

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

4 April 1952



SUBJECT :: NIE-64 (Part I): Soviet Bloc Capabilities, Through Mid-1953

1. The attached terms of reference were approved by the IAC representatives meeting on 4 April.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Monday, 28 April.

3. The following allocation of production responsibilities was made:

I	OIR Defense Agencies - A, D, F, G,	H.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 April 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-64 (Part I): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1953

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#### THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare.

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

### I. INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY WARFARE

This section seeks to determine the stability of the Soviet regime in the USSR, the extent and strength of Soviet control over the European Satellites, the relationship between the USSR and Communist China, the stability of the Chinese Communist regime, the factors which might produce change in any of these situations, and, above all, the effect which these political factors may have upon Bloc capabilities for political and military varfare.

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AUTH: ,HR 70-2

DATE: 2100-81 REVIEWER:

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- A. What is the relationship now existing in the USSR between the Communist Party, the Secret Police, and the military forces? Are there any strains within any of these groups or between the groups?
- B. How successful has the Soviet regime been in winning active support for, and in eliminating effective opposition to, its domestic and foreign policies?
- C. Which political or social problems within the USSR might develop in such a way as either to weaken or to strengthen Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare?
- D. What is the extent of the Kremlin's control over the European Satellites and how is it exercised? To what extent does Soviet control depend upon Soviet police and military force, upon Satellite police and military force? How successful has the Kremlin been in winning active support in the Satellites for its policies? In eliminating effective opposition to those policies?
- E. What is the extent of Kremlin influence or control over Communist China and how is it exercised?

F. Which political or social problems within the Satellites or within Communist China might develop in such a way as either to weaken or to strengthen Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare?

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- G. What will be the probable effects upon the political situation within the Bloc of the continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indochina, of extension of the war in the Far East, of limited attacks in the Middle East, of general war without the use of mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction weapons?
- H. In each of these instances, how will the resultant political developments within the Bloc affect Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare?

## II. ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY WARFARE

The EIC study of Soviet economic capabilities should resolve most of the issues important here, and the task may be limited largely to checking data and ascertaining the impact of the economic factors upon Bloc capabilities for both political and military warfare. Our principal interests here are in the following:

> A. Current production of the key materials, products, and weapons.

B. Current resource allocation of national income.

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- C. Bloe ability to increase production of military itams.
- D. Bloc ability to expand industrial and agricultural production.
- E. Operational stocks and stockpiles of critical materials, equipment, and weapons.
- F. Pattern of trade as it affects the Bloc economy and military potential.
- G. Contribution to Bloc strength made by economies of the Satellites and of Communist China. Ability of Bloc to integrate its economies.
- H. Status and probable effect of Soviet dispersal of industry program.
- I. Significance of foreign capital equipment, technical knowledge, and materials for maintaining and developing the current Bloc program.
- J. Ability of the Bloc economy to produce new weapons developed by Bloc scientists, while at same time performing other critical functions.
- K. Indications that the long-term investment programs designed to increase the productive capacity of the USSR, the Satellites, and Communist China has been, or will be, seriously altered to achieve greater immediate war-readiness.

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- L. In the various situations listed in I, G, (page 3):
  - 1. Which economic factors represent major points of vulnerability
  - 2. What will be the ability of the Bloc economy to support increased effort for political and military warfare?

#### III. SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL WARFARE

Soviet Bloc political warfare techniques include political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the actions of Communist Parties and Communist Party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, support of various kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare.

- A. What has been the impact of the expansion of Soviet power since World War II upon the international Comnumist movement?
- B. To what degree does Soviet Bloc military power contribute to the effectiveness of the Bloc's political warfare?
- C. To what extent has the emergence of Communist China affected Bloc political warfare?

