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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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30 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: NIE-64 (Part I): Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through
Mid-1953.

1. Reference is made to CIA memorandum, subject as above,
dated 4 April 1952.

2. In accordance with request contained in reference
memorandum, attached hereto as Tab "A" is the Department of the
Army contribution to NIE-64 (Part I), prepared by the Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of
the Army.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

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1 Incl
Tab "A" (8 cys)

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TAB "A"

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A. C. G-2. DA

G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-64 (Part I)I. Internal Political Factors Affecting Soviet Bloc Capabilities for Political and Military Warfare

A. What is the relationship now existing in the U.S.S.R. between the Communist Party, the Secret Police and the military forces? Are there any strains within any of these groups?

The Soviet Communist Party holds complete and effective control over the country. However, there is considerable evidence of frictions and strains within and between the various groups making up Soviet society. A few of the more important include jealousies among officials on lower levels of the Communist Party, peasant resentment of the controlling authorities, and dissatisfaction with conditions within the Army. These are all exploitable psychologically and, particularly in wartime, would require certain attention from the Soviet Government. It is believed, however that these problems do not constitute any particular obstacle to Soviet political warfare or that they would hamper a Soviet military effort to any significant degree.

D. What is the extent of the Kremlin's control over the European Satellites and how is it exercised? To what extent does Soviet control depend upon Soviet police and military forces, upon Satellite police and military forces? How successful has the Kremlin been in winning active support for its policies? In eliminating effective opposition to those policies?

Soviet control over the European Satellites is complete in the sense that there is no present likely threat to the continuance of the Communist regimes. In all the Satellites except East Germany, the local security forces, backed by the Satellite Armies, probably are sufficient to maintain Communist power. In every country, however, the proximity, if not the actual presence, of the Soviet Army is the basic element of control.

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The Kremlin has had little success in winning active support for its policies, except among youth groups, opportunists, and Communist elements. Popular discontent is general in the European Satellites. It affects all population categories, and is caused primarily by economic hardships resulting from Soviet demands and by Communist interference with personal liberties. Some hostility to Communist rule, particularly intense among the older generation, is to be found even within the structure of the Satellite regimes, all of which still contain some Nationalist elements.

The Kremlin's police methods have been almost completely successful in controlling all popular discontent and prevent it from seriously threatening Soviet goals. In no Satellite is there a resistance group or combination of groups which appears to have the slightest chance of overthrowing the regime or even of materially slowing down its program. The Kremlin has been highly successful in eliminating open resistance, although in all the Satellites guerrilla bands still carry out limited and sporadic activity. These underground organizations are presently preoccupied with efforts to avoid annihilation and to conserve their strength until it can be used effectively. They do, however, constitute a nucleus which could be reactivated if given outside aid and hope of liberation. Passive resistance, apparently increasing as opportunities for overt resistance have diminished, at times constitutes a vexing harassment for the Satellite regimes, but not a serious threat. However, in a war which offered hope of liberation, passive resistance might be expected to increase and to play an important role in reducing Soviet capabilities.

E. What is the extent of Kremlin influence or control over Communist China and how is it exercised?

The relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union is unique among Communist-Bloc countries. The precise nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship results from external and internal conditions affecting both Soviet Russia and Communist China.

China cannot be termed a "satellite" in the same sense that

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other Communist-dominated countries are "satellites"; Soviet influence and control over Communist China is not exercised in the same degree and manner as that over Communist-Bloc countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. Communist China may well be on the road to becoming a complete satellite; or it may achieve a full, though junior, partnership with the Soviet Union. The special position of Communist China may not be one desired by the Kremlin, but it is an existing one which the Soviets evidently feel they must accept for the present at least.

The extent of Soviet influence and control is seen in Chinese Communist foreign policy. Here the Chinese Communists have openly touted Kremlin leadership in Communist world strategy, and Chinese Communist foreign relations appear at least to follow Soviet guidance, if not obey Soviet dictation.

By a combination of circumstances the Soviets are precluded from "taking over" full control of Communist China. They can, however, effectively direct Chinese Communist relations with other countries and, to a lesser degree, internal development. This capability derives from the community of interest existing between the Soviets and the Chinese Communist leaders. It is greatly reinforced by the Soviets' capability of seizing Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang and by Chinese Communist dependence upon the Soviet Union for military and industrial modernization.

F. Which political or social problems within the Satellites may develop in such a way as either to weaken or to strengthen Bloc capabilities for political or military warfare?

1. European Satellites

Soviet Bloc capabilities for political warfare would not be affected by the development of Satellite political or social problems. The only exception would be the possibly, though highly improbable, successful

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emergence of further "Titoism" within the Satellite orbit resulting in the defection of another Satellite state from the Soviet Bloc.

Soviet Bloc capabilities for military warfare, however, are limited by passive resistance to Communist political repression and socialization. Such resistance, which has increased as social and economic hardships have multiplied, takes many forms. It varies from annoyance of the Communist regimes by ridicule and apathy to more serious harassment and interference with Communist goals through peasant and worker resistance. Although not serious threats to the Satellite regimes, popular apathy, indifference, and noncooperation have to date placed an upper limit on what the regimes can extract from the people.

In war, the Kremlin's failure to fully Sovietize the Satellite peoples would become more significant. If the war promised liberation, indications are that passive resistance would grow and become widespread, would hamper the Satellite economics, and would eventually tie down a significant number of troops as security forces.

The only political-social development which will operate to increase Soviet military capabilities is Communist success in the indoctrination of youth, which can be expected ultimately to produce a Communist-indoctrinated generation which will compensate for the present lack of whole hearted support by the older groups.

2. China

The political and social developments within Communist China most likely to affect Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare are those which will probably flow from Chinese Communist success or failure to solve fundamental economic problems. The most pressing of these problems is that of increasing government revenue, which, in turn, is related to the more fundamental economic problem of increasing production.

