


Mr. A. Smith
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Intelligence Report

IR 5930

AN ESTIMATE OF INDEPENDENT LIBYA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Office of Intelligence Research

Date: June 13, 1952

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Abstract

Libya enjoys a superficial and momentary political stability, but the government is confronted with a formidable task if it is to achieve lasting national unity in the face of (a) strong provincial separatism and (b) increasing tension arising from the impact of modern ideas and techniques on a traditional rural society.

The economy is inherently unstable. Libya's limited resources are subject to the vagaries of capricious nature, and the country is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Gradual improvements can be expected, but without the discovery of some hitherto unknown resources, Libya is likely to remain a poor nation.

King Idris al-Sannusi I and his leading ministers are strongly pro-Western, the Parliament less so. The principal anti-Western political leader and several of his associates were deported shortly after the February elections. Most of the Libyan people are still politically apathetic. Anti-Westernism is pronounced mainly in the urban centers but is not yet sufficiently powerful to provoke a change in government orientation. Influential in maintaining Libya's ties with the West are: (1) the important role played by the UK Minister with respect to the King and of British advisors in the Libyan Government; and (2) the technical and financial aid which is being extended to Libya. There are signs that this friendly orientation will be subject to change at some time in the future as certain developments draw Libya away from the West. These include: (1) attempts by Egypt and other Arab countries to bring Libya into a common front against the UK; (2) fear of the involvement of Libyan territory and lives in another major war as a result of Western bases in the country; and (3) the appearance of powerful anti-Western demagogues who would inflame public opinion.

In the period before Libya gained its independence, the predominant influence of the UK proved to be of great assistance to the US in achieving its policy objectives in Libya. In the first five months of Libyan statehood, however, there have been (1) signs of a possible decline in British prestige in Libya, (2) a confidential Libyan Government bid for the US to replace the UK in the leading role, and (3) apparent divergences in the assessments by the UK and US Ministers in Libya of the importance which should be attached to the maintenance of Libyan unity.

While the UK Foreign Office appears to appreciate the dangers to Libya's future inherent in the King's lack of interest in establishing real unity among the three sections of Libya, it attributes the hesitancy of its Minister to use his influence with the King to encourage such unity to the delicacy of negotiating a treaty and other agreements. The US Minister, however, fears that his British colleague's inaction stems also from a desire on the part of the UK to place friendship with Cyrenaica, where Britain's primary strategic interests lie, higher than the preservation of Libyan national unity. By contrast, the US military installations are in Tripolitania. A breakdown of the Libyan federation would leave these facilities in a politically unstable territory whose future would again be subject to the uncertainties of international power politics.

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I. POLITICAL STABILITY

The United Kingdom of Libya became an independent sovereign state on December 24, 1951. The former Italian colony was occupied by British and French military forces during World War II; Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were each administered separately by the British, Fezzan by the French. When the four powers -- France, the UK, the US, and the USSR -- were unable to agree on the final disposition of Libya, the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1949, recommended independence for Libya by 1952; during the interim period, the people of Libya were to be assisted by a UN Commissioner and an international and Libyan council in formulating a constitution and laying the groundwork for independence. The Libyan Constitution provides for a federal monarchy under King Muhammad Idris al Mahdi al Sanusi and his heirs, with a bicameral legislature and a Council of Ministers appointed by the King and responsible to the lower house. Despite the machinery for direct responsibility to representatives of the people, the Libyan Government in practice is likely to follow the oligarchic pattern of other Arab states.

Libya's present internal political stability rests primarily upon: (1) the political apathy of most Libyans arising from their primary interest in tribal membership and relations of consanguinity; (2) their loyalty and respect for King Idris I, even though many Tripolitarians and some Cyrenaicans have certain misgivings on the advisability of recognizing his dynasty; and (3) the absence, as a result of deportation, of such major troublemakers as the demagogic Bashir Bey Saadawi and lesser upstarts such as the pro-Communist Enrico Cibelli.

The political atmosphere throughout Libya was quiet at the end of May 1952. There was no evidence within the country to substantiate rumors circulating abroad that anti-government elements were seeking to foment a revolt. According to the American Legation in Tripoli, the Libyan police force (some 1,900 in Tripolitania and 1,000 in Cyrenaica) were intent upon and capable of maintaining law and order; in the unlikely event of a major revolt, the British (approximately 9,000) and French (400) military forces presumably would be available if needed to support the government.

A. Subversives

While the Libyan political situation is now calm, developments in Tripolitania in the past few years demonstrate the power of political demagoguery aided by foreign funds to stir up mercurial mass feeling, particularly in urban centers. Prior to the nationwide elections of February 19, 1952 for members of the lower house of Parliament, the stability of the new government regime appeared seriously threatened by the activities of Bashir Bey Saadawi, leader of the National Congress Party of Tripolitania. The government deported him shortly after the elections on the grounds that his party was responsible for disorders bordering on revolt, which resulted in 8 deaths and 110 other casualties. Saadawi is a Tripolitanian by birth but holds a Saudi Arabian passport; he commands the respect of many Tripolitarians because of his long record of opposition to Italian rule in Libya, his oratorical talents, and his prestige as an elder statesman and counselor to

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King Ibn Saud. Essentially an opportunist, he had succeeded by mid-1951, according to competent observers, in identifying in the minds of most urban Tripolitarians the application of federalism to Libya with the possibility of the country's partition and the infiltration of foreign imperialistic control. He had also played on the Tripolitanian fear that a federal form of government might result in the domination of Tripolitania by Cyrenaica and Fezzan. He had the support of the leading pro-Communist in Libya, Enrico Cibelli (until the latter was deported in November 1951), several trade unions in Tripolitania, and a large number of anti-foreign extremists and malcontents.

Although the national elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for pro-government forces (46 or 47 out of 55 seats), Saadawi's party (winning 7 seats) carried by large majorities all districts of Tripoli City (the most important urban center) and some of its environs, where his following is said still to remain devoted. His failure to gain more seats arose partly from (1) the system of oral voting in the rural (and mostly illiterate) districts, where government-appointed committees record the votes, with no candidates or their representatives permitted to be present; (2) the local influence of government officials; (3) a tradition of submission to established authority; (4) personal differences between notables or tribal chieftains and their following; and (5) favorable rains promising good crops. Furthermore, Saadawi's attacks on the legitimacy of the constitution and the new government were largely vitiated when Egypt, his chief foreign supporter, hastily recognized the newly independent government and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution of congratulation to Libya.

