


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1970

Dear Dick:

I just wanted you to know that I found the ONE memorandum "Some Implications of Population Trends in Poor Countries" thoughtful and thought-provoking. Please tell the people who drafted the memo that I have read it and think it is a first-rate job. As a result of the memo, I have several follow-on questions which I will be sending to you separately.

Warm regards,


Henry A. Kissinger

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
POPULATION TRENDS IN POOR COUNTRIES

1. After consultation with the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board and discussion with appropriate USIB representatives, the Board of National Estimates concluded that subject paper would be put in final form and disseminated as a memorandum, rather than as a National Intelligence Estimate. This is clearly not the usual material of Estimates, yet we regard the subject matter as important and urge you to give the paper wide distribution.

2. The entry, NIE 6-70, which appears on the Program of National Intelligence Estimates for the Third Quarter of 1970 (USIB-D-14.1/48, dated 1 July 1970) should now be deleted.



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
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates

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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM

Some Implications of Population Trends in Poor Countries

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1 September 1970

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1 September 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS IN POOR COUNTRIES

NOTE

This memorandum deals with problems that are increasingly important in all our analyses of the prospects for poor countries of the world, and in our judgments on their relations with the rich countries as well. Though not based on intelligence data in the narrower sense, the conclusions we draw here are relevant to many intelligence estimates likely to be undertaken in the future. We have, therefore, discussed the paper with the appropriate representatives of the other USIB agencies; they are in general agreement with its findings.

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SUMMARY

The unprecedented growth of world population is almost certain to continue over the next decade and beyond. Most of it will occur in the poor countries* because their death rates are falling rapidly under the impact of cheap and popular public health measures while the birth rates remain very high, and are unlikely soon to diminish.

Thanks to the "green revolution," the food problem appears less intractable than it did even a few years ago. In most parts of the world, food production seems likely to keep pace with population growth over the next decade. But even if the growing population is fed, its sheer size will bring about increases in urbanization and unemployment so rapid as to pose grave challenges to the governments of poor nations and, in many cases, lead to profound social and political instability.

Economic development in these countries, a slow process at best, will be further impeded. Hence the existing gap in income, values and goals between the rich nations and the poor is certain to widen. While there is little chance of direct physical confrontation between the rich and the poor countries, the rich (including the US) will find their interests involved in the numerous local wars, ethnic conflicts, and other strife that will almost certainly occur in the Third World as a consequence, in part, of population pressures.

* *In this estimate the term "poor countries" includes all the countries of Latin America, Africa (except South Africa), and Asia (except for Japan and that part of Asia included in the USSR). "Rich countries" are taken as the US, Canada, all of Europe including the USSR, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.*

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I. THE POPULATION PROBLEM

1. The population of the world is rising at an unprecedented rate, and this is creating or intensifying a host of other fundamental social, political, and economic problems. The most obvious problem is that of food, but rapid population growth also means an aggravated demand for education, health, and other services. Population growth has stimulated urbanization and added to the mounting unemployment problem in much of the world. And in various ways population pressures are exacerbating international tensions, sharpening tribal and racial hostilities, and complicating relations between the rich and poor nations of the world.

2. The current burgeoning of population is primarily a phenomenon of the poor countries of the world -- those in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In northern Europe, for example, population is growing about 0.6 percent a year while in Central America the rate is about 3.4 percent.* Until very recently the poor countries were lands of high birth rates and high death rates. Since World War II, and particularly in the past decade, the widespread application of cheap and effective public health measures has dramatically lowered death rates. Yet for

* See Tables I and II.

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a variety of reasons, mainly cultural, birth rates remain high in most of the poor world.*


3. Clearly there is scant hope for a reversal or even a slowing of the population growth in the poor countries until the birth rate drops (or the death rises). The development of improved methods of contraception in the past few decades would seem to offer a chance for rapid reduction of the birth rate, and there are a few encouraging indications in this direction. Sample surveys from some of the poor countries of the world indicate that many women who already have four or more living children are not anxious for more, though few of them are likely to practice contraception. The estimated high rate of abortion in much of Latin America indicates a willingness to take drastic measures to limit family size. Some national governments already are making efforts to promote family planning -- Taiwan, Mauritius, and India among the most notable. Yet, even those governments which recognize rapid population growth as a national problem find it very difficult to organize effective family planning programs.

