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13 March 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Joint DIA/CIA Civil Defense Study

Scope Note

This study will consider all available evidence on Soviet civil defense. It will focus on the following questions: 1) how much resources are the Soviets devoting to civil defense; 2) how feasible would it be to evacuate large Soviet cities and provide evacuees adequate fallout protection; 3) how effectively could Soviet civil defense minimize casualties in the event of nuclear war. The study will be completed by 15 August 1969.

Terms of Reference

- I. Summary (CIA and DIA)
- II. Soviet Civil Defense Philosophy (CIA)

1. Scope: This will entail an attempt to define the extent of the Soviet civil defense effort mainly in terms of how training and other civil defense responsibilities affect the society.

2. Organization: This will involve a description of the hierarchical structure of Soviet civil defense within the Ministry of Defense, at the various political subdivisions and the military districts. The responsibilities of the various ministries will be defined, and the civil defense communications network will be delineated. We hope to have NSA update an earlier comprehensive study of the CD network.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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3. Resource Commitment

We will attempt to estimate how much the Soviets are spending for civil defense by quantifying as much of the program as possible, e.g., the staff strength and breakdown according to military rank; training in the school system and industry; publications; civil defense construction; equipment and maintenance costs of the communications network.

4. Political-Sociological Usages of Civil Defense Training A good case can be made that ideological considerations account for some of the impetus behind the civil defense program.

5. Soviet Civil Defense and ABM Defense
No evidence has come to light of any conceptual or practical relationship between the two systems in the USSR. This section will entail an analysis of statements on ABM by civil defense and other military officials. We may include an examination of the criteria the Soviets use to assign defense priorities to various cities.

III. Civil Defense Training (DIA)

1. Military Civil Defense Schools (DIA)

2. Staff School System (CIA): This will examine the specialized training programs the Soviets run for Party, government and managerial personnel, school teachers, and civil defense unit commanders.

3. Population Training (DIA)

4. Training Effectiveness (DIA)

IV. Urban Area Shelter and Fallout Shelter Factors (CIA and DIA)

1. Urban Area Shelter Construction

Basically, this will amount to estimating how much shelter was included in new housing construction in the 1950's when the practice was widespread. There is little evidence

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the Soviets continued this practice beyond 1958 because of development of more destructive warheads. Subsequent emphasis on evacuation seems to confirm this. This section will involve estimates of the hardness of Soviet cities and of the capacities of Soviet subways for blast and fallout shelter.

2. General Fallout Protection

This will involve an analysis of Soviet construction designs and practices to determine amount of protection from radiation Soviet basements would provide.

3. Availability

We will examine the distribution of potential fallout shelter in the USSR taking into consideration the day and nighttime configuration of the population. Construction Branch has already estimated the amount of structurally free basement space there is in the USSR, but further study would be necessary to see if distribution of population corresponds to location of this potential space.

4. BW/CW Protection

Basement

shelters built during the 1950's were designed to protect against these agents, but some of the filter-ventilating equipment necessary for this protection may not have installed. We have a few [redacted] that might provide the basis for an estimate of how many ventilating apparatuses may have been produced. This portion will also require an estimate of the availability of gas masks and protective clothing for civil defense personnel as well as for general population.

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V. Urban Area Evacuation Possibilities (CIA and DIA):

1. Study of Selected Cities:

(OSR's Exmaster model for population data): The military's requirements for additional vehicles in the area of each target will have to be known in order to estimate the amount of residual transport that would be available for evacuation purposes. Likely relocation sites will have to be selected and studied to estimate

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their capacity for absorbing evacuees in sheltered space. Such factors as prevailing winds at various times of year will have to be considered in selection of relocation sites. List of candidate cities for case study is attached. It was drawn up with help of SF/D.


2. Considerations and Problems Relating to Widespread Evacuation This will entail a study of past evacuation experiences, e.g., USSR and London in WW II; Hanoi and Haiphong. Problems of adequate forewarning and widespread radioactive contamination will be considered.

3. Visibility of Evacuation
Will attempt to determine the evacuation indicators that could be seen by satellite reconnaissance; will also examine the possibility of covert evacuation.

VI. Ten Largest Soviet Cities in Terms of Population

- Moscow - 6.5 million
- Leningrad - 3.7 million
- Kharkov - 2.0 million
- Kiyev - 2.0 million
- L'vov - 1.6 million
- Tashkent - 1.5 million
- Perm - 1.4 million
- Alma Ata - 1.4 million
- Dnepropetrovsk - 1.4 million
- Baku - 1.2 million

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