CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

3 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Congo Crisis

SUMMARY

1. The long-continued crisis in the Congo appears to be entering upon a new and far more disquieting phase. No one would be justified in attempting to estimate with any confidence the course of events in that country, yet in general it seems clear that the failure of the UN to achieve its objectives in Katanga by military force threatens to upset the limited progress toward stability which had been made with the establishment of the Adoula government in Leopoldville. Tshombe will almost certainly be confirmed in his determination to resist Katanga's reintegration into a united Congo. At the same time Adoula will be under strong pressure to accomplish the reintegration, by forceful means if necessary, lest his 25X1
leadership in Leopoldville itself be endangered. The Congo may again become embroiled in civil war.

2. Meanwhile, the ability of the UN to maintain some measure of order and administration in the area has been seriously weakened. This is owing in part to the disastrous outcome of the Katanga venture, and even more to the death of Secretary General Hammarskjold, which bids fair to paralyze the UN executive machinery generally, and render any vigorous action in the Congo virtually out of the question. This fact may afford the Communist Bloc, and other states such as Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR, a renewed opportunity to intervene in Congolese politics.

DISCUSSION

3. The issue between Leopoldville and Katanga came to the fore most recently at the time of the Adoula government formation early in August 1961 after lengthy maneuvering between domestic Congolese factions and pressure by interested foreign governments. The installation of Adoula, a representative of more moderate Congolese elements, was expected to herald an all-out
struggle by the moderates to end the differences between the contending regimes of Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and Elizabethville. After considerable prodding and occasional threats, Antoine Gizenga agreed to enter a coalition cabinet as deputy Prime Minister, and a number of Gizengists followed him into the cabinet to assume ministerial responsibility, _inter alia_ for Interior and Justice. All other key posts, however, have been retained by Adoula supporters. Moreover, Gizenga has continued to maintain Stanleyville outside of central government control, has refused to permit the subordination of Stanleyville military units to ANC command, and frequently threatens to withdraw his cooperation if the goals of the "martyred" Patrice Lumumba are not vigorously pursued by Adoula.

4. The Adoula government has also sought to reduce the intransigence of the Katangans alternately through threat of force and promises of high office. These efforts failed, however, and Tshombe threatened to use force to prevent integration. The Leopoldville regime finally concluded that force would be required to insure Tshombe's cooperation. The UN at this juncture and at Adoula's urging interceded in an
effort to eliminate the Belgian and other foreign advisors bolstering Katangan separatism, as well as the mercenaries and the Belgian officers in the local gendarmerie forces who were opposed to the UN presence. With the threat of violent opposition mounting in Elizabethville the UN decided on a coup de frappe to reduce the obstacles to the province's reintegration. Poor intelligence, an underestimate of Katangan military prowess, and inadequate logistical support frustrated the venture, and the UN was forced to negotiate a cease-fire.

5. Confusion in the UN executive structure as to the organization's future policy in the Congo, coming with the death of the Secretary General, could paralyze the UN effort in the Congo. If this should occur, the position of Congo moderates who have looked to the UN for advice and guidance would be greatly enfeebled. Prime Minister Acula, in particular, is faced with the need to take steps to assert the primacy of the central government. His Parliament, the Cizengists, and some ANC leaders are clamoring for a campaign against Elizabethville. However, the ANC does not have the capability to subdue the secessionist province. Even with substantial external assistance we believe that Acula could not achieve effective control of Katanga.
6. It seems likely that, as agitation mounts among his supporters, Adoula will alternately threaten and appeal to the UN for a determined resumption of action against Katanga. While he may make, with UN assistance, another attempt at reconciliation with Tshombe, we do not believe that Tshombe would prove flexible in view of the pressures being maintained upon him in Katanga, including those of vested Belgian interests and local chieftains. Tshombe also will probably continue to receive some material support from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As a result, the Leopoldville regime probably will feel compelled to renew its plans for an ANC military operation against Katanga and will seek transportation and logistical support from the UN. Refusal by the latter to sanction such plans would virtually eliminate its influence upon Adoula, who then probably would request support from the US, or from African states such as Ghana and Guinea. We believe that, with the establishment of Bloc Embassies in Leopoldville after their mid-1960 closing by General Joseph Mobutu, it is possible that Prime Minister Adoula would turn in desperation to the Bloc for support against the Katanga separatists. Any such policy shift would
constitute a serious threat to the Western position not only in the Congo but in all Central Africa.