* *The chart on the following page and the chart which follows page 15 are from Finance and Development, Quarterly No. 4, 1969 published by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. The data presented should be considered illustrative. Population statistics for Third World countries are of uneven quality.*

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TRENDS OF BIRTHS, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

(Per thousand)



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4. Many other governments, including most in Africa and Latin America, appear unconcerned about the rapid increase in their populations. Indeed, some welcome it. The notion that large means "great" in terms of prestige among nations still has a considerable hold on the minds of rulers. Many of them view population growth in terms of larger markets or labor forces, ignoring considerations of effective demand or manpower efficiency. Hence, they frequently resent the preaching of foreigners about birth control. Some increasingly nationalistic spokesmen in the poor countries see these projects as a form of biological imperialism.* Thus, despite the strenuous efforts of the World Bank and others concerned by the population explosion, it is likely to be many years before most governments in Africa, Latin America, and Asia actively promote birth control.

5. Even where governments espouse family planning and offer inducements to keep families small, the sheer number of individuals who must be reached and convinced presents enormous organizational, financial, and manpower problems. Coercion, in the form of sterility additives to food or water supplies, has already been seriously suggested by some in the US and Europe, but is most unlikely to be

* *The following are examples of this point of view:*

"To tell you my blunt opinion, birth control propaganda is part of an insidious plan to cut down the black population of the world." New Nigerian, 5 November 1969.

"No one, no nation is going to tell Brazil what is best for Brazilians. That's up to us to decide. And this whole question of birth control that you Americans talk so much about is simply an effort to exert your influence on us." Reported by The Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1969.

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adopted soon. To the extent that the decision is left up to individuals, tradition, culture, and social attitudes which largely govern family size can be expected to change only slowly. In much of Latin America, for example, there are strong cultural barriers to the concept of population limitations. Many Latins, Arabs, and others feel that men are really men only if they have a large number of offspring. Moreover, in many agrarian cultures, a goodly number of sons is considered necessary to ensure a labor supply and security in one's old age.

6. For all these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the rate of population growth in the poor countries will be slowed during the next decade or so, and it may even rise. The total world population in 1970 is about 3.6 billion, of which around 2.6 billion live in the poor countries. According to UN projections, which assume a continuing decline of death rates and continuing high fertility, there will be some 3.4 billion in the poor countries by 1980 and about 3.9 billion by 1985.

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II. THE FOOD PROBLEM

7. The virtual certainty of continued rapid population growth in Africa, Latin America, and Asia raises questions about feeding the additional multitudes. Thus far, food production in these lands has about kept pace -- except for natural disasters such as the failure of the monsoon in South Asia for two successive years, localized droughts, and politically caused famines such as the one in Biafra. By and large, sales or gifts from the stocks of the rich countries have made up the shortfalls. But, in the years ahead, the quantities of additional food required will be so large that the rich countries will almost certainly not be both willing and able to supply them.

8. Clearly it will be up to the poor countries to provide most of the food themselves. Will they be able to do so? According to most expert opinion, it is technically possible not only to feed the world's multitudes but also to improve the general level of nutrition within the next decade or so. This is the "green revolution", i.e., the rapid adoption of high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, water control, and other measures in the poor countries.*

* *Methods for increasing production of protein from the sea, by such means as fish farming, seaweed cultivation, etc., are also part of the new technology. If concerted and well-funded scientific and technological programs are instigated, food from the sea could be considerably increased, but this is unlikely to provide a panacea for the populations of the poor countries.*

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9. Technical feasibility is, however, only one aspect of a very complex set of problems which the "green revolution" poses. The application of advanced agricultural techniques requires revolutionary changes in national priorities and vast improvements in administrative performance. Most of the poor countries probably could finance the essential investments in irrigation, land reclamation, fertilizer and chemical plants. But this would call for mobilization of resources at an unprecedented level and a drastic shift in public spending in the direction of agriculture. Aid from the rich countries would of course ease the burden, but the bulk of the effort would have to come from within the poor countries themselves.

