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
13 December 1974

to

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Importance of the Chilean Solidarity Movement in Europe

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1. You recently asked that we look into the importance of the Chilean Solidarity Movement (CSM) in Europe and what might be done about it. The question arose when Arnold Silver suggested that it constituted a serious vulnerability for the US which should be countered by US moves to cut off aid to Chile and otherwise clearly disavow the junta. The Congress may have already ameliorated the problem by the House move this week to cut off aid to Chile, but the problem will not thereby disappear.

2. In response to your request:

a. I asked DDO [redacted] to prepare a wrapup of the facts about the CSM in Europe (copy attached).

b. I convened a session of DDI analysts, together with [redacted] of DDO, to discuss the problem in the light of the DDO paper.

3. The discussion led to the following conclusions:

a. The Chile question is popular journalistic stuff all over Europe and it is true enough to say that it has replaced Vietnam as a convenient means of focusing anti-US sentiment. It offers a common ground for communists, socialists and left-to-moderate Christians and liberals to come together on an issue -- when they can agree on little else.

b. It is also an embarrassment to our friends in public and official quarters, and there is no respectable voice, public or official, actively willing to defend.

c. Whether measured as a rallying point for disparate groups, or as a public impact issue, it is most significant in Portugal, Greece, Italy and Sweden; least so in Britain and West Germany; France is in between.

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d. But measurements of impact are very imprecise. It should be noted that:

- Except for Sweden, no European government has shown itself actively exercised about US policy toward Chile, and certainly none has exerted any strong or recurrent pressure on the US to do anything.
- In all cases, it is local considerations that determine whether the communists, socialists and others come together or stay apart. Considered as a platform for building a broad anti-US coalition, the Chile issue is unique and marginal in that it does not have impact much beyond the issue itself.
- Offsetting the near-universal disapproval of US policy toward Chile, but much less publicized, is the lesson drawn in some quarters that Chile shows the folly of communists pushing too far or too fast for control. The Chilean lesson is central to the PCI's current "historic compromise" and "soft opposition" strategy, and is no doubt reflected in the USSR's general line of advising European communists to go slow and avoid risks.
- In Greece and especially in Portugal, fears that Chile shows what the US might do to them are no doubt sharpened by the CSM's activities, but would also no doubt be there if the CSM did not exist. They are the result of circumstances having nothing to do with Chile, and will grow or diminish for reasons having nothing to do with Chile.

4. These caveats should not be read as arguments against the US doing what it can to limit damage in Europe over Chile. Congressional action this week will help, though the credit will not go to the Administration. Apart from the aid question, there seems no reason why the US should not come on stronger in deploring any brutalities of which the junta is guilty. This could be done without public mea culpas over the question of covert action capabilities.

5. But one should not hold out hope that the CSM would cease anti-US attacks or go away. The historical record -- including

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distortions and exaggerations -- is there, and an ostentatious switch on this issue, given what has been publicly said by the President and the Secretary, would probably not persuade those disposed to believe the worst. It would certainly not end the CSM's propaganda efforts. It would, however, help our friends to defend us better in public and private, and would remove an irritant with the neutrals, most notably the Swedes.

6. It would be marginal in its impact, case by case, compared to what the US can do on far more critical issues with key countries. Thus an ounce of help to Greece on Cyprus, or of aid to Portugal, would no doubt be worth a pound of gestures over the Chile issue in the country concerned.

7. Finally, and quite apart from the merits and morals of US policy toward Chile, is the matter of US ability to keep intelligence secrets. Some of our European friends, no matter how they feel about the junta and US policy toward it, have been appalled at the fact that US operational secrets become public in the US press. This gives them concern about working with us. They would be helped by some persuasive assurance that the USG can still keep secrets. This is, of course, no news to you.

8. If you agree with the argument herein, it would be easy to adapt this memorandum to become a note to HAK from you. I suggest that nothing short of that level would do any good.



National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

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Remarks:

Many thanks -
 Let's let it rest -

J