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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

FROM: C. Cooper

SUBJECT: Draft of NIE-55

1. You may find the draft of NIE-55 somewhat longer than was expected, but the drafting team believed that the importance of the subject and the fluid situation warranted fairly intensive treatment. In addition, the fact that the NSC asked for somewhat broader scope required going beyond the original terms of reference.

2. On the whole, the contributions were fairly satisfactory. The State Department draft was excellent although several days late. In fact, the material it submitted on the military aspects of the paper was better than the similar material submitted by the military agencies. The G-2 contribution suffered from certain internal inconsistencies and in several instances was at variance with either the State Department contribution or current FECOM estimates.

3. We have noted in the draft several more serious problems of fact or analysis which appeared in the G-2 draft. The following list includes these points noted in the draft as well as others:

(a) The estimate of Soviet personnel in Korea is extremely low in the G-2 draft (2,000) as compared with FECOM's estimate (25,000).

(b) Analysis of transportation strains within Communist China as a result of the war is still fuzzy. For example no one apparently has estimated how many locomotives there were in North Korea at the time of the major UN withdrawal last winter; how many have been destroyed in Korea within the last year, and consequently

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DATE: 2/23/81 REVIEWER: 009256

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how many locomotives must have been sent into Korea from Communist China with concomitant strains in Communist China.

(c) G-2 has estimated the morale of Chinese Communist troops along the front as being good to excellent although certain recent FECOM intelligence would tend to counteract this estimate.

(d) G 2 and OIR appear to be at variance in appraising the seriousness of the food situation in North Korea. G-2 indicates that although food problems are serious, they are by no means acute, whereas OIR seems to take a more serious view in the matter.

(e) The G-2 contribution points out that if the Chinese Communists asserted a maximum effort, they could increase their forces in Korea to 1,500,000. This figure seems at best to be a theoretical maximum, and no where does G-2 consider how many Communist troops can be supported in Korea with logistics available.

(f) The military contributions give no hint as to Communist intentions. The OIR contribution appears to be closely in line with the tentative conclusions that were reached by the Board late last week.

4. The Air Forces have informally revised upwards their estimate of Communist air strength since preparing their contribution, but we intend to leave the revision of the figures up to them.


CHESTER L. COOPER

NOTE: Page 32 of the NIE-55 draft should be numbered Page 31 to precede the present Page 31.

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