10. Political and social obstacles are formidable. Hard decisions between economic and social objectives are already confronting many of the poor countries, and new agricultural programs which are economically efficient may have high social or political cost. In India, for example, where the new, high-yielding seeds and technology contributed to bumper crops in the past few years, most of the gains have been made by the relatively rich farmers who had more land and better credit. For tenants and sharecroppers this "green revolution" has sometimes meant higher rents, or expulsion, as the owners have extended the more efficient new methods to more of their land. Moreover, economic disparities between regions have widened -- those

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with natural advantages have forged ahead, while depressed regions stagnated. Mexico has experienced similar difficulties in introducing high-yielding seeds. Its agricultural output has risen impressively, but the tenant farmers and laborers have not benefited.

11. The increased disparities in living standards which the agricultural revolution creates in the countryside is contributing to rural unrest and may hasten migration to the cities. Further, in countries such as India where votes matter, competing demands from city-dwellers and proponents of industry tend to reduce the attention and funds that are devoted to agriculture. Moreover, once a food crisis passes, attention and funds may be diverted from agriculture, creating a stop-go pattern inimical to sustained progress.

12. In a few countries or areas where favorable climatic, organizational, and financial conditions exist, agricultural production may increase drastically as it did in Taiwan. Some countries, now in deficit, will produce surplus food. Others will fall behind and need external aid to maintain even current nutritional levels. In the more sparsely populated countries -- including most of Africa, much of Latin America, and parts of Asia -- gradual, less expensive and less technologically demanding changes in agriculture are likely to suffice to maintain roughly current levels of nutrition for some

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years. In some of these countries, more land can be brought under cultivation relatively easily, fallow periods may be shortened, new crops may be introduced to maintain soil fertility, and so on.

13. But the amount of land suitable for permanent agriculture is limited, particularly in the tropics. The danger here, especially where the soil is thin or exposed to extremes of temperature and rainfall, is that if population pressure on the land rises faster than agricultural techniques change, large areas may be destroyed. This has already happened or begun in parts of Africa, in Mexico, in Brazil and in Pakistan. The deserts are growing and erosion has ruined thousands, perhaps millions, of acres for crops or even pastures.

14. The prospects for the densely populated areas, especially in the longer run, must be considered doubtful. There, most arable land is already under cultivation and raising output will require complex new technology -- bringing more land under irrigation, or extending the growing period by supplemental water storage, for example. Not only do such changes cost more per acre, they also require a higher level of social and political organization to carry out. Nevertheless, the "green revolution" began in these

countries; they are more conscious of a food problem, and they are likely to get most of whatever outside aid is available. If they bring themselves to give their highest priority to agricultural development, and then sustain that priority, they may manage to maintain current levels of nutrition over the next decade.

15. In effect, then, the "green revolution" appears capable of buying time in the race between population growth and food production. But the very process of achieving this goal will generate or exacerbate other problems. For one thing, the effect on the world environment of greatly increased use of fertilizers and insecticides required by the new technology is likely to be considerable. For another, if food is available world population will go on increasing for a long time, even though family size may begin to decline. This, in turn, will intensify further problems associated with population growth such as unemployment and rapid urbanization.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH

A. Urbanization and Unemployment

16. The implications of rapid population growth in terms of urbanization and unemployment are more pressing than the food problem in many of the poor countries. A major impetus to urbanization

is the sheer increase in the numbers of the population which causes many to leave traditional villages in search of food or work in the cities. The process is facilitated by the contemporary revolution in communications, i.e., the spread in recent years of transistor radios, newspapers, advertising, and better roads, which lure the countryman to the bright lights of the city. The "green revolution" itself may drive some people off the land and into the cities. The urban-oriented policies of some governments, e.g., subsidization of urban food prices, tend to add to the urban flow.

17. The rise of cities in the poor countries of the world today is a vastly different phenomenon from the process of urbanization in Western Europe, the US, and Japan. There the cities grew largely as a response to industrial, commercial or administrative demands, and fulfilled specific economic requirements. The typical city in a poor country in 1970 has a core of such activity, but is also a vast collecting pool of unemployed, partially unemployed, and many whose vague hopes of employment are dimming, but who have no other place to go. Hence, the vast shanty-towns in and around the cities are spreading. Though sanitary conditions are generally miserable, the birth rate in the cities of the poor countries is probably at least as high as in the hinterland, and the death rate appears lower.

The urban population in these countries has grown five-fold since 1920, and in the coming decade the cities will probably grow at about twice the rate of total population.

