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FEMA Review Completed.

COMMENTS ON PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS FOR FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION

ASSUMPTIONS NO. 1 and 2

It is suggested that substitution of the following for Assumptions 1 and 2 will provide a better perspective of the probability of an attack on the U.S.:

"There is now, and will continue to be for at least some years, grave danger of war between the U.S. and the USSR, and in the event of war there will be grave danger of an air attack on the continental U.S. with atomic and other weapons. Such a war may be initiated by a surprise attack on the U.S. in which the USSR might well strike with maximum surprise and effectiveness in an effort to cripple our retaliatory forces, our principal mobilization and communication centers, and specific critical industries."

ASSUMPTION NO. 3

1. While the principal method of delivery of atomic weapons probably will be aircraft, the Soviets are also capable of clandestine introduction of atomic weapons into key harbors. If successful, such introduction would be a most effective means of deterring our logistic support for Western Europe. Therefore, this method of attack should be specifically mentioned.

2. Some high explosive and incendiary bombs may be employed concurrently with, or as a supplement to, atomic weapons. However, it is misleading to include high explosive and incendiary bombs with atomic weapons as the principal method of air attack. Sizeable high explosive and incendiary attacks against the continental U. S. during the next few years are considered unlikely.

3. The statement that "such attack ... might be ... preceded by the use of BI and CW agents" is presumed to refer to clandestine

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or unconventional employment. Overt or conventional mass employment of BW or CW prior to atomic bombardment, is most unlikely. With respect to pre-D-Day clandestine employment of BW and CW, the assumption should indicate that:

a. Clandestine employment of BW agents against personnel prior to D-Day is less likely than such employment after D-Day. Suspicion as to the cause of the resulting disease could cost the Soviets complete loss of strategic surprise.

b. Clandestine employment of CW agents prior to overt military attack is most unlikely. Their characteristic physiological effect would insure their identification.

4. The statement that, "such attack ... might be ... accomplished by the use of BW and CW agents" is considered too general and hence misleading:

a. It is most unlikely that BW and/or CW would be employed concurrently with AW on the same target. The heat of the fire-storms caused by atomic explosions would probably destroy the bacteria, and the resulting wind storms would undoubtedly dissipate the CW agents. An air attack on population centers with BW and/or CW would be most effective as a follow-up to an atomic attack.

b. After D-Day, sabotage attacks with BW agents may still be employed against personnel, crops and livestock. Air attack against crops and livestock is likely to be limited to small-scale isolated attacks with self-propagating agents.

c. Coincident with overt military attack, as well as subsequently, sabotage employment of CW agents may possibly be employed against personnel in key installations.

d. Unless there is significant increase in the decisiveness of BW and CW, air attack with these weapons is more likely during that period when the Soviet atomic bomb stockpile is relatively limited.

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ASSUMPTION NO. 4

1. The kiloton equivalent power of Soviet atomic weapons should be "20 to 50" instead of "60 to 80".

2. This assumption implies that the total Soviet bomb stockpile will be employed against the U. S. and also that all of the bombs will be employed simultaneously. Even in the case of a surprise attack "of maximum effectiveness", it is doubtful that the total stockpile would be employed in "the attack". A more realistic assumption could be obtained by estimating the weight of the attack in terms of the number of bombs likely to be allocated for employment against the U. S. in any one attack and the percentage of delivering aircraft likely to reach the target area.

3. Current estimates of the Soviet stockpile are:

Mid-1951	.....	50
Mid-1952	.....	120
Mid-1953	.....	205
Mid-1954	.....	315

ASSUMPTION NO. 5

1. Regardless of the number of bombs available, the USSR will establish priorities for targets which will greatly reduce the probability of attack on the full number of the "critical areas". With a limited number of bombs (much fewer than the available aircraft for delivery), target priorities will be determined almost entirely by the Soviet estimate of the most important targets (irrespective of geographical location) in terms of deterring U. S. retaliation and damaging war potential and without regard to the aircraft loss to be incurred from one-way missions.

2. Civil defense planning must be based on an assessment of the relative likelihood of bombing of the various critical target areas, and on the fact that all the continental U. S. with the exception of Florida is within range of Soviet Tu-4 bombers flying one-way missions.

ASSUMPTION NO. 6

1. This assumption is deficient because of its failure to distinguish between "strategic" and "tactical" warning.

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2. It must be assumed that little or no "strategic" warning will be received.

3. "Tactical" warning is dependent upon the effectiveness of the U. S. air defense system. Information on this subject is not available to CIA.

ASSUMPTIONS NOS. 7, 8, 9, and 10

No comment inasmuch as these assumptions are considered to be technical rather than intelligence questions.

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