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COMMUNIST CHINA

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I. STABILITY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

A. Political Composition

1. The Communist Party the Dominant Influence in Government.

The People's Republic of China was created by and remains under the strict control of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party exercises its power at all levels of government by means of a) staffing the key positions with party personnel; b) overseeing all personnel procedures, including training, selection, promotion, assignments, and salaries; c) controlling policy-making, fiscal, legislative and secretarial organs; d) retaining command over the armed forces; and e) controlling the disciplinary and policing machinery both within the Party itself and throughout the government. In addition the Party controls all channels of public information, all semi-official agencies (such as the All China Federation of Labor), an ever increasing number of industrial and commercial enterprises, and the plethora of professional, cultural, and occupational associations which in themselves act as governing bodies over the populace. The Party also exercises a supervision over all tolerated minor parties amounting to virtual control.

In recent months the Party has acted to tighten even further its hold over the government processes by a) strengthening the internal organization and discipline of the Party itself, and b) restricting further the influence of non-party people in government affairs. At the same time the Party is training the younger generation to serve as a new and presumably more trustworthy bureaucracy.

2. Role and Political Orientation of Armed Forces and Police

The armed forces and political police, like the civil arm of the government, are dominated by the Party: -- most top-level military officials are trusted party veterans; commanders at all echelon levels are checked by party-appointed political commissars; roughly 60% of the Field Army troops are party members; and the entire body of military personnel are subjected to regular Party-imposed indoctrination and discipline. Communist leaders have displayed great skill in the maintenance of unity and coordination in the growth of the army, so that it is not only well disciplined, but well controlled. Recent steps toward "nationalizing" all armies have had the effect of materially reducing the chances of ambitious commanders pursuing independent courses by exploiting their troops personalized loyalty to them.

Since the army is an arm of the Party, its actions have always been linked closely to the Party's political moves. In many cases the army has served as the vanguard of the Party and thus has been one of the most important elements in the Party's rise to power. Today the army represents the backbone of Party control over the mainland as well as the basis for its power-politics approach to international affairs.

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The political policy, or public security force, is used by the Party for bandit-suppression, counter-espionage, prevention of sabotage, and the enforcement of political and ideological conformity to the Party's programs. In general the police are less well oriented to Party leadership. While there is no question that the Party directs the top organs of the police, the efficiency of the police force is hampered by the necessity to retain ex-Nationalist personnel in the lower echelons. The lack of competent and loyal police personnel (which is less of a problem in the rural areas where the military has primary responsibility for public security) is currently being corrected by intensive training programs and the weeding out of unreliable individuals.

## B. Internal Stability

### 1. Extent of pacification of Opposition Forces Within Mainland China.

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Large areas, especially the newly occupied territories in East, South and Southwest China, are not yet under the full control of the Chinese Communists. The Communists, however, veterans in the arts of guerrilla warfare, have shown themselves capable of effectively containing resistance elements and of keeping down any serious uprisings.

There is no place on the China mainland today where an opposition force has established a strong base of operations of a type similar to the Communist border regions of pre-conquest days. Bandits and/or guerrilla bands have been effectively isolated and their anti-government activities have been reduced to scattered, sporadic operations limited by a general lack of weapons, funds, leadership and organization.

Nationalist leadership has been thoroughly discredited in the minds of guerrilla leaders and Nationalist support of their operations has been ineffective. The prospect of an organized "Third Force" movement around which anti-communist elements could rally also appears negligible at this time.

In the event of a sustained attack in force against the Chinese mainland some measure of support could be expected from the anti-government elements on the mainland if funds and materials were supplied in quantity. Short of such aid the Communist military and militia appear capable of containing and eventually of eliminating present opposition forces.

### 2. Ability of Chinese Communist Regime to Control the Peoples of China

The Chinese Communist regime enjoys a strong position with respect to the general populace. In spite of growing discontent among some elements of the population the regime has gained the acceptance of important groups in the urban areas (professional people, technicians, youth, student class, laborers, many intellectuals, rank and file party and government people, etc.) and the passive support of those who do not accept Communist policy but who grudgingly admire the zeal, honesty, and competency of Communist administration. Most politically conscious people prefer the present government to that of the Nationalists.

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In the rural areas, especially those in the newly occupied territories south of the Yangtze River, the Communists have experienced greater hostility but here too their positive programs seem to have engendered some degree of confidence among the people while their forceful police-actions have limited the avenues of open resistance.

