what has been apparent for many years: the Moscow-Peking split not only has divided the Communist movement into supporters of the Soviet Union or China but also has added a third group of parties whose limited independence from Moscow would be endangered by a healing of the breach or by a move to cast China into limbo.

**Three Attitudes Noted**

By and large, the pro-Soviet parties came and signed the four-part document that will be the principal formal result of the conference; the pro-Chinese parties and those who come within China's sphere of influence stayed home, and the neutralist group, headed by Rumania and Italy, came to voice its opposition and reservations.

Opposition and reservations were voiced by 14 of the 75 participants. Five parties did not sign. They were the Cuban and Swedish parties, present only as observers; the British and Norwegian parties, which will consult their memberships before deciding whether to sign, and the party from the Dominican Republic, which refused outright.

Four parties signed only the third section of the document, dealing with the struggle against imperialism. They were the Italian, San Marino, Aus-

## Some Parties Balk at Signing Text of Statement

tralian and Réunion parties. Five parties—from Rumania, Spain, Switzerland, Morocco and the Sudan—signed after having expressed reservations.

The statement was not made public immediately, but its contents were disclosed by conference sources. Those who signed despite misgivings did so largely because they considered it sufficiently vague and innocuous so as not to commit them to anything.

But even skeptical Communist observers believed that the Soviet Union gained its principal objective from the conference. Moscow proved, they said, that it could still persuade 74 other Communist parties to attend a meeting that only the Soviet Union really wanted and get the majority to support a common position.

This alone, the observers said, will be welcome ammunition in the ideological battle with China, in which Peking has scored most of the points so far. The Soviet Union must have wanted this ammunition badly, according to the observers, because it paid the price of disclosing formally how weak is its hold on some of the important parties among the 74.

The blandness of the statement came as no surprise. The original draft, which expressed the Soviet view of the world more bluntly, had been watered down in nearly a year and a half of preparatory meetings, by hundreds of formal amendments and thousands of informal talks.

The form in which the document appeared before the conference when it opened on June 5 was so diluted that no party

objected seriously when the dozens of amendments still before the drafting committee were mostly disregarded.

**Silent on Chinese Issue**

As it was signed in the sumptuous St. George's Hall of the Kremlin, the statement made no mention of the Soviet-Chinese dispute or the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the other issue that makes the Soviet Union's rule over its camp of countries and bloc of parties uneasy.

The issues with which the document does deal are the stand-bys of joint Communist pronouncements. "Imperialism," principally American, West German and Israeli, is depicted as the chief foe. Peaceful coexistence remains the principal mode of international life.

The superiority and growing world ascendancy of Communist ideology are affirmed, but they are accompanied with calls for greater vigilance against "bourgeois" ideology.

The independence and sovereignty of each Communist party and country is emphasized, but so is the obscure notion of "proletarian internationalism, which served as the ideological cloak for the interference last August with the independence and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.

**Two Parties Identified**

MOSCOW, June 17 (Reuters)—A conference mystery was cleared up today when two underground delegations that had not been named in official reports were inadvertently identified. The two parties were from Nepal and the Philippines. Correspondents who were escorted through a meeting room saw the names on placeboards, to the apparent chagrin of conference officials.

NEW YORK TIMES  
1 June 1969

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## PRAGUE LIBERALS LOSE PARTY POSTS IN A BROAD PURGE

Sik and Kriegel Are Among  
'Opportunists' Expelled by  
the Central Committee

MOSCOW TIES STRESSED

Husak Calls Close Relations  
Best Guarantee of National  
Security for Czechs

CPYRIGHT

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to the New York Times

PRAGUE, May 31—Dr. Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovak Communist party leader, announced a purge of "opportunistic elements" today. His comments were generally believed to mark the regime's adoption of an orthodox pro-Moscow policy.

He disclosed that Prof. Ota Sik, a former Deputy Premier and chief planner of last year's tentative economic reform, and other political liberals, had been ousted from the party's Central Committee.

The expelled men had clung to "non-Marxist, antiparty positions," Dr. Husak declared. "To such people we shall have to say good-by."

Speaking at a Prague industrial plant, Dr. Husak also maintained that close relations with Moscow were the "best guarantee for the country's security." He all but condoned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia last August.

Intervention Explained

The "fraternal" Communist parties of the Warsaw Pact group watched the events in Czechoslovakia last spring and summer with increasing uneasiness. Dr. Husak said, "until

they gradually lost their confidence that the leadership of our party was able to restore order by its own means."

Dr. Husak's nationally televised speech was a report on a two-day plenary meeting of the 180-member Central Committee, which ended last night. It was the first plenary meet-

ing since he succeeded Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary of the party on April 17.

Some 1,500 party workers listened to Dr. Husak in the modern auditorium of the C.K.D. engineering complex on the capital's northeast outskirts. President Ludvik Svoboda and Premier Oldrich Cernik also spoke.

Appears in Control

The new party chief sounded as if he felt himself in thorough control of the Communist apparatus.

Dr. Husak told the rally that Dr. Kriegel and Frantisek Vodszonek had been eliminated from the Central Committee because they had voted against an accord with Moscow sanctioning the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia when it was ratified by the National Assembly last October.

Dr. Kriegel is a physician and a veteran of the Spanish civil war who served as Public Health Minister and medical adviser to Cuba. Mr. Vodszonek is also a leading liberal.

Every reference at today's rally to the Soviet Union brought loud cheers from the audience.

There was a standing ovation when Dr. Husak said that Czechoslovakia must closely cooperate with the Warsaw Pact countries and especially the Soviet Union.

"We cannot tolerate any anti-Soviet attitudes in our ranks," Dr. Husak said. "This would be against our principles and interests."

Svoboda for Soviet Ties

President Svoboda, who spoke before Dr. Husak, also stressed that it was against the country's best interests "to nurture feelings of distrust toward the Soviet Union. "Firm and decisive measures" are needed to reaffirm the Communist party's guiding role, the President said.

Discussing the party purges, Dr. Husak said that the new leadership had in vain requested and "begged" dissenters to give up their incorrect positions.

Dr. Husak affirmed that "not a single person has been illegally arrested" or persecuted under the present regime. This, he said, was a result of the Communist party's departure from old methods in January, 1968.

The present party leadership would strengthen democratic principles and never permit them to be violated, Dr. Husak said, "for this we don't need advice from Sik or Kriegel."

Professor Sik, who returned home to attend the Central Committee meeting Thursday and yesterday, was reported today to be on his way back to Basel, Switzerland, where he is on a lecturing assignment.

Others in Purge Listed

The First Secretary announced also the ouster of Central Committee members who had signed the "2,000 words," a manifesto for democratization last June. They include Oldrich Stary, outgoing rector of Prague's Charles University, and Karel Kosik, a philosopher.

Referring to the novelist Ludvik Vaculik, the author of the "2,000 words," Dr. Husak declared that the party was not judging his qualities as a writer, but his political role.

"If you want to be a politician, you must take the risks; it's a risky job," Dr. Husak said with a broad grin. The audience, understanding the allusion to the nine years in jail Dr. Husak had served in the nineteen fifties for alleged Slovak "bourgeois nationalism," roared with laughter.

Dr. Husak spoke in Slovak, which is slightly different from Czech, but equally easily understood in Prague.

Premier Cernik indicated a return to central economic planning and gave to understand that a project to set up worker councils in individual enterprises, somewhat on the pattern of the Yugoslavs' self-management system, had been shelved.

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 June 1969

## Conservatives Get High Posts in Czechoslovakia

**Strougal, Ex-Aide of Novotny  
Named Deputy to Husak**

CPYRGHT  
By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, June 3 — The Communist party's ruling Presidium today filled high posts in the apparatus with pro-Soviet conservatives, and appointed one of them, Dr. Lubomir Strougal, as deputy to the party leader, Dr. Gustav Husak.

Dr. Strougal, a party functionary of more than 20 years' standing with a reputation for unwavering Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, thus became in effect the No. 2 man in the new Czechoslovak regime.

He is considered a driving force in the present purge of progressives from regional and local party organizations, which has just eliminated the last major liberal holdout in the party, the Prague city committee.

### Husak Widens Role

The resignation of the capital's Communist leader, Bohumil Simon, a liberal who gained vast popularity last year, and of the entire Prague committee Presidium, was announced today.

Dr. Strougal, who is 45 years old, was an Interior Minister for four years under former Presi-

dent Antonin Novotny, a hard-line backer of Moscow. Since the Soviet-led invasion last August, the new Deputy First Secretary has consistently advocated close relations with Moscow.

Today's redistribution of responsibilities within the 11-man Presidium placed Dr. Husak in direct charge of the sensitive party departments for defense

and security. In the Communist system of interlocking party and state organs, the defense and security departments practically transmit party orders to the army and the police, and therefore constitute a formidable power center.

### Strougal and Bilak in Party

The assignments announced by the Presidium today nevertheless did nothing to discourage current general speculation that Dr. Strougal, a Czech with a strong power base in Bohemia and Moravia, was emerging as a potential rival to Dr. Husak, a Slovak who was persecuted and imprisoned in the Novotny era.

The impression that Dr. Husak's powers were rather narrowly defined was heightened by the composition of the team that he led to the Moscow world conference of Communist parties this afternoon.

The First Secretary was accompanied to Moscow by Dr. Strougal and other pro-Soviet party officials, including Vasil Bilak, the former First Secretary of the Slovak Communist party.

The Czechoslovak delegation to the Moscow conference, due to open on Thursday, was instructed by the party's Central Committee last week to oppose any debate of last year's invasion at the parley.

While rejecting any attempts to "internationalize the so-called Czechoslovak problem" in Moscow, the Central Committee authorized the party delegation to discuss the presence of Soviet troops with other Communist parties in bilateral talks.

The two-day plenary meeting of the Czechoslovak Central Committee last week approved a pro-Moscow power shift in the Communist leadership in which Dr. Husak, for-

merly regarded as a moderate and a "centrist," appeared to be allied with ultraconservatives.

The Central Committee expelled or disciplined some liberal members, and in effect urged a speed-up in the purge on lower party levels.

### Simon's Successor Named

Yesterday Dr. Husak and Dr. Strougal were present at a tense meeting of Prague's city committee that saw the backers. The committee had been summoned for an extraordinary session yesterday after it had voiced dissent from the decisions of the Central Committee, especially the ouster of progressives, in an earlier meeting over the weekend. The party shuffle in Prague was disclosed only today.

A supporter of the present pro-Soviet central leadership, Oldrich Matejka, became Mr. Simon's successor. Mr. Matejka had been secretary of the industrial Vysocany district on Prague's northeastern outskirts.

In today's meeting of the central Presidium Mr. Bilak was placed in charge of the party's foreign relations. Alois Indra became head of the party department for state administration and social organizations, and Jozef Lenart was made head of the economy department.

Mr. Bilak, Mr. Indra and Mr. Lenart were among a group of 10 party leaders whom the Presidium formerly cleared of accusations that had been widely leveled at them of having betrayed the country by collaborating with the Soviet invaders last August. They all were "honorable comrades," the party Presidium said in a statement in April.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER  
31 May 1969

## CPYRGHT Purge of the reformers

The hopes of Prague liberals that Dr Husak would have the will and strength to hold the centre to a decent course in Czechoslovakia must have dwindled almost to vanishing point now. In little more than one month the clock has been put back nearly to where it was in the late days of Novotny's rule. Indeed, there is even less room for debate now than there was then. For "Listy" is silenced again, and who can expect that the Writers' Union, if indeed its congress is permitted at all next month, will be able to talk back to the party chiefs as it did in the summer of 1967?

Once more, in the mouths of those Communist leaders who are doing the talking at present, centralism is all and democracy comes nowhere. In the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia particularly, the party, headed by Novotny's Minister of the Interior, Lubomir Strougal, has embarked on an extensive purge whose end is by no means in sight. The removal of Dubcek's chief ideologist, Josef Spacek, from his senior post in South Moravia earlier this week was only the latest of a series of "resignations" and outright dismissals in which reformers have been replaced by conservatives. Almost every other day the Czech press and radio have carried reports of regional party conferences at which senior officials and editors of local party newspapers have been purged. Usually it was reported also that the meetings had been attended by Mr Strougal or his ally Milos Jakes, the head of the party's central control and auditing commission.

Evidently more is to come, especially if Dr Husak loses the struggle for control which is reported to be going on in the meeting of the full central committee which has been in session in Prague during the last few days. Yesterday Milos Jakes was voicing the control commission's "grave dissatisfaction over the inadequate development of the struggle against rightist and anti-Soviet forces," and calling for the dismissal from the central committee of those members of Parliament

who voted against the treaty signed last autumn which "permitted" the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

If Dr Husak is indeed fighting to save some of the substance of last year's reform programme, then he is at bay in a corner between the dominant Czech conservatives and the requirements of his Soviet taskmasters. He retains the support of the majority of his Slovak party (though even there Vasil Bilak, the man whom he replaced in Bratislava and who now sits with him on the praesidium, will be waiting for any opening to oust him) and the survivors of the liberal element among the Czechs. But neither he nor they can speak out to enlist support in the country now that the press has been so comprehensively muzzled.

Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues must be reasonably satisfied with the present progress of "normalisation" in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, they seem to have taken a leaf out of their pupils' book by reducing still farther the narrow scope for intellectual dissent and debate in their own country. The dismissal of Alexander Tvardovsky from the editorship of "Novy Mir" and the removal of Yevtushenko and Akhmatova from the editorial board of "Yunost" are two of the heaviest blows that the regime has struck at what was left of cultural freedom in Russia since the removal of Khrushchev, for these magazines had been the main outlets for all that was most lively and original in Soviet literature. Tvardovsky especially fought a long good fight for the work of Solzhenitsyn, its most noble hope.

It seems a low point, then, for all those who have been working for freedom and creative space in the Communist half of Europe. Those in the West who have admired them and learned from them can only hold fast, as they do, to the belief that neither Russia nor Czechoslovakia can afford for long to silence its most creative men, and alienate all those who need more nourishment than the Kremlin's frozen dogmas can provide if they are to work for socialism.

# LIBERALS IN PRAGUE QUIT PARTY

Mass Action Follows  
 National Committee's  
 Expulsion Of Six

BY STUART S. SMITH  
 (Sun Staff Correspondent)

Prague, June 3—The entire liberal leadership of the influential Prague city Communist party committee has resigned, it was officially announced here today.

No reasons were cited for the event, which followed the expulsion of six reformist leaders by the national party's central committee Saturday.

CTK, the Czechoslovak news agency, said the resignations were accepted at the city committee's special session last night. Those leaving include Bohumil Simon, the committee's progressive chief secretary, and the entire eleven-man committee presidium.

During the meeting the Prague committee also discussed last week's Czechoslovak party central committee resolutions and their effect on the city organization. The Prague organization was one of the leading forces behind the Dubcek-era party reform program.

Following last August's Warsaw power invasion, Mr. Simon incurred the Kremlin's wrath for having organized the fourteenth party congress, which denounced the military attack and elected a new, democratic-minded central committee.

The congress, which was secretly convened in a Prague factory despite occupation forces' efforts to arrest the delegates, was later declared invalid at Soviet insistence.

Asked to explain the causes of yesterday's mass resignations, a CTK spokesman replied: "We don't know because we were not told. At CTK we don't have any more information than we are giving out officially."

Yesterday CTK reported that at what was apparently an ear-

lier Prague party organization meeting, the national central committee's hard-line stand was approved by an unspecified "overwhelming majority," but opposed by eight votes.

The national party's new line was also discussed recently by the party district committee in Prague's First district, where, according to CTK, "some differences of views appeared" over the orthodox "organizational and cadre measures."

#### Other Opposition

Opposition was reported elsewhere throughout Bohemia and Moravia, although the rigidly censored press played this down.

Gustav Husak, the new Czechoslovak party first secretary, has told the reformers to either

conform to the new course or take a "vacation."

As last week's central committee resolution noted: "It is possible that we shall have to say good-by—possibly temporarily—to some people who cannot be convinced. If there is no other possibility, even this will contribute toward strengthening the internal ideological coherence and the action ability of the party."

Possibly it will, but the party, which last year had the confidence of many, if not most,

Czechoslovak citizens, is fast losing its popularity.