Since the deportation of Saadawi, there has been no one in Tripolitania with comparable abilities of mass persuasion to unite the heterogeneous Tripolitanian elements. The province lacks the political cohesiveness of Cyrenaica, where the tribal system unites the loyalties of all but the city dwellers of Benghazi and Derna -- composed largely of settlers from Tripolitania and advocates of Libyan unity -- to almost a blind support for the King. Nevertheless, the strong support which Saadawi's forces are still believed to possess in Tripoli warrants close government watch for future anti-government developments in that city. Thus far, there are no signs of any active Libyan interest in the formation of a party on wholly national rather than sectional lines. Libyan political parties continue to revolve around persons more than issues and to be unstable.

Communist influence in Libya is relatively unimportant and is confined mostly to left-wing members of the Italian community in Tripolitania who have sought to infiltrate the trade union movement. There is no recognized Communist Party as such in Libya. The deportation of Cibelli and his chief lieutenants dealt a serious blow to the movement, and the Libyan Government now appears to be engaged in a determined campaign against all Communist sympathizers.

B. Sectionalism

Libya's future internal political stability depends fundamentally on the development of a sense of national consciousness among Libyans strong enough to overcome (1) the threat of disintegrating sectionalism and (2)

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the struggle between rural, tribal and conservative society -- strongest in Cyrenaica and Fezzan -- and urban, detribalized, and more progressive elements -- mainly in Tripolitania. The factors encouraging separatism are numerous. Geographically, the three distinct areas which comprise Libya -- Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan -- are islands of fertility and population widely separated from one another by the Sahara. There are striking contrasts among predominantly pastoral and semi-nomadic tribal Cyrenaica, most of whose 300,000 inhabitants are followers of the Sanusiya religious sect; more sedentary and relatively detribalized Tripolitania, whose 800,000 people are somewhat more sophisticated and less ethnically or politically cohesive; and Fezzan's 50,000 largely sedentary but politically untutored oases dwellers. Not until recent times has Libya had a distinct history of its own apart from the separate histories of its segments or of North Africa as a whole. Libya was not a single governmental unit until 1934.

Friction between Cyrenaicans and Tripolitarians has frequently occurred within the Libyan nationalist movement, which obtained its initial hold during the 20 years (1911-1931) of intermittent warfare and resistance to the Italians. Cyrenaicans consider that they, in contrast to the Tripolitarians, did most of the fighting against the Italians not only during and after World War I but also in World War II. Although Tripolitarians proposed Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica (now King Idris I) as head of the country in 1921 (and again in 1939 as well as later), they did so primarily because they were politically disunited and unable to find a Tripolitanian of comparable stature. The Sanusi Amir (as Sayyid Idris was designated by the Italians in 1920) was revered as head of the Sanusi brotherhood, which had given the Cyrenaicans a system of law and order for almost 70 years before the Italians and had been active in organizing resistance to the Italians. In 1947, negotiations on Libyan unity between Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican delegations broke down because the Tripolitarians, although ready to accept the Amir, refused unconditional allegiance to his dynasty.

The British pledge in 1942 that Cyrenaica would in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination after the war raised Cyrenaican hopes for separate independence and Tripolitanian fears of Italian penetration of its territory unless Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were united. Except for a small group of urban intellectuals, fearful of conservative and probably reactionary policies of a Sanusi government backed strongly by the tribes and the British, most Cyrenaicans would have preferred a separate state. As late as the spring of 1949, Cyrenaica sent a delegation to the UN General Assembly instructed to press for separate Cyrenaican independence, but these delegates joined with the Tripolitanian delegation in favoring Libyan unity. In June 1949, the British recognized the Amir as head of a Cyrenaican government with responsibility for internal affairs and in September authorized him to issue a constitution for Cyrenaica. In December, a Cyrenaican nationality law was enacted to prepare for the eventual holding of elections, and the Amir later announced that plans were on foot for the establishment of a Cyrenaican national army. By the spring of 1950, the British

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and the Amir were preparing to conclude a treaty for the period remaining prior to Libyan independence whereby Cyrenaica would be granted in effect nominal independence "without prejudice" to the provisions of the UN resolution, and British military facilities would be assured. However, the forceful representations of UN Commissioner Adrian Pelt that the treaty would in fact prejudice the achievement of Libyan unity brought a halt to treaty negotiations in April, with the result that they were postponed until a Libyan government should be formed. As the reluctant bride, Cyrenaica has accepted Libyan unity only on condition that the Amir and his dynasty become rulers of all Libya and that, because of the disparity in the population of the three territories, the form of government be federal.

Cyrenaican demands (strengthened by annoyance at the assignment of customs, by far the chief source of Cyrenaican revenue, to the federal government) were also responsible for several constitutional provisions including: (1) recognition of two capitals, Benghazi and Tripoli; (2) prohibition of immigration of non-Libyans into a province without its approval; and (3) establishment of a Sanusi dynasty with considerable power.

C. National Leadership. If the present Libyan Government is to mend the deep cracks of sectional rivalry and weld the three provinces into a single nation, strong national leadership is required by the King, his ministers, or Parliament. While the King will probably be able to depend generally on the support of the majority of the appointed Senate (in which Cyrenaica and the Fezzan will have a two-thirds vote), his control of the elected House of Representatives (in which Tripolitania will have 35 out of 55 seats) will depend upon the degree to which he can maintain the support of the Tripolitanian majority. Ministerial responsibility to the lower house and the power of that body to block legislation (including the ratification of treaties) could at some future date make for internal political instability. This possibility has been postponed by the pro-government victory in the February elections, the deportation of Saadawi, and the tendency of Libyans to accept established Arab authority.

The first five months of Libya's statehood, although admittedly too short a period on which to base firm judgments, appear thus far to indicate that: (1) the King would prefer to be the ruler of an independent Cyrenaica and thus is not disposed to discourage Cyrenaican efforts to dominate the nation; (2) the ministers who favor the strengthening of national union (notably the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Muntasir and the Minister of Defense Ali Jarbi) have limited influence; and (3) Parliament has shown no promise in its first sessions that it will exercise energetically its prerogatives as the representative body of the Libyan people.

