SECRET

ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR
AND
CHINESE INTERVENTION
SUBJECT: Statement on CIA's Position on Intelligence in the Far East

1. The Director will testify if necessary before an executive session of the appropriate Congressional committee. He will point out that his responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence did not commence until 1 October. At that time there was not any substantial evidence upon which to judge an estimate that the Chinese Communists would intervene in the Korean conflict, although there was evidence of Chinese trouble concentrating north of the Yalu river.  

indications showed increased Chinese activities with the result that on 20 October a memorandum was sent to the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense indicating the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene in the Korean conflict to protect the hydro-electric dams.

2. It can be stated that the relations between the CIA and the Far Eastern command were not everything that could be desired at the time General Smith assumed the Directorship of the agency. As soon as possible thereafter, together with Mr. Allen Dulles, General Smith went to Tokyo to confer with General MacArthur and General Willoughby. Thereafter the relations with the Far Eastern command were excellent.

3. An estimate was made by the CIA of the feasibility of using The estimate came to the conclusion that such use would be of questionable military value.

4. The official responsibility of the CIA is to the National Security Council. Intelligence estimates and reports produced by the CIA
and disseminated to the appropriate executive departments including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the responsibility of these departments to
service each of their foreign field stations. In addition, CIA representatives
overseas hand any material they may collect directly to the State Department
and any U.S. military commands. On the other hand, the CIA does depend on the
executive departments for keeping it informed of the problems of its field
representatives and overseas commands.

5. No statement will be made concerning the organization or methods
used by the CIA. Public Law 253 authorizes the Director to protect his sources
of information.
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1. O.N.E. Excerpts from National Intelligence Estimates relating to the war in Korea. TAB A is a chronological list of such estimates.

2. __________________________

3. F.B.I.D. Foreign Broadcast Information Division reporting on the Korean War.

4. F.D.D. Foreign Documents Division reporting on the Korean War.

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**Approved For Release 2004/12/01: CIA-RDP79R01095A0000800010001-2**
25 April 1951

"EYES ALONE"

MEMORANDUM FOR [Name]

SUBJECT: Statement on Korean Intelligence

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the Executive Assistant to the Director for the AD/NE dated 23 April.

ENCLOSURES: 1. Briefing
2. Chronological List

1. The attached briefing and chronological list of estimates relating to the war in Korea is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of reference.

2. Your attention is particularly invited to the abstract of the Memorandum of 17 August, "Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of all Korea." Copies of this memorandum were passed by the DCI to the NCC Staff.

3. If we can assist you further, let me know.

Executive Secretary
National Estimates Board
BRIEFING AND CHRONOLOGICAL LIST

of

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA, ORE's

and

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

relating to the war in Korea

25 April 1951
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("... contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1950.")

The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.

The major external aim of the North Korean regime is to extend control over South Korea, and it is capable of continuing and increasing its support of the present program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla operations against South Korea. The program will not be sufficient to accomplish the main objective as long as US economic and military aid to South Korea is not substantially reduced or seriously dissipated.

The capability of the North Korean armed forces for both short- and long-term overt military operations is being further developed. The northern and southern Korean forces are nearly equal in terms of combat effectives, training, and leadership, but the North Koreans possess a superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft. Thus, even as presently constituted, North Korea's
armed forces have a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against South Korea, including the capture of Seoul.

North Korea's capability for long-term military operations is dependent upon increased logistical support from the USSR. If the foreign supporters of each faction were called upon for increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that Soviet support would be withheld, and considerations of proximity and availability of such assistance would greatly favor the North Korean regime. Soviet assistance to North Korea, however, would probably not be in the form of direct participation of regular Soviet or Chinese Communist military units, except as a last resort.

Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lacking the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist military units, would be able to gain effective control over all of southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist attitude of the southern Koreans; (2) a continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of trained administrators and technicians.
Current Military Situation. Trained and equipped units of the Communist "People's Army" are being deployed southward in the area of the 38th Parallel. "People's Army" and Border Constabulary units there equal or surpass the strength of southern Korean army units similarly deployed. Tanks and heavy artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent months.