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Two basic facts restrict Chinese Communist capabilities in any immediate attempts to cope with their economic difficulties. The first is that the Chinese economy is able to produce only a small surplus over minimum requirements for subsistence. The second is that by far the greater part of total national income and of government revenue is derived from agriculture.

Because the Chinese economy is operating so near the subsistence level, increases in taxes can rapidly become intolerable, resulting in a falling of industrial production and in widespread peasant discontent. The Chinese Communist regime--in spite of the size and effectiveness of its organization--still does not have enough trustworthy and competent personnel to operate all of China's industry or to regulate all its agriculture. The Chinese Communists lack men and means to create a bureaucracy able to manage effectively the whole economy. Widespread resistance not only would be difficult to suppress but would certainly cause such a fundamental cleavage within the Chinese Communist party as could seriously weaken the stability of the regime.

That the Chinese Communists have handled with some degree of success their basic economic problems appears to be indicated by the apparent relative stability of the Chinese economy over the past two years. Chinese Communist military operations in Korea have so far been carried by Manchuria, leaving China proper more or less insulated against the effects of the war. Manchuria is one of the few regions of China which produces a substantial surplus and is, therefore, an area in which the tax burden can be increased without seriously affecting production.

Therefore, Chinese Communist capabilities for political and military warfare are largely dependent upon the success of economic policies in Manchuria. Failure in Manchuria will increase the burden in China proper where economic resources are much less flexible.

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3. Indochina

Two political pressures are currently evident within the Viet Minh party machinery. The first is the strengthening of the Indochinese Communist Party's control of the Viet Minh united front. Since 1950, the Viet Minh have neglected their original policy of emphasizing the nationalistic base of its struggle against the French and have openly identified their regime with the Asiatic Communist movement. In this process, the identity of interest with the Chinese Communist "People's Revolution" is frequently emphasized.

The second political pressure results from the increasingly active role in the Viet Minh of Chinese Communists in the political and, particularly, the military fields. This Viet Minh dependence upon Chinese Communist assistance has heightened the traditional antipathy of the Vietnamese people for the Chinese, and available information indicates that some Viet Minh leaders fear the Chinese Communists' increasing influence and control.

However, it seems probable that during the period of this estimate, the traditional Vietnamese dislike for the Chinese will be subordinated to the Viet Minh Communist policy of cooperation with the Chinese Communists. There should thus be a continued strengthening of Bloc military and political capabilities in Indochina.

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G. What will the probable effects upon the political situation within the Bloc of the continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indochina, of extension of the war in the Far East, of limited attacks in the Middle East, of general war without the use of mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction weapons?

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The continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indochina are not likely to have serious adverse internal political effects within the Bloc, but will probably result in a further tightening of control over local populations. In particular, advantages to be gained by the Chinese Communists by the present type of limited war appear to outweigh the probable economic and political disadvantages. This conclusion is subject to the qualification that the greater part of the economic burden of the war continues to be carried by the Manchurian economy, and that the Soviet Union continues to provide substantial aid.

The probable political repercussions of an extension of war in the Far East will depend largely upon the form which this extension of war takes, the areas of Communist China which it affects, and the military objectives of this warfare. Assuming that such an extension of warfare would consist principally of effective air attacks on industrial and communications targets of strategic importance in Manchuria and North China, the Chinese Communist ability to maintain forces in Korea could be crippled, and China proper could be cut off both from substantial material aid from Soviet Russia and from the economic resources of Manchuria. Since the economic burden of supporting the war would then, in a larger measure, be transferred to the economy of China proper, the probability of adverse political repercussions would be greatly increased.

On the other hand, if extension of warfare in the Far East is limited to air attacks on strategic targets in Central and South China, the probable political repercussions will not seriously damage either Chinese Communist military or political potential. Not only would it be difficult to cripple the economy of this part of the country by attacks on strategic targets, but it is doubtful that adverse economic developments in South China would greatly affect the Chinese Communist military capabilities in Korea.

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The internal political effects which will probably result from a general war will depend, to a large degree, upon the effect such a war would have on the continuation of Soviet material assistance and upon the military pressure maintained against the Chinese Communists. Deprived of Soviet Military assistance and under heavy military pressure, the Chinese economy would be subject to such strain that strong political opposition to the Chinese Communist regime could readily develop. On the other hand, even if Communist China were deprived of Soviet aid but not subjected to military pressure sufficient to put a serious drain on her resources, the political repercussions are not likely to be serious.

The probable internal political effects of the use of mass destruction weapons are largely unpredictable, for they depend, to a great degree, both on the reaction of the people and upon the skill with which this reaction is exploited.

H. In each of these instances, how will the resultant political developments within the Bloc affect Bloc capabilities for political and military warfare?

A continuation of the cold war and of the present conflict in Korea and Indochina would, in general, favor the Communist capabilities for political and military warfare. The Chinese Communist economy has not yet shown signs of serious strain; its army is being modernized and trained in modern warfare, and no political opposition to the Chinese Communist regime has shown signs of becoming serious. As long as the present conditions continue, the Chinese Communists can increase their military potential while exploiting the opportunities for political warfare during the period of great uncertainty.

While it is true that continuation of the cold war is depriving Communist China of the benefits of normal trade relations with non-Communist countries, Communist China is increasing its degree of economic self-sufficiency and is constructing alternate lines of communication with

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the Soviet Union--thus improving her war potential.

III. SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL WARFARE

B. To what degree does Soviet Bloc military power contribute to the effectiveness of the Bloc's political warfare?

1. Military power--or the threat inherent in the possession of military power--is one of the key weapons in Soviet political warfare. This weapon constitutes the most serious obstacle to Western programs designed to reduce the threat of Communist power to the point where it is no longer a threat to international security. The Soviets use military power in three major ways in a "cold war" sense:

- a. The threat value of a force in being,
- b. The use of Satellite forces against non-Communist areas and,
- c. The use of military-economic aid to insurgent groups.

