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21 May 1969

The Honorable George A. Lincoln
Director, Office of Emergency
Preparedness
Room 202 Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear General Lincoln:

Mr. Helms has asked that I respond to your letter of 1 May, in which you inquired about Soviet planning for wartime emergencies. Attached is a CIA Intelligence Report on Soviet civil defense that is just now off the press. It addresses some of your questions, including the one on the assumptions underlying Soviet civil defense planning. A joint CIA/DIA study is also planned for publication in late summer to examine in greater detail the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, its costs, and the feasibility of urban evacuation in the USSR.

We have little hard information on Soviet preparations for assuring continuity of government in wartime. As far as emergency facilities go, the leadership probably would retire in wartime to hardened national air defense or strategic rocket forces command centers. These may be located relatively close to Moscow. Hardened offices are also reported to be beneath the Kremlin. Below the national level, emergency government offices may be collocated with the dispersed alternate civil defense headquarters which have been set up for major industrial and administrative centers.

Some of the USSR's East European allies have established relocation facilities for government agencies and have held drills to test government command and control systems. Few details are known about the facilities and exercises. Civil

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defense in the East European Communist countries has some similarities to Soviet civil defense. As in the USSR, public training in these countries is compulsory and workers are organized into rescue and recovery units. There are differences, however, in organizational concepts.

East Germany and Czechoslovakia apparently are creating territorial defense systems that would place their civil defense, rear area military, paramilitary, and security forces under a single command. Poland has had an organization of this type for several years and has held exercises to test the ability of these various forces to coordinate operations in wartime. The USSR has no similar organization.

In China, the construction of the Peking subway may be related to planning for continuity of government control in wartime. The subway apparently is designed to terminate inside a mountain range fifteen miles northwest of the capital. A number of reports have suggested that a large tunnel complex is being excavated inside these mountains for an emergency national command and control center. The subway would permit quick and inconspicuous access to the center.

There is no evidence that the Chinese plan a large-scale shelter construction program for the general population. Shelter preparations appear to have been limited mainly to marking large buildings as shelter areas, building some solid bunkers or tunnels for special personnel, and digging air raid trenches on the outskirts of some cities.

The Chinese have mounted campaigns in recent years to disperse industrial facilities and to reduce the population of large cities. To the extent that this is done, some reduction in vulnerability would occur. Although these campaigns ostensibly serve such civil defense objectives as reducing the vulnerability of the population and economy, they appear to be motivated primarily by social, economic, and political considerations.

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We cannot tell you much about civil defense and emergency preparedness planning among our allies, such as Great Britain, since we do not devote research efforts to this subject in free world countries. It is worth noting, though, that psychological attitudes toward civil defense seem to be most favorable in the Scandanavian countries, where laws require various municipalities and owners of industries, public buildings, and housing to provide shelters and duty personnel for civil defense at their own expense.

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25X1A9a I suggest that your staff contact [redacted] Chief of the Strategic Evaluation Branch, if further information is desired. He can be reached on code 143, ext. 6233.

Sincerely,

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research

Attachment: a/s

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