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G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS  
IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

I. (1)

In October 1947, following a wide-spread internal revolt and an invasion by Pakistan tribesmen, Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, acceded the Princely state to India, and simultaneously appealed to India for military assistance. Indian troops were flown immediately into the area and began operations to restore order. Later Pakistan sent its regular army units into Western Kashmir and soon the forces of India and Pakistan were engaged in an undeclared war, which was confined solely to the state of Kashmir. Fighting continued until January 1949, at which time the United Nations succeeded in arranging a Cease-Fire Agreement. The two forces continued to occupy the areas they held at the time of the cease fire. This gave India the most important part of Kashmir, including the Vale, while Pakistan occupied that area known as "Azad (Free) Kashmir," comprised of the northern part of the state and a narrow strip in the southwest. Both countries withdrew a part of their forces from the State, but considerable numbers continued to be disposed along the Cease-Fire line.

Until the recent upsurge of tension, the military situation in Kashmir remained relatively unchanged, except for minor violations of the Cease-Fire line.

About 1 July 1951, India began concentrating forces on the Pakistan borders, moving over 60,000 troops, including all her armored units, into East Punjab in the vicinity of Amritsar across the border from the important Pakistan communications and commercial center of Lahore. At the same time, the 20th Division in Calcutta was strengthened and certain small units in Assam were moved up to the East Pakistan border. On 14 July, Pakistan countered the Indian moves by ordering approximately 40,000 reinforcements to the vicinity of Lahore and Wazirabad.

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The deployment of the respective forces, as of 20 August 1951, was as follows:

INDIA - (Total Army strength - 400,000. Six infantry divisions, one Line of Communication division, and one armored division.) Three infantry divisions and one Line of Communication division in Kashmir (total approximately 65,000); two infantry divisions, one armored division, an armored brigade, and four independent infantry brigades in East Punjab near Amritsar (total over 75,000); one infantry division at Calcutta (total 20,000); seven independent brigades placed throughout India for internal security.

PAKISTAN - (Total Army strength - 197,000. Seven infantry divisions) One infantry brigade and 20 Azad Kashmir battalions in Kashmir (total 18,000); two infantry divisions and most of a third, and one armored brigade plus smaller units in the area of Lahore and Wazirabad (total 57,000); one infantry division at Peshawar (15,000); one infantry division at Dacca (10,000); one infantry division at Quetta (12,000); and one infantry division at Bahawalpur (7,500).

## II. A. 2.

Kashmir is not important to the Indian economy. India is in no way dependent on Kashmiri products for her economic well-being. Trade between India and Kashmir is limited as there is only one road between them connecting Pathankot, India with Jammu, Kashmir. Direct connections between India and the Valley of Kashmir at Srinagar are poor as the road from Jammu must cross the 9,000 ft. Banihal pass which is intermittently impassable during the winter.

Timber is Kashmir's chief item of export, but India imports none from Kashmir as the logs can be transported profitably only by being floated down the rivers which flow into Pakistan. Other important Kashmir export items, fruits and vegetables, cannot be profitably transported to India due to their perishability.

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Inasmuch as Kashmir shawls, blankets, wool, and woollen goods, wood carvings, papier mache, silk manufactures, and carpets are manufactured only on a small scale, and find a ready market in Pakistan, Indian participation in this trade is very small.

The difficulty of transporting heavy machinery and equipment into Kashmir from India has discouraged the investment of capital there. The lack of minerals, other than a little coal which is consumed locally, is a further deterrent to investment.

Because of its geographical setting Kashmir's economy is directed almost entirely toward Pakistan. In no measure can Kashmir be considered to be important to the Indian economy.

The possession of Kashmir by India could be used to bring economic pressure on Pakistan through control of the water supply. Pakistan is in a precarious position as regards her water supply as one of the rivers which she depends upon for the irrigation of 19,000,000 acres of land rises in her own territory. Among the six rivers on which Pakistan depends for irrigation purposes, the Chenab, the Jhelum, and the Indus flow through Kashmir. The Chenab lies wholly within the Indian-held section of Kashmir while the Jhelum originates in the Indian-held portion and flows through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir into Pakistan. Even the Indus river, which rises in Tibet, flows through Indian-held territory before it reaches Azad (Free) Kashmir and finally Pakistan.