As Stefan Sadovsky, the Slovak party leader, pointed out today in a speech in Bratislava, "part of the population still does not understand all the measures and there is insufficient drive in the work of Communist editors and even in *Pravda*," The Slovak party daily.

The nonchalance Mr. Sadovsky noticed in the editors has also infected the workers, who have slacked off and lowered production levels.

Washington Post  
2 June 1969

*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## Harassment of Czech Journalists May Be Prelude to Total Police State

CPYRE

PRAGUE—Present harassment of leading journalists shows how far Czechoslovakia has returned to the controlled society of orthodox communism and, further, suggests ominous portents of something worse in the days ahead.

Some 16 newspaper and radio journalists who comprised the vanguard of last year's liberal revolution, having already been dismissed from their posts, are spending hours on end at the Communist Central Committee building on the banks of the Vltava for interrogation about the heretical writings of last year.

It's all very civil. Instead of trying to bully the heretics into self-criticism, the interrogators are studiously polite, offering little sandwiches and a glass of wine. Nevertheless, the journalists face expulsion from the Communist Party and, unless they recant, exclusion from any job above the level of manual labor.

What makes this so ominous is the possibility it is merely the prelude to thought control going far beyond the press. The very momentum of the re-emerging police state may extend party control to the theater, motion pictures, and creative writing—all relatively free in Czechoslovakia the past decade. From there, the Soviet-style police state with arrests, trials and imprisonments is not far away.

THEY ALREADY have turned back the clock to 1966, one leading writer told us. Before they stop, they may go all the way to the 1950s.

Thus, a deep depression blankets Prague in this dismal spring of 1969. Czechs know they can never recap-

ture the buoyant freedom of 1968. The choice, they realize, is between the present, relatively restrained dictatorship that Dr. Gustav Husak seems to favor or something much closer to the Soviet model backed by Lubomir Strougal.

Husak, a flinty Slovak hard-liner who replaced Alexander Dubcek as Czechoslovak party secretary on April 17, is scarcely an appealing figure in Prague.

But Czechs here are coming to prefer him to fellow-Czech Strougal, a party hanger-on who now heads the Communist Party in the Czech regions and is clearly challenging Husak for national power on a slavish, pro-Soviet platform.

In fact, it is Strougal who has presided over the systematic demolition of the 1968 revolution. Besides banning liberal weeklies and replacing liberal journalists in the daily press and radio-television with apparatchiki (including some police agents), Strougal has intimidated and eviscerated the student and worker movements. Trade unions, emerging as a political force after last August's Russian-led invasion, are back as a docile recipient of political doctrine at the end of the Communist Party's traditional transmission belt.

Most impressive was Strougal's quick takeover of the party organization in the Czech regions. Western experts had expected the Czech party structure, thoroughly liberalized through unprecedented democratic elections in 1968, to prove a lasting headache for pro-Soviet hard-liners. Instead, the liberalization was wiped away by Strougal within a month. Only one (Prague

City) of eight regional Czech communist secretaryships is still held by a liberal.

AT THE same time, the secret police—dormant through 1968—has been revived and reinforced. Liberals are sure that their telephones are tapped and their mail inspected. Before talking to Western correspondents, liberals select a secluded restaurant booth and then talk in a whisper. Exit visas out of Czechoslovakia have been denied to liberals the past month.

However, fragments of the Prague spring of 1968 linger in bizarre combination with the current repression. For instance, Jiri Hochmann—a major force in the 1968 revolution as a writer for the weekly Reporter (now banned)—replied with a four-letter obscenity two weeks ago when the Central Committee asked him over for questioning about his 1968 writings. Hochmann immediately went off to his country place to begin work on a novel and has not been bothered up to this writing.

Similarly, cultural unions—theater, movies, writers, etc.—recently criticized the new repression despite a request not to do so from the Interior Ministry (though their statement went unpublished in Prague's controlled press.)

But everybody here is well aware that defiance by Jiri Hochmann and the cultural unions is an anachronism that will soon wither away whether medium-hard Husak or ultra-hard Strougal wins the power struggle—a realization that produces intense despair in Prague for intellectuals and the general public alike.

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BALTIMORE SUN  
6 June 1969

## Moravians Demand Prague Indorse Czech Invasion

CPYRGHT

By STUART S. SMITH  
[Sun Staff Correspondent]

Prague, June 5—A provincial Czechoslovak Communist organization has demanded that the party Central Committee approve last summer's Warsaw powers' invasion, it was reported here today.

In a Moravian resolution to the party's top ruling body, the local group called upon Czechoslovak Communist leaders to rescind their August denunciation of the military intervention and take the "correct" stand.

### Threat To Svoboda

The event may pose a potential threat to the country's remaining moderate officials, including even Premier Oldrich Cernik and President Ludvik Svoboda.

The resolution was issued yesterday by a miners organization in Ostrava and printed this morning on the front page of *Rude Pravo* the official Czechoslovak party daily.

However, in what struck political commentators here as a significant omission, the story was not picked up later by CTK, the official Czechoslovak news agency, indicating that the national leadership probably does not sanction the Ostrava action—at least not yet.

Yesterday's miners' meeting was addressed by Drahomir Kolder, one of the Central Committee's most loyal supporters of Kremlin policy and a man whom Czechoslovak news media last year denounced as a national traitor and Russian collaborator.

As soon as the Warsaw pow-

er's troops marched across the Czechoslovak frontiers last August 20 President Svoboda issued an official statement opposing the intrusion as an illegal invasion.

The country's principal governing bodies, including the Communist leadership, the federal administration and the Czechoslovak National Assembly, quickly followed suit, accusing their Communist allies of violating international law and breaking both the United Nations Charter and the Warsaw treaty itself.

### Party Support Elsewhere

Despite overbearing Soviet pressure to validate the invasion ex post facto, the country's legal position still remains that the troops entered without just cause.

Numerous important Communist parties now attending the international conference in Moscow sided with Czechoslovakia at the time. The French, Austrian, Spanish, English, Scandinavia, Italian and Romanian parties rebuked the Soviet leaders with particular vehemence.

For the Czechoslovak party now to admit that the invasion was warranted would not only sanction the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the Socialist commonwealth states, but also would cut the ground out from under the Romanians, Italians et al and also jeopardize President Svoboda.

BALTIMORE SUN  
29 May 1969

# RIGHTS GROUP IS BANNED BY CZECH REGIME

## Decree Says Society Functioned As A Political Body

CPYRGHT STUART S. SMITH  
[Sun Staff Correspondent]

Prague, May 28—The Czech republic's Interior Ministry today banned Czechoslovakia's Society for Human Rights.

The organization, which has some 3,000 dues-paying members, was founded May 3, 1968, during the height of the nation's democratization movement.

A Society official explained today that the group's goal was the implementation in Czechoslovakia of the principles embodied in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

### Includes Respected Figures

The organization's leadership includes some of the country's most respected public figures, including Frantisek Tomasek, Archbishop of Prague, Eduard Goldstuecker, a Communist party Central Committee member and Vilibald Bezdicek, the Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

A society spokesman noted that the group was dedicated to the same ideals as are all other humanitarian organizations in a Democratic community.

### "Disbanded" By Action

However, an Interior Ministry

CPYRGHT

decree alleged that "the activities of the Society for Human Rights" prove that it is fundamentally . . . fulfilling the function of a political organization actively working within the population.

CTK, the Czechoslovak news agency, published without further clarification that the decree published today has "not yet come into force."

Nonetheless, the society spokesman tonight commented that the group had been "disbanded" by the government action.

### Vendetta Carried Out

The ban is just one of countless blows which the Czechoslovak authorities have recently struck against the short-lived freedom the people enjoyed during the liberalization initiated by Alexander Dubcek, the former party leader.

Since Gustav Husak replaced Mr. Dubcek last month, the party's orthodox wing has been allowed to carry out Vendetta against legions of journalists, educators, intellectuals, workers, labor union leaders and party official who were responsible for last year's democratic Action Program.

### Adopted A Year Ago

The program, which was adopted as official party policy at a Central Committee meeting just a year ago, has passed into oblivion and Czechoslovak newspapers have either been silenced entirely or turned into propaganda organ by the new regime.

Yesterday, the Czechoslovak press boss announced that the government is "now trying to induce publishers to exert greater influence" over the new they print "not only to suppress harmful material but also to win active support . . . for state policy".



# Czech Official Asks Further Purges of Liberals

CPYRGT BY PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

Strong Demands Continued

PRAGUE, June 17—The rising leader of conservatives in the Czechoslovak Communist apparatus, Dr. Lubomir Strougal, announced today a campaign of further purges of liberals.

Personnel changes in party bodies "must take place," Dr. Strougal wrote in Rude Pravo, the main Communist newspaper, because some members were "asses" while others were "resorting even to obstructionism."

Dr. Strougal's call for a new shake-up in the party's structures after the recent gains by conservative factions followed a party statement yesterday urging the apparatus in belli-

Tightening of Press Curbs and Personnel Shifts

close language to curb Communist liberalism.

The statement was issued by the national Central Committee's Bureau for the Czech Regions, which is headed by Dr. Strougal. A separate party organization exists for the Slovak part of the country.

It is now the party's task, the Czech statement said, "to defeat the political platform of these forces, to isolate their representatives, to split their centers of organization and to

restrict their possibilities of influencing public opinion."

The Bureau disclosed that it had re-examined the situation of the press and other information media, apparently with a view to tightening censorship.

The bureau announced that it had suspended the party membership of Ludek Pachman, a progressive writer and chess champion, who had recently denounced the conservative line in an unauthorized rally of foundry workers in Ostrava. Suspension is a milder party censure than outright expulsion.

The party statement observed that "right-wing views and positions," meaning liberalism, had "influenced a rather large section of CPYRGT including Communists."

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 June 1969

## Prague, After Brief Relaxation, Tightening Security Measures

CPYRGT By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, June 8—European diplomats here say that Czechoslovak security measures have been noticeably tightened lately.

According to these sources, embassies and consulates in Prague and other foreign—not only Western—agencies and individuals are being as closely watched as before the short-lived liberalization last year.

Czechoslovaks who work for foreign employers or are known to have other international connections also are again coming in for much attention from security agencies, it is understood.

While tourists and business visitors from abroad continue to receive a friendly welcome in casual contacts with the hospitable and jovial people, Czechoslovaks are again wary of associating with foreigners who might cause them trouble. "Don't call me—I'll call you," is the rule for the Czechoslovak dealing with an alien, and if the call is actually put through, it is likely to be from a pay telephone.

CPYRGT The diplomats' awareness of

more stringent security follows recent appeals by Communist party spokesmen and the press for a stepped up fight against "enemy intelligence." The sources of the alleged spying and plotting are usually defined as "antisocialist forces."

At the same time the Communist party apparatus, now firmly controlled by pro-Soviet conservatives, is extolling the work of security forces, obviously including a reorganized secret police, and deploring that they were hampered and subject to harsh criticisms by liberals last year.

Heightened vigilance over foreign activities in Czechoslovakia was reportedly advocated also during the last plenary meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee May 29 and 30. The federal Minister of Interior, Jan Pelnar, who is in charge of the police, is understood to have called for increased watchfulness. His speech, said to have been very detailed, has not been published.

CPYRGT In today's Rude Pravo article, Dr. Strougal remarked that "a serious destruction of valid Marxist-Leninist principles and values took place" during last year's liberalization.

Dr. Strougal is in Moscow together with Dr. Gustav Husak, the party head, at the international Communist conference, which closed today. Dr. Strougal, who is 44 years old, was named deputy to Dr. Husak two weeks ago and is widely considered his rival.

Last week Dr. Strougal made an unannounced trip back to Prague while Dr. Husak apparently stayed on in Moscow.

NEW YORK TIMES  
30 May 1969

# Impassive Bohemian

*Lubomir Strougal*

Special to The New York Times  
PRAGUE, May 29—The short, muscular commu-

nist party chief of Bohemia-Moravia, Lubomir Strougal, had a reputation for toughness even as a 19-year-old law student at the end of the World War II when he went into the streets of Prague to cheer the Soviet liberators.

Now, at 45, Dr. Strougal is a leader of the "new realists" who are convinced that Czechoslovakia's fate hinges on good relations with Moscow. His name is still a byword for toughness.

Lately he has kept up a denunciation of "petit bourgeois" and "nationalist" currents and pressed for stern measures to curb lingering dissent in the news media and among intellectuals and students.

The public oratory of Dr. Strougal (pronounced STRO-gahl) is hard on listeners and newspaper readers, full of Marxist-Leninist jargon and lacking the folksy humor that Czechoslovak audiences like.

Students of Czechoslovak power shifts have always considered Dr. Strougal a model functionary of the party apparatus.

He has survived the Stalin era, de-Stalinization, last year's liberal "Prague spring," the Soviet-led invasion of August, and the fall of Alexander Dubcek in April. Looking impassive behind his eyeglasses, the bushy-haired south Bohemian has become politically stronger all the time.

### Butt of Sardonic Jokes

Dr. Strougal was born on Oct. 24, 1924, at Veseli nad Luznici, northeast of Budweis. He is married, and a brother works in the government's foreign trade agency.

There are the usual sardonic Prague jokes about Dr. Strougal's political fortunes. When he was made Agriculture Minister at the age of only 35, Czechoslovaks noted that potatoes, their staple



United Press International

*A survivor of many a political upheaval.*

there will be a scarcity of policemen, people remarked in 1961 when Dr. Strougal took over the Interior Ministry, which controls the police.

No dearth of policemen and informers was observed during the nearly four years that Dr. Strougal remained Interior Minister. Antonin Novotny, a holdover from the Stalin era, was then President and party leader.

As Mr. Novotny came under increasing criticism from party ranks, Dr. Strougal went back into the corridors of power at Communist headquarters.

He served as a secretary of the Central Committee, as chairman of its committees on legal questions, agriculture and standard of living.

In the hectic days at the end of 1967, Dr. Strougal was mentioned as a possible successor to Mr. Novotny, but is said to have declined as did other prudent party leaders. The post went to Mr. Dubcek, and the liberalization drive started.

Dr. Strougal rejoined the government in March, 1968, as a Deputy Premier, but kept his distance from the reformers. In inner party councils, he reportedly warned against irritating Moscow and weak-

Last November, Dr. Strougal was given a new post, and he quickly transformed it into a personal power base.

Czechoslovakia was about to be reorganized as a federation of two semiautonomous units, the Czech and Slovak republics. This bolstered the old Slovak party, which had retained a separate identity.

The Czechoslovak leadership and its Soviet advisers thought that some counterpart must be created in the Czech section of the country.

### Compromise Emerged

Unwilling to set up an independent Czech party organization, the party theorists devised a compromise, creating a new agency, named Bureau of the Czechoslovak Communist party for the Management of Party Work in the Czech Lands.

The Czech lands are Bohemia, including Prague, and Moravia, where 10 million of the country's 14 million people live. When Dr. Strougal gave up the deputy premiership last January, ostensibly to devote himself fulltime to the Czech lands, he was already one of the most powerful men in the nation.

He was considered a candidate for succession to Mr. Dubcek, reportedly favored by Moscow over Dr. Gustak Husak, the Slovak nationalist, who eventually won the post on April 17.

Since then Dr. Strougal has purged the Bohemian and Moravian regional and local party organizations, demoting or ousting liberals.

## HUSAK ADVOCATES FIRM PARTY RULE

Sets Aim in Opening Talk  
to Central Committee

CPYRGT  
BY PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, May 29 — Dr. Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovak Communist leader, advocated "the restoration of the leading role of the party" at the opening of a Central Committee meeting here today.

The session of the party's 180-member policy body began at Hradcany Castle amid speculation on leadership changes.

Most Czechoslovaks appeared to expect that the meeting, the first to be held since Dr. Husak succeeded Alexander Dubcek as party leader on April 17, would indicate a hardening of policies toward news media, intellectuals, students, dissidents and the trade unions.

The decisions will be announced after the end of the session, probably tomorrow night.

According to a published summary of Dr. Husak's opening statement at the closed party meeting, he called for a reassertion of party dominance in government administration, economy and culture.

### Bloc Relations a Topic

He also declared that the committee would discuss the party's relations with "fraternal Communist parties of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that represent the basis of our foreign policy."

Dr. Husak will lead the Czechoslovak delegation to the world conference of Communist parties in Moscow, scheduled to begin on June 5.