18. A number of governments are already attempting to slow migration to the cities but few have had even short term success. Even in the Soviet Union and South Africa, where governments have far more effective control over the movement of the populace than the poor countries can aspire to for many years, cities continue to outgrow official plans. There seems scant prospect, then, for the reversal of the trend towards urbanization.

19. The urban multitudes already pose serious problems for their governments. For one thing, they expect more goods and services -- housing, schools, clinics, water supplies and the like -- than rural people and have a greater potential for backing up these demands with demonstrations and riots. Most governments of the poor countries have espoused some of the welfare standards of the rich states, and many are attempting to meet them. To the extent that they do, even more people are likely to head for the cities. Moreover, unless productive jobs (as opposed to the multitude of errand boys, servants, beggars and thieves) can be

found for the city dwellers, they will constitute a large potential drain on government budgets -- a drain which would reduce funds available for investment in agriculture, industry, and services. Thus, what has until recently seemed primarily a food-population problem is likely to have even greater impact as an employment-population problem.

20. To the extent that governments are unable to cope with the expectations, however unrealistic, of the urban masses, the spectre rises of mobs swarming out of slums and shanty-towns to show their discontent. Though apathy normally prevails among the bulk of the suffering urbanites, the flash point of violence in many of the world's cities seems to be getting lower, and the danger seems to be growing that minor incidents can quickly turn into revolutionary challenges to authority. Unemployed school-leavers and graduates tend to flock to the cities and this group is likely to have far more potential for fomenting unrest and unseating governments than their illiterate and less ambitious country cousins. The current great fascination with education in much of the poor world will almost certainly continue and will produce

hordes of self-styled intellectuals, many of them either unemployed or unsuitably employed, who will be harder and harder to manage.

21. It seems likely, therefore, that the most striking political ramifications of the population explosion in the poor countries will be exhibited in the cities. It is difficult at this stage to foresee what kind of urban agitations will arise, how widespread they will be, or what effect they will have upon the political institutions of the nations of Latin America, Africa, or Asia. Some states may simply be overwhelmed by an outpouring of urban discontent, and pass through periods of anarchy. In some cases popular pressures may force established rulers out of office, and install demagogues who in turn are unable to satisfy popular demands. In some cases, perhaps many cases, the end-products will be tough authoritarian regimes, maintaining order by repression.

B. Effects on Economic Development

22. The fact of rapid population growth does not, in and of itself, constitute an obstacle to economic development; there are a number of examples from the past -- some of them in US experience


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-- where trends in population and in economic growth have moved smartly upward together. But for this to happen the additions made to the labor force must prove to be large enough and productive enough to outweigh the additional demands on the consumption side. And in the circumstances now prevailing in almost all of the poor countries, the opposite will be the case: new increments of population will generate consumption increases markedly larger than the production increases. This will occur partly because of the *patterns* of population growth which are characteristic there, and partly because of the fundamental *political-economic conditions* upon which these patterns will impinge.

23. In Africa, in Latin America, and in South Asia, at least 40 percent of the population is less than 15 years old. (The comparable figure for Europe is 26 percent.) With each new year, moreover, there are many more new mouths waiting to be fed and many more new hands waiting to be trained before the many more new bodies are able to labor productively. Efforts in these backward countries simply to maintain the existing low standards in schools, housing, health and social services absorb constantly increasing funds from national budgets. And these governments, like the governments of richer nations, are under heavy pressures

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AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION IN SELECTED REGIONS



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from their citizenry to improve, rather than simply maintain, such services.

24. The need which most of these governments see to emphasize social investment sharply limits the public investment they can make in industry and economic infrastructure. In few cases, moreover, are either private investment from internal sources, or investment funds from abroad, likely to take up the slack. The general tendency to increasing political unrest (discussed above in paragraphs 19-21) can only discourage new private investment, whether from domestic or foreign sources. Strongly nationalistic attitudes and the proliferation of laws regulating the activities of foreign firms are a further deterrent to private investment from outside. Certainly foreign governments and international banking institutions will continue to provide some economic and technical aid, but all indications are that the magnitude of such assistance is likely to diminish in the years ahead.

25. In short, the economic outlook for much of the poor world appears dismal indeed. Of course, there will be exceptions. In some countries progress has been comparatively rapid over the past few decades and chances are it will continue. A few, such as Taiwan, Iran, possibly Turkey, seem to have broken out of poverty

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and stagnation. More will probably do so in the next decade or so, particularly those that have rich mineral deposits, or are successful in attracting large amounts of foreign investment.

