

31 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Selin Group Meetings

1. The study group organized by [redacted] to examine the bureaucratic features of Soviet military decision-making for Dr. Ivan Selin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Strategic Programs), held its first meetings on 26 and 27 January in Dr. Selin's office. The group consisted of three academic experts on organizational behavior and a dozen or so specialists on Soviet military affairs from several government agencies. The academic experts were Professors Bower and Christensen of Harvard, and Bush of California. The government specialists included Colonel Fitzgerald, former U.S. Army [redacted] in Moscow, Colonel Scott, also a former attache, [redacted] Bob Kilmarx of the Air Forces, [redacted] and the following representatives from CIA, all members of the Office of Strategic Research: [redacted]

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2. The purpose of the discussions was to give the academic experts some sense of the scope and limitations of our knowledge concerning the workings of the Soviet military establishment, and some feeling for the nature of the evidence available for the projected study. To this end a series of briefings was presented by members for the Office of Strategic Research to cover various aspects of the problem as defined by Dr. Selin in discussions with Bruce Clarke. These briefings served to structure the agenda of the meetings, and provided the take-off points for lively discussions. The topics of the briefings, and the persons giving them, were:

- Formal Organization of Soviet Armed Forces — [redacted]
- The Military-Industrial Bureaucracy — [redacted]
- Military Expenditures by Mission and Organization — [redacted]
- The Political Context of Soviet Policy Decisions — [redacted]
- The High Command and Military Career System — [redacted]

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3. The meetings cannot but have impressed the academic experts with the enormous complexities of the subject and are likely to have prompted some reconsiderations of the feasibility of the project as originally conceived. It seems evident to those of us who sat through most of the meetings that the study is unlikely to produce the kinds of results that Dr. Selin apparently had hoped to achieve, namely, judgments about Soviet behavioral patterns that would be sufficiently explicit and objective to serve as predictive factors in estimating Soviet force structure and weapon systems developments. What he seems likely to get, we suspect, is a more general treatment of the subject designed to provide a systematic framework for dealing with the problem, and/or recommendations concerning avenues of research deemed likely to contribute to the results he is seeking. Either or both of these results would be a solid plus from our point of view.

4. We are satisfied that our participation in the exercise was useful to us, and we believe that it contributed something to Dr. Selin and the study group. We believe that it will be in the Agency's interest to continue cooperating with the study group by giving assistance with respect to sources, etc., but we doubt that the results of the project will be of such value as to warrant any substantial diversion of our efforts from regularly scheduled tasks.

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Chief, Strategy and Trends Branch, SR/PA

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