2. The mere threat of Soviet military action, in Europe or Asia, has several political effects. Wherever Soviet military forces are present, the West is faced with the necessity of deploying opposing military forces to prevent other areas from being absorbed. Obviously, Western failure to defend peripheral areas could result in their loss. Of equal importance, however, are the inherent political disadvantages of Western maldployment arising from Soviet ability to mass in any given area greater force than the West possesses. Similarly, the massiveness of Soviet power in any given location tends to induce despair, the feeling that little effective opposition could be offered to a Soviet invasion. Efforts to overcome this feeling of futility and neutralism require an impressive amount of Western political effort.

(b) Of perhaps greater value is the type of operation exemplified in Korea wherein Communist forces are employed to achieve territorial advantage and cause attrition in Western forces without directly committing Soviet Forces. Such operations have the dual effect of permitting further Communist expansion at far less risks of global war than would be

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the case where Soviet forces themselves employed and of increasing the instability of large areas of the world for exploitation by other means.

(c) Finally, the material strength of Soviet military-economic force in being enables the Soviets to provide extensive aid to insurgent movements attempting to achieve control in emerging national states. Such aid has contributed materially to the success of the Communist or Communist supported groups in such areas.

C. To what extent has the emergence of Communist China affected Bloc political warfare?

The principal effect of the emergence of Communist China is the capability this development has given to the Bloc of posing major military threats in the Far East as well as in Western Europe and the Middle East. It has also given the Bloc greater flexibility and greater room for maneuver in the execution of political warfare. A threatening military posture in one part of the world can be accompanied by proposals of "peaceful settlement" in another. Communist China can be engaged in a limited war with the United States while Soviet propaganda preaches the feasibility of "coexistence" of capitalism and socialism.

The emergence also appears to have made it more profitable to the Bloc to place greater emphasis on political warfare in Europe by pursuing a "peace offensive." Because the Bloc's military capabilities in Europe are quite thoroughly appreciated, the Bloc does not need to resort to bellicose demonstrations to remind Western Europeans of the military threat it poses.

Chinese Communist forces have the capability of invading Indochina and Burma. But probably more important is the stimulus given to Communist penetration of all Southeast Asia by the material and technical assistance which the Chinese Communists are now able to give Southeast Asian Communists.

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The emergence of Communist China has also greatly strengthened Bloc political capabilities with reference to Japan and India. While keeping the military threat in the background, the Bloc can, among other things, place propaganda emphasis on the economic advantages of reestablishing economic ties with continental China. At the same time the Bloc can exploit the propaganda value of the continued presence on Japanese soil of United States forces and the fear that United States policies will draw the world into another war.

D.6. What is the attitude of the people toward rearmament? Toward the East-West Struggle?

The attitudes of the peoples toward rearmament in the various geographic areas vary greatly. In Latin America a traditionally isolationist attitude prevails. Their interest in increased rearmament is principally concerned with the problem of quelling internal disturbances. Within Western Europe, the people of most nations are resigned to the necessity for rearming to meet the present Communist threat but have not enthusiastically accepted this condition. Most of the French people are torn between their anti-Communist, pro-Western sympathies and their fear of a resurgent Germany. For this reason they would welcome some solution which might reduce the Soviet threat and prevent German rearmament. The people of Italy generally support rearmament. On the German side, their endorsement of the rearmament program is tempered by the fear that such action may jeopardize unification.

As for the Near and Middle East, only Greece and Turkey are fully cooperative with the West. The peoples of the Arabic countries are not particularly interested in any rearmament program which has as its aim the active support of Western policies. The people of Iran and Afghanistan, because of their proximity to the U.S.S.R. and their inherently weak military

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potential even with considerable Western aid, are interested in developing strong armed forces principally for internal security purposes. In south Central and Southeast Asia, informed public opinion is generally against rearmament. This segment fears that such a course of action will hasten rather than delay general war and in turn will deny to them a prolonged period of peace, which they feel is needed for strengthening the strained economy of the area and for stabilizing internal political situations. India, in particular, is generally apathetic towards warfare due to their religious beliefs and Gandhian principles of non-violence. Support for rearmament in Southeast Asia is strongest in Indochina, but even there is found considerable anxiety that the strengthening of defending forces might lead to an invasion by Communist China. In Burma and Indonesia there appears to be wide-spread public support for governmental policies of neutrality. Among the Japanese, there is no widespread enthusiasm in support of rearmament, but a vast majority of the people have accepted this course as an inevitable necessity. Chief opposition is centered in the Socialist and Communist Parties, but some apprehension is found among conservatives over the Japanese ability to support economically such rearming.

Attitude on the East-West struggle is similar to that on rearming. The people of Latin America show little interest and are in no position economically to become involved in heavy rearmament. The peoples' sympathies in these countries are with the West, however, and in the event of general hostilities their active support could be expected. In spite of fairly large Communist Parties in France and Italy, all of the Western European nations are aligned with the West,

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and the majority of the people can be expected to continue this support. In the Middle and Near East, Greece and Turkey are pro-Western, but generally the fear of the Soviets and interest in the East-West struggle is progressively weaker as the distance from the Soviet border increases. The people are concerned principally with local problems. Popular opinion in South Central and Southeast Asia has been generally to shy away from alignment with either side; however, there appears to be a growing sympathy for the West as opposed to the Communist Nations. Sharp criticism often received by the West from people of Asian countries is attributed more to antipathy against colonialism than to orientation toward Communism. In Japan, the present Government, dominated by the Liberal Party, and the major conservative opposition parties favor alignment with the West. The Socialists largely favor neutrality while the Communist Party is, of course pro-East.

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7. What is the over-all outlook for Bloc political warfare capabilities during the period of this estimate?

In Communist eyes, political warfare techniques are not distinct from warfare in general. All pressures -- political, psychological, economic, and in the final analysis military -- are considered part of a general offensive designed to achieve the Communist goal of world domination by the Kremlin. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider present cold-war activities as a part of and contributing to the over-all program of Communist expansion.

