

1st draft

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Background and Current Status

1. The Kashmir dispute originated in 1947, at the time of the partition of India and Pakistan. Despite the predominantly ~~Muslim~~ population of Kashmir, its Hindu Maharajah obtained accession to India, and a pro-Indian Government was installed under a ~~Muslim~~, Sheikh Abdullah. These events touched off an invasion by Northwest Frontier tribesmen, possibly aided by Pakistan, and eventually both India and Pakistan sent in regular forces. After more than a year of conflict, the UN got agreement to a cease-fire under which India now occupies most of Kashmir, including the Vale of Kashmir and containing about 78% of the population. This territory is governed by Sheikh Abdullah. The balance of Kashmir is ruled by the Pakistan-backed Azad Kashmir government.

*also
in SC*

2. At the time of accession, Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, made it clear that the final disposition of Kashmir ^{should} be settled "by a reference to the people". However, despite two UN Commission resolutions, continuing UN efforts at mediation, and discussion by the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in early 1951, India and Pakistan have never been able to agree on terms for demilitarization and administration of Kashmir during a plebiscite. Pakistan has accepted several proposals for international policing, but India has absolutely refused to withdraw her forces except on virtually impossible conditions.

3. In October 1950 India moved unilaterally to break the deadlock, through the announcement by Sheikh Abdullah of plans for a Kashmir Constituent Assembly to decide the form of government and affiliation of the entire state. Pakistan denounced this plan vigorously, its leaders threatening war if it were carried out, and sought urgent UN consideration. The US and UK joined in sponsoring a further Security Council resolution, passed 30 March 1951, under which ex-Senator Frank Graham of the US was designated as UN representative to seek a solution to the demilitarization problem. India ~~opposed~~ ^{rejected} the resolution (which Pakistan supported), but agreed to receive Graham, who arrived in the subcontinent on 29 June 1951, and is due to report to the UN Security Council by 29 September 1951, though he may seek delay.

4. Despite the Graham mission, Abdullah announced in June that Constituent Assembly elections would be held between 10 and 30 September. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan then repeated that Pakistan would not permit such elections. Early in

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July, allegedly to counter Pakistani military moves, India moved the bulk of her ~~army~~ ^{army} forces hastily to Kashmir, (165,000 troops) and ^(to) the Pakistan border in the ^(East) Punjab ^{opposite Lahore} ~~(over 75,000 troops)~~ ^(over 75,000 troops) including an armored ^(division and) brigade). These are now opposed by large but outnumbered Pakistani concentrations -- about ~~20,000~~ ^(15,000) troops, with another 15,000 in reserve, deployed for possible use in Kashmir, and about 57,000 troops on the ⁽ⁱⁿ⁾ border, ^{with} ~~in the Punjab~~ ^{another 7500 in reserve.} On the distant East Pakistan front, India has 20,000 men against about 10,000 Pakistani.

Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir

5. The predominant interest of both India and Pakistan in Kashmir is one of nationalism tinged with religion. To Pakistan, founded on the principle of a separate Moslem state, it seems intolerable that any substantial part of a predominantly (78%) Moslem population should be handed over to India. To Nehru, on the other hand, it is equally important to prove that his concept of a secular state, already containing nearly 40,000,000 Moslems, is preferable. (Both Nehru, ^{is} Kashmiri by birth, and Gandhi were closely associated with Abdullah in pre-partition campaigns for Hindu-Moslem cooperation in Kashmir.) Moreover, with the progress of the dispute, public opinion in both countries has ^(extended) ~~made~~ ^(into) the issue ~~one~~ of national prestige going even beyond its original foundations.

India has no other substantial interest in Kashmir. Pakistan, however, also has

6. Important, but secondary, ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~Pakistan~~ strategic and economic interests. Although ~~some~~ ^{is} difficult of access from India, Kashmir could be a military gateway into Pakistan, not only from India but from Sinkiang. Economically, ^(Kashmir's lines of trade run to Pakistan.) possession of Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistan's control over the vital water supply obtained from the Indus River and its tributaries, though it would not prevent India from carrying out a present threat to impair the flow of two major tributaries that rise in India.

7. ~~Based heavily on religious grounds,~~ ^{as they are} the interests of both India and Pakistan could be met by less than the whole of Kashmir. However, both parties are adamant in demanding control of the central Vale area, the heart of the country, which has a Moslem majority but is on the Indian side of the present cease-fire line ^(and) within the area covered by the Constituent Assembly elections.

