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NSC BRIEFING

9 March 1960

KHRUSHCHEV TRIP TO ASIA

- I. Overall public response to Khrushchev's four nation tour of Asia (11 Feb-4 Mar) did not live up to obvious Soviet expectations.
  - A. Largest welcome received in Kabul, but Embassy characterized this as "forced and without enthusiasm."
  - B. Even in a communist stronghold like Surabaya (Indonesia), reception only moderate.
- II. Perhaps partially for this reason Khrushchev described on much of trip as glum, dispirited and irritable. In return, he irritated many leaders all countries by boasts of Soviet achievements, blunt lectures on virtues of communism and criticism of practices in individual countries.
  - A. In India, President Prasad and other leaders annoyed by Khrushchev preaching of value of one-party system, impromptu lectures on Soviet methods of farming.
- III. Biggest personality clash came in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Subandrio noted visit was "toughest affair he ever had to handle," said there was almost constant bickering between President Sukarno and Khrushchev.
  - A. He quoted Sukarno as saying "I didn't invite this man here to be insulted by him." At one point Sukarno told Subandrio, "You take over, I can't stand another minute of this."

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- B. When Sukarno expressed no interest in detailed economic figures, Khrushchev told him, "You are no socialist. Socialism consists of figures, figures, figures." "You are a robot," Sukarno retorted.
  - C. At one point, when Khrushchev had urged compulsion and sterner methods, Sukarno stated, "I will never destroy the happiness of my people."
  - D. In reply to Khrushchev's charge that Indonesia's purchase of Lockheed Electras did not befit a "socialist," Sukarno said that he was buying what he considered best suited for Indonesia.
  - E. Despite personality clash, Indonesian leaders found Khrushchev impressive and man of great ability and visit on whole a mild success.
- IV. In Afghanistan there was reported wrangling over texts of joint statements with signing of cultural agreement postponed six times, although photographers and press present each time, and Gromyko on hand four times.
- A. At departure ceremonies Prime Minister Daud distinctly unhappy and somewhat angry, stood aloof from Khrushchev. Khrushchev spoke of nothing but weather and parting words to King were "don't be worried; all these difficulties will be straightened out."
- V. Despite these frictions, resentment toward Khrushchev did not prevent acceptance of aid or final signature of joint communiques which support Soviet propaganda and policy positions. Moscow Radio now claiming that as result trip Khrushchev will represent Asian countries as well as communist bloc at summit.

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- A. In India, Khrushchev signed previously worked out aid agreement for \$375,000,000 to be utilized during Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) and arranged for Soviet assistance in development atomic energy there.
- B. Khrushchev granted \$250,000,000 new credit to Indonesia at request Sukarno. Reportedly Khrushchev was prepared give as high as \$4-500,000,000.
1. This credit is in addition to the earlier credit--amounting to \$126,300,000--of which only about 20 percent (\$26,800,000) has been used.
  2. Impact of the new credit depends on rapidity and effectiveness of use--Indonesians claim they will try to spread the new credit equally over the seven year period prescribed by the agreement (approximately \$35,000,000 per year.)
  3. Indonesia's five-year development plan, tentatively scheduled to begin in 1961, is estimated to cost \$2,000,000,000. It is said to call for 20 percent of needed funds from Soviet Union, another 10 percent from other bloc countries, and remaining 70 percent from West, Japanese reparations, and domestic resources.
  4. Late reports state that a secret agreement was reached by which Indonesia is to receive a cruiser, three or four submarines, and military aircraft, possibly including bombers.
- C. In Afghanistan Khrushchev announced Soviet gift of 50,000 tons of wheat, and promised continued economic aid. Most significant was Khrushchev's endorsement on his return of "self-determination" for Pushtoonistan, calling for plebiscite of Pakistani Pushtus. (Note this being picked up by Pakistanis for Afghan Pushtus, by West Germans for East Germany.)

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- VI. Recent aggressive activities of Chinese Communists loomed large in background of trip.
- A. Subandrio noted that while in Indonesia Khrushchev displayed real fear that, as result Chinese actions, Indonesia would alter its non-alignment policy. Khrushchev returned time and time in conversations to this theme.
- B. Khrushchev stopped again in India on his return from Indonesia, visiting Calcutta where he reportedly discussed with Nehru situation arising from Chou En-lai acceptance invitation to talk on border dispute.
- C. Peiping, still at odds with Moscow on foreign policy issues, was virtually silent during Khrushchev's trip, but more recently has publicly endorsed it as blow against American "imperialism."

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