In this context Soviet political warfare efforts are designed to gain as much as possible short of war; they are also designed to improve the absolute military position of the Communist Bloc in the event that war occurs. Thus political pressures applied against India are designed inter alia to increase the pacifistic tendencies of that country, both to prevent its active participation in the struggle against Communism on the side of the West and to improve the Soviet ability to achieve domination over that country -- either by military or non-military means -- whichever may at some future time appear most suitable. Similarly, Communist propaganda designed to foster neutralism in Europe are designed to have the same dual effect.

So long as the Communist Bloc holds the offensive in political warfare efforts and the initiative in propaganda designed to show its devotion to peace, so long may neutralism and opposition to Western defense efforts be expected to continue.

At the same time, Communist Bloc political pressures designed to cause or increase disagreement between the Western Powers and other countries of the non-Communist world weaken the individual ability of the several nations to resist Communism's attacks either military or psychological. It also reduces the rate of Western efforts to develop a power position capable of achieving balance with that of the Communist Bloc by causing maldistribution of Western political, economic, or military pressures. Thus, by association of Communist elements with anti-colonial and emergent nationalist groups in Southeast Asia

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and in the Middle East, the Communist Bloc has been successful in causing a severe drain on the French, British, and United States over-all strength potential.

F. What will be the probable effect of Bloc political warfare efforts upon the strength and determination of the non-Communist world? Upon Bloc military capabilities in the event of war?

Soviet Bloc political warfare pressures designed to reduce the strength and determination of the non-Communist world are at least in part designed to increase bloc military capabilities. The effect of any given action of Soviet Bloc countries -- political, economic, or military -- cannot be considered outside of the context of the over-all Communist program for expansion.

Political warfare efforts, if they are not defeated by counter-action, will continue throughout the world to overcome weak non-Communist countries on the Communist periphery until no more remain. The Communists will continue their program of associating themselves with anti-colonialism and emergent nationalism wherever it may occur in order to increase distrust of Western objectives, and to improve the atmosphere for their own infiltration.

Traditional anti-foreignism, anti-colonialism, low standards of living, unbalanced resources and other economic factors, plus the need for political, economic and military reforms, render the Far Eastern countries in particular fertile fields for Soviet Bloc political warfare efforts. Therefore, prospects for further Communist exploitation are very favorable. Countries such as Japan are likely to be swayed by offers of economic advantages or offers of the return to Japanese sovereignty of some territory currently under Soviet control. Political warfare gains may also be expected in Communist-dominated and leftist labor unions in the more industrial countries unless countermeasures are effective in suppressing such attempts.

At the same time the Communists will continue their campaigns to increase neutralism and opposition to Western rearmament efforts. By preaching peace they will continue to retard the development of the Western power position. Through these programs and through a varied geographical attack the Soviets also have a considerable capability to cause dissension between and among the Western powers.

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By forcing Western maldployment in the Far and Middle Eastern areas they not only develop opportunities for disagreement between the major powers but also cause a significant drain on the military and economic resources of those countries.

All of these programs taken together are designed by the Soviets to achieve three major ends:

- a. To divide the West;
- b. To prevent Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament;
- c. To reduce Western military capabilities through retardation of mobilization efforts caused by neutralism, through maldployment of forces, and through the commitment of Western power against secondary enemies.

That these programs have already achieved great success is patent; the opportunity for their continued success remains one of the gravest of Communist threats.

IV B.2. Radiological Weapons

Although the Soviet Union has the basic facilities for producing small quantities of radiological warfare agents, it is believed such agents will not be a factor at present.

IV B.3. Biological Weapons

(1) The Soviet Union appears to have given some attention to the possible use of biological warfare agents for sabotage activities, and it is capable at any time of producing a variety of agents in sufficient quantities for such purposes.

(2) Should it be the Soviet intention, and should the necessary priorities have been given, it is estimated that the Soviet Union could mass produce certain bacterial and virus agents. The Soviet Union is capable at any time of mass producing toxic substances derived from the higher plants as well as substances of the "selective" weed-killer type for use in crop destruction.

(3) We have no knowledge of Soviet biological warfare weapons development but it would be prudent to assume that the Soviet Union is as capable as we are of producing weapons of comparable performance.

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IV B. 4. Chemical Weapons

The Soviet Union can now employ standard chemical warfare agents on a large-scale. Prior to World War II the Soviet Union developed an active interest in chemical warfare. During World War II the Soviets had a stockpile of standard chemical agents quite adequate for retaliatory use. This stockpile has been retained and probably has been substantially increased. At the close of the war the Soviets obtained sufficient quantities of German GA nerve gas for a mass lethal attack on a number of cities or for limited employment against troops in the open. In addition, the Soviets obtained the only German full-scale plant for the production of GA, and obtained a number of German personnel specialized in gas production. This plant had a rated capacity of 1,000 tons per month. The Soviets also captured the German pilot plant for the production of GB, and one plant capable of full-scale production. The latter was about 85% completed and had a rated capacity of 500 tons per month. It is not known whether these plants have been fully assembled or are in production. However, there is some circumstantial evidence that the GA plant is in production and that the full scale GB plant may be in production soon. It is considered that the Soviet Union is not likely to meet any insuperable difficulty in devising reasonably efficient means for disseminating chemical warfare agents.

IV B. 5. ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT

Electronic devices are essential to the effectiveness of all modern weapons systems. The state of development, quality of mass production, and maintenance of electronic equipment may well be the limiting factors in the effectiveness of Soviet weapons. However, the Soviets do not depend on electronic equipment to as great a degree as the Western Powers. The particular aspects are as follows:

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(1) Communications. It is considered that the Soviet ground-to-ground telecommunications are capable of meeting the essential requirements imposed by war. There is, however, some doubt as to whether Soviet ground-to-air communications would, by mid-1953, be sufficiently developed to ensure effective fighter aircraft control.