C. Some International Economic Implications

26. Even so, the income gap between the rich countries, which will have a diminishing proportion of the world's population, and the great majority of the poor countries is almost certain to widen over the next decade and beyond. In a few of the very poor countries, where expectations of development have never been great, the widening gap may not cause much discontent. But elsewhere in the poor world, where hopes have been raised but where conditions will not improve fast enough to satisfy important groups of the populace, resentments are likely to build and to be directed both toward the national rulers and toward the rich countries.

27. Over the years the poverty, deprivation and general misery of the increasing billions in the poor countries will continue to have an impact on the consciences of many in the rich countries. The rich countries, however, are limited in what they can do to end or substantially ease the misery in the great bulk of the poor world within the next decade or so. Unless local attitudes and

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institutions are geared to population control and to changes conducive to economic development, loans and grants seem to have less than the desired effect, although they may buy time.

28. How then are the resentments of the poor countries toward the rich likely to find expression? Some have suggested that the poor might band together to deny their products and thus force the rich countries to be more forthcoming. This seems most unlikely on several counts. The poor need markets in the rich countries far more than vice versa and, by and large, they know it. Most of the remarkable increase in world trade over the past several decades has taken place among the rich countries. The share of the poor countries in international trade has generally declined, and they are pressing for greater access to markets in rich countries, not less. Few indeed are the agricultural products of the poor countries that are indispensable to the rich. And for those few, there are so many producers that united, sustained action seems most unlikely.

29. The case could be different for certain minerals, notably oil. Here, a small number of the poor countries could be in a position to disrupt the economies of certain rich countries by withholding the needed supply. Combined action to withhold oil by

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the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa could, for example, have severe impact on the rich countries of Western Europe, though only relatively minor effect on the US. Disruptive action of this kind will be a possibility, rather than a probability, in the foreseeable future. The countries which would have to be involved are strongly dependent on the income produced by maintaining a high level of exports of the particular commodity. Most Arab oil producers participated in an oil embargo immediately after the June 1967 war, but this proved to be short-lived because oil revenues were needed to help rebuild Arab military establishments as well as for the customary uses.

30. If indeed the rich countries are subjected to a denial or interruption of supply of a key commodity, this is more likely to result from moves by the governments of poor countries against the foreign companies extracting the minerals. The ownership of the copper mines in Chile has already been "Chileanized"; before many more years have passed, most of the mines will almost certainly be entirely nationalized. The government of Libya has been putting heavy new pressure on US oil companies operating there and has been seeking to expand the role of its own small national oil company; a sudden move to nationalize one or another of the US companies

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would not come as a surprise. These are but two of many straws in the wind. While the governments of most of the poor countries continue to acknowledge the usefulness of foreign private investment, they are becoming increasingly antagonistic toward the big foreign firms -- especially toward those in the extractive industries. Accusations that foreign companies are exploiting irreplaceable national resources have become more and more common. Rising nationalistic sentiments and frustrations over the slow course of development add to the hostility against the big international corporations.

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D. Some Broader Implications

31. The population surge in the poor countries of the world is not only widening the gap in income between them and the rich countries, but is perpetuating or intensifying other gaps in values and goals. This is not to say that the world is tending toward a complete cleavage between rich and poor. Obviously, the fundamental power rivalry between the US and the USSR will take its course regardless of the plight of the poor countries. The US and South Africa, though both considered as rich countries in this estimate, will continue to differ drastically in their views on human rights. Sharp differences of economic policy and national interests will probably cause rifts between the US and Japan, or between the US and the Western European Common Market.

32. The growing disparities between the rich countries and the poor are likely to cause problems of a different type. The US will find some of them serious, others merely annoying. For example, the poor, collectively and individually, are likely increasingly to ignore or flout hard-won international conventions which are valued by the US and other rich countries. In this category are difficulties with Mexico over illegal border-crossers seeking work in the US, the concerted effort to expel South Africa

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from the Universal Postal Union last year, and claims to territorial waters or air space far grander than international law has heretofore accepted. The upcoming conference on maritime law is likely to become another of these examples. Unconstitutional or otherwise disruptive behavior in the UN and other international organizations is likely to increase and could disrupt their work. Diplomatic incidents -- attacks on, or kidnappings of, travelers or officials -- are also likely to increase and national leaders more often to be subjected to physical attack. Such aggressive behavior will probably stem as much from rising nationalism as from frustration of the poor countries over their own poverty or over what they would regard as inadequate help from the rich. Population pressures in the poor countries will be only one of the ingredients in this developing scenario but it may be a powerful contributor.