Surrounded by Cyrenaican separatists who take advantage of his prejudice against Tripolitanians, the King apparently has made no effort to avoid the decision of the Constituent Assembly in favor of two capitals. He has refused thus far to establish a part-time residence in Tripoli or even to revisit

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Tripolitania, where he was greeted with a bomb on his last visit in 1951. He insisted that the constitution and the independence of Libya be proclaimed from Cyrenaica, that Parliament hold its first meetings there, and that the seat of the government be transferred between Benghazi and Tripoli, every six months. The King has retained the title "Amir of Cyrenaica," and Cyrenaica's organic law, published recently, also provides that he is the supreme head of the province and government of Cyrenaica.

In the event of the 62-year old King's death during the next few months -- either from natural causes or assassination -- Libya would face a serious crisis. Although the Constitution requires him to determine the order of succession by October 1952, the King as yet has not done so. He has no son but is still hopeful of producing one. None of the persons at present considered most likely to succeed him are believed to be especially well fitted. A period of confusion marked by palace intrigue might follow, especially as Tripolitania has never wholeheartedly accepted the Sanusi dynasty.

Few of the ministers take a broad Libyan approach to problems with the chief exceptions of Muntasir and Jarbi. The former has had difficulty in obtaining the King's approval of some of his views and has often felt obliged to defer to the King's wishes. In February, he intimated to the American representative in Tripoli that unless the King took steps to show regard for Tripolitanian views, he might have to resign in the face of mounting Tripolitanian criticism. There appears to be no Tripolitanian of comparable stature who could successfully replace him at present as a counterweight to the King's strong pro-Cyrenaican views. There are indications that Minister of Justice Fathi Kakhia, a Cyrenaican whom the King had earlier wished to name Foreign Minister, is being groomed to replace Muntasir as Prime Minister. Jarbi's demotion from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he held in the Provisional Libyan Government, to that of Minister of Defense resulted from charges by his political rivals (including Fathi Kakhia) that he is too pro-Western; indications are that he will shortly be assigned to a diplomatic post abroad.

Most of the members of the Libyan Parliament are politically inexperienced, not well known, and apparently without much desire for leadership. A small but aggressive minority, composed of members or sympathizers of the ex-National Association in Cyrenaica or followers of Bashir Saadawi in Tripolitania, constitute the nucleus of an opposition, which on certain matters may be able by the oratorical power of its leaders to win sufficient support to block certain legislation in the lower house. In the first two series of meetings in Benghazi and Tripoli, Parliament accomplished nothing significant.

II. ECONOMIC STABILITY

Primarily agricultural and pastoral, Libya's economy is characterized by extreme poverty, scarcity of water and good cultivable land, harsh conditions

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such as low and capricious rainfall with frequent droughts, crop damage from hot desert winds, flash floods, and locusts and other pests, the absence of valuable known minerals or fuel, and lack of sufficient technical skills and education. Budget deficits (amounting annually to some \$3,000,000 - \$5,000,000) cannot be met by increased taxation in a country where the national income is about \$35 per capita, one of the lowest in the Middle East. With a perennially unfavorable balance of trade, Libya's receipts from exports amounted in 1950 to only about 45 percent of its payments for imports, the deficit running to about \$8,000,000. Roughly half of this deficit has been covered in the past by the military expenditures of the UK, France, and the US and the remaining half by British and French grants-in-aid.

Over a long-term period it should be possible with external assistance to improve existing agricultural conditions by such steps as making more water available and gradually extending dry and irrigated farming, increasing the production and quality of cereals, fruits and vegetables, and livestock, and increasing the opportunity for agricultural training, demonstration, and research. There are also some possibilities for expanding local industry for the processing of agricultural and fishery products and of developing a tourist trade. However, progress in economic development will require foreign financial and technical aid for many years plus a spirit of enterprise and receptiveness of new ideas in the Libyan people. The nation is economically fortunate in starting off with substantial assistance from the West:

- (1) The UK and France have guaranteed any budget deficits (France for Fezzan, approximately \$250,000 - \$300,000 annually; the UK for the remainder, \$3,000,000 - \$5,000,000).
- (2) The UK will meet the annual balance of payments deficit, insofar as that deficit is not already being met by foreign exchange balances being built up through British and French contributions to the budget and grants (along with those of other foreign nations) for Libyan economic development. This deficit has fluctuated, depending on drought conditions, from a low of \$2,000,000 in 1946 to a high of over \$11,000,000 in 1949 (at prevailing exchange rates).
- (3) Substantial indirect benefits will derive from US, UK, and French expenditures in Libya on military facilities and personnel; in the past year nearly \$1,000,000 was spent by US personnel in rent, local goods, and services and over \$1,000,000 was paid by the US military and by civilian contractors for local labor.
- (4) The US will provide considerable technical assistance, directly under the Point Four and Mutual Security programs (\$150,000 for 1951, \$1,500,000 for 1952, and \$1,250,000 for 1953) and indirectly (through the high proportion of US contributions to the UN) under the UN Technical Assistance program (the UN had allotted \$188,000 to Libya by the end of 1951 and it is estimated that \$1,548,500

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will be assigned in 1952).

(5) The US has agreed to contribute \$1,000,000 annually for economic development, for 20 years;

(6) The UK, France, and Italy have contributed to the Libyan Development and Stabilization Agency, established to promote public capital improvements and provide a fund for drought contingencies. The initial UK contribution was over \$1,000,000; France, \$280,000; and Italy, \$28,000.

(7) The UK, France, and Italy have agreed to contribute to the Libyan Finance Corporation, established to make low-interest loans available for public and private development. The UK has assigned \$28,000 and France and Italy as yet unspecified amounts; Italy has privately indicated a willingness under certain conditions to contribute as much as \$168,000.

(8) Italy has granted special trade concessions to Libyan imports.

It is clear that Libya cannot achieve economic viability in a short period and that it will long remain dependent on external aid to maintain even its present low standard of living. This does not necessarily mean that Libya may not eventually choose -- in the event anti-foreign sentiment should increase -- to dispense with foreign aid, or that certain circumstances may not eventually reduce or eliminate this aid entirely. Without foreign assistance, however, Libya would have to accept a much lower standard of living; imports would have to be paid for almost entirely by exports since the country would present too great a risk to foreign investment capital; and government services would have to be cut by almost 30 percent. Such a reduction in revenue could conceivably force the federal treasury into bankruptcy, with resultant political and social chaos.

III. PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION

The Libyan Government's present pro-Western orientation is clearly implied from its policy of sanctioning Western military bases on its territory and its acceptance of substantial economic and technical assistance from the West. It is further substantiated by the Libyan Government's apparent interest in participation in the proposed Middle East Command and by its high esteem for the US. While the majority of Libyans are in no way sympathetic to Soviet aims, they feel that anti-communist activities are largely irrelevant to their own situation and would prefer to remain neutral in the East-West struggle if that were possible. Consequently, the Libyan Government's chief motivation in participating more actively is apparently to accommodate those states from which it must seek aid.

A. Base Agreements

Readiness of the Libyan Government to grant the US, UK, and France the privilege of maintaining military bases on its territory is at least on its face

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strong evidence of its present pro-Western orientation. All three nations separately negotiated temporary agreements with the Provisional Libyan Government, and notes were exchanged on independence day permitting the continued use of military facilities pending the ratification of more formal agreements -- still under separate negotiation by the Libyan Government with the UK and France but already agreed upon with the US.

The Libyan-US agreement is for 20 years and thereafter until either government gives one year's notice of termination. The preamble states that the agreement is intended "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the principles" of the UN Charter and that the development of certain areas and facilities in Libya would promote that objective. The Libyan Government permits the US to occupy and use for military and related purposes such areas and facilities as shall be agreed upon from time to time by the two governments. The Libyan Government will make all land acquisitions and arrangements required to permit US occupation and use of agreed areas, and the US will pay the Libyan Government, which in turn will reimburse the landowners, an equitable annual rental, not to be changed without the consent of both governments. Other provisions relate to such matters as US construction and removal of facilities, US maintenance of internal security in agreed areas, and the status of US personnel and property. The agreement is not formally an alliance or a mutual defense pact. Although the Libyan Government considers the agreement in the nature of a treaty, the US regards it as an executive agreement and as such, not requiring approval by the US Senate.

In addition to the notes exchanged by the representatives of the US and Libya providing for the temporary operation of the military agreement pending its ratification by the Libyan Parliament, a second series of notes was exchanged at the same time whereby, without any reference to the military agreement, the US agrees to pay the Libyan Government the sum of \$1,000,000 a year for 20 years "when appropriated by Congress" for the economic development of Libya.

The UK has discussed with the Libyan Government a short treaty of alliance calling on each of the parties to come to the aid of the other in case of war and providing the basis for British military installations in Libya. In addition, there will be a military agreement in effect implementing the treaty, and which it is understood will take a long time to negotiate, and a financial agreement. Negotiation of neither of these agreements had started as late as May 1952. A formal Libyan-French agreement, according to the Libyan Prime Minister in mid-May, was still some distance off.

With the adjournment of the Libyan Parliament on May 19 for a 50-day Ramadan recess, Parliament will probably not consider the ratification of the US, UK, and French military agreements or treaties until at least July. Some opposition to the terms of the agreements is anticipated, chiefly from the 7 representatives supported by the National Congress Party of Tripolitania and one or two Cyrenaican representatives members of the ex-National Association, and there may be requests for certain revisions. However, ratification appears at this time to be fairly certain.

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B. Middle East Command

The Libyan Minister of Defense, Ali Jarbi, whose uncertain future status (see above) in the government and whose pronounced pro-Western attitude may not necessarily represent the long term views of the Libyan Government, informally raised the question of Libyan adherence to the Middle East Command, when and if it were established. In March he told the US Minister that while Libya obviously was not eligible for NATO membership, Libya was a strategic area and should be regarded as an integral part of the defense of the Middle East. Jarbi observed that the destiny of Libya lay in association with the UK and US and that Libyans desired to do their share in the support of free nations. The US Minister replied that he was appreciative of Libya's strategic significance and thought that at some later date when Libya was in a position to make a military contribution to the area, consideration might be given to Libyan participation in the MEC. In May, Jarbi reiterated his belief that the US and other NATO members should determine the role which Libya ought to play in defense of the West and extend assistance accordingly.

C. US Prestige

In few countries and in no other Arab country does the US stand as preeminently high as it does at present with the Government of Libya. Several factors explain this reputation: (1) Libyan belief that the US is the least "colonial-minded," i.e. politically ambitious with respect to Libya, of all the powers with strategic or other interests in Libya; (2) the tangible evidence the US has given of its friendly intentions e.g., its strong support in the UN for Libyan independence, various forms of economic and technical assistance, and numerous instances of generosity and goodwill on the part of US military and civilian personnel in Libya (air transport for government officials, surgery for the Queen, anti-typhus aid in Cyrenaica); (3) Libyan desire for military aid from the US; and (4) Libyan interest in the establishment of US bases in Cyrenaica.

1. US Military Aid. In making plans for the organization of a Libyan army, Defense Minister Ali Jarbi indicated in March to the US Minister that while he would look primarily to the UK to train Libyan soldiers, because the British have a long history of experience in this region, he hoped also for US assistance in some form. In May, the US Minister reported that while he had discouraged Jarbi from expecting the US to furnish military aid, Jarbi still maintained that US assistance was needed.

2. US Bases in Cyrenaica. During Minister Villard's first visit to Benghazi in March 1952, the King and Cyrenaican Government officials made it unmistakably clear that US armed forces would be welcome in Cyrenaica. During the past year or so, there has been some interest shown by the US Navy in a possible communications center in Derna, and the possible usefulness of a former US wartime air strip (Berka II) near Benghazi has at times been considered by US military officials.

One of the chief motives for the Cyrenaican bid is sectional rivalry with Tripolitania, which is regarded enviously because of the economic benefits enjoyed.

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from US activities relating to Wheelus Field. Another possible consideration may be a Libyan desire to encourage competition with UK military interests.

3. Preponderant US Influence. In April and May, the Prime Minister confidentially told US officials in Libya that there was a growing body of opinion that the US should assume primary responsibility for the Libyan nation rather than the UK or France. While the Libyans, he said, had nothing against the British, it was feared in some quarters that after a few years of primary British interest and support, recent events in Cairo would repeat themselves in Libya. The US officials replied that the US had many other commitments besides Libya and that owing to the UK's war experience in this area and general position in the Middle East, it was only natural that the UK have primary responsibility for Libya.