In assessing the degree of popular support enjoyed by the regime several factors favor the Communists' position:

- (a) The Communists' control of all civil, military, and police power. Previous rulers (including the KMT) have governed China for many years with considerably less power than the Communists now command.
- (b) The Communists' control over sources of livelihood.
- (c) The Communists' positive program of action administered by a resourceful and politically astute leadership.
- (d) The Communists' intensive propaganda and information program backed by deeds and keyed to the nationalist aspirations of the Chinese people. In this program the Communists have identified the Party with the hopes and aspirations of almost every class of society, while exploiting the failures and political bankruptcy of the Kuomintang.

In the course of consolidating their position the Communists inevitably have aroused resentments. The chief causes of popular discontent have been a) too much government and too much interference in the life of the individual; b) burdensome taxes and general economic distress; c) failure to fulfill pre-conquest promises; and to a lesser extent, d) the pro-Soviet, anti-American position of the Party. In addition the Communists have incurred the hatred of those who have lost prerogatives enjoyed under the Nationalists.

Too much weight should not be given reports of popular disillusionment and discontent with the regime. The mass of Chinese have known nothing but authoritarian government and they have demonstrated considerably forbearance in the face of long-standing abuses and maladministration. As long as the regime maintains its vitality and its present record of success it will continue to have the acceptance if not the active support of most mainland Chinese.

### 3. Immediate Economic Problems and Effect on Political Stability.

The most urgent economic problem facing the Communists today is the necessity for increasing already burdensome taxes in order to support increased military requirements. The heavier tax burden will fall primarily on the rural population and undoubtedly will provoke considerable discontent. The greater part of the revenue, however, will be collected in the Yangtze Valley and northern rural areas where Communist control is solidified and where increased unrest is not likely to effect the regime's control within the foreseeable future.

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The Communists will not press direct rural taxes too strongly in South China until such time as they can spare the additional administrative and military personnel required to first consolidate their position.

A second economic problem of immediate importance arises from the Communist's administration of the cities, the center of China's most politically conscious population. So far the regime has gained the general backing of the urban population by convincing the populace (a) that the Communists inherited from the Nationalists a bankrupt economy aggravated still more by such external factors as blockade, bombing, and national calamities, and (b) that the Communist administration was capable, honest and earnest in its attempts to ameliorate the situation. At the same time the regime has been able to claim credit for domestic accomplishments (controlling inflation, rejuvenating urban-rural trade to some degree, railroad reconstruction, etc.) and has been able to point to achievements in international affairs (most notably the successes in Korea).

Despite the achievements to date, the basic economic problems of the cities have not been solved. Industry and trade remain dislocated and unemployment continues, while current military demands jeopardize the prospects of long-range reconstruction. The persistence of such conditions will tax the administrative resourcefulness of the regime, and, in the long run, may adversely effect its ability to retain the confidence of the urban population.

IC. 5. Prospects of UN solution of Formosa question

There is little prospect that a solution of the Formosa problem can be achieved through the UN. On the one hand there is no indication that Communist China and the Soviet Union would accept any proposal short of recognition of the sovereignty of the Communist authorities over the area, or that the Nationalists would willingly relinquish their sovereignty. On the other hand, there is little likelihood that the United Kingdom, India, France and other non-Communist members of the UN would welcome or support proposals looking toward some form of UN trusteeship over the island or giving UN sanction to the continuation of Nationalist control.

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## II. CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

### A. Objectives and aims prior to rise to power

The major objectives and aims of the Chinese Communists before their assumption of national leadership in October 1949 were set forth in the writings and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, notably "China's New Democracy" (1940) and "On Coalition Government" (1945). Those aims were as follows:

1. To destroy the authority of the Kuomintang Party and government and to destroy the power and influence of those social groups that had supported it.
2. To eradicate western cultural and economic influence in China and create a new political and cultural orientation based on Soviet example.
3. To replace the family-oriented outlook of traditional Chinese society with new political and cultural values derived from Marxist ideology.
4. To create a centralized "coalition" government based on an alliance of four Revolutionary classes -- the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, and workers -- an alliance led by the Communist Party.
5. To create a "semi-socialist" economy combining vestigial elements of private capitalism with cooperative, state-directed, and state-owned enterprises.
6. To carry out a program of land reform calculated to
  - (a) eliminate local sources of political opposition;
  - (b) enlist peasant support;
  - (c) bring the force of Communist authority more closely to bear on the rural communities.
7. To preserve China's national autonomy.
8. To retain membership in the world Communist movement.

