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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300020001-4

\*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

Changes Recommended by The Director of Intelligence, USAF

In NIE-9: TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

(13 February 1951)

1. Reference Page 1, Par. 1, Line. 4. Revise as follows:

*ok but not to be*  
~~At present the primary~~ One of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is to secure continued US assistance and, ....

2. Reference Page 2, Par. 2. Add the following sentence to end of paragraph: However, in this case Turkey would still attempt to maintain a policy of neutrality and, in any event, would resist with force any direct attack on Turkish territory.

- OK. Redraft of para. 3 and 4 as indicated in Par. 5 below.*  
3. Reference Pars. 3 and 4, Page 2, and top of Page 3. Change to Par. 5, a, and b, as indicated in Par. 5 below.

4. Reference Pars. 5 and 6, Page 3. Change numbers of paragraphs to 3 and 4.

5. Reference Page 3. Add the following as Par. 5, a, b, and c:

5. In the event that <sup>advanced</sup> Soviet ~~moves~~ in the Middle East (against Iran, Iraq, and Syria on one flank of Turkey and against Greece on the other), <sup>which</sup> do not result in general war, Turkey's foreign policy would probably be as follows:

3. a. Turkey would probably not alter its alignment ~~with the West~~ even if its <sup>were partially</sup> ~~land communications~~ with the Western Powers were virtually cut off <sup>(from the West)</sup> by Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In this event, Turkey would probably be obliged to adopt a more cautious policy toward the USSR but would almost certainly not grant the USSR territorial or other major concessions leading to ~~or embark on~~ a policy

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Review of this document by CIA has determined that

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*If, on the other hand, the USSR or its satellites were to attack Greece, and if,*

*b. If, after Soviet occupation of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, <sup>satellite</sup> ~~the USSR~~ <sup>without previous, secret, or other, ~~with the USSR~~ <sup>occupy</sup> ~~the USSR~~ <sup>there,</sup></sup>*  
Assuming that the USSR has not taken over Iran, Iraq and Syria, and if

the US failed to oppose militarily Satellite occupation of Greece or refused to consider <sup>or</sup> ~~a Soviet~~ <sup>by Soviet force</sup> attack on Greece, sufficient justification for ~~a US declaration of war~~ <sup>military action</sup> against the USSR, then Turkey's attitude would depend on broader strategic considerations. If ~~the US~~ <sup>the US</sup> left no doubt of its determination to ~~oppose the USSR~~ <sup>support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability, Turkey would</sup> support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability, Turkey would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment. If, On the other hand, ~~in the event that~~ Turkey were unable to obtain assurances of such support, Turkey would probably attempt to adopt a ~~neutralist~~ <sup>policy of</sup> neutrality.

*c. In the event that Turkey were outflanked completely by Soviet control of Greece in the west, and, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the east and south, the Turks, <sup>leaving firm assurances of US armed support in the event of a Soviet attack</sup> ~~probably would conclude that the US would be unable to~~ <sup>support and supply them in the event of war. In such circumstances,</sup> support and supply them in the event of war. In such circumstances, <sup>on Turkey</sup> ~~Turkey~~ <sup>probably shift</sup> would ~~attempt to~~ <sup>adopt</sup> a policy of neutrality, <sup>and</sup> ~~might~~ <sup>might</sup> be eventually <sup>make</sup> ~~make~~ substantial <sup>to the USSR</sup> concessions leading to a ~~policy of general appeasement.~~*

6. Reference Page 3, Par. 7. Change number of paragraph to 6.

7. Reference Page 3, Par. 8. Change number of paragraph to 7, and

revise to read as follows:

7. 8r In the event of general war, Turkey, if not itself attacked, probably would initially maintain a her non-belligerency status but would do everything compatible with that status to facilitate a Western victory.

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8. Reference Par. 1, Page 4, of DISCUSSION. Revise as follows:

1. Turkey is determined to resist Soviet expansion. ~~Short of~~  
However, a US retreat into hemispheric isolationism, or the outflanking of  
Turkey by the USSR through the control of Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria,  
would force Turkey to abandon her pro-US alignment and attempt to maintain  
a policy of neutrality, and as long as it is not completely cut off from  
Western aid, Turkey will remain solidly aligned with the West.

*O.K.*  
*merely short of*  
*from the*  
*to*  
*pro-US*  
*alignment*

9. Reference Par. 3, Page 5. Revise first sentence to read as follows:

3. ~~At present the primary~~ One of the main objectives of Turkey's  
foreign policy is to obtain a US commitment to come to Turkey's defense in  
event of a Soviet or Soviet-Satellite attack.

*O.K.*

10. Reference Par. 4, Page 6. End Paragraph 4 at end of sentence,  
line 7. Change remainder of paragraph to 5, a, as indicated below in new  
paragraph 5.

11. Add new Paragraph 5 as follows:

5. In the event that possible Soviet moves in the Middle East  
(against Iran, Iraq, and Syria on one flank of Turkey and against Greece on  
the other) do not result in general war, Turkey's foreign policy would probably  
be as follows:

*Rephrase*  
*O.K.*

a. Even if its land communications with the West were virtually  
cut off by Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkey  
would probably not alter its alignment with the West. In this event,  
Turkey would be obliged to adopt a more cautious policy toward the USSR.

*O.K.*

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A number of individuals not unacceptable to the USSR might be brought into the government, and internal security measures would be tightened. It is unlikely, however, that Turkey would agree to territorial or other major concessions, request the US military mission to leave Turkey, or otherwise appease the USSR.

5v b. Assuming that the USSR has not taken over Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and if If, after Soviet occupation of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the US failed to oppose militarily Satellite occupation of Greece or refused to consider a Soviet attack on Greece as sufficient justification for US declaration of war against the USSR, then Turkey's attitude would depend on broader strategic considerations. These considerations would include: (a) the degree of military preparedness in Western Europe; (b) Western military strength in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean; (c) the attitude of the US toward Turkey and US strategic plans concerning Turkey; and (d) the attitude of the Western Powers in general and of the US in particular toward Soviet aggression. We believe, however, that Turkey would probably maintain its pro-US alignment, provided the US left no doubt of its determination to oppose the USSR globally and to support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability. If Turkey were unable to obtain assurances of such support, it would probably attempt to adopt a neutralist policy of neutrality.

c. In the event that Turkey were outflanked completely by Soviet control of Greece in the west, and Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the east and south, the Turks probably would conclude that the US would be

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
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unable to support and supply them in the event of war. In such circum-  
stances, Turkey would still attempt to maintain a policy of neutrality.  
In this isolated position, however, Turkey would probably be eventually  
forced to make substantial territorial or other major concessions leading  
to a policy of general appeasement.

12. Reference Par. 6, Page 8. Revise Par. 6 to read as follows:

6. ~~Virtually the only circumstance which~~ The adoption by the US  
of a policy of hemispheric defense would cause Turkey automatically to abandon  
its pro-US alignment. ~~would be the adoption by the US of a policy of hemispheric~~  
~~defense. Almost by definition, such a development would force Turkey to revise~~  
~~its foreign policy.~~ However, even if Turkey were isolated from the West in  
this way, the Turks would continue to resist Soviet pressure and would attempt  
to maintain a policy of neutrality. In time, a body of opinion favoring  
appeasement and accommodation with the USSR would probably grow up and might  
eventually dominate Turkish policy, but at present it appears more likely that  
the Turks would -- if necessary -- fight for their independence, no matter how  
suicidal such a course might be.

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