Other instances of the Libyan Government's desire for closer relations with the US include: (1) the personal preference of the Libyan Prime Minister in May for the granting of oil concessions to US rather than British companies and his mild surprise at the apparent lack of interest (subsequently shown) by American companies in the possibility of obtaining such a concession; and (2) the desire for a civil aeronautics agreement with the US (now under negotiation) at the time that the UK was negotiating on the same matter.

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING A CHANGE IN LIBYA'S PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION

The continuation of Libya's present pro-Western orientation will depend on several factors, among them: (1) the maintenance of internal political and relative economic stability, (2) the influence of Egypt and the future attitude of the Arab world toward the West, (3) the continuing influence of the British Minister on the King and British advisers in the Libyan Government, (4) the involvement of Libyan territory and lives in another world war, and (5) the degree to which any of the preceding will result in the exploitation of the existing undercurrent of anti-Western criticism.

Increased sectional or personal rivalry in the absence of strong national leadership could lead to a shift in Libya's pro-Western orientation, particularly if it resulted in strong reaction to the policies of the existing regime. A deterioration in economic conditions, despite Western economic and technical assistance, could lead to a popular tendency to blame part of the difficulty on Western advisers and British financial policies. The views of the King and his successors, and, should the Crown lose its present predominant role, the views of his ministers, will obviously be important in determining future foreign orientation. The destruction of Libyan property and lives in another world war would certainly provoke considerable resentment against the West.

A. Relations with Egypt

One of the chief threats to Libya's present pro-Western orientation is the

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effort of Egypt to challenge UK influence and to gain a position of political ascendancy in Libya. Increased Egyptian influence would tend to encourage an unfavorable Libyan attitude toward foreign troops and military installations in Libya, make more difficult the settlement of problems arising from their presence or contemplated extension, raise the Libyan terms for renewal of existing base agreements, and possibly stimulate a move to play one Western power off against another.

Aside from the strong ties of Islam and the Arabic language, other factors tending to orient Libyans toward the thought patterns of Egyptians include: (1) the high proportion of the small but important group of educated Libyans who have studied in Egyptian religious or civil schools; (2) the number of other Libyans who have lived in Egypt, some of them as political refugees during the Italian occupation of Libya, others as travellers en route to pilgrimages in Mecca or on business; (3) the popularity of Egyptian newspapers, literature, cinema, and radio broadcasts; (4) the increasingly influential role in the Libyan school system played by Egyptian teachers, which would be further facilitated by the plan now under consideration for complete adoption of the Egyptian curriculum and Egyptian textbooks (already extensively used) together with the unification of the systems now in effect in each of the provinces; and (5) the influential role in an important sector of the Libyan political structure which Egyptian lawyers and jurists can be expected to play as a result of the cabinet decision of March 22 to recommend to Parliament the adoption of the Egyptian legal code, with suitable modifications, as the basis for future Libyan legislation.

Despite the present pro-Western orientation of the Libyan King and cabinet, there is a strong current of pro-Egyptian sentiment among urban dwellers and particularly the intelligentsia. This feeling, which is part of a common attitude toward other Muslim countries, arises mainly from: (1) appreciation of the efforts of Egypt (and other Arab and Asian states) in opposing in the UN General Assembly all moves toward Libyan partition and trusteeship and in favor of an independent, unified Libyan state, (2) identification of Egyptian opposition to British "colonialism and imperialism" with Libyan memory of foreign occupation and with the somewhat chagrined realization of Libya's continued dependence on foreign financial aid and foreign advisers and (3) a realization that Egypt and other Arab states offer a useful counterpoise or moral refuge to "undue" Western influence.

In the national elections of February 19, the overwhelming support for the National Congress Party of Tripolitania in Tripoli City and environs and the election of several Cyrenaicans favored by the ex-National Association was in part a reflection of pro-Egyptian attitude. This sentiment is likely to remain a popular issue for vote-gathering in Libyan politics for some time to come.

Libya's formal declaration of independence on December 24, 1951, marked the start of a transitional period ending with the Libyan elections of February 19, 1952, during which Egypt altered its tactics but not its objectives in Libya. Previously

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Egypt directly and through the Arab League had worked to minimize the influence of pro-British Sayyid Idris in the future Libyan state and to steer Libyan constitutional development toward a "democratic" unitary state with a strong Parliament in which an ostensibly pro-Egyptian Tripolitania (with its preponderant representation) could dominate French-supported Fezzan and British-supported Cyrenaica. The declaration of independence and the simultaneous entry into full effect of the Libyan constitution confirmed in power the regime which Egypt had previously opposed, and the pro-government election victory of February 19 destroyed the validity of the previous Egyptian claim that the wishes of the people of Libya had not been consulted.

Although the Egyptian representative in the General Assembly bitterly criticized the provisional Libyan Government and the course of constitutional development in Libya as contrary to previous UN resolutions and attacked the "imperialist" intentions of the UK and France toward Libya, and although he unsuccessfully proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya, he voted on February 1, 1952, in favor of the resolution congratulating the Libyan Government on the establishment of Libyan independence "in accordance with" the previous pertinent General Assembly resolutions. Moreover, Egyptian claims for a readjustment in its favor of the Libyan boundary (including a claim for the Oasis of Jaghbub -- a Cyrenaican shrine as the historic seat of the Sanusi religious order) were in effect withdrawn from the attention of the General Assembly when the latter took note on February 1, 1952, of the intention signified by Egypt of entering into direct negotiations on this question with the Libyan government.

Egyptian desire to maintain its prestige in Libya and its recognition that altered conditions required different tactics have brought about assiduous Egyptian efforts in the past few months to cultivate the friendship of the Libyan Government. Even prior to the formal declaration of Libyan independence (at least as early as December 19, 1951) Egypt sought to obtain the diplomatic deanship in Libya by having the Egyptian Minister received before representatives of any other nation, but the King-designate refused to receive him until independence was declared and even then not until December 29, several days after other representatives had been received. Moreover, the Libyan Government, even though it accepted the credentials of the Egyptian Minister, considered as premature the recognition of the Egyptian King's title as ruler of the Sudan, reserving such action until the people of the Sudan had an opportunity to express their own wishes. There were rumours in January that Egypt would still seek the deanship by being the first nation to raise its Legation in Libya to an Embassy.