A highly qualified source said the Soviet Union was "most eager" to obtain from the Czechoslovak party a formal declaration justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia last August on the ground that socialism had been threatened by "counterrevolutionary" forces.

CPYRGT

Moscow wants to obtain such a statement from Prague before the world conference, the source affirmed. The source said that Dr. Husak had so far resisted these pressures.

### Strougal a Rising Star

In his report Dr. Husak was said to have urged "the restoration of party unity." This was understood as an implicit acknowledgement of continuing feuds within the party between progressives, conservatives and other factions.

The chairman at the proceedings was Dr. Lubomir Strougal, the 45-year-old conservative who heads the party apparatus in Bohemia and Moravia. He is widely regarded as a rising star and a possible rival to Dr. Husak.

Dr. Strougal presided in his capacity as a member of the party's ruling Presidium. The chairmanship rotates among the 11 Presidium members.

A number of party and government officials and the editors in chief of Communist newspapers were admitted as invited guests.

While the Communist leadership met in the baroque Spanish Hall of the brooding castle high above the capital, Roman Catholic prelates and a congregation estimated at 3,000 per-

sons gathered in the adjoining St. Vitus Cathedral, at a requiem mass for Josef Cardinal Beran.

Mourners walked into the Gothic church past rows of the squat black Tatra limousines of party officials in the courtyard of the castle.

Cardinal Beran, exiled Archbishop of Prague who spent 17 years in Nazi and Communist prisons, died in Rome May 17.

The requiem mass was celebrated by the Apostolic Administrator of Prague, Bishop Frantisek Tomasek, and three other Bohemian bishops. A bust of the dead cardinal was in front of the main altar. Relatives of Cardinal Beran and Western diplomats also attended the rite.

WASHINGTON POST

5 June 1969

# Deposed Liberal Blames Top Officials for Czech Ills

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By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

PRAGUE, June 4—Dr. Frantisek Kriegel is purported to have told Czechoslovakia's Communist Party Central Committee Friday, right before his expulsion from that body, that those responsible for murder and torture in the 1950s, and economic crisis now, still retain their seats on it.

According to a text circulating here, Kriegel noted that "until now no one has been dismissed from the Central Committee who had direct responsibility for the fact that dozens of people met an unworthy death at the hands of the hangmen," or for the fact that "thousands were condemned for long years of torture and prison on the basis of their accusations . . ."

These remarks, in which he also defended his opposition to the legalization of the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, resulted in his expulsion from the Party on the spot—after 38 years—and a bitter denunciation from the Party leader, Gustav Husak.

The plenary sitting certified Czechoslovakia's return to the doctrine of democratic centralism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

In view of the rapid return of authoritarian control over Party and state in the last few weeks, Kriegel's speech was seen as an act of courage. The text of what is purported to be his opening statement was circulating widely in Prague at the highest level.

It was also posted in various institutes at Charles University and on one wall downtown the inscription was

chalked, "Bravo, Mr. Kriegel." Under present censorship and tightening restrictions on dissemination of information, it was impossible to authenticate the speech, but it was judged to be authentic in both official and unofficial quarters.

Aside from charging conservatives with co-responsibility for the present crisis, Dr. Kriegel said the invasion violated the Soviet Union's definition of aggression submitted as an adjunct to the United Nations Charter.

He said also that the Czechoslovak question, which the pro-Soviet leadership here wants to keep off the agenda of the Moscow conference of Communist parties, which opens Thursday, was highly pertinent and should be discussed there.

"Our delegates and the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ask other parties not to deal with the August events in the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]," the text said, "it even uses the words 'the so-called Czechoslovak events.' Is someone trying to say that August, 1968, was no event at all?"

Dr. Kriegel, 61, who fought against Franco in Spain and later against Hitler, was one of those members of deposed Party Chief Alexander Dubcek's Presidium seized by Soviet troops on the night of Aug. 20. He is something of a national hero. The Soviet authorities released him on the demand of President Ludvik Svoboda.

Dr. Kriegel, who is Jewish, was the target of "anti-Zionist" propaganda in the orthodox Eastern European press

last year. He was the first to be forced off the Dubcek leadership team. He now heads a Prague hospital.

Among those he said were responsible for present problems were former Premier Josef Lenart, former Deputy Premier Otokar Simunek and Jiri Hendrych, a protege of discredited Party leader Antonin Novotny. Kriegel indicated that all were responsible for the present situation.

In the past few weeks, a large number of Party officials from the Novotny era have returned to high posts.

According to observers, the Kriegel speech sent the plenum into turmoil, shocked the leadership and forced an adjournment. It occurred just at the moment when Party chiefs were laying down a new policy forbidding criticism of Party actions before or after they are taken.

After meeting privately for a few minutes, the 11-man ruling Presidium returned and Husak, reportedly furious, announced that Kriegel's ouster, not only from the Central Committee, but also from the Party, had been proposed.

Though some remaining moderates thought the speech would rally support against the conservative deluge, only 23 voted against the Kriegel expulsion and 18 abstained. The Party body has more than 180 members.

Shortly afterwards five more liberals were expelled from the Central Committee.

The next day, in a nationwide television speech, Husak bitterly ridiculed Kriegel, saying, "We will not kill anybody . . . but neither will we Kriegel them . . ."

# Czech's Valedictory: 'Leaders Isolated'

Following is the text of the speech purportedly given by Dr. Frantisek Kriegel before the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party last Friday immediately before his ouster from the Committee and from the Party after 38 years:

Comrades: Today's meeting of the Central Committee will consider that several comrades be dropped from the Central Committee, and I among them. This is because I voted against the treaty for the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of our republic. Through this I exceeded Party discipline.

First, I would like to make a few comments. The suggestion says nothing about which body decided this treaty, and so far as I know it was not a formal decision taken at the meeting of the Party's parliamentary caucus.

I would like the Presidium to explain this aspect.

Furthermore I would like to call the attention of the Central Committee to the fact that until now no one has been dismissed from the Central Committee who had direct responsibility or was primarily responsible for the fact that dozens of innocent people met an unworthy death at the hands of the hangman; that thousands and tens of thousands were condemned to long years of torture and prison on the basis of their accusations, and many of them met their end in prison without ever having seen the light of freedom.

#### Stresses Responsibility

Until now, likewise, no one has been removed from the Central Committee for his responsibility for the protracted economic crisis which has led us to the present situation, and which cannot be altered by palming off the causes on the last few months of last year.

We can take one sphere after another from our economic and social life and ask who is responsible, who carries the coresponsibility, for the present unhappy situation.

It is no secret that here in this room there sit a number of members who for years held responsible leading positions in our public life, and they cannot avoid the responsibility, or at least the coresponsibility, for all the things which our public is so angrily criticizing today.

I heard with interest Comrade Krajcir's (former Trade Minister and protege of the former Party leader Antonin Novotny) comments yesterday. I was confounded by his short memory. In the documents of the Central Committee the critical economic situation is mentioned. Does Comrade Krajcir believe that he "ministered" for 20 years, that he was vice premier and for year after year a member of the Central Committee without sharing responsibility for the crisis.

#### Names Comrades

Present also are Comrades Hendrych, Simunek, Lenart and many other former functionaries who led this country for years. Don't these people have responsibility for the present situation?

Comrade Hendrych was for years the second—and through his activity and influence practically the first—man in this state. Has he no responsibility?

To load all this on the post-January period is much too transparent a maneuver. There are attempts to shift responsibility onto other people, but these can't succeed. There is too little time for me to talk of large problems, but everyone knows what I am talking about.

Of course, tough sanctions are conversely demanded against opponents of the

treaty for temporary stationing of troops in the CSSR. It is known that I refused to sign the so-called Moscow Protocol.

#### Explains Opposition

I refused because I saw in it a document which completely bound the hands of our republic. I refused it, therefore, since everything happened in the atmosphere of military occupation without the benefit of consultation with constitutional bodies and in contradiction to the feelings of the people of this country.

Then when the treaty was presented to the National Assembly for ratification, I voted against it, as this treaty was in contradiction to the principles of international coexistence and to the tenets of the Warsaw Pact.

The treaty lacks specifically the basis of a normal agreement; that is, that it be signed voluntarily. The treaty was signed in an atmosphere of political and power coercion under circumstances opposed to principles of coexistence of socialist people and international documents.

#### Forced to Sign

It was signed in the presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign troops and a huge military-technical arsenal. The treaty was not signed with pens, but with the muzzles of cannons and machine guns.

In this connection let us cite the Soviet Union's definition of aggression, which it recently presented to the United Nations. It says, "An armed aggression, direct or indirect, is the employment of the armed power of the initiator state against another state, in contradiction to goals, principles and regulations of the U.N. Charter. Such acts, insofar as the initiator state carries them through without a declaration of war, are an armed aggression."

To these acts belong "bombardments or shootings on the territory of the people of another state."

I voted against the treaty as deputy (of the Federal National Assembly) in unison with feelings and wishes of the vast majority of the electors and citizens of this country.

#### Occupation Opposed

Apart from this, we know that the military occupation of the CSSR was rejected by some significant Communist parties which are in power, and many Communist parties in capitalist countries, including the most important.

We know that even the congresses of several Parties, for example the Italians, condemned the occupation of the CSSR by the troops of the Warsaw Pact. No one can lie about the fact that the military occupation severely damaged international communism in the eyes of the world public, and proved that the socialist countries were incapable of solving their disagreements on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

#### Sees NATO Strengthened

It characterized the picture of the inner contradictions of the Communist movement, which are so manifest in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and which do conflict, and demonstrated the disunity of views between several members of the Warsaw Pact and a large number of outside Communist parties.

The occupation by Warsaw Pact troops undoubtedly slowed the disintegration tendencies in NATO and actually strengthened the influence of the United States of America in NATO. In this connection allow me to make several comments on the document prepared for the Moscow conference of world Communist parties.

• Our delegates and the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ask other parties not to deal with the August events in the CSSR. It even uses the words "the so-called Czechoslovak events." Is someone trying to say that August, 1968, was no event at all?

In the draft proposal for the Moscow conference it was said that the development of socialism in one country is a matter for the whole movement. If this is so, then one cannot forbid other parties to express their views on the August events in the CSSR.

It is incumbent upon the entire international movement that it adopt a definite stand assuring against a repetition of the events in the CSSR.

**Beyond Czechoslovakia**

This is not just a Czechoslovak affair. It is true it concerns us first, but it also concerns principles—of the right of one or several countries to exploit their advantage as stronger powers to coerce the weaker—and in this the August events exceeded the realm of Czechoslovakia.

The problem exceeds the borders of our country. It is not by chance that Paragraphs 13 and 47, Chapter IV, of the proposed document for the Moscow negotiations are so formulated to

read: "The participants of the consultations confirm the unity of their views on the point that the basis of mutual relations between fraternal parties are proletarian internationalism, solidarity and mutual support, respect for independence and equality, mutual noninterference in internal affairs. The principle of the maintenance of these principles is an important condition for the development of comradely cooperation between the brotherly Parties, for the consolidation of unity of the Communist movement."

It would be just as appropriate to cite a few more of these clauses from the document, but I will limit myself to this one quote.

**Ouster Unjustified**

In connection with the suggestion for my removal from the plenary I would like to say this:

I consider the proposal unjustified. The goal is transparent and aimed further than my person. It is well known that the developments of the recent months and weeks have raised fear and doubt despite explanations that we will fulfill the post-January

policy. The series of decisions by lower Party organs, the reconstruction of the Party apparatus, the tough purge which is being carried out in various institutions

and in the apparatus, extend past January, 1968.

**Isolated From People**

They mean a wide-reaching restoration process of efforts to legalize August. Only experiences can convince the people. For the moment, however, I assume the negative echo of the people, the Party and the non-Party groups are no secret to leaders in Party and government.

The tempo is quickening to the point where the Party is isolated from the people, the leadership is isolated from the Party members, so that the Party changes from a moral and political leading force to an institution which is almost exclusively a power organization.

Inasmuch as my Party discipline goes, comrades, I have proved myself to you after 38 years of Party membership, under circumstances historically and personally very complicated.

I don't accept the charge of violating discipline and I do not agree with the proposal for my dismissal. I have stated my position so that no further errors are made by those in this room who far too often have raised their hands in approval mistakenly.

The history of the past two decades is rich in its warnings of tragic experiences.

New York Times  
3 June 1969

**Prague Concedes Opposition to Its Soviet Policy**

CPYRIGHT BY PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, June 2—The Czechoslovak Communist party conceded today that last week's pro-Moscow policy shift, resulting in a purge of liberals was meeting with opposition in local units.

The party reported some differences of views in the Prague city organization, which is headed by a well-known progressive Communist, Bohumil Simon.

However, the top leadership made it plain that party discipline would be sternly enforced on regional and local levels through what is officially termed "democratic centralism," meaning dominance by national headquarters and its apparatus over the rank and file.

Party officials and members at large who failed to endorse the pro-Soviet line face censure or expulsion, which is how the Central Committee dealt with dissenters in its midst last week.

**Committee's Acts Hailed**

The Central Committee's example, the main party newspaper, Rude Pravo, declared today, is to be followed by officials on all lower levels of the party leadership. These officials, the paper said are expected to restore the party's life on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles as soon as possible, and to act as resolutely as the supreme party body" and in accordance with Communist principles.

Meanwhile, the central party apparatus was understood to have started today at least three investigations of developments before and after the Soviet-led invasion last August.

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One inquiry was into the activities of two Central Committee members, Gen. Vaclav Prchlik and Milan Hubl.

General Prchlik, who was in charge of the Communist party's security services, caused irritation in Moscow when he publicly advocated a reorganization of the Warsaw Pact alliance last July, charging that it was dominated by Soviet military leaders.

#### Still on Central Committee

Under Soviet pressure, General Prchlik was removed from his sensitive post three weeks before the invasion. He has remained a Central Committee member.

Mr. Hubl has been in charge of the central school for party officials.

Another party inquiry concerns the involvement of party members in the document "2,000 Words," a manifesto that appeared last June. It urged more rapid progress in the liberalization movement. Central Committee members who signed the document were reprimanded or expelled last week.

The third investigation examines the activities of Government members who were abroad during the invasion and failed to return home at once. Foremost among them is former Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, a Central Committee member. Former Vice Premier Ota Sik, who also was abroad last August, was expelled from the Central Committee last Friday.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 May 1969

## PRO-SOVIET RALLY BARRED IN PRAGUE

### Longshoremen Seize a Hall to Prevent Meeting

CPYRGHT

By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, May 28 — Longshoremen occupied a union hall in the northern outskirts of Prague tonight to prevent a planned pro-Soviet rally.

About 150 would-be participants in the meeting, scheduled to commemorate Czechoslovakia's liberation by Soviet forces in World War II, milled in front of the two-story union hall and then reboarded five buses that had brought them to the hall.

Some of the frustrated visitors looked as if they had been brought in from the country. They included middle-aged women, one carrying a bunch of red flowers, which she took away with her.

#### Jeering by Workers

There was some jeering from workers inside the hall who crowded the windows. Later a scuffle flared in front of the hall, but was quickly broken up by four policemen who seized a young man and took him away in a radio car.

Only 20 uniformed policemen guarded the area in the Liben district around a shipyard on the Vltava River that builds dredges and river craft.

Persons outside the hall said that the workers would not allow the meeting to be held because they had not been previously informed of it.

When an American newsman tried to enter the hall, a man in plainclothes told union personnel that no outsider must be admitted because of the danger of "provocation."

The incident at the shipyard followed a Communist party warning against "anti-Soviet hysteria, one of the most dangerous forms of antisocialism."

#### Public Support Urged

The party appealed also for support of the security police against espionage and crime.

The appeal was contained in a report from a session of the party committee of the Interior Ministry. A resolution praised members of the Interior Ministry who "defended Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, socialist patriotism and friendship with the Soviet Union" last August, only to be unjustly slandered.

The Czechoslovak radio apologized on Monday to policemen it said it had slandered when they were denounced as collaborators and traitors last August. The party resolution from the Ministry of Interior declared that this apology had come very late and was hardly sufficient.

The public assertiveness of the security services came on the eve of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee tomorrow that is expected to mark a hardening of the position of the Prague regime.

The new party head, Dr. Gustav Husak, is scheduled to give the main report at the meeting, the first to be held since he succeeded Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary on April 17.