- D. What are the Communist capabilities for political warfare, area by area (Western Europe, Middle East, etc.)?
  - 1. What are the political strength and stability of the principal governments in the area?
  - 2. What are the political orientations of the principal non-Communist opposition groups?
  - 3. What is the strength and influence of each of the Communist Parties?
  - 4. Does the economic situation offer opportunities for Bloc economic pressure and other forms of political warfare? What are the Bloc capabilities for influencing neutrals through economic pressure?
  - 5. What is the susceptibility of the people of each important country to Communist propaganda, to military pressure, and to other political war-fare techniques?
  - 6. What is the attitude of the people toward rearmament? Toward the East-West struggle?
- E. What is the over-all outlook for Bloc political warfare capabilities during the period of this estimate?
- F. What will be the probable effect of Bloc political warfare efforts upon the strength and determination of the non-Communist world? Upon Bloc military capabilities in the event of war?

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## IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR MILITARY WARFARE

This section should estimate the current capability and probable developments of foriet Bloc science and the effect Bloc science may have upon Bloc military capabilities. It should provide an over-all view of the more complex Bloc technical weapons and systems, of the status of research and development in the most important fields, and of the application of Bloc science and technology to combat capabilities.

- A. This section is designed to provide a general assessment of Soviet Bloc scientific and technical capabilities, and of the trends of Soviet Bloc scientific and technical development.
  - 1. Priority assigned to Soviet Bloc scientific research and development.
  - 2. Quality and quantity of scientists and of enginearing groups.
  - 3. Training and educational institutions.
  - 4. Effect of ideology.
  - 5. Significance of information acquired abroad.
  - 6. Satellite and Chinese Communist contributions.
  - 7. Limitations upon research and development.
  - 8. Vulnerability of research and development facilities to attack.

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B. This section is designed to provide an analysis of Bloc capabilities in the most important scientific and technological fields, and of the weapons and weapons systems which will probably be developed and produced.

1. Atomic weapons

(a) Fissionable

- (b) Thermonuclear
- 2. Radiological veapons
- 3. Biological weapons
- 4. Chemical weapons
- 5. Electronics equipment (Communications, Radar and Fire Control, Radio Navigation, Infra-Red, ECM, Somar, Influence Fuzes)
- 6. Guided Missiles (SAM, ASM, SSM, AAM)
- 7. Asrial Weapons (Bomber, Fighter, Attack, and Other Special Purpose Craft; Engines, Armament, Equipment)
- 8. Land Combat Weapons (Tanks, Artillery, Anti-tank, Mines, Bridging, Small Arms)
- 9. Antiaircraft Artillery (Artillery, Rockets)
- 10. Special Arctic Equipment
- 11. Naval Weapons (Surface, Submarine, Coastal)
- 12. New Weapons Systems likely to appear not falling into one of the above.

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C. Over-all effect of Bloc science and technology upon Bloc tactics, strategy, and military capabilities.

#### V. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES

- A. Estimated Bloc Military Strength
  - Present strength size, composition, equipment, mobility, training, morale, combat efficiency, disposition, and coordination — of the Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese Communist military forces and of those forces coordinated.
  - 2. Size and quality of present holdings of military equipment by Soviet Bloc military forces, estinated size, quality, and disposition of military stockpiles, military consumption rates of Bloc forces under cold and hot war conditions.
  - Coordination and direction of the forces of the Bloe — ground forces, airborne forces, navy and rerchant fleets, and air forces.

4. Bloc strategic and tactical concepts.

B. Estimated Bloc Military Capabilities

Capacity of Bloc forces to initiate and maintain
(i. e., capacities of lines of communication,
supplies of manpower and materiel, etc.) various

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kinds of military campaigns, including those involving amphibious operations: present conflicts in Korea and Indochina, extension of war in Far East, limited attacks in Middle East, general war without use of mass destruction weapons, general war with use of mass destruction weapons.

- 2. Capacity of Bloc to defend itself against air attack, including atomic attack, and to carry attack to UK and US. (Bloc atomic inventory, unmber and range of Bloc aircraft capable of delivering atomic bombs, probable Bloc target priorities, operational readiness of Bloc longwange aircraft.)
- 3. Capacity of Bloc to maintain campaigns while seconomy and supply lines under various kinds of attack.
- 4. Capacity of Bloc forces to hold and utilize territories added to Bloc or overrun by Bloc forces in early stages of any war.

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