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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Expenditure Implications of Alternative Soviet Strategic Force Projections

NOTE

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research, CIA, in response to a request from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for an informal assessment of the economic resource implications of several postulated future Soviet strategic force goals.

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Expenditure Implications of Alternative
Soviet Strategic Force Projections

Conclusions


A comparison of six projected Soviet options for 1969-77 illustrates the range of expenditure levels and potential "savings" implied by limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms -- bombers, ICBM's, SLBM's, MR/IRBM's and ABM's.

Savings do not accrue automatically to arms limitations. Depending on Soviet economic and strategic objectives and the constraints on quantitative and qualitative improvements imposed by a limitation agreement, the options studied imply average expenditures on strategic arms during 1969-77 as low as \$7 billion or as high as \$14 billion a year. This compares with average spending of \$11½ billion a year for a base case projection without arms limitations. (See figure 1).

Potential savings, represented by the lower portion of the \$7 billion to \$14 billion range, might result if there are substantially restrictive constraints on both numbers of strategic weapons deployed and limitations on qualitative improvements in existing forces and if the Soviets take full advantage of arms restrictions to reduce defense outlays.

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Figure 1
Soviet Expenditures for Arms Limitation Cases for Strategic Forces
Average Annual Outlays 1969-77



* Freeze of deployment, no qualitative improvements.
 ** Restrictions on deployment, limited qualitative improvements.
 *** Freeze of deployment, moderate qualitative improvements.
 **** Restrictions on deployment, extensive qualitative improvements.

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Force goals that imply average annual spending of about \$7 billion over the period, for example, could be expected only if there are strong Soviet incentives at this time to reach an agreement on arms limitations primarily because of economic considerations.

Other force options possible under the terms of an assumed arms limiting agreement do not necessarily imply savings compared to present spending levels. Even with a freeze on numbers of strategic delivery systems, future annual spending levels could be \$2-\$3 billion higher than present ones if qualitative improvements such as MIRV's or MRV's are pursued, and if an ABM system of several hundred launchers is permitted.

In the absence of treaty constraints on its forces, the USSR might be expected to spend an average of about \$11-\$12 billion a year if it continued its spending priority for strategic programs at about the level of the last three years. If, on the other hand, it selected strategic force goals representing an increased arms race effort in an attempt to respond to projected improvements in US forces, average annual spending for strategic programs during the period could exceed \$18 billion a year.

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Discussion

The expenditure implications of six variants of Soviet strategic force goals for the period 1969-1977 have been considered in this study. The projections were based on ACDA guidelines for representative -- rather than precise -- Soviet military planning options. The projections reflect broad alternatives in Soviet motivations and objectives, both with and without constraints imposed by an agreement to limit strategic arms.

The six force options and the major variations in their resource implications are described in general terms in the following paragraphs. The conclusions about potential savings or possible increases in expenditures are sensitive both to the assumptions made about the possible terms of an agreement and to the assumptions about Soviet economic and strategic incentives that might underly an agreement. Detailed tabular presentations of annual expenditures for major elements of the strategic forces under each set of assumptions are included in an Appendix. These projections are preliminary and highly tentative, and should not be used to draw more precise or detailed conclusions than those stated in the body of this study.

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Base Case Without Arms Limitation

A. The Forces

Assuming the absence of arms limitation, the base case postulates strategic weapons deployment rates reflecting the continuation of Soviet efforts to develop and deploy new strategic systems at a moderate pace.

Bombers and tankers are assumed to decline because of the continuing emphasis on missile delivery systems for strategic attack. ICBM launchers are projected to increase by almost forty percent, principally due to the assumed deployment of the SS-13. The number of submarine ballistic missile launch tubes increase to nearly six times that of 1969, as the new Polaris-type units become available. The MR/IRBM force declines by about 10 percent throughout the period 1969-77. No MRV's or MIRV's, however, are assumed deployed.