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 June 1969

## FLOOD OF LETTERS WORRYING PRAGUE

Party Assails Campaign to  
Circulate Liberal Views

BY PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, June 16 — The

Czechoslovak Communist party showed concern today over the letter writing campaign that is going on as a way of registering opposition to the new conservative pro-Moscow regime.

Rude Pravo, the main party newspaper, acknowledged that it was receiving a spate of anonymous mail "full of anti-socialist poison and anger."

Most of these messages, the newspaper said, gloomily predicted the return to conditions prevailing before January, 1968, meaning the era of former President Antonin Novotny, "or even the nineteen-fifties," the years when Stalinist terror was lingering on in Czechoslovakia longer than in most other Communist countries.

Rude Pravo challenged the senders of such letters to sign them "if they think they are right."

Foreign embassies and many domestic agencies, offices, enterprises and private individuals also are known to be recipients of a flood of political messages expressing criticism of the present party leadership. Not all of this material is anonymous.

### Speeches Reproduced

Many of these letters reproduce opposition speeches by liberal Communists that the controlled party press fails to publish.

It is hard to determine how widely this semiclandestine literature is being circulated, but longtime residents with a large circle of acquaintances affirm that it is reaching the majority of the active population, especially young people.

To speak of the underground press at this stage would be an exaggeration. Most of the opposition material in circulation is typewritten with many carbon copies on onion-skin paper, some mimeographed. Very little is printed.

The political dissidence includes caustic poetry, black humor and taped "resistance songs" by local folk artists.

Trustworthy informants report that the political letters are being openly read and discussed by groups of workers in factory canteens during lunch or beer breaks.

The central leadership of the metalworkers union urged members last Saturday to dissociate themselves from "seditious" opposition pamphlets that it said were being illegally circulated in industrial plants.



HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Helsinki  
5 June 1969

Pravda:

Oikeisto taktikoi  
SDP:n kokouksessa

Moskova, 4. 6. (STT) Neuvostoliiton kommunistipuolueen äänenkannattaja Pravda ilmoitti keskiviikkona lyhyesti Suomen sosialidemokraattisen puolueen tulevasta puoluekokouksesta. Lehti tyytyi enimmältä osalta lainaamaan Päivän Sanomia. Ainoa kommentti sisältyi kirjoituksen otsikkoon "Oikeisto taktikoi".

Pravda viittasi suomalaisiin lehdistä ja totesi, että puoluekokouksen täytyy antaa vastaus kysymykseen, jatkavako sosialidemokraatit joitakin vuosia sitten aloitettua myönteistä kehitystä vai omistuuako puolueen oikeistosiiven estää se.

Kirjoituksessa todettiin Päivän Sanomia lainaten, ettei oikeistosiipi, johon kuuluvat Burman, Pitsinki, Karkinen, Korvenheimo, Wuokko, Puntila, Piimies jne., "epäri mennä sille kommunismin ja Neuvostoliiton vastaiselle linjalle, jota puolue seurasi kaikille tutun Tannerin johdolla". Oikeistopiirit yrittävät nyt saada oman miehensä puoluesihteerin paikalle ja toivovat lisäksi voivansa aiheuttaa Rafael Paasion eron, sanottiin kirjoituksessa.

Otsikkoa lukuunottamatta ei kirjoitukseen sisällynyt Pravdan omia kommentteja.

(Translation)

CPYRGHT

PRAVDA: "RIGHTIST TACTICS AT THE SDP CONGRESS."

Moscow, 4 June (STT [Finnish News Service]). Pravda, organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made a brief announcement Wednesday, 4 April concerning the Finnish Social Democratic Party congress. The newspaper was content for the most part to follow from Paivan Sanomat. The only commentary was contained in the headline for the article: "Rightist Tactics."

Pravda referred to Finnish newspaper statements and affirmed that the Congress will have to give an answer to the question: "Will the Social Democrats continue the favorable development started a few weeks ago or will the right wing of the party succeed in preventing this development?"

Borrowing from Paivan Sanomat, the article declared that the right wing, which includes Burman, Pitsinki, Karkinen, Korvenheimo, Wuokko, Puntila, Piimies, etc., "will not hesitate to embark on the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet line which the party followed under the leadership of the notorious Tanner." The article continued: "Right-wing circles will now try to get their own man into the post of party secretary. They also hope to remove Rafael Paasio from his post."

Apart from the headline, the article did not contain any of Pravda's own comments.

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July 1969

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES THREATENED IN PERU

The recent arrests and deportation of Peruvian journalists and politicians who have criticized the regime have led to mounting protests against the government for measures it has taken to eliminate such criticism and thereby failing not only to uphold the basic principle of freedom of the press, but also failing to respect the constitutional guarantees of civil liberties.

The incident which aroused the most furor, both within Peru and elsewhere, was the arrest and deportation of Enrique Zileri Gibson, publisher of the biweekly magazine Caretas. Zileri was arrested, reportedly by about twenty plainclothes policemen, on 24 May, the day after the 23 May - 12 June issue of his magazine appeared on the newsstands. Copies of the magazine were removed from the stands the day of his arrest, and further sales of that edition were prohibited. It carried a rumor that had circulated in Lima for more than two weeks that the military rulers had secretly authorized a thirty per cent pay raise for the armed forces. Also, Zileri had criticized a recently published law, by which certain senior military officers could be "encouraged" to retire early and thereby create vacancies for younger officers, on the basis that the government could use this as a means of getting rid of its opponents within the armed forces.

Zileri was held incommunicado overnight and put aboard a flight to Lisbon the following morning, reportedly without luggage, money or personal papers. On his arrival in Lisbon, he claimed he had not even been questioned, nor had he been given the "slightest explanation" for his deportation. In a later press statement, issued in Madrid, Zileri denied the charges of conspiracy made against him by the Peruvian Government and dismissed the far-fetched claim of the Minister of Interior, General Armando Artola Azcarate, that he and Manuel Ulloa, the exiled owner of the Lima paper Correo and former Finance Minister, were involved in a conspiracy to bring about war between Peru and Chile.

Zileri had been arrested once before, and his magazine was forced to cease publication for a brief period. On that occasion the local journalists' union staged a one-day sympathy strike and protest march against the Velasco government's action. More recently the military regime issued warnings to journalists against reporting on differences or divisions among the ruling military officials. The warnings were formally rejected by the Peruvian Journalists' Federation as a "threat to freedom of speech and attempts to place the will of the military junta over and above the provisions of the nation's Constitution and the press law." The organization then reaffirmed its decision to defend freedom of speech and stressed that freedom of the press is an "attainment older and nobler than any government."

The Interior Ministry has tried to justify the Zileri expulsion on the basis of national interest and in defense of national sovereignty and dignity. The Ministry has been supported in its stand by the Cabinet, which has taken

July 1969

the view that Zileri's expulsion must be considered within a political rather than a juridical context, and therefore the government is obliged to defend the "high national interests of the country."

The government's stand has served only to stir the press to further attacks, and to arouse protest from numerous groups and organizations against the blatant violation of press freedom and of constitutional guarantees. The Federation of Peruvian Journalists has charged that the Minister of Interior has criminally abused his authority and should be suspended. The Inter American Press Association (IAPA) cabled Velasco that it was "shocked" by the deportation of Zileri. Claiming that this action constitutes a violation of freedom of the press, the IAPA expressed hope Velasco would use his "good offices" to bring about the return of Zileri and to ensure that "this basic freedom is observed" in Peru. In addition the IAPA referred indirectly to the situation in a statement it issued to mark Freedom of the Press Day (attached).

On 10 and 11 June security police raided the printing plant of Caretas and confiscated about 30,000 copies of the magazine that were to appear on the newsstands on 12 June. Lima newspapers, including the pro-government El Comercio, carried editorials deploring the government's action, and the Peruvian Federation of Journalists denounced it as "an arbitrary measure...to censure the press." In addition, the national federation, together with the Lima journalists' organization, declared that Peruvian newsmen will hold staggered strikes throughout the country "as the beginning of a movement of protest and struggle against repeated violations of freedom of the press."

An interesting and ironic sidelight in the Zileri case is that his mother, who is co-editor of Caretas, asked Alberto Ruiz Eldridge, President of the Lima College of Lawyers (which formally condemned Zileri's deportation), and legal advisor to the Velasco government, to represent Zileri in bringing a writ of habeas corpus before the local courts. Ruiz Eldridge rejected the request, saying that Zileri's case was of no concern to him or to the bar association.

In a similar suit brought on behalf of Jose Maria de la Jara, Secretary-General of the Popular Action Party, and Eudocio Ravines, a TV commentator, both of whom were deported last February, the Peruvian courts ruled their deportation was unconstitutional, and indicated they should be permitted to return. Yet the press has reported that police officials at the Lima airport have been instructed to prevent de la Jara from leaving the plane, should he return, and de la Jara stated in Buenos Aires that the airlines have refused to sell him a ticket to return to Peru. These reports thus contradict a recent statement made by the Prime Minister, General Montagne, that both individuals are free to return. The Lima newspaper Expreso has pointed out that if these persons are not permitted to return, this will demonstrate that the judiciary cannot assure that the junta will respect its decisions.

There have been rumors that the junta is ready to issue decrees which will limit freedom of the press and ban political activity, but the strong protests against its actions to date may have delayed this action.

ANSA, Buenos Aires (in Spanish)  
12 JUNE 1969

CPYRGHT

NEWSMEN'S STRIKE

Lima, 12 June--Peruvian newsmen will hold staggered strikes throughout the country "as the beginning of a movement of protest and struggle against repeated violations of freedom of the press." The decision was made by the Federation of Journalists of Peru (FPP) and the Federated Center of Journalists (CFP) of Lima. The strikes will begin on 14 June.

A joint communique released by the two federations states that "whereas the investigative police at the service of the Interior Ministry raided the press shop of the magazine CARETAS, confiscating a whole issue of the magazine and assailed newsmen while they were performing their jobs, thereby engaging in another grave attack on freedom of the press and reaffirming the inadmissible policy of flagrantly violating the constitution, they resolve:

"To hold staggered strikes throughout the country starting on 14 June as the beginning of a movement of protest and struggle against repeated violations of freedom of the press.

"To denounce the violations of freedom of the press by the military government to the UN Human Rights Commission and the labor organizations throughout the continent.

"To demand the immediate return of the confiscated edition of CARETAS magazine and the elimination of all coercive measures against that magazine and journalism in general.

"To declare the executive committees of the FPP and the CFP of Lima in permanent session with the participation of the permanent advisory council."

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
9 June 1969

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT Strangled Press

most invidious repression of all. As one Brazilian editor told IAPA: "With self-censorship you never know what they will object to until after the paper comes out. If they find something they don't like, then they can seize the paper, arrest the editor, or both."

EACH June, the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), an organization of about 1,000 newspapers and magazines, commemorates "Freedom of the Press Day." This year, tragically, finds a near record number of publications in Latin America being strangled by totalitarian governments.

"We are all aware," IAPA President Agustin E. Edwards notes, "that the Americas are going thru one of the most restrictive periods in its history as far as the fundamental freedom of the press is concerned."

The main reason for Latin press censorship is a resurgence of militarism. Eleven countries south of the border today live under military rule, and almost all suppress freedom of information with techniques ranging from the rapier to the sledgehammer.

In a few countries, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay among them, the military governments have imposed a self-censorship on newspapers — perhaps the

There is a paradox in press suppression by the Latin military. As Mr. Edwards (himself the editor of the leading newspaper in democratic Chile) points out: "Military regimes profess to be guarding their countries against Communism, and yet their tactics have all been too typical of the methods of the Communists."

While "Freedom of the Press Day" is a time to deplore events in Latin America, it also provides a chance to cheer the press freedom which we enjoy, cherish and guard in North America. IAPA's words are appropriate:

"Humanity has demonstrated that no power on earth can destroy man's capacity to criticize and dissent. It is the proud claim of the newspapers of the democratic world that we provide a real, useful and purposeful development of this noble capacity."

**SOCIEDAD INTERAMERICANA DE IMPRESA**  
**INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION**  
**SOCIEDADE INTERAMERICANA DE IMPRENSA**

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May 23, 1969

PRESS RELEASE

For publication in AM's of Saturday, June 7

A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT AGUSTIN E. EDWARDS OF THE INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION  
ON THE OCCASION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS DAY, JUNE 7

As President of the Inter American Press Association I hereby call on the

1,000 members in this hemisphere and on others who believe in democratic civilization to condemn all governments which curtail their citizens' right to know what is going on in their own countries and in the world.

I call on this great community of newspapers and magazines to condemn, too, all governments which threaten and harass information media, and to condemn utterly the governments of Cuba and Haiti for their destruction of this fundamental human right, the right to know.

We condemn the actions of these governments in the full knowledge that the men in power are often representatives of the armed forces who seized control in the sincere belief that they could serve their countries only in this way. They believe also with equal sincerity that they have a right and a duty to select and censor any information made available to their fellow citizens.

It is our duty equally to combat with all our strength this misguided claim to the possession of truth, which all history has shown will lead to greater outrage and upheaval than any which these governments were formed to prevent.

It is our obligation to keep vividly alive in all our peoples an awareness of their absolute right to know what is happening to their countries and to

that the governments of our hemisphere will touch it only at the cost of outraging all public feeling.

In establishing ourselves as the vigilant and forceful guardians of one of the fundamental rights of all our citizens, the news media of this hemisphere undertake a duty which binds us to scrutinize the purity of our motives and the honesty of our actions. We can condemn and protest only if we can demonstrate publicly and constantly that we truly serve the great function of transmitting accurate information.

Events of the past few months in some Latin American countries show how urgent it is that by our example we must win and maintain the support of all our peoples in our struggle to transmit information to them and in our defense of their right to receive it.

The experience of these few months has taught us once again the fatal danger of complacency, of compromise and of relaxation in our duty and our function to be real servants of our readers. For it is only with their convinced support, only by an evidently honest striving to represent their interests and aspirations, that we can claim the right to condemn and protest any attack upon our service to them.

Humanity has demonstrated throughout its course that no power on earth can destroy man's capacity to criticize and dissent. It is the proud claim of the newspapers of the democratic world that we provide a reasonably efficient mechanism for the useful and purposeful development of this noble capacity.

In full and humble awareness of our function, and despite the imperfections which we must strive to remove from our fulfillment of it, we demand the right to inform, to criticize and to dissent.

Because of the alarming events of these last few months we today address this demand particularly to those governments which, professing the political ideals by which the great majority of our peoples live, have arrogantly claimed for themselves the sole possession of truth.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

July 1969

THE ILLUSORY "MIRACLE" OF EAST GERMANY'S ECONOMY

Late last year an East German from Dresden summed up the feelings of many when he wrote to the local paper saying he saw no need for the country to "climb to the top heights" in world economic competition. "We have really worked hard and accomplished much in our republic," the letter said. "Why can't we have a little peace and quiet now?". This same divergence of opinion between the leaders and those being led has typified attitudes about the East German economy ever since the Soviet Union granted East Germany the rights of "autonomous republic" in October 1949.

Impressive as it may seem that the republic of East Germany boasts of being the world's tenth industrial power, that she can claim an average annual growth rate of nearly six percent since 1949 -- most of this apparent economic burgeoning fails to reflect any real improvement in her economy. It is true that in twenty years the "German Democratic Republic" has staged a dramatic recovery from wartime devastation and has overcome many of the disadvantages of partition. But, when analyzed, the accomplishment of "recovery" fails to live up to the "East German economic miracle" that has been touted by most commentators in the East and by many in the West.

Inflation and Inflexibility

Once started, the postwar recovery process was rapid: GNP grew at seven percent per year, industry at eleven percent, and agriculture at three percent. By 1956, most sectors of the East German economy had reached their prewar levels.

It was in the late 1950's that the biggest problems which were to plague the economy throughout the 1960's made their appearance: while production rose steadily, quality failed to improve. Complaints about poor design, shoddy materials, and sloppy workmanship of East German products came from both foreign and domestic customers. Inventories of unsalable end products and unsuitable raw materials began to grow. At home, signs of inflation appeared as incomes went unabsorbed by increased purchases. In foreign trade, the unsalability of export items created problems in financing the equipment imports needed to maintain industrial production, resulting in a strained balance-of-payments situation for East Germany. Manpower loss to West Germany grew and the regime's pressure for agricultural collectivization hastened the movement of farm labor to the cities and restricted agricultural production.