Current estimates place the strength of the "People's Army" (PA) at 66,000 men (including 16,000 ex-Manchurian troops) organized into at least three infantry divisions and an independent brigade. The PA's critical arms include: (1) an armored unit, estimated to possess 65 Soviet T-34 tanks; (2) divisional artillery units equipped with 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers; and (3) anti-aircraft units in the border regions. The 20,500-man Border Constabulary, which is also being expanded with ex-Manchurian levies, is nominally a paramilitary force and was previously armed with Japanese weapons. It has been trained to infantry standards, however, and has now been re-equipped with Soviet weapons.

According to current accepted estimates the Air Force consists of an air regiment of 1,500 men, including 150 pilots,
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equipped with 35 YAK-9 and/or IL-10 fighters... This estimate may be subject to an upward revision in the near future. The North Korean navy performs mainly as a coast guard force; its strength is estimated at 5,100 men. There is a marine unit, of undetermined function, numbering approximately 5,400.

Morale in the armed forces is generally good. At the present time the North Korean armed forces are probably psychologically prepared to fight wholeheartedly against South Korean troops.

The northern Korean armed forces depend almost wholly on the USSR for logistic support. They are entirely the product of Soviet planning, and depend heavily on the large Soviet military mission for training at higher command levels and for tactical advice down to the battalion level.

28 June 1950 DM-300: The USSR and the Korean Invasion

The invasion of South Korea was undoubtedly undertaken at Soviet direction and Soviet material support is unquestionably being provided. It is estimated that the USSR will seek to localize the Korean conflict. The USSR will probably provide support to North Korea short of open participation by Soviet
forces in an attempt to perpetuate the civil war and maintain North Korean positions south of the 38th Parallel. In the probable event that this attempt proves impossible, the situation might well develop into indecisive and intermittent hostilities stabilized at approximately the 38th Parallel. Meanwhile, the USSR will continue to provide substantial material aid to the North Koreans, including irregulars recruited from Chinese Communists and Soviet forces.

8 July 1950 IM-302: Consequences of the Korean Incident

There are at present four major alternative courses of action open to the USSR in connection with the Korean conflict. They are:

A. To localize the Korean fighting, permitting US forces to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel, and to refrain from creating similar incidents elsewhere. Meanwhile, to develop the propaganda themes of US aggression and imperialistic interference in domestic affairs of an Asiatic Nation.

B. To localize the Korean fighting, still refrain from creating similar incidents elsewhere, but (in order to
prolong US involvement in Korea) to give increasing material aid to the North Koreans, and perhaps to employ Chinese Communist troops, either covertly or overtly. The USSR would remain uncommitted in Korea, and would develop the propaganda themes as in alternative A.

C. To attempt to disperse and perhaps overstrain US military forces-in-readiness by creating a series of incidents similar to the Korean affair in other parts of the world. Meanwhile the fighting in Korea would be prolonged as in alternative B.

D. Immediately to attack the US and its allies.

It is estimated that the USSR is most likely to adopt alternative B. If conditions appear favorable to Soviet leaders, after pursuing this course of action for a few weeks or months, they may well shift to alternative C.
ten to eleven divisions (11,000 men per division). There is in the Far East a sufficient bomber force for large-scale air attack on Japan. It is uncertain, however, whether the surface vessels of the Soviet naval forces in the Far East can give adequate naval support for an amphibious operation against Japan. No effort is made in this paper to estimate Soviet intentions.

This paper contains a brief estimate of Soviet military strength in the Far East.

10 July 1950 IM-301: Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of US Forces from Korea

Voluntary withdrawal of US forces from Korea would be a calamity, showing US commitments to be unreliable when severely tested, casting doubt on US military capabilities, handicapping efforts to maintain US alliances and build political influence among nations whose cooperation is needed for the containment of Communism, and probably encouraging Soviet initiation of limited wars in other areas.

