NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

- Political situation
- Economic prospects
- Military affairs
- International affairs

Central Intelligence Agency
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 5 January 1962. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 January 1962

SUBJECT: NIE 29.2-62: THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the outlook for Turkey over the next few years, with particular reference to the prospects for political stability and economic progress.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The prospects for political stability and economic progress in Turkey will depend to a large degree upon the influence of the military, which will remain the ultimate source of power in Turkey. However, the election outcome probably made the
armed forces aware that while they have high prestige with the
Turkish people, the country has no desire to be governed by the
military. (Paragraph 14)

2. It is questionable whether Turkey's present coalition
government between the Republican People's Party and the
Justice Party, which was formed as a result of strong military
pressures, can remain in office for more than a year or so. Its
collapse would not necessarily mean the end of civilian govern-
ment. However, failure of the political leaders to provide ef-
fective government -- or attempts by them to pursue policies
strongly opposed by the military -- probably would lead the
military to reassert direct control. In such an event, military
rule probably would be prolonged. (Paragraphs 11, 17, 18, 20)

3. Turkey has the natural resources necessary for sub-
stantial economic development, and progress during the postwar
period has provided Turkey with a moderate industrial base.
The new government intends to inaugurate an ambitious five-year
plan in 1963 in the hope of stimulating the economy to expand by
as much as seven percent annually. Achievement of this goal will
be dependent on optimum conditions, and we believe it more likely that the Turkish economy will grow at a rate substantially below this level. The consequent slow rise in living standards probably will lead to growing pressure for more radical social and economic policies. (Paragraphs 21, 24-26, 31-33)

4. Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials of the Western-oriented foreign policy it has pursued since World War II. As time goes by, the Turks will become more conscious of the new threat of Soviet medium range missiles, and this feeling may in the long run have some effect on their policy. Nevertheless, Turkey's basic and long-standing distrust of the Soviet Union will continue, although there may be some improvement of relations in the economic sphere. Differences between the US and Turkey are likely to arise periodically. We estimate that the Turks will continue to insist on at least some measure of joint operations of certain facilities, and could go so far as to deny to the US the use of these
facilities if they do not receive the treatment they feel they deserve as full partners in the Western alliance. However, the Turks are too aware of the Soviet threat and of their heavy dependence on the US for both protection and aid to let such differences endanger their basic relationship with the US. At the same time, Turkey is likely to seek closer ties with Western Europe to secure new markets and increased aid. (Paragraphs 38-41)

* The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this Conclusion. Though he considers that negotiations with Turkey on US base rights will be troublesome, he believes this paragraph overstates the likelihood of Turkey denying the US the use of certain facilities. Thus, he believes the Conclusion should be changed to read:

Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials of the Western-oriented foreign policy it has pursued since World War II. Turkey's basic and longstanding distrust of the Soviet Union will continue, although there may be some improvement of relations in the economic sphere. Many Turkish military leaders are convinced that the US regards its installations in Turkey as so important to the US global defense posture that Turkey will be able to extract numerous concessions from the US, and periodic differences may become more difficult to resolve. We believe the Turks are deeply aware of the Soviet threat and of their heavy dependence on the US for both protection and aid and will not intend to let such differences endanger their basic relationship with the US. However, in the course of bargaining they might impose conditions which would be extremely difficult for the US to meet. At the same time, Turkey is likely to seek closer ties with Western Europe to secure new markets and increased aid.