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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NSC Meeting

July 7

12 Noon

Subject: Cyprus

The attached memorandum has been prepared for use in connection with the July 7, 1964 NSC discussion on Cyprus.


Acting Secretary

cc: NSC Members

State Dept. review completed

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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC MEETING

Subject: Cyprus

The next six critical weeks may well decide whether there will be war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The chances of avoiding conflict may be less than 50%.

This paper describes the forces that may lead to a crisis. It discusses the measures we are taking to try to avoid a series of events that could tear up the whole right wing of NATO.

I.

THE ATMOSPHERE

Greece and Turkey are each committed to finding a Cyprus solution that requires no loss of face. Overhanging the Cyprus issue are two thousand years of Greek-Turkish antipathy. Today events, not people, are in command. Each side is acting a Greek tragedy--obsessed by a sense of the inevitable.

II.

MOTIVATIONS

A. Greece: - The Greeks are convinced that time is on their side. The Turkish position is being progressively eroded. In due course they feel that they will be able to annex Cyprus without the need for any concessions to the Turks. Prime Minister Papandreu was obviously shaken by the President's argument that he must find a peaceful settlement and by his statement that the United States would not oppose a Turkish move by force.

B. Turkey: - The Turks recognize that they are steadily losing. Prime Minister Inonu and the responsible leaders in the Government know the costs and dangers of a military intervention. Yet if they lose further ground to the Greeks and the hope of an acceptable settlement continues to fade, they will be under irresistible pressures to exercise what they regard as their valid treaty rights

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of unilateral intervention.

III EVENTS THAT MAY TRIGGER MILITARY ACTION

Two kinds of events may lead the Turks to undertake military action against Cyprus:

(a) The breakdown of the Geneva talks--which would destroy the hope of a political solution; and

(b) events on the Island prejudicial to the Turks or the Turk-Cypriots.

A. Breakdown at Geneva

If the Greek representative at Geneva shows no flexibility, Prime Minister Inonu will be deprived of his last argument against invasion. The Turks stood down action on June 5 in the hope that the United States would be able to provide them an alternative in the form of a political solution. This hope will vanish if the talks break down--or if, after some weeks, they clearly appear to be leading nowhere.

B. Events on the Island

For the last several weeks the Greek Government has been surreptitiously introducing into Cyprus not only equipment but officers and men of the Greek Army. 25X1
there may be as many as 4,000 there now (including the treaty-authorized contingent). Since the Greek-Cypriots control the ports and airfields, this infiltration is easily achieved.

The Turks are also sending in "volunteers" from the mainland. Since they must be landed on the coast in small boats, the number introduced so far probably does not exceed 1,500 (including the treaty contingent).

Turkish awareness that the Greek buildup is far outrunning their own is producing mounting anxiety. The activities of General Grivas-- who is organizing an armed force of Greek Cypriots that is expected ultimately to total 30 to 35 thousand men and who is publicly proclaiming the advent of enosis--further contributes to Turkish disquiet.

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These developments threaten the Turk Cypriots with two possibilities: (a) the danger that when the Greek strength is deemed adequate General Grivas may take over the government and announce a plebiscite to bring about immediate enosis (union with Greece) as an accomplished fact and (b) the danger that growing Greek military strength on the Island will substantially increase the cost of Turkish intervention.

The continued preoccupation with these two possibilities may increase the pressure for a Turkish intervention now. At the same time, the buildup of military forces on both sides could reach the flash point, causing an incident that would have chain reactions all over the Island. In addition, there is the chance that, if the Turkish Cypriots become convinced that increasing Greek superiority is diminishing the possibility of intervention, they may provoke an incident. There is evidence that they are developing a Gotterdammerung spirit.

IV

THE LIKELY COURSE OF MILITARY ACTION

The DOD will be prepared to make a military presentation at the NSC meeting.



The essential points are:

- (a) The Turks have the capability for establishing a substantial beachhead in the area around Kyrenia and securing the pass that dominates the Nicosia Plain;
- (b) They might be able to exercise some deterrent effect on Greek-Cypriot reprisals against the Turk-Cypriot population by threatening air action against Greek-Cypriots.

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To put the full Turkish 39th Division ashore, however, with its equipment would require at least a week.

V.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

Our objectives are twofold:

(a) To do everything possible to avoid a military collision between two of our NATO allies by bringing about an agreed settlement; and

(b) If a Turkish military intervention does occur, to assure the taking of measures to minimize the bloodshed, limit escalation, and restrict the damage to the NATO Alliance.