7. A doula is too firmly wedded to the goal of Congo reunification and the precepts of neutralism to regard acceptance of Bloc aid as anything more than a temporary expedient. A former labor union organizer, he has shown himself to be both tough-minded and capable of sudden tactical shifts in order to attain his political objectives. However, he probably is overconfident of his ability to limit Communist influence and, perhaps even more crucially, probably does not have a full appreciation of the incipient divisions within the ranks of the Leopoldville moderates. Thus, any establishment of ties with the Bloc probably would split the moderates badly, produce a violent reaction within the Mobutu wing of the ANC, and lead to serious opposition in the lower Congo, Equator, and Kasai areas. Only the Gizengists within the present coalition would strongly support recourse to Communist aid. In addition, A doula's credit in the Free World would suffer a serious decline, possibly resulting in a reconsideration of existing Western policies. We would emphasize that the Congo situation is inherently unpredictable, and that
the course of developments we have sketched out, leading
to a connection between Adoula and the Bloc, should not
necessarily be considered as likely, but rather as a possi-
sibility, reasonable enough to warrant serious attention.

8. The present phase in the Congo also affords the so-
called Casablanca powers a renewed opportunity to intercede
in opposition to Tshombe. With the reported buildup of
Communist-supplied military equipment at Accra, Conakry, and
Bamako, the leaders of these states now have the potential
to aid Adoula and the Gizengists in mounting an attack against
Katanga. Perhaps of even greater long-term significance, they
once again have a major issue for castigating the West and
fomenting opposition to moderate Western oriented leaders
in Africa.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comments on Assessment of the Congo Situation

1. On 28 September African specialists from O/NE, OCI, and I met with an American businessman who has spent considerable time in the Congo over the last year, to discuss his observations and conclusions about the situation in the Congo, particularly with respect to Katanga.

who has also discussed his concern over the situation with various people on the policy side, is convinced that the Communist Bloc is now engaged in a well-organized clandestine operation to gain control of Katanga and its resources, utilizing the UN as an instrument with the aid of certain well-placed sympathizers, notably Michel Tombelaine, until recently the top UN Civilian representative in Katanga.

2. Reasoning that the Bloc's top priority objective in Africa at this stage is to disrupt the flow of raw materials
most vital to West European industry, he concludes that Katanga, because of its importance as a source of copper, tin, and even more cobalt, and because of its proximity to Angola and the Rhodesian copper belt, is obviously a prime Soviet target. On the basis of the observations he and representatives of his firm have made in the Congo, he feels that various moves which the UN has made vis-à-vis Katanga are part of a Communist plan to gain control of Katanga. He feels strongly that central government control of Katanga would only serve Communist purposes, since it would probably lead to disruption of the economy and to nationalization of the mines, and that US interests would best be served by support of Tshombe, whom he considers a far more respectable figure than many reports would indicate.

3. To mention only the highlights of his presentation, [25X1] considers that Tombelaine, a French Marxist who "leaped" at the opportunity to get the Katanga UN assignment, has played the most important role in the Communist operation against the Katanga Government, first through systematic and sustained efforts to misrepresent Tshombe to the Western press and to his UN superiors, and secondly as the principal advocate
of the recent UN military offensive; although had some inconclusive indications that General Cruise O’Drien had displayed Communist leanings as a young man, he felt that O’Drien had probably just followed the lead of the more experienced Tombelaine in his actions and recommendations. cited the failure of the UN to maintain the Elizabethville-Port Franqui rail line, while insuring the continuation of rail operations between Katanga and Oriental provinces, as evidence of a plan to facilitate the invasion of Katanga by Gizengist troops. He also cited indications that the Ethiopian and Ghurka troops encamped near Kabalo had been secretly preparing for large-scale combat operations some weeks before the UN decision to move in, noting that this was not consistent with the theory that the UN had expected no opposition to its move.

