

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

14 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: ONE BOARD AND STAFF
(Internal ONE Only)

FROM : Chief, Estimates Staff

SUBJECT : Staff Suggestions for Memoranda Topics

1. The suggestions for memoranda which follow are for discussion at a meeting of Board and Staff at 0930 Friday 15 September.

I. IA STAFF

1. The Shape of Revolutions to Come in Latin America

Social and economic pressures are continuing to grow in many Latin American countries, but prospects do not seem bright for rapid change and reform under present political institutions. The Communist left is neither large nor strong in most of the countries. What are the forces, groups and leaders most likely to undertake revolution in the foreseeable future?

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification



4. Latin America: The Politics of Development

What have been the political conditions most conducive to economic progress? Are representative governments in Latin America seriously inhibited in the formulation and execution of practical economic policies? How severe a hindrance are the "autonomous" government corporations? Is it politically feasible to replace or reform them? Can

S-E-C-R-E-T

military governments sustain the degree of backing from various interest groups which would seem necessary for faster rates of economic growth? How much have economic problems to do with the replacement of democratic governments by non-democratic ones? Is it really much easier for a country to stick to representative government if it has lots of oil?

25X1

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010031-4

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010031-4

S-E-C-R-E-T

III. AF STAFF

25X1



25X1

14. Renewed Soviet and Chinese Interest in Africa

An analysis of the ups and (mostly) downs of Soviet and Chinese programs in black Africa in the past several

- 7 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

years and of their most recent moves, particularly Soviet military aid to Nigeria and Chinese involvement in the Tan-Zam railroad. Are these indicative of new wrinkles on old policies or of significant new departures?

IV. NE STAFF

15. Some Implications of the Arab Defeat by Israel

The summit ended with a formal split among Arab states. Meaning of division in revolutionary group for inter-Arab relations. New strength of conservative regimes. Arab attitudes toward US.



25X1

17. Southern Arabia

UAR and Saudi agreement. It's chances of success. Yemen after Egyptian withdrawal. The Saudis, the sheiks and the local rebels in South Arabia.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

V. FE STAFF

18. Certain Aspects of the Military Situation in South Vietnam

25X1 [] [] was mulling over 25X1
some ideas for a memo or two on this topic. His ideas doubtless will have taken better form now that he has been on the scene. (Fourth Quarter)

19. Politics in Hanoi

A discussion of who really runs the show and an exploration of any divergent attitudes toward the war. (Fourth Quarter)

20. Political Stability in Burma

Assess Ne Win's political hold (and how economics might affect it) and the problem of insurgency. At the recent meeting on the Estimates Schedule, the Board seemed interested in something along this line; we have our doubts that there is much new and significant to say, but are willing to give it a try. (November)

21. The Military's Involvement in China's Cultural Revolution

A rackup of what we know of the PLA's role and a few timid speculations. We've already started this and as it's shaping up it will probably be a "for the Board's info" sort of memo. (October)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

22. The GRC View of the Mainland Situation

The disarray on the Mainland has exposed a surprisingly cautious and realistic attitude toward "Return to the Mainland." Short and sweet. (October)

VI. SOV AND SMT STAFF

23. Romania and (Eastern) Europe

This memorandum would seek to describe Romania's graduated defiance of Moscow and chart its likely future course. Externally, the main question involves Romania's impact on Moscow and other East European regimes and their known and likely reaction to it. Relevant issues here might include: Romania's independent policy within CECA and the Warsaw Pact; her policies toward the Middle East, the UN, proposed international Communist conferences, and the like; efforts made by Moscow, Pankow, Prague, Budapest, and Sofia to quarantine the Romanian disease; the "Romanian" faction in Poland; the stimulus provided by Bucharest to Bonn's eastern policy. Internally, the principal question is whether the Ceausescu regime will continue to reject, by degrees, the "socialist" experience of other Communist states and

S-E-C-R-E-T

permit greater decentralization of the economy and democratization of public institutions, as is now the case in Yugoslavia.

24. Prospects for Peaceful Engagement in Europe

On the assumption that the topic is not too general, this memorandum would attempt to measure the long-term effects of the continuing expansion of East-West trade, cultural contacts, high-level visits. The issues of "gualism" in Eastern Europe, Bonn's eastern policy, prospects for revival of Communist parties in Western Europe, the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Group of Nine, even the Marxist-Christian dialogue, are among the subjects which could be grouped under this rubric.

25. Effects of the Intellectual Revival in Eastern Europe

In countries in which intellectuals have traditionally made the principal thrust for progress, the current intensive engagement of East European writers and young Party members in a critical appraisal of Communist political institutions and Marxist credenda may herald significant pressures against the regimes themselves. Most of the ferment is in Czechoslovakia, where the dissidents have gained important positions on both literary journals and in the Higher Party School,

- 11 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

but there are similar developments in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. There are also prospects for collaboration between some of these East European mavericks and their counterparts in the USSR.

26. The Soviet View of China

This memorandum would assess Soviet propaganda statements, intelligence collection requirements, diplomatic and military moves initiated by Moscow. Beyond that, the memorandum would speculate on the probable assessment being made in the Kremlin on present developments in China and the future course of Soviet-Chinese relations.

27. CPSU Leaders Diverge Over Party's Role

Problem: To examine the Soviet leadership's views on the role of the party in light of the abrogation of Khrushchev's 1962 party reform. There have been signs over the past year or so that the Soviet leaders continue to argue over the party's precise responsibilities in building a Communist society. Some leaders apparently believe that the party must adhere to its traditional responsibilities of indoctrination, control, agitation, etc., while others continue to espouse the Khrushchevian view that the party must be actively engaged in the production process, economic management, etc.

S-E-C-R-E-T

28. Factors of Political Instability in Collective Leadership

Problem: To discuss the likelihood of a return to one-man leadership as a consequence of factional alignments and realignments in the top party organs. Although collective leadership has endured for almost three years, there have been signs that Brezhnev's authority has been steadily enhanced as a result of a number of changes in the top party apparatus. At the same time, there have been indications that elements within the party and military leadership feel that the present division of authority in the leadership impedes the decision-making process.

29. The Post-Malinovskiy High Command and Soviet Defense Policy

Problem: To discuss the possible future changes in Soviet defense policy as a result of the rise to power of a new generation of Soviet military officers. New blood has been infused into the high command since Malinovskiy's death, but little is known of their positions on such issues as the ABM debate, the "flexible response" doctrine, and other major issues that have far reaching implications for future Soviet defense policy.

S-E-C-R-E-T