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### Crisis and Reform

Obsessed with competing with West Germany's economic growth, the Ulbricht regime ignored the advice of East German economists about the growing signs of trouble and launched an ambitious long-range development plan. The period was to be 1958 to 1965 and the goal was to be "to overtake and surpass" West Germany in all areas of consumption. The Plan did not succeed. By 1961 the economy was strained to the breaking point and the labor exodus had reached an intolerable level.

The "Berlin Wall" gave the regime a breathing space. It temporarily halted the stream of refugees to the West. The regime also felt secure enough, bolstered by an additional 50,000 combat troops, to instigate some unpopular measures such as raising prices and reducing incomes so as to halt the inflationary spiral. More important, the long-term plan was abandoned and with it went many unrealistic investment plans, and the construction sector was told to concentrate on finishing a very large number of incomplete projects.

Nevertheless, the basic need was unchanged: to improve quality and efficiency in an industrialized economy that was short of labor and dependent on foreign trade. East German economists had long argued for replacing the rigid Stalinist system of detailed central planning with a system that would give individual producers greater freedom and initiative. The crisis of 1961-1962 made these ideas more attractive even to the Ulbricht regime, whose leaders knew that decentralization could threaten their absolute political control.

East German Planning Commission Chief Erich Apel, an ambitious man who was untainted by "dangerous idealism," convinced the leadership that a modified program designed to restore some confidence among the disaffected managerial and technical elite could benefit East Germany without undermining the Ulbricht regime's authority. The result was the much-vaunted NES ("new economic system" of planning and management), announced in July 1963. It sounded good, and perhaps if all features of the NES had been put into effect and allowed to operate for a number of years, the East German economy might have become more efficient and modern. In fact, however, many features never got beyond the discussion stage, others were applied only experimentally, and most were modified to suit Ulbricht's need for administrative reshuffling without any dilution of political controls.

The final blow to the NES came as the long-term-plan goals for 1965 to 1970 were firmed up by an agreement with the Soviet Union. An economic policy which emphasized improved efficiency (at the cost of stressing continued rapid growth) would only have been possible if the USSR had agreed to reduce its import demands, to maintain its level of exports to East Germany, to reschedule East German debts, and to extend credits on an unprecedented basis. The Soviets, tired of East German demands for credit, concerned about their unprofitable raw material exports to East Germany, and involved in their own domestic tensions and economic debates, refused. In his office in East Berlin Erich Apel shot himself on the day the longterm agreement was signed with the

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

USSR. All momentum for major economic reforms went with him. E. Germany agreed to continue to reserve 50 percent of its exports for the USSR and to deliver some 300 merchant ships to the Soviet Union at prices 30 percent below what Western buyers would have paid. The USSR agreed to supply oil, iron ore, and other raw materials - at prices well above the world market.

#### Trying for a New Look

The NES was not formally abandoned; it was renamed the "economic system of socialism." A new approach was tried with foreign trade, the last area about which East German economists were optimistic after 1965. The hope was, partly through joint East-West industrial ventures, to increase trade with the West in order to bring to East German industry the more advanced technology and the modern equipment available only in the West. Again, East Germany failed to make the grade as a competitive producer in Western markets and was unable to finance its large increase in imports -- mainly machinery and equipment bought on credit -- thereby creating new pressures on the balance of payments.

The last chance for meaningful reform disappeared with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The consequences of Czechoslovakia's interest in expanded trade with the West showed that the political liabilities of such ventures were prohibitive. All talk in 1969 has been of strengthening ties with the East bloc and trade with Western countries is reported at a standstill. Plans for joint East-West projects have faded and, conversely, East German-Bloc trade agreements for 1969 include greatly increased exchanges of machinery and equipment. However, East European machinery is still rated as obsolete and of inferior quality and expansion of this trade cannot be expected to provide the needed resources for further rapid development of East German technology.

#### Persistent Problems

Probably the sole accomplishment of the NES was that it succeeded in diverting the attention of the public from the regime's economic failures. For the first time, the technical and managerial elite thought the government was listening and the populace began to take pride in some of East Germany's economic achievements. However, the old problems of labor shortages, inventories of unsalable products, increasing consumer prices, and inflationary pressures persist.

The regime may believe that as long as no attempt is made to force rapid growth, these problems can be controlled. However, for 1969, and indeed for a period up to 1975, the regime has disclosed plans under which production in some fields is to rise by 16 percent each year. The brunt of this endeavor will be borne by the East German worker and there has recently been evidence of new grumbling and dissatisfaction among the population of 17 million. At the end of 1968 the East German government was telling the populace that they could not expect a reduction in high consumer prices. At the same time, the regime's party newspapers were issuing warnings against attitudes of "paralyzing self-indulgence, indifference, and resignation" among the people.

CPYRGHT

THE REPORTER  
11 August 1966

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## East Germany: The Prosperous Prisoner

CPYRGHT


WELLES HANGEN

### Death of a Planner

The apostles of East Germany's new economic system must still contend with the old "tonnage ideology"—the cult of producing the heaviest possible products for the sake of fulfilling arbitrary plan targets, regardless of cost or marketability. They must also fight politically motivated interference, especially from Moscow.

That this battle is by no means won is shown by the fate of the man generally regarded as the father of East Germany's economic reforms, the late Erich Apel. Like his fellow technocrats in the GDR, Apel was an engineer first and a party member second. In fact, he did not even deem it necessary to join the SED until 1957, two years after he had become Minister of Heavy Machine Building and five years after his return from the Soviet Union, where he had spent time in a prisoner-of-war camp and had helped reassemble German plants removed by the Russians for reparations.

When the SED embarked on its economic reforms in 1963 it named Apel, already a candidate member of the Politburo, to be chairman of the State Planning Commission, the top economic job in the country. Two years later on a trip to Moscow with Ulbricht, he refused to sign a



five-year trade agreement harnessing the country's economy to Soviet needs. In the margin of a goods list later smuggled to the West, Apel penciled the percentage overcharge compared to world market prices that East Germany was paying for raw-material imports from Russia: crude oil, 88.3 per cent; diesel fuel, 80 per cent; coal, 83.6 per cent; chrome ore, 113.4 per cent; and pig iron, 86.4 per cent.

Apel's obstinate resistance to Soviet demands caused a crisis in relations between Russia and its once docile German satellite. At the end of November, 1965, Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party chief, flew to East Berlin. He insisted that the draft agreement providing for \$15 billion in trade over the next five years be signed without further delay. Ulbricht was ready to yield but Apel continued to hold out. Finally, on the morning of December 3 the Soviet side issued an ultimatum: sign by 11 A.M. or else. During a recess in the negotiations, Apel's Politburo colleagues told him there was no choice but to comply. A few minutes later the planning chief entered his office, pulled a revolver from his desk drawer, and shot himself. He was forty-eight.

# WHY COMMUNISTS GET TOUGH OVER BERLIN

CPYRGHT

**Ulbricht rides high.** Ulbricht, many experts agree, is currently the toughest anti-Western Communist in Europe. His prestige is at an all-time peak among Communists who want no part of *détente* with the West. Further, Ulbricht's economic record in East Germany is the envy of Communists everywhere—including the Soviet Union.

What Ulbricht has done is to come closer than any other Red leader to making the Communist economic system work, transforming a poverty-stricken postwar "wreck" into the most prosperous Red country in history.

East Germany, like West Germany, is enjoying a genuine boom.

There is no doubt East Germany suffers by comparison with its Western counterpart, but even the experts who hold no brief for the Communist way of doing things are impressed by the Eastern section's climb to industrial power.

These experts now rank East Germany among the world's top 10 industrial giants—and it is still growing.

**Living conditions.** Political repression under Ulbricht remains severe, but there is no doubt the 17 million people in East Germany are sitting on top of the heap in the Communist world.

- Wages have gone up 50 per cent in the last 12 years—to an average of \$170 a month. Prices of basic commodities have remained fairly constant.

- Rents are subsidized and unrealistically cheap. It is possible for an East Berliner to move into an apartment at double his previous rent and still end up paying only \$25 a month.

- A system of subsidies guarantees that prices for food staples stay low.

It is in obtaining what the Communists call "luxury" items that the East German comes off a distant second to his West German counterpart.

Imported foods are sky-high. Cocoa costs \$8 a pound, coffee \$10 a pound.

Electric appliances are staggeringly expensive. A television set costs \$300 or more, a standard washing machine \$300, and a tiny refrigerator \$340.

The private car remains a rarity. Only 10 per cent of families own autos. The wait for a car can drag out for years.

A car buyer has his choice of two East German models: the small Trabant, which costs about \$2,000 and has a three or four-year waiting list, and the Wartburg, which sells for \$3,500 and is obtainable in a much shorter time.

The East Germans' problems in buying autos and appliances are matched by a deep ignorance of Western-style salesmanship. In East Berlin only the shops along the famous boulevard Unter den Linden display any degree of flair or imagination. In the smaller cities there is no real effort to attract customers.

These "drawbacks" in the economy do not alter the facts that national income and industrial production in this country have doubled over the past 12 years. Imports and exports have trebled.

**Back from defeat.** All this has been accomplished in the face of considerable handicaps. Like its Western counterpart, East Germany was badly battered by Allied bombing in World War II. Soviet artillery brought more havoc. Then, when the war was over, the Russians bled the shattered economy for some 20 billion dollars in reparations over the next 10 years.

Take-off point for the East German boom, in the view of many economists, was when the Berlin Wall was erected, August, 1961. Until then, the country had suffered painfully from the exodus of top-quality workers to the West. When the Wall went up, the manpower situation was brutally "stabilized."

Building of the Wall was followed a few years later by the adoption of a series of far-reaching economic reforms. This "new economic system" involved, among other things, decentralization of management and establishment of the profit motive in production.

Since 1964 the East German Communists have pioneered in these capitalist innovations with growing good fortune. Bureaucrats still call the shots in most factories turning out heavy industrial goods. But there is a surprising amount of freedom given to the men in charge of plants making consumer goods.

Example: A shoe-factory manager is allowed to choose styles and decide how many pairs to make. His competence is determined by sales and profits.

**New mood.** The obvious success of the new economic system has not prevented Communist leaders from reassessing their economic reform in recent months. Behind the thinking:

First, many East German officials were frightened by the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia to halt "liberalization." They noted that economic reform had been an integral part of the Czechs' liberalization program.

Secondly, East Germany's own statistics have turned up "soft spots" in growth. Officials wondered if the capitalist innovations might be responsible.

Economic progress has been consistent, but below planned targets in recent months. National income, supposed to be rising at the rate of 5.4 per cent a year, is not touching 5 per cent. Trade was projected to increase by 7 per cent a year, but is up by only 5 per cent.

Export earnings are held down by a trade pattern that stifles expansion with the West. Forty per cent of East German trade is with Russia, another 35 per cent with other Communist nations.

Prospects for any dramatic increase in trade with the West are dim. Even if "policy wraps" were removed, the quality of East German goods is, by and large, so relatively poor that they cannot compete on the world market.

**Lack of labor.** A big problem for the East Germans, too, is the shortage of manpower. The Berlin Wall sealed off the country, but the present labor force of 7.7 million is smaller than when the Wall went up.

What happened? The death rate is inching upward and the birth rate is dropping. The country is top-heavy with old people. The ratio of men to women is out of proportion—there are 118 women for every 100 men. Women now make up 47 per cent of the work force.

West Germany, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, solved its manpower shortage by absorbing some 1 million foreign workers. But there is no great rush of Poles, Hungarians and other Eastern Europeans into East Germany.

**More housing needed.** One reason Communist workers from other lands hold back is hatred of the Germans—still strong nearly 24 years after the end of World War II. Another reason: There is a shortage in this country of decent living quarters for workers.

In the more than 20 years of its existence, East Germany never has been able to build more than 92,000 housing units in any one year. That is hardly enough.

A real effort is being made in housing construction now, but the finished product is no great lure. Most of the new buildings consist of drab, identical 10-story apartment units standing in unimaginative, soldierlike rows.

Buildings are not all that need more color and cheer. Main streets in East Berlin are in sharp contrast to the traffic-clogged, neon-lighted thoroughfares in West Berlin. At night, the buildings are usually dark and the streets nearly empty. Compared with such Communist cities as Prague and Budapest, East Berlin looks grim.

Outside East Berlin the drabness is even worse. As one woman said recently: "This is the way all war-scarred German cities looked in the late 1940s, before reconstruction started."

**Red capitalists.** A surprising remnant of pre-Communist days in East Germany is the private businessman. The "superorthodox" regime of Ulbricht has permitted close to 800,000 people to go on making a living by operating small, individually owned firms.

These businesses have little impact on the over-all economy. Although some 30 per cent of industrial enterprises are privately owned, they account for only 2 per cent of production and employ but 3 per cent of the labor force.

Still, the small businessman often does surprisingly well, individually. One local baker here is the envy of his neighbors because he owns two cars while most of them are still waiting for delivery of their first.

There also is a change in "fundamental Communist principles" in education. For years it was almost impossible for anyone other than the son of a working-class family to enter an East German university. Now a third of the students come from families officially classified as *intelligenz*—intellectuals to whom university doors used to be closed.

**Toeing the line.** For all these signs of relaxation of tight Communist doctrine, the Ulbricht regime remains one of the most repressive in Eastern Europe.

The press is censored. Intellectuals are kept in line. Protest is swiftly and severely dealt with.

Even the threat of punishment has not erased all dissent. There were open demonstrations protesting the Russian inva-

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... Czechoslovakia students took to the streets in Leipzig to protest demolition of a historic medieval church. There have been murmurings about East Germany's being tied to Moscow's economic apron strings.

Restiveness, it is felt, is on the increase here. But that does not mean rebellion is brewing. Thousands of East Germans revolted in 1953 and Russian tanks crushed the uprising. The Hungarian revolt in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year have reinforced the feeling that Russia will not hesitate to take action to maintain control of Eastern Europe.

So the East Germans, cut off from the democratic and more prosperous Germans of the West, are consoled by this fact: As they push ahead on the industrial front, they continue to lead the Communist world's economic parade.

West Germany, which still does not recognize Ulbricht's government diplomatically, is all in favor of stepping up trade. Economics Minister Karl Schiller last month urged West German businessmen to attend the Leipzig Fair. Bonn later adopted a Schiller proposal

for expanded credit guarantees to West German firms trading with East Germany. Finally, Bonn has put off for a year—until June 30, 1968—the repayment deadline for some \$100 million in trade deficits already owed by East Germany.

No matter how stubborn Ulbricht may seem, his country's westward trade drift is inevitable. At least 30% of East Germany's exports and imports are with Western nations—and of that, one-third is with West Germany. In the wee hours of the morning, even Walter Ulbricht must admit to himself that his country can only benefit by importing the vastly superior, much more varied products put out by the Germany on the other side of the Wall.

TIME  
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17 March 1967

**TRADE**

**Fair Enough**

It may fairly be said that the Leipzig Trade Fair is an annual event—the one now in progress is the 802nd. But this year there is a new sound to the old show: while some 70 nations display their wares, Communists and capitalists alike are clamoring for increased East-West trade. Says Cristina Dimitriu, director of Rumania's exhibit: "We are now interested more in business than in propaganda." Says Poland's Natalia Czaplicka: "We will sell anything to anybody."

About the only sour note was struck by East Germany's intransigent Walter Ulbricht, an old Communist who has yet to come in from the cold. Ulbricht lavished praise on the Soviet Union's exhibit—considered by most Western fairgoers to be Russia's most mediocre in years. And he notably managed to ignore the fair's biggest (and perhaps best) exhibit: that of West Germany.

Ulbricht's next-door unneighborliness was ironic in light of a 20% trade increase last year between the two Germanys. Of \$750 million worth of goods exchanged between the two countries, West German exports, mostly in industrial products, accounted for \$425 million; East German exports, mainly agricultural, textile and mining items, made up the rest.

NEW YORK TIMES,  
13 January 1969

**Catch Up  
with  
Tomorrow**



**LEIPZIG TRADE FAIR**

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

March 2-11, 1969

August 31 - September 7, 1969

NEW YORK TIMES,  
13 January 1969

# West Germans Branch Out

CPYRGHT

By RALPH BLUMENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

BONN — "To invest in India is pretty silly," an executive of one of West Germany's biggest companies remarked recently. "However, not to invest in India is even sillier."