33. All this will pose new and complicated challenges to US foreign policy. In particular, the time-honored goals of expanding the number of friends of the US and of promoting the prestige of the US abroad will be very difficult to maintain. At least in part as a result of their inabilities to cope with problems flowing from over-population, many poor countries are virtually certain to take more nationalistic and xenophobic measures, aimed particularly

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against the US. These are likely to be ill-conceived, emotionally based and sporadic harassments, rather than planned or orchestrated programs of anti-Americanism.

34. The US will, moreover, be playing a lead role in yet another emerging conflict of interest between rich and poor. Concern about pollution of air, water, and soil is mounting rapidly in the rich countries, and some aspects -- oceanic and atmospheric pollution in particular -- are viewed as global problems. The next decade is likely to see efforts by the rich countries to curtail such identifiable pollutants as came from fossil fuels and insecticides. Few in the poor countries share these concerns, and it will be difficult to persuade them to abandon practices they regard as essential. The poor countries, for example, are coming to consider insecticides and fertilizer vital to agricultural growth. Nations which have just begun to appreciate their impact on yields are unlikely to give them up no matter what the benefits may be to lower links in the food chain. Some Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans will see the antipollution drive as but another devious imperialist trick to keep the poor world poor.

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35. Most of the poor world is just beginning to exploit advanced technology and is far from being concerned with conservation or pollution. In the more developed areas of Mexico, for example, air and water pollution are increasing while little thought is given to erosion or environmental deterioration. To the extent that poor countries succeed in adopting modern technology, this sort of side-effect is certain to become more serious. Yet, to governments struggling with massive internal problems caused by population growth and economic backwardness, the lure of the "green revolution" and of industrialization are strong indeed. They are following the ways of the developed world, a world which discovered pollution to be a serious menace only after decades of thoughtless polluting. Now that they are embarked on what they see as the only escape route from poverty, they will find it intolerable to be told not to follow that route.

36. As the richest of the rich nations, the US is likely to be the most visible target of the wrath the poor come to feel over

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their many plights, as well as the recipient of the most urgent requests for help. But most other rich countries will also encounter fallout from the problems caused or exacerbated by the population explosion. To many observers, the widening gap between the rich and the poor poses grave threats to international order. This stark division between haves and have-nots cannot, in their view, be neglected without tragic consequences for the world.

37. For some, at least, this implies a physical confrontation between the rich minority and the poor majority. But is this realistic? Is the security of the US or any other rich country likely to be threatened by an assault of one or more of the over-populated nations? The problem of physical distance is a decisive deterrent in most cases; they simply couldn't get at us. In others, the military capabilities of the richer country are likely to restrain the multitudes from poorer nearby states. In short, there have always been richer and poorer countries. Rich minorities have always been surrounded by an ocean of human poverty. There are few ways by which the poor can by their own efforts directly hurt the physical security of the rich. A cataclysmic Armageddon is almost inconceivable.

38. Antagonisms and conflicts between states in the poor world will almost certainly be a cause of greater concern for

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the US. Population pressures upon land will in some areas of the poor world become intolerable, and the migration to cities cannot entirely alleviate such pressures. If some countries appear to have surplus land, this may tempt overpopulated neighbors to move in, either as migrants or as invaders. There are already few desirable habitable areas of the world not now occupied, and there will be even fewer in the decades ahead. There may be considerable contention over the remaining thinly inhabited lands, particularly if historic claims can be invoked, or deep-seated religious or ethnic antagonisms are involved. Burgeoning population and unemployment appear to have played some role in the recent clash between Salvador and Honduras and certainly were a factor in the Nigerian Civil War. In the next several decades there will likely be a proliferation of border disputes, ethnic conflicts, and nationalistic adventures, partly caused by pent-up frustrations of overpopulated societies.

