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[Redacted]

Chief, Intelligence Staff

31 May 1952

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Acting Chief, Western Division

Current Intelligence on Africa

You will recall that earlier in the month I expressed to you the view that there are certain criteria, beyond simple proximity on the map, which determine the most effective grouping of foreign countries for intelligence purposes and the relationship of the area ~~see~~ thus formed to other comparable areas. It was agreed, I believe, that the answers to the following four questions would be highly relevant to such an inquiry.

1. Does the area have certain general characteristics which distinguish it from other intelligence areas and, if so, what are they?
2. What is the area's functional relationship to other areas -- politically, militarily, economically and culturally?
3. What is the character of its intelligence problems from the point of view of OCI's mission?
4. What is the character of OCI's main intelligence sources on the area?

It was further agreed that, in submitting answers to these questions, I would apply these criteria separately to (a) Africa south of the Sahara and (b) French and Spanish North Africa. In doing this I have employed the following preliminary definitions:

Egypt and Libya are entirely excluded as independent members of the Arab world.

By French and Spanish North Africa is meant Tunisia, Algeria, French Morocco, and Spanish Morocco, plus the international zone of Tangier and the two barren Spanish territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara on the Atlantic.

Africa south of the Sahara includes, at its largest extent, all the rest of the continent; the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somaliland are, however, marginal regions.

(Answers)
The more comprehensive ~~to~~ the four questions as regards Africa south of the Sahara are set forth in Appendix A; those on French and Spanish North Africa in Appendix B. These necessarily run to some

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000800050001-7

African Intelligence p. 2

length because the case presented rests essentially on a considerable amount of hard factual data. These facts have been assembled with some care and, I think, cannot as a whole be controverted, though there will inevitably be differences of opinion as to relative emphases and particular implications. For brevity's sake I summarize below my main conclusions on the most efficient organization of current intelligence on Africa.

1. Each of the two areas under discussion has distinguishing characteristics which set it apart from other intelligence areas of the world; Africa south of the Sahara has these distinguishing characteristics in marked degree.

2. Each of the two African areas has close political, military, economic and cultural ties with the area of Western Europe, and these functional relationships with Europe exceed in importance those with any other area. In the case of French and Spanish North Africa ties with the Middle Eastern area are clearly important also — especially those of a cultural nature — but, on balance, of less present significance from the point of view of American security interests than those with Western Europe.

It is the generally accepted theory of foreign intelligence organization that, given equal individual skills, more effective intelligence will be produced if analysts work on countries with whose primary institutions their past training and experience have familiarized them, and if the grouping of the countries in the intelligence organization approximately reproduces the more important functional relationships between the countries themselves. In terms of present and projected OGI regional divisions, producing intelligence according to present standards, these considerations would argue the continued assumption by the Western Division of responsibility for the African dependencies of the various European colonial powers and for the Commonwealth country of South Africa.

3. It is assumed that, despite the increasing importance of both areas for American security and the comparative paucity of American knowledge about them, the intelligence mission of OGI is still not essentially different for Africa than for any other part of the world. This is to say that, among the many interesting problems which an area presents, the OGI regional divisions necessarily focus on foreign policy, defense policy, and major economic policy; on internal political and economic developments significantly affecting the stability of the country or its relations to the United States; on Communism, East-West trade, and important changes in the availability of strategic materials to the United States and its allies. These, at any rate, have been the targets at which the Western Division's production of African intelligence has hitherto been aimed. Since major policy for the African colonies is all made in Europe, since internal threats to the stability of the area are distant rather than immediate, and since Communism and East-West trade are phenomena largely absent from the African scene, comparatively few items of intelligence have been produced.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000800050001-7

African Intelligence p. 3

Even so, to judge from the reception given African items by the OGI Publications Board, the Division has in this respect erred rather on the side of producing too much than of producing too little. (I make this last statement not in complaint at the Board but merely to indicate that the above view of African intelligence is not personal with me but, in effect, widely held by competent judges of current intelligence.) If "indigenous Africa" has been largely left out of the Division's production, it has been left out not because it was indigenous but because it had little to do in any direct way with American security interests. Developments of this sort are, however, followed with considerable care by several members of the Western Division both for their general intelligence value and for their relevance to the African policies of the European powers.