The denial to Pakistan of sufficient water from the rivers flowing through Kashmir would be a serious blow to the economy of the country. The Pakistanis claim that their irrigation canals are so interlinked that if the water supply of one river is restricted, practically all the canals would be adversely affected. The maintenance of an adequate water supply in the West Punjab is of the utmost importance to Pakistan as it is the principal wheat-growing area of the nation. Without adequate water the agricultural value of West Punjab and the Sind would be negligible, and the area would revert to draught conditions.

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**SECRET**II. A. 3.

In relation to a possible conflict with Pakistan, Kashmir is important to India in that Indian units in Kashmir would be in a favorable position to launch an immediate attack on the important military supply center of Rawalpindi, and capture the only Pakistan ordnance factory at nearby Wah. General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army is also located at Rawalpindi. Furthermore, an attack from Kashmir toward Rawalpindi would endanger the rear flank of the Pakistan forces in the vicinity of Wazirabad and force the Pakistan Army to fight on a greatly extended front.

In relation to a possible conflict with any other nation, Kashmir is of little strategic importance to India except as a buffer zone against invasion from the north. It would be almost impossible for any sizeable land force to come from the north, cross through Kashmir, and successfully invade India. The trails leading into Kashmir from the north are passable only to men and animals and then only for a few months out of each year, and it would be impossible logistically to support any invasion force via these trails.

II. A. 5.

India's primary reasons for wanting Kashmir are political rather than military; therefore, from the military point of view there is no particular urgency or time factor involved in the dispute.

II. B. 2.

Kashmir is of extreme importance to the Pakistani economy. The economic life of the West Punjab and the Sind is dependent to a great extent on a continuous supply of water from the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers which flow through Kashmir. A denial of water to these areas would have a serious effect on the Pakistan economy as the area is the chief wheat-producing region in Pakistan.

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Due to its geographic location, the economy of Kashmir is oriented toward West Pakistan. The only two roads that are open throughout the year connect Srinagar and Dama, Kashmir, with Rawalpindi and Abbottabad in Pakistan. The only railway connection from Kashmir to the outside is a branch of the Pakistan North West railway. Ninety percent of Kashmir's timber is floated down the Indus, Jhelum, and the Chenab rivers to such collecting points as Jhelum and Wazirabad in Pakistan. Because of their perishable nature, the bulk of the fruits and vegetables produced in Kashmir is sent to Rawalpindi and supplies an area deficient in such produce. The main market for woollens and carpets is the West Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.

As Pakistan is her major source of supply, Kashmir, with a population of 4,000,000 is naturally a very important market. Pakistan exports to Kashmir considerable quantities of rock salt, and meets most of Kashmir's requirements of sugar, pulses, grain, leather, and oil seeds. Kashmir imports large amounts of raw and manufactured cotton from the West Punjab, and her requirements of petrol and petrol products have been met primarily from the Attock oil field of West Pakistan.

## II. B. 3.

In relation to a possible conflict with India, Kashmir is of strategic importance to Pakistan. Possession of Kashmir would enable Pakistan Army units to flank any Indian force attempting an invasion of West Punjab. Furthermore, with Kashmir in its possession, Pakistan would have a much shorter common border with India to defend than would be the case if India controlled the State. Loss of Kashmir to India would threaten the Pakistan flank and permit the massing of Indian troops within easy striking distance of the only Pakistan ordnance factory at Wah and the city of Rawalpindi, which is an important military supply center and the location of General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army.

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It is thought that the Pakistan leaders attach great importance to holding Kashmir. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan expressed this feeling in the following words, "Kashmir is a vital necessity for our survival. It is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap then I am always at the mercy of India. The very position - the strategic position of Kashmir - is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India."

Pakistan probably attaches no strategic importance to Kashmir with regard to possible war with nations other than India except, perhaps, as a buffer zone against invasion from the north or northeast. Any invader from the north would face tremendous difficulties in trying to move troops, equipment and supplies through the extremely rugged mountains that are characteristic of Kashmir.

