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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. William L. Langer, Assistant
National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General Vernon E. Megee, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, Acting for Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission

SUBJECT: (Secret) National Intelligence Estimate No. 12, "Consequences
of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea."
12 December 1950

1. In the original Draft of NIE No. 12 the military implications appear to have been inadequately developed or weighed in the final conclusion. Whereas the political implications admittedly are of vital importance at this stage of delicate negotiations, the law of returns has already set in with respect to those negotiations, consideration should be given to the question of utilizing Nat troops than this paper would indicate. With the departure of the Chinese Communist delegation and of Mr. Vishinsky, and the that negotiations may be resumed at some future date in Peiping that the Communists are in the process of buying further time, which their forces in Korea will drive for a final military de Hence the initiative to take any and all possible countermeasu our capabilities cannot be delayed in the hope of diplomatic s

2. The amendments set out in Tab "A" are recommended.

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

1 Incl
Tab "A"

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J. KIELING
Colonel, USAF
Executive
Directorate of Intelligence

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Return to Dr. Langer

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TAB "A"

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18 Dec 50

AMENDMENTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S.A.F.,
TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 12, "CONSEQUENCES OF
THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA".

12 DECEMBER 1950

1. The Director of Intelligence, U.S.A.F., has reviewed National Intelligence Estimate No. 12, and offers the following amendments:

a. Reference p. 1, par. 1. Amend first sentence as follows:

"The Chinese Nationalists have offered a task force of 33,000 troops for service in Korea and possibly could provide a greater number up to about 150,000 without jeopardizing the security of Taiwan."

b. Reference p. 2, par. 2. Revise as follows: "There is no immediate crisis in Korea requiring Chinese Nationalist troops to prevent a disaster, but there is a requirement to begin the dynamic exploitation of any anti-Communist Chinese forces both in Korea and on the Chinese mainland, whose commitment could have a favorable effect on the Korean and possibly the entire Far Eastern situations. The Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa provide the only visible means for such exploitation. The presence-or absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in-the-limited numbers-estimated-to-be-available within the immediate near future and later would not be a major factor affecting the ability of UN forces to establish and hold a defensive line across the peninsula against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces, provided the US-UN introduced reinforcements directly."

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c. Reference p. 2, par. 3. Add at end of paragraph as follows:

"An important requirement in Korea is for additional infantry. By using Nationalist infantry as a screening force, present UN forces in Korea could be used more effectively as a striking force. The defense of a beachhead requires a mobile reserve which can counterattack quickly at the points of greatest enemy pressure."

d. Reference p. 2, par. 4. Revise as follows: "The best Chinese

Communist forces are now deployed in North Korea and Manchuria. If hostilities between the US and Communist China were to spread beyond Korea, or should the Chinese Nationalists independently initiate operations on the mainland, the commitment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea would reduce Chinese Nationalist offensive capabilities for carrying out operations on the mainland, such as supporting anti-Communist guerrilla operations. On the other hand, utilization of Nationalist troops in Korea would serve to contain greater numbers of Communist forces in Korea, whether or not the fighting has spread. Such containment in addition would lessen the requirement for forces for action on the mainland."

e. Reference p. 2, par. 5. Amend first sentence and add a new

sentence as follows: "Whatever the military outcome in Korea, the employment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of other nations, further identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists and would constitute a degree of moral commitment for continuing US support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. Since this moral commitment would at the same time identify U.S. intentions to support anti-Communist forces within its capabilities, it would have a positive psychological effect of potentially great value throughout Asia and the rest of the world."

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1. Reference pp. 2 and 3, par. 6. Revise as follows: "Without an effort to prepare the non-Communist world for such a decision, a majority of UN nations would probably reject a US proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. There is a general apprehension that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus, or at least provide the pretext, for increased militancy on the part of Communist China. Despite the repeated assurance of the US-UN to respect the Manchurian borders and the maintenance of the embargo against Chinese Nationalist operations on the mainland, Chinese Communist militancy has already reached a high level in committing the Fourth Field Army, which represents the best available Chinese Communist military force. It is difficult to see any new form which this militancy could take. This militancy would increase. Therefore, there would be little increase in the danger of a general war with Communist China, which in turn might develop into a global war already exists. This, too, will have little direct effect upon the development of a global war. In addition, Although, at least in the beginning, the Western European nations would not feel strongly that the US was jeopardizing the first-priority task of defense of the European continent by becoming involved in a continued involvement in protracted hostilities in Asia, it is unlikely that those UN nations would withdraw their troops and active support from Korea. They might come to appreciate the determination of the US to take constructive action in an area of vital importance in the struggle against Soviet directed Communist aggression. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists would not alienate those elements in certain other Asiatic countries, which

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who consider the Chinese Nationalists to be reactionary, politically incompetent, and already repudiated by their own people. On the other hand, the employment of the Chinese anti-Communist forces could hearten the anti-Communist elements of all Asiatic countries and increase their will to resist Communist aggression. Unilateral-US-action-in-using Chinese-Nationalist-troops-would-intensify-these-feelings. In addition, if the other nations should determine that it is necessary to make a stand in Korea, they will be more amenable when they recognize this as a method of relieving them of the necessity of providing more forces themselves."

2. Reference p. 3, par. 7. Amend as follows: "At a time of delicate negotiations the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would--remove-whatever-chances-might-remain-of might have prejudiced a political solution of the Korean conflict deriving from those negotiations. Although-it-is-evident-that-Communist-China-strongly-supports general-Soviet-strategic-objectives,-this-support-might-become-even stronger-as-a-result-of-the-use-of-Chinese-Nationalist-forces-in-Korea. This would not necessarily have precluded, however, a later political settlement. It was, therefore, important that a decision to use Nationalist troops be deferred until the probabilities of obtaining an acceptable political solution were gone. But since Chinese Communist intervention on a massive scale is already a fact, and since political solution deriving from present negotiations now appears either impossible or too long; delayed to be effective, the sheer military and psychological advantages of the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and freeing them from

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restraints imposed by the U.S. preventing them from operating against the Chinese mainland, would appear to outweigh other considerations, if the minimum interests of the US-UN are to be safeguarded in Asia. Delay will aid in the deterioration of our present advantages, which, in view of Chinese Communist vulnerabilities and the potential for exploitation by Chinese anti-Communist forces with U.S. aid, are at present considerable."

h. Reference p. 3, par. 8. Delete entire paragraph: "The USSR would probably welcome a unilateral . . . reactionary regime."

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