In the defensive forces, the number of deployed interceptor aircraft is projected to decline by one-third although the effectiveness of the force increases with the deployment of newer and more highly sophisticated aircraft. The number

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of SAM launchers deployed remains virtually the same throughout the period. The effectiveness of the force will increase, however, as newer systems such as the SA-5 replace the old. ABM launchers are estimated to increase, from 48 in mid-1969, to a thin national deployment totaling some 500 toward the end of the period.

B. Expenditures

The base case, which does not assume an arms limitation agreement, results in average annual outlays of about 11 billion dollars, or more than 100 billion dollars for the entire 1969-77 period as shown in the following tabulation:

	Base Case Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
Total Strategic Forces	<u>103</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>50</u>
Strategic Offense	48	29	19
Strategic Defense	55	24	31

As a share of total strategic force outlays, spending for strategic offense declines from 55 percent during the 1969-72 period, to 40 percent in the 1973-77 period. This decrease is the result of

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the declining bomber and tanker force and the completion of the ICBM programs.

The increase in strategic defense as a share of total spending -- from 45 percent in 1969-1972, to 60 percent in 1973-1977 -- reflects greater spending for ABM's and SAM's which more than offsets the decline in expenditures for interceptor aircraft.

Projected expenditures under the base case would call for average annual expenditures for strategic forces at about the same level as those incurred during 1966-1968.

Moderately Increased Arms Race

A. The Forces

Force projections under this case imply a substantial increase in the pace of strategic weapons deployment. This case, however, is not intended to represent an unconstrained maximum arms race. ICBM launchers are projected to increase some 40 percent and SLBM launch tubes about four fold by mid-1977. There is a slight reduction in the number of MR/IRBM's but the force is improved during the period by the introduction of mobile launchers. No

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MIRV's or MRV's are added to either ICBM or MR/IRBM forces, and the long-range bomber force declines as no new bombers are introduced.

Emphasis on the strategic defensive forces continues and a large national deployment of some 3000 long and short range ABM launchers is begun. Some growth also is projected in the number of SAM's, including a new low-altitude system. Interceptor aircraft decline in number, but a new model is phased in and constitutes about 17 percent of the force by mid-1977.

B. Expenditures

The moderately increased arms race case, as defined, implies costs to the Soviets of some 7 billion dollars more per year than required by the base case, or a total increase of some 62 billion dollars over the 1969-77 period.

Expenditures in the later period, 1973-77, average 7.6 billion dollars annually, about 25 percent higher than the near term (1969-72), mainly as a result of the high costs of the ABM program that impacts most strongly in the later years.

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	Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
Moderate Arms Race	165	77	88
Base Case	103	53	50
Difference	+62	+24	+38
Average Annual Difference	+6.9	+6.0	+7.6

The qualitative and quantitative improvements in the ABM and SAM forces are quite costly, and as a result, two-thirds of total outlays (110 billion of the 165 billion dollars) are allocated to strategic defense.

Despite substantial expenditures for the large SLBM program and the retrofiting of the ICBM and MR/IRBM forces, the strategic offensive forces account for only one-third of the outlays. This is partially due to the decline in outlays for the other elements and partially due to the assumed absence of qualitative improvements (no MRV's or MIRV's for example) in the forces.

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)-Lo -- Limited Qualitative Improvements Case

A. The Forces

The strategic offensive and defensive forces

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defined in this arms limitation case either decline or are allowed to expand only moderately under the assumptions about an arms limiting treaty. There is a slight increase in the number of ICBM's as SS-11 sites currently under construction are completed. Existing SS-7 sites are retrofitted with the SS-9, and SLBM launch tubes increase by about 50 percent. The number of MR/IRBM's remains the same but the SS-4 systems are retrofitted with a new solid propellant missile. Bombers and tankers decline, as do interceptor aircraft and SAM launchers. In addition to the current ABM deployment at Moscow, a follow-on thin national deployment program for an improved ABM system is postulated.

B. Expenditures

The conditions imposed by an arms limitation with limited qualitative improvements result in average annual savings of about 1.2 billion dollars over expenditures required by the base case.

	Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
SALT-Lo	92	46	46
Base Case	103	53	50
Difference	-11	-7	-4
Average Annual Difference	-1.2	-1.8	-0.8

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In the near term, the limiting of strategic offensive weapons, particularly the ICBM's and SLBM's, reduces expenditures and is largely responsible for the savings. Although expenditures for the ABM system increase in the later period as the improved system reaches moderate deployment, they do not completely erode the savings resulting from the reduction of the offensive forces.

Expenditures for SAM systems constitute the largest single element expenditure in both the offensive and defensive forces due to the large number deployed and the resulting high operating costs.

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)-Hi -- Extensive Qualitative Improvement Case

A. The Forces

This projection assumes both quantitative and qualitative improvements to the strategic offensive forces. Accompanying the increase in the numbers of missiles (primarily SLBM's) are significant improvements in system capabilities by the addition of MIRV's to the ICBM's and newer type SLBM's. Existing MR/IRBM sites are retrofitted with new solid propellant missiles. Further upgrading of the strategic offensive

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forces occurs with the introduction of a new super-sonic bomber.

The strategic defense posture would be augmented by the deployment of a thin national ABM system of 700 launchers, replacing the current Moscow system in the early 1970's. The number of SAM launchers and interceptors declines throughout the period.

B. Expenditures

The forces projected by this extensive qualitative improvement case call for additional expenditures of 2.4 billion dollars per year over the base case or a total increase of some 22 billion dollars over the 1969-77 period.

	Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
SALT-Hi	125	55	70
Base Case	103	53	50
Difference	+22	+2	+20
Average Annual Difference	+2.4	+0.5	+4.0

The extensive qualitative improvement case, SALT-Hi, is very costly, but substantially below the level implied by the increased arms race case.

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Expenditures in the earlier period for the SALT-Hi reflect the complete retrofitting of the MR/IRBM force and procurement of long-range SAM launchers and new type interceptors. The majority of the additional expenditures, however, falls in the later period as ambitious programs in both strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems proliferate. All ICBM's are MIRV'ed during this period and the new supersonic bomber is deployed. In addition, ABM deployment is assumed to reach 700 launchers.

Expenditures for strategic attack systems average some 20 percent higher than those for strategic defense during the later period, while in the earlier period the expenditure allocations are almost equal.

The ACDA Lo and Hi

The following scenarios were prepared by ACDA by selective modifications to the force structure outlined in the 1968 National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP) series. They represent two other possible options open to the Soviets within the framework of some arms control agreement.

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ACDA-Lo -- Freeze of Deployment, No Qualitative Improvements

A. The Forces

A broadly ranged reduction in strategic offensive and defensive forces over the period 1969-77, allowing only the completion of SLBM submarines and ICBM launchers currently under construction, yields a partial strategic disarmament case. A freeze on strategic weapons deployment and on technological improvements (such as MIRV's) is instituted. In addition, there are sizable reductions in such systems as bombers, interceptor aircraft, and SAM forces.

B. Expenditures

Of all the cases presented, this case results in the lowest level of expenditures and results in average annual savings of 4 billion dollars relative to the base series.

With a virtual freeze on new systems, investment outlays decline continually throughout the 1969-77 period and as the following tabulation indicates, annual savings are slightly higher in the later period, 1973-77.

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	Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
ACDA-Lo	66	37	29
Base Case	103	53	50
Difference	-37	-16	-21
Average Annual Difference	-4.1	-4.0	-4.2

Because of the sizable SAM forces maintained, sixty percent or better of the cumulative 1969-77 outlay would be incurred by the strategic defense forces.

ACDA-Hi -- Freeze of Deployment, Moderate Qualitative Improvements

A. The Forces

The strategic force levels under this arms limitation case are expected to remain at the 1969 level, except that the SLBM submarines and ICBM launchers under construction are completed. Capabilities are upgraded in the future by retrofitting new systems and the addition of MIRV's to some of the ICBM force. SAM and ABM launchers increase and a new low-altitude SAM system is introduced. The augmentation of the ABM force includes additional deployment of the long-range system and the initiation

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of a short-range interceptor system, to a total of 700 launchers. Force reductions are postulated for bombers and MR/IRBM's. Interceptors also decline in number but force capabilities are improved by the addition of new advanced aircraft.