4. Unless OGI can radically change the reporting procedures of State, SO and various other organizations, any separate African Branch would have essentially the same body of classified information to work from as is now seen by the Western Division. Much of this material, moreover -- as well as much of the unclassified material on Africa -- would still have to be given some degree of inspection in the Western Division because of the Division's continuing responsibility for following the general capabilities and intentions of the five European powers mainly involved. Western Division manpower requirements, in other words, would not go down to anywhere near the extent to which the new Middle Eastern Division's requirements would go up.

It would therefore seem that creation of a comprehensive African Branch under the latter division would, under present conditions of intelligence procurement, necessarily result in one of two possible alternatives. Either two different sets of analysts would be inspecting much the same materials to produce much the same intelligence as is now produced by one set; or an additional set of analysts would be assembled -- at a time when several regions of the world are pressing for increased attention -- to produce intelligence of a so far undefined nature on an area which OGI's working experience to date has indicated to be still of low priority for current intelligence purposes. Either alternative would leave OGI open to the accusation of overstaffing.

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Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000800050001-7

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Intelligence on Africa: Appendix A

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

1. General Characteristics

This area might be very loosely termed "Black Africa." It is widely recognized — both in such standard works as Lord Hailey's An African Survey and in intelligence doctrine generally — as one of the major geographic entities of the world. Physically, it is perhaps more like South America than any other major area; but a variety of distinguishing characteristics make it essentially unique.

Except by long sea voyages and by air, it is relatively inaccessible to the rest of the world. By and large, its population is far more primitive than that of any other major area, the great majority living in a pagan tribal society and in a basically non-monetary economy. A third characteristic is the extreme diversity of the population: besides some three million people of European stock and some half million Asians, there are about 140 million indigenous Africans at cultural levels ranging almost from the Stone Age to that of the Europeans. Five European languages are widely spoken, and there are literally hundreds of different native languages and dialects.

A fourth distinguishing characteristic follows naturally from the preceding two: the entire area is under European colonial rule except for Liberia, Ethiopia and what might be termed the transplanted European state of South Africa. Furthermore, the area is economically colonial as well as politically so. Its mining enterprises, its transportation facilities and even some of its agriculture have grown up in large part to meet the economic needs of the distant metropolitan countries rather than those of an integrated development of Africa itself.

2. Functional relationships with other areas

(a) Politically, the area's relationships with Western Europe are far more intimate than with any other area. In the colonial territories the closeness of the tie varies from region to region, but in all cases the higher political institutions follow European patterns and basic policy is laid down in the European capitals. Angola and Mozambique are in a legal sense overseas provinces of metropolitan Portugal; 35 representatives from the French African territories sit in the National Assembly in Paris. On the other hand, various parts of British

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION****Africa p. 2**

colonial Africa have considerable local autonomy, Southern Rhodesia being often described as a "semi-dominion." Of the independent states, South Africa is a full fledged member of the Commonwealth with democratic political institutions closely patterned on British models; while Liberia and Ethiopia necessarily have varied contacts with Britain and France as colonial powers possessing territories contiguous to their own. Liberia's most important external relations, however, are ~~probably~~ those with the United States.

With other major areas of the world, Africa south of the Sahara has few political relations except through the United Nations, of which all three independent states are members. South Africa also maintains formal relations with the other members of the Commonwealth; but with India and Pakistan its actual relations are very unfriendly, owing to India's dislike of the Union's racial and colonial policies, and the Union government's general distrust of Asian states as such. The UN trusteeship system has meant a certain amount of concern on the part of various non-European states with African questions; but this concern has not involved significant inter-governmental relationships. One marginal region of Africa south of the Sahara has close and important relations with the Arab world: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, whose formal sovereignty is at present a subject of hot international dispute.