Both together

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Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities

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8. Militarily, India's land forces heavily outnumber those of Pakistan and its Air Force and Navy are likewise superior. In an all-out war, India would almost certainly be able to defeat Pakistan, ~~completely. It would be able to conquer East Pakistan~~ *in a very short time, perhaps a month, while* its Navy could successfully blockage Karachi, Pakistan's only major port, and its Air Force would almost certainly destroy the Pakistan Air Force, though it does not now have the ability to carry on a steady bombing offensive against Pakistani cities and installations. Using its superior armored forces, India could conduct a successful invasion of West Pakistan and in the judgment of US observers could overrun Lahore within a week and take over most of the territory within two months, *in dry weather.*

India's numerical superiority

9. On the Kashmir front alone, however, India is less strong. The land tie between India and Kashmir consists of only a single road, and while this might be kept open it would be inadequate for full supplying of even India's present strength in Kashmir. Initially, despite their numerical superiority, Indian forces in Kashmir would almost certainly have to give ground before a determined Pakistani attack, and might well lose the Vale area. *Subota hill* Major factors in a Kashmir campaign would be the attitude of the Northwest Frontier tribesmen, particularly the Pathans, and to a lesser extent that of Afghanistan. ~~The Pathans are primarily separatists and secondarily anti-Indian. With~~ *in spite of recent Afghan propaganda, some of the Pathans would* political assurances from Pakistan, which would probably be given in a crisis, they might well fight again *on the Pakistani side,* in its interest, as in 1947, and if so their numbers (up to 30,000) and warlike qualities would ~~greatly~~ *greatly* augment Pakistani strength in Kashmir. Afghanistan, *which* which has been diligently courted by India in recent months, would probably make border raids on Pakistan, but these would probably have no more than nuisance value.

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10. Pakistan's military capabilities are the obverse of India's: little chance of success (and the certainty of quick loss of East Pakistan) in an all-out war, but a strong chance of quick gains in a Kashmir-alone campaign. There is evidence that the Pakistani themselves, who are somewhat contemptuous of Indian fighting power, believe that they could take over the Vale of Kashmir and at the same time fight a successful delaying action, at least for a month or two, on the Punjab border in defense of Lahore. (This view is more optimistic than that of US observers, who do not believe Lahore could be held even for this period.)

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11. Weather factors might have a critical effect on the military capabilities of the parties. The monsoon season ends in Kashmir about 15 September, but lingers in the Punjab till about 1 October. It has been reported that floods in the Lahore area will prevent military operations there until 1 October, and Pakistan is capable (through connecting canals from northern rivers not subject to Indian control) of increasing such floods to the point where they would constitute an effective barrier to India's armor. Thus, there will probably be a period of 2 - 3 weeks during which Pakistan could move in Kashmir without serious fear of a fatal thrust by India into West Pakistan. During this period, however, while the monsoon would still prevail on the East Pakistan front, India's superiority here is so complete that ^{the monsoon} ~~it~~ would probably not affect her ability to invade East Pakistan and defeat the Pakistani forces completely. <

Indian and Pakistani Political Prospects

12. Politically, India's trump card is her present possession of the coveted Vale of Kashmir. It is generally agreed that a plebiscite conducted under international auspices would produce a substantial majority in the Vale for accession to Pakistan, though the small Jammu area in the south might vote for India (and would go with Pakistan's blessing). On the other hand, control by Indian forces, with the central object of ^{pro-Pakistan} ~~barring any~~ campaigning on religious grounds, would with equal certainty produce a result favorable to India throughout the area to be covered by the Constituent Assembly elections. Thus, if India is able to go through with the Constituent Assembly plan while her forces are still in control of their present area, she will be able to present Pakistan and the UN with an accomplished fact.

13. Pakistan, on the other hand, because of its willingness to accept an internationally policed plebiscite in Kashmir, clearly has the upper hand over India in the UN and in British Commonwealth circles. Dr. Graham has made it clear that he regards Nehru as the stumbling block to solution. Any solution he may recommend, or that would be acceptable to the UN, would almost certainly be favorable to Pakistan and would require major concessions by India such as to undermine her chances of success in the plebiscite.

14. India regards the Constituent Assembly elections as critical, and only very great pressure would induce her to accept a postponement at this late date. Conversely, Pakistan has made it clear that it regards the Constituent Assembly elections as extremely harmful, if not fatal, to her interests in Kashmir. A question therefore exists whether Pakistan would provoke war to prevent Constituent Assembly elections.

15. From a military standpoint both sides are in a state of complete readiness for war, and the forces are deployed in positions consistent with the probable respective strategic plans. The only action by either side that would be a probable prelude to war and of which there is as yet no evidence is a Pakistani arousing of the tribesmen.