B. Expenditures

The level of expenditures for a force posture as outlined above amounts to a 1.9 billion dollar increase over the average annual outlay in the base series.

	Expenditures (Billion Dollars)		
	<u>1969-77</u>	<u>1969-72</u>	<u>1973-77</u>
ACDA-Hi	120	59	61
Base Case	103	53	50
Difference	+17	+6	+11
Average Annual Difference	+1.9	+1.5	+2.2

Average annual expenditures are somewhat higher in the earlier part of the period as would be expected with both an improvement program for the ICBM-MR/IRBM forces and a rather large ABM deployment being undertaken simultaneously.

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Strategic defense systems by far account for the largest share of total expenditures over the period, especially during the later years (1973-77) when spending for these systems accounts for some 75 percent of the total.

It is apparent that despite the high cost of MIRVing ICBM's and retrofitting the ICBM-MR/IRBM forces, declining outlays for other strategic offense elements are more than enough to cause a rapid decrease in strategic offense expenditures, both absolutely and as a share of the total.

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Methodology and Statistical Tables

The expenditures for the various projections of the strategic forces are presented in terms of equivalent dollars to reflect the general size of the projected programs as if these programs had been purchased in the US. This is done in order to present the relationships between the different programs in terms which are comparable with US programs and which are familiar and meaningful to US policymakers and planners.

Although their costs might have produced different levels of expenditures, such activities as dispersing and further hardening of existing systems, increasing the reliability and accuracy of weapons beyond the present state of the art, increasing the on-station and alert status of the forces, and civil defense, could not be included because suitable costing parameters are not yet available.

In comparing US spending with Soviet spending for similar forces, the following points should be kept in mind:

- a. Nuclear weapon costs are included in the Soviet figures.

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b. R&D expenditures are not included.

c. All Soviet outlays are stated in
1966 dollars.

d. There may be minor variations in the
categorization of Soviet and US expenditures,
due to differences in organizational structure
and availability of information.

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Table 1
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces
1969-1977

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Strategic Offensive									
Bombers and Tankers	1.16	0.93	0.81	0.73	0.63	0.58	0.55	0.51	0.44
ICBM's	3.12	2.93	3.31	3.02	2.17	1.58	1.24	1.24	1.24
MR/IRBM's	1.32	2.07	2.06	1.30	0.79	0.59	0.53	0.53	0.53
SLBM's	0.98	1.16	1.20	1.16	1.12	1.15	0.99	0.83	0.65
Cruise Missile Submarines a/	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.17
Space Weapons b/	0.34	0.31	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
TOTAL Offensive	7.12	7.59	7.71	6.46	4.95	4.14	3.55	3.35	3.09
Strategic Defensive									
Interceptors	1.97	2.19	2.33	1.96	1.63	1.34	1.29	0.81	0.77
ABM's	0.24	0.27	0.24	0.32	0.55	0.84	1.40	1.56	1.36
SAM's	2.83	2.69	2.76	2.68	2.43	2.28	2.68	3.30	3.60
Control and Warning b/	0.85	0.88	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.92
Anti-Satellite b/	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
TOTAL Defensive	5.92	6.07	6.33	5.95	5.62	5.46	6.39	6.68	6.69

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic offensive programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from 11/8/3-68 "Best Estimate".