### B. Objectives since rise to power

Since their successful establishment of national leadership in China, in October 1949, the Chinese Communists have placed increasing emphasis on political and economic stability, at the expense of the rapid achievement of their long-range socialist objectives. Moreover, since June 1950, they have tended to sacrifice gains in the field of

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domestic reconstruction at home by embarking on a policy of military expansion abroad.

The major objectives which emerge from the internal and external policies pursued by the Communist since 1949 are briefly as follows:

1. On the domestic front the Communist objectives are:
  - a. To increase production, both agricultural and industrial, while reducing consumption;
  - b. To create the foundations for a modern industrial plant;
  - c. To shift the base of Party operations to urban areas;
  - d. To eliminate counter-revolutionary elements by tightening ideological controls and by strengthening the defense and security forces;
  - e. To carry out a gradual and limited program of agrarian reform; one which will not interfere with the prior aim of increasing or at least maintaining current levels of agricultural production.
2. In the field of international relations, the Communist objectives are:
  - a. To gain sovereignty over Taiwan and Tibet, by force if necessary;
  - b. To aid and abet world Communist objectives in Korea and Southeast Asia;
  - c. To expel Western economic and cultural influences from China;
  - d. To retain a position of informal leadership among Asiatic Communist parties;
  - e. To secure China's borders and to assure China access to needed commodities;
  - f. To maintain close and amicable relations with the USSR and world Communist leadership;
  - g. To gain recognition for China's equal and sovereign position among nations of the world.

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C. Relation of above to Soviet Objectives

The domestic objectives and most of the international objectives of Communist China are compatible with those of the USSR. However, to the extent that the USSR seeks (a) to consolidate control over Communist China and (b) eventually to establish Soviet domination over Asia, Soviet objectives will come into sharp conflict with the Chinese Communist aims of preserving national autonomy, securing China's borders and retaining a leadership position among other asiatic Communist parties. (The situations under which these objectives are likely to conflict together with an appraisal of possible compromises are discussed in part IV below).

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### III. EXTERNAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS

#### A. Role of overseas Chinese

The Chinese Communists, fully alive to potentialities of the large Chinese overseas communities, have expended great effort in seeking to extend their control over those communities, especially in areas near to China. Their strategy to gain such control has involved principally the use of front organizations, appeals to nationalism and self-interest, attention to youth, and pressure exerted through control of remittances which overseas Chinese seek to deliver to their relatives in China. The Chinese Communists have been successful in securing a certain amount of financial assistance for their regime, and have built up a nucleus of supporters who can be utilized for fifth column activities if needed. However, the Communists have not yet been able to induce the majority of even nearby overseas Chinese to support their cause wholeheartedly. Progress is hampered by the circumstance that almost all overseas Chinese come from areas of south China where anti-communist sentiment is strongest. Reported opposition by overseas Chinese to the Communists is not organized, nor does it include any indication of a significant rebirth of confidence in the Kuomintang. Most nearby overseas Chinese will probably offer at least passive acquiescence to the Communists if they become convinced that there is no practical alternative.

#### B. Effectiveness of pressure from other Asian governments

The Chinese Communists proclaim their role as defenders of Asia and leaders in the struggle to eliminate foreign imperialism from Asia. They may respond to pressure from other Asian governments on minor issues, but not on major ones so long as those governments do not appear able and willing to thwart Communist aspirations. The Chinese Communists have demonstrated their capacity to disregard the desires of other Asian governments if a serious conflict of interest exists, as in the case of India in the recent Tibetan invasion. The Chinese Communists obviously regard the Asiatic nations as pupils requiring China's guidance rather than as partners to be consulted. No Asian government nor likely combination of governments seems strong enough to be able to exert enough pressure on the Chinese Communists in the immediate future to dissuade them from any action which the Communists consider essential.

#### C. Vulnerability to economic warfare

Although China has a predominantly primitive and rural economy, the introduction of modern industry and transport has created a small sector of the economy which is highly productive. The high proportion of savings which can be made available out of the income of this "modern sector" to finance current government requirements gives this area of the economy a special significance. According to

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current budgets, the Chinese Communists plan to finance through urban revenues and the earnings of government enterprise some three-fifths of their expenditures in China proper and three-quarters in Manchuria.