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16. Indian intentions: We estimate that the Nehru government is unlikely to provoke a war during this period. Its reasons against war are formidable: (a) war would prevent the holding of the Constituent Assembly elections; (b) time is all on ^{India's} side -- even if the Constituent Assembly elections were postponed, her possession of the disputed areas leaves her in a strong position; (c) even a victorious war would be a serious threat to Indian economic and political stability -- it would almost certainly lead to widespread communal rioting ~~and would also prevent the holding of the general elections now slated for January~~. The only contrary argument of any possible weight is that a war that led to quick victories in the West Punjab and East Pakistan would help Nehru's wavering prestige; however, he is probably too well aware of the risks to be ^{swayed} by this.

will also be away w. Pakistan

17. Indian actions are consistent with this view of her intentions. The July troop movements could well have been designed to forestall Pakistani ^{interference} influence with the Constituent Assembly elections while further deterring Pakistan by the threat of a Punjab counterattack. Nonetheless India is clearly willing to accept war, and if hostilities were to break out she would certainly strike in the Punjab and probably in East Pakistan and not permit Pakistan to confine the fight to Kashmir.

18. Pakistani intentions: We estimate that there is a ^{substantial} strong possibility that Pakistan will provoke a war during this period through a local attack in Kashmir. Rationally, the reasons against war are persuasive: in a long war Pakistan would almost certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60% of her population) and at least some Punjab



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territory, and her economic and political stability -- even her very existence -- would be threatened. However, there are many signs that the Pakistani leaders have reached a dangerous mood of frustration in which these considerations might be outweighed by the desire to thwart the Constituent Assembly elections and by the tempting theory of quick Kashmir gains, a holding action in the Punjab, and an appeal for a UN cease fire. Pakistani statements have used every possible argument to put India in the wrong and encourage support for a contention that military action in Kashmir is justified because of Indian obduracy and the illegality of the Constituent Assembly elections (which were specifically condemned by the SC Resolution of 30 March).

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19. Even if neither government deliberately ^{WOK}proaches war, there is a substantial chance that war would be brought on within this period by one or more explosive factors. Roughly in the order of their probability and importance, these are:

chain reaction

a) Unauthorized military action or a coup attempt by Pakistani military leaders.

Considerable dissatisfaction with the government and its Kashmir policy is known to exist in army circles, and an anti-government plot was nipped in the bud in the spring of 1951.

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b) A rise in general Pakistani public feeling. The GOP has been able substantially to control popular sentiment in the past, and the continued GOP reference to this threat is probably exaggerated. But the possibility of a dangerous ^{SURGE} ~~seize~~ exists, especially in the event of:

c) Renewal and/or increase of communal ^{Rioting} ~~rioting~~ in Bengal. This could lead to a ^{SURGE} ~~seize~~ of hostility in both countries.

(d) Indian internal politics. ^{public opinion} The right wing of the Congress Party is now engaged in a ^{STRUGGLE} ~~struggle~~ with Nehru. Some elements of the right are sympathetic to the strongly anti-Moslem and anti-Pakistan Hindu Mahasabha, though others are conservative businessmen generally opposed to conflict. Apart from actual beliefs, there is a strong possibility of inflammatory ^W ~~statements~~ for political advantage.

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e) Border incidents. Both in Kashmir and in the Punjab the two armies are in close proximity in difficult country. Incidents have already taken place and could easily multiply.

Probable Developments if and after Constituent Assembly Elections are Held

20. Once Constituent Assembly elections are held, UN action will be of critical importance. It can be assumed that India will make a maximum effort to propagandize the

election results as settling the issue, at least as to the area actually covered. It may also be assumed that the elected Constituent Assembly will ^{meet} ~~met~~ within about a month -- i.e., by 1 November -- and will then vote to approve accession to India. To counter the effect of these developments, Pakistan will look to the UN.

21. There is no present indication that the Graham ^{MISSION} ~~version~~ will ~~achieve~~ ^{achieve} a solution of the demilitarization issue. It is likely to report ^{on} or about its scheduled date of 29 September, its lack of success and to propose the whole issue be submitted to arbitration. It is almost certain that Pakistan will support such a proposal while India will oppose it. Simultaneously, Pakistan is likely to seek a new SC resolution denouncing and refusing to recognize the result of the Constituent Assembly elections, and continuing efforts to achieve demilitarization.

22. With these proposals before it, the UN would have several possible courses. These would include, on the part of the Security Council, denunciation of the Constituent Assembly elections, appointment of an arbitrator (or arbitrators) to formulate a demilitarization plan regardless of India's opposition, and a request for explanation of troop movements. Reference to the General Assembly in November is also a possibility (and need not mean withdrawal of Security Council jurisdiction); Pakistan might welcome this as a more effective means of ^{BRINGING} ~~buying~~ world opinion pressure to bear on India.

