

16 April 1970

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR**

**SUBJECT: Interim Report on Planning for Military Estimates**

1. For some weeks a working group from this Office, chaired by [ ] has been considering the changes and reforms that should be made in this year's military estimates. We have seen the suggestions submitted to you by Messrs. Rogers, Laird, and Kissinger, talked with Andy Marshall, worked over some ideas of our own, and picked up other thoughts from here and there.

2. It is clear that the consumers want, among other things, (a) much more copious setting-forth of evidence and argument, at least on the more important and controversial matters; (b) more history, in order to see how Soviet forces got to be as they are; (c) somewhat more attention to Soviet military doctrine, economic constraints, etc.; (d) more graphs and charts; and (e) estimates carried out to five years.

3. How far all this can successfully be done will only be known by trying. We have outlines for various papers, and we have graphics people already working on the problem. We shall use numerous Annexes, probably of two kinds: (a) for more lengthy and detailed descriptive matter, as e.g., for the fronts, armies, divisions, etc. of Soviet ground forces, and (b) for technical discussions in detail -- including those involving disagreements -- as e.g., on the SS-9 and the SA-5 if these subjects are still lively issues as of next fall. We are already engaged in some preliminary drafting.

4. The consumers also ask for an additional estimate for high-level attention to follow the major estimates on the forces. This we will prepare. They suggest no other change from the present three-paper division of subject matter -- i. e., into NIE's 11-8, 11-3, and 11-14. Nevertheless we are contemplating a modest rearrangement as follows:

NIE 11-8 would be called Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack. Like the present 11-8 it would cover ICBM's, heavy bombers, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, etc., but would omit MREM's, IRBM's, medium bombers, etc., except as some allusions might be necessary.

NIE 11-3 on Soviet Strategic Defense Forces would be essentially as before, with the addition of Soviet ASW capabilities (as requested by the White House).

NIE 11-14 Soviet Forces for Attack in Eurasia would contain most of what is in the present 11-14, plus MREM's, IRBM's, diesel powered submarines, medium bombers, etc., and minus those traditional parts of 11-14 which have discussed forces for distant military action - sea and airlift, etc.

NIE 11-7 would be a new paper on Soviet capabilities to use military forces in distant areas - primarily in the "third world". This would be less a description of hardware than a consideration of capabilities to move forces - airlift, sealift, base structures, etc., together with something on military aid programs (the last mainly to satisfy the Army).

5. There may well be problems with this rearrangement. The lower-level military have already made mild preliminary protests,

though we have had no extended discussion with them, and some of their apprehension is no doubt sheer bureaucratic resistance to innovation. Willard Matthias thinks the proposed arrangement not far-reaching enough, and asked me to give you his counter-suggestion, which is attached. Before going any further, I would like to ascertain whether you have views on the matter, pro or con. Could we talk about it at a convenient time?

/s/

ABBOT SMITH  
Director  
National Estimates

Attachment