#### II. B. 5. A

Although Pakistan considers Kashmir to be strategically important in relation to India, Pakistan's present positions in Azad Kashmir are adequate for defensive purposes, and consequently, from the military point of view, no particular urgency or time factor is involved.

#### II. C.

Naturally, Pakistan desires all of Kashmir, but in view of the present conditions, it is believed that, from the military standpoint, Pakistan probably would be satisfied with the status quo.

#### III. A. (1).

In an all-out war with Pakistan, India probably would be victorious, provided that Pakistan received no outside help. Initially, probably neither country would be likely to gain a decisive victory. In the first stages of an all-out war, Pakistan might even win a few victories. But in time, the balance probably would be tipped in India's favor as her advantages in troop strength, trained reserves, manpower resources, and industrial capacity made themselves felt, and ultimately

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Pakistan would be forced to sue for peace. A major Pakistan weakness lies in the fact that its transportation and communications network in West Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to attack as it parallels the Indian frontier.

(2). In a limited action designed to take all or part of Kashmir, India, with her present superiority of troops in the area would probably be able to complete the conquest of Kashmir, but the rugged terrain of the country would rule out a quick, easy victory. The greatest success probably could be obtained by launching a determined attack against West Punjab and driving through Lahore toward Rawalpindi; the initiation of this operation to be followed shortly by a full-scale attack in Kashmir. The drive in West Punjab would prevent Pakistan from sending heavy reinforcements into Kashmir.

In any type of engagement with Pakistan, India would benefit greatly by open Afghan intervention against Pakistan. Such intervention would force Pakistan to divert a part of her limited forces in order to fight on two fronts. Should Afghanistan continue in its present role, it would still be beneficial to India because Pakistan must station the better part of two divisions near the Afghan frontier to counteract border raids, prevent a general tribal uprising over the Pushtoonistan issue, and to meet the threat of possible overt Afghan intervention in case of an Indo-Pakistan war. The possibility that Afghanistan would intervene on India's behalf is suggested by indications that Afghanistan is being encouraged, if not actually supported, by India to provoke incidents along Pakistan's tribal border areas. From the Afghan point of view, an Indo-Pakistan clash would improve the chances of Afghanistan to achieve its goals in the Pushtoonistan issue.

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III C. 1.

Though India made the first troop movements in July, it appears that this action was designed to prevent or contain a possible attack by Pakistan, and not to provoke a war. These moves indicate, also, that India is prepared to accept war, if necessary, and that she is determined to see the Kashmir elections through. The recent concentrations in the vicinity of Amritsar place the striking power of the Indian Army in excellent position to invade West Punjab, capture the grain belt of Pakistan and cut the lines of communication into Kashmir. The concentration of this force in such a strategic position thus serves to deter the Pakistan Army from starting any disturbances in other areas by showing Pakistan that India is ready for any eventuality.

III C. 2.

These moves do much toward constituting a complete preparation for an all-out war against Pakistan. India now has roughly 90% of her combat strength on the Pakistan borders in position to attack. No other movement of troops would be necessary. The status of stockpiling of supply is not known, but it is believed that the Indian forces have sufficient supplies to carry out at least a major initial attack. One factor which must be considered is the shortage of POL supplies. Prior to the Iranian oil dispute, the Indian Army requested a 50% increase in the oil supplied them by Burma Shell and Caltex but these companies were unable to meet this request. The amount of Indian POL supplies on hand is not known, but indications are that these materials are in short supply.

III C. 3.

In general, climatic considerations would indicate optimum conditions for ground operations and for supporting tactical air from October through November. Operations are possible throughout the winter but cold in the north and lack of water in the extreme south would restrict Indian ground operations. Conditions in the Punjab itself should remain favorable for

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operation throughout the remainder of the winter until approximately 1 April.