Evaluation

4. and his associates have been in a position to watch developments in the Congo from a point of special vantage and we consider their factual reporting to be essentially accurate. However, we believe that explanation of these events as a part of a Communist master plan going back to the middle of last year is not supported by other evidence we have.
5. We assume that the Communists have been keenly aware from the outset of the Congo crisis, as has everyone else, of the economic and strategic importance of Katanga. For this reason, and because of the opportunity provided for depicting the Belgian and other white supporters of Tshombe as agents of imperialism, the USSR has consistently sought to bring down the separatist Katangan regime, with the ultimate hope of bringing Katanga under the control of a leftist -- oriented central government.

6. However, the USSR's path has been beset with difficulties, not only because of the opposition of the West and the independent course taken by Hammarskjold but also because of the volatility and unpredictability of Congolese politicians. Thus, by necessity if not by choice, the Soviets have used flexible and opportunistic tactics -- first supporting Lumumba, though he was far from an ideal "chosen vessel," then Gizenga, who also left much to be desired, and finally seeking to do what they could with an Aduola Government whose formation they had opposed. The Soviets almost certainly favored the UN's military move against Tshombe and presumably did all they could to put pressure on the UN and the Leopoldville Government to move in
on Elizabethville. However, the operation was possible only because Hammarskjold and his associates, whom the Soviets so distrusted in virtually every other respect, had been deeply convinced from the outset, on grounds of their own, that reunification of Katanga with the rest of the Congo and elimination of undue Belgian influence there was essential to solution of the Congo problem.

7. In this connection, we believe that the role of Tombelaine should not be overrated. We agree with [redacted] about his unsavory qualities, as have some leading UN officials in the Congo; with some pressure from the US he is now being relieved of his assignment there. By misrepresenting the situation, Tombelaine may have persuaded the UN authorities to authorize more extreme measures in Katanga than they otherwise would have done and may have begun preparations for a military showdown before getting a go-ahead signal from headquarters; this may account for Hammarskjold's denial to Spaak shortly before the operation that military moves were in the offing. However, we do not believe that the operation took place without approval up the line, including that of Hammarskjold. Ample evidence exists that the Secretary-General and his chief advisors...
chose the course of action they did for their own reasons, and, while they may have miscalculated the amount of resistance they would encounter, were willing to take the risks of abrupt unilateral action.

8. We have no other evidence on the continuation of operations on the Elizabethville-Port Franqui rail line by the UN or on the preparations by Ethiopian and Gurkha troops near Kabalo for combat operations. We have no reason to doubt reporting on these points, but believe that, if correct, they reflect UN preparations for the use of force against Katanga, not Communist control of UN operations.

9. In sum, we believe that has made some useful observations on matters of fact, but that he has not produced evidence to support his thesis that UN operations in Katanga were essentially Communist-inspired. And though we agree with as to the potential dangers of a forcible reintegration of Katanga into the Congo, we are equally concerned that continuation of an independent Katanga regime will lead to new recrimination against the Belgians and the other supporters of Tshombe and to increased pressures on Aducua to take action, if necessary.
with Bloc and radical African support. As himself indicated, our best hope is for some sort of compromise between Elizabethville and Leopoldville — and the sooner the better.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Is it agreeable with you to send copies of this memorandum to the USIB members and to the White House (Bundy, General Taylor, and Rostow)?

Sherman Kent
AD/NE

3 Oct 61
(DATE)