Table 2

Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
Offensive and Defensive Forces
1969-1977

Moderately Increased Arms Race Scenario

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Strategic Offensive									
Bombers and Tankers	1.23	1.07	0.97	0.87	0.82	0.77	0.72	0.68	0.63
ICBM's	3.12	2.95	2.99	3.50	2.69	1.61	1.24	1.24	1.24
MR/IRBM's	2.28	2.69	2.03	0.90	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
SLBM's	1.01	1.20	1.15	1.23	1.23	1.25	1.34	1.41	1.40
Cruise Missile Submarines a/	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.19
Space Weapons b/	0.73	0.69	0.36	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
TOTAL Offensive	8.59	8.81	7.70	6.86	5.71	4.60	4.26	4.29	4.23
Strategic Defensive									
Interceptors	3.27	2.83	2.81	2.74	2.60	2.24	2.00	1.48	1.48
ABM's	1.52	2.73	3.50	4.19	4.75	5.30	5.85	6.38	6.79
SAM's	3.56	4.20	4.48	4.30	4.20	3.94	3.80	3.53	3.47
Control and Warning b/	1.03	1.05	1.16	1.21	1.27	1.29	1.29	1.26	1.27
Anti-Satellite b/	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
TOTAL Defensive	9.53	10.93	12.07	12.56	12.94	12.89	13.06	12.77	13.13

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic offensive programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from NIPP-68 "Hi".

Table 3
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces
1969-1977

SALT-Lo Scenario (Restrictions on Deployment, Limited Qualitative Improvements)

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Strategic Offensive	1.16	0.95	0.84	0.77	0.69	0.66	0.64	0.63	0.60
Bombers and Tankers	2.39	1.88	1.84	2.10	2.28	1.72	1.32	1.32	1.32
ICBM's	1.21	1.93	1.65	1.03	0.93	0.79	0.56	0.45	0.44
MR/IRBM's	0.60	0.48	0.33	0.24	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
SLBM's	0.67	0.52	0.27	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Space Weapons	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Cruise Missile Submarines a/									
TOTAL Offensive	6.24	5.96	5.12	4.45	4.40	3.65	3.00	2.88	2.84
Strategic Defensive	1.97	2.19	2.33	1.96	1.63	1.34	1.29	0.81	0.77
Interceptors b/	0.15	0.21	0.43	0.59	0.90	1.03	0.89	0.85	0.32
ABM's	2.83	2.69	2.76	2.68	2.43	2.28	2.68	3.30	3.60
SAM's b/	0.85	0.88	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.92
Control and Warning b/	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Anti-Satellite b/									
TOTAL Defensive	5.83	6.01	6.52	6.22	5.97	5.65	5.87	5.98	5.65

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from 11-8/3-68 "Best Estimate".

Table 4
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces 1969-1977

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<u>SALT -Hi Scenario (Restrictions on Deployment, Extensive Qualitative Improvements)</u>									
Strategic Offensive									
Bombers and Tankers	1.72	1.61	1.59	1.68	1.51	1.70	2.24	2.10	1.24
ICBM's	2.91	2.13	2.50	3.70	4.29	4.76	6.04	5.15	2.22
MR/IRBM's	1.96	1.70	1.12	1.04	0.87	0.59	0.44	0.44	0.43
SLBM's	0.80	0.65	0.40	0.32	0.42	0.58	0.69	0.53	0.32
Space Weapons	0.25	0.14	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Cruise Missile Submarines a/	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
TOTAL Offensive	7.86	6.43	5.84	6.97	7.32	7.86	9.64	8.45	4.44
Strategic Defensive									
Interceptors b/	1.97	2.19	2.33	1.96	1.63	1.34	1.29	0.81	0.77
ABM's	0.42	0.73	1.35	2.01	2.01	2.06	1.80	0.92	0.85
SAM's b/	2.84	2.69	2.76	2.68	2.43	2.28	2.68	3.30	3.60
Control and Warning b/	0.85	0.88	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.92
Anti-Satellite b/	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
TOTAL Defensive	6.11	6.53	7.44	7.64	7.08	6.68	6.79	6.04	6.18

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic offensive programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from 11-8/3-68 "Best Estimate".

