Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020005-5 4 August

Jim, and whomever else it may concern,

Where to go from here on the Brezhnev succession paper

As I understood the Director's concerns this noon,

He wanted a sense of a how an early succession period collective functions;

He wanted a range of succession scenario options (with % guess likelihood options attached) beyond our best estimate (a double succession led by Kirilenko)

Possible line of march:

- Beginning in Section II on p. 12, run through new para 16 as is (para 15 in all but my master draft,) re Brezhnev unlikely arrange succession himself.
- Spend a para on scenario: Brezhnev becomes too uneven to really run the country, and is forced by present politburo into figurehead status in the Presidency; he acquiesces because he has to and it's more fun than quiet retirement; someone becomes party boss (probably Kirilenko,) and a collective of present seniors runs thoungs until they fade enough that the new party boss consolidates power or he too fades and another "succession" begins.
 - State the proposition that it is highly likely (90%? more?) that a collective will xxxxxxxx be be the principal authority for several years after Brezhnev goes. Someone will have the CPSU boss title, but however greater or lesser his influence within a collective, it will be more his master than he its for some time.
 - Spend several paragraphs describing the dynamics of a collective in early succession months and years: how power is were squabbled for, won and used; what power bases are important, etc. Don Graves at State is drafting these, and will IDX results over on Tuesday night or Wednesday morning. Use most of new para 22 as intro to this.
 - Then pick up the sections describing the SU's policy woes that will confront the new leadership, with divisive impact these will have mixed with political process. New paras 23-28 (rest of Characteristics of an Early Brezhnev Succession, Probable Weakening of the Leadership, Serious Problems to be Confronted)
 - Then turn to likeliest scenario, Kirilenko section, paras 17-2, old 16-19,) with 60% chance he will succeed to title, 30% he'll fully consolidate power.
 - Then a para (new para 20, old 19 adapted) on chance someone else would succeed to title (what are chances, 30%??) and try to get through a consappretied for Release 2004/12/20:*CPA-RDP79R00603A003000920905-5 that follows, old 20, new 21. Make clear these chaps are illustrative, not inclusive.

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be magnitude of SU's problems and extent of stagnation at time. State we have no idea who he might be. Explore briefly Dick Lehman's idea of this happening in context of one or more young turks being able to muster support of Central Committee at some intolerable period of collective stagnation post Brezhnev, or even of Brezhnev ultimate immobolism.

| The Director had one other concern, strugglefor primacy vs collective think that the Part III covers this | mixture would make for obd. I |
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| worked into Part II also. | |

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