More and more every day, West German businessmen are following this dictum for a range of countries. But, in the opinion of some experts, West German export of capital and know-how still lags far behind the potential.

This movement of advanced West German production units abroad takes many forms. Siemens, A. G., the West German equivalent of International Business Machines, has full ownership or majority control of telecommunications factories and related industry in 100 foreign countries. The units abroad bring in about \$400-million of the company's \$2.2-billion annual sales.

There are many more smaller German concerns that sign agreements with foreign companies to manufacture thousands of other products, from enameled iron bathtubs

to bicycle parts and knitting machines. Some arrangements involve only technical assistance — no money or machinery — from West Germany.

The German motives for such foreign investments are cheaper production, nearness to raw materials and markets and diversification of investment areas.

In 1961, total West German investments abroad were put at just under a billion dollars.

### Investments Triple

At the end of 1967 the figure had more than tripled, to just over \$3-billion. By last June the figure was up to \$3.26-billion.

Seven years ago, West Germans invested \$280-million abroad. In 1967, they invested \$515-million and the 1968 figure is expected to show another healthy increase.

Europe continues to be the main theater of West German foreign investment. Latin America, Canada, the United States, Africa and Asia follow in descending order.

The field is led by the chemical industry, worth nearly

\$500-million. Vehicles, electrical appliances and electronics and iron and steel works follow.

Still, the investments are small when measured against the Bonn Government's economy. According to a confidential study by the Loan Bank for Reconstruction in Frankfurt, investments represented only 0.9 per cent of the value of internal trade last year and 1.4 per cent of the value of exports.

Almost all other highly industrial nations, except Japan, were investing larger shares of their economy abroad.

The Bonn Government — as well as the nations receiving investment — eagerly welcomes the establishment of advanced German production units abroad to build international goodwill and restore German prestige.

More important, perhaps, the long-term foreign investments help cut down West Germany's trade surplus of about \$4-billion a year, which has brought international pressure for an upward valuation of the mark.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE,  
17 March 1969 (Excerpts)

# Germany's pace quickens

CPYRGHT

Germany's growth tempo in the closing months of 1968 accelerated dramatically over the already high rates of the earlier recovery period, with the real Gross National Product in the last quarter exceeding the fourth quarter of 1967 by at least 10.5%. Corresponding percentage gains for industrial production and new orders were, respectively, 13.5% and 18% according to the semiannual Economic Trends Report from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.

This burst of activity carried GNP in constant prices for the year as a whole to a level nearly 7% over 1967, with the growth rate for GNP in current prices

reaching almost 9%. These results take on added significance in light of earlier predictions of 1968 real growth in the 4-5% range. \* \* \*

Even more, the German Government has adopted a policy of actively encouraging imports in order to reduce the persistent balance of payments surplus, a policy which may not be limited to the 4% tax refund on imports discussed above. \* \* \*

German gross private long-term capital exports, at the unprecedented level of nearly \$3 billion in 1968, proved a major unexpected element in keeping



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the amount of payments surplus within bounds. Most of this outflow was in the form of bank loans and deutsche-mark-denominated bonds. Although some slowdown in issuance of such bonds occurred last fall, due to revaluation fears and introduction of a rationing system to prevent overburdening the German capital market, the volume of new foreign issues is again at previously high levels.

So long as the interest rate differential between the German capital market and foreign financial centers remains wide—and with normal business loans available at 6.5%-7.5%, it is at present considerably cheaper to borrow in Germany—a sizable long-term capital export can probably be anticipated again for the current year. \* \* \*

In the context of searching for ways to reduce the German balance of payments surplus, leading Government and banking figures are increasingly urging a serious attempt to stimulate German direct investment abroad. The Government is reportedly preparing a proposal which might involve credits and/or interest subsidies to German firms investing abroad.

The main impulses for the extraordinary 1968 expansion came from industrial investment, which rebounded with unexpected vitality from the 1966-67 recession, and from an export boom far surpassing earlier predictions. Total investment in fixed assets grew by roughly 10%, virtually erasing the losses of the recession, while a massive inventory restocking—\$1.9 billion—was a further major contributor to the upswing.

Although strong domestic demand boosted imports of goods and services by 13% in 1968, exports of goods and services climbed at the same rate, resulting in an unprecedented high net foreign balance on goods and services of \$4.5 billion, exceeding even the \$4 billion recorded in the recession-year 1967.

Private consumption expanded at a more leisurely pace in 1968—5½%—although higher employment and wages resulted in some acceleration toward the end of the year.

A strongly expansive tone will continue to characterize at least the first half of the current year. Production and sales are developing strongly, unemployment remains low by any standards, and industry order books are full. Business confidence, as measured by surveys, is even higher than during the previous 1964-65 boom, and industrialists plan to invest one-fifth more this year than last.

Exceptional activity at the Frankfurt Spring Fair—Germany's largest for consumer goods—augurs well for this sector. Particular strength is also indicated for the chemical industry, electrical equipment, and paper, while iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, automobiles, and rubber should show higher-than-average activity in coming months.

Examples of significant new investment projects planned for 1969 include a \$110 million Volkswagen plant in Salzgitter, two huge nuclear power plants of Siemens and AEG-Telefunken, and large new aluminum smelters in Essen, Hamburg and Dinslaken. Civil engineering and road and subway construction projects, stimulated by continuing high investment at the local government level, should also show strong results this year.

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LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, No. 23

Dakar, November 1967

CPYRGHT

WEST GERMAN - AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS (Excerpts)

Geographic Distribution

A phrase that is often heard when one hears of cooperation between Germany and Africa is "Africa received more German aid per inhabitant than any other continent." If this is true, nevertheless, one must merely look at the other continents and see their size and population density to see that the statement is a gross exaggeration. More closely, we can look at the geographic distribution of the German government and "KW" Bank commitments, a total of 1,243 million DM in 1965, to see that Africa's share has been reduced in favor of Asian and European underdeveloped countries.

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Africa	28%	19%
Latin America	8%	6%
Asia	49%	61%
Europe	10%	14%
Others	5%	

The same evolution can be observed in the domain of technical assistance, where Africa's share has gone from 57.1% to 45.8% in favor of Latin America and Europe. However, these percentages are still impressive. Africa holds great attractions for many Germans, especially the young people. Beyond this, almost all the private aid agencies -- especially the Church groups, began sanitation, health and education projects even before the independence in Africa, so that there is a certain basis of experience and personnel on which the public aid can depend.

There has been much talk in the last two or three years of replacing the "water-spout" policy by one of "centers of gravity," that is, to create centers of development in the various continents and certain regions, concentrate on certain countries so that there is no waste by spreading the capital too thin. An examination of the figures prove, however, that from the beginning of cooperation between Germany and the Third World there have been "centers of gravity," both in the field of credit and in technical assistance. For example, India received 30% of the credits and capital and 10% of the total technical assistance. On the other hand, most of the 29 projects for changing the social structures of countries have taken place in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, and Ghana. Among the 72 underdeveloped countries that receive aid from Germany, 12 have received 53% of the total amount. With regard to the African continent, twelve of the thirty-eight countries tied to the West German Republic by technical assistance treaties get 80% of the funds devoted to this end in that continent.

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The tendency towards concentration continues, but it is difficult to say on what criteria it is based. One can nevertheless state -- and this has to do with capital primarily, but also sometimes involve technical assistance -- that it is the countries that trade most with Germany in the Third World that also get the most technical and monetary assistance. Thus, the UAR, Germany's best partner after the South African Republic, has received, in the form of credit and contributions, an amount equal to 300 million DM. In all, the UAR owes Germany one billion DM, of which 800 million are considered as a pure loss by the West German Government. Tunisia is another country in which there is a lot of German money and several German experts. Germany's investments in Tunisia totals 140 million DM. The projects revolve around improved agricultural production and improved tourism, linking private German investment -- in the form of new hotels, etc. -- to Government money grants and the sending of technical experts. Thus, there are 145 Tunisians studying hostelry in Germany, and there is a hotel school under construction in Bizerte so that the Tunisians can be trained right in their own country.

Morocco can also be considered as a "center of gravity" in Africa. The Federal German Republic has given it credits amounting to 40 million DM to finance a chemical complex in Safi and infrastructure work. Another 50 million DM is to go towards strengthening the tourist trade, and a third donation of 20 million DM has been put at the disposal of the Moroccan Development Bank by a consortium of German banks. In the area of technical assistance, the West German Government sends experts in agricultural machinery, landscapers, specialists in the cultivation of sugar beets, consulting engineers for industrialization, etc. Another African country, Tanzania, almost became another "center of gravity." This was stopped twice: when Tanganyika merged with the ex-German colony of Zanzibar and when the East German Government set up a consulate in Dar-es-Salaam. Since that time, no new projects have been discussed, but the old ones have been carried out routinely. Private and semi-public activity which undertake smaller technical assistance projects, housing projects, etc., were not affected at all.

In West Africa, Togo seems to be the favored one. West Germany gives it long-term credit and other donations with a total value of 110 million DM, including 3.3 billion CFA francs for the construction of the port of Lome. The rest is to finance the establishment of two model villages, an agricultural experimental station, a hygiene institute, a printing factory, seven doctors and nurses, a small fishing fleet, and sixteen agricultural teachers and monitors. Another West African country is also privileged: Guinea. If in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, and even more so in the case of the UAR, aid followed trade, and if in the case of Tanzania and Togo it is a sentimental attachment to the colonial past and the two Presidents -- Nyerere and Sylvanus Olympio --

for Guinea neither reason is valid. Here the German commitment was one of political opportunism and the result of very hard work on the part of German and Guinean diplomats. It was mostly when the USSR failed to fill the void left by France that Germany stepped in. The German projects carried out in Guinea -- in fishing, water for Conakry, radio, the school in Kankan, etc., were all carried out to the satisfaction of both partners. German "military aid" is often cited, though it is criticized in other contexts. In Guinea, German soldiers build roads, improve the communications system, and three "military factories" financed by German money produce clothing, shoes, and machinery. The German specialists are very pleased with their soldier-workmen, and the Guineans are, too.

Another word about the "military aid." Germany has given such aid to the following African countries: Sudan Somali, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, Nigeria, and Tanzania. This aid was violently criticized at the Parliament and in the newspapers; in the case of Sudan, Somali, and Kenya, it is possible that German military aid accentuated the tension among these countries, but it was really on a small scale.

As a whole, the independent countries of Africa receive between 10 million and 100 million DM of foreign aid and technical assistance. Besides the "centers of gravity" already mentioned, one can add on a lesser scale, Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, and Chad; in these infrastructures, projects are more numerous than industrialization projects. Up to now, the Federal Cooperation Ministry, the Federal Statistical Service, and the agencies of the private economy, have not published information on what projects foreign aid is spent, although this was done regarding the Americas. This is not very comprehensible; since the data exist, although scattered around, they would merely have to be gathered together, and the rather large margin of error could be eliminated by an official publication of these data.

#### Private Investment

Published figures on German investment in Africa is done by country and not by economic sectors or branch of activity; this will be changed beginning next year, when the extractive industries will be dealt with independently. The latest figures for the first three months of 1967 show a total figure of 415 million DM that German private industry has invested abroad, with 158 million DM going to the underdeveloped countries. The lion's share went to Libya, where the 62 million DM invested this year show that German investment there has doubled.

The latest statistics published by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry give 666 million DM for the African continent, of which 557 million DM are for the African countries, excluding the Republic of South Africa. This last

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figure is about equal to the German investment in European and Greece -- and is almost double the German investment in Asia. Compared with German investment in Latin America, German investment in Africa does not even equal a third: with 1,787 million DM, the Latin American countries - especially Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru -- have half of the German investments in underdeveloped countries. Africa, without including the South African Republic, gets only one fifth. If Africa receives more foreign aid per inhabitant, it is only in second place as far as investments are concerned, while Latin America is first in this area.

The absence of information on branches of activity makes it difficult to interpret the statistics. It is, however, possible to say that of German investments in the extractive industries, Libya, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guinea, and Nigeria get the most, so that what is left over for the transformation industries is practically nil. Compared to other continents, Africa has not received much investment. Only two countries, Liberia and Nigeria, have received investments totaling 100 million DM. Beyond this, the political regimes in the African countries do not seem to influence the choice of German capitalists in particular; the Ivory Coast, which is known for its political stability in West Germany, was able to attract only 19 million DM, while Sekou Toure's Guinea got 29.4 million. Considerations of economic profits seem to overcome any political feelings of the German private investors.

In order to encourage German investment in underdeveloped countries and to supplement weak or non-existent capital, the Federal Government set up the German Development Society. This organization, though backed by the Federal Budget, operates like a private business. Its capital is 115 million DM. It was able to double its participation during the five years of its existence, reaching 53 million DM, and through it 270 million more were invested. The Society participates directly and indirectly in 100 enterprises, representing a total value of 450 million DM, which shows a capital mobilization ten times as large. Besides financing, the Society also handles marketing, development and management problems, etc., when the countries themselves are not equipped to handle them. The societies created by it and through it, or with its financial backing work in all branches of industry and transformation.

Besides the textile enterprises, the Financial Development Company is charged with creating local industrial units. Three companies of this kind exist in Africa already: in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; together they have 53 projects to carry out. Recently, the German Development Society has entered the hotel business. Seeing the great opportunities for tourism in the underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa, as a source of foreign currency and creator of labor, it formed, with some large hotel companies, tourist agencies and airlines, the German Hotel Association for the Underdeveloped Countries.

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THE ECONOMIST, London  
14 June 1969

Vietnam

CPY The new escalator

It is now clear that the communists have raised their terms for breaking the deadlock in the Vietnam peace talks. Last year, when they were trying to persuade President Johnson to end the bombing of North Vietnam, they seemed to be saying that that act alone would be enough to open the way to serious negotiations for a political settlement. "Things will take a new turn" once the bombing had stopped, said Mr Thuy, North Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris, on October 23rd. More specifically, Mr Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese prime minister, said on August 30th that "to end the war the United States must immediately and unconditionally stop the bombing and . . . recognise the National Liberation Front and enter into discussions with it."

The bombing was stopped at the end of October (though the Americans were wrong in thinking they had got the Vietcong to stop rocketing South Vietnam's towns in return); the NLF was admitted to the table in Paris; and President Thieu of South Vietnam offered, on March 20th, to negotiate directly with it. Yet the peace talks are still stuck in a barren exchange of propaganda. The communists now seem to be saying that a settlement requires the Americans to meet two further conditions. One is the immediate, total and unconditional evacuation of all American troops, with the question of the North Vietnamese army in the south to be settled, according to point three of the NLF's ten-point programme of May 8th, by the (unspecified) "Vietnamese parties." The second is the establishment of a provisional coalition government which, by the look of point five of the NLF's May 8th programme, would exclude members of the present Saigon government. If this bogus coalition, and North Vietnam itself, are meant to be the "Vietnamese parties" that would deal with the question of the North Vietnamese troops, it is not hard to guess what would happen; or rather what would not.

CPYRGHT

Escalation is a word that has been worn thin over the past four years; but it is curious how few people have commented that this is precisely what North Vietnam and the NLF are practising. President Nixon announced on Sunday the withdrawal of 25,000 American troops from Vietnam. On Tuesday the NLF converted itself into a "revolutionary government." Mr Nixon will have to decide how far he can carry unilateral concessions before the other side concludes that it need do nothing except sit and wait for the escalator to carry it into Saigon.

JAPAN TIMES  
10 June 1969

Midway Decision  
Hailed by Khoman

KAWANA, ~~Sirizuka~~ Prof.

(AP)—Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman Monday described U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's Midway troop withdrawal decision as a "gesture to restore peace in Vietnam" and said he hopes North Vietnam will see it that way.

Here for the fourth ministerial conference of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), Khoman said in a prepared statement: "We hope the other side will take this gesture for what it is intended to be, that it is a gesture to restore peace in Vietnam. Thailand supports the move as a peaceful step leading to a settlement of the Vietnam conflict and we earnestly hope the other side will give an appropriate and corresponding response by also removing North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia."

Thailand has 12,000 troops in Vietnam.

THE WASHINGTON POST  
22 June 1969

# Pressure Is on Nixon to End War But the Enemy Refuses to Negotiate

CPYRCHT Chalmers M. Roberts  
Washington Post Staff Writer

## News Analysis

President Nixon demonstrated yesterday just how trapped he is between the Scylla of domestic demand for a quick end to the war and the Charybdis of a Communist enemy which thus far refuses to negotiate on his terms to end the conflict.