Table 5

Estimated Soviet Expenditures For Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces 1969-1977

ACDA-Lo Scenario (Freeze of Deployment, No Qualitative Improvements)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
	Billion 1966 Dollars								
Strategic Offensive	0.85	0.74	0.66	0.59	0.52	0.49	0.45	0.40	0.34
Bombers and Tankers	2.04	1.87	0.80	0.72	0.69	0.70	0.69	0.72	0.49
ICBM's	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68
MR/IRBM's	0.80	0.98	1.07	1.04	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
SLBM's	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Cruise Missile Submarines a/	0.29	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Space Weapons b/									
TOTAL Offensive	4.84	4.57	3.41	3.24	2.26	2.24	2.19	2.17	1.88
Strategic Defensive	2.28	2.25	2.04	2.21	1.43	1.35	1.18	0.96	0.95
Interceptors	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
ABM's	2.57	2.58	2.15	1.54	1.48	1.41	1.42	1.36	1.35
SAM's	0.68	0.70	0.76	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.82	0.78	0.80
Control and Warning b/	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Anti-Satellite b/									
TOTAL Defensive	5.69	5.69	5.11	4.70	3.88	3.73	3.58	3.26	3.26

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from NIPP-68 "Lo".

Table 6

Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces
1969-1977

ACDA-Hi Scenario (Freeze of Deployment, Moderate Qualitative Improvements)

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Strategic Offensive									
Bombers and Tankers	1.23	1.07	0.97	0.87	0.82	0.77	0.72	0.68	0.63
ICBM's	1.32	0.93	1.35	2.69	2.99	1.80	0.51	0.51	0.51
MR/IRBM's	1.77	2.02	1.65	0.71	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
SLBM's	1.01	1.20	1.25	1.41	0.28	0.24	0.21	0.21	0.21
Cruise Missile Submarines a/	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.19
Space Weapons b/	0.73	0.69	0.36	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
TOTAL Offensive	6.28	6.12	5.78	6.04	4.87	3.59	2.21	2.17	2.12
Strategic Defensive									
Interceptors	3.27	2.83	2.81	2.74	2.60	2.24	2.00	1.48	1.48
ABM's	0.31	0.47	0.66	0.75	2.43	2.62	1.54	1.64	1.74
SAM's	3.56	4.20	4.48	4.30	4.20	3.94	3.80	3.53	3.47
Control and Warning b/	1.03	1.05	1.16	1.21	1.27	1.29	1.29	1.26	1.27
Anti-Satellite b/	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
TOTAL Defensive	8.32	8.67	9.23	9.12	10.62	10.21	8.75	8.03	8.08

a/ Cruise missile submarines, because of their assigned mission in this scenario are included with strategic offensive programs.

b/ These elements are not specified in the scenario but are included for comparability. The data are from NIPP-68 "Hi".

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Table 7
Alternative Expenditure Series for
Missions Not Specified by the Scenarios
1969-1977

	Billion 1966 Dollars								
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
	NIPP-68 "Hi"								
General Purpose Forces a/ Command and General Support RDTE and Space	18.68	19.15	19.59	19.98	19.77	18.98	18.32	17.90	17.78
	15.60	15.23	15.20	15.40	15.64	15.75	15.87	16.03	16.07
	17.30	19.20	21.09	23.16	25.45	27.94	b/	b/	b/
	NIPP-68 "Lo"								
General Purpose Forces a/ Command and General Support RDTE and Space	15.17	15.30	15.42	15.46	15.03	14.71	14.44	14.01	13.82
	12.67	12.38	12.23	12.16	12.17	12.22	12.20	12.28	12.22
	12.00	12.59	12.85	13.37	13.51	13.56	b/	b/	b/
	NIE 11-8/3-68 "Best Estimate"								
General Purpose Forces a/ Command and General Support RDTE and Space	17.72	17.62	17.45	17.30	17.22	16.60	16.14	15.79	15.48
	14.67	14.69	14.55	14.57	14.62	14.65	14.71	14.76	14.79
	15.45	16.77	17.94	19.16	20.40	21.57	22.74	23.96	25.11

a/ Excluding cruise missile submarines.
b/ Not specified in NIPP-68.

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