(b) Militarily, the resources of the area have been organized almost entirely under Western European direction except for Liberia, where the direction has been American, and Ethiopia, which has largely been left to itself. France and Britain maintain important bases at Dakar and at Sisonstoun on the Cape of Good Hope (supplemented by various smaller naval bases and numerous airfields of other powers as well) and also count on African natives for substantial reserves of military manpower in times of emergency. The Union of South Africa uses mainly British equipment and training methods, and has agreed to contribute to the projected Middle East Command sufficient white troops to man one armored division. Only in the case of the Union are local political considerations a factor of much present significance in mobilizing the area's military resources for Western use.

In terms of military geography, the eastern part of the area bears an important relation to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East in somewhat the same way as the western bulge does to the South Atlantic and Latin America. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean is also a matter of concern for the eastern edge of the entire continent.

(c) Economically, the area's ties are overwhelmingly with Western Europe. The four principal colonial powers have developed their

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Africa p. 3

respective African territories in large part with the idea of complementing their own economies -- both directly with commodities otherwise unobtainable within their own currency systems, and indirectly by means of the colonies' earnings in international trade. For example, in 1950 the area as a whole sold over 400 million dollars worth of goods to the United States (in addition to American stock-piling purchases) and over 90 percent of this sum contributed to the dollar positions of Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. Portugal's consistent role as creditor nation in the European Payments Union is due in large part to its African territories' favorable trade balances with the other EPU members; while sterling, without the earnings of British colonial Africa and the Union of South Africa, would be in a much worse position than it now is. To preserve their own preferred economic positions in their colonies all four European powers keep a fairly careful eye on the foreign economic relations of the territories -- insisting, for example, that all United States government aid programs be channeled through the metropolitan capitals.

With other major areas of the world Africa south of the Sahara has comparatively few economic relations. Trade with the Soviet orbit is negligible. Oil is supplied to much of the continent by Western companies from Persian Gulf sources, but colonial Africa's oil requirements are very small. In the past year or two Japan has been making rapid strides to win back its pre-war African markets for cheap consumer goods. How little all this non-European trade adds up to, however, is evident from a few illustrative figures. Nigeria, for example, in 1951 sent about 80 percent of its exports to Western Europe, about 14 percent to the United States, and only 6 percent to all the rest of the world. Mozambique, situated though it is on the Indian Ocean, sent in 1950 only 8 percent of its exports to Asian countries on the Indian Ocean, as against 57 percent going to Western Europe, 6 percent to the United States and a residual 29 percent going mainly to nearby African countries. (Mozambique's imports were even more heavily weighted in favor of Western Europe and against the Indian Ocean area.) The Union of South Africa, exporting heavily to neighboring African colonies, nevertheless sent 60 percent of its exports to Western Europe in 1951 and only about 4 percent to India and the Middle East.

(d) Culturally, the dominant non-indigenous influence throughout the area is that of Western Europe -- with the single exception of American influence in Liberia. In each of the colonial territories the language of the metropolitan power is the medium for all higher education, for government administration above the local level, and for the more important commercial transactions. With a few exceptions, such as the schools maintained by the immigrant Indian community in British East Africa, all education beyond that provided by the traditional initiatory rites of the native tribe is Western-organized, springing from the initiative either of European and American missionary enterprise or of the colonial governments themselves. The French territorial governments

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000800050001-7

SECURITY INFORMATION

Africa p. 4

in particular have made a strong effort to assimilate the more prominent and intelligent natives to French culture. In Ethiopia, French, British and Italian civilization has each made its influence felt, but without achieving anything like the predominance found elsewhere in the area. In the Union of South Africa, which officially has two languages and two cultural traditions, English and Afrikaans are now in conflict; but both groups agree in their belligerent insistence that South Africa is a predominantly European country.

Of the non-European cultural influences from outside the area that of the Moslem religion is the most widespread. All along the northern edge of black Africa a large proportion of the population is Moslem, and in the northern and more civilized portion of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan the people are almost completely Moslem. Elsewhere in this border strip adherence to Islam is a social fact of importance, as it is likewise in Indonesia and various parts of the Soviet orbit, but by no means a determining factor in the orientation of the region. Moslem influence is also found sporadically along many hundreds of miles of the continent's east coast in the form of small long-established and once dominant Arab trading communities, now having little more significance than the Greek and Italian trading communities in the Egyptian delta. A second non-European influence in the area is found in the half million or so Indians and Pakistanis who in the past few generations have settled in the Union of South Africa, Tanganyika and Kenya. Important as these immigrants are in some sectors of African economic life, they nowhere form so large a proportion of the population as in Fiji in the Western Pacific or in British Guiana in the Caribbean, and are disliked by both the Europeans and the indigenous Africans. The Indian Government tries to preserve their cultural ties with the motherland by maintaining High Commissioners' offices in the East African territories and by encouraging periodic visits home. Some scholarships have also been offered to native Africans for study in India. Another, and almost infinitesimal, Asiatic influence is seen in the immigrant Levantine traders to be found in West African ports as in various other parts of the world.

* * * *

The points made above are general and comprehensive considerations affecting the relationships of Africa south of the Sahara to the rest of the world. How these basic relationships have been reflected in actual OGI intelligence production is partially indicated in the attached table of Current Intelligence Digest items for the period 1 January

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/10/23 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000800050001-7

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Intelligence on Africa: Table to Appendix A

Current Intelligence Digest Items on Africa South of the Sahara: 1 January - 30 April 1952

(Africa south of the Sahara is divided into four categories: (1) Ethiopia, Eritrea, British & French Somaliland, Somalia; (2) French, Belgian Portuguese & Spanish colonies in black Africa, plus Liberia; (3) British Colonial Africa; (4) Union of South Africa.)

For purposes of comparison French & Spanish North Africa is also tabulated. Egypt (with the Sudan question) and Libya are excluded as independent states of the Arab world.)

Region	No. of Items	Other areas referred to in either list or comment (i.e. any mention of the region, a country thereof, or the country's policy)						
		Other African	Northern Europe	Western Europe	Latin America	USSR	Soviet Satellite	Western Asia
1) Ethiopia, Eritrea, British & French Somaliland, Somalia	2							
2) French, Belgian Portuguese & Spanish colonies in black Africa, plus Liberia	2	1	2	2				
3) British Colonies	4	1	4	1				
4) Union of South Africa	6			2				1

French & Spanish North Africa	76	17	7	65	3	4	1	27
								5
								1
								27
								5
								1
								27

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Africa p. 5

through 30 April 1952. The nine branches of the OCI regional divisions have been used as the categories for listing references to other areas, and the two further categories of "United Nations" and "Other African" have been added to record any remaining references to external bodies other than the United States. It is believed that analysis of the half dozen Current Intelligence Review articles which have treated Africa south of the Sahara would show a similarly strong concentration on Western Europe as the other area of the world most involved; but such an analysis would perhaps be less objective than one based primarily on OCI's intelligence intake for an arbitrarily selected period.

3. Intelligence Problems

The strategic raw materials and other resources of the area clearly make it one of steadily increasing importance for United States security. Clearly, also, there is great scope for expanding American knowledge of the area. Large parts of it, even in territories known to be rich in strategic minerals, have never been thoroughly explored; and the full exploitation even of the already known resources is probably dependent on further investigations of the medical problem of tropical diseases and the sociological problem of work incentives in a primitive tribal society. Land utilization questions, food problems, transportation surveys, local administration studies, race relations in regions of three and even four separate racial communities, and the general problem of the gradual accession of backward and dependent peoples to political responsibility -- all these are subjects of indirect but real significance for American security interests.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that it is OCI's mission to deal with these questions to any significantly greater extent than OCI has in the past. Some are clearly topics for the universities, others for the research organizations of State or other government agencies. The mission of the OCI regional divisions is necessarily of a more summary sort, even on so critical an area as the Soviet orbit, where the detailed research is by common consent left to ORR. Generally speaking, intelligence production throughout the regional divisions has focused on the following main points:

- (a) Government foreign policy
- (b) Government defense policy
- (c) Government economic policy, particularly as affecting
 - (1) the general economic stability of the territory involved

SECURITY INFORMATION

Africa p. 6

- (2) strategic raw materials important to the United States or its allies
- (3) East-West trade
- (d) Government internal policy as it affects the general political stability of the territory involved.
- (e) Internal party politics and the activities of labor unions, church groups and other domestic organizations in so far as all these significantly affect the general political stability of the territory involved or its relations with the United States
- (f) Non-governmental economic trends and developments in so far as these concern points (1), (2) and (3) listed under (e) above
- (g) Communist activities not already included in the points above

Applying these rough criteria to the intelligence problems of Africa south of the Sahara, one finds that for the colonial territories which comprise the vast majority of the area, the following situation applies. Developments under (a) and (b) above are entirely determined in the respective European capitals, and developments under (c) and (d) are in all their larger aspects determined there -- entirely so for a number of colonies. These moves of European government policy in Africa, moreover, cannot properly be considered apart from the general policies of the government making them. Developments under (e) are of a far more rudimentary nature in the African colonial territories than in most other parts of the world; and even in such comparatively advanced territories as the Rhodesias or the Gold Coast these developments cannot be intelligently treated without constant reference to London policy on the subject. Much the same thing is true of (f) and (g), known Communist activities within most of the colonial territories being almost negligible. Of the three independent countries of the area, Liberia and Ethiopia are weak states, more primitive than several of the colonial territories, and present few intelligence problems for the United States. The Union of South Africa has the varied resources for an active foreign and defense policy, but its special relationship to the United Kingdom makes it difficult to deal with Union independently of various larger considerations of British policy.

It should perhaps be emphasized here that the American responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara remains an indirect one, the primary interest being officially recognized as belonging to the European colonial powers. Also, the general tempo of developments in the area affecting American security is comparatively slow, since the

SECRET

SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION****Africa p. 7**

primary factors influencing the availability of strategic raw materials for Western rearmament programs are technical, not political, and do not change greatly from one year to the next. In a number of instances it is not the production figures themselves but the proportion African sources bear to total American requirements, and efforts contemplated by the United States to increase these supplies, that is highly classified information. On the matter of African sources of uranium, special considerations obtain, involving the jurisdictions of other CIA offices.

It is therefore hard to envisage a greatly increased demand for high-level current intelligence on Africa, unless it is decided that, for example, labor conditions in the vicinity of African strategic mineral developments warrant an intensity of scrutiny which has not hitherto been deemed advisable for the no less essential iron mines of northern Sweden or the oil wells of Venezuela.

4. Intelligence Sources

The scope of any OCI intelligence activity is necessarily limited by the character and extent of the intelligence sources available. The United States maintains embassies and consulates in Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa; it maintains consulates in French West Africa, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Belgian Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Kenya and Eritrea.

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Africa p. 8

SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1

It is evident from the description of these various sources of intelligence on Africa south of the Sahara that most of the more useful materials for current intelligence must be inspected in any case by the analysts responsible for following the government policies of the European colonial powers.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Intelligence on Africa: Appendix B

FRENCH AND SPANISH NORTH AFRICA

1. General Characteristics

This area is of mixed character. Physically separated by salt water from Europe, by the Sahara from most of the rest of Africa, and to a lesser extent by the arid Libyan country from the lower Nile region, it has a population of elements related to those in these other three areas. Berbers and Arabs make up the great majority, the dominant Europeans comprising some million and a half out of a total of about 23 million. After several generations of European immigration (which still continues) considerable intermarriage has occurred.

In a broad sense, the area is both politically and economically colonial. The economy is predominantly agricultural; large-scale industry is almost non-existent; much of the population in the interior is nomadic. On the other hand, such large coastal cities as Algiers and Casablanca are strongly European in general character.

2. Functional Relationships with Other Areas

(a) Politically, the entire area is under effective European control. Northern Algeria is legally an integral part of metropolitan France, with 30 representatives in the National Assembly. In Tunisia, as in French Morocco, the French Resident General is the real center of political power, though nominally an adviser to the Arab sovereign. A similar arrangement exists in Spanish Morocco, but the cities of Melilla and Ceuta have been directly administered by Spain since 1470 and 1640 respectively. In all these territories the European-controlled police is a formidable instrument of power. The International Zone of Tangier is ruled by the consuls of six Western European states, plus the United States, France having at present the dominant influence.

With countries other than France and Spain the area has official relations only on a consular basis — except for certain special relations between the United States and Morocco going back to the treaty of 1836. The Soviet Union has a currently dormant claim to participation in the control of Tangier. On the other hand, unofficial ties exist between the Arab nationalist parties of the area and political leaders in the independent states of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Cairo and Baghdad are favorite centers for political refugees, while Moslem states as far away as Pakistan have lobbied in the United Nations in support of the Moroccan and Tunisian cause against the French. Representatives of the Istiqlal Party (Morocco) and the Neo-Destourians (Tunisia) have also engaged in UN lobbying on their own account.

SECRET

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SECURITY INFORMATION

North Africa, p.2

It may be noted that the demands of these Arab nationalist parties have so far not extended to severance of the political ties with France but only to greatly increased autonomy.

(b) Militarily, the important resources of the area are entirely under French and Spanish control, except in so far as NATO command arrangements and the lease of five French Moroccan air bases to the United States have altered this situation. Algeria, but no other part of North Africa, is included in the area guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty; and a survey has been made of possible NATO air base sites there. The United States has desired a similar survey of Tunisia, but the French have so far not allowed the survey mission to enter the country. The key naval base is at present Bizerte, in Tunisia, but the French are slowly building up Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran, to be the most important in the Mediterranean area. Of about 130,000 French and 60,000 Spanish ground troops in the area, roughly half are native; and both European powers follow the practice of using special Moroccan combat troops outside of North Africa.

In terms of military geography, the area is a kind of backstop for Western Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion, being a secure base for long-range bombing attacks extending as far as European Russia. It has an important secondary relationship to the Eastern Mediterranean area, providing the means of protecting NATO supply lines to that area from air and submarine attack, and also a means of closing the western exit from the Mediterranean.

(c) Economically, the area has been well integrated with the two metropolitan countries, forming subordinate parts of their respective currency systems and (except for Tangier) receiving the great majority of its imports from there. Its secondary economic ties (again excepting Tangier's trade with the United States) are predominantly with the other countries of Western Europe. Thus, the high grade iron ore which is the major export of Spanish Morocco goes almost entirely to Western Europe, about half of it to Britain. Phosphates from French Morocco are important to the agriculture of Western Europe and the entire Mediterranean basin, but are exported mainly to European countries. All three French North African territories send at least half their exports to other parts of the French Union, and Algeria sends as much as 78 percent of its exports to France itself.

With other major areas of the world French and Spanish North Africa have relatively little trade, that with the United States generally coming next in importance after Western Europe's. With the countries of the Soviet orbit trade is negligible, the only shipments of any size involving a variety of green tea from China that is a staple of native diets. Despite the possibilities of cheap sea transport, the countries at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean figure most insignificantly in North African trade statistics.

(d) Culturally, European influence is dominant in the sense that French and Spanish are the languages of government and education, and the Arab upper classes in the coastal centers of population generally aspire to European modes of dress and a European way of life. The French governing authorities, in line with their general colonial theory, have furthered these tendencies as much as they can, encouraging students to go to France for their higher training and discouraging, by various indirect means, education along non-

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

North Africa, p. 3

French lines.

The great majority of the population, however, is illiterate, has been comparatively little affected by European influences, and, particularly in the interior, follows a mode of life that has changed little in centuries. Derivatives of Arabic constitute the dominant tongue and these, rather than French or Spanish, must necessarily be used in many of the processes of local government. The Arab, during the twelve centuries of his political rule, also imposed his religion, his dress, and many of his incidental customs on most of the indigenous Berbers. Zeitouna University, which traces its history back to 732, still survives in Tunisia, and some Tunisian students go to Cairo for higher training. The cultural bond with the independent Arab world is unquestionably a strong one, and inevitably finds a reflection in the political aspirations of the nationalist parties.

3. Intelligence Problems

As in the case of Africa south of the Sahara, this area is one of increasing importance for American security interests, though more for immediately strategic reasons than for its raw materials. Applying to North Africa the general criteria of CCI's main interests outlined on pp. 5 and 6 of Appendix A, one finds that here, as in the larger African colonial area, foreign policy and defense policy are entirely determined in Europe, and that European decisions constitute the largest single factor in internal political and economic developments. Communism, though considerably more of a problem in French North Africa than elsewhere on the continent, is not one of the magnitude encountered in various West European and Asian countries; while questions of East-West trade, and of the availability of strategic raw materials to the United States and its allies, are almost negligible.

On the other hand, the strong cultural affinity between French and Spanish North Africa and large regions of the Middle East is a factor not paralleled in Africa south of the Sahara. It complicates the intelligence problem in at least two ways. For one thing, this cultural bond encourages and strengthens the internal nationalist agitation against the French-controlled governments of North Africa, and must therefore be taken fully into account in any estimate of these governments' stability. The limitations of the Moslem faith in influencing basic political orientation are, however, strongly suggested by the existence in the Soviet Union of large regions where the population is about as predominantly Moslem as in French and Spanish North Africa.

A second way in which this Arab cultural tie complicates the intelligence problem on North Africa is in influencing independent Moslem states to adopt attitudes unfriendly to France and its allies. For example, the recent move to bring the Tunisian question before the UN Security Council diplomatically embarrassed the United States by forcing it to choose publicly between antagonizing France and antagonizing the Moslem states; and evaluations of national reactions to the case, both in the Moslem states and elsewhere in the world, accordingly became significant current intelligence. (This situation was incidentally responsible for a large proportion of the items on North Africa enumerated in the table between pp. 4 and 5 of Appendix A as appearing in the Current Intelligence Digest between 1 January and 30 April, and possibly responsible also for the fact that over two-and-a-half times as many references were noted to Western European countries as to those in

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

North Africa, p. 4

the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas) On this aspect of North African intelligence production, however, there would be no significant advantage in having North Africa and the Moslem states in the same intelligence area, since the reactions of Western European states to Tunisian and Moroccan developments are just as important considerations for American foreign policy. In the particular Tunisian case referred to, it was evidently France's reaction which was decisive.

In general, it is safest to assume that the nature of the United States security interest in an area necessarily conditions the nature of OCI's intelligence interest. At the present time the primary United States security interest in this area is the NATO and other Western military bases there; correspondingly, OCI's interest in the area must focus primarily on the factors likely to make these bases available or unavailable. These factors are admittedly of varying sorts and strengths. Popular nationalist feeling is one, and it would certainly seem to be an OCI responsibility to watch for any indications that it may be approaching the point where, as in Egypt now, it could raise the question of whether Western military bases are still fully operable. For the present and immediate future, however, it is clear that the main factor affecting the availability of French North African bases is to be found in governmental offices in Paris - a factor which OCI cannot handle with maximum effectiveness if it is separated from other French policy considerations.

However strong the North African area's cultural relations with the Arab states, therefore, and whatever its future political development may be, for the practical problems of current intelligence the area still has primarily a Western European and not a Middle Eastern context.

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* The enumeration was not mathematically exact, since two independent checkers of the North African items got slightly varying results, though not differing as to the general proportions involved.

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