2 August 1950 IM-311: Northern Korea's Dependence on Outside Supplies

A factual review of North Korea's import requirements, and
of the pattern of foreign trade by which they are fulfilled.7

19 July 1950 CIA 7-50: Review of the World Situation 25X1

Apart from the immediate strategic advantages of Communist control of all Korea, the primary aim of the USSR in instigating the attack probably was to discredit the US policy of general containment of Soviet-Communism. It amounts to a laboratory test of the advantages the USSR might gain by fighting a war of limited objectives and limited liabilities through the medium of puppet troops.

The efficient military performance of the invading forces in the first three weeks of battle indicates that there is little probability that the North Koreans can be quickly driven back to the 38th Parallel. The USSR can supply material aid in sufficient quantities to prolong the fighting and deeply involve the US in Korean military operations. Chinese Communist troops can be brought into action covertly and, if necessary, openly. The USSR might consider that the risk of provoking a global war was not substantial so long as no Soviet forces were openly committed.
TOP SECRET

It is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the Chinese Communists to give open military support to the Korean operations or to start a new operation elsewhere in the area. The Peiping regime almost certainly would comply with a Soviet request for military action.

4 August 1950  TM-315: Possible Soviet Use of Japanese Prisoners of War

Estimate that it is not likely that the USSR will attempt to use the Japanese prisoners of war under its control for action against Japan.

11 August 1950  TM-336: North Korean Unification Propaganda

[A report concerning the current North Korean propaganda campaign for the unification of all Korea.]

17 August 1950  Memorandum: Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of all of Korea

Although an invasion of North Korea by UN forces could, if successful, bring several important advantages to the US, it appears

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at present that grave risks would be involved in such a course of action. (1) It is doubtful that US allies and other non-Soviet nations in the UN would support such a course of action. Asian nations, particularly India, would react unfavorably, and many Asians might be convinced that the US is, after all, an aggressive nation pursuing a policy of self-interest in Asia. (2) The invading forces might become involved in hostilities with the Chinese Communists. As it became apparent that the North Koreans were being defeated in South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north of the 38th Parallel. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful at the 38th Parallel where UN members could legally discontinue their support of the US policy. (3) Inasmuch as the USSR would regard the invasion of North Korea as a strategic threat to the security of the Soviet Far East, the invading forces might become involved, either directly or indirectly, in hostilities with Soviet forces, under conditions which would alienate most of Asia from the US-UN cause in Korea.

The conquest of North Korea would not provide assurance of peace throughout the country or of true unification. Continued threats of aggression from Manchuria or the USSR would produce instability, requiring the continued presence of large numbers
of US or UN forces. Syngman Rhee and his regime are unpopular among many -- if not a majority -- of non-Communist Koreans. To establish his government throughout all Korea would be difficult, if not impossible; even if this could be done, the regime would be so unstable as to require continuing US or UN military and economic support. If a UN trusteeship were established it would be unstable. Korea once more would become the cat's paw of international politics, and its ultimate status would be dependent upon the comparative strength and ambitions of the countries whose representatives supervised the trust administration.

8 September 1950  IM-324; Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

It is estimated that the major elements of Lin Piao's 4th Field Army - totalling perhaps 100,000 combat veterans - are now in Manchuria and are probably located along or adjacent to the Korean border, in position for rapid commitment in Korea. Possibly 100,000 to 125,000 of the Military District troops in Manchuria have now been integrated into the regular Chinese Communist army and organized as combat forces. These
units probably are Soviet equipped. Approximately 210,000
Communist regulars under Nieh Jung-chen's command are pre-
sently deployed in the North China area; some of these troops
have been reported en route to Manchuria.

Military construction is in pro-
gress near Antung and along the Yalu River. Chinese Communist
aircraft are reported to have arrived at Antung.

It is evident that the Chinese Communists or the USSR
must supply trained and equipped combat replacements if the
North Korean invasion is to achieve complete control over
South Korea before the end of the year. It is clear that
intervention in Korea is well within immediate Chinese Communist
capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese Communist accusations
regarding US "aggression" and "violation of the Manchurian
border" may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move.

In view of the momentumous repercussions from such an overt
action, however, it appears more probable that the Chinese Com-
munist participation in the Korean conflict will be more
indirect, although significant, and will be limited to inte-
grating into the North Korean forces "Manchurian volunteers",
perhaps including air units as well as ground forces.
15 September 1950  IM-326: Military Supplies for North Korea

A summary account of the supplies required by the North Korean army, and of the routes by which that army is re-supplied from the USSR.

20 September 1950  CIA 9-50: Review of the World Situation

(based on information available to CIA on 15 September)

As a result of Communist seizure of control in China, the USSR has available in the Peiping regime a disciplined lieutenant capable of furthering the international Communist program of eliminating Western influence and establishing indigenous Communist governments throughout the Far East.

The concentration of Chinese Communist troops near the Korean border in Manchuria constitutes a powerful secondary reserve for the North Korean forces, which, if Moscow and Peiping should agree on it despite the attendant risks, could enter the battle and materially change its course at any time.

It is doubtful that either Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be committed south of the 38th Parallel. Moscow and Peiping are much more likely to aid the Communist cause in Korea.
by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese Communist (Manchurian "volunteer") units, perhaps including small air units, for incorporation in the North Korean forces.

12 October 1950 ORE 58-50: Critical Situations in the Far East

[A set of six estimates prepared in response to a request from the President. Of the six, the first two refer to Korea.]

A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.

The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict. There are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea. After reviewing the factors favoring, and those opposing, Chinese Communist intervention, it is concluded that "while full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision
for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans."

B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea

Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning. The Soviet Union to date has given no indication that it intends to intervene directly in Korea. However, the Soviet Government for some months has been increasingly improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as in other strategic areas.

After weighing the factors favoring, and those opposing, Soviet intervention: "It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of over-all considerations, that it is to their interest to precipitate a global war at this time."
18 October 1950  CIA 10-50: Review of the World Situation

The Soviet Korean venture has ended in failure.

The Kremlin will probably aid the North Korean Communists to hold organized defensive positions as long as possible and then to harass UN forces by employing guerrilla warfare.

There are certainly enough Chinese Communist forces readily available in Manchuria to permit military intervention on a scale sufficient to alter the course of events in Korea. Forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained Communist troops have in fact already been fighting in the North Korean army. It is becoming less and less likely, however, that Chinese Communist troop units will openly enter the battle under the flag of the Peiping regime. Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason the Peiping leaders do not think that war with the US would result from open intervention in Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not openly intervene against the UN troops in North Korea.


Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000; in Manchuria it is estimated
at 700,000 of which at least 200,000 are regular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the forces already in Korea are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (a) halting further UN advance northward, through piecemeal commitment of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by a powerful assault.

The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN troops in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil. The Chinese Communists retain full freedom of action. If they should succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in North Korea they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the military situation is stabilized they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to prevent a military decision favorable to the UN, at least until spring.

A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war. The Chinese Communists appreciate
that they have incurred grave risks of retaliation. They would probably ignore a UN ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they could and probably would enter Korea in full force, with the purpose of expelling UN forces altogether.

15 November 1950 NIE-3: Soviet Capabilities and Intentions

"With respect to the Korean situation, to date there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commit Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of general war... The probability is that the Soviet Government has not yet made a decision directly to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There is a good chance that they will not in the immediate future take such a decision."

15 November 1950 CIA 11-50: Review of the World Situation

The intervention of Chinese Communist troops in Korea demon-
strates that the USSR is willing to pursue the experiment in war-by-proxy despite a considerable risk of vastly enlarging the area of armed conflict.

By not formally announcing the objectives of their intervention, the Chinese Communists have retained full freedom of action with respect to Korea, and, depending upon UN and US reaction, can tailor the precise nature and extent of their intervention to developments.