(2) Aircraft Warning and Tracking Network. The Soviet Union has established aircraft warning and tracking networks in most critical areas, utilizing warning radar, ground observers, weather stations, and telecommunications facilities, and it is to be expected that these will be extended and coordinated. While the radar equipment in use at the present time is vulnerable to jamming, other deficiencies in design and quantity may be reduced by effective coordination of radar networks through the telecommunications system.

(3) Antiaircraft Fire Control Radar and Directors. The Soviet Union received British and American automatic gun-laying radar and directors, and also acquired German equipment during the war. The U. S. equipment was of the most advanced design at that time, and is still considered good. There is evidence indicating that the Soviets may be producing radar in limited quantities similar to the US SCR 584. There is no information on directors. While the Soviet Union, in view of the importance of air defense, may be developing automatic gun-laying radars and directors, such development has not been confirmed. It should be noted that this equipment could be used not only with conventional aircraft guns but also with unguided antiaircraft rockets. Specialized radars and directors for a guided missile program are not expected to be available within the period covered by this estimate.

(4) Electronic Countermeasures.

a. Jamming of Radio Communications. At the present time the Soviet Union is engaged in extensive jamming of radio communications. This

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jamming has been confined largely to broadcasts by the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. It is believed that the Soviet Union now has capabilities for extensive jamming of radio communications at frequencies at least as high as VHF.

b. Jamming of Radar. The Soviet Union has used "window" in the past. This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, electronic jamming will probably be used at all frequencies up to the 1,000 megacycle range at present and up to the 3,000 megacycle range by mid-1953. However, it is believed that the Soviet Union is not capable of jamming BTO (bombing through overcast) radar which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,000 megacycles.

(5) Proximity Fuses. The availability of radio type proximity fuses for ground and antiaircraft artillery will depend on the ability of the Soviet Union to overcome the problems of production. It is ^{possible} ~~assumed~~ that efficient fuses will be available to the Soviet Union in significant quantities by mid-1953. However, because of less exacting engineering requirements, it is believed that the Soviet Union is capable of producing operational quantities of proximity fuses for such guided missiles as may be produced.

(6) Infrared. During World War II the Germans carried out extensive research and development in the field of infrared and produced a large amount of equipment, including night driving and firing devices. These devices and qualified German personnel became available to the Soviet Union. It may be assumed that the Soviet Union will exploit the potentialities of infrared for both land and sea combat as well as for aircraft detection and for guided missile homing.

IV.B.6. GUIDED MISSILES

Soviet missiles that may be encountered in quantity up to 1954 will most likely be variations of the following German types:

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(1) Surface-to-Surface

- a. Large-scale production of V-1 can be attained at any time the Soviet Union considers it to be required.
- b. Improved V-1 models could also be in production.
- c. Should the Soviet Union have decided to reproduce the standard German A-4 (V-2), this could now be in mass production.
- d. An improved A-4 (V-2) with range about 300 miles could be in pilot production, its accuracy at this range being about the same as the German missile at 200 miles.

(2) Surface-to-Air

- a. It is believed that the Soviets could have a supersonic guided missile available now if they are willing to accept one for which optical tracking is employed. However, this missile would be quite limited in performance and would have a low kill probability. It is also believed that by 1953 they could have available an all-weather guided missile with a slant range in the order of 15,000 to 20,000 yards.
- b. German-type sub-sonic missiles could be available to the Soviet Union for limited use. However, such missiles would be relatively ineffective against modern high speed bombers.

(3) Air-to-Surface (ASM). There is evidence of Satellite activity and of Soviet interest in the German air-to-surface missiles: the HS-295, a radio-controlled glide bomb, rocket-powered, guided visually from an aircraft; and the Fritz X(FX-1400), a radio-controlled bomb, guided visually from an aircraft. These missiles could be used at longer range and more accurately than German World War II types. It is conceivable that these missiles could now be in production on a scale large enough to meet Soviet air-sea warfare requirements.

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(4) Air-to-Air (AAM). It is believed that the Soviets are not capable of developing and producing an effective air-to-air guided missile before 1954.

IV,B,8. LAND COMBAT WEAPONS (TANKS, ARTILLERY, ANTI-TANK, MINES BRIDGING, SMALL ARMS)

The Soviet Army currently possesses quantities of simple, efficient, and rugged arms and equipment of all types, sufficient to meet immediate mobilization needs. The continual production of these proved models indicates that the Soviets intend to retain most of their late World War II materiel for use in any war in the near future. At the same time, energetic research and development programs imply that they will improve the characteristics of present equipment and produce new models wherever possible.

a. Soviet infantry weapons, with the exception of medium and heavy mortars which have no counterparts in United States equipment, though adequate for Soviet need, are generally not up to U. S. standards. Research development and troop testing of new items, particularly infantry antitank weapons, is under way at the present time.

b. Soviet artillery is good, abundant, and has continued in limited production since World War II. Present field artillery weapons are roughly comparable to their counterparts in the United States Army. However, fire control devices are not up to standard. The excellent towed antitank guns of the Soviets, their heavily armored self-propelled close-support artillery, heavy mortars, and field artillery-type rocket launchers have no counterparts in the hands of U. S. troops.

c. The Soviet Union has two standard tanks, the T-34(85) medium, weighing 35 tons, and the heavy Joseph Stalin 3, weighing 51 tons. Both have very good combat characteristics and are produced and stockpiled in large numbers. Considerable energy is also being devoted to medium tank research and development. If present trends continue, there can be little doubt that the existing Soviet lead in tank design, which provides a maximum of armor and gun power, will be maintained.

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d. The Soviet Union uses some 14 standard anti-personnel and antitank mines and 20 standard mine fuses. While, in general, Soviet mines and fuses are approximately equal in effectiveness to U. S. mines and fuses, they are somewhat more difficult to lay and a great deal more difficult to clear because of the very diversity of models involved.

e. Soviet pre-fabricated bridging is comparable to similar U. S. equipment, but is less widely used owing to smaller stocks being carried by Soviet engineer units than by U. S. units. The Soviets place a great deal more emphasis upon improvised combat bridging than does the U. S.

