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France

Page 1, par 1 - It is suggested that the phrase "to be heavily affected by fear of Germany" is somewhat misleading. The French fear German resurgence to the point that it threatens French leadership of Western Europe. The old French fear of German conquest is not believed significant, and it is feared that the sentence, as now phrased, may be interpreted in this fashion.

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while seeking to reduce French commitments by transferring to the US and the Associated States a larger share of the burden. Should the Indochina drain continue without any more hopeful outlook, we believe that French will to continue the struggle would seriously weaken. In view of France's greater interest in maintaining its position in Europe and North Africa, Indochina is the most likely area in which France will seek to reduce its commitments.

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4. Despite their desire for a Korean settlement, which in their eyes might permit ^(aw) some honorable solution to Indochina, dominant French sentiment will probably continue to support the US/UN position on the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. In the more near-at-hand question of Berlin, however, the French would be unlikely to support affirmatively, though they might acquiesce in, measures apparently involving substantial risk of war to maintain the Allied position.

5. The French are likely to continue to support COCOM restrictions on East-West trade in principle, but there will probably be growing pressure for some relaxation of particular controls. French trade with the East will remain limited by the fact that Polish coal is the only major attractive potential import from the Soviet Bloc.

6. General French sentiment for measures leading to European integration will probably continue strong, [but the Assembly may nonetheless delay and obstruct such measures in concrete form, particularly if Germany is given an equal role under them.]

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general agreement. A sizeable segment of French public opinion is nonetheless susceptible to Soviet lures in this direction, and popular pressure for such negotiations might increase during the period of this estimate.

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