The productivity of this "modern sector" is intimately related to conditions of China's foreign trade. Most of China's exports represent the activation of marginal resources which would otherwise remain wholly or largely unemployed. Industrial, transport, and communications facilities depend upon imports of capital goods, raw materials, and producers' goods for their maintenance and operation. Economic warfare could immediately reduce the income and productivity of the "modern sector" in denying the advantages of exchange offered by foreign trade, and in the long run, could effect a progressive deterioration of the "modern sector" through denying essential imports of maintenance equipment, raw materials, and producers' goods. This deterioration, however, could be retarded somewhat through compensating imports from the USSR. Economic warfare would not greatly affect the rural economy, which employs perhaps 80 percent of the population, and therefore would not necessarily affect the political stability of the Chinese Communist regime. However, in destroying a major source of government revenues, economic warfare would necessitate increased rural taxes or a reduction in government expenditures. Since the first alternative would probably require the re-deployment of military forces for garrison duty, it seems likely that either eventuality would reduce the Chinese Communist potential for external military efforts.

D. Vulnerability to air bombardment and naval blockade

Aerial bombardment and naval blockade could achieve the objectives of economic warfare far more quickly. Naval blockade could ensure a complete cessation of seaborne foreign trade, while aerial bombardment could reduce modern transport facilities and industrial output. Aerial operations against the Manchurian rail network would minimize the possibility of compensating imports from the USSR by rail.

In addition, aerial bombardment could directly affect the military potential of the Chinese Communist regime. The disruption of the Manchurian rail network would reduce the flow of material from the USSR, while operations against the transport system in China would prevent the rapid movement of military forces, thereby increasing internal security requirements.

Aerial bombardment and naval blockade could therefore be expected to reduce rapidly the domestic resources available to the Chinese Communist regime, to limit the flow of military supplies from the USSR, and to increase the requirements for garrison duty to maintain order within China. The effective achievement of these objectives could be expected to limit the capacity of the Chinese Communists to sustain a strong external military effort.

IV. PROBABLE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE USSR

## A. Basic Elements in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China

Throughout its history the Chinese Communist Party has acted in consonance with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Following the Party's accession to national power in China, indications have pointed to an even stronger fixation of this alignment. There is no reasonable prospect that any change in the relationship will occur so long as the course of action charted by present leadership of the Chinese party meets with no overwhelming disaster.

The binding tie between the Chinese Communists and the USSR is a common interest in the preservation and promotion of the world Communist movement. All the relevant evidence demonstrates that the Chinese party, like most other non-Russian Communist parties, has accepted and continues to accept the thesis that its future and the future of the movement toward "world socialism" are dependent upon the continued existence of the Russian Communist state, which, in turn, is always threatened by the major non-Communist nations. Given this fundamental tenet, subordination of Chinese policy to Soviet policy (or coordination of the two policies) is for the Chinese Communist leaders an entirely logical and, indeed, necessary procedure.

When it is recalled that most of the Chinese Communist leaders have made their careers in almost total isolation from the non-Communist world, it becomes the more understandable that neither the shifts and turns in Soviet policy nor the burden of national responsibility in China have shaken their assumption that an identity of interest exists between themselves and the Soviet Union. It is possible that this conviction was hardened by actions of other powers, notably by US assistance to the National Government during the post-1945 phase of the Chinese civil war. There can be little doubt, however, that this conviction has been a basic part of Chinese Communist doctrine from the date of the party's founding.

## B. Possible Sources of Conflict between Communist China and the USSR

It is quite obvious that issues exist that could give rise to serious differences between Communist China and the USSR. These issues may be summarized under the following six headings:

(1) The probable anxiety of Peiping over the extent of the Soviet share in the technical and managerial operations of industry in Manchuria and over the Soviet control from Port Arthur of the maritime approaches to Manchuria and North China. For Peiping, these circumstances represent a threat to its ultimate attainment of full control over its own territory, and especially over the Manchurian economy. For the USSR, these circumstances provide some check on Communist China's actions now and would facilitate any Soviet attempt to dominate China eventually. The maintenance of Soviet advisors at their present posts in Manchuria and the continuation of direct Soviet participation in the management of certain Manchurian factories would perpetuate the important Soviet role in the growth of Communist China's chief source of modern military

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 equipment; while the maintenance of Soviet troops and naval vessels in Kwantung would somewhat enhance the Soviet Union's ability to attack Manchuria by land from the north and by sea from the south.