24 November 1950 NIE-2/1: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:


b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria.

c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means, there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a minimum, the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale, unacknowledged operations designed to immobilize UN forces in
Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.

The USSR will continue to support the Chinese Communists as long as their intervention continues.

The risk that a general war will develop already exists.

27 November 1950 NIE-2/2: Soviet Participation in the Air Defense of Manchuria

In the event of UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, the USSR would provide aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and trained personnel as necessary for the defense of Manchurian targets. At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation in the defense of Manchurian targets would be actual participation
without identification. The open participation of Soviet
units would be unlikely unless general war should develop.
UN air attacks on Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause
the Soviet rulers to decide to launch a general war.

5 December 1950 NIE-ll: Soviet Intentions in the Current
Situation

Developments in Korea and Manchuria indicate that the pur-
pose of the Chinese Communist intervention is to render the UN
position in Korea untenable. The Chinese Communists have ac-
cepted the risk of general war with the US; it is highly improbable that
they would have done so without explicit assurance of effective
Soviet support.

The Soviet Union will probably (1) continue to support the
Chinese operations in Korea with materiel, technical personnel,
and even "volunteer" units, as necessary; (2) provide aircraft
and anti-aircraft artillery with trained personnel, as necessary
for the defense of targets in China against UN air attack; (3)
come openly to the support of Communist China under the terms of
the Sino-Soviet Treaty, in the event of major US (UN) operations
against Chinese territory.
The Soviet rulers must have felt ready to accept the increased risk of global war involved in the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. They must estimate that a broadening of the Korean war into a general war between the United States and China would be advantageous to the USSR. Whether or not a global war were to ensue, the USSR could reasonably hope to derive advantages from the development of a general war between the United States and Communist China.

11 December 1950 NIE-15: Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation

"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiation, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of the situation."

27 December 1950 NIE-12: Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea

\[\text{This report weighs the various factors involved in}\]

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immediately using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and concludes that the reasons against such use outweigh those in its favor. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, publishes a dissent.\)

\[11 \text{ January 1951 SE-1: } \text{International Implications of Maintaining a Beachhead in South Korea} \]

\[\text{This paper estimates and enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of holding a UN beachhead in South Korea.}\]

\[17 \text{ January 1951 NIE-10: } \text{Communist China} \]

A general paper on Communist China, with the following remarks relevant to the Korean situation:

"The scale of the Chinese Communist operations in Korea and the unwillingness of the Chinese Communists to discuss a diplomatic settlement except on their own terms indicate that they intend to drive UN forces out of Korea; they have already committed a large proportion of their best troops for this purpose, and are prepared to commit additional forces."
"The continued maintenance of UN military operations in Korea would result in a significant drain on the Chinese Communists, would pin down a large portion of their crack troops and reduce their war-making capabilities elsewhere..."
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<td>International Implications of Maintaining a Beachhead in South Korea</td>
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<td>17 January 1951</td>
<td>NIE-10</td>
<td>Communist China</td>
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FBID reported:

3 August, USSR Survey
In late July there was a revival of pre-Korean war charges that the U.S. harbored hostile intentions toward all of Asia.

10 August, USSR Survey
Moscow emphatically claims that American intervention in Korea constitutes aggression since the hostilities are a "civil war."

17 August, USSR Survey
Peking does not exploit the "civil war argument."

31 August, USSR Survey
There is a declining volume of attention to the Korean war but increasing attention to America's aggressive intentions toward all of Asia. Moscow insists that the Korean war is but a stepping stone to further aggression while Peking notes that America wants to widen the sphere of aggression.

8 September, USSR Survey
American efforts to keep China out of the Korean war are ignored by both Peking and Moscow. The 27 August raid on Antung is said to be a premeditated, provocative act.

14 September, USSR Survey
The shooting down of the Soviet plane receives only moderate propaganda treatment but there are continuing and frequent hints concerning the American intention to enlarge the sphere of aggression to include all the people of Asia.