The Egyptian Minister, Salah Fadal Bey, has established his residence in Benghazi rather than Tripoli in order to remain as close as possible to the King and influence his point of view. Egyptian influence in Libya also operates, although to an unknown degree, through the prominent government positions of certain Egyptians and Libyans whose previous long residence in Egypt tend to make them receptive to Egyptian ideas even when they are not necessarily strongly pro-Egyptian.

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Although Libya would be welcomed into the Arab League as an additional member and as a means for further extending the League's influence in North Africa, the Libyan Government has not yet formally applied for membership. Libya's role in the League would probably be a minor one, but its presence might possibly help to modify extreme anti-British sentiment.

B. Libyan Attitude toward the West

The attitude of the Libyan Government toward the Western powers does not always square with the views of the small minority of Libyans who are interested in Libyan foreign policy. An undercurrent of popular feeling against the West, which at times can be exploited by clever politicians, as illustrated by Saadawi before the Libyan elections, could some day flare into a form of nationalist xenophobia comparable to that now evident in Egypt and Iraq. Another war involving Libyan property and lives and the appearance of another demagogue with the persuasiveness of Saadawi could create a situation where no amount of financial inducement could make a Libyan Government resist a popular demand for discontinuing its present policy of permitting foreign military bases on its territory. At present, however, there are strong deterrents in the high proportion of political apathy and the lack of a strong sense of national consciousness.

1. Attitude toward the US. Although, as shown above, the Libyan King and certain of his ministers are strongly disposed toward the US, several Arab newspapers in Libya contain overtones of criticism and hostility. The main elements of this criticism appear to stem from: (1) resentment of US support for Israel during and since the Palestinian War; (2) fear that the US as well as UK and French military facilities in Libya will make Libya a vulnerable target in the next war; (3) a feeling that Libya has not been properly compensated for the damages of Allied bombing and fighting in the last war; (4) fear that American wealth may "purchase" (there has been no publicity as yet about rentals) not only valuable farm land for military purposes but also the right to interfere in Libyan domestic affairs; (5) fear that the base agreement may be for too long a period and without adequate remuneration; (6) association of the US with the "imperialist and colonial" UK and France as "occupying" powers; (7) criticism of US "passiveness" toward its two "imperialist" partners, recently illustrated by the US abstention on the Tunisian question in the UN Security Council; (8) impatience with the slowness of tangible results from the US technical assistance program and dissatisfaction with the proportion of funds spent on highly paid foreign technicians; and (9) irritations arising from the existence in Libya of US military facilities, such as the "loss" of valuable revenue resulting from the exemption of US personnel from customs and taxation and the exacerbation of the housing problems by the influx of Americans prepared to pay more than others in Libya can afford.

2. Attitude toward the UK. The Libyan Government accepted the offer of UK financial assistance for its budget and balance of payments deficits with reluctance and resignation, realizing full well that no other nation -- except France with respect to Fezzan -- was willing to undertake the financial burden. As a condition

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for British aid, Libya had to agree to the appointment of a British Financial and Economic Adviser with wide powers over Libyan financial affairs and a British Auditor General. British personnel were attached to the federal and provincial governments at various levels, among the most important being the adviser to the Prime Minister and the Legal Adviser to the Minister of Justice. An additional condition to British financial aid, unstated but implied, was Libya's membership in the sterling area.

There is a good deal of evidence of Libyan Government restlessness at the prospect of undue British influence in Libya, among them: (1) the appeal for greater US participation in and sponsorship of Libya; (2) the suggestion of Libyan preference for dollar rather than sterling backing for its currency; (3) the efforts of the Libyan Defense Minister, who disagreed with the British on such matters as the size of the proposed Libyan army and the appropriate commander, to seek suggestions and possibly additional aid from other countries such as the US, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan (the King's cancellation of Jarbi's proposed trip to the last three of these countries was attributed by Jarbi to British intrigue); (4) the adoption of the Egyptian code of laws as a model for future legislation despite British efforts to draft a code based on Anglo-Saxon principles; (5) the plans for adopting the Egyptian educational curriculum despite British preference for a different system; (6) a general preference for granting oil and possibly other concessions to American rather than British companies; and (7) a general resentment against several of the British administrators in the Libyan Government because of their "colonial-mindedness" and lack of sufficient appreciation for different Arab ethical standards.

The British had hoped that by blanketing British personnel into the Libyan Government, they would ensure stability and a pro-Western orientation. There have been signs in the past few months that this effort has not been completely successful, in some instances because of personality clashes between "over-arrogant" Libyans and British, Libyan patronage and nepotism, and the likelihood of increasing Libyan preference for employment of Egyptians and Arabs from other countries. Some of the British personnel have been released; others are thinking seriously of resigning. While these may be isolated instances, illustrative only of the "growing pains" of the young government, they may prove to be signs of a decline in British prestige and influence. If the latter should become the case, unless the British can counteract this tendency or some other alternative course is adopted, there may be an increase in Egyptian influence and a tendency of Libya to become increasingly less pro-Western, more intolerant of Western "interference", and more insistent on "independence from foreign supervision."

Among the small proportion of Libyan people who concern themselves with the matter, there is an even stronger anti-British feeling than is evident in the government. This feeling has been stronger in Tripolitania, partly because of (1) British favoritism toward Cyrenaica during the past few years; (2) the greater lack of political cohesion and tribal solidarity which in Cyrenaica has long been associated with almost blind acceptance of any policy whatever of pro-British Sayyid Idris; (3) Tripolitania's greater receptiveness to the anti-British propaganda of

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Saadawi and the Egyptians; and (4) the larger urban population in Tripolitania (in Cyrenaica the two urban centers of Derna and Benghazi have had similar feelings). However, anti-British feeling in Cyrenaica increased considerably in 1951 after it was revealed that the British had concluded an agreement with Italy on the touchy subject of Italian property in Libya (even though the agreement specified it was without prejudice to the rights of the Libyan Government under the UN General Assembly resolution on economic provisions relating to Libya).

There is a strong sympathy with Egypt's point of view in the present Anglo-Egyptian crisis, stimulated in part by the prevalence of Egyptian press and radio propaganda; a tendency to regard the British as still having "imperialist" designs on Libya; resentment of the influence which the British have with the Libyan Government; and criticism of the number of "foreigners" (i.e. British and Italians) in government jobs and of their better pay than Libyans. There is also the usual tendency to blame most of the country's ills in the past few years on the British and failure to understand why the British administrations, handicapped by the uncertainty of Libya's future, and operating under the "care and maintenance" policy of the Hague Convention, had not done more for Libya during their occupation.

