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# MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE


## *Developments in Indochina*

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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

*(Information as of 1500)*

CAMBODIA

South Vietnamese forces are continuing to move unopposed into eastern Kompong Cham Province. The government has made little headway in the clearing operations west of Phnom Penh, and the Communists may be increasing the pressure against Route 4.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Recent Viet Cong directives and instructions have admitted that the campaign against Saigon's pacification program has not been going well.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Communist dry season logistic campaign is under way in the Laotian panhandle.

LAOS

Irregular forces operating against enemy transportation routes north of the Bolovens Plateau continue to meet little resistance. The Communists have moved tanks to the Muong Phalane area.


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CAMBODIA

The US defense attaché reports that the government has made little headway in the clearing operations west of Phnom Penh. Several additional battalions from the Chenla II area, however, are being ferried in by South Vietnamese helicopters and are to be added to the government's relief efforts during the next three days. In the meantime, elements of some 14 government battalions--about 5,200 troops--remain in essentially static positions.

The Communists may be increasing the pressure against Route 4. Delayed reports indicate that enemy sappers destroyed a key bridge about ten miles north of Veal Renh over the weekend. Cambodian Army engineers are trying to rig some sort of a bypass. In the Pich Nil Pass area, the Communists reportedly ambushed a government patrol, killing four and wounding 15.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Anti-Pacification: Still at Square One

Viet Cong directives and instructions for cadre in South Vietnam have recently been more explicit than in the past in admitting Saigon's pacification program has not been going well. One directive, from an area near Saigon, reveals that COSVN--the top Communist command in the South--has warned its political leaders they must "adjust their counterpacification methods to the realities of the present situation" and end their underestimation of the strength of the government's program. COSVN singled out the government's relocation of people away from the rural areas as an example of the damage that had been caused by the program.

To help meet the problem, COSVN has been encouraging its subordinates to take another look at the problem of rebuilding the local cadre network. A South Vietnamese intelligence source in Kien Phong Province with contacts among local Viet Cong says that cadre there were told recently to adopt a "cold war" strategy of evading large government operations and rebuilding the local cadre network. The fundamental concepts of winning support for the revolution were to be emphasized, and more attention also was to be given to rebuilding hamlet, village, and district administrations.

Communist documents from the delta emphasize this line even more strongly. A document reportedly originating from COSVN states that "political activities" are currently the most important part of the revolution, and that during the current phase military action will be de-emphasized. Cadres also were instructed to get back in touch with the people and to build up

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their local organizations by recruiting more people from the ranks of dissatisfied citizens in government-controlled areas.

Much of the information reported recently appears to echo Resolution 9, the Communist pronouncement that changed Viet Cong strategy from big unit warfare to low profile guerrilla strategy in the summer of 1969. Resolution 9 acknowledged then, as the latest pronouncements do now, that the government's pacification was having serious repercussions on the enemy's local cadre network and that Viet Cong leaders would have to focus their attention on destroying the program and regaining contact with the people. The latest indications seem to suggest that much of what the Communists hoped to accomplish with Resolution 9 has failed, and that a renewed emphasis on the basic precepts of the document is now being made to keep the situation from deteriorating.

Recent authoritative pronouncements from Hanoi carry a more broadly phrased version of much the same message. In a series of four articles that constitute one of the few comprehensive examinations of guerrilla warfare strategy in recent years, the North Vietnamese army journal takes the standard line that pacification must be countered by a mixture of political and military tactics. The articles lay heavy stress on guerrilla warfare, political agitation, and other traditional elements of the Vietnamese Communist revolutionary scenario, and they emphasize in customary fashion the evolutionary, developmental nature of the struggle. "This truly is a process of mass uprising," they assert, "from phased, repeated, scattered uprisings to concerted uprisings and from persistent struggle to big leaps forward." Moreover, the articles suggest that "concerted uprisings" are still a long way off.

The army journal conveys the notion, largely absent in information from South Vietnam, that the

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Communists are looking toward a better coordinated antipacification effort, possibly combined with a bigger military effort sometime in the future. "Only by launching concerted, large-scale offensive waves under a unified plan," it says, "will the southern armed forces and people be able to achieve high combat efficiency, deal the enemy vigorous blows, and demolish military subsectors." If the author is talking about larger-scale operations directly against the pacification program, he is looking far into the future; there are few heavily populated areas in South Vietnam where the Communists are now in a position to strike with large numbers of forces directly against pacification. The Communists may also, however, be stretching the term "unified plan" to include main-force action in border areas--action which always is aimed partly at distracting South Vietnamese forces ordinarily used to shield pacification operations. This sort of indirect pressure on the pacification effort can be anticipated during the current dry season, and the articles may be exhorting local Communist cadres to gear their own activities more closely to these diversionary thrusts.

As far as the "frontal assault" on pacification itself is concerned, the evidence is reasonably clear that the Communists will continue to concentrate mainly on low-level activities in the near future in which cadre will be exhorted to make sure that military actions they carry out are specifically aimed at undercutting pacification. This will be especially true in the southern half of the country, where Communist military capabilities are thinnest. The emphasis on political activity will probably be less pronounced in northern South Vietnam, where Communist capabilities for both main-force and guerrilla warfare are in better shape.

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


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Increased Truck Activity



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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Communist dry season logistic campaign is under way in the Laotian panhandle. During the past week sensor detections of truck traffic doubled over the previous week, reaching the highest level since the end of the last dry season. Most of this traffic is concentrated in the area between the entry routes from North Vietnam and Tchepone. The panhandle roadnet is generally in excellent condition, however, and with continued good weather likely, truck activity is expected to increase and spread southward during the coming weeks.

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
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● Government-held location    ● Communist-held location

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LAOS

Irregular forces operating against enemy transportation routes north of the Bolovens Plateau continue to meet little resistance. A four-battalion task force is continuing to operate around Ban Phone, while another irregular battalion has moved to a point six miles northeast of Thateng.

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In the central panhandle, elements from two irregular battalions that had been pushed back from Muong Phalane by strong enemy attacks late last week sent patrols to check the area south and southwest of the town, but they encountered no enemy forces. Government commanders believe that three to five new battalions, along with the NVA's 4th and 5th battalions which have been defending the town, participated in the attacks. This estimate may be exaggerated, however.

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The Communists have moved tanks to the Muong Phalane area. US pilots on 21 November discovered that two tanks had moved along the road to a point halfway between Muong Phalane and Dong Hene. One of the tanks was destroyed by an air strike, however.

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