SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

- The Development of the Dispute
- The Forces at Work
- The Outlook for a Settlement
- Likely Developments

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 19 June 1964. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 June 1964

SUBJECT: SNE 2923-64; THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

THE PROBLEM

To examine possible lines of settlement of the Cyprus dispute, and their implications for the parties involved.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The present drift toward a de facto Greek Cypriot state cannot go much further without provoking a more serious military confrontation with the Turkish Cypriots. An independent Cyprus has come to pose the dangers of provoking an invasion by Turkey to prevent the island from falling wholly under Greek Cypriot sway or of becoming heavily Communist-influenced, and these considerations are becoming of increasing concern to the Western countries most intimately involved.

B. Any early settlement based on the hope of cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is virtually precluded by their mutual hostility.
Two remaining possibilities are enosis (union with Greece) and double enosis (division of the island between Greece and Turkey). Most Greek Cypriots favor the former, but all would be strongly opposed to the latter. Whatever Makarios' private view, he would find it difficult openly to oppose enosis. Either enosis or double enosis would make continuance of UK bases and US facilities likely. Both solutions would be opposed by the USSR and the UAR, which dislike the maintenance of Western power positions in the Levant.

C. To force a settlement and to make it work would require the support of Athens, which strongly favors enosis, and of Ankara, which advocates the double enosis solution. It is possible that both governments could accept a combination of the two approaches: i.e., a Cyprus united to Greece, but containing an area under some sort of Turkish administration. But it would be a tricky business, since both governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of military and political pressures on Inonu's minority government, Athens because for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership.

D. An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result at least for a time in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Failing a settlement, we believe that Turkey would be moved to intervene to protect the Turkish community. In this case, Greece would be prepared to send additional forces to Cyprus, perhaps waiting long enough to establish Turkey as the aggressor. In the tension and confusion, armed clashes would be likely, but both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities.