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ARGUMENT

SECDEF/JCS responsibilities for determining the size, composition, capabilities and disposition of U.S. armed forces and for effective command and control of military operations require direct management and operational control of the assets and capabilities which provide the intelligence necessary to support those missions. Their placement within an independent authority under the DCI would exacerbate competition between "national" and "defense" intelligence requirements at the cost of understanding of and responsiveness to defense establishment needs.

COUNTERPOINTS

--The DoD argument emphasizes the potential contradictions between national and defense intelligence requirements while overlooking the much larger area of commonality. Thus, the issue is framed in an either/or context which greatly overstates the case.

--The principal argument for centralized management of intelligence resources and operations is not the primacy of national over defense or other particular requirements, but that the very existence of differing requirements against the same set of resources and capabilities requires centralized management so that optimum investment of funds and employment of assets to meet varying needs may be assured.

--In short, the losses or deficiencies DoD perceives will come from centralization are, in great measure, the result of the very distinction between "national" and "defense" that it is championing. Resulting fragmentation of planning, investment and management creates inefficiencies which leave all claimants unsatisfied and preclude realization of the synergistic benefits to be derived from approaching requirements and capabilities on an integrated basis.

--The practice of categorizing intelligence collection capabilities and the information they yield as "national," "defense," "departmental" and "tactical" has created administrative and operational difficulties far exceeding the utility of such distinctions. While they clearly characterize some valid differences, there are larger areas of overlap which have become counterproductive sources of confusion and contention. Specifically:

- o "national" collection systems can be major sources of tactical support and vice versa;

- o the definitional distinctions between "national" and "defense" or "tactical" intelligence tend to disappear in specific operational contexts, where all levels of government are focused on the same problems and questions;

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o the uniqueness of "departmental" intelligence requirements is, to a significant extent, contradicted by parallel demands by the White House and Congress for independent, multi-lateral estimates and net assessments pertaining to foreign threat, force posture determination, weapons systems requirements, etc. Thus, intelligence required by DoD to perform its mission in these areas, is also required by such agencies as CIA, State, ACDA, OMB, et al.

25X1 --In sum, the concept of "predominant need" as the principal factor in determining who should control what intelligence resources and capabilities is not useful since valid and multiple claims to predominance can exist and will vary from one operational context to another. In the longer term, an intelligence system subdivided along such lines would actually operate to the detriment of DoD's interests, insofar as the trend toward concentrating the bulk of investment resources in so-called "national" assets, e.g., [] will gradually increase the proportion of Community assets to which "defense intelligence" is an external claimant, as opposed to a centralized system in which DoD would be a powerful insider.

--Further, the technical aspects of intelligence operations, particularly in the area of collection, have evolved to the point that centralized operation is mandatory from the system design, technical management and economics viewpoints. This is most obvious in overhead reconnaissance and increasingly so in SIGINT. The real issue, therefore, is not centralization per se, but priority of access to the services of centrally managed and operated capabilities and participation in their design.

--In this regard, DoD's argument for autarky appears to reflect a belief that, within a centrally operated system, it would become a client or customer of the DCI and, therefore, lose the capability to meet its intelligence requirements. However, this view ignores the fact that defense intelligence needs will be the single largest consideration under any system of management and that this will give DoD a strong management voice that could increase to effective system control in wartime.

--Creation of a National intelligence authority does not mean that the DCI will directly operate all intelligence assets. Clearly, where capabilities are designed to support the missions of particular organizations, delegation of operational management authority would be indicated. Similarly, the existence of a national intelligence authority would impose no inherent limitation on DoD's requirement for and access to intelligence necessary to perform its mission. In circumstances where competition for access to particular intelligence capabilities occurs, the interests of all parties would be better served by a common arbiter obligated to consider the needs of all claimants rather than by a determination ultimately based on resource ownership. Thus, DoD access to needed intelligence

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capabilities and support would improve within a centralized structure because of integration with the capabilities of other agencies such as the CIA. Where, in effect, all requirements are "national," there will be greater facility for judging them on merit rather than by who controls the underlying resources.

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