IV.B.9. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (ARTILLERY, ROCKETS)

a. Artillery. Antiaircraft artillery with Soviet troops has been mediocre, particularly as regards the outmoded fire control equipment for the 85-mm guns. Soviet AA capabilities have been improved with the appearance of a new gun, estimated at 100-mm, in the Moscow defenses. It is believed that the new weapon has a ceiling of about 36,000 feet with conventional ammunition. It is assumed from the very existence of this new gun that a new gun director has been developed for use with it and that already available Soviet manufactured copies of the SCR-584 type radar are probably in use. A few indications have appeared that point to supplementing the current standard 37-mm AAA gun with a new 57-mm AAA gun designed to cope with modern aircraft at low altitudes, and to improve the chances of a kill with one hit..

b. Antiaircraft Rockets. The Soviet Union is capable of producing improved versions of the German Taifun type supersonic unguided antiaircraft rockets which were designed to be effective against aircraft at altitudes up to at least 50,000 feet. Although there is no factual evidence that such production has commenced, the weapon is a logical choice for the Soviet Union, because of ease of manufacture, operational mobility, and minimized electronic requirements. Operationally significant quantities could be available about six months after the decision to manufacture this weapon had been made.

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V. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES

A. Estimated Soviet Bloc Military Strength

1. Soviet and Satellite

a. Present Strength

At the present time the Soviet ground forces consist of 175 combat divisions, of which 105 are rifle divisions, 40 arm mechanized divisions, 25 tank, and 5 cavalry. In addition the Soviet ground forces contain 20 artillery divisions and 25 antiaircraft artillery divisions. In all, the Soviet ground forces maintain a standing strength of 2,500,000 men plus an additional 400,000 security troops in semi-military units. These forces have undergone a considerable modernization and reorganization since the end of World War II. They have excellent equipment in adequate quantity and undergo a rigid training program which probably makes them the most combat-ready large army in the world. They are disposed throughout the Soviet Union and in occupied or Satellite areas in such a way as to pose a distinct offensive threat against Europe, the Middle East, and Japan. Their disposition is also such as to provide more than adequate ground defense for their own territory. They are also so placed as to provide an overwhelming reserve to back up any Satellite or Communist Chinese aggression in the event that the Soviets find it necessary or desirable to provide such support. They are also well for defense of such areas against any presently envisioned attack.

The Eastern European Satellite armies (including the East German Alert Police) total 1,077,000 men in 70 line divisions (59 infantry or rifle, 7 mechanized, and 4 tank), 3 artillery divisions, 6 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and various independent brigades and regiments. In addition, the Satellite Ground Forces include at least 232,000 security troops.

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The Satellite armies are equipped largely with Soviet World War II material of good quality, but generally lack quantities of the newer weapons which are becoming standard in the Soviet Army. Materiel now in use also includes items of German, Czechoslovak, and local manufacture. The most obvious deficiency is in motor transport; few Satellite divisions are motorized or mechanized, which means that the majority of units lack mobility. However, a concentrated effort is being made to overcome this weakness by increasing deliveries of motor vehicles from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia and by some vehicle manufacturing in other countries. The Satellite forces also are weak in communications equipment, and their antiaircraft defenses have almost no gun-laying radar.

Satellite training has become more intensive during the last two years. In most countries troops engage in continuous exercises throughout the winter in all weather. The yearly training cycle usually culminates in combined arms, division-level maneuvers in the autumn. There are exceptions: The maneuvers of the Bulgarian Army for several years have reached the corps level and those of the Albanian Army have not progressed beyond the regimental level. Training programs are generally well planned and efficiently executed. Extensive reserve training is also conducted. The Bulgarian Army is considered as well trained as any force in Europe today, except the Soviet Army. The Hungarian and Polish, and possibly the Rumania, Armies are being pushed rapidly toward the Bulgarian level of achievement and the Czechoslovak Army may catch up by the spring of 1953.

Satellite combat efficiency varies. The Bulgarian Army would give a good account of itself against any force of comparable size. The Hungarian Army may now be almost as effective. The Polish Army might

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be successful in limited offensive operations. The Czechoslovak Army will not be combat-ready before the spring of 1953, the Albanian Army continues to be trained only for guerrilla operations.

Generally speaking, Satellite dispositions lack strategic or tactical significance. In Bulgaria, however, there is a marked concentration near the Yugoslav border, with a lesser concentration near the Greek border; and there is some evidence of a Rumanian build-up in the Yugoslav border region. The bulk of the Czechoslovak Army, following the traditional pattern, is in the western part of the country.

The morale of Satellite troops has been improved during the past two years. It is good in Bulgaria and Hungary, fair in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, and poor in Albania and East Germany.

b. Size and Quality of Present Holdings of Military Equipment

Arms and equipment now in the hands of Soviet and Satellite forces in Eastern Europe are of excellent quality. The 22 Soviet line divisions in Germany have much new equipment including heavy weapons. The 70 Satellite divisions are equipped largely with Soviet World War II materiel of good quality plus some German and Czechoslovak equipment. Military stockpiles west of the Soviet border are sufficient to maintain Soviet and Satellite forces now in being there for approximately 45 days of active combat. Road and rail nets are capable of moving troops with sufficient speed and efficiency to permit full utilization of the Soviet and Satellite divisions now in Eastern Europe. The flow of additional supplies and materiel to Eastern Europe from the U.S.S.R. would be affected somewhat by the necessity of transloading from wide to standard gauge railroads at the Soviet border.

Weapons and equipment maintained by the Soviets in the Far East are of the same quality as in Eastern Europe. Soviet Far Eastern stockpiles are estimated to be sufficient to supply 30 divisions in combat

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from six months to one year. Road, rail, and water transport facilities are adequate to permit utilization of such a force in areas adjacent to the Trans-Siberian railroad.