(2) Possible Soviet anxiety over the reintroduction of Chinese Communist influence into Korea. This development represents an alteration of the original policy whereby before the June 1950 invasion Chinese Communist influence within the Korean Communist leadership had been eliminated thus making the Soviet border more secure in another quarter and consolidating the Soviet encirclement of Chinese Communist territory by land and sea. The diminution of Soviet influence in Korea, of whatever magnitude, might therefore suggest Soviet efforts to remove at some more propitious time both the Chinese Communist troops and the Korean Communist agents of Peiping's will, or to achieve a firmer control over these Chinese Communist troops by other means. For the Chinese Communists, the reassertion of their influence in Korea would help to deny the USSR another base from which pressure could be applied against Manchuria and would assist materially whatever plans they may have for achieving dominance over the Japanese Communist Party and ultimately for acquiring unchallenged access to Japanese industrial products.

(3) The probable anxiety of Peiping over the potential extent of Soviet influence in Sinkiang made possible by the anti-Chinese sentiment existing among the majority of Sinkiang's inhabitants, by the presence of non-Chinese Communists and the pressure upon Peiping to increase their number, and by the dominant Soviet role in the province's extractive economy. The withdrawal of Chinese Communist authority from Sinkiang would be a blow to the domestic prestige of the Chinese Communist regime and would advance the limits of Moscow's authority that much closer around China north of the Yangtze River, an area containing the main material sources of Peiping's power. On its part, the USSR recognizes Sinkiang to be a source of some essential mineral (tungsten and tin) as well as a territory in which Peiping's authority can be harassed if necessary.

(4) The possibility of differing opinions over the nature and timing of Chinese Communist and Soviet actions to be taken with respect to the non-Communist governments and other Communist Parties in the Far East, and the possibility of the resentment of one side at independent actions taken by the other side in this sphere.

(5) The irritation of the Chinese Communists that would follow a failure by the Soviet Union to fulfill such commitments as it had made regarding action in Europe for the purpose of rendering indirect aid to Chinese Communist plans and actions in the Far East.

(6) The resentment of Peiping at Soviet attempts to subvert the Chinese Communist Party and its instrumentalities.

With regard to all of these possible sources of conflict, certain factors more or less peculiar to the Chinese Communist position may enhance the possibility that differences will be difficult to reconcile. Unlike the Eastern European satellites, the Chinese regime came into power mainly by its own efforts. Whatever debt may be owed for Soviet material aid, no Soviet divisions on the border or in the country are needed to prop up the government. In the process of achieving power, the Chinese Communists appealed to nationalist sentiment and successfully attracted much of it to their cause. To retain this support -- or, negatively, to keep nationalist opposition within tolerable limits, the Chinese Communists must put limits on their concessions to

Russian interests in China. The presence of large numbers of Soviet "advisers" in a country with so xenophobic a cultural tradition as China must be an irritant even within the ranks of the Communist Party. It is at least imaginable that circumstances could arise in which the Communist leaders would find it politic to appease such domestic sentiment at the expense of the Soviet alliance.

C. Capabilities of Communist China for pursuing independent courses of action

Objectively, there is no necessary impediment to the choice by the Chinese Communist regime of a course of action independent of the USSR.

The ultimate instrument of domestic power, the Chinese Red Army, is uniquely the creation of the present Chinese Communist leadership. Its top commanders are tested members of the inner circle of the Chinese Communist Party. Although it is almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union for new supplies of armor, vehicles, and aircraft, its domestic responsibilities can be discharged effectively without such equipment. Undoubtedly there has been a measure of Stalinist infiltration into the command structure and into the political commissar system. It is quite beyond belief, however, that this process could have so subverted the army's loyalty as to make it any decisive degree unresponsive to the command of the Pei-p'ing government.

In China the political police constitute a distinctly secondary mechanism of control. The organization is now undergoing a rapid expansion, presumably under Soviet tutelage. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet intention is to capture and control it. There is equally no reason to expect the police system to achieve sufficient power to enable it to sway the regime so long as the army remains loyal to the Party's leaders.

The Chinese Communist Party itself -- and the labor unions and peasant associations subordinate to it -- cannot yet have been brought under detailed Stalinist control except on a localized basis, as in parts of Sinkiang and in the Kwantung peninsula of Manchuria where Soviet influence has been dominant for a number of years. The obstacles to wholesale Soviet penetration are simply too great to make credible any other conclusion: the very size of the party organization, the language and cultural barriers to be overcome, and, most importantly, the fact that the Pei-p'ing leadership to date has successfully achieved the Party's immediate goals.