He amazed his press conference listeners by a personal attack on former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford. And then he went on to say twice that he hoped to "beat" Clifford's accelerated timetable for withdrawal of American ground forces.

The Clifford program calls for taking out 100,000 men this year. Senate Republicans have been saying they understood that the Nixon program's maximum figure was 70,000 but nobody in the Administration had been talking of withdrawing all ground combat forces by the end of next year.

Indeed, both before and after the recent Midway meeting between Mr. Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thieu, White House sources were stressing the careful and cautious nature of the withdrawal planning.

They stressed that they must move as fast as Thieu's own army can take over the burden but not so fast as to make the Communists think the Administration plans what was termed an elegant bugout.

Just what Hanoi now will think can only be imagined. But the Nixon statement, whether or not it was the result of anger at Clifford, will buttress the argument of those who ask why the Communists should concede anything at the Paris peace talks if the Americans are going to withdraw unilaterally.

It is true, of course, that neither Clifford nor the President was talking about taking out all troops. But many officials fear that such a rapid withdrawal of ground forces, even with remaining American air and logistical support, could lead to massive Communist military gains.

As to the negotiations, Mr. Nixon had nothing encouraging to offer. He said the two sides are still "far apart." The best he could do was to "hope" for "some progress" in the next two to three months.

The President stuck valiantly to Thieu, saying both that the United States can take no action he does not approve and that the United States is not going to accept the Communist demand that Thieu and his chief lieutenants, if not his entire government, be thrown out of office before there are any substantive talks.

That, said Mr. Nixon, would be a "surrender on our part, a defeat" and meant turning South Vietnam over to the North Vietnamese Communists.

The only hopeful note the President could offer was the same one hinted at after the Midway meeting: that Thieu soon "will be making an offer of his own with regard to a political settlement."

For months the Nixon Administration has been pushing Thieu to take more risks in order to reach some compromise political solution with the Communists. Just what the new step will be has not been disclosed but there is some reason to think it will be a broadening of the Thieu government, perhaps including the release from jail some of his non-Communist political enemies.

Meanwhile American military orders will not be altered and the casualties can be expected to continue. The President said that the casu-

alties during the nearly a year Clifford was Defense Secretary were the highest of the war. But the rate since Jan. 20, when Mr. Nixon was sworn in, have not been much lower.

As of now, there is no reason to believe that the Communists will accept any. And Mr. Nixon will be Thieu proposals, old or new, plagued by domestic doves to "beat" the Clifford troop withdrawal proposals.



TIME,  
20 June 1969

CPYRGHT

## How the Troop Decision Was Made

*Even before he won the Republican nomination for President in 1968, Richard Nixon proposed "a fuller enlistment of our Vietnamese allies in their own defense." TIME Washington Bureau Chief Hugh Sidey traces the evolution of the Nixon Administration's efforts to carry out that aim through the Midway meeting.*

IN January, when he acquired both the responsibility and the information to deal with the war's intricacies, Nixon felt that he should not meet with South Viet Nam's Nguyen Van Thieu until well after he had publicly outlined his own ideas on ending the war. Then, early in May, the Viet Cong proposed its ten-point plan in Paris, and less than a week later the President responded with his own eight-point proposal (TIME, May 23). The prospect for movement was growing faster than Nixon had anticipated. The meeting with Thieu, first planned for July, was moved up to June 8.

The U.S. military had already been long at work on upgrading South Vietnamese forces. But the enemy's winter offensive was soon in progress. When the attacks abated somewhat, firm plans could be made to begin supplanting American troops with South Vietnamese.

In Saigon, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker worked with the Thieu government; two days before the Midway meeting, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger flew to the summer White House in San Clemente, Calif., with a draft of the troop-reduction statement.

From the start, roughly 25,000 was the target figure. The President could have rounded up every cook and clerk and made a more dramatic gesture, recalling as many as 100,000. He rejected that idea: to act responsibly in his view meant pulling out a maximum of 70,000 troops this year, and to remove them all at once would have looked too much like what White House insiders call "an elegant bug-

out." In any event, there would be opportunity later to take out more support personnel. To underline his seriousness, Nixon felt that most of the men to be replaced initially must be combat troops.

When Nixon and Thieu met in the modest house of the U.S. base commander at Midway, Nixon moved quickly to the troop question. "We have claimed for years that we were getting stronger," Thieu replied. "If it is so, we have to be willing to see some Americans leave." Thieu agreed that the announcement might help the Paris negotiations. Said Nixon: "We do not want to break the umbilical cord to your people." The troop replacement would not, said Thieu.

After an hour of detailed discussion, Nixon was satisfied that Thieu was in genuine agreement. He brought out the U.S. draft statement and asked: "Is it agreeable then that when we go out for pictures I read this statement?" A Thieu aide, Nguyen Phu Duc, wrote a companion statement for Thieu. There was more discussion and some minor changes in each draft.

Nixon asked his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to type the Thieu text. Because there was no typewriter in the house, Miss Woods went outside and picked her way through the island's ubiquitous gooney birds in search of one. After 45 minutes, she returned. While they waited, the two Presidents talked of problems of military leadership and negotiating strategy. Later in the day they would discuss political conditions and economic reform in South Viet Nam. But the main business at hand was that of troop replacement and they took a break to go into the bright sunlight and face the press. Nixon began what may some day be viewed as an historic statement: "I have decided to order the immediate redeployment from Viet Nam of the divisional equivalent of approximately 25,000 men . . ."

TIME  
20 June 1969

CPYRGHT A Mixed Response

In the U.S., many expressed reservations about Nixon's move. John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a charter hawk, doubted that "South Vietnamese forces will be able to rapidly assume this burden of fighting and be effective." Senator George McGovern spoke for many critics of the war: "I don't see that as anything more than token action." Yet there was also a sense of relief. In Manhattan, Hubert Humphrey declared the prospects for political settlement to be "brighter now than they have been for a long time." John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the Senate's most respected doves, found the announcement "a step forward and a very hopeful sign." He added that the U.S. should continue with step-by-step withdrawal

of all its troops. "We have done enough," he said.

Some Democrats, among them National Committee Chairman Fred Harris, complained that Nixon could continue buying time with the U.S. public almost indefinitely by a series of small withdrawals—which is a possibility implicit in Nixon's approach. Averell Harriman, chief negotiator at Paris in the Johnson Administration, had a more trenchant criticism. "This is a replacement, not a withdrawal," said he. "The first order of business is the reduction of violence. We still have orders for all-out pressure on the enemy. How can we expect the enemy to end their fighting if we don't? We should be taking a more defensive position and at the same time demand that the other side re-

# Withdrawal of 25,000 Troops

CPYRGHT

BY TED SELL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, returning early Monday from

Related stories, Pages 18-22.

the Midway Island meeting at which Mr. Nixon made his announcement, referred to the step-by-step nature of the plan on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base near here.

"As the President said," Laird declared, "this is the first announcement. The program will be under continuing review and another decision will be made in early August."

The decision in August, according to Pentagon sources, will involve whether the United States will continue the withdrawal at the planned rate—another 15,000 men after pullout of the first 25,000, with the balance in increments roughly once a month after that.

This plan covers only the time up to Dec. 31. What will happen in 1970 is unknown. Presumably it depends on events and on political decisions not yet made.

In the Midway announcement, Mr. Nixon said the United States first would withdraw the equivalent of a division. He did not disclose what proportion of the 25,000 men would be combat soldiers and how many would be from support and logistics units.

Late Monday, Laird told an impromptu meeting in the Pentagon press room the first group would be "heavily weighted" with combat forces.

Laird said a reason for pulling out mostly combat units, as opposed to support units, was that "our U.S. forces will have to supply some of the support for the South Vietnamese forces" who replace American units and who lack the complex support structure of the U.S. Army.

Elsewhere, it was learned that the initial group would include 15,000 to 16,000 men in combat-type units and their immediate headquarters elements. The 9,000 to 10,000 remaining troops will be in units directly involved in support of that size force.

Although the initial 25,000 withdrawal amounts to only about 4½% of the total 538,500-man U.S. force in Vietnam, it will be about 9% of total combat units there as measured by "maneuver battalions" available to the U.S. commander, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams.

Maneuver battalions are infantry, armored cavalry and reconnaissance units which actually seek out the enemy, supported by artillery, combat engineer, aviation and other battalions not counted in the maneuver total.

There are 11 combat divisions or their equivalents in Vietnam. Eight and one-third are Army; two and one-third Marine.

An Army division normally has about 16,000 men. Those in Vietnam are larger because most have a tenth infantry battalion, compared to eight or nine in a stateside division, and each battalion has an additional rifle company.

Identification of the units to be pulled out first, a Pentagon spokesman said, "will be the subject of talks in Honolulu" beginning Thursday.

Taking part will be representatives of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pacific commander in chief, the U.S. military command in Saigon and the Military Airlift Command and Military Sea Transportation Service.

The latter two commands will be key elements in talks which the Pentagon said will "go into all phases of logistics requirements for the movement of troops from South Vietnam."

Destination Vague

Laird was vague about where the troops would be sent after withdrawal. He

said some would return to the United States, but he left open the possibility some would be sent to American bases in Okinawa and Hawaii.

Army and Marine operations officers have submitted plans which call for one reinforced regimental landing team (equivalent to an Army brigade, one-third of a division) and one or two Army brigades to be withdrawn first. Under these plans the marines would be sent to Okinawa and the Army units would be divided either between Okinawa and Hawaii or Hawaii and a home base in the United States.

These units plus support troops — who might be sent to a number of bases here and abroad — comprise the initial 25,000-man withdrawal.

If other increments follow on the expected schedule, military commanders hope to use them to rebuild the Pacific Ocean strategic reserve which before Vietnam stood at two full divisions in Okinawa and Hawaii. It is now down to two brigade equivalents, one of which is a mobilized National Guard infantry brigade due for release by December.

Which to Leave

As to which units will be withdrawn, Pentagon sources indicate the Marine brigade equivalent in the initial increment obviously will come from the I Corps sector in far northern South Vietnam, where all marines are stationed.

One Army brigade probably will come from the sector north of Saigon, although there may be shifts also involving a realignment of the sector in the Central Highlands where the 4th Infantry Division operates.

The third brigade equivalent may also come from I Corps, according to military sources. It could be either a Marine or an

Army unit—more likely the latter. In addition to two and one-third Marine divisions, there has been a similar Army force in the northern corps area since the 1968 Tet offensive.

Army officers said the units to be returned would not be the units as presently manned. They said that before departure the units probably would be filled with men finishing their 12-month tours in Vietnam. Men in the designated units with more time to serve will be transferred to outfits which will stay in Vietnam.

Hence the first immediate personal effect of the withdrawal will be on men waiting to be sent to Vietnam as replacements.

Withdrawal of 25,000 troops will cut replacement needs—now running about 50,000 a month—by about 2,200 men. That number of men ticketed for Vietnam now will be surplus to replacement needs every month after the withdrawal is complete.

Pentagon officials noted that in one sense Mr. Nixon's announced 25,000-man withdrawal actually amounts to a larger cut. U.S. strength in Vietnam had been scheduled to reach 549,500 by July 1. It is 11,000 below that figure. Hence, the withdrawal in this computation actually amounts to 36,000 men in terms of what the plans had been.

**Other Forces**

Of present U.S. strength in Vietnam, 360,000 are Army; 81,000, marines; 61,000, airmen; 36,000, sailors and 500, coast guardsmen.

from South Vietnam as "a good sign for an eventual peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict."

Malik said this after a meeting with Lord Shepherd, visiting British undersecretary for Asian affairs.

"This is proof of the United States' seriousness in reducing its troops in Vietnam to pave the way for a peaceful settlement," Malik said. He described the United States decision as "unilateral withdrawal" since North Vietnam has not expressed willingness to do the same.

JAPAN TIMES  
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**No Aussie Reduction**

CANBERRA, Australia (AP)—The Australian Government will not seek a reduction of its forces in Vietnam following the announcement of America's intention to withdraw 25,000 of its men.

Prime Minister John Gorton made this clear in a statement. He said: "I feel it would be a wrong thing for Australia to do."

He said the Americans had greatly increased their forces since the Australian contingent was committed to the area.

The Americans had also built up South Vietnam's forces to take over some of the burdens now borne by the 500,000 American troops.

Gorton added, "It would be a shabby thing for Australia to withdraw its own forces and to that degree impose a further burden, or at least to that degree prevent a lessening of the burden, borne by the United States."

He said he had earlier pointed out it would be a tragic mistake for North Vietnam or anyone else to interpret the American action as a prelude to general withdrawal or any retreat by the United States from its determination to persevere until attainment of their objective—the right of self-determination for South Vietnam's people.

He added, "We must continue to hope for a peaceful settlement along the lines suggested in Nixon's eight-point plan and for an opportunity for the South Vietnamese people freely to determine the kind of government they want."

JAPAN TIMES  
10 June 1969

# Holyoake Praises Nixon's Pullout Plan

WELLINGTON, New Zealand (AP)—Prime Minister Keith Holyoake said Monday that the joint decision to withdraw American troops from South Vietnam reflects the progress which South Vietnam has made in assuming responsibility for its own defense.

"We must now hope this initial withdrawal of allied troops will be matched by withdrawals of North Vietnamese troops that would mean an over-all reduction in the level of hostilities.

"Nor have we given up hope that agreed withdrawals by both sides will be possible in the near future."

Holyoake said New Zealand will be reviewing its own level of troops in Vietnam but the practicability of this had to be considered.

Holyoake also pointed out that the United States and Australia had both increased their military forces since New Zealand attained its present level of military support.

REUTERS, Bangkok  
11 June 1969

## Thailand Seeking Pull Troops Out

BANGKOK, June 11—Thai

combat troops in South Vietnam will be withdrawn as soon as South Vietnamese forces can replace them, the communications minister, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, said today.

The 6000 Thai troops now in South Vietnam were needed in many parts of Thailand, Dawee said.

Dawee told reporters Thailand has asked the United States to make preparations for South Vietnamese troops to take over the fighting in the Bencat area near Saigon, where Thai troops are based.

JAPAN TIMES  
10 June 1969

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Malik Lauds Move  
DIAKARTA (UPI)—Foreign Minister Adam Malik Monday hailed the U.S. decision to withdraw 25,000 troops

# U.S. Is Said to Consider 2 New Pullouts of Troops

CPYRGT

By WILLIAM BEECHER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 17 — The Nixon Administration has drawn up tentative plans for two additional troop withdrawals from Vietnam this year—one in August, the other in October—according to authoritative sources. The withdrawals would total 45,000 to 75,000 men.

The plans are contingent in large part on how the forces of Hanoi and Saigon react to the pullout of the 25,000 troops decided on at the Midway conference between President Nixon and President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam.

If South Vietnamese forces move aggressively and if North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops either do not try, or try and fail, to launch successful military offensives, the rest of this year's withdrawal plan probably will be carried out, these sources assert.

The new withdrawals would involve two combat divisions, the 10,000 Army reserve troops remaining in Vietnam, and various support and service units. After the three withdrawals, the total reduction of United States troops would be 75,000 to 100,000.

A progressive schedule of American withdrawals, the sources contend, should reduce antiwar pressure at home while

demonstrating that even with smaller forces, the allies are capable of fending off the enemy on the battlefield.

If North Vietnam becomes persuaded of this, the hope is that it will agree, formally or tacitly, to a mutual withdrawal plan that would see the bulk of both North Vietnamese and American troops out of South Vietnam at a much faster rate than under unilateral United States withdrawals.

But if Hanoi refuses to consider mutual reductions, the strategy looks toward removal of 340,000 American troops over the next three years, leaving behind "indefinitely" enough of a force to so bolster South Vietnamese troops that they could contend with anything the enemy could throw at them.

This would involve a residual force of about 200,000 Americans.

The Defense Department released details today on the disposition of the 25,000 troops scheduled to come out by August. About 16,000 soldiers and marines will be moved to garrisons in Hawaii, Okinawa and Japan.

About 8,000 Army men, including about 2,000 active duty reservists and National Guardsmen, will return home. Some 1,200 Navy men will be reassigned both in the Pacific and the United States.