3. Attitude toward France. Realizing the usefulness of French financial and technical support in Fezzan, the Libyan Government has been careful to give no public indication of the suspicion with which most Libyans regard France. The government is also aware of the French skepticism regarding the readiness and capacities of Libya for independence and believes that France would not be sorry to see a failure of the Libyan experiment as an object-lesson to nationalists in French North Africa. Moreover, Libyan leaders are also privately suspicious of French intentions with respect to Fezzan and to the border oases of Ghadames and Ghat, to which the French laid claims prior to Libyan independence. In May, the Libyan Prime Minister told the American Minister that there were "real difficulties" with respect to the French. The French Minister has informed his American colleague of a controversy with the Libyan Government with respect to his residence near Tripoli, which he believes the Libyans want him to relinquish for use of the Muntasir family rather than, as claimed, for the Queen. He also stated that the Minister of Justice, Fathi Kakhia, had indirectly accused the French, without proof, of subsidizing tribal unrest near the border of Cyrenaica with Fezzan in order to increase French influence in Libya.

The people in the coastal provinces of Libya regard France as the arch-imperialist and make no effort to disguise their sympathies with the nationalist movements of French North Africa. The Mufti of Libya recently told the US Minister that his "heart boiled" within him at French "imperialist" policies in Tunisia. Although the government press apparently confines itself to reporting facts on the French North African situation, the independent Arab press is vitriolic in its comments against France. Nothing is known of the current public attitude toward France in Fezzan, but the Four Power Commission of Investigation, in 1948, found that the people appeared to be satisfied with French influence and grateful not only for the preservation of law and order but also for the improvements in public

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works, health, and education.

4. Attitude Toward Italy. The Libyan Government, although apparently satisfied that Italy has reconciled itself to Libyan independence, is inevitably wary of any step that might in any way give its former enemy any political influence in the country. The chief problem at the present relates to the status of Italian property in Libya.

Although the Libyan people get along well with the 46,000 Italian settlers in Tripolitania, they are suspicious of any evidence of increased Italian immigration. Cyrenaica's opposition to the return of Italians to its territory was responsible for the constitutional requirement of provincial consent prior to the immigration of non-Libyans into a province. As long as the Italian settlers in Libya do not try to participate in Libyan political matters, they will remain in the good graces of the Libyans, and they may become Libyan citizens under certain constitutional conditions. A bitterness against Italy for its former policies as a colonial power will remain for some time, but there are already signs of its gradual disappearance. Popular misunderstanding of the technical aspects of the status and disposal of Italian property in Libya tends to support the feeling that Italy is getting a better property deal than it deserves.

V. ATTITUDE OF WESTERN POWERS TOWARD LIBYA

If Libya is to remain oriented toward the West, the positions of the Western powers (i.e., US, UK, France, and Italy) most directly concerned with Libya must be (1) mutually compatible with one another and (2) be such as not to unduly antagonize the Libyans. As will be noted below, these positions do not fully satisfy these characteristics.

A. UK Position

The primary interest of the UK in Libya stems from its strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean. If the British are forced to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone, Libya's strategic importance to the UK will increase. The British have always shown particular interest in Cyrenaica, particularly since Foreign Secretary Eden pledged in 1942 that the Sanusi would never again fall under Italian domination. The UK's earlier postwar aim was for trusteeship over Cyrenaica or, if Cyrenaica became independent, British domination and primary influence. However, the UN General Assembly's resolution of November 1949 for the independence of a single Libyan state obligated the UK to cooperate with the UN Commissioner in Libya in its implementation. Consequently, when the Commissioner objected strongly in 1950 to the treaty which the UK had been planning to conclude with Cyrenaica as detrimental to his efforts to promote Libyan unity, further efforts to conclude a treaty were postponed until after independence; now the UK must negotiate with representatives of all of Libya rather than only Cyrenaica. When other states

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were unwilling to make firm commitments to support Tripolitania financially, the UK decided, during the constitution-making period to extend to Tripolitania the financial assistance which it had originally planned to render Cyrenaica. Present British military plans in Libya now envisage, it is understood, the quartering of a number of the British field units in Tripolitania (it is not clear for how long a period), not only because of the scarcity of available facilities in Cyrenaica but also because of Tripolitania's potential usefulness as a wartime base of operations. However, Britain's predominant and longterm interests lie more in Cyrenaica than Tripolitania both because of its strategic location and because it has greater political cohesion than Tripolitania and thus is easier to dominate.

Although there is no justification for supposing that the UK Government does not remain fully in support of Libyan unity, the personal attitude and policies of its chief representatives in Libya reflect little interest in positive steps to promote unity. Instead, they seem to indicate a doubt that unity will succeed and a determination that, come what may, primary support must be given to the King even if his Cyrenaican parochialism and apparent disinterest in unity should result in the triumph of separatism.

Both E.A.V. de Candole, the former British Resident of Cyrenaica, and Sir Alec Kirkbride, the present British Minister in Libya, have followed a policy of treading lightly with the King, even when pressure seemed desirable from the standpoint of Libya's and Britain's best interests. Thus, while the issue of two capitals was still being debated in 1951, de Candole apparently made little effort to persuade the King, on the grounds of the additional expense which the British would have to pay, to take a strong stand in favor of a less expensive and more practical solution of the problem.

Kirkbride's approach to Libyan problems is based on 34 years experience in Transjordan where he maintained British influence chiefly by cultivating a close personal friendship with Abdullah. He has taken up residence in Cyrenaica in order to live close to the King. Kirkbride apparently prefers to regard the King as if the latter were an absolute monarch or the head of a small oligarchy and to deal with him directly, even bypassing the Prime Minister. The UK Foreign Office appears to feel at present that Kirkbride, in view of his known understanding of the Arabs, should be given largely a free hand, particularly during the delicate negotiations with the Libyan Government of a treaty and financial and military agreements.

The British remain unofficially suspicious of French intentions in Libya. They would also resent any indications that the US was trying to vie for predominant influence in Libya (particularly Cyrenaica), although they would welcome additional US financial contributions (especially to Tripolitania) to lighten their own burden.

