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*John F. Kennedy*  
SNIE 65-64 ADVCON  
5 August 1964

*SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS  
FOR THE  
TSHOMBE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONGO

- The Tasks Facing Tshombe
- Internal Security
- The Political Situation
- Economic Problems
- Tshombe's Foreign Policy

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency

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*Submitted by the*

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.*

*Concurred in by the*

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 5 August 1964. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 August 1964

SUBJECT: SNIE 65-64: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE TSHOMBE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONGO

THE PROBLEM

To examine the prospects for the Tshombe government during the next six to nine months.\*

CONCLUSIONS

A. In recent months, regional dissidence and violence have assumed serious proportions even by Congolese standards, and produced the threat of a total breakdown in governmental authority. The difficulties confronting Prime Minister Tshombe are enormous. His greatest need is a military force which can handle the various rebellions. His political position will be threatened by other aspirants to power. We think the chances are about even that he will be able to remain Prime Minister over the next six to

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\* Under the newly approved Constitution national elections are to be held during this period.

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nine months. If Tshombe is able to avoid anarchy in the Congo, he will have scored a considerable achievement, but there is little prospect of establishing a central government which will have a substantial degree of authority throughout the country.

B. Should Tshombe fall, the prospects are dark. Extremists would be likely to gain increased influence in Leopoldville, successionist regimes might break off and disorder would spread.

C. We believe Tshombe will adopt a generally pro-West orientation within the confines of a pro forma non-aligned policy. He will probably remain close to the Belgians and susceptible to their influence; we believe he will cooperate with the US. Although still suspect by many African leaders, we believe Tshombe would become generally acceptable in Black Africa if he succeeded in providing a workable solution to the Congo's problems.

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