21 September, USSR Survey
There is little attention to U.N. consideration of Peking's charges of American aggression against China and there is continuing and concentrated denunciation of American aggression from Peking. Moscow reiterates that the U.S. is starting a third world war in Korea.

10 October, Special Report on Soviet broadcasts on the war
Radio Moscow has been unwilling at any time to commit its propaganda to a North Korean victory. It has not predicted a Korean victory in specific terms or talked about Korean strength in a way which would involve a serious loss of face or a commitment of Soviet material support.

18 October, USSR Survey
Chou En-lai's bitter rejection of American aggression and his claim that China will not "supinely tolerate" such aggression is publicized without any indication from either Peking or Moscow of what steps will be taken.
23 October, Special Report for the President

PRAVDA ignores President Truman's appeal to the Chinese people and Peking speaks of "euphemisms" about American friendship for China.

1 November, USSR Survey

Moscow continues to document charges that America is the "worst enemy" of the Chinese people.

8 November, Far East Survey

In the week 31 October to 6 November Chinese broadcasts increase their denunciations of American aggression in a ratio of five to one. There is an unprecedented attempt to convince the Chinese people that "the blood debt" to Korea must be paid and that the U.S. can be defeated.

15 November, USSR Survey

Moscow justifies Chinese participation by elaborating on the closeness to China's borders of America's aggressive actions and by dwelling on the charge that U.S. aggression in Korea is really directed at China.

22 November, Trends and Highlights

Moscow avoids military events and gives little attention to the Chinese delegation at the U.N. It does not commit itself or that delegation to any particular course of action nor indicate that there is a threat of general war.

6 December, Trends and Highlights

PRAVDA's exploitation of President Truman's threat to China and general attacks on American aggression in Korea bring attention to the war to a record breaking 51 percent of all comment.

7 December, Far East Survey

Peking gives little heed to President Truman's "saber rattling" statement of 30 November and continues its attacks on American aggression. There is no departure from the claim that only volunteers are fighting in Korea.

14 December, USSR Survey

Moscow ignores the possibility of a negotiated settlement and continues to talk of expanded American aggression.

20 December, Trends and Highlights

U.N. mediation efforts are ignored and atrocity propaganda is emphasized in Soviet broadcasts.

21 December, Far East Survey

Peking says mediation efforts are an American directed maneuver and widely publicizes Delegate Wu's denunciation of American hostility.

5 January, Far East Survey

Peking continues to endorse Chou En-lai's rejection of U.N. negotiation efforts. There is no attempt to exploit a victory situation.

11 January, USSR Survey

Moscow vehemently rejects the U.N. resolution branding China an aggressor and contrasts U.S. hostility toward China with Soviet friendliness.
8 February, USSR Survey  
Chou's caustic rejection of the U.N. resolution is hailed but Pravda is less categoric in its rejection.

14 February, Trends and Highlights  
U.N. negotiation efforts continue to be ignored.

21 February, USSR Survey  
The Sino-Soviet treaty is commemorated in elaborations on its economic and political significance. Moscow goes to great lengths to identify the U.S. as the enemy of China.

21 February, USSR Survey  
Despite the large volume of broadcast time devoted to underscoring Stalin's interview there is little stress on his temperately-worded references to American fighting ability and the references to a settlement in Korea are not mentioned. Moscow continues to charge the U.S. with slandering China and to ignore the mediation committees.

28 February, Trends and Highlights  
Two indicators of possible Sino-Korean tension appear in Moscow broadcasts for the first time since November; Pyongyang also suggests such tension in stressing the cordiality of Sino-Korean relations.

7 March, Trends and Highlights  
Moscow's attention veers away from military events but the certainty of a Korean victory is reiterated.

8 March, USSR Survey  
Moscow's attention to the Korean war continues to be low in volume and defensive in tone. Soviet broadcasts make conventional references to the ultimate victory of the Korean cause but do not elaborate on the predictions.