39. The protagonists in these minor wars will often seek to involve the rich countries by appeals to humanitarian concerns or attempts to entangle rival great powers in the conflict. The continuing dispute between India and Pakistan illustrates the type of diplomatic problem such poor nation quarrels can cause. And the outlook is for many more. The task of policy-makers in

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the rich countries will be further complicated in some cases by emotional appeals from the contending poor countries on issues of race, religion, and language.

40. Racial antagonisms are likely to persist and may intensify in the next decade regardless of population pressures. The coincidence that most of the nations beset by rapid population increase are colored -- black, brown, or yellow -- and the rich world is conspicuously white will add racial overtones to many of the issues and conflicts between the poor and the rich countries.

E. Implications for the East-West Struggle

41. Certain of the poor countries are likely, at some stage of their irritation with the US, to turn for help to the Soviet Union. This will mean additional Soviet opportunities to displace Western interests and influence, but it almost certainly will not lead to any meaningful and militant new alliances directed against the US. The fears of a decade ago that the USSR might use aid and trade inducements to throw Western interests out of the underdeveloped world and then deny us its resources now seem less valid. The Soviets appear highly reluctant to reduce trade barriers at the request of poor countries or to expand economic aid very much -- yet both are measures which seem prerequisite to a major Soviet

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effort to gain significant influence in the poor and population burdened world. Moreover, the rising nationalism and self-assertiveness of some of the poor countries are likely to make their relations with the Soviets nearly as difficult as with us. It is fairly common in the poor countries today to lump the USSR with the "rich and selfish West" and to subject it to similar criticism.

42. The Soviets will probably be far more successful in helping to diminish the influence of the US in a number of the poor countries than they will be in replacing it with their own influence. In responding to requests for handouts, Moscow will probably continue to be quite selective. The future Soviet policy is much more likely to be one of taking advantage of individual openings to enhance their standing in particular countries than one of undertaking a crusade throughout the underdeveloped world. The price tag on a major aid program to countries deeply caught up in the population explosion would be extremely high, and the rewards for the USSR uncertain at best.

43. There is, however, another possible combination of circumstances involving the poor countries which could, over time, pose a danger to US national security interests. This possibility would involve Communist China rather than the USSR. It is at least

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conceivable that China, if it regains power and internal cohesion, might one day seek to become the champion of the world's poor. The concept of an alliance among the non-white, poor, and burgeoning nations against the imperialistic, domineering, rich, and largely white community may again appeal to some. Its earlier brief manifestations as the Bandung spirit, and as other constellations of Afro-Asian-Latin American groupings, went by the board as China turned inward.

44. But if, in the next decade or two, the US appears less disposed to play a major role in the poor countries, if China formulates a more coherent foreign policy, and if such a policy attracts poor non-white nations, then a collaboration of the kind envisaged at Bandung could indeed significantly alter the world power structure. For example, a cohesive and determined China, possessed of a nuclear arsenal and supporting the demands of the poor for more aid and trade concessions, might force the rich to modify their policies. Such an arrangement would be in accord with the Maoist doctrine of pitting the "rural" world against the rich "urban" world. While such a development now seems unlikely, it cannot be entirely ruled out because, in many ways, China is the great unknown of the coming decades.

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TABLE I

ESTIMATED ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION
GROWTH -- PER 1,000^{a/}

	<u>1800-1850</u>	<u>1850-1900</u>	<u>1900-1920</u>	<u>1920-1930</u>	<u>1930-1940</u>	<u>1940-1950</u>
WORLD	3-5	6-7	6-7	11	11	10
Africa	0-1	5-7	0-8	10	10	15
North America	30	23	19	14	8	14
Latin America	7-11	13	19	18	19	21
Asia	2-4	4-5	3-6	10	12	13
Europe and USSR	7	8	7	9	8	0

^{a/} Rounded

SOURCE: Cambridge Economic History, Volume III, page 58

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TABLE II

ESTIMATED RECENT ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION
GROWTH -- PER 1,000

AVERAGE

	<u>1950-1960</u>	<u>1960-1967</u>
Industrialized Countries	12	12
North America	18	14
Western Europe	7	11
Poor Countries	22	25
Africa	23	24
South Asia	19	24
East Asia	25	27
Latin America	28	29
Middle East	30	29
World	17	20

SOURCE: World Bank, Annual Report 1969

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