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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG)

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SUBJECT : Post Mortems

REFERENCE : ONE Memorandum for the IAC dated 3 June 1952:
Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies
in National Intelligence Estimates

1. The attached paper is the first action taken by ONE on post mortems since March 1953.

2. Past experience with the procedure outlined in the reference indicates several flaws. Tying the post mortem to individual estimates proved generally unsatisfactory. In many cases the problem was to determine what conclusions to draw from available facts rather than to collect more facts. In other cases, appropriate collection action had already been taken as the result of a prior estimate on the same area and any further action would be duplicatory. In many instances, no specific action was considered necessary other than for each agency to take continuing action within the field of its responsibilities; it was considered superfluous to initiate special procedures to tell each agency to continue carrying out its assigned mission. The net result was a series of post mortem memos which concluded that no action was necessary, and thereby implied that no intelligence deficiencies existed.

3. It is obvious, however, that intelligence deficiencies do exist and that the IAC bears ultimate responsibility for detecting them and initiating action for remedying them. It is believed that some of the deficiencies in the present procedure could be remedied by a post mortem issued quarterly rather than after each estimate. The post mortem could be issued simultaneously with the quarterly revision of the estimates program. Such a publication would provide further guidance to research and collection agencies and would provide the basis for a more comprehensive attack on intelligence deficiencies.

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4. For the present, however, we want to review the 1953 production to identify significant gaps. This will also give us a chance to test out the periodic rather than estimate-by-estimate approach.

5. Action: Would you therefore please review the attached for substance and have your representative meet with us at 10:00 Monday, 15 February, in Room 146 South.



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**Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates**

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 February 1954

SUBJECT: POST MORTEM OF 1953 PRODUCTION

The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed during preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during 1953. The principal estimates upon which the findings are based are listed in TAB "A."

1. SOVIET BLOC

The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc have been widely recognized for a long time. Many of them will probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for more effort on the resistance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly, the IAC authorized creation of an Ad Hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee on 8 December 1953. Experience during 1953 also indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in the following key areas:

- a. Aircraft Production. Strenuous efforts should be continued to resolve existing differences in procedures for estimating aircraft production. With the growth of Soviet atomic power, accurate estimates of Soviet long-range and fighter aircraft production are of critical importance.

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TAB "X"

O/NE Memo to
IAC representatives
8 February 1954

PRINCIPAL NIE PRODUCTION BASE FOR 1953 POST MORTEM FINDINGS

1. SOVIET BLOC

- NIE-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957
- NIE-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany through Mid-1954
- NIE-87 Probable Developments within the European Satellites through Mid-1955
- NIE-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955
- NIE-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through Mid-1955
- SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955
- SE-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955
- SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare
- SE-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR
- SE-40 Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"
- SE-42 Current Communist Tactics
- SE-46 Probable Long Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions
- SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developments in Eastern Germany on Soviet Policy with Respect to Germany

SECRET

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2. FAR EAST

- NIE-74** Probable Developments in Burma through 1953
- NIE-77** Probable Developments in Indonesia
- NIE-80** Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea
- NIE-91** Probable Developments in Indochina through 1954
- SE-37** Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China
- SE-45** Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1954
- SE-48** Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea
- SE-51** The Significance of the New Indonesian Government
- SE-53** Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible Developments in Indochina

3. WESTERN EUROPE

- NIE-63** France's Probable Future Role in the Western Security System
- NIE-63/1** Probable Short Term Developments in French Policy
- NIE-71** Probable Outlook for Italy
- NIE-93** Probable Developments in Yugoslavia
- SE-54** The Political Outlook in Italy

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4. NEAR EAST-AFRICA


NIE-73 **Conditions and Trends in the Middle
East Affecting US Security**

NIE-75/1 **Probable Developments in Iran through 1953**

NIE-76 **Probable Developments in Egypt**

NIE-79 **Probable Developments in South Asia**

NIE-83 **Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa**



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NIE-102 **Probable Developments in Iran through 1954**

SE-49 **The Current Outlook in Iran**

5. LATIN AMERICA

NIE-84 **Probable Developments in Guatemala**

NIE-85 **Probable Developments in Chile**

NIE-86 **Probable Developments in Brazil**

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