In the Punjab and Sind, the rainy season begins to give way in most years in late August and there is little rain after 15 September. Well into September the major rivers in the north, such as the Ravi and Sutlej, will be deep and generally unfordable, and rivers in the south, including the Indus, will be up to several miles wide and unfordable though relatively shallow. Movement is generally easy in the inter-stream areas (e.g. between the Ravi and Sutlej, from Amritsar toward Multan and Bahawalpur.) However, steep-sided but narrow irrigation canals may hinder use of such areas. After September the level of the streams will drop rapidly. The major rivers are rarely fordable at any time in the foot hills north of Lahore and Amritsar, but should be easily bridgeable in many places from October to April. During the same period in the south the stream levels become very low, but shifting courses and quick and loose sand in the braided stream beds will create risks for vehicular crossings. Streams in Kashmir and Jammu are often glacier and snow-fed and should be at their lowest stages in mid-winter from late December through February. These streams should be bridgeable or fordable in most places throughout the period from October to March.

Cross-country and off-road movement should be relatively easy in the Punjab and Sind from late September to April. Cross-country movement of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the foothills of the northern Punjab and in Kashmir and Jammu is always restricted by steep slopes. In the mountains of Jammu and Kashmir snow and cold at higher elevations and in the passes may hamper operations intermittently from late September through early March, but passes are rarely impassable except for short periods in mid-winter (January or February).

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In the south, on the borders of Rajputana and the Sind, lack of water will restrict operations in the Thar Desert. Many shallow wells and springs may be dry from January to mid-June.

Cool to cold weather in Kashmir, especially from December on, would require the use of warm clothing and would probably impair the combat effectiveness of Indian troops from the south or the east.

III D. 1. a.

The opinions of Indian military leaders on the chances of an easy victory over Pakistan are not known. On the basis of available information, G-2 currently is of the opinion that, despite the disadvantages facing Pakistan, India could not gain an easy victory over its neighbor.

III D. 2. b.

With memories of the previous fighting in Kashmir, communal rioting, and the effects of the recent trade war still fresh in mind, Indian leaders must be aware of the destruction and chaos which probably would be involved in a war with Pakistan. However, border incidents, communal rioting, or even emotional instability among government leaders could set off hostilities.

III D. 3.

The disadvantages for India of launching a war with Pakistan appear to outweigh the possible advantages, and barring a complete surrender to emotionalism on the part of Indian government leaders, a deliberate resort to war by India does not seem likely.

III E.

It is probable that individual Communist agitators in India are stirring up the discontents which can breed communal disorders. However, the present pre-occupation of the leaders of the Communist Party of India (CPI) with organizational difficulties and the current emphasis on "united front" tactics, with a view to achieving success in scheduled elections, rather than on violence of any sort indicates that Communist agitation for

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violence at present is of secondary importance in current party programming. It is not believed that the party can carry on a number of operations at peak level simultaneously.

IV A. (1).

In an all-out war with India, Pakistan would probably be capable of some initial victories, but eventually, due to a shortage of supplies, obsolete equipment, lack of indigenous production, dependence on foreign sources for supplies, and the superior numbers of the Indian Army, Pakistan would probably be forced to withdraw and sue for peace.

IV A. (2).

It is doubtful, under the present conditions, that Pakistan could achieve success in a limited attack in Kashmir with or without a simultaneous limited invasion of India. In Kashmir, Indian forces now outnumber Pakistan forces at least three to one. Pakistan at present cannot strengthen her forces in Kashmir without weakening her forces in some other vital area. Furthermore, India is expecting trouble now and would not be caught by surprise.

IV C.

Pakistan's recent troop movements probably do not indicate a desire to provoke war and appear to be defensive in nature. It is believed that Pakistan will not deliberately initiate hostilities. Public statements to the contrary by government leaders probably are issued in the pursuit of political objectives.

IV C. (1).

Pakistan military moves do not indicate a state of complete readiness for war. At present Pakistan's forces are strategically placed to defend Pakistan against an Indian attack from any direction. However, further moves would be necessary before Pakistan forces would be in an advantageous position to attack India. Pakistan, like India, is short of certain supplies and could not hope to be successful in a long, full-scale war without access

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to outside sources of supply.

IV D. 1. b.

G-2 has little evidence as to what Pakistan military leaders believe, but in view of the odds against them, it is probable that they would not start any war which depended for success on an early United Nations Cease-Fire arrangement. India probably would not agree to any cease-fire until Pakistan forces had at least been driven back to their original position.

IV D. 2. a.

The Pakistan leaders undoubtedly know that a war would involve heavy casualties and possible defeat.

IV D. 2. b.

