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Security Information

11 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-74: Probable Developments in Burma through 1953

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was initiated by the IAC in response to a Department of State requirement. It supersedes NIE-36 and NIE-36/1.

2. No major disagreements were revealed in the preparation of the Burma estimate, and we do not anticipate any special problems in the course of final IAC approval of this paper.

SUBSTANCE

3. The paper strikes a note of cautious optimism, in contrast to the pessimism of the previous estimate on Burma (NIE-36/1), and concludes that the prospects are for a slight improvement in Burma's internal security and economic and political stability during 1953.

4. The major problem encountered in the inter-agency discussion had to do with the likelihood of full-scale military cooperation during 1953 between the insurgent Karens and the Chinese Nationalist troops located in north eastern Burma. It was felt that if such cooperation were achieved it would force the Burmese government to divert substantial numbers of troops from anti-Communist operations and seriously weaken the government's capability of dealing with insurgency throughout Burma. The representatives felt that such cooperation was unlikely, but in the face of current evidence of increasing local cooperation between the Karen and Nationalist units, we found it necessary to indicate some lack of confidence in the estimate at that point (paragraph 3 of the conclusions and paragraph 30 of the discussion).

RAYMOND SONTAG
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates

O/NE:RJS:Smith:PAB:le
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Addressee, []

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