In addition to the materiel in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Far East, the U.S.S.R. maintains large quantities of all classes of supplies between Lake Baikal and the western border of the U.S.S.R. These supplies are sufficient to maintain the units in that area for approximately one year. Adequate transport is available for movement of these supplies.

Under cold war conditions, Soviet troops require about 75 tons of supplies per division per day. In active combat this requirement is about 250 tons per division per day.

c. Coordination and Direction

The leaders of the Soviet Union have demonstrated a clear understanding of the problems inherent in establishing control over amalgamated armed forces of several nationalities. Their techniques, peculiarly adapted to police state methods, have largely eliminated the control and coordination problems entailed in the language, strategic, and technical differences that exist among the nations of the Western Bloc.

The Soviet technique for the establishment of control consists of the imposition of large numbers of "advisors" upon the armies of the Satellites and China. Although these advisors rarely assume positions of overt command within the military establishment, such command is not unknown, as is shown by Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, Minister of War for Poland. Normally, control is maintained by extensive infiltration of special assistants and technical advisors, plus a large number of "political" advisors who are in reality members of the Soviet security forces.

It is the mission of these advisors to train the Satellite armies in Soviet techniques, tactics, and operations. It is also

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their mission to provide technical assistance in the operations of the Soviet equipment. This standardization on Soviet weapons, which characterizes the Satellite and Chinese Armies, also greatly simplifies control of Satellite military forces.

As is evident in Korea, control is considered so well established that overt commitment of Soviet forces is not required to insure the loyalty of the Communist troops engaged in combat.

d. Strategic and Tactical Doctrine

From a purely military point of view, the sheer mass of the present Soviet or Soviet controlled military force suggests strongly that Soviet strategic as well as tactical doctrine remains one of attacking with strength against weakness. Strategically, it is apparent that the mass of Soviet military force is now deployed both to defend and to pose a threat of offensive operations against peripheral areas. As a result, the principal strategic fact of Soviet military power is its size.

On the other hand, the Soviets have gone far toward modernizing their forces, and extension and improvement may be expected of their late World War II practice of combining mass with mobility.

Even though the Soviets have devoted considerable attention to strategic air power, they still retain a highly developed concept of tactical air support for ground forces. This is in keeping with notable Soviet reliance upon effective artillery fire as a means toward tactical victory: A major share of their air power is assigned as "long-range artillery."

If a tactical distinction may be made between the principles of seizing ground as opposed to destroying enemy forces, then the Soviets adhere strictly to the latter. This principle of "encirclement to destroy the enemy forces" is the most evident tactical doctrine in Soviet

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ground forces. References to the seizure of specific terrain features are rarely found in offensive operations.

Strategic defense is based upon the opposite principle: terrain is the key of all defensive concepts. However, position defense of the Maginot-line type has no role in Soviet tactical or strategic doctrine. Whether or not the Soviets conceive that the defense of the U.S.S.R. will again require the massive retreats of the Napoleonic and German invasion (Soviet expansion of buffer areas in the Satellite suggests that these are at least in part intended for such withdrawal), the fundamental principle of Soviet defensive operations is to counterattack.

2. Communist China

a. Present Strength

The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist Field Forces is estimated at 2,238,000 troops, and consists of 69 armies, 4 columns, 227 divisions, and 13 separate regiments. An additional regular force comprise the Military District troops whose strength is estimated at 1,450,000. The Militia, a part-time irregular force totals approximately 6,000,000 men.

Dispositions and strengths by geographical areas are as follows:

AREA	FIELD FORCES	MILITARY DISTRICT TROOPS	MILITIA	FIELD FORCE LINE DIVISIONS*	FIELD FORCE SUPPORTING DIVISIONS
Korea	635,000		--	53	10
Manchuria	237,000	370,000	565,000	24	6
North China	133,000	300,000	2,370,000	12	3
East China	404,000	300,000	1,070,000	38	2
Central-South China	426,000	260,000	1,160,000	35	--
Southwest China	314,000	100,000	500,000	33	-
Northwest China	79,000	120,000	335,000	11	--
TOTAL	2,228,000**	1,450,000	6,000,000	206	21

*The total number of divisions includes 206 infantry, 11 artillery, 6 cavalry and 4 armored

**In addition, an estimated 10,000 Chinese Communist military personnel are accepted as being in Indochina in technical and advisory capacities.

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Training in the past has been a small-unit responsibility but there are many indications that this practice has been supplemented by unit training for artillery, infantry, and armored units conducted in Manchuria and North China and that the basic training of troops by their parent unit is being augmented by limited replacement training prior to assignment. A Soviet Army advisory staff of an estimated 12,000 is presently with the Chinese Communists in China and North Korea. Advisory responsibility probably includes instruction in the operation of Soviet weapons, maintenance of equipment, organization, administration, tactics, and staff functions and procedures. Training of the Militia and the Military District formations appears to be conducted strictly on a local, small-unit basis with a high percentage of the training consisting of political indoctrination at the expense of basic and unit military training.

As a class the morale and combat efficiency of the Chinese Communist soldier is high, and the Chinese Communist Army is an effective force. Combat effectiveness has been limited, however, by lack of uniformity of weapons and equipment, deficiencies in heavy weapons and equipment, and inherent lack of supporting Services. Even in Korea where supporting services have been improved through Soviet aid, these limitations have prevented the Chinese Communists from sustaining their offensives beyond the 7-to-10 day period for which the individual soldier can maintain himself with the supplies that he can carry. In the past the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Army as a whole has been further limited by the absence of tactical air support, the air effort to date having been limited to engaging UN aircraft back of the battle lines.

b. Size and Quality of Present Holdings of Military Equipment

The Chinese Communist forces are basically infantry. Their weapons consist largely of a heterogeneous assortment of light weapons from virtually every munitions manufacturing nation in the world. The traditional

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Chinese Communist shortage of heavy equipment is gradually being overcome by the Soviet program of material aid initiated in mid-1950. Heavy ground equipment, including tanks, trucks, artillery, and engineering equipment, as well as ammunition for the Soviet weapons is being supplied. Radar and rocket launchers are also being furnished by the USSR. Much of the armored equipment appears to have been shipped to the Chinese Communists during late 1950 and 1951, but other types of material and ammunition are apparently being furnished on a continuing basis. This program has made Communist China dependent upon the Soviet Union to the extent that shipments of ammunition, spare parts, POL, and replacement equipment must be provided on a continuing basis if the Chinese Communist Army is to retain its current effectiveness.