Pakistan leaders are cognizant of the exposed position of East Pakistan and are taking steps to strengthen the area. However, in the event of war with India, the forces in East Pakistan are still inadequate to defend successfully against an Indian invasion, and this fact probably exercises a deterring effect on Pakistan military leaders.

IV D. 2. c.

Pakistan undoubtedly considers the possibility of an Afghan attack in the event of war with India. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in the present emergency, the Eighth Division, though initially ordered to a position in southern West Punjab, was later ordered to remain in the Quetta-Chaman area near the Afghan border. Furthermore, certain Afghan leaders have stated that in the event of war, Afghanistan would be on the side of India.

Pakistan leaders have been trying to establish friendly relations with Afghanistan but have had little success.

IV D. 3.

The disadvantages to Pakistan of launching a war with India outweigh the possible advantages and barring a complete surrender to emotionalism on the part of government leaders, a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan does not appear likely.

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If the Government of Pakistan continues to permit the press and radio to incite the people, public clamor may reach the point where the Government will be forced to war by popular demand. At present, this point has not been reached and the Pakistan Government still has control of the situation, and can continue to control it if the government so desires.

The one unknown element in the present situation is the possible conduct of the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. It has been known for some time that there is a definite militant group in Pakistan who agitate for aggressive action in Kashmir. The Akbar Khan conspiracy was in part a manifestation of this agitation. The question is whether those officers arrested in the Akbar Khan conspiracy comprise all or the main part of the militant group or whether a large number remained undiscovered. In any event, some or all of the militant group are in prison, and the Pakistan Government has been alerted. The recurrence of such an event appears improbable.

In West Pakistan, it is believed that trials being carried on with reference to the 8 March 1951 conspiracy have resulted in the arrest of many Communist party leaders and would tend to preclude high-level planning to exploit communal problems. Agitators who work on such problems on a continuing basis would of course continue operations. In East Pakistan where Communist efforts are closely coordinated with Communist Party of India actions, there is evidence of Communist activity designed to exacerbate the situation.

VI.

If India carries out the elections for a constituent assembly in Kashmir, Pakistan may attempt intervention. This could be done in many ways, the most likely being uprisings by the tribes within Kashmir, followed by the entrance of Pakistan tribesmen. India has stated that if war breaks out it will not be confined to Kashmir alone.

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Under the present conditions of tension, any border violation by either country may start a war. Both countries realize this and profess to be making every effort to prevent any action which might start an all-out war.

Barring serious border incidents, communal rioting, or a complete surrender by the various leaders to their emotions, neither country is likely to initiate hostilities. It appears now that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly will be held. Pakistan undoubtedly will continue to protest to the United Nations, but it is believed that she (Pakistan) will not deliberately initiate hostilities to prevent the elections. Popular feeling in Pakistan undoubtedly will become more intense, but competent observers in Karachi feel that the Pakistan Government can control this situation. Strong nationalist feelings do not appear to be a problem in India.

#### VII.

United States security interests in India and Pakistan, from the military point of view, appear to be chiefly concerned with possible air and naval bases in those countries. Since an outbreak of hostilities is not anticipated before the end of 1951, it appears that United States military security interests in the area will be little affected by probable developments in that period.

Present tension will make future defense of the Middle East more difficult, by preventing planning for a joint defense in which both India and Pakistan normally would participate.

As one of the most important sources of strategic materials to the United States, the continuation of production, transportation, and export trade of these materials from India and Pakistan in the event of war is an important military security interest of the United States. If military operations are limited only to Kashmir and adjacent areas in India and Pakistan, it is unlikely that the production and trade of raw materials important to the United States would be significantly affected.

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On the other hand, if military operations spread to East Bengal, the production and export of jute would be seriously curtailed, as would the mining and processing of mica in the State of Bihar, the source of 80 percent of India's mica output. Access would probably be denied to the shipping facilities of the port of Calcutta in West Bengal, an important export port for rice, kyanite, shellac and jute, as well as beryl and ranganese. Interruption of operations at manganese mines in Madhya Pradesh or of port facilities at Vizagapatam would have serious effect on United States industry since over 30 percent of United States supply of this critical mineral is currently being obtained from India.

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