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Page 4, para 1. While basically true, the view expressed here borders Ъ. on the pessimistic. Whether or not the Arab states adopt an increasingly neutralist position in the East-West struggle depends to a large extent upon what measures the West takes during the next few months to alleviate or dissipate existing grievances. Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon give evidence of wanting to be helped and of basically wanting to side with the West. However, despite the fact that the U.S. claims to have the same objective policy towards both Israel and the Arab states, it is manifest that the Israelis have been favored by large grants-in-aid and other measures, and that only now is U.S. attempting to redress this inbalance with economic and military aid programs. The Arabs have just grievances against both the British and the French, as well. Recognizing the rightful aspirations of these peoples and treating them with respect and dignity would eliminate much hard feeling and suspicion upon which neutralism feeds. It is true that the Arabs have, and will continue to have, a selfish attitude and attempt to obtain as much aid as possible. But it cannot be stated categorically that the underlying reason for this is that such aid can be employed against Israel. It might be used against her under certain conditions, but the Arabs are interested in the aid for itself and for the security which it provides. The chances of the Arab states declaring war on Israel at any time within a foreseeable future are extremely remote. The danger of Israel using force to break down the so-called Arab blockade and to assure the survival of her present and projected future population is much more real.

Para 2, lines 1-3. We feel this should be toned down somewhat, as the flat statement is too cynical. (There are elements in the Arab states



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5. Middle East & Africa: A. Page 2, para 4. Suggest putting period after the word "issues." The paper does not make it clear as to just why the Turks should side increasingly with Arab-Asian bloc on colonial issues. The Turks have very little sympathy for the Arabs, and the Arabs have no love for the Turks who held them in subjection for 400 years.

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who believe in freedom and democracy, and are as opposed to communism as we are. These elements may not always be dominant, but there is a residue of good will existing there that can be cultivated.)

Line 8. The military regimes in Egypt and Syria are also interested in building up their military forces for survival purposes, and this is perhaps more over-riding than prestige.

c. Page 5, para 3. (in the belief etc....") We feel that this is probably too pat, and that there are other equally important feelings involved. The Arabs resent the presence of foreign troops on their soil and interferences in their internal affairs. They have an inferiority complex and are extremely sensitive to foreign influences and pressures. They are aware of their military weakness, but are also convinced that they could defend their countries if given training and the necessary weapons.

Last sentence. Here too we believe the statement too strong. All the Arab states, including Iraq, are opposed to granting bases, especially in peacetime. There is no evidence that they would not accept the stationing of foreign ground troops in their respective countries if a real emergency developed. West-Arab relations at the time would probably decide that.

d. Page 5, para 4. Last sentence. We feel there is an alternative, as the Arab nations have little to gain by remaining neutral or passive. In the event of a developing emergency would there not be requests for more and greater aid, rather than passive acceptance?

e. Page 8, para 1, line 4. We suggest inclusion of statement regarding Israel's financial and economic dependence on the West, as well as vulnerability to wartime shortages.

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