Chinese Armies are still lacking in small-unit motor transport, heavy weapons, and supporting services, but the Chinese Communists have maintained a high degree of local tactical mobility despite these basic deficiencies. Their movements are characterized by sustained overland marches, the use of light weapons, and a short term independence from organized supply from the rear.

c. Strategic and Tactical Doctrine

In Korea, coordination of effort by adjacent units and the employment of heavy weapons and equipment in conjunction with infantry probably reflects the materiel and advisory assistance which has been given to the Chinese Communists by the USSR more than Chinese efforts toward modernization of their forces. However, it indicates a trend, demonstrates a capability to absorb modern concepts, and points to the future Sovietization of the Chinese Communist forces doctrine, both strategic and tactical.

3. Viet Minh

a. Present Strength and Effectiveness

Viet Minh military forces consist of a regular army of 130,000 organized into one artillery and six infantry divisions plus numerous

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independent formations, and supported by 70,000 regional troops and 100,000 poorly armed irregulars. Transportation facilities are poor, most of the available motor transport being used in handling the movement of military supplies from China. Intensive training of regular forces has to a large extent taken place in Communist China, although recent heavy losses sustained by the Viet Minh have probably been compensated for by the use of hastily trained replacements. Morale has generally been high enough during the past 5½ years of guerrilla warfare against the French to maintain the general effectiveness of their operations. Recent French successes in mopping-up operations against Viet Minh forces in the Tonkin Delta have probably lowered Viet Minh morale in Tonkin to some extent.

The combat efficiency of the regular Viet Minh forces is considered good. Three-fourths of them are within the strategic Tonkin area.

b. Coordination and Direction

Viet Minh-Chinese Communist coordination to date has been confined to the use of Chinese Communist advisors, technicians, and logistical personnel serving with the Viet Minh. No Chinese Communist combat units as such are believed to be operating in Indochina.

4. North Korea

a. Present Strength

The North Korean Army has an estimated strength of 242,000 and is composed of 17 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 mechanized divisions, and 4 mechanized artillery brigades.

Three North Korean corps are currently engaged in combat on the eastern front. The remaining forces are engaged on coastal defense missions or have security missions on lines of communications.

Initially, the North Korean soldier was well trained; however, severe casualties forced large numbers of untrained men into combat units. Recent reports indicate that the period of inactivity since the beginning of the truce talks has been utilized to bring the standard of training

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up to a higher level. However, morale can only be rated as fair.

Rigid discipline, experienced leadership, and the benefit of Soviet staff advice will continue to give the North Koreans a general overall combat efficiency rating of from fair to good.

b. Present Holdings of Military Equipment

All heavy equipment is of Soviet origin and includes 76-mm field guns, 76-mm infantry howitzers, 122-mm howitzers, mortars of 82-mm and 120-mm caliber. It is estimated that at present the North Korean army has 192 tanks (T-34) of Soviet manufacture.

B. Estimated Bloc Military Capabilities

1. Capacity of Bloc forces to initiate and maintain various kinds of military campaigns

Soviet bloc forces have adequate manpower and supplies to carry on the present conflicts in Korea and Indochina, to extend the war in the Far East and to undertake limited attacks in the Middle East. Adequate materiel is available for the initiation of such limited operations and to maintain a continued flow of supplies and equipment from the U.S.S.R. to the areas involved. Assuming that only certain selected operations were undertaken (i.e., not all conceivable operations) and that general war would not result, manpower and equipment would be sufficient to continue operations for an indefinite period from current production and stockpiles without placing a serious strain on the Soviet economy.

In a general war not involving the use of mass destruction weapons, the Soviet Bloc can conduct operations anywhere on the Eurasian land mass. They would be virtually unhampered by logistics (except in the case of the Indian subcontinent) and would be operating on interior lines of communications. The efficiency of campaigns in areas hostile to the Soviet bloc forces would be limited by the extent to which conventional weapons were effective in:

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- a. Destruction of Soviet Bloc forces.
- b. Denying the use of selected roads and rail lines.
- c. Destroying or damaging key industrial installations

within the bloc or conquered areas.

In a general war involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, Soviet Bloc logistical capabilities as a whole would remain unchanged until "on hand" supplies outside the U.S.S.R. were exhausted. Upon the exhaustion of "on-hand" supplies (D / 45 days in Europe), campaigns outside the U.S.S.R. would be limited to an extent determined by the effectiveness of mass destruction weapons, as well as conventional weapons, in weakening the transportation systems. The extent of further limitations on Soviet Bloc campaigns would be determined by the effectiveness of mass destruction and conventional weapons in restricting Soviet production. Because of military stockpiling in the U.S.S.R. (which is estimated to be sufficient for one year of operations without recourse to new production except in the case of POL) weapons of mass destruction directed at industrial targets within the U.S.S.R. would have little effect on the absolute capability of the Soviets to engage in military operations for most of the first year. Detailed capabilities would depend on such factors as:

- a. Soviet ability to maintain its weak railroad system under attack, or to improvise, as in World War II.
- b. Vulnerability of key industries (location of petroleum producing areas in border regions, etc).
- c. Ability to utilize water transport system, which is dependent on vulnerable locks, canals, and dams.

The Soviets recognize these vulnerabilities, and there is ample evidence that both their strategic doctrine and defensive preparations are designed to reduce the ability of Western forces to engage in a successful interdiction or strategic bombing program. It may be estimated that absolute Soviet capabilities to engage in extended combat operations will be reduced only over a considerable period of time and through the combined effect of all forms of Western military action.

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