If this estimate is correct -- and obviously it rests not on detailed intelligence reporting but on an analysis of what might be possible in the Chinese situation -- then the Chinese party need not have undue fears as to the effect of the USSR's intra-party influence in the event of a Sino-Soviet split. Weapons at the command of the USSR, then, come to economic retaliation or military intervention by the Soviet Army. The Chinese leadership must be aware that the one could not be decisive and that the other, from the Soviet point of view, is impracticable. China not only is not dependent economically on the USSR, but it cannot, in fact obtain in adequate quantities from Soviet sources such critically needed imports as raw cotton and petroleum. The Pei-p'ing Politburo would have to be totally blind to the lesson of Tito not to realize that the West could be relied upon to more than compensate for a cessation of Soviet exports to China. As for actual Soviet military intervention, the Chinese planners could reason with assurance that the USSR's strategic situation would not permit the allocation of Red Army resources to a potentially indecisive adventure in China.

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It is possible, of course, that the leaders of Communist China have concluded that by intervening overtly in Korea they have forfeited any hope of obtaining Western sympathy and assistance and that they thus have a choice only between association with the USSR and complete and hopeless isolation. Such a conclusion would require so complete a misreading of the developments in Yugoslavia and so absolute a misunderstanding of the current international scene as to make it, conservatively stated, unlikely.

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D. Possibility of a break between the USSR and Communist China

If the potential motivation and the capabilities for turning from the USSR can be said to exist, is there then any real likelihood that a break will occur?

Abstractly, of course, it could. The Soviets might push too hard and too fast for concessions in China that would make the present pro-Stalinist Chinese leadership balk at accepting the burden of the resulting pro-Nationalist resentment. The Kremlin might insist upon assigning to China anti-Western tasks too hazardous even for the Pei-p'ing regime in its presently reckless mood. A split in the Chinese party might bring into power a nationalist Communist leadership comprised of military commanders unwilling to sacrifice Chinese interests and armies to the Soviet Union's aims.

Already, certainly, there must be a wide measure of restiveness within the Chinese party over the consequences of the Soviet association. This ranges, probably, from resentment occasioned by the preferential treatment that undoubtedly is accorded in China to Soviet "experts" to dismay at the risks incurred as a result of the USSR's original Korea venture and the subsequent Chinese entry into a shooting war with the West. The absence of any reliable reports of intra-party purges suggests that to date such disaffection been kept within narrow limits. Nevertheless, it can scarcely fail to grow if Chinese armies are embroiled over a long period in a bloody war in Korea, as the hardships resulting from the diminution of trade with the west become more burdensome, and as it becomes fully clear that the job of national reconstruction and development must be postponed into some indefinite future.

For all this, however, the expectation of any early split between Pei-p'ing and Moscow remains a matter of wishing and hoping by analysts in Belgrade and in other interested capitals. Thus far, every word and action of the Chinese Communist regime has fitted neatly into the Soviet scheme of things. Furthermore, the actions have been crowned with a large degree of success. On this point, it needs to be recognized, no Chinese, in or out of the Communist Party, can be entirely displeased at the exploits of Chinese armies against western military power. If this is the case generally, how much more must the Korean success have impressed the leaders in Pei-p'ing? Having taken the gravest kinds of risks, in collaboration with Moscow, they have thus far gained an accretion of power and influence probably far beyond their original expectations. To break the tie with Moscow now would mean for them the abandonment of these very results of their so far successful gamble.

It is far more realistic, therefore, to reason that the Chinese regime, having committed itself to the Moscow association in about the



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most overt fashion possible, has no present intention of altering its course. The possibility that the Soviets may overreach themselves in dealing with so demonstrably potent a junior partner cannot be entirely excluded. To look forward optimistically to such a development, however, requires the adoption of two related premises: first, that the Kremlin learned nothing at all from its miscalculation in Yugoslavia; second, that the Soviet Politburo is so lacking in appreciation of the USSR's short-term self-interest (during a period of utmost tension with the West) that it would be unwilling to make the minimum concessions and compromises needed to keep China Communist a willing and even anxious ally. These premises seem hopelessly far-fetched.

What may rationally be expected, then, is a continuance of close foreign policy association between Communist China and the USSR for a period of indefinite duration. For the Chinese regime, moreover, this association will represent a voluntary act, calculated by its own standards to serve its own over-riding interests.