The 8,000 men in the Ninth Marine Regimental Landing Team will go to Okinawa, the 7,400-man First Brigade of the Ninth Infantry Division and division headquarters will go to Hawaii, and a 400-man Marine squadron of F-4 jet fighters will go to Japan.

The 6,000 men in the Second Brigade of the Ninth Division and 1,200 reservists will return to the United States. New York reserve units in this group are the 74th Field Medical Hospital and the 316th Medical Detachment, with a total of about 190 men.

Administration officials make clear that they would have preferred to work out a mutual withdrawal with North Vietnam, but have despaired of achieving such an agreement soon.

Rather than leave the initiative with Hanoi, they have moved to unilateral withdrawals at a deliberate pace, hoping to achieve the same final result.

are designed in part to reduce opposition to the war by reducing the number of American troops involved, and thus both the cost and casualties, and by persuading the public there is an end in sight.

Further, it is hoped, that Saigon will realize that it must move its troops to the forefront if it is to avoid military defeat, in addition to taking steps to solidify its hold on its people.

And, finally, it is designed to suggest to Hanoi that with an increasingly lighter load, the American public would assent to keeping sufficient forces in South Vietnam over the long haul to insure that the previous investment in lives and dollars will not have been wasted.

"Make no mistake," said one Administration planner, "Hanoi has some time pressures, too, both in the north and the south."

In the north, he said, there are increasing reports of black marketeering, shirking of work assignments and a general disillusionment with the burden of the war.

In the South, he said, with each passing day the South Vietnamese military forces are becoming noticeably stronger, the Government more entrenched, and the Vietcong political apparatus—the element that will be Hanoi's principal force to fight the post-war political battle—loses more and more experienced men.

Administration officials agree, reluctantly, that despite the obvious improvement in the South Vietnamese forces, substantial reductions in American troops do represent a lessening of the allied military punch and thus a calculated risk.

One official said: "We believe we know the worst that the enemy can do: the Tet offensive of 1968. We held then. We don't believe he is capable of mounting as massive or effective an assault in the future. And we should be able to hold."

In the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam, there are no plans to reinforce the three South Vietnamese divisions as the only American combat units—two brigades of the Ninth Division—move out.

"They'll have to carry a larger load," one officer conceded, but he pointed out that American fighter-bombers, helicopter units and artillery would provide increased close support.

Administration plan calls for the removal of the Third Brigade of the Ninth Division in August. Along with the rest of the Third Marine Division in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

But to guard against the possibility that North Vietnam will suddenly move one or more of its divisions from its territory into the area vacated by the Third, this division will be redeployed to Okinawa where it would be in position to rush back in an emergency.

Additionally, the remaining 10,000 Army reserve and National Guardsmen in Vietnam who were called to duty last year are expected to be returned home and demobilized in the August withdrawal.

The October withdrawal announcement, according to this same schedule, would involve another division-size combat force—as yet not selected—and various support troops.

Some Pentagon planners are already looking beyond these tentative 1969 withdrawals, but have not yet reached specific choices for 1970 and 1971, sources say.

Administration officials say that North Vietnam might want to try another offensive this summer to demonstrate its strength, to raise questions among American planners about the feasibility of their timetable of withdrawals, and to shake Saigon's confidence in its American allies.

If that offensive fizzles, officials say, Hanoi might then be ready to contemplate mutual withdrawals suggested by President Nixon on May 14.

A basic sticking point, they concede, is over a political formula that might provide protection for Vietcong elements that remain behind.

The Hanoi regime remembers, one official pointed out, that while the Geneva Accords of 1954 guaranteed amnesty to Vietminh rebels, about 15,000 of them were killed subsequently.

"We're convinced that President [Ngo Dinh] Diem was sincere in intending to live up to the amnesty," he said, "but he didn't have control over many of the officials at the village and hamlet level."

Hanoi, then, would be expected to demand some kind of political settlement that, at the very minimum, would protect the Vietcong before agreeing to pull out all of its forces, officials note.

President Thieu's June 9 Press Conference statements concerning "withdrawal" instead of "replacement":

"I would like to emphasize that you should not confuse the two terms. On the one hand, gradual replacement of the US troops by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam as the situation permits and as the development of the Vietnamese Army permits, and on the other hand the defeatist term, the distorting term, and the term which causes a loss in the morale of the Vietnamese people and in the morale of the armed forces, and which causes confusion in the national ranks, and that is the term "withdrawal" of the American troops."

GÖTEBORGS HANDELS- OCH SJÖFARTSTIDNING (Liberal), Sweden  
10 June 1969

A DWARF'S STRIDE

"The decision on the relatively modest reduction can hardly give rise to any great relief either in the U.S.A. or elsewhere. The American doves' harsh criticism seems to be compensated by disappointment in wide circles. The first step in deescalation of the American war effort became only a dwarf's stride....

Whether American troop reductions in the near future are of such dimensions and character that they really bring a noticeable relaxation of tension is uncertain. A decisive factor, of course, is Hanoi's willingness somehow to respond with a similar reduction of its forces in South Vietnam. The visibly most important decision at Midway cannot be said to open any promising vistas for peace in Vietnam. One can only hope that greater things are happening out of sight."

DJAKARTA TIMES (English-Language-Independent)  
10 June 1969

"(This is)... third bombshell to be exploded by a USA president in period of 15 months in the effort to find peace in Vietnam.... However, unilateral measures will not be sufficient if war is to be ended. The other side of the warring parties should also show reciprocal actions to scale down war activities. What North Vietnam has so far done is making all possible efforts to justify the

presence of its troops in South Vietnam. This, for certain, cannot be described as sincerity to find peace.

What remains to be seen now is how the other side will react to this."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London (Conservative)  
10 June 1969

"The Communists in Vietnam have been fighting for 20 years. They ignore public opinion. Time is a much less valuable commodity to them. This is the background against which the results of the Midway conference... have to be judged.

It (troop removal) will not immediately reduce the exposure of American fighting troops to possible casualties....

Nevertheless, the announced withdrawal is not to be sniffed at. It is significant that the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris yesterday described it as 'a vulgar farce.' Anything they castigate like that must have good in it."

DAILY MAIL (Conservative)  
10 June 1969

"We can be optimistic but we must be cautious.... The progress is slow and painful. But at least it is in the direction of peace."

FRENCH RADIO (State-owned)  
9 June 1969

"President Nixon very sincerely wants to find an honorable end to a war that represents a tragic error in American history....

But Nixon also has to reckon with the fact that if he ends the war too quickly or...sells out Vietnam, this may alarm some allies, especially in Southeast Asia....

That is why he is compelled to act step by step and to find an adequate formula for withdrawing honorably."

COMMENTATOR ON FRENCH TV (State-owned)  
9 June 1969

"But let us not forget that there are others besides doves in the U.S.

It was difficult for him (President Nixon) to go further. You have heard that the North Vietnamese claim that the troop withdrawal is a farce.... I think they are exaggerating....

From a military point of view the decision is more symbolic than meaningful, but from a political viewpoint it is very important because it is the first time the Americans have committed themselves to disengagement....

I believe the North Vietnamese after thinking it over will find some satisfactory points in the American gesture, and it is quite possible that the Midway conference will revive the Paris conference."

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Right-center)  
10 June 1969

"Midway has produced a fair compromise which enables both the Communist and allied sides to save face and thus opens the way to...progress toward a political solution ...Nixon is right when he speaks of a historic decision: The military withdrawal has begun. This is an irreversible decision."

WEST GERMAN TV  
9 June 1969

"It would be unfair to reproach Nixon for doing a half-hearted job. In arriving at his decision, he had to consider Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and even India, where it is no longer fashionable to condemn the U.S. for its engagement in Vietnam....

The situation today is not much different from yesterday, except for one thing: 25,000 is a beginning."

"Once again the U.S. has proved that it really wants peace in offering its opponents an opportunity for real negotiation. The first reaction from Hanoi does not show the same goodwill."

CANBERRA TIMES (Independent)  
10 June 1969

"The Midway agreement marks the beginning, a small beginning, of the end of U.S. engagement with Communist forces in Indochina..."

The first U.S. withdrawal is the start of a continuing process, but the process will continue well into the seventies."

DAILY TELEGRAPH (Conservative), Sydney  
10 June 1969

"President Nixon's decision indicated the sincerity of his intention to bring the war to an honorable end and the enormously increased capacity of the South Vietnamese to provide their own defense.

The Prime Minister is right to point out that it should be 'interpreted as a sign of strength' -- and that 'it would be a tragic mistake for North Vietnam or anyone else to interpret it as a prelude to any retreat by the U.S.'"

EVENING POST, Wellington  
10 June 1969

"No matter how comparatively small is the number of men involved or how bleak the prospect of a military settlement or an acceptable political agreement, President Nixon's announcement of the pending withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam will be widely regarded as a definite ray of hope."



BANGKOK WORLD (Pro-U.S.)  
10 June 1969

"In establishing his eight-point program, Mr. Nixon advanced the sound thesis that any withdrawal to be effective must be properly supervised by an international body acceptable to both sides.... The message makes clear that Vietnamese leaders, both in the north and the south, must assume a greater part of the initiative if the conflict is to be resolved."

PHILIPPINES HERALD (Independent), Manila  
10 June 1969

"Without waiting for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to promise similar moves or to match the initiative, the U.S. and South Vietnam have gone on to prove their sincerity and good faith by taking the first step."

TRIBUNE DE GENEVE (Independent)  
10 June 1969

"The right of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination has been forcefully reaffirmed.... Mr. Nixon thus refuses to play the game of the doves who would impose on Saigon a government of coalition and capitulation....

"The prudence of this removal of 25,000 troops indicates that the South Vietnamese are to be given a chance to prove on a small scale their ability to assume tasks formerly entrusted to American troops, and Hanoi is to be given the opportunity to take a reciprocal step."

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LA SUISSE, Geneva  
11 June 1969

"Hanoi and the NLF would be very naive if they try to drag things out in the hope that de-Americanization will be translated into capitulation."

GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN (Catholic), Brussels  
11 June 1969

"The U.S. de-escalation move reflects the growing confidence of the Americans in the increasing strength of South Vietnam. Any reduction in U.S. troop strength will henceforth indicate an improvement in the situation. Nixon has effectively shown his goodwill."

LA LIBRE BELGIQUE (Catholic), Brussels  
11 June 1969

"Outrageous Communist reactions do not diminish the value of Mr. Nixon's gesture, measured though it may be. What is proclaimed in Moscow or Hanoi is not important, but rather what is said backstage at the Paris talks."

LA PRENSA, Buenos Aires  
11 June 1969

"President Nixon has given the impression that he wishes to make peace -- a just peace without victor or vanquished -- and without disengagement from the commitments the U.S. has undertaken in Southeast Asia."

EL TIEMPO, Bogota  
11 June 1969

"A great step toward peace...the U.S. at Midway, Paris and Saigon is continuously seeking out openings susceptible of acceptance by the other side as platforms for positive discussion...."

LA REPUBLICA, Bogota  
11 June 1969

"As a result of the talks the U.S. has recovered its freedom of action, retained its prestige, and having reduced its military expenditures can turn its attention to other domestic and external problems. This will serve us all. We welcome it."

LAMERHAV, Tel Aviv  
11 June 1969

"South Korean, Nationalist Chinese and Thai leaders are frankly afraid that Nixon might want to discard all of the U.S. military commitments in the Far East and let the anticommunist states there shoulder the burden.

"What President Nixon was saying to Saigon leaders is, 'If you are determined not to surrender to the Viet Cong and if you are opposed to a coalition government incorporating representatives of the NLF, then you must increase your share in the war against the Viet Cong.'"

FREE PRESS JOURNAL (Left-of-center, independent), Bombay  
11 June 1969

"The North Vietnamese have little to lose by responding to the American gesture in a manner that would create confidence abroad in their intentions for the future."

HANOI RADIO  
10 June 1969

"Nixon's statement on the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops only represents a propaganda act aimed at easing public pressure and dodging the just demand by the Vietnamese and world peoples that the U.S. unconditionally withdraw all U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Nixon's perfidious measure cannot deceive U.S. public opinion."

VIET CONG RADIO  
10 June 1969

"The real situations in South Vietnam and the Paris conference on Vietnam and the Midway meeting between Nixon and his lackey have further bared the Nixon Administration's scheme to stubbornly pursue the war of aggression and implement neo-colonialism in South Vietnam.

"But no matter how frantically he squirms and no matter what tortuous or perfidious tricks he may resort to, Nixon will be unable to salvage the U.S. warmongers' war of aggression in South Vietnam."

IZVESTIYA  
10 June 1969

"The Midway meeting only confirmed once again that the U.S. has no intention of extricating itself from the quagmire in which it was landed by Washington's military-political machine...

"This means that...the Republican Administration is still following in the steps of its predecessor.... Instead of constructive steps we have a futile propaganda move..."

SOFIA RADIO  
10 June 1969

"The cutback is a propaganda bluff."

BUDAPEST RADIO

10 June

"The withdrawal is not significant and cannot be regarded as an expression of goodwill."

MOSCOW RADIO

11 June 1969

"The talks prove that the United States does not intend to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, but clings to its demand for 'reciprocity' in order to prolong the intervention and gain time to strengthen the Saigon army."

Excerpts from Communist Points  
on Pre-Conditions to Peace Negotiations

"Five Points" of National Liberation Front (now called the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government) as issued by the NLF Central Committee on 22 March 1965:

Point 1 - "...all negotiations are useless as long as the U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons and means of war of the U.S. and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military bases in South Vietnam..."

"Four Points" of North Vietnam as presented in a speech by Premier Phan Van Dong on 8 April 1965:

Point 1 - "the U.S. must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases, cancel its 'military alliance' with South Vietnam."

North Vietnam's Revised "Four Points" as issued by the Foreign ministry of the DRV on 17 July 1968:

Point 1 - "...demand that the U.S. withdraw American and Satellite troops from South Vietnam..."

"Ten Points" of Viet Cong Proposal in Paris, as submitted by Chief Delegate of NLF, Tran Buu Kiem, 8 May 1969:

Point 2 - "...the U.S. must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, arms and war materiel...without posing any condition whatsoever; liquidate all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam..."

Excerpted from Newspaper Articles  
on Troop Contributing Nations  
in South Vietnam

mid June 1969

Since July 1964, when the Saigon government launched its appeal for military (and non military) assistance from the free world, troops have been arriving in South Vietnam's port cities from Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand. With the addition in February of the last 4,000 Thai combat troops, Asian and Pacific nations will have contributed a total of over 71,000 men to Saigon's fighting forces.

Thai Black Panther Division	11,566
Royal Australian Regiment	7,663
New Zealand's Artillery Battalion	562
Philippines Armed PHILCAG Teams	1,521
Republic of Korea's White Horse and Tiger Divisions and Blue Dragon Marine Brigade	<u>50,295</u>
	<u>71,607</u>

(N.B.: The total number of free world troops who went to the aid of South Korea when she was attacked by North Korea and later by Communist China came to about 48,000 -- exclusive of U.S. and South Korean forces.)

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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July 1969

D A T E S   W O R T H   N O T I N G

July 2-8	Brussels	9th World Congress of International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and 20th Anniversary of ICFTU.
July 21	Vietnam	15th Anniversary of the Geneva Accords on an Indochina Armistice, the partition of Vietnam and the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.
August 1	China	Army Day -- commemorating the founding of the Chinese Red Army in 1921.
August 1	Poland	25th Anniversary of the World War II Warsaw Uprising against Nazi German occupation, 1944.
August 16-23	Helsinki	Youth and Student Conference on Vietnam, sponsored by the (communist) International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.
August 18-28	Liège, Belgium	7th General Assembly of the (non-communist) World Assembly of Youth.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	1st Anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, East German, Hungarian, Polish and Bulgarian forces of the Warsaw Pact.
August 24	NATO	20th Anniversary, NATO Treaty (signed April 4) which went into effect in 1949.
August 24	Soviet Union	30th Anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact.
August 25	France	25th Anniversary of the liberation of Paris by French and U.S. forces, 1944.
August 28	Czechoslovakia	25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising against the Nazi German occupation, 1944.
September 1		30th Anniversary of the beginning of World War II -- Germany invaded Poland from the West September 1; USSR invaded Poland from the East, September 17, 1939.
September 21	China	20th Anniversary, Chinese Peoples' Republic proclaimed, 1949.