23. The effect of any of these measures on Pakistan is uncertain. The wind-up of the Constituent Assembly elections (October) would undoubtedly increase army and popular pressure for war, and this pressure could become irresistible if the Security Council failed to take even the steps of denunciation and proposing arbitration. The ~~existing~~ ^{ensuing} accession vote of the Constituent Assembly (1 November or later) would create another highly critical period in which these pressures could get out of hand. Pakistani feeling will undoubtedly be intensified on both occasions by the extent of Indian "crowing" over the results. On balance, so long as the UN appears to offer hope of effective action, the GOP would probably not resort to war after the Constituent Assembly elections if it ^{HAD} ~~declined~~ to do so before then. However, the popular pressures would probably be even greater after the Genstituent Assembly elections and the chances of unauthorized army action or irresistible clamor would increase. Thus, the aggregate chance for war would decline little if at all up to the end of 1951, unless ~~some~~ ^{effective} ~~clear-cut measure is put forward~~ ^{measures are taken} by the UN during this period.

24. On the Indian side, the favorable Constituent Assembly election result and ensuing accession vote would diminish immediate popular pressure for war and reduce the already small chance that the GOI would actually provoke war. However, these events would also strengthen India's sense of self-righteousness and make it all the more difficult to obtain her consent to any UN proposal. However, though a clear-cut UN proposal might be unacceptable to India; it probably would not increase the likelihood of deliberate war by her or even the popular pressures for war.

~~24.~~ 27. In summary, the avoidance of hostilities up to the end of 1951 is dependent on numerous factors, of which the most important are a) whether and to what extent India pursues her Constituent Assembly election plan (and subsequently attempts to integrate Kashmir into India); b) the extent to which the UN is able to achieve a plan that has at least general world backing and affords hope of an impartial plebiscite, ~~c) whether the present state of tension between the two countries can be diminished by conciliatory statements and actions.~~ There exists the slim possibility that Nehru and Liaquat would stage a dramatic meeting to effect a settlement (perhaps extending to other issues such as the water dispute). But it must be concluded that on the present facts there is a substantial chance of hostilities within the next four months and only a very slight chance that the issue will have reached a satisfactory solution by the end of 1951.

Consequences of War for US Security Interests

28. If war should break out, it is extremely unlikely that it could be confined to Kashmir itself. The disadvantages to India of that battleground are so great and her superiority in other areas so clear that she would certainly strike in the West Punjab and in East Pakistan. UN cease-fire efforts are not likely to be successful in the early stages of conflict, at least until a stalemate is reached such that neither side has hope of major immediate gains.

29. War on a broad scale, whatever its outcome, would have a very serious impact on US security interests. Extended hostilities would so weaken both India and Pakistan as to make the maintenance of orderly government a matter of question. There would almost certainly be vast communal disturbances and a resulting increase in the severity of the refugee problem. Under such conditions there is a serious possibility that in India the local Communist party would be able, possibly with Chinese help, to assume control of the government. A Communist coup is less likely in Pakistan, but at the least a state of internal chaos and immobilization would result.

The consequences of a Communist India to US interests vis-a-vis the USSR, especially in Southeast Asia and the Near East, is considered in NIK-23.

28. If the Communists gained control in India, neighboring states would be exposed to military threat from the flank. Southeast Asia would probably be pinched off and fall under Communist domination. The relatively pro-Western governments of Pakistan and Ceylon would find it difficult, if not impossible, to take a firm position against Soviet or Chinese aggression even if strong Western military support forthcoming. Neutralism would be greatly encouraged in Iran, the Arab Near East, and in the Philippines.

29. More specifically, the US would lose substantial quantities of strategic materials (especially manganese, mica, and graphite) from South Asia, and even more seriously from Southeast Asia (rubber, tin, and oil). The immobilization (or Indian control) of Pakistan would deprive the West of excellent potential air bases from which to bomb the USSR in the event of all-out war. A Communist India would immediately add to the military power of the Soviet bloc an army of about 400,000 men, a navy consisting of a cruiser, three destroyers, and miscellaneous smaller craft, and a small air force composed largely of World War II type aircraft. India is believed to have about 1,500,000 trained reserves and, given Soviet equipment, might, in time, develop an army comparable to that of the Chinese Communists.

30. Even if the consequences of war should be something less than a Communist take-over in India, political stability in the subcontinent would be gravely threatened by a prolonged conflict and the ensuing chaos and economic and financial pressures would severely weaken, if not destroy, these groups presently most favorably disposed to US security interests in the area.