A. Bringing About an Agreed Solution

The only realistic possibility of a political solution is through a deal between the Greek and Turkish Governments. If Greece and Turkey can be brought together, the Greek Government should be able to handle the Government of Cyprus. However, the search for a solution will be rendered almost impossible if Makarios is brought into the negotiations before Athens and Ankara have reached a meeting of the minds. His Beatitude has shown by his conduct that he does not want a negotiated solution. He wants a unitary Cypriot state in which the Turk-Cypriot minority would be submerged. He is prepared to play games with the USSR and the Afro-Asian Bloc to achieve this--even at the risk of creating another Cuba.

We have, therefore, concentrated on pressing for a negotiation between Greece and Turkey, as the two responsible governments most directly concerned.

The President emphasized to Prime Minister Papandreu that unless he negotiated with the Turks he ran the risk of precipitating a disastrous war. At the same time he emphasized to Prime Minister Inonu that a military action against Cyprus could yield nothing but calamity.

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The pressure on these two Prime Ministers resulted in an agreement to undertake negotiations at Geneva under conditions where--with luck--the United States could continue to apply pressure to both sides. The Greek and Turkish Governments has each named a representative to meet with the UN Mediator. The President has sent Mr. Dean Acheson to Geneva to advise and assist the Mediator and to conduct discussions with the two representatives.

B. Possible Shape of Settlement

The Greek Government is publicly committed to the achievement of enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece). So long as the Greek Government pursues this line the Turkish Government will continue to insist upon double enosis (partition with the two parts uniting with the respective metropolises).

The United States has so far refused to put forward any solution. It has, however, proposed the following specifications which a solution should fulfill:

1. It should come about with the full approval of both Greece and Turkey;
2. It should be permanent;
3. It should leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
4. It should involve no humiliation to either side;
5. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
6. It should be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

We have, of course, studied a wide range of possible solutions. On the basis of these studies Mr. Acheson will be in position to propose various elements for inclusion in a final package--if that proves advisable at Geneva,

C. Ancillary Measures in Support of Negotiation

In support of the Geneva negotiations, we are seeking to bring about additional pressure on both sides through--

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- (a) enlisting the aid of our other NATO allies;
- (b) arranging for military discussions between General Lemnitzer as SACEUR and the top military of Greece, Turkey and other NATO countries;
- (c) exploring all available channels to key individuals having influence on Greek policy (Onassis, Niarchos, etc.) in order to impress on them the serious economic consequences of letting the Cyprus problem remain unresolved; and
- (d) conducting tripartite talks with the British and Canadians (to be held in Washington on Thursday).

VI
MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CONSEQUENCES
OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION

A. Contingency Plans

We have developed extensive contingency planning designed to minimize the consequences of a Turkish intervention.

This planning includes the following:

- (1) The use of the Security Council to limit the conflict through such measures as a ceasefire, a stand-still, the employment of the UN peacekeeping force to maintain the ceasefire, a call for immediate negotiations, and an appeal for nonintervention by other states.
- (2) An emergency NATO Foreign Ministers meeting to mobilize support for containing the hostilities and for a negotiated settlement.
- (3) The development of a plan for action by the UN force on the Island to minimize bloodshed by protecting threatened elements of the population in pre-planned safe havens. (This will be discussed with the British and the Canadians on Thursday and we have alerted our posts in other countries contributing components to the UN force in preparation for discussions at the appropriate time.

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(4) We have sent a mission to Athens to update the arrangements for evacuating Americans (including tourists) from Greece in the event that a Turkish intervention precipitates a wave of anti-American feeling.

(5) We are reviewing plans for evacuating Americans from Ankara and Nicosia and are perfecting arrangements for protecting Embassy property in all three capitals.

B. Measures to Prevent Greek-Turkish Collision

Should the Turks move we would seek to avoid a collision with the Greeks by diplomatic moves designed to keep their armed forces apart. There might be considerable delay before Greek national forces could engage Turkish national forces in substantial strength-- although the existence of Greek national elements on Cyprus today renders an ultimate avoidance of a clash less possible.

In any event, we should seek to dissuade the Greeks from attempting to attack Turkish forces while the Security Council is arranging a ceasefire. We should be under no illusions that this will be easy to achieve, even if we can secure the full cooperation of the other NATO powers.

C. Use of Sixth Fleet and other U.S. Military Forces

The President made it clear to Prime Minister Papandreou that we do not propose to use U.S. military force to prevent a Turkish military action against Cyprus. Nor do we intend to use the Sixth Fleet to roll back a Turkish beachhead once achieved.

Plans should, however, be made to ready U.S. military forces for precautionary moves in the event of Soviet intervention and for the evacuation of American personnel.

Our best estimate is that while the Soviet Union would join in deploring the Turks' military intervention and would no doubt utter threats against the Turks, it would not engage its own forces in any Cyprus crisis. We cannot, however, ignore the possibility that Moscow might seek to exploit this crisis of NATO through moves elsewhere in the world, i.e., Cuba, Berlin, etc.

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