B. Position of France

France's chief interest in Libya stems from the proximity of Libyan territory

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to French North, West, and Equatorial Africa, the strategic value of French military bases in Libya as a means of advance protection against possible invasion of French-dominated territory in Africa, and the usefulness of air bases in Fezzan for trans-Saharan traffic to French possessions. France hopes to continue maintaining its present influence in Fezzan through financial and technical assistance and through close relations with the Governor of Fezzan, Ahmad Bey Sef al Nasr, head of an important French-supported local family. Although committed as a member of the UN to support Libyan national unity, France would prefer as loose a federation as possible.

When France took the first steps toward a rapprochement with its traditional opponent, the Sanusi, in the fall of 1950, the French envoy informed Amir Sayyid Idris that Ahmad Bey had certain fears as to his status and that of Fezzan in a Libyan union. At French suggestion, the Amir wrote Ahmad Bey a letter in which he recognized: (1) the Bey and his family as the traditional and hereditary leaders of Fezzan, (2) the desire of the Fezzanese to have no outside interference in their purely local affairs, and (3) the special relationships established between France and the Bey since the war. The Amir gave his assurances that he would not interfere with the last two matters. According to a British official in Cyrenaica, the French envoy was unable to obtain written assurances that the Amir would do nothing to harm French interests in the areas of Chad, Sahara, or French North Africa.

French suspicions of UK intentions in Libya have been apparent on numerous occasions in the past few years. Most recently, in May, when the Libyan Minister of Justice indirectly accused the French of subsidizing tribal unrest along the Cyrenaica-Fezzan border, the French Minister replied that the source of money was not France but the UK, which was trying to extend its sway over both Cyrenaica and Fezzan at the expense of Tripolitania. He told his American colleague that he was firmly convinced that the British policy was to create a greater Cyrenaica, isolating Tripolitania and leaving it to fend for itself in some undetermined manner.

C. Position of Italy

Italian interest in Libya arises mainly from the desire to ensure protection for the 46,000 Italians living in Tripolitania and for Italian property in Libya, from historic ties, and from geographic proximity. Italy is anxious to participate as fully as possible in economic relations with Libya, as illustrated by the special tariff concessions for imports from Libya and by Italian interest in contributing to the Libyan Stabilization and Development Agency and the Libyan Finance Corporation. Although Italy has apparently abandoned for the present any hope of obtaining political influence with the new state of Libya, it would probably be opportunistic if in the future the chance to regain prestige and control was presented.

Italy is attempting to retain as much as possible of its former investments in Libya, among other reasons, in the hope of satisfying domestic opinion in Italy.

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These investments, particularly the agricultural concessions and settlements, represent a substantial contribution to the Libyan economy. A UN General Assembly resolution of December 15, 1950 laid down certain principles with respect to the disposal of Italian state, parastatal, and private property in Libya. The UK concluded an agreement with Italy on June 28, 1951, relating to Italian property ostensibly private (including parastatal property in which Italy maintained there was no Italian state interest). Italy was permitted to establish a liaison agent in Cyrenaica, and the UK was to arrange a procedure for property owners or their representatives to return to Cyrenaica to take over and dispose of their property held in official custody. The denunciation of this agreement by the powerful ex-Prime Minister of Cyrenaica, Omar Mansur Pasha al Kakhia, eventually prevented its implementation in Cyrenaica. The Italian Government tried to reach a property agreement with Libya prior to independence, but negotiations have been repeatedly postponed by the Libyans. The UN Arbitral Tribunal established by the 1950 resolution is available in any event to settle questions on which the two governments fail to agree.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS IN LIBYA

US interest in Libya stems from: (1) the strategic value of Libya, and (2) a desire to maintain the friendship of the Libyan people, both in peace and war. As a member of the UN, the US supported the General Assembly resolution on Libyan unity and independence and is concerned with maintaining Libya's internal stability and pro-Western orientation.

While US military facilities are confined at present to Tripolitania, the US-Libyan base agreement will permit the US, with the consent of the Libyan Government, to establish bases anywhere else in Libya. Should the US eventually decide to establish bases in Cyrenaica, they would probably not be on as large a scale as those in Tripolitania, among other reasons because of limited available physical facilities (e.g. ports and water supply) but also because of probable UK reluctance toward extensive US penetration.

Although the US has acted on the assumption that it is desirable for the UK to retain the predominant position of influence in Libya, the Libyan Government has privately indicated that it would prefer US to UK predominance. Thus far the US representatives, while expressing appreciation for this high Libyan regard, have given no encouragement to the Libyan Government but have referred to the burden of many other US commitments in the world and the US high regard for British abilities.

This Libyan bid for increased US support may be nothing more than wishful thinking as the result of (1) a desire to avoid becoming as closely dependent on the UK as was Jordan under Abdullah, and (2) a realization that the US today would be a more powerful and wealthy sponsor than the UK. It could also be an indication of a serious decline in British prestige in Libya and of a desire to look elsewhere

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for political support -- the US if possible, and Egypt and the Arab world. Any US effort to rival the British for political predominance would probably endanger the achievement of the mutual security objectives of both countries by engendering Anglo-American illwill, transferring to the US the latent Libyan hostility against the British, and creating numerous practical and technical problems.

For the present, it seems clear that the Libyan Government has no practical alternative to accepting existing UK and US arrangements. It realizes that, however much Egypt may promise Libya in the way of economic or technical help, Egypt cannot afford to match the aid Libya now receives from the West. There is no evidence and little likelihood of any Libyan inclination to turn to the Soviet Union for any kind of assistance.

Although overall Anglo-American strategic interests in Libya harmonize and although both nations favor Libyan unity, there is a divergence in emphasis in US and UK lines of action with respect to Libyan unity which stems basically from the primary strategic interest of the UK in Cyrenaica and the extensive installations of the US in Tripolitania. The UK's interest in Libyan unity, however much it may respect the principle, is secondary to its fundamental interest in ensuring the preservation of its interests in Cyrenaica. Although the UK Foreign Office is aware of the dangers inherent in the Libyan King's lack of interest in national unity, it has avoided pressure on the King while negotiating important agreements with the Libyan Government. Libyan unity is of major concern if the political isolation of Tripolitania -- where US military facilities in Libya are now located -- is to be avoided.

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