14 March, Trends and Highlights  
Moscow gives minimal attention to the military situation and ignores the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

15 March, Far East Survey  
Peking overlooks the actual hostilities and attempts instead to make propaganda capital out of Stalin's declaration concerning a settlement. American atrocities are highlighted.

22 March, USSR Survey  
There is marked attention to Soviet-Korean friendship in its economic and cultural manifestations and to the propriety of the USSR's support of the Korean cause; but there is no attempt to commit the Soviet Union to any specific course of action. American hostility toward the OPR continues to be documented.

28 March, Trends and Highlights  
General MacArthur's 23 March bid for a field truce is ignored. Moscow's continued declarations that the Korean cause will be victorious remain detached and there is no commitment to concrete Soviet and OPR aid. The Soviet is more pointed in prodding of the Koreans to reconstruct their economy and supply the fighting forces.
29 March, Far East Survey

Peking makes a definite attempt to establish "the high degree of fraternal love, unity, and mutual assistance" between the Chinese and Korean fighters.

4 April, Trends and Highlights

Moscow ignores the question of a field truce or a negotiated settlement and makes frequent reference to Stalin's pronouncement that the West must accept Peking's terms.

5 April, USSR Survey

Moscow ignores the military situation, claiming that American military strength is a myth, and concentrates on convincing the Koreans that their cause is receiving wide support. But it scrupulously avoids the question of more than spiritual support from the USSR.

19 April, USSR Survey

Moscow's current concentration on American responsibility for the war seems intended to capitalize on the reportedly growing American opposition to the war. The theme has recurred throughout the nine months of the war but now receives marked publicity. Moscow continues to remind the Koreans that other countries are also engaged in liberating themselves from capitalist exploitation.
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
19 August 1950

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

THRU : 

TO : 

1. Your action in conjunction with the Far East Air Forces Intelligence Team operating in Korea during the period 30 June - 13 July 1950, have been brought to my attention.

2. Your ingenuity and tireless effort in the collection and transmission of intelligence vital to the Far East Air Forces, was a contributing factor which enabled the Far East Air Forces to intelligently plan and execute devastating air strikes against the enemy.

3. On several occasions you carried out extensive reconnaissance missions with utter disregard for your own personal safety. These missions resulted in the clarification of friendly troop dispositions and in locating enemy positions that soon became the targets of air attack.

4. The excellent cooperation and team work that existed between your group and the Far East Air Force group enabled the accomplishment of a mission well done, and was made possible, to a large extent, through your efforts.

5. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take this opportunity to commend you for your splendid performance. Your actions stand as a tribute to our country and a credit to your service.

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force  
Commanding

C O P Y
25X1

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925

19 August 1950

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

THRU:

TO:

1. Your commendable actions in conjunction with the Far East Air Forces Intelligence Team in Korea during the period 29 June - 18 July 1950 has been brought to my attention.

2. The skillful application of your knowledge of radio plus your tireless effort, often requiring that you work round the clock, enabled the team to make available to Far East Air Forces a large volume of information amounting to as much as 9000 groups per 24 hour period. This information had a very direct bearing upon Far East Air Forces air operations during the first two weeks of the conflict.

3. In spite of enemy activity that required that your station be moved several times under conditions of extreme difficulty, and required that you destroy most of your equipment, you succeeded in maintaining radio contact with the outside when all others failed. For a period of several weeks you were the only secure means of communication. This was accomplished largely through the efforts of yourself and one other man. A great responsibility was placed upon your shoulders, and you rose nobly to the occasion.

4. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take this opportunity to commend your actions. Your actions are a tribute to our country and a credit to your service.

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3. The fact that you often worked around the clock to the detriment of your own health and well being, eventually resulting in your collapse from sheer exhaustion, is an act of devotion of the highest order.

4. The excellent cooperation and team work that existed between your group and the Far East Air Forces group enabled the accomplishment of a mission well done, and was made possible to a large extent through your efforts.

5. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take this opportunity to commend you for your splendid performances. Your actions stand as a tribute to our country and a credit to your service.

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